case digest article 7.pdf
TRANSCRIPT
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PONTEJOS VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN 483 SCRA 83
Facts:
Sometime in 1998, Restituto P. Aquino filed an Affidavit/Complaint before theOmbudsman against Emmanuel T.
Pontejos (arbiter), Wilfredo I. Imperial (regionaldirector) and Carmencita R. Atos (legal staff), all of them officials of the
Housing andLand Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).Several documents were adduced during the preliminary investigation
findingprobable cause against Pontejos for the crimes of estafa, direct bribery and illegalpractice of profession in
violation of RA 6713. Consequently, criminal cases for estafaand bribery against Pontejos were filed before the RTC of
Quezon City. Prior to that,Atos was extended immunity as a state witness by the Ombudsman Aniano A.Desierto.
Pontejos motioned for reinvestigation to be conducted by the CityProsecutor without remanding the case to the
Ombudsman. The Assistant CityProsecutor, after conducting reinvestigation, recommended amending the
Informationfor estafa to include Atos as accused reasoning that the power to grant immunitypertains solely to the
courts not to the prosecution which can only recommend. TheOverall Deputy Ombudsman disapproved the prosecutors
report in May 21, 2002Review and Recommendation. The March 14, 2003 Order denied reconsideration. Thus, the
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed byPontejos.
Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion of the Ombudsmanamounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction
when it granted immunity to Atos tobecome a state witness.
Held:
The court held in the negative. The power to choose who to discharge as statewitness is an executive function. It is the
prosecution that could essentially determinethe strength of pursuing the case against an accused. The prosecutorial
powersinclude the discretion of granting immunity to an accused in exchange for testimonyagainst another. Essentially,
it is not a judicial prerogative. The fact that an individualhad not been previously charged or included in an information
does not prevent theprosecution from utilizing said person as a witness
Note:
Can the Ombudsman grant immunity from prosecution?
Yes, any person whose testimony or production of documents or other evidence is necessary to determine the truth in
any inquiry, hearing, or proceeding being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman or under its authority in the
performance or furthermore of its Constitutional functions and statutory objectives, including preliminary investigation,
may be granted immunity from criminal prosecution by the Ombudsman, upon such terms and conditions as the
Ombudsman may determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.
How is the immunity from prosecution granted by the Ombudsman?
The immunity from prosecution may be granted upon application of the concerned party, the investigating, and hearing,
or prosecuting officer, or at the instance of the Ombudsman. However, in all cases, the concerned party shall execute an
affidavit reciting the substance of his proposed testimony and/or nature of the evidence in his possession.
How is the immunity from prosecution granted by the Ombudsman?
The immunity from prosecution may be granted upon application of the concerned party, the investigating, and hearing,
or prosecuting officer, or at the instance of the Ombudsman. However, in all cases, the concerned party shall execute an
affidavit reciting the substance of his proposed testimony and/or nature of the evidence in his possession.
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BIRAOGO vs PTC
SC: Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 Void
At the dawn of his administration, President Noynoy signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is created to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Barely a month after the issuance of EO No. 1, two
cases were filed before the SC assailing the validity and constitutionality of the said EO.
The first case is a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1,
Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to
appropriate funds therefor. Biraogo argues that EO No. 1 is unconstitutional because there is no provision in the
Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission.
The second case is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B.
Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House
of Representatives. Petitioners-Legislators argue that the said Order is unconstitutional because the creation of a public
office lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government.
The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the President of a fact-finding bodysuch as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the
President to create public offices within the Office of the President Proper has long been recognized. According to the
OSG, the Executive, just like the other two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create fact-
finding committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its
administrative functions.
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita, where it was held that the President has the power to reorganize
the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control and by
virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. The OSG
concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices.
1. Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates
reorganization as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of
the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from
one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or
vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice
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versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a
modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.
2. May the President legally create the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC)? Is there a valid delegation of power from
Congress empowering the President to create a public office?
Yes.The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the
President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powersof the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This
flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of
a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds
already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. fellester.blogspot.com Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, whatever funds the Congress has provided
for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. Moreover, since the amount that
would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the
funding.
3. According to petitioners, E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the
Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the 1987 Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the Administrative Code of 1987. Is
this correct?
No. Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-
judicial agency or office. Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ
or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two
offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall
task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation.
The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is
certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, when in the course of its investigation, under Section
2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ
and the Ombudsman.
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4. Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it
excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. Are the petitioners correct?
Yes! Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court
finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the
equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. Superficial differences do not make for a
valid classification.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
past administrations. fellester.blogspot.com It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation
clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations,
these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the previous
administration only. (Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303,
December 7, 2010)
Senate vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 169777, July 14, 2006
Requisites of Judicial Review
Legislative Inquiry vs. Executive Privilege
Executive Privilege, defined
Kinds of Executive Privilege
Executive Privilege as applied to an official
Constitutionality of EO 464
FACTS:
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This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery
and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.
The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for them to
appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President
Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its
investigation. Senate refused the request.
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that all heads
of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either House of Congress. Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the
executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent.
Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the
investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.
Hence, these petitions.
ISSUES:
Whether or not EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress
Whether or not EO 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern
Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented EO 464 prior to its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation
RULING:
ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise
stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement;
the question of constitutionality must be raised as the earliest opportunity; and
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
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LEGAL STANDING
Standing of the Senate
That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-making in a
democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation is not disputed. EO 464, however, allegedly stifles the
ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making. Verily, the Senate, including its
individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to
assail the constitutionality of EO 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
Standing of an ordinary citizen
It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws,
presidential decrees, orders and other regulations must be direct and personal. In Francisco v. House of Representatives,
this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen
satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
Requisites for transcendental importance: Establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets
involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and
specific interest in raising the questions being raised.
ACTUAL CASE/CONTROVERSY
The Court finds respondents assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of
the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as EO 464 is
concerned. For EO 464 does not require either a deliberative withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing
from the President in order to bar officials from appearing before Congress.
As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the hearings of
petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for any further event before considering the present
case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing
on the constitutionality of EO 464.
The power of inquiry
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Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which
exemptions falls under the rubric of executive privilege.
Executive privilege, defined
Schwartz defines executive privilege as the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the
courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it as the right of the President and high-level executive branch
officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.
Kinds of executive privilege
One variety of the privilege...is the state secrets privilege...on the ground that the information is of such nature that its
disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informers privilege, or the
privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to
officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to
attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising
part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered
privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not
only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege
should be honored in a given procedural setting.
The principle of executive privilege
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain
types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may
be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is
any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being
executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
xxx
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When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by
a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive
official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach
of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing
custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency,
judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of
powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary.
Constitutionality of Sec. 1, EO 464
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Sec. 22 of Art. VI and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of
legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour
contemplated in the provision of said Sec. 22, Art. VI xxx
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question
hour, is valid on its face. For under Sec. 22, Art. VI, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is
not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim
of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
Validity of Sec. 2 and 3, EO 464
En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of EO 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers persons.
Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege...is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information
and not to categories of persons.
The claim of executive privilege must be accompanied by specific allegation of basis thereof
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not
suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the
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President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested
information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem
like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of
why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested.
A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly
asserted xxx
Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining whether it
falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be
respected xxx
Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity
as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. A useful analogy in determining the
requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination xxx
The claim of privilege under Sec. 3, EO 464 in relation to Sec. 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely
implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes EO 464, coupled with an
announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine
whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the
power of inquiry of Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of EO 464 must be invalidated.
EO 464 unlawfully delegated authority to the heads of offices in Sec. 2(b) to determine certain information as privileged
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain information
is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents authority and has the effect of prohibiting the
official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing
the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere
silence.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exception nature of the privilege. Executive privilege...is
recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role
and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the
discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact
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that certain informations (sic) must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to
invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which
case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is By order of the President, which means that he personally
consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the
executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power.
How executive privilege should be applied in the case of an official
xxx when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by
executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the
possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary
with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, afer the lapse of
that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer
bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal
means to compel his appearance.
Neri vs. Senate
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
Former NEDA Director General Romulo Neri testified before the Senate for 11 hours relating to the ZTE-NBN mess.
However, when probed further on what he and the President discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer,
invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer 3 questions:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it
Unrelenting, the Senate Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to Neri, requiring him to appear and testify on
November 20, 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested the Senate Committees to dispense
with Neris testimony on the ground of executive privilege. In his letter, Ermita said that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with China. Neri did not appear before the
Committees. As a result, the Senate issued an Order citing him in contempt and ordered his arrest and detention until
such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
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Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The Communications elicited by the 3 Questions are covered by Executive Privilege. xxx we are convinced that the
communications elicited by the questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner
can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of theinformation elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
The Senate contends that the grant of the executive privilege violates the Right of the people to information on matters
of public concern. Is the senate correct?
ANSWER: No. While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a
highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.
The right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the
peoples right to public information. The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita: There are clear
distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people
to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant
to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress.
Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These
powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual citizen. (visit fellester.blogspot.com)
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking E.O. 464. Is there a recognized
claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464?
ANSWER: Yes. The revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our concept of executive privilege. This is
because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
In Senate v. Ermita, the executive privilege should be invoked by the President or through the Executive Secretary by
order of the President. Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle of executive privilege, by order of
the President?
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ANSWER: Yes. The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as
the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of
executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly. Obviously, he is referring
to the Office of the President. That is more than enough compliance.
May the Congress require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with particularity?
ANSWER: No. The Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as
to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a
coordinate and co-equal department. (Senate v. Ermita)
Is the contempt and arrest Order of Neri valid?
ANSWER: No. There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order suffers from
constitutional infirmity. The respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita
that the invitations should contain the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry, along with
the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof. The SC also find
merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure. The respondent Committees
issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not
first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his
explanation as unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his immediate
arrest and detention. (Neri vs. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)
AKBAYAN vs. Aquino
G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008
JPEPA
Diplomatic Negotiations are Privileged
Executive Privilege, an Exception to Congress' Power of Inquiry
Treaty-making Power
Executive Privilege vs. People's Right to Information
FACTS:
This is regarding the JPEPA, the bilateral free trade agreement ratified by the President with Japan, concerning trade in
goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, etc.
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Prior to Presidents signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners non-government organizations, Congresspersons,
citizens and taxpayers sought via petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of
the JPEPA, including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent
attachments and annexes thereto. Particularly, Congress through the House Committee are calling for an inquiry into
the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive is refusing to give them the said copies until the negotiation is
completed.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
Whether or not the Philippine and Japanese offers during the negotiation process are privileged
Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress, exercising its power of inquiry and power to concur in
treaties, from the negotiation process
RULING:
Standing
In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which is a public right
by its very nature, petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficientto show that they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. As the present
petition is anchored on the right to information and petitioners are all suing in their capacity as citizens and groups of
citizens including petitioners-members of the House of Representatives who additionally are suing in their capacity as
such, the standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in jurisprudence.
JPEPA, A Matter of Public Concern
To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that it be a
matter of public concern xxx
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do not
dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus
constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.
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Privileged Character of Diplomatic Negotiations Recognized
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations
on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that information on inter-government exchanges prior to
the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national
interest.
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept
perpetually confidential since there should be ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved the
offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is
reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that historic
confidentiality would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not
only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should not be open to public scrutiny would discourage future
Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. While, on first impression, it appears
wise to deter Philippine representatives from entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any
negotiation for that matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing to
grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national
interest.
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting
no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds,
recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only
after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls
for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.
Does the exception apply even though JPEPA is primarily economic and does not involve national security?
While there are certainly privileges grounded on the necessity of safeguarding national security such as those involving
military secrets, not all are founded thereon. One example is the informers privilege, or the privilege of the
Government not to disclose the identity of a person or persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers
charged with the enforcement of that law. The suspect involved need not be so notorious as to be a threat to national
security for this privilege to apply in any given instance. Otherwise, the privilege would be inapplicable in all but the
most high-profile cases, in which case not only would this be contrary to long-standing practice. It would also be highly
prejudicial to law enforcement efforts in general.
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Also illustrative is the privileged accorded to presidential communications, which are presumed privileged without
distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security and those which do not, the rationale for the
privilege being that a frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure
by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise
Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.
In the same way that the privilege for judicial deliberations does not depend on the nature of the case deliberated upon,
so presidential communications are privileged whether they involve matters of national security.
It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute, one significant
qualification being that the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invoke a general
confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions
into possible criminal wrongdoing. This qualification applies whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of a
judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation.
Closely related to the presidential communications privilege is the deliberative process privilege recognized in the
United States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co, deliberative process covers
documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such documents rests, not on the
need to protect national security but, on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among
themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news, the objective of the privilege being to
enhance the quality of agency decisions.
The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and presidential
communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the confidential character of diplomatic
negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential communications is similar, if not identical.
The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus shows that the privilege for diplomatic negotiations is meant to encourage
a frank exchange of exploratory ideas between the negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations from public view.Similar to the privilege for presidential communications, the diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks, through the same
means, to protect the independence in decision-making of the President, particularly in its capacity as the sole organ of
the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. And, as with the deliberative
process privilege, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations arises, not on account of the content of the
information per se, but because the information is part of a process of deliberation which, in pursuit of the public
interest, must be presumed confidential.
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Clearly, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence from the privileged character
of the deliberative process.
Does diplomatic privilege only apply to certain stages of the negotiation process?
In Chavez v. PEA and Chavez v. PCGG, the Court held that with regard to the duty to disclose definite propositions of
the government, such duty does not include recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.
Treaty-making power of the President
xxx they (petitioners) argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA negotiations since whatever
power and authority the President has to negotiate international trade agreements is derived only by delegation of
Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of Presidential Decree No.
1464.
The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the power to negotiate treaties and international
agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other taxes xxx.
As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of Article VII the article on the
Executive Department.
xxx
While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is exercised by the President
only be delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested directly andexclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for
the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations
provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent in its office. It may not
be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty
negotiations.
This is not to say, of course, that the Presidents power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of
Senate concurrence, since the President must still enure that all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant
provisions of the Constitution.
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It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the
field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the
validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is
not even Congress as a while that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making
power of the President, but only the Senate.
Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-members of the House of
Representatives fail to present a sufficient showing of need that the information sought is critical to the performance
of the functions of Congress, functions that do not include treaty-negotiation.
Did the respondents alleged failure to timely claim executive privilege constitute waiver of such privilege?
That respondent invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present petition does not mean
that the claim of privilege should not be credited. Petitioners position presupposes that an assertion of the privilege
should have been made during the House Committee investigations, failing which respondents are deemed to have
waived it.
xxx (but) Respondents failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not, however, be
construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. xxx what respondents received from the House Committee and
petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for information. And as priorly stated, the House Committee itself
refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de
Venecias alleged request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance.
The privilege is an exemption to Congress power of inquiry. So long as Congress itself finds no cause to enforce such
power, there is no strict necessity to assert the privilege. In this light, respondents failure to invoke the privilege during
the House Committee investigations did not amount to waiver thereof.
Showing of Need Test
In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a sufficient showing of need only means, in
substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of
privilege. Verily, the Court in such cases engages in a balancing of interests. Such a balancing of interests is certainly not
new in constitutional adjudication involving fundamental rights.
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xxx However, when the Executive has as in this case invoked the privilege, and it has been established that the
subject information is indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a party overcome the same by merely
asserting that the information being demanded is a matter of public concern, without any further showing required?
Certainly not, for that would render the doctrine of executive privilege of no force and effect whatsoever as a limitation
on the right to information, because then the sole test in such controversies would be whether an information is a
matter of public concern.
Right to information vis-a-vis Executive Privilege
xxx the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to information, a specific
showing of need for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of public
concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is
indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that
information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably
participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.
Prof. Randolf S. David, et al., Vs. Gloria Macapagal-Aroyo et al.,
G.R. No. 171396
Facts : On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, she cited that over the past three months, element in the
political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the
extreme, right, represented by military adventurist the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State who are
now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly
constituted Government elected in May 2004, On the same day, The President issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017.
By the virtue of power vested upon the President by the Constitution and Commander in chief of the Republic of the
Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, the president call upon the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in
the country.
The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary
celebration of edsa people power 1; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments.
Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the Presidents mind were organized for purpose of
destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that warrantless arrest and take-
over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented.
Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public protest would not be allowed, members of Kilusang Mayo Uno
and National Federation of Labor Unions, marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging
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at the EDSA shrine. Those who where already near EDSA were violently dispersed by huge cluster of anti-riot police. The
same police action was used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and the corner of Santolan
street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot police broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue
and Paseo de Roxas street in Makaty City.
During the dispersal of the rallyist along EDSA, police arrested without warrant petitioner Randolf S. David, a Proffesor of
the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president
of party-list Akbayan.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune Offices in Manila. The raiding team
confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue.
A few minutes later after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune. The police surrounded the premises of another
pro-opposition paper, Malaya and its sister publication, tabloid Abante.
Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis party and
Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno, while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his arrest
gated 1985. Beltrans lawyer explained that the warrant, which stemmed form a case of inciting to rebellion filed during
the Marcos regime, had long been quashed. When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit beltran,
they were told they could not be admitted because PP 1017 and G.O. No.5. Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampoeluded arrest when the police went after him during a public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. Retired Major
General Ramon Montao, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, were arrested while with his wife and golfmates at
the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmarias, Cavite. Attempts were made to arrest Bayan Muna Represenatative
Satur Ocampo, Teodoro Casio, Anakpawis Representative Rafael Mariano, Gabriela Representative Liza Maza, Bayan
Muna Representative Jose Virador was arrested at a PAL ticket Office in Davao City, Later, he was turned to the custody
of the House of Representative where the Batasan % decided to stay indefinitely.
March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had
been filed, the president lifted PP 1017, and issued Proclamation No. 1021.
Issue: Whether the issuance of PP 1017 is Constitutional, Whether the provision of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to
enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, and provision declaring
national emergency under section 17, article VII of the Constitution is Constitutional. Whether G.O. No. 5 is
Constitutional Whether the dispersal and warrantless arrest, the warrantless search are Constitutional.
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Held: PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitute a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress Lawless
violence. The proclamation is sustained by section 18, article VII of the constitution. However, PP 1017s extraneous
provisions giving the President express or implied power to issue decrees to direct AFP to enforce obedience to all laws
even those not related to lawless violence as decrees promulgated by the President; and to impose standards on media
or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under section
17, article XII of the constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned publicutility and private business affected with public interest.
In the same element, the court finds G.O. No. 5 valid It is an Order issued by the President acting as Commander in Chief
addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides valid standard that
the military and the police should take necessary and appropriate actions and measure to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence. But the word acts of terrorism found in G.O. No. 5 have not been denounced generally in media, no law
has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFPs authority in
carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.
On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear trhat the warrantless arrest of
petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal of rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-
KMU members; the imposition of standard on media or any prior restraint on the press; and the warrantless search of
the tribune offices and whimsical seizure of some article for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the
Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
Wherefore, The Petitions are partly granted. The court rules that PP 1017 is Constitutional insofar as it constitute a call
by the President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions
of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the
President, are declared unconstitutional. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under
section 17, article VII of the Constitution is constitutional, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take
over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is Constitutional since it provides a standard which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, whatever
is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering that
acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declaredUnconstitutional.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronal Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of KMU and NAFLU-
KMU members during their rallies, in absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint
on press, as well as the warrantless search of the tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and
other materials, are declared Unconstitutional.
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The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, as noted in the brackets above.
1. Calling-out power
The validity of this power is already settled in Sanlakas. However, there is a distinction between the Presidentsauthority to declare a state of rebellion (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. In
declaring a state of national emergency under PP 1017, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over
privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an
awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written,
as in Sanlakas.
2. Take Care Power
PP 1017 states in part: to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction. The first part is valid. As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the
President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. This is based on Section
17, Article VII which reads:
SEC.17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.
However, the President cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by former President Ferdinand Marcos under PP
1081 (declaring martial law). Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes.
PP 1017 is, therefore, unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees.
3. Power to Take Over
PP 1017 authorizes the President to call the military not only to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, but
also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII:
Sec.17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned publicutility or business affected with public interest.
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017? According to
the Supreme Court, the answer is simple - during the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to
grant the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
However, Section 17 must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. When Section 17 speaks of the
State, it refers to Congress, not the President. The exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately
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owned public utility or business affected with public interest, requires a delegation from Congress in accordance with
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution, the requirements of which are:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare a state of national emergency
and to exercise emergency powers. The President is authorized to declare a state of national emergency. However,
without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the takeover of privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances haveceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with
public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of
the SBeltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for libel by the president. Cory
herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit
because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot
be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the courts
jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the
president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
BELTRAN VS MAKASIAR
SSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.
HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of
the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the
holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal
case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded
the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.tate under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act
passed by Congress.
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SOLIVEN V MAKASIAR
PER CURIAM; November 14, 1988
NATURE
- Petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of Manila RTC
FACTS
- This case consists of three consolidated petitions (Soliven v Makasiar, Beltra v Makasiar and Beltran v
ExecutiveSecretary).- The President asked for the prosecution of a newspaper columnist, the publisher and chairman of
the editorialboard, the business manager and the managing editor for libel.
Petitioners Claims
- With regard to the third issue, the Presidents immunity from suit results to an automatic correlation that he is also
not allowed from filing suits- If criminal suits were allowed, the President may subsequently become a prosecution
witness.- This would, in an indirect way, defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand,
shewould be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the findingof
the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by
thePresident2. WON the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for
his arrestwithout personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause3. WONthe President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against thepetitioners through
the filing of a complaint-affidavit
HELD
1.
Ratio
Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavitsbefore the
preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given theOpportunity to
submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
Reasoning -
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed", in effect waiving hisright
to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.-The first issue was rendered moot and academic because of events
that unfolded.- March 30, 1988
DOJ secretary denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners and upheld the resolutionof the DOJ
undersecretary which sustained the findings of the city fiscal of a prima facie case against the petitioners.- April 7, 1988
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a second motion for reconsideration was denied by the DOJ secretary- On appeal the President (through the Executive
Secretary) affirmed the resolution of the DOJ secretary- The argument of the petitioners that they have not been
granted the administrative remedies available does nothold water.-
With regard to Beltrans arguments that he was denied due process of law in the preliminary investigation:
2.
Ratio
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge tosatisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for theissuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Reasoning
- It is not accurate to say that the judge should personally examine the complainant and the witnesses in
determiningprobable cause.- Procedure to be followed by the judge (based on established doctrine and procedure):
1. personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on based on these documents, issue a warrant of arrest2. if he finds no basis for probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at
a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause- The Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular # 12 which
established the guidelines for the issuance of awarrant of arrest.- In this case, there is no showing that the respondent
judge has deviated from the established procedure.The second issue calls for an evaluation of Sec. 2 of Art. 3 (on the
right of the people to be secure in their persons,houses, papers and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures).
The said provision states that the judge
should personally determine the probable cause before a search warrant can be issued.
3. The privilege of immunity from suit granted to the President may be waived should the Chief Executive choose
tosubmit him/herself to the jurisdiction of the Court since no Constitutional provision bars her from doing so.-
In the issue regarding the chilling effect this suit would have on freedom of speech, the Court has decided to defer
judgment on that
CASE DIGEST: ESTRADA VS. ARROYO; ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO
G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo
G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto
March 2, 2001
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FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close friend the President, alleged that he had personally
given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as Jose Velarde a grassroots-based
numbers game. Singsons allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of
Representatives filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-
tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court wasformed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded not guilty.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by
students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as
lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for
Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he
will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove
him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively
resigned his post. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd
at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of
her proclamation as president, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation.
Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
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A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition with
a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any
further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada was a
president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.
HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure.
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said that while the
Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973
Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government
exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The
question of whether the previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court
held that the issue is legal and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by
acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the
palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estradas implied resignation
On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president
despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court
held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioners contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longer
entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life
to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive
immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the
framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which
the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of
right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another)
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