cards to cut organized

8/8/2019 Cards to Cut Organized

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PROLIF BAD:

Prolif transforms ongoing disputes into shooting wars.Sobek et al 09 ± Professor of Political Science @ Louisiana StateUniversity [David Sobek, Dennis M. Foster (Professor of International

Studies and Political Science @ Virginia Military Institute) & SamuelB. Robison (Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science @ Louisiana StateUniversity) ³Conventional Wisdom? The Effect of Nuclear Proliferationon Armed Conflict, 1945-2001,´ Prepared for presentation at the 2009Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago. 2009-05-22,pg. http://www.allacademic.com/ meta/p362138_index.html]

They will escalate to great power nuclear warsBelow 08 ± Wing Commander for the Royal Air Force [TIM D. Q. BELOW(Master of Arts degree in Defence Studies from Kings College London),³OPTIONS FOR US NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: EXEMPLARY LEADERSHIP OREXTRAORDINARY LUNACY?,´ A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THESCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION

REQUIREMENTS, AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, JUNE2008]

The end result is nuclear winter that destroys the vast majority of the world¶s populationToon et al 07 ± Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences @University of Colorado [Owen B. Toon, Alan Robock (Professor of Environmental Sciences @ Rutgers University), Richard P. Turco(Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences @ UCLA, Charles Bardeen(Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences @ University of Colorado), Luke Oman (Professor of of Earth and Planetary Sciences @Johns Hopkins University), Georgiy L. Stenchikov (Professor of Environmental Sciences @ Rutgers University), ³NUCLEAR WAR:Consequences of Regional-Scale Nuclear Conflicts,´ Science, 2 March2007, Vol. 315. no. 5816, pp. 1224 ± 1225]

New proliferators will be uniquely destabilizing ² guaranteesconflict escalation.

Cimbala, 2008

[Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. ² Penn. State Brandywine, Comparative Strategy, Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear

Crisis Stability in Future Asiaµ, 27, InformaWorld]

If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption « marginalization of major interstate warfare.

Fast global prolif is inevitable without US arsenal cuts.

Cirincione, 2007

[Joe, Ploughshares President, Former Center for American Progress and Carnegie Endowment Nonproliferation

program Directors, Former House Armed Services Committee member, Georgetown University Foreign Service

Professor, CFR member, nonproliferation expert, Bomb Scare, p. 105-8]

The longest-term, but most severe, « the brink of annihiliation for the first time in some twenty years.



Prolif leads to nuclear terrorism³multiple groups are pursuing weapons.

Perry & Schlesinger, 2009

[William J., Chairman, United States Institute of Peace, James R., Vice-Chair, ´America·s

Strategic Posture,µ http://www.usip.org/files/file/strat_posture_report_adv_copy.pdf ]

The second important new challenge is nuclear « is dangerously close to a ´tipping point.µ

The plan reverses perceptions of US nuclear hypocrisy ² key to RevCon and the NPT. Acheson, 2008

[Ray, project associate of Reaching Critical Will, a project of the Women·s International League for Peace and Freedom,

editor of the News in Review, a daily newsletter published during NPT PrepComs and Review Conferences, and is

associate editor of the Arms Control Reporter, ´The Challenges of Non-proliferation: Preparing for the NPT Review

Conference,µ http://disarm.igc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=121:the-challenges-of-non-

proliferation-preparing-for-the-npt-review-conference&catid=62:dt2008summer&Itemid=2, 7-6]

The tension between nuclear- and non-nuclear-« spoken of by the Swiss ambassador evaporates permanently.

Strong NPT preventsrunaway global proliferation.

Dunn, 2009 ² Senior vice president of Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC) [Lewis A. Dunn (Former

assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and ambassador for the nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty in the Reagan administration), THE NPT: Assessing the Past, Building the Future,µ Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, July 2009]

Metric: Does NPT adherence provide a leverage « there is compliance with NPT obligations. Pg. 149-151

SOLVENCY:

us must abandon nukes/ although us cut weapons they're more powerful=us nuke

primacy/

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61931/peter-c-w-flory-keith-payne-pavel-podvig-alexei-arbatov-keir-a-l/nuclear-exchange-does-washington-really-have-or-

?page=4

Weapons reductions send an immediate global signal that halts proliferation.

Cirincione 11-6-09 [Joseph, The impact of nuclear posture on non-proliferation,µ http://www.ploughshares.org/news-

analysis/blog/impact-nuclear-posture-non-proliferation ]

The nuclear posture and strategic decisions «by new states and by terrorist groups.

Anything short of total disarmament fails

Muller 08 [Harald Muller is director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt in Germany and a professor

of international relations at Frankfurt University, The Future of Nuclear Weapons in an Interdependent

World, The Washington Quarterly 31.2, Project Muse]Taking complete nuclear disarmament as a serious and « national security of any party involved in the

process.

A2 SECURITY K



Security Kritik Answers

There is no link between discursive framing and global politics ² only we have empirical proof.Minnesota and Monasch U, 1998(Richard and Christian Dangerous Liasons?..µ European Journal of IR)Ironically, the end of the Cold War « from disciplinary critique to substantive analysis.

Accept all ontologies. These questions are unresolvable. Arnd-Caddigan and Puzzuto ¶6 (Margaret, Assistant Prof. Soc. ² East Carolina U. , and Richard, Associate Prof. Soc. ² ECU, Qualitative Social Work, ´Truth in Our Timeµ, 5:4, Sage)From the authors· perspective, the «none of these quadrants have a ¶God·s eye· perspective.

Existence is a prerequisite to value Wapner ¶3 (Paul, Associate Prof. and Dir. Global Env·t. Policy Prog. ² American U., Dissent, ´Leftist criticism of ´natureµµ, Winter, 50:1, Proquest)

All attempts to listen to nature are social« their fundamental moral commitment.

Stability isn·t about perfection. Trying to achieve social peace is about preventing violent anarchy.

Elshtain ¶3 (Jean Bethke, Prof. Social and Pol. Ethics ² U. Chicago, ´Just War Against Terror: The Burden of AmericanPower in a Violent Worldµ, p. 48-49)Many, myself included, believe that « we are likely to call for a new government.

Predictions are feasible. They can be made logically from empirical evidence.Chernoff ¶9 (Fred, Prof. IR and Dir. IR ² Colgate U., European Journal of International Relations, ´Conventionalism asan Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theoryµ, 15:1, Sage)For these and other reasons, many social theorists «should be evident from the foregoing discussion.

Enemies are realElshtain ¶2 (Jean Bethke, Prof. Social and Politics Ethics ² U. Chicago, and Chair in Foundations of American Freedom

² Georgetown U., Common Knowledge, ´LUTHER·S LAMB: When and How to Fight a Just Warµ, 8:2, Highwire)One sign that the American president «but unfortunately they do occur.

Securitization key to heg.Kelstrup, Writer and editor for Sage Publications, 2004 [Morten, Globalisation and Societal Insecurityµ,Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research, pg.115]

This strategy is, it seems, « 'war on terror' is part of such a strategy.

Security Kritik Answers

Total rejection of capitalism fragments resistance --² the perm solves best

Gibson-Graham ·96 (J.K., Feminist Economists ² The End of Capitalism)One of our goals as Marxists has been to produce « visible as a denial of diversity and change.

The impact is extinction, the refusal to engage in traditional politics is an abdication of social responsibility that makes

social crises inevitable

Boggs ¶97 (Carl, National University, Los Angeles, Theory and Society, ´The great retreat: Decline of the public sphere

in late

twentieth-century Americaµ, December, Volume 26, Number 6,



http://www.springerlink.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/content/m7254768m63h16r0/fulltext.pdf )

The decline of the public sphere in late«had vanished from civil society. 75

And, they don·t fiat a global shift³this means other countries will act capitalist and resource wars/no value to life is

inevitable. The economic crisis means capitalist super powers will be stronger

Mead 2/4 - Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Walter Russell, The New

Republic, ´Only Makes You Strongerµ, 2/4)But, in many other countries where capitalism«is almost as long as the list of financial crises.

Cap solves war

Griswold, 05 (Daniel, director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at Cato, ´Peace on earth? Try free trade among

menµ, http://www.freetrade.org/node/282 )

As one little-noticed headline on an «financial assets, and human capital.

POLITICS

Plan popular with religious groups

http://www.zero-nukes.org/Disarmament_Scenarios _Case _Against_Nukes _Moral.html

turkey does not support nukes in the region

http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=58412

fears of withdrawal of nukes are conceptual / removal of nukes drains capital

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/Kelleher

nato supports withdrawal of weapons/ removal of weapons=insecurity=prolif for defense

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/22/nato-states-us-nuclear-arms-europe

turkey supports withdrawal (start treaty proves)

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90854/6945527.html

http://www.haaretz.com/news/turkey-calls-for-mideast-free-of-nuclear-weapons-1.274139

turkey supports withdrawal

http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2006/06/turkish_parliament_debates_us_.php

obama supports disarment

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/atomic_weapons/index.html

Japan Proliferation Answers

Scrapping missile defense should have triggered the link.

David, Former US Assistant Defens Secretary for WMD, and Kirkpatrick, Former WSJ Deputy Editor, 9/17/2009



[Jack, Melanie, "A New Nuclear-Arms Race,"

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204518504574419173653298610.html?mod=googlenews_wsj ]

Call it a shot heard round « affords are plainly diminished.

Weakening of US nuclear umbrella won·t cause Japanse prolif --- no sustained political support and costs overwhelm

benefits.

Llewelyn Hughes, Spring 2007. Doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology. Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet),µ International Security 31.4, Project Muse.

Nevertheless, a hollowing out of the « bilateral alliance with the United States.

US LEADERSHIP KEY

Failure to take a leadership role in non-prolif makes prolif, nuclear terrorism and nuclear war inevitable.

Russo, 2006

[Gregory, Osgood Center for International Studies, The U.S. and the Proliferation Situation: An Opinion,µ 8-8,

http://www.osgoodcenter.org/Russo_Paper.pdf ]

If I have taken anything away from « group, becomes terrifyingly real.

Second, GLOBAL NORMS ² US action creates a norm that prevents prolif. AND ² that is an independent internal link

to preventing conflicts from escalating

Graham and Kampelman, 08 Ambassador, involved in the negotiation and/or review process of every major

international arms control agreement in which the United States participated between 1970 and 1997 and Ambassador to

the Conference on Security and cooperation in Europe from 1980 to 1984

(Thomas and Max, Nuclear Weapons: A n Existential Threat to Humanity, CTBTO Spectrum 1, September 2008,)

Sixty-three years ago last month, .....United Nations to live up to its potential.

ADVANTAGE TWO ² SOFT POWER

Obama improved the US image ² but it isn·t translating into soft power ² action on nuclear issues key.

Ghitis, 2009 independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor

(Frida, World Citizen: Obama Must Parlay Soft Power Gains into Real Results, april 9)

When viewed through a wide .... to score more solid results.

CTBT ratification is the NUMBER ONE sign that we respect the international community, are committed to

multilateralism, and revamps soft power.

Joseph, 2009 senior Democratic foreign policy staffer in the United States Senate (Jofi, Renew the Drive for CTBT

Ratification, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 32, Issue 2 April 2009 , pages 79 - 90

First, a pledge to work toward CTBT .... U.S. commitment to disarmament.

Nuclear issues are the best way to change the perception of US leadership ² it shores up our soft power ² that·s key to

solving a litany of issues

Stanley, 2007 PhD in the Walsh School of Foreign Service and Department of Government at Georgetown University (Elizabeth A, , ´International Perceptions of US Nuclear Policy,µ independent research project for the Advanced

Concepts Group at Sandia National Laboratories, Feb,)

Seen in light of this .... and incredibly difficult to model.

Soft power & perception is key to effective leadership ² builds alliances, checks counter-balancing, maintains domestic

support ² multilateral co-op is the best internal link to solving terrorism

Jervis, 2009 professor of international politics at Columbia University. (Robert, Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective,

World Politics Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009



To say that the system is .... that its leadership is benign.

Commitment to multilateralism is vital to prevent counter-balancing and overstretch ² which destroy US leadership

Grygiel, 2006 George H. W. Bush Chair in International Relations at Johns Hopkins University (Jakub Imperial Alliesµ

Orbis, Volume 50, Issue 2 (ScienceDirect)

But the fact that the .... to the detriment of American interests.

US decline won·t be peaceful ² it·ll explode into global chaos & WMD conflicts ² mending our image is vital.

Brzezinski, 2005 National Security Advisor in the Carter Administration, Professor of Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins

University [Zbigniew ´The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadershipµ (p. 2-4)]

History is a record of change, .... a more secure international environment.

That causes extinction.

Nye, 1990

[Joseph, Former Dean of Harvard·s Kennedy School of Government, ´Bound to Lead,µ p.17]

Perceptions of change in the relative« history as we know it may end.

Finally, hegemonic decline triggers nuclear wars around the globe.

Kagan, 2007 Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Robert ´End of Dreams, Return of

Historyµ Policy Review ( http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10 )]

This is a good thing, and it should .... will provide an easier path.

WARMING IMPACT: (ADV IF CUT INTERNAL LINK)

And, Nonprolif credibility is key to revitalize multinational enrichment

Goodby, 8 [James E., research fellow at the Hoover Institution and nonresident senior fellow at the

Brookings Institution. He has taught at Stanford, Georgetown, Syracuse, and at Carnegie Mellon, where

he is a distinguished service professor emeritus. His career spanned 35 years in the U.S. Foreign Service

and included several assignments dealing with nuclear issues including the START treaty, what became

the Helsinki Accords, and five ambassadorial rank appointments including ambassador to Finland., 9/4,

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, ³Internationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle´, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-

edition/op-eds/internationalizing-the-nuclear-fuel-cycle ]

The rising demand for energy, especially in Asia, has made it all but inevitable that «the treaty regime

still has after years of erosion will be gone for good.

Multinational fuel processing makes nuclear energy globally affordable and reduces the risk of global

warming

Rislove 07 - JD @ University of Wisconsin & Ph.D. in Physics @ University of New Mexico [DANIEL C.

RISLOVE, ³Global Warming v. Non-proliferation: The Time Has Come for Nations to Reassert Their Right

to Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy,´ Wisconsin International Law Journal, 2007, VOL 24; NUMB 4, pages

1069-1098] Establishment of multinational fuel processing programs modeled after the European experiment «risks

of diversion of this technology into weapons programs.

Multinational Fuel cycle is the only solution to climate change and energy shortages

Eerkens 08 - Research Professor @ Nuclear Science and Engineering Institute, University of Missouri

[Jeff W. Eerkens (MS degree in Nuclear Engineering and a PhD in Engineering Science from the

University of California at Berkeley.), ³Nuclear and Coal: The Energy 'Dream Team' for Years to Come,´

Seeking Alpha, December 14, 2008, Pg. http://seekingalpha.com/user/319497/comments ]



Green nuclear power is the only practical solution to simultaneously (1) avoid dependence on foreign

«short-sightedness and follies of prior administrations.

Warming causes extinction

Tickell, 8-11-2008

(Oliver, Climate Researcher, The Gaurdian, ³On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction´,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange )

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week.

«human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.

Energy scarcity causes extinction

HEINBERG, Senior Fellow of Post Carbon Institute, 2004 Richard, Book Excerpt: Powerdown: Options

and Actions for a Port-Carbon World, http://www.energybulletin.net/node/2291¶

Last One Standing ± The path of competition for remaining «Recent US administrations have enunciated

a policy of nuclear first-strike.

A2 IMPACT DEFENSE ON NUCLEAR WAR:

Even a small nuclear war causes extinction

Reville 2-4-2010

William, associate professor of biochemistry and public awareness of science officer at UCC, ³Nuclear

winter weather forecast´

The Irish Times, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/sciencetoday/2010/0204/1224263727687.html

Contention One- Nuclear War Termination

Conventional wars are inevitable- conflict will push the U.S. to the brink of nuclear use now.

Wilson, 2006 [Ward, former Fellow at the Robert Kennedy Memorial Foundation, ³Rationale for a study of

City Annihilations,´ http://wardhayeswilson.squarespace.com/city_annihilation/]

One of the « and rationality.

The U.S. will use nukes to terminate these conflicts- there¶s a high likelihood of nuclear use in wartime.

Kultgen, 1999 [John, Ph.D., University of Chicago, ³In the Valley of the Shadow: Reflections on the

Morality of Nuclear Deterrence,´ p. 224]

The accumulation of «use nuclear weapons.

Err on the side of caution- crises distort rational thinking and encourage nuclear miscalculation.

Wilson, 2006 [Ward, former Fellow at the Robert Kennedy Memorial Foundation, ³Rationale for a study of

City Annihilations,´ http://wardhayeswilson.squarespace.com/city_annihilation/]

The rationality/risk argument « to maximize rewards.

Nuclear war termination escalates to extinction- even limited nuclear use collapses deterrence.

Kultgen, 1999 [John, Ph.D., University of Chicago, ³In the Valley of the Shadow: Reflections on the

Morality of Nuclear Deterrence,´ p. 226]

The problem of controlling«international politics as played.

Even the threat of war termination sparks miscalculation and encourages other states to use nuclear



weapons in conventional conflicts.

Kimball, 2005 [Daryl G., director of the Arms Control Association, ³Goading China: Of Madmen and

Nukes,´ November 4, http://www.counterpunch.org/kimball11042005.html]

Since the beginning of «U.S. nuclear forces.

No offense- war termination fails- even a single bomb sparks massive retaliation because countries

become convinced they are going to be exterminated.

Wilson, 2008 [Ward, former Fellow at the Robert Kennedy Memorial Foundation, ³The Myth Of Nuclear

Deterrence,´ Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, November]

One of the striking things « Yet they rarely succeed.

A2 TRANSITION TO NUCLEAR ZERO=NUKE WAR

ITS INEVITABLE

No Transtion Wars - Ikenberry 8 (John, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton

University The Rise of China and the Future of the West. Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jan/Feb2008, Vol.

87, Issue 1)

THE MOST important benefit of these features today is that they give the Western order a

remarkable capacity to accommodate rising powers. New entrants into the system have ways of

gaining status and authority and opportunities to play a role in governing the order. The fact that the

United States, China, and other great powers have nuclear weapons also limits the ability of a rising

power to overturn the existing order. In the age of nuclear deterrence, great-power war is, thankfully,

no longer a mechanism of historical change. War-driven change has been abolished as a

historical process. The Western order's strong framework of rules and institutions is already starting to

facilitate Chinese integration. At first, China embraced certain rules and institutions for defensive

purposes: protecting its sovereignty and economic interests while seeking to reassure other states of its

peaceful intentions by getting involved in regional and global groupings. But as the scholar Marc

Lanteigne argues, "What separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers, is that not only is it 'growing up' within a milieu

of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to

promote the country's development of global power status." China, in short, is increasingly working within, rather than

outside of, the Western order.

A2 NON-PROLIF CAUSES A SHIFT TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Even if used, bioweapons won¶t spread or cause epidemicsEasterbrook 03

(Gregg Easterbrook, Senior fellow at The New Republic, July 2003, Wired, Were All Gonna Die!

http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=2&topic=&topic_set)



3. Germ warfare! Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in

popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The

reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan,

in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out

of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but

no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a USgovernment facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked

around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was

discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning

mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known

pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it

didn¶t kill off humanity. Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug

introduced into today¶s Western world would encounter top-notch public health,

excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill

bioagents. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some

novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent

(two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly

troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook upnasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out

humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.

Too difficult to acquire and deploy bioweapons

Burton Stewart, 08

(Fred and Scott, Stratfor Intelligence, Busting the Anthrax Myth, July 30,

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/busting _anthrax _myth)

We must admit to being among those who do not perceive the threat of bioterrorism to be as significant as that posed by a nuclear strike.To be fair, it must be noted that we also do not see strikes using chemical or radiological weapons rising to the threshold of a true

weapon of mass destruction either. The successful detonation of a nuclear weapon in an American city would be far more devastatingthan any of these other forms of attack. In fact, based on the past history of nonstate actors conducting attacks using biological weapons,

we remain skeptical that a nonstate actor could conduct a bio logical weapons strike capable of creating as many casualties as a

large strike using conventional explosives ² such as the October 2002 Bali bombings that resulted in 202 deaths or the March 2004train bombings in Madrid that killed 191. We do not disagree with Runge¶s statements that actors such as al Qaeda have demonstrated

an interest in biological weapons. There is ample evidence that al Qaeda has a rudimentary biological weapons capability. However,there is a huge chasm of capability that separates intent and a rudimentary biological weapons program from a biologicalweapons program that is capable of killing hundreds of thousands of people. Misconceptions About Biological Weapons There are

many misconceptions involving biological weapons. The three most common are that they are easy to obtain, that they are easy to

deploy effectively, and that, when used, they always cause massive casualties. While it is certainly true that there are many different

types of actors who can easily gain access to rudimentary biological agents, there are far few er actors who can actually isolate

virulent strains of the agents, weaponize them and then effectively employ these agents in a manner that will realistically pose asignificant threat of causing mass casualties. While organisms such as anthrax are present in the environment and are not difficult to

obtain, more highly virulent strains of these tend to be far more difficult to locate, isolate and replicate. Such efforts require highlyskilled individuals and sophisticated laboratory equipment. Even incredibly deadly biological substances such as ricin and botulinumtoxin are difficult to use in mass attacks. This difficulty arises when one attempts to take a rudimentary biological substance and then

convert it into a weaponized form ² a form that is potent enough to be deadly and yet readily dispersed. Even if this weaponizationhurdle can be overcome, once developed, the weaponized agent must then be integrated with a weapons system that can effectively takelarge quantities of the agent and evenly distribute it in lethal doses to the intended targets. During the past several decades in the era

of modern terrorism, biological weapons have been used very infrequently and with very little success. This fact alone serves tohighlight the gap between the biological warfare misconceptions and reality. Militant groups desperately want to kill people and areconstantly seeking new innovations that will allow them to kill larger numbers of people. Certainly if biological weapons were as easily

obtained, as easily weaponized and as effective at producing mass casualties as commonly portrayed, militant groups would have usedthem far more frequently than they have. Militant groups are generally adaptive and responsive to failure. If something works,

they will use it. If it does not, they will seek more effective means of achieving their deadly goals. A good example of this was the

rise and fall of the use of chlorine in militant attacks in Iraq. Anthrax As noted by Runge, the spore-forming bacterium Bacillusanthracis is readily available in nature and can be deadly if inhaled, if ingested or if it comes into contact with a person¶s skin. Whatconstitutes a deadly dose of inhalation anthrax has not been precisely quantified, but is estimated to be somewhere between 8,000 and



Busch 4 Associate Professor Govt. @ Christopher Newport U, Nathan, No End in Sight, p 8-9

Optimists and pessimists also agree NWSs must avoid weapon deployments that could lead to inadvertent launches. These includedeployments that re¬quire rapid response or policies that call for launch-on-warning (LOW), which requires a state to fire its nuclear

weapons after an attack is detected but before the incoming nuclear weapons have reached their targets. For ex¬ample, Kenneth Waltz

argues that "survival of forces must not require early firing in response to what may be false alarms."" Thus, Waltz acknowledgesthat if NWSs do in fact tend to develop rapid-response capabilities and policies of LOW, then the risks of

inadvertent use would be quite high, since these doctrines greatly reduce the time that leaders have to decidewhether to launch their nuclear weapons. But optimists argue that emerging NWSs will not develop these capabilities and use-

doctrines because they will be able to ensure survivability by dispersing and concealing their nuclear weapons." Instead, optimists argue,emerging NWSs will adopt force doctrines that call for "riding out" a first strike, then engaging in a delayed retaliation. As a number of

pessimists have pointed out, however, a doctrine of ride out and delayed retaliation increases a state's vulnerability todecapitation (where those authorized to order a retaliation are killed or the communica¬tion networksnecessary for disseminating a launch command are severely disrupted or destroyed) and to counterforcestrikes (where large numbers of the state's nuclear forces are destroyed), both of which significantly reducethe state's retaliatory capability. Pessimists have therefore argued that emerging NWSs will not be satisfiedwith such doctrines, and will instead develop rapid-response capabilities and even adopt policies that allowfor LOW.7

Wide spread of tech makes fast breakout prolif possible.

Roberts 99 member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia,and a member of the editorial board of The Nonproliferation Review. Brad, VIEWPOINT:

PROLIFERATION AND NONPROLIFERATION IN THE 1990S: LOOKING FOR THE RIGHT LESSONS,

Nonproliferation Review, fall, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/robert64.pdf

But there is an historical inevitability to the latency phenomenon. Beneath the patterns of conventional and unconventionalweapons proliferation is a much more substantial pattern of technology diffusion. Reflecting theglobalization of the industrial revolution, this diffusion has been greatly accelerated by the emergence over thelast couple of decades of a transnational economy in which technologies, materials, capital, and expertiseflow rapidly across international borders, typically from firm to firm rather than from state to state. Many of

these technologies and materials are dual-use in nature, meaning they have both civil and military applications. In

fact, the number of civil technologies with military applications appears to be growing ever larger and includes today, for example,

biotechnology, commercial observation satellites, and the Internet. Also increasingly available internationally are so-called enabling

technologies that facilitate the production, integration, and use of weaponry.3 In short, more and more countries areacquiring the ability to produce strategic military capabilities. This potential to create long-reach weaponswith the ability to inflict mass casualties could supply these countries with great political leverage in time of war and crisis. These latent capabilities are strategic hedges. One of the least measurable indices of

proliferation, but also one of the most important, is the degree to which states consciously develop thosehedges so that they are in a position to compete successfully if they enter a disintegrating internationalenvironment that calls f or rapid break-out.

nuke war good/bad

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50769/michael-mandelbaum/lessons-of-the-next-nuclear-war?page=6

all nukes are nukes (still dangerous even if unarmed)/

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60426/john-deutch/a-nuclear-posture-for-today?page=3



the risk that weapons are stolen o/w the risk of detterence/ a2 removing weapons destroys allied

credibility/ a2 weapons key to negotiation with russia/ a2 turkey wants them there

http://www.connectusfund.org/blogs/bombs-away-removing-tactical-nukes-europe

A2 TERRORISM IMPACT DEFENSE

a2 nuclear thef t exagerated / facilities not well armed

www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/mond01b.html

Nuclear Terrorism is likely, causes nuclear retaliation, and triggers a new arms race²consensus of

experts

Rhodes 12-14-09

Richard, affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Former

visiting scholar at Harvard and MIT, and author of ³The Making of the Atomic Bomb´ which won the

Pulitzer Prize in Nonfiction, National Book Award, and National Book Critics Circle Award. ³Reducing the

nuclear threat: The argument for public safety´ http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/reducing-

the-nuclear-threat-the-argument-public-safety

The response was very different among nuclear and national security«had nothing to do with those

attacks in the name of sending a message.

TNW¶s make the risk of nuclear terrorism very high- theft and no locks

Bin and Zhiwei 3

(³The contribution of arms control to fighting nuclear terrorism)

tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are short-range « attractive terrorist objective

risk of terrorist acquisition of weapons

http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/npt2010%20B5%20-%20Tactical%20NWs.pdf

2AC Consult Japan

3. Consultation nowUS Fed News 09 (US State Department Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs,³JAPANESE LOWER HOUSE ELECTION RESULTS´, 9-1, L/N)We congratulate Japan on this historic election and « of the issues confronting this generation of Japanese and

American leaders.

7. Massive delay to the counterplan & it doesn¶t solve the net benefitTastumi 9-3 [Yuki Tastumi, 9/3/09 Yuki Senior Associate of the East Asia Program at the Henry L.Stimson Center

New Government in Japan²implication for US-Japan relations http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=858]Over the next six to twelve months, « of new cooperation in that key relationship.

Collapse of heg causes rearm

Kagan 98 assistant professor of military history at the United States Military Academy at West Point

(Frederick, ³THE ARMED FORCES WE DESERVE´, The Weekly Standard, June 1, p 27)

In three regions -- Europe, the Middle East,«we should seek assiduously to prevent.



The CP is unconstitutional

Gellner 83 (Charles, Senior Specialist Foreign Affairs ± Congressional Research Service, ³Who should

control US nuclear weapons in Britain?´ 5-18, L/N)

That, however, could pose serious constitutional«Officials of other governments do not.

That outweighs ± constitutional questions are a priori

Levinson 00 (Daryl, Associate Prof. ± UVA Law School, University of Chicago Law Review, ³Making

Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs Spring, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev.

345 L/N)

Extending a majority rule analysis of « constitutional rights were never violated.

Also means you don¶t solve cause the plan gets struck down.

Knox 07 (John, Prof. Law ± Wake Forest U., American Journal of International Law, ³INTERNATIONAL

DECISIONS: NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY. 464 F.3d 1. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, August 29,

2006´, April, 101 A.J.I.L. 471, L/N)

The D.C. Circuit's confusion over the nature « implies that this instruction is unconstitutional .

2AC CMR

2. CMR low now

Feaver 10-21 [Peter, ³Obama¶s military problem is getting worse,´ Foreign Policy,

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/21/obamas_military_problem_is_getting_worse]

President Obama is presiding over a slow-motion «to the electorate to judge him, not the military.

Or B. it¶s resilient

De Luce 10-29 [Dan, writer for Tehran Times, ³Like past presidents, Obama faces tension with his

generals,´ http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=205967] As he contemplates dire warnings from his « obligation is to carry that out to the best of our ability.´

3. Leaks killing civil military relations

Feaver 9/21/09 ± Alexander F. Hehmeyer Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke

University, Director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS), and former special advisor on the

National Security Council Staff ± µForeign Policy: Woodward discloses troops needed´

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113022583

Here is the crucial bit: "... But Obama's deliberative pace ² «. more clearly spelled out. This is significant

and serious.

B. Leaks outweigh any debate caused by the aff

The Telegraph 10/5/2009 (³Barack Obama furious at General Stanley McChrystal speech on

Afghanistan,´

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/barackobama/6259582/Barack-Obama-

furious-at-General-Stanley-McChrystal-speech-on-Afghanistan.html#article)

Bruce Ackerman, an expert on constitutional law at « McChrystal once since his appointment in June.



[Steven E. Miller, ³The Utility of Nuclear Weapons and the Strategy of

No-First-Use,´ Pugwash Meeting no. 279, London, UK, 15-17 November

2002, pg. http://www.pugwash.org/ reports/nw/miller.htm]

NFU forces the Global Strike Command to adopt conventional strike posture

The Stanley Foundation 08 [³US Nuclear Weapons Doctrine: Can We Adopt

No First Use?´ Policy Dialogue Brief, April 4, 2008]

This prevents inevitable low-level friction from becoming great power wars

Grant 09 ± Research Analyst @ Lexington Institute w/ emphasis on joint

doctrine, air power, aerospace defense [Dr. Rebecca Grant (PhD in

International Relations from the London School of Economics and Former

lecturer at Air University and Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell

Air Force Base), ³Global Deterrence: The Role of F-22,´ Lexington

Institute, February 2009]

And, Conventional deterrence prevents shifts in the local balance of power from triggering global wars.

Gerson & Whiteneck 09 ± Research analysts @ Center for Naval Analyses,

a federally funded research center, where he focuses on deterrence,

nuclear strategy, counterproliferation, and arms control [Michael

Gerson (M.A. in International Relations from the University of

Chicago) & Daniel Whiteneck, ³Deterrence and Influence: The Navy's

Role in Preventing War,´ CNA Analysis and Solutions, March 2009]

These coming regional disputes can only be addressed with conventional

deterrence. Our ev is comparative

Lichtenstein 02 ± Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army [WENDY L.

LICHTENSTEIN, ³CONVENTIONAL MILITARY DETERRENCE - ITS RISE TODOMINANCE AND ITS FUTURE,´ U.S. Army War College Strategy Research

Project, 28 February 2002]

Failure to upgrade conventionals is the worse-case scenario for global

security.

Horowitz & Shalmon 09 - Professor of Political Science @ University of

Pennsylvania & Senior Analyst @ Lincoln Group, LLC. [Michael C.

Horowitz and Dan A. Shalmon, ³The Future of War and American Military

Strategy,´ Orbis, Spring 2009]

Nukes aren¶t credible ± and nuclear threat aren¶t credible

Gerson 9/29 ± senior fellow at CFR, was at Heritage Foundation

(Michael, 2009, "Rethinking US Nuclear Posture"

http://carnegieendowment.org/ files/0929_transcript_nuclear_ posture.pdf )

us doesn't need nukes for dettterrence/ turkey nukes can't be used for detterence because they're not

armed (dual purpose)/ nukes key to us security and preventing prolif/ nukes don't influence terrorism



http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60426/john-deutch/a-nuclear-posture-for-today

Nuclear deterrence

US nuclear deterrence is in terminal decline

Monroe 09 [Vice Admiral Robert, national security consultant, former director of the Defense Nuclear

Agency, director of Navy Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, partner and senior counselor for Bechtel (management firm), serves on boards for the DOD, Dept of State, DOE, NASA, and other

organizations, Air & Space Power Journal, Fall, V23 I3, p.19-29, Ebsco]

America faces a critical decision point in history. The ... nonprolifera tion, which caused the test bans and

moratoria.

And, collapse in umbrella credibility is inevitable

Gaffney 10 [Frank J Jr., President of the Center for Security Policy ± 1-25 ³Stopping START,´ Canada

Free Press, 25 January. [Online] http://canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/19352]

One of those exceptions, we are constantly reminded, was Ronald ... and effective as we can make them

Advantage : Conventional Deterrence

Disarm locks in American conventional superiority ± solidifies alliances to deter regional aggressorsLind 09 [Michael, ed of the New American Contract and the New America Foundation, ³How I learned to

stop worrying and live with the bomb,´ Salon, 10-13,

salon.com/opinion/feature/2009/10/13/nuclear_weapons/index.html]

President Obama's Nobel Peace Prize has been justified ... renouncing the use of mass-casualty nuclear

weapons not only in first strikes but also in retaliation.)

Disarm allows greater conflict escalation flexibility and is a more credible threat. Even if there¶s no

reciprocation, it independently boosts US military R&D

Dujarric 3-4-10 [Robert Dujarric runs the Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies, Temple University,

Japan Campus, ³The Obama bid to rid the world of nuclear weapons boosts US security -- minus the

threat of Armageddon, Christian Science Monitor,

http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0304/The-Obama-bid-to-rid-the-world-of-nuclear-

weapons-boosts-US-security-minus-the-threat-of-Armageddon]

As tensions over Iran and North Korea¶s programs ... strengthen US military capabilities and deterrence.

This is the MOST IMPORTANT factor for deterrence

Horowitz and Shalmon 09 - Professor of Political Science @ University of Pennsylvania & Senior Analyst

@ Lincoln Group, LLC. [Michael C. Horowitz and Dan A. Shalmon, ³The Future of War and American

Military Strategy,´ Orbis, Spring 2009]

Hedging will be the optimal strategy for the U.S. « military power not only for this generation, but also for

the next, as well.

And, it would establish overwhelming American air dominance ± key to power projectionScoblic 09 [J. Peter Scoblic, J. Peter Scoblic is executive editor of the New Republic, ³The hawkish case

for nuclear disarmament,´ 8-16, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/16/opinion/oe-scoblic16]

Last week, peace activists around the world commemorated ... we face, but our own nuclear arsenal

cannot protect us from an attack.

Hegemony prevents nuclear wars around the globe.

Kagan 07 [Robert, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ³End of Dreams,



Return of History´ Policy Review, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10]

This is a good thing, and it should continue to be a primary « American influence and global involvement

will provide an easier path.

Plan is necessary to resolve status quo weapon ambiguity that makes deterrence impossible

Kristensen 07 ± Project Director for the Nuclear Information Project @ Federation of American Scientists

[Hans M. Kristensen (Former Special Advisor to the Danish Defence Commission and Former Senior

Researcher @Nautilus Institute), ³U.S. STRATEGIC WAR PLANNING AFTER 9/11,´ Nonproliferation

Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, July 2007]

The New Triad has been sold on the presumption that it « if the target includes both soft and deeply

buried hardened time-urgent targets.

And, conventional trident missiles make a world of disarm stable and boots the credibility of our deterrent

Brito and Intriligator 3-1-10 [Dagobert L, is the Peterkin Professor of Political Economy and Baker Institute

Scholar at Rice University; Michael D., is Professor of Economics at UCLA where he is also Professor of

Political Science, Professor of Public Policy in the School of Public Affairs, and Co-Director of the Jacob

Marschak Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Mathematics in the Behavioral Sciences. He is also a Senior

Fellow of the Milken Institute, Conventional Trident Modification Program: Creating the Possibility of Global Zero for Nuclear Weapons, huffingtonpost.com/dagobert-l-brito/conventional-trident-

modi_b_480660.html]

Global Zero has the support of the Obama Administration « weapons to a rogue state, it also makes

possible the stability of Global Zero in the future.

nuke prolif threatens us security/ nuke protection key to stop nuke prolif (allies) (orphans)/

detterence=prolif

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50769/michael-mandelbaum/lessons-of-the-next-nuclear-war

nuclear detterrent is bad/ nukes in turkey is what keeps them from proliferating/ conservatives like

nukes presence

http://cosmopolitanreview.com/articles/56-2010-spring-vol-2-no1/201-a-step-closer-to-a-world-without-

nuclear-weapons

weapons not used for detterrence/ a2 allied prolif/ a2 key to alliances

http://csis.org/blog/us-nuclear-weapons-europe-ineffective-deterrent-and-unnecessary-assurance

Positive Peace 2AC

Arguing that reps and language determines reality is reductionist and simplistic

Rodwell, 05 (Jonathan, PhD student at Manchester Met. researching U.S. Foreign Policy, 49th parallel,

Spring, ³Trendy but empty: A Response to Richard Jackson´,

http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm)

However, having said that, the problem is « are at best a footnote in our understanding .



Turn²masking

Meisner, 95 [professor of environmental studies at York University, 1995 (Mark, ³Resourcist Language:

The Symbolic Enslavement of Nature´, Proceedings of the Conference on Communication and Our

Environment, ed: David Sachsman, p. 242)

Changing the language we use to «language is trivial, or that it is deterministic.

Turn - their argument assumes a static conception of language that locks in a particular meaning. You

should vote affirmative to embrace our use of language to change the way that it has constructed reality

in the past

Anna Kurtz and Christopher Oscarson, Members of National Council of Teachers of English Conference

on College, Composition and Communication, 2003 ("BookTalk: Revising the Discourse of Hate,"

ProQuest)

However, Butler also argues that « for learning in which everyone feels safe.

Framework - we get to weigh our aff ± the K moots out the entire 1AC and is unpredictable. They kill

education by destroying clash and making debate one sided.

No link ± we agree that war is irrelevant ± accidents and terror are the only scenarios for war

Structural violence is an obscure metaphor. Its use cannot lead to positive changes because it conflates

distinct and generally unrelated problems of violence and poverty.

Boulding ¶77 (Kenneth, Faculty ± U. Colorado Boulder, Former Pres. American Economic Association,

Society for General Systems Research, and American Association for the Advancement of Science,

Journal of Peace Research, ³Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung´, 14:1, JSTOR)

Finally, we come to the great « a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer .

Perm ± do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alt

The Permutation is critical. Trying to claim moral authority ghettoizes peace research into academia. The

best option is to combine the policy of the plan with insights brought out by the K.

Byrd ¶87 (Peter, Lecturer in Politics/Continuing Education ± U. Warwick, Cambridge Journal of Education,³Peace Studies: A Case for Careful Development´, 17:1, p. 36-37)

Peace studies may place an even broader « claim a monopoly of concern or of insight.

*Condos a voter --- kills education by encouraging argument under-development ± cross-applications and

unpredictability kills 2ac strategy --- dispo solves their offense.

Structural violence death tolls are inflated. They are meaninglessly attributed and the models are

guaranteed to produce high death counts.

Maley ¶88 (William, Prof. and Founding Dir. Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy ± Australian National

University, The Australian Outlook, ³Peace Studies: A Conceptual and Practical Critique´, 42:1, p. 29-30)

Various authors have sought to operationalise « all their various dimensions for many years.

Social injustice isn¶t the root of war. We don¶t need positive peace for negative peace.

Mushkat ¶94 (Marian, Fellow ± World Academy of Art and Science, International Problems, ³Peace

Research in the Post Cold War Era´, 33:12, p. 39)

It goes without saying that there is « answers to the problems of war and peace.

Positive peace is a justification for intervention and war.

Maley ¶88 (William, Prof. and Founding Dir. Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy ± Australian National



University, The Australian Outlook, ³Peace Studies: A Conceptual and Practical Critique´, 42:1, p. 30)

The deployment of a notion of positive « in justification of Italian Fascism."

Interventionism risks global war

Valenzuela µ3 (Manuel, Freelance author and social critic, ³Perpetual War, Perpetual Terror´, 12-16,

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article5382.htm)

Today, the U.S. is responsible for 40% « the world¶s perception and treatment of us today.

Structural violence prevents tyranny and annihilation.


Research in the Post Cold War Era´, 33:12, p. 42-43)

Many claim that the use of « the national liberation movements as wel1.26

Case outweighs ± prefer our specific impact scenarios compared to nebulous theory that is empirically

denied for decades

*Alt vagueness is a voter ± it moots the 2ac by shifting the alt in the block, aff can never generate offense

skewing strategy. Specific options key to education

Alt fails -We have empirical evidence. Policymakers dismiss overly broad peace formulations.


Research in the Post Cold War Era´, 33:12, p. 38-39)

The peace-related knowledge produced « German economist H.G. Nutzinger - "empty boxes.15

2ac NPR CP

1. Perm do CPit solves we would just do the plan after the NPRits justified because the CP includes an element

of future fiat, which is bad because it creates false net benefits makes it impossible to be aff -- also plan doesnt have to be mandatoryshould proves not mandatory

Atlas Collaboration, 99, Use of shall, should, may can,

http://rd13doc.cern.ch/Atlas/DaqSoft/sde/inspect/shall.html

shall

'shall' describes something so much the better.

2. No solvency Pentagon opposes the plan will block NPR changes

Rosenbaum, 09 (Ron, Slate, Will the Pentagon Thwart Obama's Dream of Zero?, 8/21,

http://www.slate.com/id/2225817/pagenum/all/ )

Meanwhile, there are further derailing the commander in chief's goals.

E mpirically provendoesnt result in the aff

Cirincionne, 09 (Joe, The 'Nuclear Posture Landmine' : An Interview With Joe Cirincione, 8/16,

http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2009/8/16/767100/-The-Nuclear-Posture-Landmine-:-An-Interview-

With-Joe-Cirincione )

Well, the way that way the President wanted it to.



perm do the plan as an NSDsolves your offense

A2 ALLI E D PROLIF

Allies trust us --- they defer to any changes in our arsenal as long as we express political commitment to

their defense.

David S. Yost, July 2004. Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Ph.D. in international relations at

the University of Southern California (1979). ³The US Nuclear Posture Review and the NATO allies,´

International Affairs 80.4, Ebsco.

Perhaps partly because of improved relations with Russia, « the size of the force and its specific

characteristics.

NFU negotiations increase alliance cred

Sagan 09 ± Professor of Political Science @ Stanford University [Scott D. Sagan (Co-Director of

Stanford¶s Center for International Security and Cooperation.), ³The Case for No First Use,´ Survival | vol.

51 no. 3 | June±July 2009 | pp. 163±182]

Concerns about extended deterrence have thus often been « from changes in declaratory policy. Pg.

168-169

No link ± aff doesn¶t cause a loss of credibility in our deterrent ± security guarantees mean that the US is

still bound to protect allies

Weakening the umbrella doesn¶t actually cause prolif --- its all cold warrior hype --- multiple other factors

are more important in the decision to go nuclear.

Hans M. Kristensen, 7/2/2009. Project Director for the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. ³Japan, TLAM/N, and Extended Deterrence,´ Federation of American Scientists,

http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/07/tlam.php?pfstyle=wp.

These r eports, authored by agencies « the role of nuclear weapons as alpha omega.

--prolif makes the impact inevitable²we control terminal impact unqiuness²they¶ll do it covertly to

counter other protential threats²that¶s Krieger

--modeling solves²other countries follow our nuclear areseanl models and all ban first use²this

decreases regional tensions which are the impetus for developing weapons in the first place²that¶shanso----Allies oppose aggressive nuclear posture.

Advantage : War

The existence of US nuclear weapons makes their use inevitable ± first is commitment traps

Wirtz 05 [James J., ³Disarmament, Deterrence, and Denial,´ Naval Postgraduate School, Comparative

Strategy, 24.5, Dec]

Second, these divergent policy perspectives often emerge ... and only increases the risk of nuclear war.



Second is cyber terrorism

Evans et al 09 [Gareth, Chancellor of Australian Nat¶l U, former Cabinet Minister of Atty General,

Resources and Energy, Transport and Communications, and Foreign Minister, negotiated at the

Canberra Commission and the Chem Weapons Convention; Yoriko Kawaguchi; Turki Al Faisal (Saudi

Arabia), Alexi Arbatov (Russia), Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), Frene Noshir Ginwala (South Africa),

Francois Heisbourg (France), Jehangir Karamat (Pakistan), Brajesh Mishra (India), Klaus Naumann

(Germany), William Perry (US), Wang Yingfan (China), Shirley Williams (U.K.), Wiryono Sastrohandoyo

(Indonesia), Ernesto Zedillo (Mexico), Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament,

December 09, Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers,

http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/cover.html]

4.20 Cyber attacks. Producing and detonating radiological or « be assumed that such attempts will never

be successful in the future.

Third, accidents

Granoff 10 [Jonathan, president of the Global Security Institute, senior advisor to the American Bar

Association¶s (ABA) Committee on Arms Control and National Security, co-chair of the ABA Blue Ribbon

Task Force on Nuclear Non- proliferation, and senior advisor to the Nobel Peace Laureate Summit, ³The

Process of Zero,´ World Policy Journal, Winter 09/10]History never stands still. The existence of nuclear weapons amplifies « heightens the frightening

prospect of the possible use of nuclear weapons.

Fourth, weapon ambiguity

Shull 05 [Major in the United States Air Force, Todd C. Shull (M.S. @ University of North Dakota),

³CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE: VALUABLE MILITARY OPTION OR THREAT TO

GLOBAL STABILITY?´ Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master

of Arts in Security Studies from Naval Postgraduate School, September 2005]

For terrestrially-based concepts, the single « presence of enduring launch-on-warning postures.

These risks compound every year ± making extinction inevitable in the long run

Harrell 09 [Eben, writer for Time, 2-20-09, The Nuclear Risk: How Long Will Our Luck Hold?http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1880702,00.html#ixzz0dt55cGcXhttp://www.time.com/time/

world/article/0,8599,1880702,00.html]There There are hundreds of these and similar land-based ... to ask

after this latest nervy episode: is it worth it?

Plan makes wars less destructive Sagan 09 [Scott D. Sagan, a Fellow of the American Academy since

2008, is Professor of Political Science and Codirector of the Center for International Security and

Cooperation at Stanford University. He is Codirector of the American Academy's Initiative on the Global

Nuclear Future, Daedalus. Boston: Fall 2009. Vol. 138, Iss. 4; pg. 157, 13 pgs]

Some are pessimistic about the prospects for « the consequences of individual failures of wisdom and

prudence.

Advantage : Iran

Iran will get nuclear ballistic missiles in a year ± multiple intelligence sources agree

Kimery 3-4-10 [Anthony L., award-wining editor and journalist who has covered national and global

security, intelligence and defense issues for two decades, ³Iran Close to Having Nukes, DOD Official Tells

Oil Execs´ http://www.hstoday.us/content/view/12389/149/]

Intelligence collected by Western spy agencies strongly indicates ... fears that Iran may be secretly

working on developing nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles.



A new wave of sanctions is coming ± they will fail without international cooperation

Solomon and Lyons 3-4-10 [Jay and John are writers for the WSJ, ³New Hurdle to Iran Sanctions,´

online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704541304575099972132770104.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDD

LETopStories]

The Obama administration, still struggling to win China's ... sanctions regime, whether endorsed by the

U.N. or not.

A strong diplomatic push is necessary to get others on board

Richter 2-25-10 [Paul, LA Times, Unity lacking for U.N. sanctions against Iran,

http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/25/world/la-fg-iran-sanctions26-2010feb26]

Reporting from Washington ² As many as four countries « agreed Daniel Brumberg, a specialist on the

Muslim world at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Specifically, the nuclear double standard must be resolved

Makinda 2-12-10 [Professor of Politics and International Studies @ Murdoch University ± 02/12, Sam,

³West applying double standards,´ Business Daily Africa, 12 February

http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Opinion%20&%20Analysis/-/539548/860118/-/sujnm6z/-/]

The continuing diplomatic row over Iran¶s « advancing international peace and security if it is done inisolation.

Eliminating the nuclear double standard boosts negotiation credibility

Schell 07 [Jonathan Schell, the Harold Willens Peace Fellow at The Nation Institute, ³The Old and New

Shapes of Nuclear Danger,´ The Nation, December 24, 2007, p. 11-18]

There are important differences, of course. The new « presented more quickly, for a critical moment of

decision has already arrived.

Effective sanctions force Iranian concessions and spur regime change ± lobbying by the US is key

Gerecht and Dubowitz 2-23-10 [Reuel Marc was former Central Intelligence Agency officer, is a senior

fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies; and Mark, ³The case for gasoline sanctions on

Iran,´ http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703315004575073682694222948.html] Are gasoline sanctions against Iran a bad idea? President Barack « commerce with the United States or

diminishing trade with Iran.

This stops their nuclear program and avoids an Israeli strike

Kagan 1-27-10 [Robert, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, How

Obama can reverse Iran's dangerous course, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2010/01/26/AR2010012602122.html]

Imagine an Iran whose educated, inventive and highly ... to reverse their strategic and ideological

debacle. But he cannot wait too long.

Israel will attack by the end of the year Zenko 3-4-10 [Micah Zenko, Fellow for Conflict Prevention, A Predictable Catastrophe,

http://www.cfr.org/publication/21585/predictable_catastrophe.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fby_ty

pe%2Fop_ed]

To analyze the likelihood of an Israeli strike on Iran in « Israeli strike might be the foreseeable

catastrophe of 2010.

The US would get drawn in

Phillips 1-15-10 [Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs @ Heritage Foundation [James



Phillips, ³An Israeli Preventive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Sites: Implications for the U.S.,´ Backgrounder

#2361, January 15, 2010, pg. http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/bg2361.cfm]

The Iranian regime's drive for nuclear weapons, rapid ... Israel's right to take action in self-defense

against Iran's growing threat;

Extinction

Morgan 09 [Professor of Current Affairs @ Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, South Korea (Dennis

Ray Morgan, ³World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction

of the human race´, Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10, December 2009, Pages 683-693, ScienceDirect]

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the ... a savage toll upon the environment and

fragile ecosphere as well.

Iran prolif causes global nuclear war - multiple scenarios

Rubin 09 [Barry, director of Global Research in Int'l Affairs, Center in Israel and editor of the Middle East

Review of International Affairs]

If and when Iran gets nuclear weapons it would set off ... avoid Iran getting nuclear weapons in the first

place.

Nuclear Iran collapses US-China relations, US leadership in East Asia and causes aggression against

Taiwan

Zambelis µ7 (Chris, Associate ± Helios Global (International Political Risk Analysis), China Brief 7:23, ³The

Iranian Nuclear Question in U.S.-China Relations´, 12-13,

http://www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=2373858)

The United States also shares many of the concerns ... architecture aimed at containing China in East

Asia.

US alliance structure in East Asia prevents regional instability and warNye ¶95 (Joseph, Prof. IR ±

Harvard, Foreign Affairs, ³The case for deep engagement´, 74:4, July, Proquest)

Political order is not sufficient to explain economic prosperity, ... alliances and friendships. That is what

we propose to do.

East Asian instability leads to World War II IKnight Ridder ¶00 (Jonathon S. Landay, ³Top administration

officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts´, 3-11, L/N)

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea ... security mechanism in place. There are

elements for potential disaster."

Anything short of total disarmament fails

Muller 08 [Harald Muller is director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt in Germany and a professor

of international relations at Frankfurt University, The Future of Nuclear Weapons in an Interdependent

World, The Washington Quarterly 31.2, Project Muse]

Taking complete nuclear disarmament as a serious and « national security of any party involved in the

process.

Prez key

Obama is in a battle with it over the direction of US nuke policy. The next month is key

van der Linden 1/10/10 - Contributing Editor @ Daily Kos [Page van der Linden (Former research assistant in a

physical inorganic research laboratory in the University of New Mexico Chemistry Department), " US National Security

Policy And Nuclear Weapons: Perspectives on the Nuclear ... ", Daily Kos (blog), pg. http://www.dailykos.com/



storyonly/2010/1/10/823593/- US-National-Security-Policy- And-Nuclear-Weapons:- Perspectives-on-the-

Nuclear- Posture-Review ]

What has also currently been addressed by ... structure?" not "why do we have it?"

He will blink first. Establishing a new nuclear agenda is less important than compromising

Westen 09 - Professor of Psychology and Psychiatry @ Emory University [Drew Westen, ´Leadership, Obama

Style,µ Huffington Post, Posted: November 2, 2009 11:38 AM, pg. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ drew-

westen/leadership-obama- style_b_342269.html ]

Genuine leadership means setting ... is well on his way to the thirty yard line.

His credibility is at risk. Obama needs to run roughshod over adversaries to prove that he is a fighter

Harrison 09 - Banking and finance specialist at the economic consultancy Global Macro Advisors. [ Edward Harrison

(Former diplomat in the foreign service.), "Obama: knowing when to be an asshole,µ Credit Writedowns, on 18

August 2009 at 6:16 am, pg. http://www.creditwritedowns. com/2009/08/obama-knowing- when-to-be-an-

asshole.html.

So, from a purely Machiavellian perspective, Obama ... fight will be come a true liability for the President.

The world is watching the nuke debate. He has to knock resisters inline to sustain his credibility

Butfoy 09 - Senior lecturer in international relations @ Monash University. [Andy Butfoy, ´Obama versus the

Pentagon,µ Inside Story, 25 September 2009, pg. http://inside.org.au/obama- versus-the-pentagon/ ]

The most interesting area of potential change... Iraq and Afghanistan.

That issue is key to international perceptions

Nye 09 ² Professor and former dean of Harvard·s Kennedy School of Government. [Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (PhD in political

science from Harvard. Former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. Former chair of the

National Intelligence Council. Former deputy assistant secretary of state for security assistance, science and technology.),

"Obama's Nuclear Agenda"Op-Ed, __Daily News Egypt__ , October 13, 2009, pg. http://belfercenter.ksg.

harvard.edu/publication/19633/ obamas_nuclear_agenda.html ]

How successful Obama is in ...taboo against the use of nuclear weapons.

Indecision signals weakness and leads bell igerence from our adversaries. The process is more important

than the decision

Bolton 09 - Senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute [John R. Bolton (Former U.S. ambassador to

the United Nations) ³The danger of Obama's dithering,´ Los Angeles Times, October 18, 2009, pg.

http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/18/opinion/oe-bolton18]

Weakness in American foreign policy ...direction of the next 39, we still have a long way to fall.

Obama¶s indecisiveness is the key internal linkBolton 09 - Senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute [John R. Bolton (Former U.S. ambassador to

the United Nations) ³Bolton on Obama's Afghanistan Decision: 'This Is Like a Slow-Motion Trainwreck',´

Fox News, Friday, November 13, 2009, Pg. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,574349,00.html]

JOHN BOLTON, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE U.N.: Right. Well, this is like a slow-motion ...

he's got a problem making hard decisions.

And, weak Obama risks global wars. One test of resolve will open the floodgates



Hanson 09 ± Senior Fellow in Residence in Classics and Military History @ Hoover Institution, Stanford

University [Dr. Victor Davis Hanson, ³Change, Weakness, Disaster, Obama: Answers from Victor Davis

Hanson,´ Interview with the Oregon Patriots, Resistnet.com, December 7, 2009 at 3:52pm, pg.

http://www.resistnet.com/group/oregon/forum/topics/change-weakness-disaster-obama/showLastReply.]

BC: Are we currently sending a message ... tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.

There are multiple scenarios

Peters 08 ± Former Foreign Area Officer, in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. [Ralph

Peters (Retired United States Army Lieutenant Colonel. Currently is a reporter who fouses on politics in

troubled countries), ³AMERICA THE WEAK: US RISKS TURMOIL UNDER PREZ O,´ Last Updated: 4:51

AM, New York Post, October 20, 2008, pg.

http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/item_GS5vnNwCO6UjfBPf3uobyM.]

IF Sen. Barack Obama is elected president, ...allowed to do what he wants.

Israel risks nuclear winter

Morgan 09 - Professor of Current Affairs @ Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, South Korea (Dennis

Ray Morgan, ³World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction

of the human race´, Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10, December 2009, Pages 683-693, ScienceDirect)

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, ... and fragile ecosphere as well.

Russia risks World War III

Hellman 08 ± professor of electrical engineering @ Stanford University. A renowned mathematician who

has worked for over 25 years during nuclear war risk assessment [Martin Hellman, ³Soaring, cryptographyand nuclear weapons,´ Asia Times, Oct 23, 2008, pg.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/JJ23Aa01.html]

A similar situation exists with ... ignoring the warning signs.

Obama must enact a policy change to control the nuclear bureaucracy. Presidential declaration is a

prerequisite

Cirincione 09 ± Nuclear non-proliferation expert & President of the Ploughshares Fund [Joseph Cirincione

(Former Director of nonproliferation and international policy programs @ Center for American Progress

and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) ³Interview with Global Zero signatory, JoeCirincione on Daily Kos,´ Global Zero, Sunday, August 16, 2009, Pg.

http://www.globalzero.org/en/interview-global-zero-signatory-joe-cirincione-daily-kos]

Unfortunately, it's still not being treated ... outcome unless it is predetermined

³Sole purpose´ creates a psychological shift that thwarts political opposition to the president¶s agenda

Evans 09 ± President of the International Crisis Group & Former Foreign Minister of Japan [Gareth Evans

(Co-chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament and



Professorial fellow in the School of Social and Political Sciences @ University of Melbourne) ³Getting to

Zero: An Interview With International Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Commission Co-Chair

Gareth Evans,´ Interviewed by Miles A. Pomper and Peter Crail, Arms Control Today » April 2009, pg.

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_4/Evans]

As far as a doctrinal shift, it ...should in turn engender in others.

The bureaucracy will push for ³usability´ as long as it is an option. An immediate restriction is key

Kimball 09 ± Executive Director of the Arms Control Association [Daryl Kimball (Former executive director

of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers), ³Reality Check: The Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombings in

Pictures,´ Arms Control Association, August 2009, pg.

http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/realitycheck.]

To back up his words with ... most terrible killing machines.

A direct order is key.

Smith 09 [Barron Young Smith, "These Are The President's Weapons" The New Republic, September 22,

2009 | 2:13 pmPg. http://www.tnr.com/print/blog/the-plank/these-are-the-presidents-weapons]

Yet none of that obscures the ... ask anyone for permission.

Only a presidential directive ensures Obama will fight the plan

Howell 05 - Professor of government @ Harvard University [William G. Howell, ³Unilateral Powers: A Brief

Overview,´ Presidential Studies Quarterly, Volume: 35. Issue: 3. Publication Year: 2005. Page Number:

417+Questia]

Having issued a directive, presidents ... goals throughout the federal bureaucracy.

MODELING INTERNAL LINK

Britian models our nuclear policy

Norton-Taylor, 5 [Richard, Guardian's security affairs editor, 10/5, Guardian, ³As the US lowers the

nuclear threshold, debate is stifled´,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/oct/05/foreignpolicy.freedomofinformation]

The circumstances in which the most powerful country ... has already decided, in private with

Washington.

Cutting British Trident solves nuclear war

Murphy, 9 [Joe, Political Editor, Cut in Trident submarine fleet µwould ease tensions¶, London Evening

Standard, http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23747523-gordon-browns-plan-to-scale-back-trident.do;jsessionid=86812A6DFCD2E2B234CB16AD35692670]

Foreign Secretary David Miliband today said a ...and was clearly timed to cheer up Labour activists

before next week's party conference.

That access Russia, China, and Iran

Rogers et al, 6 [Paul Rogers, Bradford School of Peace Studies, John Ainslie, Scottish CND, Bob



Aldridge, Pacific Life Research Center, Frank Barnaby, Oxford Research Group, Paul Ingram, British

American Security Information Council, Hans Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, Robert

Norris, Natural Resources Defense Council, Greg Mello, Los Alamos Study Group, Andy Oppenheimer,

Nuclear Weapons Consultant, Milan Rai, Justice Not Vengeance, Greenpeace, ³Why Britain Should Stop

Deploying Trident´, March, http://www.plrc.org/docs/GP_UK_Trident_Briefing_Paper.pdf ]

Even if the UK never intended to use Trident aggressively, its ... gives China a strong incentive to

upgrade its nuclear arsenal.

NUKE ENERGY DA ANSWERS

Non-unique ± their card

Squassoni 2009

³enthusiasm for nuclear energy´ ³still in operation´

Reducing reliance on nuclear weapons decreases the DOE nuclear weapons budget

Ling 2009

³obama particularly highlighted the´ ³New Mexico, California, Nevada, Tennessee and Idaho´

Nuclaer weapons funding trades-off with funding for nuke power ± cuts from the NNSA budget will be

funneled into nuclear energy programs

Munger 2009

³I¶d been trying unsuccessfully´ ³because that is the $64´

2AC WEAPONITIS--

IR predictions are feasible and effects

Chernoff 2005 ³The power of international theory: reforging the link to foreign policy making through

scientific enquiry,´ 157-9

³in the social sciences the´ « ³international stability from each scenario´

Root cause isn¶t offense²we can still solve something²no root causes ±violence is proximately caused

Curtler 1997 ³rediscovering values: coming to terms with postnmodernism´ 164-5

³at the same time, we´ ³problems with postmodernism, however.´

Structural violence is down

Russettt et al 2006 International studies quartlerly, 50:3, ³the declining risk of death in battle,´

³the correlates of war (COW)´ ³the end of the cold war´

Arms control creates momentum for peace

Knopf 1997 ³Coalitions and political movements: the lessons of the nuclear freeze,´ 157-8

³The anti-nuclear weapons movement´ « ³the end of the cold war´

Arms can create a war risk by justifying internvention which their authors concede

Mayer 1992 ³review: avoiding nuclear war´ 12:1 JSTOR

³the nuclear seduction, a´ « ³movement as they claim´

The alt fails

Robinowitch 1971



³stoning of America´ bulletin of the atomic scientists 27:9

³this appeared to many´ « ³ real and important improvement´

We solve fem

ONLY THROUGH A DECONSTRUCTION OF FOUNDATION THIS LANGUAGE RESTS UPON CAN AN

ALTERNATE DEPICTION OF REALITY BE CREATED THAT WOULD INCORPORATE INDIVIDUALSINTO THE DISUCSSION AND THUS DISPLACE THE DOMINATE MILITARIZED MASCULINE VOICE

THAT DE CONTEXTUALIZES THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE STATUS QUO. Cohn 1990 [Carol, Director of

the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, ³µClean Bombs¶ and Clean Language,´ Women,

Militarism, & War. Elshtain, Tobias. 1990 pg 50-51] However, I have been arguing throughout

this...conversations with each other will invent those futures.

BY UNDERSTANDING THE IMPLICATIONS THAT OUR CURRENT GENDERED LENS HAS ON OUR

VIEWING AND DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONRY OPENS SPACE FOR A FEMINIZED LENS

THAT HELPS DECONSTRUCT OTHER FORMS OF PATRIARCHAL OPPRESSION Peterson and

Runyan 99 [V. Spike and Anne, professor of political science at the University of Arizona and professor of

women¶s studies at Wright State University, Global Gender Issues, 2nd edition, 1999. p. 14-15) Gender

issues surface now because...transforming other oppressive hierarchies at work in the world.

IGNORANCE OF GENDER MAKES THEIR METHODOLOGY SUSPECT- ONLY BY INVESTIGATING

HOW REALITY IS CONSTITUTED CAN WE DEVELOP A BASIS FOR ACTION AND AVOID ERROR

REPLICATION Peterson and Runyan, professor of political science at the University of Arizona and

professor of women¶s studies at Wright State University, 1999 (V. Spike and Anne, Global Gender Issues,

2nd edition, p. 1-3) Whenever we study a topic, we....outdated maps are inadequate, and potentially

disastrous, guides.

Courts CP 2AC:

Perm shields

Katherine Perine, 2008 [6/12, Congress Unlikely to Try to Counter Supreme Court Detainee Ruling, CQ

Politics, online]

Thursday¶s decision, from a . . . made me do it.¶´

No solvency ± Only the President can alter Counterforce

FAS, 2009 [April 8, New Report Recommends Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Nuclear Disarmament]

This report argues that . . . be reevaluated and loosened.

No Solvency ± Presidential action key to prevent cooption

FAS, 2009 [April 8, New Report Recommends Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Nuclear Disarmament]

The president will need . . . directive might look.

The RRW program would cause US-Russian nuclear war

UCS, 2007 [³New Nuclear Weapons: Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW),´ May, online]

The RRW program would . . . based on false information.

Having Obama issue an Anti-Nuclear PDD brings his Administration in line ± Solving RRW

Ron Rosenbaum, 2009 [August 21, Slate, ³Will the Pentagon Thwart Obama¶s Dream of Zero? How



serious is the president about nuclear disarmament?, online]

He has yet to mobilize . . .is a dream denied.

ILAW ADV

nukes in turkey violate NPT (nuclear non prolif treaty) ILAW?

http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/nato.htm

nukes violate ilaw (adv)

http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/140/international-law-and-nuclear-weapons-does-the-continued-

development-of-advanced-nuclear-weapons-violate-international-law

nukes EVERYTHING

http://www.nuclearweaponslaw.com/Syllabus_Fordham_Law_2007.htm

nukes violate ilaw

http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/1997/05/00_illegality-nato.htm

nukes violate ilaw

http://jcsl.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/15/1/65

International Law is inevitable but US engagement is critical to its effectiveness

Institute for Energy and Environmental Research 2

and the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, Rule of Power or Rule of Law? An Assessment of U.S. Policies and Actions Regarding

Security-Related Treaties, May, http://www.ieer.org/reports/treaties/execsumm.pdf The evolution of international law since World War II is largely a response to the demands of states and individuals living within aglobal society with a deeply integrated world economy. In this global society, the repercussions of the actions of states, non-state actors,

and individuals are not confined within borders, whether we look to greenhouse gas accumulations, nuclear testing, the danger of

accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians that have taken place over the course of the last hundred years and stillcontinue. Multilateral agreements increasingly have been a primary instrument employed by states to meet extremely serious challenges

of this kind, for several reasons. They clearly and publicly embody a set of universally applicable expectations, including prohibited andrequired practices and policies. In other words, they articulate global norms, such as the protection of human rights and the prohibitionsof genocide and use of weapons of mass destruction. They establish predictability and accountability in addressing a given issue. States

are able to accumulate expertise and confidence by participating in the structured system established by a treaty. However, influentialU.S. policymakers are resistant to the idea of a treaty-based international legal system because they fear

infringement on U.S. sovereignty and they claim to lack confidence in compliance and enforcement mechanisms. This approach has

dangerous practical implications for international cooperation and compliance with norms. U.S. treaty partners do not enter into treaties expecting that they are only political commitments that can be overridden based on U.S.interests. When a powerful and influential state like the United States is seen to treat its legal obligations as a



matter of convenience or of national interest alone, other states will see this as a justification to relax or withdraw from their own commitments. When the United States wants to require another state to live up toits treaty obligations, it may find that the state has followed the U.S. example and opted out of compliance.

Effective international law solves every impact, includes warming, human rights and

nuclear war

Institute for Energy and Environmental Research 2

and the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, Rule of Power or Rule of Law? An Assessment of U.S. Policies and Actions RegardingSecurity-Related Treaties, May, http://www.ieer.org/reports/treaties/execsumm.pdf

The evolution of international law since World War II is largely a response to the demands of states and individuals living within a

global society with a deeply integrated world economy. In this global society, the repercussions of the actions of states, non-

state actors, and individuals are not confined within borders, whether we look to greenhouse gas accumulations,nuclear testing, the danger of accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians that have taken place over the

course of the last hundred years and still continue. Multilateral agreements increasingly have been a primary instrumentemployed by states to meet extremely serious challenges of this kind, for several reasons. They clearly and publicly embody a set of universally applicable expectations, including prohibited and required practices and policies. In other words,

they articulate global norms, such as the protection of human rights and the prohibitions of genocide and useof weapons of mass destruction. They establish predictability and accountability in addressing a given issue. States are ableto accumulate expertise and confidence by participating in the structured system established by a treaty.

However, influential U.S. policymakers are resistant to the idea of a treaty-based international legal system because they fear

infringement on U.S. sovereignty and they claim to lack confidence in compliance and enforcement mechanisms. This approach hasdangerous practical implications for international cooperation and compliance with norms. U.S. treaty partners do not enter into treatiesexpecting that they are only political commitments that can be overridden based on U.S. interests. When a powerful and influential state

like the United States is seen to treat its legal obligations as a matter of convenience or of national interest alone, other states will see thisas a justification to relax or withdraw from their own commitments. When the United States wants to require another state to live up toits treaty obligations, it may find that the state has followed the U.S. example and opted out of compliance.



1AC ± International Law (13/18)

Scenario One ± Environment

Broader incorporation of international law solves biodiversity loss.Glennon, Board of Editors, American Journal of International Law, 90 [Michael, Board of Editors @

American Journal of Intl Law, Jan., 84 A.J.I.L. 1]

It is now possible to conclude that customary international law requires states to take appropriate steps to protectendangered species. Customary norms are created by state practice "followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."

250 Like highly codified humanitarian law norms that have come to bind even states that are not parties to the instruments

promulgating them, 251 wildlife protection norms also have become binding on nonparties as customary law. Closely

related to this process of norm creation by practice is that of norm creation by convention: customary norms are created byinternational agreements "when such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely

accepted." 252 Several such [*31] agreements are directed at wildlife protection, 253 and CITES is one of them. It is intended for

adherence by states generally 254 and is accepted by the 103 states that have become parties. In addition, some nonparties complywith certain CITES documentary requirements so as to trade with parties. 255 CITES is not "rejected by a significant number of states"; 256 only the United Arab Emirates has withdrawn from the agreement. In such circumstances, the International Court of

Justice has observed, international agreements constitute state practice and represent law for nonparties. 257 Moreover, customarynorms are created by "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." 258 Because CITES requires domestic

implementation by parties to it, 259 and because the overall level of compliance seems quite high, 260 the general principles embodied in states' domestic endangered species laws may be relied upon as another source of customarylaw. 261 Even apart from the CITES requirements, states that lack laws protecting endangered species seem now to be the clear

exception rather than the rule. 262 That there exists opinio juris as to the binding character of this obligation 263 is suggested by thefirm support given endangered species [*32] protection by the UN General Assembly and various international conferences. 264

Extinction

Diner 94 (Diner, David N. B.S. Recipient. Ohio State University. J.D. Recipient. College of Law. Ohio State University. LL.M. The Judge

Advocate General¶s School. United States Army. Judge Advocate¶s General¶s Corps. United States Army. ³The Army and the EndangeredSpecies Act: Who¶s Endangering Whom?´ Military Law Review. 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161. Winter, 1994. Lexis-Nexis.)

No species has ever dominated its fellow species as man has. In most cases, people have assumed the God-like power of life and death --

extinction or survival -- over the plants and animals of the world. For most of history, mankind pursued this domination with asingleminded determination to master the world, tame the wilderness, and exploit nature for the maximum benefit of the human race.n67 In past mass extinction episodes, as many as ninety percent of the existing species perished, and yet the world moved forward, and

new species replaced the old. So why should the world be concerned now? The prime reason is the world's survival. Like all animal life,

humans live off of other species. At some point, the number of species could decline to the point at which theecosystem fails, and then humans also would become extinct. No one knows how many [*171] species the world needs to

support human life, and to find out -- by allowing certain species to become extinct -- would not be sound policy. In addition to food,species offer many direct and indirect benefits to mankind. n68 2. Ecological Value. -- Ecological value is the value that species have inmaintaining the environment. Pest, n69 erosion, and flood control are prime benefits certain species provide to man. Plants and animals

also provide additional ecological services -- pollution control, n70 oxygen production, sewage treatment, and biodegradation. n71 3.Scientific and Utilitarian Value. -- Scientific value is the use of species for research into the physical processes of the world. n72Without plants and animals, a large portion of basic scientific research would be impossible. Utilitarian value is the direct utility humans

draw from plants and animals. n73 Only a fraction of the [*172] earth's species have been examined, and mankind may somedaydesperately need the species that it is exterminating today. To accept that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeasternshrew n74 could save mankind may be difficult for some. Many, if not most, species are useless to man in a direct utilitarian sense.

Nonetheless, they may be critical in an indirect role, because their extirpations could affect a directly useful species negatively. In a

closely interconnected ecosystem, the loss of a species affects other species dependent on it. n75 Moreover, as thenumber of species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dramatically. n76 4. Biological Diversity. -- The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. n77 As the current

mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems byreducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications.Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. Theseecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a

stress. . . .[l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple,

unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." n79 By causing widespread extinctions,humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are

relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction,

with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new



extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, [hu]mankind may beedging closer to the abyss.




Scenario Two ± Leadership

Multiple factors make unipolarity unsustainableHaass 8 Richard, President of the Council on Foreign Relations (Bottom of Form The Age of Nonpolarity What Will Follow U.S.

Dominance, Foreign Affairs, May/June)

But even if great-power rivals have not emerged, unipolarity has ended. Three explanations for its demise stand out. Thefirst is historical. States develop; they get better at generating and piecing together the human, financial, and technological resources that le ad to

productivity and prosperity. The same holds for corporations and other organizations. The rise of these new powers cannot be stopped. The

result is an ever larger number of actors able to exert influence regionally or globally. A second cause is U.S. policy.

To paraphrase Walt Kelly's Pogo, the post-World W ar II comic hero, we have met the explanation and it is us. By both what it has done and what it has

failed to do, the United States has accelerated the emergence of alternative power cente rs in the world and has weakened its own position relative to them.U.S. energy policy (or the lack thereof) is a driving force behind the end of unipolarity. Since the first oil shocks of the 1970s, U.S.

consumption of oil has grown by approximately 20 percent, and, more important, U.S. imports of petroleum products have more

than doubled in volume and nearly doubled as a percentage of consumption. This growth in demand for foreign oil has helped drive up

the world price of oil from just over $20 a barrel to over $100 a barrel in less than a decade. The result is an enormous transfer of

wealth and leverage to those states with energy reserves. In short, U.S. energy policy has helped bring about the emergence of oil andgas producers as major power centers. U.S. economic policy has played a role as well. President Lyndon Johnson was widely criticized

for simultaneously fighting a war in Vietnam and increasing domestic spending. President Bush has fought costly wars in Afghanistanand Iraq, allowed discretionary spending to increase by an annual rate of eight percent, and cut taxes. As a result, the United States'fiscal position declined from a surplus of over $100 billion in 2001 to an estimated deficit of approximately $250 billion in 2007.

Perhaps more relevant is the ballooning current account deficit, which is now more than six percent of GDP. This places downward pressure on the dollar, stimulates inflation, and contributes to the accumulation of wealth and power elsewhere in the world. Poor regulation of the U.S. mortgage market and the credit crisis it has spawned have exacerbated these problems. The war in Iraq has also

contributed to the dilution of the United States' position in the world. The war in Iraq has proved to be an expensive war of choice --militarily, economically, and diplomatically as well as in human terms. Years ago, the historian Paul Kennedy outlined his thesis about"imperial overstretch," which posited that the United States would eventually decline by overreaching, just as other great powers had inthe past. Kennedy's theory turned out to apply most immediately to the Soviet Union, but the United States -- for all its correctivemechanisms and dynamism -- has not proved to be immune. It is not simply that the U.S. military will take a generation to recover fromIraq; it is also that the United States lacks sufficient military assets to continue doing what it is doing in Iraq, much less assume new

burdens of any scale elsewhere. Finally, today's nonpolar world is not simply a result of the rise of other states and organizations or

of the failures and follies of U.S. policy. It is also an inevitable consequence of globalization. Globalization has increased the

volume, velocity, and importance of cross-border flows of just about everything, from drugs, e-mails, greenhouse gases, manufacturedgoods, and people to television and radio signals, viruses (virtual and real), and weapons. Globalization reinforces nonpolarity in two

fundamental ways. First, many cross-border flows take place outside the control of governments and without their knowledge. As a

result, globalization dilutes the influence of the major powers. Second, these same flows often strengthen the capacitiesof nonstate actors, such as energy exporters (who are experiencing a dramatic increase in wealth owing to transfers from importers),

terrorists (who use the Internet to recruit and train, the international banking system to move resources, and the global transport systemto move people), rogue states (who can exploit black and gray markets), and Fortune 500 firms (who quickly move personnel andinvestments). It is increasingly apparent that being the strongest state no longer means having a near monopoly on power. It is easier

than ever before for individuals and groups to accumulate and project substantial power. NONPOLAR DISORDER Theincreasingly nonpolar world will have mostly negative consequences for the United States -- and for much of the rest of the

world as well. It will make it more difficult for Washington to lead on those occasions when it seeks to promote

collective responses to regional and global challenges. One reason has to do with simple arithmetic. Herding dozens is harder than

herding a few. The inability to reach agreement in the Doha Round of global t rade talks is a telling example. Nonpolarity will also increase the number of

threats and vulnerabilities facing a country such as the United States. These threats can take the form of rogue states, te rrorist groups, energy producersthat choose to reduce their output, or central banks whose action or inaction can create conditions that affect the role and strength of the

U.S. dollar. The Federal Reserve might want to think twice before continuing to lower interest rates, lest it precipitate a further moveaway from the dollar. There can be worse things than a recession. Iran is a case in point. Its effort to become a nuclear power is a resultof nonpolarity. Thanks more than anything to the surge in oil prices, it has become another meaningful concentration of power, one ableto exert influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinian territories, and beyond, as well as within OPEC. It has many sources of

technology and finance and numerous markets for its energy exports. And due to nonpolarity, the United States cannot manage Iranalone. Rather, Washington is dependent on others to support political and economic sanctions or block Tehran's access to nuclear technology and materials. Nonpolarity begets nonpolarity.




Unilateralism causes international and domestic backlash, terrorism, and mass

proliferation resulting in isolationismIk enberry 2 G. John Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice @ Georgetown, October ("America's Imperial Ambition ± Foreign

Affairs) p. lexis

Pitfalls accompany this neoimperial grand strategy, however. Unchecked U.S. power , shorn of legitimacy and disentangled from

the postwar norms and institutions of the international order, will usher in a more hostile international system, making itfar harder to achieve American interests. The secret of the United States' long brilliant run as the world's leading state was its

ability and willingness to exercise power within alliance and multinational frameworks, which made its power and agenda moreacceptable to allies and other key states around the world. This achievement has now been put at risk by the administration's new

thinking. The most immediate problem is that the neoimperialist approach is unsustainable. Going it alone might well succeed

in removing Saddam Hussein from power, but it is far less certain that a strategy of counterproliferation, based on American willingness

to use unilateral force to confront dangerous dictators, can work over the long term . An American policy that leaves theUnited States alone to decide which states are threats and how best to deny them weapons of mass destruction will lead to adiminishment of multilateral mechanisms -- most important of which is the nonproliferation regime. The Bush

administration has elevated the threat of WMD to the top of its security agenda without investing its power or prestige in fostering,monitoring, and enforcing nonproliferation commitments. The tragedy of September 11 has given the Bush administration the authority

and willingness to confront the Iraqs of the world. But that will not be enough when even more complicated cases come along -- when it

is not the use of force that is needed but concerted multilateral action to provide sanctions and inspections. Nor is it certain that a

preemptive or preventive military intervention will go well; it might trigger a domestic political backlash to American-led

and military-focused interventionism. America's well-meaning imperial strategy could undermine the principled multilateral

agreements, institutional infrastructure, and cooperative spirit needed for the long-term success of nonproliferation goals. The specific

doctrine of preemptive action poses a related problem: once the United States feels it can take such a course, nothing will stop other countries from doing the same. Does the United States want this doctrine in the hands of Pakistan, or even China or Russia? After all, itwould not require the intervening state to first provide evidence for its actions. The United States argues that to wait until all the

evidence is in, or until authoritative international bodies support action, is to wait too long. Yet that approach is the only basis that the

United States can use if it needs to appeal for restraint in the actions of others. Moreover, and quite paradoxically , overwhelmingAmerican conventional military might, combined with a policy of preemptive strikes, could lead hostile states to

accelerate programs to acquire their only possible deterrent to the United States: WMD. This is another version of

the security dilemma, but one made worse by a neoimperial grand strategy. Another problem follows. The use of force to eliminate

WMD capabilities or overturn dangerous regimes is never simple, whether it is pursued unilaterally or by a concert of major states. After the military intervention is over, the target country has to be put back together. Peacekeeping and state building are inevitably required,as are long-term strategies that bring the un, the World Bank, and the major powers together to orchestrate aid and other forms of

assistance. This is not heroic work, but it is utterly necessary. Peacekeeping troops may be required for many years, even after a newregime is built. Regional conflicts inflamed by outside military intervention must also be calmed. This is the "long tail" of burdens andcommitments that comes with every major military action. When these costs and obligations are added to America's imperial military

role, it becomes even more doubtful that the neoimperial strategy can be sustained at home over the long haul -- the classic problem of imperial overstretch. The United States could keep its military predominance for decades if it is supported by a growing and increasingly

productive economy. But the indirect burdens of cleaning up the political mess in terrorist-prone failed states levy a hidden cost.

Peacekeeping and state building will require coalitions of states and multilateral agencies that can be brought into the process only if theinitial decisions about military intervention are hammered out in consultation with other major states. America's older realist and liberal

grand strategies suddenly become relevant again. A third problem with an imperial grand strategy is that it cannot generatethe cooperation needed to solve practical problems at the heart of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. In the fighton terrorism, the United States needs cooperation from European and Asian countries in intelligence, lawenforcement, and logistics. Outside the security sphere, realizing U.S. objectives depends even more on a continuous stream of

amicable working relations with major states around the world. It needs partners for trade liberalization, global financial stabilization,environmental protection, deterring transnational organized crime, managing the rise of China, and a host of other thorny challenges. But

it is impossible to expect would-be partners to acquiesce to America's self-appointed global security protectorate and then pursue

business as usual in all other domains. The key policy tool for states confronting a unipolar and unilateral America is to withholdcooperation in day-to-day relations with the United States. One obvious means is trade policy; the European response to the recent

American decision to impose tariffs on imported steel is explicable in these terms. This particular struggle concerns specific trade issues, but it is also a struggle over how Washington exercises power. The United States may be a unipolar military power, but economic and political power is more evenly distributed across the globe. The major states may not have much leverage in directly restrainingAmerican military policy, but they can make the United States pay a price in other areas. Finally, the neoimperial grand strategy poses awider problem for the maintenance of American unipolar power. It steps into the oldest trap of powerful imperial states: self-encirclement. When the most powerful state in the world throws its weight around, unconstrained by rules or norms of legitimacy, it

risks a backlash. Other countries will bridle at an international order in which the United States plays only by its own rules. The proponents of the new grand strategy have assumed that the United States can single-handedly deploy military power abroad and notsuffer untoward consequences; relations will be coarser with friends and allies, they believe, but such are the costs of leadership. Buthistory shows that powerful states tend to trigger self-encirclement by their own overestimation of their power. Charles V, Louis XIV,




Proliferation causes nuclear war ±it uniquely increases the risk and magnitude of conflicts.Sok olski 9 (Henry, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and serves on the US congressional Commission on

the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, ³Avoiding a nuclear crowd,´ Policy Review, June/July) AT A MINIMUM, such developments will be a departure from whatever stability existed during the Cold War. After World War II,

there was a clear subordination of nations to one or another of the two superpowers' strong alliance systems ² the U.S.-led free worldand the Russian-Chinese led Communist Bloc. The net effect was relative peace with only small, nonindustrial wars. This alliancetension and system, however, no longer exist. Instead, we now have one superpower, the United States, that is capable of overthrowing

small nations unilaterally with conventional arms alone, associated with a relatively weak alliance system (NATO) that includes twoEuropean nuclear powers (France and the UK). NATO is increasingly integrating its nuclear targeting policies. The U.S. also hasretained its security allies in Asia (Japan, Australia, and South Korea) but has seen the emergence of an increasing number of nuclear or

nuclearweapon- armed or -ready states. So far , the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by makingthem "strategic partners" (e.g., India and Russia), NATO nuclear allies (France and the UK), "non-NATO allies" (e.g., Israel and

Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea,

which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world, every nuclear power center (our

European nuclear NATO allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic security

relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as being as

important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure 3). There are limits, however, to what

this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming

analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no

power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states

or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washingtoncould have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize suchthreatening or unstable nuclear states.^^ Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each

of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted

above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear

deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and

nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear state's military would

place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that

are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced militarystates will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance

munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly, in such a world, relations betweenstates could become far less stable. Relatively small developments ² e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad

provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities inIran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in

the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. ² could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with "strategic" consequences (arms

races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war ). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world "every quarrel or difference of

opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today."^^ In short, we may soon see a future

that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want.



in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an eraof burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult

as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retractionof American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.




U.S. credibility in international is key to leadership ± it stabilized US power, reduces

backlash against unilateralism and increases overall credibilityK risch 3 [Nico. Senior Fellow @ the Center for International Studies @ NYU Law. Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy ± edited by Malone

and Khong. Pp. 62-63] However, when international instruments reflect U.S. policy preferences vis-à-vis other states ± as they often do (eg., in the area of armscontrol) ± careful analysis is needed on whether unilateral action can render similar results or whatever even the short-term interests of the United States demand adherence to the treaty. Even the United States itself recognizes the value of legal regulation of international

relations, as the description of its attempts to create and enforce law by unilateral means has shown. It is not ready to renounce law as aninstrument, because law stabilizes expectations and reduces the costs of later negotiation and of the enforcement of certain policies.Thus, the question is whether it is in the U.S. interest to accept the more egalitarian process of international law instead of using

unilateral, hierarchal legal instruments. Although it is impossible to enter into a comprehensive discussion of the general value of

international law in this chapter, I shall outline at least some arguments in favor of such an acceptance. First, a stronger use of international law could help stabilize the current predominant positions of the United States. If the UnitedStates now concludes that treaties with other states that reflect its superior negotiating power (even if not to the

degree the United States would wish), U.S. preferences can shape international relations in a longer perspective, aschange in international law is slower and more difficult than political change. It is worthwhile noting that past great

powers similarly influenced the international legal order to such a degree that it is possible to divide the history of international law intoepochs dominated by these powers ± epochs that have left many traces in contemporary law. Second, even if the U.S. power continues to

increase and this argument therefore appears to be less appealing, the United States can gain from stronger reliance on

international law because the law can help legitimize its current exercise of power. Unilateralism ininternational politics is always regarded suspiciously by other states, and it is quite probable that perceptions of

³imperialism´ or ³bully hegemony´ will lead to stronger reactions by other states in the long run. Already now, some states show greater unity. Although it remains to be seen whether in the Case of Russia and China this greater unity is only symbolic, other instances, such

as the strong stance of the like-minded states in the ICC, indicate a more substantive regrouping in the face of U.S. predominance.

Similarly, the accelerated integration of the EU can be regarded as caused in part by the desire to counterbalance the United States. IFthe United States were able to channel its power into the more egalitarian process of international law, itcould gain much more legitimacy for its exercise of power and significantly reduce the short and long termcosts of its policies. This has been recognized in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001,

and the U.S. president not only sought to build an international ad hoc coalition but also taken steps to bolster the international legalregime against terrorism, in particular by transmitting conventions against terrorism to the Senate in order to proceed with ratification.Multilateralism is certainly valued more highly by U.S. administration since the attacks, but reluctance still prevails in many areas, as

enduring U.S. opposition to the ICC and to the additional protocol to the BWC shows. Third, it is highly questionable whether theUnited States will in fact be able to pursue its strategy of subjecting international law in the future. In the past, it might have been

possible to exert significant influence on the content of international agreements and then not subscribe to them. Repeating this in the

future is likely to be more difficult ± as the United States discovered in the case of the ICC statute after a certain point. As one observer to the ICC negotiations notes: Increasingly, the other delegations felt that it would be better to stop giving in to the Untied States; they

believed that the United States would never be satisfied with the concessions it got and ultimately would never sign the treaty for

completely unrelated domestic political reasons. Similarly, the use of reservations in order to secure a privileged position has becomeincreasingly difficult as other states become wary of this strategy and seek to foreclose the possibility of reservations to new treatiesentirely, as in the ICC statute and the Ottawa Convention. And discontent with U.S. behavior might backfire in unexpected

circumstances ± as with the loss of the seat in the Commission for Human Rights, or the suit brought and vigorously defended by

Germany in the LaGrand case. In general, these effects are likely to undermine the U.S. capacity for leadership whichto a large degree is based on reputation, credibility, and persuasiveness ± not only on brute power. Moreover, as

the United States discovered in its failure to achieve desired goals in the climate change and the landmine negotiations, leadership can be barred by too great a difference in opinion between the leader and those to be led. Compromise may thus be necessary to maintain the

momentum to lead. The United States may be forced to choose between engagement, leadership, and control, on the one hand, and free-riding, isolation, and a loss of influence on the other.

CONSULT NATO

nato would say no/ discussing removal of weapons with allies key to relations

http://en.trend.az/regions/world/usa/1653851.html



nato would say yes

http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/02/20

nato would say no

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/22/AR2010042201714.html

A2 REARM

a2 rearm

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons.pdf

A2 TURKEY PROLIF

First off extend Bell 09, the first card in the 1AC. Not only do TNWs lack any strategic value, but if you

look into the warrants it says no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik

(Incirlik is the base housing the B-61 TNWs). This is public data which means no one, even Iran, will

consider this a deterrent. The bombs cant even be used in their defense.

Also, extend my Ingram 09 inherency evidence your disad is inevitable. TNWs will be inevitably

removed in the future, but if we wait too long the costs will raise and we will lose the clarity of our

purpose which in turn closes the doors for an alliance and cooperation which is key in the fight for

Nuclear Zero.

On to the line-by-line.

Even if we pull out our nuclear weapons, it seems Turkey is too heavily rooted in non-proliferation

efforts to start making nuclear arms of their own according to his NTI 09 evidence. Turkey wouldnt

think about starting a nuclear weapons program af ter taking such a strong non-proliferation posture or

they would risk their credibility with all non-proliferation alliances.

The Disarm Counterplan

Text: The United States federal government should completely disarm itself of all nuclear weapons,

other than B-61 Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Turkey. Well clarif y.



The CP doesnt solve ANY of the 1AC advantages, if you refer back to the 1AC all my internal links to

proliferation and nuclear war are specific to the B-61 TNWs stationed in Turkey and the Russia

advantage as stated in cross-x of the 1AC is best solved by Turkey. Russia wont care about the other

nuclear weapons because youre leaving a stockpile right in their front yard! Turkey TNWs is the most immediate threat to Russia and as stated before trying to get Russia to disarm before we do in Turkey is

like saying Put down your nukes even though we have 80 of them just down the street. Russia wont

cooperate without the plans passage so the plan has a huge solvency deficit over this CP. Besides, the CP

happens af ter the plan passes. In case you missed the Nuclear Zero part.

Also the CP advocates disarming nuclear weapons not elimination. Disarmed nukes can be rearmed,

making the proliferation impacts underlined in the 1AC inevitable post the CP.

The TNW Counterplan

Text: President Obama should issue an Executive Order to substantially reduce military presence by

eliminating all U.S. B-61 Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy.

Well clarif y.

This CP also has a huge solvency deficit. It cant claim either of the advantages of the 1AC, just refer to

my rant above on the last CP. Also my second Bell 09 card assumes that out of the 5 TNW holdingcountries Turkey is the key piece to the disarmament puzzle because of its geographical region and it

houses almost half of the TNWs split between the 5 alone. Turkey is the only country that would send a

message not only by encouraging Russia to eliminate their weapons, but the strengthen the NPT

conference which is key in the non-proliferation effort.

The Consult Counterplan

Text: The United States federal government should enter into binding consultation with Japan and

propose that President Obama ought to issue an Executive Order to substantially reduce military

presence by eliminating all U.S. B-61 Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Turkey. The United States federal

government will allow minor modifications and implement the result of the consultation. Well clarif y.



First off there is a solvency deficit because there is no guarantee Japan says yes, so the CP is already

shaky. Also the CP doesnt solve the proliferation advantage extend my Van 9 evidence that Removing

U.S. TNWs from Turkey UNILATERALLY would motivate countries like Russia to make large efforts in

clearing their own arsenals and strengthens the NPT/ Review causing a spillover The key word

unilaterally Im not sure if I made that large enough in the 1AC. As you can see, not a single one of these

CPs solve the entirety of the case.

Onto the line-by-line

The Bergsten et al. 01 evidence that says consult is key to the alliance says that the kind of consultation

that is key is both economic and security issues. If there is a single economic or security issue that we

havent consulted Japan on in the last nine years either A. the net benefit is non-unique or B. It wont

matter if we dont consult because they will just not care like the last nine years. Dont give them the net

benefit, its ridiculous because the entire scenario depends on this card.

AND

US assurance solves, no consultations on nuclear policies so far because Japan doesnt want to be

involved in our nuclear strategies so the CP wouldnt pass

Satoh 9 [Yukio - the japan institute of international affairs. are the requirements for extended

deterrence changing? Monday, april 6, 2009 carnegie international nonproliferation

CONFERENCE http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1299]

Strategically, Japans adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles depends largely, if not solely, upon

the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, or more specifically, the credibility of the United States

commitment to provide deterrence for Japan. In coping with conceivable nuclear threats, the

Japanese government has hitherto expressed no more than sheer and total dependence upon the

American deterrence. The present Defense Programs Outlines, which was adopted by the cabinet in

2004, for example, takes the position that to protect its territory and people against the threat of

nuclear weapons, Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. This position has been

maintained ever since the first Defense Program Outlines was adopted in 1976. Unlike the case of

NATO, however, there have been no official consultations between Washington and Tokyo on how

American extended deterrence should function, nor even any mechanism put in place for such



consultations. This is largely, in my eyes, due to Japans reluctance to date to be involved in

American nuclear strategy.

This card is especially hot, theres no way Japan would even want to consult on the plan so theres no

risk of the net benefit.

AND

Strengthened US-Japan cooperation freaks out China causes miscalc and instability over Taiwan and

it expands their nuclear arsenal which is the opposite of what the CP tries to do

Park and Lee8 [ John Dir. Of the Korea Working Group at the US Institute of Peace, and Dong Sun Asst Prof of IR at Korea University. North Korea, in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security

in 21st

Century Asia. Ed. Muthiah Alagappa. p. 288]

While these measures are designedprimarily for self-defense, they are raising significant concerns in

Beijing, which regards them as potentially detrimental to its security interests. China suspects that the

strengthened cooperation between Washington and Tokyo might be an attempt to contain its growing

power and influence, and that the two allies' development of a missile defense might be aimed at

undermining China's nuclear deterrent (Friedberg 2005). Chinese officials are particularly concerned that

the joint missile defense system might be extended to include Taiwan, neutralizing their coercive

capabilities and facilitating the island's formal independence ( China's National Defense 2006; Cody

2006). IfJapan (which occupied parts of Chinese territory between 1931 and 1945) ac- quired any

offensive capability, Beijing also would suspect that Japan aggressively intended to expand its influence

at China's expense in order to dominate East Asia (Blanchard 2006). A Chinese Foreign Ministry

spokesman strongly criticized high-level Japanese politicians' consideration of a preemptive strike as

"extremely irresponsible" ( Yonhap News 2006a). In response to the increasing military capabilities of

its potential adversaries, China will likely expand its own nuclear arsenal to maintain an effective

deterrent against the United States (and Japan) and augment its missile and submarine capabilities to

restrain Taiwan. The United States and Japan might, in turn, interpret these Chinese moves as an

aggressive attempt at blackmail aimed at subjugating Taiwanand therefore take countermeasures,

such as an increase of their missile defense capabilities. More- over, Taiwan may also strengthen its ownmilitary capabilitiesfor example, by acquiring ballistic missiles and missile defense systemsto offset

China's aug- mented offensive capability. These reactions could further reinforce China's suspi- cions

about the two allies' intention and strengthen its effort to expand its military power. In the midst of this

arms buildup, mutual suspicion and tension would further grow, and the region would become

unstable.



Courts (301)

1. Multiple conditional worlds that include a K are a voter ±

skews 2AC strategy by creating multiple worlds. Worse than

multiple counterplans because answers to the K can¶t beleveraged as offense to the other counterplan. Not reciprocal

because we can¶t go for contradictory frameworks or

advantages as DAs to the status quo. Leads to run-and-gun

no risk offense for the negative that distracts from topic

education. Two conditional worlds of either CP or K solves

flexibility.

2. Perm --- do the CP --- we never specified an agent --- if

any part of the USFG should do the plan that¶s a reason to

vote aff.

3. No test case specification is a voting issue ± undermines akey area of ground for offense. Means the CP is a perversion

of normal means.

4. Perm do both- solves 100% of the net benefit because it

still has the Court incorporate Ilaw

5. Agent counterplans bad- steals the entirety of the 1AC-

particularly true in the context of an artificially competitive



net benefit- it forces the aff to generate offense to something

external- makes it impossible to be aff

6. Congress would overrule

Brickman 07 [Brickman, Danette. "Congressional Reaction to U.S. Supreme Court Decisions:

Understanding the Introduction of Legislation to Override", Southern Political Science Association, Jan

03, 2007, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p143265 _index.html]

Congress¶s policy-making realm is sometimes challenged by the U.S. Supreme Court when the Court

renders a decision reflecting a policy which conflicts with congressional preferences. At times this conflict

proceeds to a battle over national policy, culminating in Congress overriding the Court¶s decision. While

research on successful congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions has added to our understanding of Court-Congress interaction, missing from the discourse is an examination of initial congressional reaction, the

introduction of legislation in opposition to Supreme Court decisions. Using a unified dynamic approachwhich incorporates changing congressional preferences and

context this research examines the circumstances under which Congress introduces legislation to override Supreme Court decisions. The results revel that the

absolute distance between congressional preferences and the Court¶s policy statement, together with

various decision and saliency factors increase the probability that Congress will introduce legislation to

overturn Supreme Court decisions.

7. CPs without a solvency advocate are a voting issue ---

a. Predictability --- lack of solvency advocate means the

policy is not grounded in the literature --- makes it

impossible to research aff answers.

b. Education --- encourages contrived CPs that don¶t have

actual literature --- causes shallow and uneducationaldebates.



8. No solvency for ilaw- no reason ruling on the plan changes

all of the military deference

A2 EUROPE CP

Klaus Naumann, 5/19/2010, ³A Farewell to Nuclear Arms´ Project Syndicate,

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/naumann3/English

But the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from Europe is by no means the first step

towards nuclear disarmament. To suggest it as an opening move could damage European

security and jeopardize transatlantic cohesion, so the message has to be ³no´ to unilateral

withdrawal, but ³yes´ to including these weapons in future arms-control negotiations. Withdrawal

of these weapons would not mean the end of nuclear deterrence for Europe, as deterrence willremain necessary until the last nuclear weapon is dismantled. But the sole purpose of retaining

some degree of deterrence will be to deter the use of nuclear weapons.

Europe perhaps benefited more than any other part of the world from nuclear deterrence,

because it helped to preserve peace during the Cold War and prevented nuclear proliferation.

But the time has now come to join Presidents Obama and Medvedev in bringing about

disarmament. Indeed, without the US and Russian examples, the world would see more, not

fewer, nuclear-weapon states.

NOW IS KEY

NOW IS KEY ± GLOBAL MOMENTUM ENSURES SUCCESS

GLOBAL ZERO, 2009, ³The Beginning´, An organization impacted with Global Nuclear

Posture, http://www.globalzero.org/en/2009-review

We partnered with Avaaz.org at key global decis ion-making moments. When President Obama gave his his toric speech in Prague and called on other nations to join him in working towards a nuclear-free world, Avaaz members in France sent 23,000 emails to President Sarkozy urging him to

participate in multi-lateral negotiations for global zero. In July, before the Obama/Medvedev Summit, over 100,000 people fromevery country in the world signed the Global Zero declaration in just three days. This kind of

growth can only be achieved if all of us take a minute to tell our friends and family about Global Zero. If you haven't done so, please use our simple tool

to invite your friends and family to join our cause. In 2009, the Global Zero movement grew exponentially among

students f rom around the world. There are now more than 50 Global Zero Campus Chapters in10 countries. Global Zero leaders have spoken at universities worldwide , including on a panel at the

London School of Economics, which featured Her Majesty Queen Noor and Ambassador Richard Burt before a sold-out audience of over 400.

cards to cut organized

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