Guy v. CA502 SCRA 151G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.:

Facts:1. The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the acknowledged  illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The minors were represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration before the RTC of Makati City.

2. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and not by counsel.

3. Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities.

4. The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could not have validly signed the waiver.  It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the wards

RULING: No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians must necessarily obtain judicial approval. repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court, the release or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived their supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which, according to the petitioner, the latter do not have.

As to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the heirs

The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the claimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in one complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to claim inheritance. (Briz v. Briz)

SILVERIO v. REPUBLICJuly 14, 2012 § Leave a comment

Silverio v. Republic

October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)

 

PARTIES:

petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio

respondent: Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:

On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel Jacinto” to

“Mely” and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for

reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but

thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is

consonance with the principle of justice and equality.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there

is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but

was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

HELD:

No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is

ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if

the change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the change of his name is that he intends his

first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court

says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the

birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the petition.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 174689             October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx       xxx       xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx       xxx       xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

AZNAR vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749

January 31, 1963

FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner Aznar according

to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest

of his estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her of

her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us an acknowledged

natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier case.

As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in

Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased

appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will

he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon

his California citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the

Philippines.

ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower

court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil

Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is

situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to

the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be

regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be

the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term

“national law” is used therein.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?

The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California

Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires. But

HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to

follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of

California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case, should govern the

determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen’s will, such law being in

force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists

that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the

renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to

the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in

In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the conflict of laws rules of California are

to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re

Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens

as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of

the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the

general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights

which follow the person of the owner.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law

is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets

of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.

It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there is no law to the contrary in

the place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of

the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in

said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be

sustained.

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil

Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the

reference or return of the question to the law of the testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in

California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in

California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can

not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of

determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two

states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The

Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the

decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of

California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of

the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing

them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the

Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the

appellant HELEN, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the

Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..

NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the

United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in

force only within the state. The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted

can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other

than the private law of the State of California.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. 139

SCRA 139October 8, 1985

Fact of the Case:

Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is

citizen of the Philippines while

private respondentRichard

Upton is a citizen of the United

States, were married on 1972

at Hongkong. On1982,

they got divorced in Nevada,

United States; and the petitione

r remarried toTheod

ore Van Dorn.On July

8, 1983,

private respondent filed suit

against petitioner, asking that

thepetitioner be ordered to

render an accounting of

her business in Ermita,

Manila, and bedeclared with

right to manage the conjugal

property. Petitioner

moved to dismiss the

caseon the ground that the

cause of action is barred by

previous judgement in the divorcep

roceeding before Nevada Court

where respondent acknowl

edged that they had nocomm

unity property. The lower

court denied the motion

to dismiss on the ground

that theproperty involved

is located in the Philippin

es, that the Divorce Decree

has no bearing inthe case.

Respondent avers that

Divorce Decree abroad cannot

prevail over theprohibitive

laws of the Philippines.

Issue:(1)Whether or not the

divorce obtained the spouse

valid to each of them.

(2)Whether or not Richard

Upton may assert his right

on conjugal properties.

Held:As to

Richard Upton

the divorce is binding

on him as an American

Citizen.As heis bound by the

Decision of his own country’

s Court, which validly exercise

d jurisdictionover him, and

whose decision he does not

repudiate, he is estopped by his

ownrepresentation before

said Court from assertin

g his right over the alleged

conjugalproperty. Only Philippin

e Nationals are covered

by the policy against absolute

divorcethe same being consider

ed contrary to our concept

of public policy and morality.

AliciaReyes under our

National law is still consider

ed married to private

respondent. However,petition

er should not be obliged

to live together with, observe

respect and fidelity, andrend

er support to private

respondent. The latter should

not continue to be one of

her heirswith possible

rights to conjugal property. She

should not be discriminated

against herown country if the

ends of justice are to

be served.Pilapil vs Ibay-SomeraTITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera

CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany.  They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.  Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in

January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.  The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”. 

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else.  Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned.  Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.    

Garcia-Recio vs. RecioTITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio

CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987.  They lived as husband and wife in Australia.  However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989. 

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City.  Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.  As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian.  However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree.  The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

Quita vs Court of Appeals

December 22, 1998

Fact of the Case:

Fe D. Quita, the petitione

r, and Arturo T. Padlan,

both Filipinos, were married

inthe Philippines on May 18,

1941. They got divorce

in San Francisco on July 23,

1954.Both of them remarrie

d another person. Arturo

remarried Bladina Dandan,

the respondentherewith.

They were blessed

with six children.On

April 16,

1972, when Arturo died, the

trial court was set to

declared as to whowill be the

intestate heirs. The trial court

invoking Tenchavez vs Escano

case held thatthe divorce

acquired by the petitioner is not

recognized in our country.

Private respondentstressed that

the citizenship of petitione

r was relevant in the light of

the ruling in VanDorn v.

Rommillo Jr that aliens who

obtain divorce abroad are

recognized in thePhilippnes

provided they are valid accordin

g to their national law. The

petitioner herselfanswered

that she was an American citizen

since 1954. Through the

hearing she alsostated that

Arturo was a Filipino at the

time she obtained the divorce.

Implying the shewas no

longer a Filipino citizen.

The Trial court disregar

ded the respondent’s stateme

nt. The net hereditary

estatewas ordered in favor

the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto,

the brother of Arturo.

Blandina and thePadlan

children moved for reconsid

eration. On February 15,

1988 partial reconsiderationw

as granted declaring the

Padlan children, with the exceptio

n of Alexis, entitled to one-

half of the estate to the

exclusion of Ruperto Padlan,

and the other half to Fe

Quita.Private respondent was

not declared an heir for her

marriage to Arturo was

declared voidsince it was celebrat

ed during the existenc

e of his previous marriage to

petitioner.Blandina and her

children appeal to the Court of

Appeals thatthe case was

decidedwithout a hearing

in violation of the

Rules of Court.Issue:(1)

Whether or not Blandina’s

marriage to Arturo

void ab initio.(2)

Whether or not Fe D. Quita be

declared the primary

beneficiary assurviving

spouse of Arturo.Held:

No. The marriage of

Blandina and Arturo is not void.

The citizenship of Fe

D.Quita at the time of their

divorce is relevant to this

case. The divorce is valid

here sinceshe was already

an alien at the time she obtained

divorce, and such is valid in

theircountry’s national law.

Thus, Fe D. Quita is no

longer recognized as a wife of

Arturo. She cannot be the

primary beneficiary or will be

recognized as surviving

spouse of Arturo.