1. 1. Ian M Malis
2. 2. Malis 2 The Algerian Civil War (1991-2002) provides a good case study of political reforms by begging the question when might a government offer concessions? Sparked by a multifaceted Islamists movement vying for political inclusion and a military regime unwilling to relinquish power, the dynamism of this case lends itself to a theoretical framework that focuses on negotiation and transition away from conflict. This is because any fruitful argument for such a process must account for divergent interests within the regime and opposition. Guillermo ODonnell and Philippe Schmitter present a worthwhile framework that examines when and why a government will offer concessions to an opposition group by accounting for diverging interests within the regime and opposition. This paper will do the following things. First, it will briefly define key concepts necessary to understanding the theoretical framework by ODonnell and Schmitter. Second, it will use these concepts in relation to the Algerian case. Particularly, this paper will divide the conflict into three periodsthe years prior to the conflict (1989-1992), the period of extended violence that make up most of the civil war (1992-Rome Accords-1999), and the reconciliatory years (1999-2000s). Does the framework provided stand up when viewed across these periods? How can the Algerian case improve on the framework discussed? The virtue of ODonnell and Schmitters conclusions will depend on how we answer these two questions. First, Schmitter and ODonnell define transition as the interval between one political regime and another (6). The Algerian Civil War is an interesting case of regime transition because it encompasses both a move towards pluralism and a reversion to authoritarianism. However, according to ODonnell and Schmitter, both moves can mostly be explained by domestic, internal factors. They assert there is no transition whose beginnings is not the consequencedirect or indirectof important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself,
3. 3. Malis 3 principally along the fluctuating cleavages between hard-liners and soft-liners (19). Hard-liners want to hold on to power at all cost. As ODonnell and Schmitter state, they believe the perpetuation of authoritarian rule is possible and desirable (16). Hardliners are willing to deploy various methods to maintain power. Sometimes, they might exercise their military capacity and impose severe repression towards regime opposition. Other times, they might tactfully erect a faade behind which they can maintain their state power (16). Either way they are unwilling to relinquish power. Alternatively, soft-liners within the regime will have an increasing awareness that they might have to implement some degree of compromise in the near future to remain in power; often achieved by some form of electoral legitimation (16). The overarching concept involved in determining the makeup of individual actors within the regimeeither as a hard-liner or as soft- lineris uncertainty. The hardliners fear that the transition and political democracy will result in the destruction of the status-quo and are prepared to force at any cost a return to the good-old- times of order, social peace, and respect for authority (24). Alternatively, the soft-liners might see cooperation as a means to keep alive the hope that they will eventually be able to control the process and protect their interest (25). The differing positions on transition and reform as illustrated by the distinction between hard-liners and soft-liners lead us to the next concept, liberalization. Defined as the process of redefining and extending rights, liberalization often includes the freedom from punishment for expression of collective dissent from government policy, freedom from punishment for expression of the means of communication, and freedom to associate voluntarily with other citizens (7). Benefactors of liberalization programs typically are the opposition groups seeking concessions and the soft-liners within the regime who, as mentioned earlier, are more open to
4. 4. Malis 4 retaining power through pluralist reform. Another outcome stemming from liberalization is that the opposition can become fragmented into factions that are extremist or moderate in their opinion towards the regime. The extremists are similar to the hardliners of the regime in that they refuse to participate in negotiations because they view compromise as harmful to their interests. They might interpret reform as a false-promise, disillusioned by past actions of the regime, or they can be simply too angry at the actions committed by the regime that, even if negotiations would be beneficial to their interests, they would rather continue to fight. Alternatively, the moderates while still frustrated with the regimesee negotiation as beneficial to transition and are willing to make concessions at the bargaining table in order to secure a quicker resolution. So when do incumbent authoritarian regimes decide to negotiate with the opposition? According to ODonnell and Schmitter, this process takes place when soft-liners and moderates are able to come together and cooperate towards ending the conflict. This infers that there is already a split within the regime and the soft-liners are willing to begin negotiation with moderates rather than continuing to fight. Moreover, it infers that these soft-liners are prepared to depart from the hardliners in the regime and sacrifice their safety in order to negotiate with the opposition. Lastly, soft-liners must also have enough power to be able to speak on behalf of the whole government. Similarly, the moderates of the opposition must be willing to lay down their arms and come to the negotiation table. This infers that they, too, are prepared to depart from the extremist opposition and sacrifice their safety to be able to speak with the regime. However, this also means the moderates must appear to the regime as strong enough to speak on behalf of the opposition. Without the perception of force, the soft-liners risk being labeled a support of the state and become open to attacks from the extremists. They also risk losing credibility with regime as a legitimate force of contention. The same risk applies for the soft-liners in the regime.
5. 5. Malis 5 Lastly, there has to be enough trust between both parties that negotiations will not fall apart and that whatever deal determined would be upheld. The delicate balance between force and trust on both sides (regime and opposition) creates pronounced uncertainty during a transition, particularly during instances of negotiation. According to ODonnell and Schmitter, the regime tends to have, at least at the beginning of the transition, a strong hand in relation to the opposition. If the opposition refuses to play according to the regimes rules, they will simply cancel the game and return to the authoritarian status quo ante (24). Therefore, the framework argues that the moderatespreferring to avoid the worse outcomewill agree to play the game and accept less-than-ideal reform. Conversely, extremists are more willing to risk a showdown with the regime than to accepting such a self- limited outcome (24). The conceptual framework illustrates the frailty of regime transition. During conflict, rifts within both the regime and the opposition create uncertainty and complicate the process of negotiation. Much like a game of poker, each side is trying to appear both powerful and trustworthy so that they can maximize the potential outcome. With this in mind, how does the conceptual framework hold up when placed in conjunction with the Algerian Civil War? As we will see, the strength of the argument varies depending on the period being discussed. Economic Crisis, Social Cleavages, and Liberalization Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, many saw Algeria as a promising Middle Eastern country bound for modernization and development. Gaining independence from France through a bloody war from 1954 to 1962, Algeria was praised for assembling a seemingly successful socialist economy with development potential. Proof of its potential during the 1960s and 1970s was its leadership in the Group of 77 (G77) (Takeyh 62). The system adopted after independence
6. 6. Malis 6 was a mixture of the party, the administration, and the army. However, the militarycontent to remain behind the sceneshas always been the real power in the Algerian political system. Perhaps the first display of its military authority was when the army brought Ahmed Ben Bella to power as the first president in 1962. Three years later, in a military coup led by Minister of Defense Houari Boumedienne, President Ben Bella was ousted from office. In 1979, the military played power broker again following a disagreement over Boumedienne's successor, eventually selecting FLN candidate Chadli Bendjedid as the countrys third president. Noticeably, the FLN was simply a smokescreen to the militarys interests. For much of the 1970s, the party-regime controlled all aspects of legal political activity. Formal political opposition was banned and those who did not conform to the law were punished (Bouandel 4). However, the political landscape of Algeria began to show signs of distress as political, social, and cultural cleavages within Algerian society emerged in the mid-1980s. The countrys reliance on the broader petroleum market to fund its socialist programs came under threat as oil prices collapsed (Takeyh 63). The following brief overview of the oil collapse shows just how drastic the situation stood. In 1973-74, the real price of crude oil more than tripled. After declining slightly in 1975-78, it doubled again in 1979-80. But the 1979-80 price increase was eroded between 1981 and 1985, as price declined by nearly 40 percent. Price then collapsed in the first half of 1986, falling by more than 50 percent (Gately 238). Moreover, the states failure to diversify its markets integrated with a growing educated-youth base. As Takeyh states, In any developing society, by far the most difficult challenge for the state is not managing the poor but controlling the aggrieved intelligentsia whose aspirations remain unfulfilled (Takeyh 63). Faced with marginalization and underemployment, many Algerians sought Islam as an escape.
7. 7. Malis 7 Reeling from falling oil and gas prices in 1988 and a middle-class who were beginning to take to the street and protest under the banner of Islam, the party-regime pursued economic and political solutions in the form of liberalization. Many social-welfare services and subsidies that were eating up state resources were cut. The effect of this liberalization, however, was an increase in public dissent. Used to receiving these services under the socialist regimes of prior, many citizens disagreed with the abolishment of these safety nets, especially since the liberalization disproportionately hurt the working-class and the poor. By October 1988, a large portion of the population could no longer buy basic essential goods and bread riots spread throughout Algeria. This opposition was met by fierce suppression from the military (Takeyh 66). Faced with the dilemma concerning its willingness to repress, the party-regime implemented further political liberalization in hopes of subduing the opposition. On November 3, 1988, the Algerian Constitution was amended to allow parties other than the ruling FLN. For the first times in its history, Algeria witnessed a relatively free political atmosphere with a flourishing press, competitive political parties, and intense debate on the direction of the state (Takeyh 66). Joining this political debate was the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)founded on February 18, 1989who was dedicated to displacing the existing ruling system. Its main constituents included the bereaved urban-middle classthe small merchants, the civil servants, the first-generation graduateswho had taken to the streets during the previous riots (Takeyh 66). From first glance, Algeria appeared to be transitioning towards a pluralist society through the apparent acceptance of political reform by both the party-regime and the emerging opposition groups. However, a closer examination at the actions of the regime and rhetoric of the opposition during this period of political liberalization reveal how precarious this impression actually was.
8. 8. Malis 8 Algeria: 19891992 During the primary period of political liberalizationbetween 1989 and 1992various strategies were employed by the Islamist opposition in order to gain public support. In Tragedy of Errors Mohammed M. Hafez delineates four periods where the Islamists strategies were distinct. From 1989-91 there was a period of accommodation and limited militancy, in May and June 1991 there was escalating militancy, from June 1990 to December 1991 there was a moderation and retreat from confrontation, and then from 1992 onwards, there was violent insurgency. Turning our focus to the first three periods (the fourth will be detailed later in the paper), the strategies implemented during each phases were a direct product of how the regime used repression and liberalization. These two conceptsrepression and liberalizationcan be understood as opposing forces and a regime must be careful in how it exercises each. Inappropriate use of either could spell disaster for the regime. Repression could further embolden your opposition by fostering anti-regime sentiments. Liberalization could give the opposition the false hope of taking power through democratic processes. Alternatively, when used effectively, both can result in the regimes conservation of state power. Beginning with the first phase (1989-1991), we can begin to see two groups emerging within the Islamist movement. The FIS presented the public with two faces, one moderate and the other radical. Abbasi al-Madani, the principle leader of the FIS, was the moderate face and sought to reassure the public of FISs good intentions and moderate message, particularly when it came to issues of democracy and individual liberties (Hafez 310). Despite preferring a government based on al-shura (Islamist tradition for consultation) to democracy, Madani saw no conflict between Islam and democratic procedures stating, Pluralism is a guarantee of the cultural wealth and diversity needed for development. Democracy as we understand it means
9. 9. Malis 9 pluralism, choice, and freedom (Takeyh 67). The FIS deputy leader, Ali Benhadj, another longstanding Islamists advocate, had more radical opinions and on several occasions had denounced democracy, the state, and opponents of Islam in public speeches. Further evidence can be seen in his statement regarding majority rule where he asserts, The truth is not decided by the majority even if the latter were Muslims but is represented by adopting the divine truth, even if we alone do so (Hafez 311). Replicating the stances of its two leaders, the actions of the FIS supporters fluctuated between militancy and moderation. Two moments capture the balancing act characteristic of the first phase: a march in April 1990 and a demonstration against the Gulf War in 1991. On April 20, 1990, the FIS held a landmark demonstration that brought together between six hundred and eight hundred thousand people to march in silence (Hafez 311). The march was both an act of defiance and an act of discipline. Scheduled on the same day as a FLN march against the political use of mosques by Islamists, the FIS march was seen as a move to embarrass the regime due to the inability of the state to match its level of participation. However, the silent demonstration also intended to combat the charges of Islamist violence espoused by the state. By remaining silent, the FIS showed its commitment for political inclusion (Hafez 311). On January 18, 1991, the FIS and some other parties organized a mass demonstration against the US-led coalition preparing to liberate Kuwait. With nearly four hundred thousand people participating in the demonstration, the rhetoric was destined to be multidimensional. Radicals, led by Benhadj, did express their militancy calling for jihad and demanded the state to open training camps for volunteers to fight the new crusaders in Iraq (Hafez 311). Even still, much of the actions of the FIS during the first phase were not revolutionary in nature and, in general, the demonstrations were peaceful. Although militancy did play a role in obtaining
10. 10. Malis 10 public support, the FIS also tried to garner support through the extension of social services (Hafez 312). In short, the FIS relied on multiple sources of support and was neither moderate nor radical in full. However, in the following months (May-June 1991), the FIS began to demonstrate more fervently in the streets. The voice had shifted towards greater militancy than before with the FIS now using protests, rallies, and public prayers, as an open expression of dissent with the FLN regime. In May 1991, militant rhetoric by the FIS had reached its height. The FLN had implemented several electoral laws that directly impacted the substantive power of the FIS in politics (one of which being the ban on electoral propaganda in mosques). Clearly enacted to benefit the ruling FLN, the FIS responded by calling for a general and unlimited strike (Hafez 314). Signs reading Down with Chadli adorned the streets. The strike extended into June, diffusing into a series of rallies and occupations of public squares. These were met by a series of clashes with the military and mass arrests and several deaths and injuries came as an additional consequence. Both Madani and Benhadj were charged with fomenting, organizing, and conspiring against the state and the state was put under the status of siege, making political demonstrations momentarily illegal (Hafez 314). Frustrated by the FLNs attempts to diminish substantive power, the FIS sought to bypass the increasingly hostile state by relying on its mobilization capacity (Hafez 315). Additionally, in the years prior (first phase), the state showed no sign of repressing public demonstrations that were largely peaceful in nature. This gave the impression that as long as the FIS did not engage or advocate violence it was given a free pass. This was clear in the two large demonstrations in 1990. As Hafez puts it, Advocates of escalation within the FIS thought they could get away with non-violent, extra-institutional militancy (Hafez 316).
11. 11. Malis 11 Taken aback by the crackdown but wanting to remain a legitimate actor, the FIS implemented several moderation measures in response to the events of June. First, in July 1991, prominent members met in Batna, Algeria for a Loyalty conference. The question of where to go from here was floated around and a loose consensus was formed. The FIS wanted to continue the path towards electoral legitimacy. Additional moderation measures included the suspension of Said Mekhloufi and Qameredin Kharban, two radical advocates, from the party. The freeze on their membership was meant to show the regime that the FIS would not tolerate militancy and violence. Abdelkader Hachani, the provisional leader of the FIS, also moderated the voice of the party by waiting to organize rallies until the state had made it legal to so (Hafez 316). Their strategy appeared to have worked enough because in December 1991, the first round of parliamentary elections began. After examining the years prior to the 1991 elections, it becomes clear that the degree of militancy in the FIS varied across time and can be partly explained by the degree of system accessibility and the nature of state repression. As ODonnell & Schmitter assert, movement along these lines [liberalization], however, sporadic and uneven, constitutes an important departure from the usual practice of authoritarian regimes (7). The liberalization of the late 1980s and the lack of repression by the state during the first phase, gave the FIS the perception of political freedom. As Adam Przeworski states, such movements have the effect of lowering the costsreal and anticipatedof individual expression and collective action (7). However, since the state allowed for the FIS to mobilize with very little reprisalas seen by the April 1990 demonstration and the Gulf War protestthere was no deterrent for the FIS to moderate the radical tone. Had the state cracked down and selectively punished militant rhetoric, the FIS would have been forced to take a stance on where it stood on the spectrum of militancy.
12. 12. Malis 12 Sticking with our poker metaphor from earlier, the FIS had no reason to fold its hand because the regime was checking every move. Testing the waters, the FIS slow-played and accommodated the regime. Had the regime pressed the action earlier on, it is likely the FIS would have settled and accepted a less-than ideal outcome. But as time passed, the FIS decided to increase the pot and place larger and larger bets; slowing escalating its militancy. It felt confident doing so because it perceived the state as either having a weak hand (willing to compromise/liberalize) or unwilling to go all-in (full out repression) and risk losing the game. However, seeing how large the pot had become, the regime decided it needed to crack down on the extra-institutional activities and militant rhetoric. Sticking with the terminology, the crackdown was a late raise by the regimecalling the FIS bet. Not only did they arrest thousands of individuals, including Madani and Benhadj, the military shut down the FISs newspapers. The message was sent loud and clear, the state would only tolerate those who maintain their opposition off the streets (318). The FISs desire for political inclusion and its optimism concerning the upcoming elections links closely to our theoretical framework. According to ODonnell & Schmitter, regime opponents, provided they believe they have some chance of gaining representation, have strong incentives to cooperate with the regimes soft- liners, if only to guarantee that elections will be held (58). Algeria: 1992Rome Accords This was indeed the position the FIS took after the military cracked down. Fearful that the regime would end the game but still hopeful that it could still win the hand, the FIS moderated its voice and opted for accommodation from July 1991 to January 1992; long enough for the parliamentary elections to begin. Unfortunately, unbeknownst to the FIS, this game of poker was on the verge of a sudden halt. On December 21, 1991, the FIS participated in the
13. 13. Malis 13 national parliamentary elections winning 188 out of 430 national assembly seats in the first round. The military, foreseeing another electoral defeat for the FLN, performed a coup dtat throwing President Benjedid from office and declaring a state of emergency. The FIS leadership initially sought a political solution to the crisis and rallied the FLN and Socialists Forces Front (FSS) to challenge the constitutionality of the coup (Hafez 318). Shortly after the coup, the military established the High State Committee (HCE) and banned the FIS, sending its leaders Madani and Benhadj to twelve years in prison. In addition, the military opened up five internment camps in the middle of the Sahara desert. There more than 10,000 known or suspected FIS supporters were deported over the next half-year. Even after all of this, there were still FIS leaders willing to seek a political solution based on a return to elections (320). For others, the coup signaled the end of the states legitimacy of power and over the next few years insurgents organized into numerous armed groupsthe most prominent being the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) (Hafez 319). The GIA was constituted by the most radical elements and included other extremist actors that had opted to stay outside the FIS apparatus from 1989 to 1991 due to their admonishment of democracy and the electoral process (Hafez 319). The AIS materialized a little later, officially formed in July 1994, and represented the armed wing of the FIS. Despite them both being radical Islamist groups, differences in ideology developed. The AIS believed that violence be used as a last resort and that violence would not resolve the Algerian crisis (Takeyh 70). Rather, its use of violence was directed at pressuring the military regime to release the FIS leaders, rehabilitate the FIS as a legitimate political party, and reinstitute the electoral process. Moreover, the AISs willingness to negotiate stood in stark contrast to that of the GIAs policy which declared no dialogue, no cease-fire, no reconciliation, and no security and guarantee with
14. 14. Malis 14 the apostate regime (319). As fighting went on, a popular saying amongst GIA insurgents was Power is within the range of our Kalashnikovs (Takeyh 70). As ODonnell & Schmitter projected, splits in both the regime and the opposition have emerged. The military, no longer seeing the FLN party as a viable cover-up for power, forces Bendjedid from office and establishes its own institutions to govern. Thus, the distinction between hard-liners and soft-liners becomes revealed. On the other side, the diverging tones of the FIS during the years leading up to the election break into distinctly separate groups. The FIS and other moderate groups are contrasted by newly formed extremists groups, such as the AIS and GIA. The Rome Accords Roughly two years into the conflict, a potential opportunity to end the violence materialized. In November 1994, the Sant'Egidio Community, a peace group affiliated with the Vatican, arranged a meeting of representatives from the FIS, the FLN, and the other opposition parties to draft a plan to end the war. Known as the Rome Accords, due to the location of the meeting, it had managed to bring over 80 percent of the vote in 1991 parliamentary election into discussion about a possible peace solution. Imprisoned FIS leaders Madani and Benhadj endorsed the meeting from their cells with Benhadj declaring if the Rome Accords led to a dialogue with the government, he would "go himself into the mountains" to get the mujahedeen (GIA) to accept the terms (Viorst 96). To this point there had not been any clear sign of the Islamic movements readiness to compromise. In January 1995, all the parties at the table signed the Rome Accords. Both secularists and Islamists made significant compromises during the negotiation. Secular parties joined the FIS in affirming the enlightened Islamic principles set forth in the
15. 15. Malis 15 1954 declaration that had launched Algerias war of liberation (Viorst 96). On the other side, the FIS also made significant concessions, agreeing to waive reinstatement of the results of the 1991 election, along with its claim to be Algerias legitimate government (Viorst 96). Moreover, all parties dismissed dictatorship in any form and guaranteed fundamental individual and collective liberties such as race, sex, and religion (Takeyh 70). On paper, the Rome Accords represented an unprecedented openness of dialogue between conflicting groups. Nevertheless, the dialogue between political leadership did not translate into an agreement between armed factions; the reason being both the GIA and the military regime refused to attend the negotiations. The Rome Accords reveal an important condition to negotiations, the necessity of power. Without power, negotiations are merely symbolic gestures that produce little in terms of actual conflict resolution. As our framework asserts, negotiation and compromise is possible when soft- liners of the regime can talk with moderates of the opposition from a position of power. Unfortunately, the Rome Accords could not produce a peaceful resolution to the crisis because, despite representing over 80 percent of the voters in 1991, the groups that possessed substantive powerthe military and the GIAwere not present. The collapse of preliminary negotiations, according to our framework, seemed to mean that both sides were subject to the veto of their hard-liners. Simply, the dialoguiste on both sides could not persuade the radicateurs to put down their arms. While our framework does acknowledge the fickleness of negotiations through its emphasis on power and trust between soft-liners and moderates, some scholars, such as Daniel Brumberg, have argued that the bargaining in transitions literature cannot really apply to cases where religious, rather than economic, actors are involved. This is because the demands of
16. 16. Malis 16 religious actors often cannot be fulfilled with negotiated compromise. He begins by reiterating the complexity of the political environment and how many factors contribute to the stability of an autocratic regime. He states, In the Arab world, a set of interdependent institutional, economic, ideological, social, and geostrategic factors has created an adaptable ecology of repression, control, and partial openness (Brumberg The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy 57). In other words, the regime can manipulate a multitude of factors to remain in power and these factors make negotiating with an autocratic regime difficult for any opposition, not just an Islamist opposition. However, the following assessment by Brumberg captures precisely the difficulties moderate Islamist activists face during negotiation and is the root of his argument. The problem with the Islamic modernists' arguments is that their project hinges on a complex and often opaque interpretive schema difficult for lay people to grasp. More crucially, many find it difficult to avoid concluding that the core values that modernists attribute to Islam come from Western political thought, and the validity of this claim is far less politically relevant than the perception that Islamic modernism is a Western project dressed in a thin Islamic garb. Why sweat through a complicated series of interpretations to conclude that Islam demands, for example, equal rights for women or equality of citizenship for Muslims and non-Muslims when it is far easier and perhaps more honest to embrace Western ideas? Islamic fundamentalists insist that a literalist reading of the Koran is the only defense against a slippery slope that will eviscerate Islamic laws of whatever distinct message God meant them to have. The efforts of Islamic modernists to advance an Islamic Reformation have been especially susceptible to such fundamentalist critiques (Brumberg Islam Is Not the Solution 100) Essentially, a policy of Islamic Reformation suffers because it greatly underestimates the political, social, and ideological obstacles required to disseminate a liberal Islamic ethos (Brumberg Islam Is Not the Solution (or the Problem 98). Moreover, both secularist autocrats and fundamentalist Islamists can invoke the above critique at the bargaining table; making it exceptionally difficult for the moderate Islamists message to be received and believed. Brumbergs argument sheds light on the Rome Accords and why it failed. Even with overwhelming representationroughly 80 percentthe deal was not agreed upon by the
17. 17. Malis 17 military or the extremist GIA. The military might have been skeptical of the moderate message, seeing it as a faade for more fundamentalist interests, and as such, chose not to be involved in the talks. The GIA could also be dissatisfied with the moderate message, believing that it is either a watered-down interpretation of Islam or a veiled form of Western democracy. Appropriately, Brumbergs argument raises concern for the likelihood of negotiated compromise when religious interests are involved. For the Algerian case, does the prospect for negotiated compromise remain bleak? In order to answer this question, our attention must be directed towards the latter half of the civil war. The Wake of the Rome Accords (19961999) The latter half of the civil war consisted of two parts. The first, from 1996 to 1999, includes the bloodiest period of the civil war. However, emerging from violence is also a cease- fore agreement in 1997. To start with, the characteristics of the violence committed gives us insight into the power of the actors involved. According to figures reported by various news sources, there were a total of ninety-one massacres between August 1996 and January 1999. The number of victims ranged between 4 and 375 but over half (48) were of forty or fewer deaths (Kalyvas 249 Table 1). The majority of the massacres took place in an area roughly 150km2 south of Algiers dubbed the triangle of death (Kalyvas 247). One might predict that the majority of the violence was committed by the regime towards the Islamist opposition and its supporters. However, the opposite was the case. There is substantial evidence that many among the deadliest massacres have been perpetrated by the Islamists guerillas, in particular the GIA (Kalyvas 253). Proof of this can be extrapolated from the selectivity of the killings. Kalyvas also asserts that most massacres in Algeria were not random (Kalyvas 253). Rather, attackers targeted specific neighborhoods and, in particular, three
18. 18. Malis 18 groups of individuals: local opponents (members of the security forces, informers, or state- sympathizers), people supporting competing guerilla organizations (such as the AIS), and former sympathizers who either switched sides, refused to help the rebels, or were about to do so (Kaylvas 254). Indeed, the most-targeted group was these former guerilla sympathizers. In just three months, between July 12 and October 12, 1997, 1690 people reportedly lost their lives in these massacres; nearly 48% of the total massacre victims (August 1996 to January 1999) (Kalyvas 256). The following quote by Antar Zouabri, the GIA leader from 1996-2000, illustrates the groups position on violence throughout the conflict: In our war, there is no neutrality except for those who are with us, all others are renegades (Takeyh 70). While on the one hand you have an increase in violence, in the form of civilian massacres predominately committed by the GIA, you also have, in 1997, a move towards reconciliation through a cease-fire agreement between the military and the AIS (signed on September 21st ). The ceasefire was made possible through several approaches applied by the AIS. First, the AIS sought to distinguish itself from the FIS, whose political leadership had been determined ineffective by the failure of the Rome Accords, and the GIA, who were far too extremist to participate in an agreement. To do so, the AIS adopted a bottom-up approach that focused on mid-level military officials and not the political leadership (Ashour 3). By contacting mid-level army officials of the National Popular Army, many of which who had blood ties with commanders of the AIS, they were able to influence the soldiers that were actually doing the fighting. Additionally, interactions between the AIS and other moderate Islamists and non- Islamists factions were important in influencing the cease-fire (Ashour 8). The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its renouncement of violence against the Egyptian regime in the 1970s greatly influenced the AIS leadership position on conflict resolution (Ashour 8). As a result,
19. 19. Malis 19 there has been an increasing trend within Islamist groups towards pro-democratic institutions and policies that focus on conjoining family law, human rights, and economic equity with a traditional focus on cultural views (Takeyh 70). Moreover, de-radicalization manifested itself in the rhetoric championed by Islamist parties. In 1997, the MSP changed its slogan from Islam is the Solution to Peace is the Solution (Boubekeur 2). The cease-fire represents a clear shift in power away from the extremists towards the moderates. Part of the reason for this shift can be seen by the characteristics of the violence. The increasingly violent tactics of the GIA that were often aimed at innocent civilians Islamist supporters show that the extremists were losing power. Defections from the GIA and other armed groups were common. This is illustrated by the extremist oppositions attempt to retain control through coercion in the form of punitive expeditions that targeted believed sympathizers. Moreover, the GIAs use of violence inevitably lost it support and essentially confined them to the fringe of political discourse whereas moderate Islamist parties were able to gradually reenter the political sphere. From this, the AIS were able to negotiate with the military to form a cease- fire agreement that began the reconciliation process. Reconciliation (19992005) While the de-radicalization process began in 1997 with the cease-fire agreement, the real effort took place in the late 1990s and early 2000s. President Abdelaziz Bouteflikawho took office in 1999was able to successfully appease most of the Islamist parties by effectively dealing with the issues of political prisoners, social reintegration, the political rights of the de- radicalized groups, and the role of the military in politics (Ashour 9). Additionally, an amnesty agreement between the government and the AIS, which officially declared the groups
20. 20. Malis 20 dissolution, tens of thousands of political prisoners were released and official apology was given to thousands of former FIS and AIS members (Ashour 9). The issues of social integration, political rights, and the role of the military are more difficult to immediately resolve. Elections continued to be an area of contention between the regime and Islamist parties, when in 2007, the FIS were closed from the participating in the parliamentary election. Additionally, a number of former AIS leaders seeking office, have been targeted in assassination attempts from GIA memberseither being killed or maimed in the process (Ashour 10). Lastly, the future role of the military in Algeria was a contentious issue because many of the military officials involved in the cancellation of the 1991 elections were among the groups who had who negotiated and supported the 1997 ceasefire and de- radicalization process. Tactfully, Bouteflika negotiated the issue by professionalizing the military. This involved the removal of over 800 senior military officials, all of whom were given comfortable pensions (Ashour 10). On September 29, 2005, the Charter on Peace and National Reconciliation is approved in a national referendum, garnering 97 percent of the vote. The Charter, which came into force on February 2006, provided for compensation for the victims of the civil war. Additionally, it granted amnesty for the members of armed groups who turned themselves in to authorities before the end of August 2006 (Algeria). Furthermore, it prohibits those who were involved in "mass killings, rape or attempts to set off explosives in public places" from receiving amnesty (Algeria). The Future of Islamism in Algeria Conservative casualty estimates place the number dead or missing at approximately one- hundred thousand by the end of conflict in February 2001. Nevertheless, ODonnell & Schmitter
21. 21. Malis 21 define the end of a transition as when abnormality is no longer the central feature of political life, that is, when actors have settled on and obey a set of more or less explicit rules defining the channels they may use to gain access to governing roles, the means they legitimately employ in their conflicts with each other, the procedures they should apply in taking decisions, and the criteria they may use to exclude others from the game (65). Thus, the cease-fire arrangement and the reconciliation process that culminated in the National Peace Charter on Reconciliation can be interpreted as a gradual move towards certainty where the rules of the game become established and made explicit. This was made explicit by the Charter in a couple of ways. For one, the Charter provide concessions to those who chose to moderate and subsequent elections illustrate the some political openness has been established. In addition, the Charter secured that the regime won on moral grounds. As a report by Amnesty International in 2006 stated, the Charter denies that the security forces and state-armed militias have been responsible for serious crimes, thus conferring systematic impunity. This denial stands in stark contrast to a body of evidence which points to their responsibility for thousands of cases of torture, extrajudicial executions and "disappearances", some of which constitute crimes against humanity (Algeria). Regardless of the soundness of the Charter in 2006, recent surveys seem to suggest that the future is bright for both sides. While only one-third of the respondents believed that it would be better for the country if people with strong religious beliefs held public office (Tessler 12), moderate Islamists groups, such as the Algerian Muslim Brotherhood (HAMS, or MSP), do exist in civil society. Accordingly, encouragement by the international community would be beneficial for future relations between the regime and moderate Islamists, which in turn, could assist in further political legitimacy for Islamism.
22. 22. Malis 22 Work Cited Algeria: The Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation and the Evolution of the Violence in Algeria." Refworld. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Dec. 2013 Ashour, Omar. "Islamist de-radicalization in Algeria: Successes and failures." (2010). Bouandel, Youcef. "Political parties and the transition from authoritarianism: the case of Algeria." The Journal of Modern African Studies 41.01 (2003): 1-22. Boubekeur, Amel. Political islam in Algeria. No. 268. Ceps, 2007. Brumberg, Daniel. "Islam Is Not the Solution (or the Problem)." The Washington Quarterly Winter 2005-06 29.1 (n.d.): 97-116. Project Muse. Web. 08 Dec. 2013. . Brumberg, Daniel. "The trap of liberalized autocracy." Journal of democracy 13.4 (2002): 56-68. Gately, Dermot, M. A. Adelman, and James M. Griffin. "Lessons from the 1986 oil price collapse." Brookings papers on economic activity 1986.2 (1986): 237-284. Hafez, Mohammed M. "A Tragedy of Errors." Democratic Development & Political Terrorism: The Global Perspective. By William J. Crotty. Boston: Northeastern UP, 2005. 301-31. Print. Kalyvas, Stathis N. "Wanton and senseless? The logic of massacres in Algeria." Rationality and Society 11.3 (1999): 243-285. O'Donnell, Guillermo A., and Philippe C. Schmitter. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986. Print. Takeyh, Ray. "Islamism in Algeria: A struggle between hope and agony." Middle East Policy 10.2 (2003): 62-75. Viorst, Milton. "Algeria's Long Night." Foreign Aff. 76 (1997): 86.
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