capturing web application threats using virtual cms honeypot

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Krakow, April 24-25, 2010 Capturing Web Application Threats Using virtual CMS Honeypot Saharudin Saat

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Page 1: Capturing Web Application Threats Using virtual CMS Honeypot

Krakow, April 24-25, 2010

Capturing Web Application Threats Using virtual CMS Honeypot

Saharudin Saat

Page 3: Capturing Web Application Threats Using virtual CMS Honeypot

Krakow, April 24-25, 2010

Why Honeypot?

• Capture live attacks• Find solution for 0 day • Hackers view the virtual honeypots as a real

server (playground)• Honeypots cannot be used as a stepping stone to

do any harm (permit in, block out)

Page 4: Capturing Web Application Threats Using virtual CMS Honeypot

Krakow, April 24-25, 2010

The Architecture

Page 5: Capturing Web Application Threats Using virtual CMS Honeypot

Krakow, April 24-25, 2010

Tools• Raw Honeypot (virtualbox)• Proxy (pound – apache log format)• Awstats (log analysis)• Snort (signatures)• ACID BASE (report )• Tcpdump (record packets)• Tcpreplay (crash - replay packets )

Page 6: Capturing Web Application Threats Using virtual CMS Honeypot

Krakow, April 24-25, 2010

What’s Different?• Enhanced awstats error logs• Detailed error message based on W3C• Custom virus and worm signature• Better report

Page 7: Capturing Web Application Threats Using virtual CMS Honeypot

Krakow, April 24-25, 2010

Results and FindingsPercentages of attack

Page 8: Capturing Web Application Threats Using virtual CMS Honeypot

Krakow, April 24-25, 2010

PHP CMS

• Default (welcome intruder)• Cliché (admin)

Page 9: Capturing Web Application Threats Using virtual CMS Honeypot

Krakow, April 24-25, 2010

ASP CMS

• Windows virus and worm• Not work on Linux (mod mono - .NET environment)

Page 10: Capturing Web Application Threats Using virtual CMS Honeypot

Krakow, April 24-25, 2010

JSP CMS

• unauthorized access (servlet manager)

Page 11: Capturing Web Application Threats Using virtual CMS Honeypot

Krakow, April 24-25, 2010

RUBY CMS

• Normal access

Page 12: Capturing Web Application Threats Using virtual CMS Honeypot

Krakow, April 24-25, 2010

Conclusion

Future plan JSP/Ruby

• PHP most threats • ASP high threats but less significant impact• JSP less threats but high impact• Ruby low impact

Page 13: Capturing Web Application Threats Using virtual CMS Honeypot

Krakow, April 24-25, 2010

Future Works• Compiled attacks can be utilised for IDS/IPS• Implement database monitoring