JESUS MA. CUIvs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, ROMULO CUI

G.R. NO. L-18727 AUGUST 31, 1964

FACTS:- Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and DoñaBenigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigentinvalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence bylegislation and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series ofdonations, principally the deed of donation.

- Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, incase of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, inthe order prescribed to them."- Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer theHospicio untilher death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and DionisioJakosalem who both died. Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became theadministrator.

- Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons ofMariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui.On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned infavor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them andembodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took hisoath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or ofhis brother's assumption of the position.

- Dr. Teodoro Cui died on August 27, 1960; on Sept 5, 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter tothe defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and the demand nothaving been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui lateron intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui,another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of theHospicio in their deed ofdonation.

- As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications tothe position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equalcircumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However,before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among thelegitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, omedico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estadomayor impuesto o contribucion."

- The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma.Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify himas one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and althoughdisbarred by this Court, he was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of theHospiciode Barili.

- Court a quo - decided in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado,"taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donationand considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given astrict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma ofBachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by theintervenor.

ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office ofadministrator. (YES)

RATIO: Whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not merepossession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after dueadmission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor's degree alone, conferredby a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holderto exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of personswho are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, andupon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as aconsequence.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of theSupreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations,taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificatebeing his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itselfhas little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with therequirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all theprescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary ofEducation." For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable:completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there areinstances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had notgone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinationsand to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessaryqualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such personsdo not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor ofLaws from some law school or university.

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing testadvisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should bea doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the onewho pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, becauseunder Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of theHospicio shall "make regulations for thegovernment of said institution; shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids andincapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute"; shall see to it that therules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of theAct; and shall administer properties of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to bepresumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be adistinct asset.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator.As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement tothe office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed ofdonation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant wasrestored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previousdisbarment were wiped out.

For the claim of intervener and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson ofVicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of theHospicio mentioned by them in thedeed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui,who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews.

Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he andtherefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contendsthat the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and successively tothe descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, heargues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cuiline, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenorbelongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.

Cayetano v. MonsodG.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991

Facts:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the

COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner

opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been

engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the

COMELEC.

On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,

petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said

confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be

declared null and void.

Issue:

Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987

Constitution?

Held:

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that there shall be a Commission on Elections

composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the

time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been

candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including

the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten

years.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade

of 86-55%. He has been dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73.

He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an

individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone

are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and

members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the

members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most

firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates."

Hence, the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation,

implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by

the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a

clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1

Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the

Commission's judgement. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power,

since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and

would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, he Court said that, Appointment is an essentially

discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only

condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the

appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been

preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can

decide.