Case

Solvency

Securitization inevitableSecuritization is inevitable – IR system ensures itCARL BJORK, MAR 4 2015 Carl Bjork is a Ph.D. candidate in international relations at the Australian National University, “Is the Security Dilemma an Inescapable Reality or Self-Fulfilling Prophecy?”

http://www.e-ir.info/2015/03/04/is-the-security-dilemma-an-inescapable-reality-or-self-fulfilling-prophecy/

The security dilemma is an unfortunate reality. As Robert Schweller states, ‘insecurity and the use of force are enduring attributes of the self-help international system’.[28] Where one state increases its relative security, it reduces the security of other states. The acquisition of power by both defensive and offensive states to counter-balance creates an inescapable possibility of violent conflict between states.[29] Moreover, Dale Copeland reinforces this paper’s claim that the security dilemma cannot be escaped. His argument debates Glaser’s claim that purely defensive states can end the aggressive spiral.[30] However, Glaser’s argument does not account for states that protect their resources, allies and foreign interests. It merely discusses a state’s need to secure its own territorial integrity.[31] Therefore, defensive states can postpone or mitigate the security dilemma but they cannot escape it. Eventually all great powers will need to project an offensive capability into a desired region to deter potential threats to their interests abroad.[32] This paper’s estimation of the dilemma being inescapable is not entirely accepted among IR scholars. Differing from Glaser’s hopeful outlook on state motivations preventing a dilemma, other IR theorists debate the existence of the security dilemma altogether. Schweller argues that the neorealist security dilemma does not exist, but is a superficial ideology- ‘the security dilemma is always apparent, not real’.[33] If there is an aggressive state whose motivations lie in expansion, then responding with military build-up and alliance forming is a justified response, not a dilemma.[34] If no states are seeking expansion or making manoeuvres that would appear at face value to threaten another state, then the security dilemma would be mitigated. Nevertheless, this fading of the dilemma itself is not possible when powerful states are required to make military mobilisations to acquire resources, if even only for domestic use. An example of how the security dilemma is spiralling between states contemporary politics is the frequent mobilisation of Japanese and Chinese Air Force jets to defend against incursions into the Senkaku (Diaoyu in Chinese) Islands. Both states are claiming ownership over the islands and as China increases its defence spending and encroachments on assets within the South and East China Seas, Japan has been building alliances. [35] Of the alliances Japan is forming, China worries most about India and other Asian states co-operating, which will fuel Chinese insecurities of an anti-China coalition encirclement. This geopolitical strangle on China may motivate China to develop greater military might and build new

alliances leading to an increased security dilemma, not a mobilization against an aggressive state. Worse, the situation could lead to military conflict between the states, even when both are defending resources they both deem necessary for state security. If one state abandons its claims over the Senkaku Islands, the predicament will be mitigated, though the reality that both Japan and China engage in this counter-balancing act is evidence to support the claim that even in the modern era the security dilemma is inescapable.

Securitization is inevitable – uncertainty exists in international relationsKen Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler No Date “Rethinking the Security Dilemma” security studies chapter 10 http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1924/security%20studies%20chapter%2010,%20Wheeler.pdf?sequence=1 KEN BOOTH is the E.H. Carr Professor in the Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK. He was a former Vice-Chair and Chair of the British International Studies Association, and its first President. In addition to numerous publications in the field of International Politics he is founding series editor of the Critical Security Studies Series (Lynne Rienner Publishers) and editor of International Relations. NICHOLAS WHEELER is Professor in International Politics in the Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK. He is also Director of the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, a

Trustee of the Welsh Centre of International Affairs, and a member of the United Nations Association of the UK's Policy Advisory Committee.

For Herz, who first coined the term „security dilemma‟, the issue at the base of social life was „kill or perish‟ (Herz 1951: 3). For Butterfield, the other pioneer, the inability of one set of decisionmakers to enter into the counter-fear of others was the „irreducible dilemma‟ (1951: 20). In other words, for Herz fear created a structure of conflict between groups, while for Butterfield this fear derived from an inescapable inability of people(s) to understand how their own peaceful/benign motives and defensive/reactive intentions could be interpreted as threatening by

others. The operating principle for those responsible for national security planning tends to be: „You have nothing to fear from us, but we must be concerned that your motives, even if peaceful now, might not be in the future, and that your intentions – whether or not reactive now – give you the increased power to further your ambitions.‟ Clearly, the problems of mistrust are maximized when current predicaments are set against a historical record of a conflictual relationship. Future uncertainty appears therefore to construct international politics as an inescapable insecurity trap. Even if, today, the government of State A considers the leadership group in State B to be peacefully inclined, can it afford to rely indefinitely on „best-case‟ thinking in a situation where bad judgements of interpretation and response can have such negative consequences for one‟s own state (Copeland 2000, 2003, Mearsheimer 2001)? The conclusion drawn so often through history has been that those charged with responsibility for a state‟s or people‟s security must never rely on bestcase forecasting when assessing potential threats to their well-being. Instead, the guiding principle must be very conservative. Barry Posen put it very baldly when he advised that states „must assume the worst because the worst is possible‟ (Posen 1993: 28). The corollary of all this, in the language of US security dilemma theorists, is that defensively motivated states cannot „signal type‟ (Glaser 1992, 1997, Kydd 1997a, 1997b, 2000, 2005, Mitzen 2006). That is, however peaceful State A believes itself to be, it can never transmit such intent with 100 per cent effectiveness to State B (and C, D) because others know that „the worst is possible‟ in a world of future uncertainty. If uncertainty and fear logically exist at the best of times in relations between states – when all the parties hold weapons only for self-protection, but cannot effectively signal this to others – then can there ever be any hope that humans can live together in a more peaceful world? In this understanding, the security dilemma depicts politics among nations as being a potential or actual war system even when all the units believe

themselves as having peaceful/benign motives and defensive/reactive intentions. This is why it is the quintessential dilemma in international politics. Butterfield, as a historian, claimed that it was only much later, when the guns had gone silent, that it became possible to reconstruct the past, and so to understand the motives and intentions of the key actors. But we now know that such a view belongs to an older and more confident era of historiography. Today we are more familiar with the idea of an endless debate among historians – adding further layers of uncertainty. If historians, with critical distance and abundant information, cannot make up their minds about the interpretations and responses of policy-makers in the past, students of security studies should show sympathy to the predicaments that had to be faced by those on whose shoulders rested great responsibilities, when operating with always limited information and often very compressed time in the face of terrible risks.

Discourse not FirstEngagement with military institutions key – critiquing alone does not allow access to empirical evidenceRech et al 14

Matthew Rech, Daniel Bos, K. Neil Jenkings, Alison Williams & Rachel Woodward. “Geography, military geography, and critical military studies” Critical Military Studies, 1:1, 47-60, 10-9-14. PDF. Accessed 7-8-16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23337486.2014.963416

Moving beyond the questions of foci and intersecting spatialities, our final point concerns the understandings that we bring as geographers to research practices, and the necessity of engaging with military actors and institutions as part of that practice. We have already noted the reflexivity around research practice prevalent in much geography and across the social sciences, particularly around the politics and ethics of fieldwork and engagement with research subjects, and the wider

purposes to which academic research may be put. Given the longstanding relationship between the pursuit of military power and the pursuit of geographical knowledge, it is unsurprising that this kind of work continues –

and that it might be subject to critique. A good example is the case of the Bowman Expeditions in the USA – surveying exercises of territories, undertaken by geographers and funded by the US Department of Defense – which have been roundly critiqued by those taking a critical human geography approach (Wainwright 2013). Another might be the legacies for Chilean geographers of the Pinochet dictatorship and its influences on the form and scope of Chilean geography (Barton and Irarrázaval 2014). But there are more generalist critiques around the idea of geographers’ engagements with the military-industrial-academic complex, including around publication (see Chatterton and

Featherstone 2007, and responses), and around educational contexts (see Mitchell 2005). Although not reaching the levels of visibility attained by anthropology scholars in the US through their critique of the US military’s engagement of anthropologists in “human terrain” assessments in occupied Iraq and Afghanistan, these critical voices within the geographical community raise some provocative questions about how one might proceed, as a critical human geographer and as a researcher working within a critical military studies approach, in engagement with military institutions, organizations, and personnel in the course of undertaking research. We argue that the study of the military, of militarism, and of processes of militarization, should not be undertaken solely for its own sake, but should also by guided by the possibility of engagement with the forces and institutions responsible, and should not be bashful about doing so.

There are two reasons for this. First, to be critical is to be engaged in critique; it is not to be dismissive. Critical engagement with military forces, and military and militarized institutions, can be underpinned by an understanding of these institutions as accountable to the civilian world, and necessarily understood as potentially open to collaboration

and knowledge exchange, even where this idea may initially appear ridiculous. Our backgrounds in human geography and sociology, with their rich methodological traditions of fieldwork and of co-inquiry and recognition of the necessity for academic labour as a

communicative and engaged social practice, prompt us to return continually to questions about the possibilities and limits of collaboration with military institutions. The question which follows, then, is about the opportunities a critical military studies might provide for envisioning and promoting possibilities for change within the

institutions and practices which constitute its focus. This is not a simple issue. There are issues of visibility and voice at play,

of making critiques heard not just within scholarly communities but more broadly within social debates. Critiques are often complex entities, arguments drawing on a range of empirical evidence and political positions which may be nuanced in ways that more simplistic positions (such as “pro-military” or “anti-military”) i. Far better that they are conducted with an intention in mind to

inculcate change, even where that seems on the face of it to be unlikely, than not at all. That seems, to us, to be the point. The second reason for wanting to open up a space for considering the potential of engagement with military institutions,

organizations, and personnel as part of the critical military project concerns issues of access. Military-related research can be quite different from other social scientific inquiry in other social contexts because of issues of secrecy and security (some justifiable, some less so) in these institutions (see Williams et al., forthcoming). To be engaged in

informed critique may require the collection of reliable empirical evidence . This is partly a question of access and trust. This may also be a question of direct collaboration around research, including through the provision of defence funding.1 In our view,

the critical military studies project has to develop on the basis of informed critique in which the nuances and complexities of civil-military relations are identified, rendered transparent (or as transparent as any other

complex social phenomenon might be) and shared across academic, military, and other civilian spheres. This requires direct engagement with military forces, and a critical approach to those encounters. Thus, critical military geography offers opportunities to strive for progressive change in social sciences’ engagements with the military, militarism, and its processes of enactment, which enable us to undertake critical inquiry into military phenomena.

China Threat

Consequentialism GoodWe have an obligation to prevent mass catastrophe and human suffering-this does not lead to intervention that ignores means in favor of ends. Instead, it views both as importantFuyuki Kurasawa in 2k4 (Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004, Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf

By contrast, Jonas’s strong consequentialism takes a cue from Weber’s “ethic of responsibility,” which stipulates that we must carefully ponder the potential impacts of our actions and assume responsibility for them – even for the incidence of unexpected and unintended results. Neither the contingency of outcomes nor the retrospective nature of certain moral judgments exempts an act from normative evaluation. On the contrary, consequentialism reconnects what intentionalism prefers to keep distinct: the moral worth of ends partly depends upon the means selected to attain them (and vice versa), while the correspondence between intentions and results is crucial. At the same time, Jonas goes further than Weber in breaking with presentism by advocating an “ethic of long-range responsibility” that refuses to accept the future’s indeterminacy, gesturing instead toward a practice of farsighted preparation for crises that could occur.30 From a consequentialist perspective, then, intergenerational solidarity would consist of striving to prevent our endeavors from causing large-scale human suffering and damage to the natural world over time. Jonas reformulates the categorical imperative along these lines: “Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life,” or “Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life.”31 What we find here, I would hold, is a substantive and future-oriented ethos on the basis of which civic associations can enact the work of preventive foresight.

Predictions/Threats = realThreats are real – Gives us the best way to prevent and preapre for crisis in the future and presentKurasawa, 4, Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. Fuyuki Kurasawa is Associate Professor of Sociology, Political Science, and Social and Political Thought at York University in Toronto, and Co-President of the International Sociological Association's Research Committee on Sociological Theory. He has been a Fullbright Scholar, a Commonwealth Scholar, as well as a Visiting Fellow at Cornell University, the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Harvard University, New York University and Yale University, where he is a Faculty Fellow of The Center for Cultural Sociology. Kurasawa is the author of The Ethnological Imagination: A Cross-Cultural Critique of Modernity (Minnesota, 2004) and The Work of Global Justice: Human Rights as Practices (Cambridge, 2007). He is currently completing a book. Accessed 7/8/16 from http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf -O’Brien

When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is∂ likely to encounter from some

intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism∂ about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for∂ instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to ∂ strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms ∂ of historical analysis. If , contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic ∂ meaning , direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human

reason, and ∂ if , contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without ∂ error, then the abyss of

chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our∂ feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore,∂ rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we∂ should adopt

a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history;∂ let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise.∂ While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all∂ predictive schemes, it

conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of ∂ history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy.∂ Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty ∂ does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing ∂ on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the ∂ incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that ∂ we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that ∂ provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return

in∂ the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the∂ acceptance of historical contingency and of

the self-limiting character of farsightedness ∂ places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of ∂ present generations . The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of∂ destiny or of the cunning of

reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness.∂ It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the ∂ present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and ∂ avoidable sources of harm to our successors.∂ Combining a sense of analytical contingency toward the future and ethical∂ responsibility for it, the idea of early warning is making its way into preventive ∂ action on the global stage. Despite the fact that not all humanitarian, technoscientific, ∂ and environmental disasters can be predicted in advance, the multiplication ∂

of independent sources of knowledge and detection mechanisms enables us ∂ to foresee many of them before it is too late. Indeed, in recent years, global civil∂ society’s capacity for early warning has dramatically increased, in no small part∂ due to the impressive number of NGOs that include catastrophe prevention at the∂ heart of their mandates.17 These organizations are often the first to detect signs of∂ trouble, to dispatch investigative or fact-finding missions,

and to warn the international∂ community about impending dangers; to wit, the lead role of environmental∂ groups in sounding the alarm about global warming and species depletion∂ or of humanitarian agencies regarding the AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, frequently∂ months or

even years before Western governments or multilateral institutions∂ followed suit. What has come into being, then, is a loose-knit network of ∂ watchdog groups that is acquiring finely tuned antennae to pinpoint indicators of ∂

forthcoming or already unfolding crises. ∂ This network of ‘early warners’ are working to publicize potential and actual ∂ emergencies by locating indicators of danger into larger catastrophic patterns of∂ interpretation, culturally meaningful chains of

events whose implications become∂ discernable for decision-makers and ordinary citizens (‘this is why you should∂ care’).18 Civic associations

can thus invest perilous situations with urgency and ∂ importance, transforming climate change from an apparently mild and distant ∂ possibility to an irreversible and grave threat to human survival, and genocide ∂ from a supposedly isolated aberration to an affront to our common humanity .∂ The growing public

significance of preventive message in global affairs is part∂ and parcel of what Ignatieff has termed an “advocacy revolution,”19 since threatened ∂ populations and allied organizations are acting as early warning beacons that ∂ educate citizens about certain perils and appeal for action on the part of states and∂ multilateral institutions. Global civil society players have devised a host of ‘naming∂ and shaming’ strategies and high-profile information campaigns to this effect,∂ including press conferences, petitions, mass marches, and boycotts, and spectacular∂ stunts that denounce bureaucratic inertia, the reckless pursuit of profit, or the∂ preponderance of national interests in world affairs.20 The advocacy revolution is∂ having both ‘trickle-down’ and ‘trickle-up’ effects, establishing audiences of∂ constituents and ordinary citizens conversant with some of the great challenges∂ facing humanity as well as putting

pressure on official institutions to be proactive∂ in their long-term planning and shorter-term responses.∂ None of this would be possible without the existence of global media, whose ∂ speed and range make it possible for reports of an unfolding or upcoming disaster ∂ to reach viewers or readers in most parts of the world almost instantaneously.∂ Despite the highly selective character of what is deemed newsworthy and state and∂ commercial influence on what is

broadcast, several recent attempts to hide evidence ∂ of acts of mass violence (Tiananmen Square, East Timor, Chechnya, etc.) and ∂ crises (e.g., during the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the Soviet Union or the ∂ SARS outbreak in China) have failed; few things now entirely escape from the ∂ satellite camera, the cellular telephone, or the notebook computer. And although ∂ the internet may never become the populist panacea technological determinists ∂ have been heralding for years, it remains a key device through which concerned ∂ citizens and activists can share and spread information. While media coverage∂ almost always follows a crisis rather than preceding it, the

broadcast of shocking ∂ images and testimonies can nevertheless shame governments and international ∂ organizations into taking immediate steps. The ‘CNN or BBC effect,’ to which we∂ should now add the ‘Al-Jazeera effect,’ is a surprisingly powerful force in impacting ∂ world public opinion, as the now notorious Abu Ghraib prison photographs ∂ remind us . The possibility that the threat of media exposure may dissuade individuals ∂ and groups from enacting genocidal plans or reckless gambles with our future ∂ is one of the lynchpins of prevention in our information-saturated age.∂ Are forewarnings of disasters being heard? The mobilization of official

intervention∂ and popular interest has certainly been mixed, yet global civil society is ∂ having some success in cultivating

audiences and advocates coalescing around ∂ specific perils (mass human rights violations, ecological devastation, genetic ∂ engineering, epidemics, and so on ). After Bhopal and Chernobyl, after ‘mad cow∂ disease’ and the war in Iraq, citizens are scrutinizing, questioning and even∂ contesting official expertise in risk assessment more than ever before.21 Hence, in∂ a world where early warnings of cataclysms are often available, pleading ignorance∂ or helplessness to anticipate what may come in the future becomes less and∂ less plausible.

Discourse centered around the prevention of global catastrophe counters dominant conceptions of international relations, preventing a focus on short term profit and instead infusing ethics into public institutionsFuyuki Kurasawa in 2k4 (Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004, Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf

My contention is that civic associations are engaging in dialogical, public, and transnational forms of ethico-political action that contribute to the creation of a fledgling global civil society existing ‘below’ the official and institutionalized architecture of international relations.6 The work of preventive foresight consists of forging ties between citizens; participating in the circulation of flows of claims, images, and information across borders; promoting an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism; and forming and mobilizing weak publics that debate and struggle against possible catastrophes. Over the past few decades, states and international organizations have frequently been content to follow the lead of globally- minded civil society actors, who have been instrumental in placing on the public agenda a host of pivotal issues (such as nuclear war, ecological pollution, species extinction, genetic engineering, and mass human rights violations). To my mind, this strongly indicates that if prevention of global crises is to eventually rival the assertion of short-term and narrowly defined rationales (national interest, profit, bureaucratic self-preservation, etc.), weak publics must begin by convincing or compelling official representatives and multilateral organizations to act differently; only then will farsightedness be in a position to ‘move up’ and become institutionalized via strong publics.7 Since the global culture of prevention remains a work in progress, the argument presented in this paper is poised between empirical and normative dimensions of analysis. It proposes a theory of the practice of preventive foresight based upon already existing struggles and discourses, at the same time as it advocates the adoption of certain principles that would substantively thicken and assist in the realization of a sense of responsibility for the future of humankind. I will thereby proceed in four steps, beginning with a consideration of the shifting socio-political and cultural climate that is giving rise to farsightedness today (I). I will then contend that the development of a public aptitude for early warning about global cataclysms can overcome flawed conceptions of the future’s essential inscrutability (II). From this will follow the claim that an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism – of solidarity that extends to future generations – can supplant the preeminence of ‘short-termism’ with the help of appeals to the public’s moral imagination and use of reason (III). In the final section of the paper, I will argue that the commitment of global civil society actors to norms of precaution and transnational justice can hone citizens’ faculty of critical judgment against abuses of the dystopian imaginary, thereby opening the way to public deliberation about the construction of an alternative world order (IV).

Squo Solves Sec DilemmaUS and China won’t go to war – bilateral communication and training exercises will prevent miscalculationBo 14

Zhou Bo: honorary fellow with Center of China-American Defense Relations, Academy of Military Science, PLA, China. “Sino-US Military Relationship: Vulnerability vs Resilience” chinausfocus.com, 7-31-14. Webpage. Accessed 7-8-16. http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/sino-us-military-relationship-vulnerability-vs-resilience/

The list of initiatives decided at the 2014 Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) strategic track is longer than that of last year. The 116 outcomes, compared with 91 outcomes last year, are impressive not only because of the progress made,

but also because of the scope of the issues to be addressed by these important countries. A lot of attention has been given to progress in the military field since the last S&ED. What really raises eyebrows is the expression of a “new type of military relations,” which is a step higher than the “new level of military relations” coined at last year’s S&ED. It is also the first time that such an expression has appeared in writing. Besides calling for deepening cooperation in counter-piracy, maritime

search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, both sides affirmed a mutual commitment to the management of crises and prevention of accidental events. This is good news, especially after senior American officials unleashed an avalanche of criticism about the PLA being “assertive” in the East China Sea and “salami-slicing” in the South China Sea. It

looks like the pendulum has swung back and the US has decided to correct itself. The Sino-American relationship is intrinsically imbued with two distinctive characteristics – vulnerability and resilience. The vulnerability is obvious, but the resilience is often overlooked. For example, in April 2001, a collision between an American EP-3 reconnaissance

aircraft and a Chinese J-8 fighter killed a Chinese pilot. No matter how appalling the incident was, soon after the US government delivered its “letter of two sorries,” the Chinese government released the American crew .

The crisis was basically resolved, in only 11 days. This year’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore appeared to be very much “soured” by the spat between participants from China and the US and Japan. However, the US later announced that four Chinese ships would attend RIMPAC 2014, a multilateral exercise hosted by the US Navy off of Hawaii. And the size of the Chinese participating task force is second to that

of the US Navy. Such seemingly contradictory phenomena reflect a strong resilience and even a kind of maturity in the relationship between the two major powers. That is, if discord is unavoidable, you do what you can to avoid it from becoming a crisis. The resilience between China and the US has been sustained, first of all, by dialogue.

There are over 90 dialogues of all sorts between the two countries, and quite a few of them are at the military-level. Even

the S&ED has a security dialogue. The defense and security dialogues can provide a timely exchange of views and are therefore critically important. They help avoid unnecessary surprises and miscalculations and should be encouraged by all means. Cooperation between the two militaries has thus far been confined to “practical areas,” such as counter-piracy, maritime search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. There are twelve areas that are restricted by a paranoid American Congress for fear that the PLA could benefit more than the US military from the interactions. But in recent years, more bilateral and multilateral exercises are held in “practical areas.” This is a great step forward. The US could continue inviting China for multilateral exercises, such as Cobra Gold and RIMPAC 2014 and accept PLA’s greater involvement. Likewise, the PLA could invite the US military to observe its exercises and visit

more military facilities. The real challenge in the major power relationship is not how good it will be, but the degree to which it could present less risk. Right now, China and the US are discussing a mechanism for notifying each other of major military activities and rules of behavior for air and maritime encounters. The bad news is that the progress is slow; the good news is that the commitment is reaffirmed . Another healthy development, according to the S&ED, is that the US coast guard and PRC maritime law enforcement agency will be included in future

discussions on rules for air and maritime behavior. No region is more dangerous than the seas in the Western Pacific.

Unplanned encounters between naval ships and aircraft are not rare, especially between Chinese naval ships and aircraft, and

those of the US and Japan. Fortunately on 22 April, 2014, 21 states unanimously voted for a Code for Unplanned

Encounters at Sea (CUES) in Tsingtao. CUES offers safety procedures, a basic communications plan and maneuvering instructions when naval ships or naval aircraft of two states meet unexpectedly at sea. It helps reduce miscalculations

and the chance of a conflict. CUES is the greatest achievement we have had in recent years, in terms of crisis management in the West Pacific. It should be observed in earnest. There should be training exercises so that officers and sailors can become familiar with the rules. This is exceedingly important for the Chinese and American navies, whose ships often get dangerously close to each other.

Threat = RealChina poses a threat to the US- building up its military to fight highly informized conventional war against Washington Colby in 15 ----Robert M. Gates Fellow Center for a New American Security

“China’s Offensive Missile Forces: Implications for the United States” (2015) (testimony of Elbridge Colby). Print

As is well known, China has been investing substantially since the 1990s in developing a sophisticated arsenal of conventional ballistic and cruise missiles able to strike accurately, rapidly, and with material effect against U.S. and allied bases, vessels, and other targets in the Western Pacific. While the exact impetus for and precise level of

progress of this initiative are both difficult to establish with precision, what is clear is that China has been able to develop a highly sophisticated and large missile force and that the challenge it poses to the U.S. military posture in the Pacific is real and increasingly serious. But while China’s missile arsenal represents one of the – if not the – most potent aspects of its military modernization program, it cannot be viewed in isolation. Rather, China’s missile force needs to be seen in the context of the PRC’s broader effort to develop a high-end conventional military able to contest U.S. military dominance in the Western Pacific and eventually very likely beyond it. This broader military buildup comprises increasingly sophisticated, resilient, and formidable command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)

capabilities; naval and air forces; space and anti-space assets; and a range of other capabilities across the full spectrum of modern military force. While much of the focus of this initiative appears oriented at dealing with a Taiwan

scenario, it is increasingly apparent that Beijing’s ambitions have widened or are widening beyond Taiwan. Indeed, the PRC appears to be seeking ultimately to create a zone in the western Pacific within which the military power of the PLA will be able to ensure that Chinese strategic interests are held paramount—in effect, to supplant the United States as the military primate in the region. Based upon its efforts to date, China has in fact already been able to put together a formidable military, one that can contest U.S. military primacy in the Western Pacific, including in what the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) refers to as “warfare under highly informationized conditions” – or, in more common parlance, modern, high-tech war. Indeed, the median point of contemporary defense expert opinion appears to be that the United States would already face a serious challenge to prevailing against Chinese military power over plausible conflicts in the Western Pacific, especially Taiwan – and that the situation is getting worse rather than better. And it is the future that is the real problem. This is because the trend lines are worsening from the perspective of the United States and its allies. China’s military buildup is continuing apace despite a slowdown in the PRC’s overall economic growth even as U.S. defense investment is hobbled by sequestration and its associated spending restrictions as well as by the diffuse but perhaps more significant

difficulties Washington finds in focusing its own military modernization efforts on the “pacing” challenge posed by the PRC. These difficulties include the draw of military attention to other regions of interest for the United States, organizational and programmatic inertia in the Pentagon and elsewhere, and, perhaps most perniciously, the simple unwillingness of large swathes of U.S. opinion to believe that U.S. military primacy could actually be seriously challenged. These unfavorable trends, of course, build upon a fundamental geographic conundrum that the United States faces in the Western Pacific: Washington seeks to retain military primacy in the waters and skies just off the Chinese coast, while Beijing seeks to seize the military upper hand in areas just off its

shores. China is thus able to seek to exploit the advantages that derive in conventional warfare from proximity, the ability to deploy mass, shorter lines of communication, and a host of other factors

China’s nuclear weapons pose a threat to the US- modernizing their fleet to attack US assets and challenge US power Colby in 15 ----Robert M. Gates Fellow Center for a New American Security

“China’s Offensive Missile Forces: Implications for the United States” (2015) (testimony of Elbridge Colby). Print

At the same time as China has been mounting an aggressive buildup of its conventional military, however,

the PRC’s nuclear arsenal is also becoming somewhat larger and considerably more sophisticated. While China continues to exhibit restraint regarding the size of its nuclear arsenal and in how it appears to think about the role of nuclear weapons in

its military strategy, the PRC is nevertheless substantially modernizing its nuclear forces. These improvements include the deployment of more survivable road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with multiple, independently targetable warheads and penetration aids designed to defeat missile defenses; the development and gradual deployment of a ballistic-missile submarine force; the fielding of new command, control

and communications assets that enable more deliberate and controlled employment; and the marked improvement in training and professionalism among the PLA’s nuclear warriors. The Department of Defense conservatively judged in its 2014 annual report to Congress on China’s military modernization that “these technologies and training enhancements strengthen China’s nuclear force and enhance its strategic strike capabilities” and assessed that China will “implement more sophisticated command and control systems.”1 While these advances do not at this stage appear to portend an effort by Beijing to “sprint to parity,” they do have serious strategic consequences even

without such an attempt. That is because, whether deliberately pursued or not, these improvements will by necessity give Beijing more and better options for employing its nuclear weapons, especially in more limited and controlled ways. In the past, China’s nuclear forces were considered vulnerable and blunt instruments, messy weapons that would only likely be used at the very top of the “escalatory ladder”—for instance, against the cities of its opponents. Needless to say, this presumably rendered the bar for Chinese nuclear use exceptionally high, an inference fortified by China’s ofttrumpeted (if ambiguous and rarely fully

trusted) “no first use” policy regarding its nuclear weapons. But, armed with its new generation of nuclear forces, China will gain options for using them that are more discriminate in nature than those entailing massive strikes against American territory. Instead of only, practically speaking, having the option of striking at a major American or Japanese city, China will increasingly gain the ability to employ its nuclear forces in more tailored fashion—for example, against military facilities or forces, including in the region. This ability to use nuclear weapons in more limited and tailored ways will make China’s threats—explicit or implicit—to use nuclear forces more credible. The consequence of this is that China’s nuclear force will cast a darker shadow over SinoAmerican competition in the Pacific. Thus, strategists and military planners in the United States and allied countries will need to take the possibility of Chinese nuclear employment in the event of conflict more seriously. This does not mean that China will reach for the nuclear saber early or often. But a more sophisticated force will give China better options for how it might seek to use these weapons not only, as in the past, as a desperate last resort, but also to deter U.S. escalation of a conflict—escalation the United States might need to resort to if it is to prevail.

China rise poses a challenge to US primacy in the region – also makes conflict in the region inevitable Colby in 15 ----Robert M. Gates Fellow Center for a New American Security

“China’s Offensive Missile Forces: Implications for the United States” (2015) (testimony of Elbridge Colby). Print

This shift in the military balance driven by China’s increasing conventional military capability and its more sophisticated nuclear force represents a major challenge for the United States, which has since the Second World War underwritten its strategy for the Asia-Pacific by military supremacy in maritime Asia .2 During this era, U.S. forces could, generally speaking, defeat any challenger in the waters of the western Pacific or in the skies over them. This allowed the United States to shape the regional environment in ways conductive to U.S. interests in open commerce and political interaction; sustain alliances with countries like Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand; and prevent Asia from being used as a

springboard to challenge broader American interests and security. In brief, military primacy in maritime Asia has been the crucial predicate of broader American strategy in the Asia-Pacific. A loss of military primacy in this region would, therefore, have profound strategic consequences for the United States and those nations that rely upon it. The United States has seen an open and friendly order in maritime Asia as crucial to its interests at least since Matthew Perry’s

“Black Ships” opened Japan in the nineteenth century; since the Second World War, it has seen its own military supremacy in the Pacific as the best way to secure and promote that order. If China can attain military dominance or even simply advantage in this area, the world’s most dynamic region, then U.S. interests as traditionally understood are likely to suffer, perhaps seriously. It will be Beijing rather than Washington that will serve as the ultimate arbiter of what is and is not acceptable in Asia . It is a reasonable assumption that such a power structure would be considerably less congenial to Washington’s interests—let alone those of U.S. allies—than

the current order. It therefore makes sense for the United States to strive to preserve its military advantages in the region. But prudence and realism suggest that we anticipate that the future conventional military balance in the western Pacific between the United States and its allies and partners on the one hand and China on the other will, at the very least, be far more even than was

previously the case, and likely will become increasingly competitive. Over time, indeed, the balance may tip against the United States and its allies, at least in certain regions and with respect to particular contingencies about which the United States has traditionally cared. Even without wholly losing the conventional upper hand in the Pacific, this highly probable shift toward a more even military balance in the region will likely lead to significant changes in the Asia-Pacific. It will likely make China more assertive, since Beijing will be more confident that resorting to military force could pay off for it in regional disputes it cares about, especially if a conflict can be kept relatively limited. We should therefore expect Beijing to be at least somewhat more ambitious and assertive. This point should not be controversial: the notion that greater strength makes one more assertive and ambitious is well demonstrated, both in international politics and

in everyday life. Indeed, China’s rising forcefulness in its near seas in recent years appears to have been fueled by the nation’s general sense of growing power as well as the expanding inventory of assets available to pursue its ambitions. For instance, China’s acquisition of far more developed maritime and oil-drilling capabilities seem to have been

playing a major role in Beijing’s increased pushiness in the South China Sea. A more even power balance is also likely to lead to a reordering of alignments and strategic postures in the region. Asian and Pacific states will continually judge the relative strength of the two titans of the Asia-Pacific as well as the pair’s respective resolve and future trajectories, and will adjust their own

policies and postures accordingly. Indeed, this is already happening. Old U.S. ally Thailand, for instance, has drifted away from Washington and moved closer to Beijing, while old U.S. adversary Vietnam, feeling the PRC’s pressure in the South China Sea, has been warming up to Washington. Taiwan may be the canary in the

coal mine for these unfavorable trends. 3 Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense stated in 2013 that the United States would not be able to block a Chinese invasion of the island by 2020. Of course, one might ascribe this judgment to special pleading on the part of Taipei—except that Taiwan’s is not an isolated assessment; many defense experts share this view. Yet if the United States loses the military upper hand over Taiwan, it risks opening Taiwan and, to an important degree, itself to the potential for military-

backed coercion by Beijing over Taiwan’s status. A loss of the ability to credibly protect Taiwan from Chinese invasion or serious coercion could result in loss of confidence in other U.S. security commitments in Asia (and

beyond) in the face of growing Chinese power. An outright seizure of Taiwan by China, meanwhile, would present an even more dramatic challenge to U.S. credibility and would also considerably simplify and assist China’s efforts to project power beyond the socalled “First Island Chain” in the Western Pacific. Nor

should we expect a shift in the balance with respect to Taiwan to be the end of this trend. Rather, if the United States fails to maintain its edge over China, Beijing is likely to be able to attain practical military superiority in areas of

maritime Asia other than Taiwan, and over the long term perhaps well beyond it. Indeed, success in gaining military advantage over a Taiwan contingency is just as – if not more – likely to encourage as it is to satiate Beijing’s ambitions. Assuming that the United States will not concede regional hegemony to Beijing (as it should not), that the United States and its allies will continue to have significant areas of tension and disagreement with an increasingly capable China, and that the United States will remain ready to use military force to defend or vindicate its and its allies’ interests in Asia, this means that the United States may come to blows with a power deploying military forces of roughly comparable and, in some circumstances, possibly superior effectiveness. In simpler terms, it means that the outcome

of a conflict between the United States and China will be more uncertain and that, if current trends are not redressed, the United States might well ultimately find itself on the losing end of a major military engagement in the western Pacific.This more competitive military landscape between the United States and China is also likely to make conflict in the region more plausible. War is more likely in situations like this, when both sides think they can prevail, rather than when the prospective winner is clear. The great powers, for example, were more ready to fight in 1914 because each side believed it enjoyed a solid chance of victory. Conversely, a large amount of the stability and comity among the major powers of the post–Cold War world can be traced to a situation of “hegemonic stability”—the evident fact that no other power could venture beyond its own borders to challenge the United States in the years following the 1991 Gulf War. This more stable

situation will no longer so clearly hold as resort to force in maritime Asia becomes a more reasonable option for Beijing. If war does happen, then, the United States will have to fight much harder and under more stressing conditions than it would have in the past to prevail against China. This is well known and there has been ample work detailing the difficulties China’s growing strength would impose on the U.S. military as well as suggestions for how the United States might overcome them.4

Indeed, the Pentagon itself appears increasingly and commendably seized with grappling with this problem. Through initiatives such as the Department’s new “Offset Strategy” initiative, the Pentagon rightly appears to be focused on maintaining American advantages in the effective projection of conventional military force even in the face of a resolute and highly capable

opponent like Beijing. This effort by the Department deserves to be lauded, supported, and encouraged, since it represents precisely the kind of effort to retain the conventional upper hand through using cost-efficient means that the United States should be undertaking.

China poses a nuclear threat to the US- rapidly modernizing their fleet Heritage Foundation, 2016

"Threats To U.S. Vital Interests In Asia" Heritage Foundation . 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength. N. p., 2016. Web. 8 July 2016.

Missile Threat: North Korea and China. The two sources of the ballistic missile threat to the U.S. are very different in terms of their sophistication and integration into broader strategies for achieving national goals. The threats from North Korea and China are therefore very

different in nature. Chinese nuclear forces are largely the responsibility of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Second Artillery Corps, which controls most of China’s ballistic missile forces. It is considered a “super branch,” but not quite an independent service. China’s nuclear ballistic missile forces include land-based missiles with a 13,000 km range that can reach the U.S. (CSS-4) and submarine-based missiles that can reach the U.S. when the submarine is deployed within missile range. The PRC became a nuclear power in 1964 when it exploded its first atomic bomb as part of its “two bombs, one satellite” effort. In quick succession, China then exploded its first thermonuclear bomb in 1967 and orbited its first satellite in 1970, demonstrating the capability to build a delivery system that can reach the ends of the Earth. China chose to rely primarily on a land-based nuclear deterrent rather than developing two or three different basing systems as the United States did.

Furthermore, unlike the United States or the Soviet Union, China chose to pursue only a minimal nuclear deterrent. The PRC fielded only a small number of nuclear weapons, with estimates of about 100–150 weapons on medium-range ballistic missiles and about 60 ICBMs. Its only ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) conducted relatively few deterrence patrols (perhaps none),18 and its first-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the JL-1 (if it ever attained full operational capability), had limited reach. The JL-1’s 1,700-kilometer range makes it comparable to the first-generation Polaris A1

missile the U.S. fielded in the 1960s. While China’s nuclear force remained stable for several decades, the Second Artillery has been part of the modernization effort of the past 20 years. Consequently, there has been modernization and some expansion of the Chinese nuclear deterrent. The core of China’s ICBM force is the DF-31 series, a solid-fueled, road-mobile system, with a growing number of longer-range DF-41 missiles that may be in the PLA operational inventory.

China’s medium-range nuclear forces have similarly shifted to mobile, solid rocket systems so that they are both more survivable and more easily maintained. Notably, the Chinese are expanding their ballistic submarine fleet. Replacing the one Type 092 Xia-class SSBN are several Type 094 Jin-class SSBNs, three of which are already operational. These are expected to be equipped with the new, longer-range JL-2 SLBM. Such a system would provide the PRC with a “secure second-strike”

capability, substantially enhancing China’s nuclear deterrent. There is also some possibility that the Chinese nuclear arsenal now contains land-attack cruise missiles. The CJ-20, a long-range, air-launched cruise missile carried on China’s H-6 bomber, may be nuclear tipped, although there is not much evidence that China has pursued such a capability at this time. China is also believed to be working on a cruise missile submarine, which, if equipped with nuclear cruise missiles, would further expand the range of

nuclear attack options. As a result of its modernization efforts, China’s nuclear forces appear to be shifting from a minimal deterrent posture (one suited only to responding to an attack, and even then with only limited numbers) to a more robust, but limited, deterrent posture. While the PRC will still likely field fewer nuclear weapons than either the United States or Russia, it will field a more modern and diverse set of capabilities than India or Pakistan (or North Korea), its nuclear-armed neighbors. If there are corresponding changes in doctrine, modernization will enable China to engage in limited nuclear options in the event of a conflict. WWTA: The WWTA references China’s strengthening of its nuclear deterrent and strategic strike options, its continued development of advanced ballistic and cruise missiles, and participation of its strategic missile forces in military exercises. The 2015 WWTA notes that China is likely to begin seaborne nuclear deterrence patrols in the near future but offers no judgment on the degree of threat that it poses to the U.S.

China poses a risk to US interests Heritage Foundation, 2016

"Threats To U.S. Vital Interests In Asia" Heritage Foundation . 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength. N. p., 2016. Web. 8 July 2016.

The U.S. has critical direct interests at stake in the East and South Asia commons that include sea, air, space, and cyber interests. Washington has long provided the security backbone in these areas, which in turn has supported the region’s remarkable economic development. However, China is taking increasingly assertive steps to secure its own interests in these areas independent of U.S. efforts to maintain freedom of the commons for all in the region. It cannot be assumed that China shares a common conception of international space with the United States or interest in perpetuating American predominance in securing the commons. Maritime and Airspace

Commons. The aggressiveness of the Chinese navy, maritime law enforcement forces, and air forces in and over the waters of the East and South China Sea, coupled with ambiguous, extralegal territorial claims and assertion of control there, poses an incipient threat to American and overlapping allied interests. East

China Sea. Since 2010, China has intensified its efforts to assert claims of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands of Japan in the East China Sea. Beijing asserts not only exclusive economic rights within the disputed waters, but also recognition of “historic” rights to dominate and control those areas as part of its territory. Chinese and Japanese maritime law enforcement and coast guard vessels regularly operate in waters surrounding the

Senkakus that are administered by Japan, raising the potential for miscalculation and escalation into a military clash. In November 2013, China declared an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea that largely aligned with its claimed maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The People’s Liberation Army declared that it would “take defense emergency

measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in identification or refuse to follow orders.”42 The announcement was a provocative act and another Chinese attempt to change the status quo unilaterally . The ADIZ declaration is part of a broader Chinese pattern of using intimidation and coercion to assert expansive extralegal claims of sovereignty and/or control

incrementally. South China Sea. Roughly half of global trade in goods, a third of trade in oil, and over half of global liquefied natural gas shipments pass through the South China Sea, which also accounts for approximately 10 percent of global fish catch and may contain massive potential reserves of oil and natural gas. It is hotly contested by six countries, including Taiwan and the Philippines, an American security treaty

ally. Incidents between Chinese law enforcement vessels and other claimants’ fishing boats occur on a regular basis in the South China Sea, as do other Chinese assertions of administrative authority. The U.S. presence also has become an object of Chinese attention, from confrontations with the ocean surveillance ship USNS Impeccable and the destroyer USS John McCain in 2009 to the confrontation with the guided-missile cruiser USS Cowpens in December 2013 and a dangerous intercept of a U.S. Navy P-8 aircraft in August 2014. The most serious inter-regional incidents in the South China Sea have occurred between China and the Republic of the Philippines (RP). In 2012, an RP naval ship operating on behalf of its coast guard challenged private Chinese poachers in waters around Scarborough Shoal. The resulting escalation left Chinese government ships in control of the Shoal.

China poses a military threat to the US – increase in defense cabilibty and lack of a relationship between the 2 armies Basha et al

Basha, Christopher, Tabitha Hodges, Jeffery Clark, Thwang Lian, and Joan Nguyen. China: A Multi-faceted Threat to US National Security. Rep. N.p.: n.p., 2009. Print.

China's growing military capability has attracted a great deal of attention, but details about the current and likely

near-future state of China's military power have been in short supply. While it is true that China is modernizing its forces and increasing defense spending, the prospective improvements in overall military capability need to be set against the very low-technology starting point of China's armed forces. The 1982 Chinese constitution vests supreme command of the armed forces in the Central Military Commission. The country’s military force is the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), so named in 1946; the army, navy, and air force are all components of the PLA. In the early 1990s the PLA was approximately 3 million strong and as such was the world’s largest military force. However, it is not considered a highly sophisticated armed force. Of this number, the navy had 240,000 members, including about 25,000 in the naval air force and another 6000 in the marines; the air force had 470,000 members, including 220,000 in air defense. The army was supported by a national militia of some 12 million and by a security force of more than 1.8 million. The navy had more than 1700 vessels, including more than 90 submarines, one of them armed with nuclear missiles. The air force had an estimated 5000 combat aircraft. China has made significant progress in the development of nuclear weapons, but in comparison with those of the U.S. or Russia, its arsenal is small. The PLA also plays a significant role in economic production and in major construction efforts such as dams, irrigation projects, and land reclamation schemes. The PLA virtually ran the nation during the most chaotic years of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–69) and suppressed prodemocracy

demonstrations in Beijing in June 1989. When viewed through the lens on a security dilemma, China’s modernization may cause much instability. The dilemma exists because one state’s efforts to increase its own security usually decrease the security of another state. Signs of mistrust and suspicion consistent with the presence of a security dilemma are not hard to find within the United States and Chinese militaries. One Chinese source notes that “the United States resolutely believes that China will become its global strategic opponent around 2015.” According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the SIPRI Yearbook 1999, the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal is about 400 warheads. The Bulletin estimates that 20 nuclear-armed missiles are deployed in the intercontinental role, and another 230 nuclear weapons on deployed (or can be deployed) on aircraft, missiles, and submarines with regional capabilities. The 150 remaining nuclear warheads are believed to be reserved for "tactical" uses (short-range missiles, low yield aircraft-dropped bombs, and possibly artillery shells or demolition

munitions). For the United States, China’s evolving maritime denial capability could be seen as challenging its command of the seas. Although China has only conducted a few submarine patrols in recent years, mostly in the coastal water, the number has increased to seven in 2007. Chinese submarines have become more visible, transiting unannounced through Japanese territorial waters in November 2004

and surfacing unexpectedly near a U.S carrier in October 2006. China’s naval modernization is also likely to appear threatening to other states in the region, especially those involved in disputes with China over maritime sovereignty. China says it pursues a national defense policy solely aimed at protecting its territory and people, and in keeping with its concept of "peaceful development." The government's latest white paper on national defense says it will "by and large reach the goal of modernization of national defense and armed forces by the mid-21st century." The paper stresses China's hopes to create a more technologically advanced, capable military that will allow it to conduct and sustain operations at a greater distance from its border and says the country will make much progress toward that goal by 2020. There are many reasons as to why China has accelerated their military build-up. It is not difficult to identify the stimuli which have prompted China to go in for an accelerated military build-up in the last decade or so. • United States victory in the Cold War and loss of the Cold War’s predictable global strategic templates which China adroitly exploited to her strategic advantage was disconcerting for China. • The disintegration of the Former Soviet Union as a Communist superpower and the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower were strategically traumatic for China. • United States military intervention in Iraq (Gulf War I in 1991-92) and the hi-tech ‘shock and awe’ blitzkrieg military campaign was militarily traumatic for China. • United States military interventions in former Yugoslavia on humanitarian grounds in the mid-1990s rattled China fearing that the same principles could be used by United States for military interventions in Tibet and Xinjiang. Further, it was militarily traumatic that another Communist state stood disintegrated by American policies. • The ease with which Taliban Afghanistan was subjugated in 2002 by awesome use of American military power and that too on China’s immediate periphery further reinforced China’s military fears arising from USA. • Whatever Chinese doubts of American military power that may have lingered stood shattered by Gulf War II in Iraq where once again US hi-tech integrated military power sliced through Iraq in days. • The strategic hemming-in of China both in the East and the West by United States strategic initiatives have kept China worried. China announced a nearly 15 percent rise in military spending on 04 March 2009 — a smaller boost than in previous years — as the national legislature prepared to open its annual session with a focus firmly on overcoming the country's brewing economic crisis. The 14.9 percent increase in defense spending is the lowest in three years, a possible reflection of shifting priorities. The 480.68 billion yuan (US$70.27 billion) military budget follows a 17.6 percent increase last year and 17.8

percent in 2007 — the biggest jump in more than a decade. It also was the 19th double-digit percentage increase in the past two decades. While economic and trade relations between the United States and China have been growing, military to military relations remain relatively underdeveloped. Military conflict between the two is highly unlikely, but "not impossible" according to CFR Senior Fellow Adam Segal. Some experts see little prospect of a closer military relationship between the two countries in the near future. Admiral Timothy J. Keating, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, told CFR.org it would be a "giant leap of faith" to believe the United States and China could develop a close military partnership any time soon. To improve the relationship, Keating says, will require "more transparency, a better understanding of intention on our part of the Chinese, and to get there we would need more active cooperation with the Chinese." How U.S. defense planners will respond to China's military buildup going forward is also dependent on the ongoing debate over the biggest threats to U.S. national security.

Chinese censorship poses a threat the the US – blocks out trade with tech companies and misconstrues American politics Basha et al 2009

Basha, Christopher, Tabitha Hodges, Jeffery Clark, Thwang Lian, and Joan Nguyen. China: A Multi-faceted Threat to US National Security. Rep. N.p.: n.p., 2009. Print.

June 4, 2009 is the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre in China. The incident involved demonstrations around the Tiananmen Square area by intellectuals and students against the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The group of protestors called for a series of economic and democratic reforms and expressed a general disapproval of the government’s authoritarian ways. In order to stop the protests which had lasted for nearly two weeks, the government ordered the People’s Liberation Army to quell the protestors by opening fire on the square. After two days of military involvement the Red Cross estimated that 2,600 people had been killed and

nearly 7,000 to 10,000 wounded (Kristof). Now, 20 years after the event occurred, the Chinese government continues to flex its authoritarian might by taking a number of precautionary steps to keep discussion of the event and the anniversary non existent. One such effort was the complete and total censorship of any internet discussion of the massacre taking place. So much pressure was put on Chinese internet

services that many just completely shut down comment boards stating the day was Chinese Internet Maintenance Day. Furthermore, Twitter, human rights’ groups websites, and blogging services hosted outside of China were also blocked to keep information about the event at a minimum (Singel). This blatant denial of information to the citizens of China may at first appear to be a domestic issue; however, its consequences are much more widespread. Actions such as this present a serious and possibly dangerous threat to the United States and its national security interests. This threat manifests itself in two primary ways. First, the Chinese government is causing harm to free trade interests of United States companies. Second, by engaging in censorship of incoming information and world events, Chinese citizens are not presented with full information regarding American policy and opinions. The strict censorship of the Internet by Chinese authorities has increasingly caused damage to United States companies and their ability to engage in free trade. The blocking of information across the World Wide Web has affected technology companies such as Microsoft, Google, and Yahoo; this trade restriction by our largest trading partner only stands to hurt the already struggling American economy, which in turn hinders our global security (Santoro and

Goldberg). For example, United States based company Google has since 2002, lost a considerable amount of the Chinese market to an inferior search engine, Baidu. This was caused by the Chinese government forcing Google to deliver an inferior product in order to comply with the numerous censorship laws and regulations. Chinese companies such as Baidu do not need to create the best product; they only need to make sure that they are fully in

compliance with Chinese laws (Santoro and Goldberg). The concessions that these American technology firms have made in order to comply with Chinese mandates has also brought unwanted flack to the industries themselves. These corporations have been accused by Congress, the United States public, and human rights groups of supporting the construction of the “Great Firewall of China” (Feuerberg). This type of portrayal of American firms as assisting the repressive tendencies of the PRC is yet another set-back in regards to our national interests. Thus, internet censorship in China has had a bad impact on free trade as well as public perception of our own corporations and their ethical standards. It is in the United States national security interests to allow its domestic firms to expand across the globe, especially in countries such as China where the free flow of

information and services stands to bring traditionally distinct groups of people closer together. The second way in which Chinese policies regarding the media harms United States national security interests is through the censoring of what our elected officials say. Due to the highly regulated nature of all media institutions within China, there is the possibility that what our politicians say in America does not reach the Chinese people the same way it was originally intended. In other words, this censorship stops important information that would hopefully inspire beneficial political and social change from ever reaching the intended audience. While the Chinese constitution officially recognizes freedom of speech and press, there is also vague language that states that citizens must defend the country’s “security, honor, and interests of the

motherland” (Zissis). An example of this type of scenario occurred when China altered its translation of President Barack Obama’s inauguration speech. Removed from the speech were references to communism and free speech as well as stopping the broadcast of the feed when Cold War animosities were mentioned. Those who engaged in the censorship of the speech said that they did so because they were “duty bound to protect the

country’s interests” (Chang). In regards to this incident, Rebecca MacKinnon, a journalism professor at the University of Hong Kong said “this is standard practice” of the Chinese government to censor translations of political speeches. A similar incident occurred in a speech delivered in 2004 in Shanghai by former Vice President

Dick Cheney (Chang). This type of censorship is extremely harmful because it does not allow the majority of Chinese citizens to see that the United States politicians are aware and unsupportive of the vast political deficiencies which exist in their country. It creates an intellectual gap between our elected policy makers and their efforts to denounce particular government practices. It is in the United States national interest to have the citizens of China receive the exact message we are trying to send rather than one that is altered to fit the PRC’s standards. When this does not occur, the United States faces a security dilemma in that there is a disconnect from the information we send out and the message that is

eventually received. The disruption of free trade and the tampering with political messages by American

policymakers are two major obstacles to our national security interests. China’s strict adherence to such authoritarian censorship has also caused numerous other consequences which further confound the problem. While this security threat may not be the most striking nor salient, it does pose a real problem for the United States and is one

which deserves to be dealt with. Because of the already controversial nature of the Chinese tradition of heavy handed censorship and filtering, this may be an area which the United States can realize its security interests by tackling the issue as one of human rights and freedom for the people of China. Washington would benefit in numerous ways from persuading Beijing to take a critical look at its censorship policies and instead adopt methods, which promote the spread of unhampered information to its citizens.

Chinese economic growth threatens the US – competition over energy and resources, alliances with problematic nations Basha et al 2009

Basha, Christopher, Tabitha Hodges, Jeffery Clark, Thwang Lian, and Joan Nguyen. China: A Multi-faceted Threat to US National Security. Rep. N.p.: n.p., 2009. Print.

China is the main Asian power and its economic, political, and security interests are mainly focused on economic prosperity and political stability. Normalizing relations between the U.S. and China has faced many obstacles, and it is very complex. Different presidential administrations approached China in their own ways that allowed maintaining a normalized steady relationship. The relationship between China and the U.S has been “love-hate” based on their interests and influences by the decision makers (Garrison 1). The policies and politics allow economics and power races between the two countries (Garrison 14). The Central Intelligence Agency reports that China is the second largest economy in the world, and China, therefore, enjoys economic development. Former President George W. Bush’s top advisors Condoleezza Rice and John Negroponte suggest that China “may become a peer competitor” to the United States because of the economic growth and its military powers (Tkacik 1). China’s economic growth is a national security threat to the United States because the economic growth has permitted military build up, hunt for natural resources, and strong trade partnerships with hostile countries.. China’s economic growth is a serious concern to the U.S. national security because the economic growth has permitted expending its military and technology advancement. According to Tkacik, the Chinese defense spending has increased every year in a “double-digit” tailing the United States and Russia (Tkacik 2). China’s military build up in more than enough to defend and protect the country. Therefore, it is clear that the military build up sends a strong signal to the world that China is capable of protecting its interests around the world and against the U.S. Modernizing military technologies require billions of dollars, and strong economy growth is the main factor making China enable to increase it military size and equipping with modern technologies. Economic growth that allows military build up is a big concern for the future U.S. national security. Due to the fact that natural resources and raw materials are needed to support and sustain China’s economic growth, China and the United States have the common problem: energy. Energy plays a major role in China’s economic development. Therefore, the U.S. faces energy challenges over China because China needs to buy more oil and other natural resources for making possible to keep running the economy. The growing economy consumes millions of barrels oil, and the Chinese government can domestically produce only half of what it needs. Therefore, China needs to import more oil from other countries, and this may force to “pursue an expansionist policy to support its economy” (Mellman 10). Mellman also suggests that this “policy would conflict” with the American energy security policy and it interests around the world ( 7). Many people believe China and the U.S. share the same interests of energy security and securing sea-lane, and China, therefore, is not a threat to the U.S. national security (Zweig and Jianhai 37). However, it is my belief that China and the U.S. need the same resources from the same region, and China will protect its national interest whatever it costs. The economic growth forces expansion in global partnership that could become global trade partnership competitions. China has expanded its global interests and economic partnerships in many regions against the U.S. interests. The need for global alliance is very

important for marketing their products and security. Therefore, China is expanding its partnership with African countries, Central and South Asia, Middle East, and South America to find raw materials. China is willing to negotiate with hostile countries like Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, and Myanmar, which strongly oppose the U.S. interests and policies toward the world. Expanding China’s global partnerships should not be a big concern for the U.S., but the willingness against the U.S .interests and political stability are threats to the U.S. national security. Therefore, the competition trade partnership with hostile countries could become the major concern for both the United States and China, and it could lead to military confrontation, as was the case for the World Wars. From President Nixon to the second President Bush, all presidents have faced different kind of obstacles normalization with China, and it still will face in the future. After the Communism collapsed in Soviet Union, the U.S. and China relationship has improved in many areas. But, China’s economic growth bring political influence and a stronger military power in international communities that could challenge the U.S. interests in the globe (Zweig and Jainhai 26). Seeking political influences, hunting natural resources, and competing military powers could bring tension between the U.S. and China. It is almost impossible to predict China’s future, so the U.S. must raise its national security concern for the possible negative consequences. This is a legitimate concern for the United States because China is governed by Communist Party leaders, not democratic elected officials, and it is possible that in the future China economic power become a threat to the U.S. national security. In sum, China’s massive economic growth is a threat the United States national security and interests around the world because economic growth allows strengthening military power, massive energy consumption, and strong trade partners. Having access to foreign natural resources is the necessary for China’s economic growth and political stability. China’s leaders believe that economic development is a very importance issue for the Chinese Communist Party survival because the poverty and high population demand massive economic development to support the their basic needs, and declining economic would result in political instability and “the possibly collapse of the Chinese Communist Party” (Lt Col Mellman 11). Many people may argue that some other Asian Countries such as India, Indonesia, and Malaysia also have large size of economic and population, but it is my belief that China still plays a major role in the U.S. national security concerns. Setting China policies and the process of making decision will be the challenges for the new Presidents of the United States.

China’s climate policies threaten the world- refusal to adopt climate standards Basha et al 2009

Basha, Christopher, Tabitha Hodges, Jeffery Clark, Thwang Lian, and Joan Nguyen. China: A Multi-faceted Threat to US National Security. Rep. N.p.: n.p., 2009. Print.

During the last half of the twentieth century, there has been a significant rise in human impact on the natural environment, a trend that can be attributed to the growth of the world’s population from approximately 2.5 billion in 1950 to a little over 6 billion currently (Soroos 1999, p. 27). Most of these increases are taking place in Africa, Asian and Latin America. At the same time, the world’s economy has grown exponentially as well, giving way to large increases to global food production, which in turn led to a rise in agricultural industries, fertilizers, pesticides, and land expansion. This large increase in human activity has given scientists enough data to virtually conclude that humans are mostly responsible for fundamental alterations being made on the planet, such as “depletion of stratospheric ozone layer” and “global climate change” (Soroos 1999). In a pre-industrial world, there was a balance of the sun’s energy absorbed by greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Increasingly, the atmosphere absorbed too much greenhouse gases, affecting the way in which infrared radiation moved in and out of the atmosphere, creating major changes in the earth’s temperature, making it increasingly warmer. These effects are the basis for the scientific argument behind the climate crisis that the earth is facing today (Gore 2006, p. 25). Some of these changes in temperature have devastating effects that include increases in flash floods (Gore 2006, p. 72), more severe hurricanes (Gore 2006, p. 54), and in some areas, extremely drier climates (Gore 2006, p. 73). It has become evident that international cooperation is imperative to prevent even further drastic changes from negatively affecting the Earth and its inhabitants, that all countries do their part to set goals to live more environmentally responsible while creating ways for improved sustainable development. However, I believe that superpowers like the United States must set high standards for change so that rapidly developing countries like China will make environmental policy a priority for

themselves as well. Within the past few years, there have been growing concerns about the effects of industrial pollution in China—on both the domestic and international level. These effects potentially harmful effects have caught the attention of the United States to help China address its environmental challenges. However, concerns of the climate change issue does not “really resonate with the Chinese”, who do not want to slow down economic growth to “mitigate carbon dioxide emissions” (Zwaniecki, 2007), despite the effects the pollution have on neighboring countries, such as Japan. The Japanese ODA (Official Development Assistance has had some difficulty in addressing the problems of China’s industrial pollution, creating worries about acid rain and dust blown in from China (Yahuda

2006, p. 292). The concern of acid rain that are formed from emissions coming from China has also extended beyond affecting Japan—it has degraded forests and watersheds in other parts of Asia and some Asian

pollutants are reaching as far as the U.S. West Coast. Despite some disagreements the China has expressed with the United States about slowing their economic growth in response the international climate crisis, they are very receptive to propositions that can help them decrease energy consumption without endangering the fast pace of growth (Zwaniecki, 2007). Studies have shown that improving energy efficiency could allow China to not only reduce the cost of environmental degradation, which now equals 8 percent to 13 percent (Zwaniecki, 2007) of its annual gross domestic product, but also cut down its greenhouse gas emissions. More importantly, better air quality could save some 200,000 to 750,000 lives per year now lost prematurely in China (Zwaniecki, 2007). Such potential for safe economic improvement and a necessity to help raise the quality of health for Chinese citizens and a prevention for Chinese industrial pollutants from affecting other the US

among other countries have made China a US priority in helping the two focuses on tackling the environmental challenges. However, because China is currently in economic transition as a communist-to-extreme capitalist country, addressing the industrialization pollution problems are making achieving better environmental standards even more difficult. For example, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol illustrated the fact that China remained “more concerned about economic growth” and fixing its “own pollution problems” (Lampton

2002, p. 165) than looking at the larger picture of its effects on the global environment. China, along with other many developing nations, which included Brazil and India, was active in pushing to “exempt developing countries from greenhouse gas reduction targets (Lampton 2002, p. 166). It was in their opinion that the burden of meeting the emissions requirements should be placed on the more developed countries, like the United States. It was reasoned that because not only was the United States more able to economically support such a drastic initiative, they were the also the largest emitters of greenhouse gases to begin with. A study released by the U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration and Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center indicated that the United States emits more greenhouse gas pollution than “South America, Africa, the Middle East, Australia, and Asia all put together,” contributing 30.3 percent of the greenhouse gas emission into the Earth’s atmosphere alone (Gore 2006, p. 156). This disagreement is the reflection of the “North-South gap” that exists between developing and developed countries like China and the United States (respectively) and how each country’s priorities differ based on this concept. Essentially, while the North, represented by developed countries, gives substantial attention to “environmental” issues that threaten ecological stability, the South, represented by developing countries, has placed greater emphasis on “immediate need for economic growth to raise standards of living” (Vig 1999, p. 6). The developing countries’ attitudes at the Kyoto meetings can be summed up by Mark Mwandosya of Tanzania, chair of the developing country caucus: “Very many of us are struggling to attain a decent standard of living for our peoples, and yet we are constantly told that we must share in the effort to reduce emissions so that industrialized countries can continue to enjoy the benefits of their wasteful lifestyle” (Paarlberg 1999,

p. 249). In result, the optimism that was initially felt at the international summit to ratify Kyoto Protocol was quickly extinguished—China pushed for the protocol’s emissions requirements to be non-binding and on a voluntary basis (Molitor 1999, p. 232) while the United States did not even adopt the protocol’s policies for ratification (Gore

2006, p. 177). What was to be a major step in the world working collectively to take a step forward to address the climate crisis, the end product of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol was essentially a set of toothless, underspecified guidelines, allowing countries to freely decide which gas or combination of gases to be controlled for regulation (Molitor 1999, p. 232). Although on a per capita basis, human activity in the United States puts in an estimated “ten times as much carbon dioxide as human activity in China” (Paarlberg 1999, p. 249), the World Bank has recently released a report that if China remains on its present rate of industrialization, it is estimated that it will surpass U.S. carbon emissions early in the twenty-first century, around 2020 (Lampton 2006, p. 166). This fact illustrates the importance for both the United States and China to overcome North-South fundamental differences to reduce the harm that each inflicted upon the global environment.

US-China war impactsWarfare between the United States and China escalates Colby in 15 ----Robert M. Gates Fellow Center for a New American Security

“China’s Offensive Missile Forces: Implications for the United States” (2015) (testimony of Elbridge Colby). Print

Considerably less remarked upon than the difficulties the United States would face in a conventional conflict with China, however, is that, in the

event of such a war between the United States and China, nuclear weapons are more likely to be implicated than they had been in the past. This is true because war in the region between the United States and China under circumstances of even rough conventional parity will be more susceptible to nuclear escalation. In the past, most defense analysts and planners envisioned a Sino-American conflict in maritime Asia starting and remaining a conventional fight. Given the PLA’s very modest capabilities for such a contingency, the United States was seen as able to handle any Chinese attempts at power projection

solely by relying on U.S. conventional forces and with relatively limited requirements for vertical or horizontal escalation. In practical terms, the United States would have been able to defeat Chinese attacks on Taiwan or other such plausible beneficiaries of American defense with relatively limited means and on Washington’s terms. Nuclear weapons, if they were to become involved, were seen as most likely to be introduced in limited numbers by the Chinese in a desperate attempt to stave off defeat in a Taiwan contingency, a defeat that might jeopardize the legitimacy of the Communist regime. But the threat to resort to such usage was seen as of limited credibility and actual employment along these lines of minimal effectiveness in light of substantial American advantages in the quality

and quantity of the conventional and nuclear forces it could use to conduct such a limited nuclear war. But we will be moving into a world in which the basic assumptions that determined such assessments no longer hold. That is because future efforts to defeat Chinese attempts at power projection will not be so easily handled, especially without our needing to resort to vertical or horizontal escalation to preva il. In any contingency in the region, the growing sophistication of China’s large military will mean that the United States will have a much more difficult time overcoming it, since Chinese systems that have longer range, are more accurate, are smarter and are more effectively netted together require more work, creativity and skill to defeat. Put more directly, the United States and its allies will have to fight harder, quicker, nastier, deeper, for longer, with less deliberation and over a wider battlefield than was the case in the past in order to defeat Chinese forces in maritime Asia. For example, in the past, the United States might have designated Chinese fixed ballistic missiles of limited range and accuracy based on or near the coast for attack by aircraft operating safely with excellent and secure information later in a campaign. In the future, however, the United States might have to designate Chinese mobile ballistic missiles of longer range and better accuracy based farther in the country’s interior for attack by aircraft operating perilously with limited information early in a conflict. So, for instance, if Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense is right that China will have the upper hand in a battle over Taiwan by the 2020s—but the United States still wants to deter or defeat an attempted Chinese invasion of the island—the United States may well need to be willing to hit targets deeper in China than had been envisioned before, strike sooner and expand the war considerably beyond the island’s immediate environs in order to compel Beijing to back away from seizing Taiwan.

Even without anyone really wanting to introduce nuclear weapons into the equation, then, these trends raise classic “inadvertent escalation” risks. This line of analysis points to the dangers of escalation that can arise due to the way even a conventional war can unfold. In particular, if one needs to fight harder against an opponent in order to prevail, it also becomes harder to limit the war—including in ways that might entangle nuclear weapons. For instance, U.S. efforts in the event of conflict to strike at Chinese command-and-control nodes, missile bases and systems, surveillance and intelligence assets, and the like, even if intended only to affect the nonnuclear balance, might well implicate nuclear weapons. This might be because such assets or capabilities might be collocated with nuclear forces or themselves have dual nuclear and conventional roles, because the Chinese might fear such hard-hitting attacks are a prelude to decapitation, or because the Chinese might misread conventional strikes as nuclear

attacks. In the fog of war, any number of such dynamics could push toward consideration of nuclear use. Nor would nuclear weapons

necessarily be introduced into a potential Sino-U.S. conflict solely by China. Rather, it could well be the United States that elects to do so – and, in peacetime, to signal its willingness to do so in wartime for deterrence and assurance purposes. This willingness on the part of the United States stems from the unfortunate fact that Washington may lose the conventional military advantage it has historically enjoyed over China in maritime Asia. Such a loss would most plausibly be partial—China would be unlikely to seize whole the conventional upper hand in the region. But, having gained the advantage over some parts of the western Pacific, Beijing might, for example, attempt to force the United States into a situation in which Washington would be unwilling to take the necessarily escalatory steps to overcome or push back Chinese attacks. For instance, Beijing might gain conventional superiority around Taiwan and be able to block U.S. efforts designed to defend the island. In such a case, the United States might need to broaden the war, possibly by striking targets further into China and of greater value to the PRC’s leadership, in order to persuade Beijing to agree to terms acceptable to Washington. The plausible threat of a limited Chinese nuclear response would prove a substantial disincentive to pursuing such a course.

US- China conflict causes proliferation Colby in 15 ----Robert M. Gates Fellow Center for a New American Security

“China’s Offensive Missile Forces: Implications for the United States” (2015) (testimony of Elbridge Colby). Print

This course will seem unappealing to many, not least in the United States, given the risks it will entail for Americans. But this disquiet points to

another potential implication should China gain military primacy in the Western Pacific: the prospect of further nuclear proliferation in the region. If, as China grows stronger and more assertive, its conventional military power begins to outweigh that of the United States in maritime Asia, and that shift is

not met by a greater U.S. reliance on its nuclear forces or some other effective countervailing steps, then those countries of Asia traditionally allied to or reliant upon Washington—countries that cannot hope to match China’s strength at the conventional level—may ultimately see getting their own nuclear weapons as essential to deterring China’s exploitation of its growing strength. It is worth emphasizing that this will particularly be the case if these nations view a weaker United States as lacking the resolve or the ability to use its nuclear weapons on behalf of its allies, since in such a case they will be exposed to Chinese coercion . This

is no fantasy; polls in South Korea already show substantial support for an indigenous nuclear-weapons program, and South Korea, Japan, Australia and Taiwan have pursued or seriously contemplated pursuing their own nuclear arsenals in the past and might do so again. In other words, in such a scenario a cruel dynamic will take hold in which diminishing U.S. conventional advantages will lead to pressure for greater emphasis on nuclear forces, but, in

light of China’s own advancing nuclear capabilities, such reliance itself will be decidedly less attractive. The loss of U.S. conventional advantages would leave Washington with a series of unpalatable options. Relying more on nuclear weapons might raise the costs and risks of conventional war with China and thus fortify deterrence, but those costs and risks would increasingly redound not only against the PRC but also against the United States and its allies. Ignoring or refusing to confront the nuclear implications of China’s growing conventional advantages, on the other hand, would increase the impetus toward proliferation among Washington’s allies and partners. Such developments would put enormous pressure on what has been, since the end of the Cold War, a relatively easy dual pursuit of credible extended nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation. In the unipolar era, one policy served the other, and neither was very risky or costly. But during the darker days of the Cold War, there were bitter debates about whether the risks that extended deterrence involved for the United States were worth the benefits of nonproliferation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, those

debates effectively vanished. But as China grows stronger, it will be harder and riskier for the United States to credibly extend nuclear deterrence against Beijing to U.S. allies—perhaps much harder—which will mean that using it to forestall proliferation will also be harder and riskier. The greater the danger posed by China’s

military and the broader its ambitions, the less plausible it is that Washington will be able to—or will want to—serve both masters. Thus, the more threatening and ambitious Beijing appears, the less likely it is that the strategic and nuclear order of the Asia-Pacific will endure.

No econ containmentThe Purpose of TPP is not to contain China – that would encourage protectionist interests, scare away potential members, and cause China to refuse to cooperateSolis 2013

Mireya Solis: Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies. “The Containment Fallacy: China and the TPP” Brookings.edu, 5-24-13. Webpage. Accessed 7-8-16. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/05/24-china-transpacific-partnership-solis

In recent commentary for the Financial Times, David Pilling argues that the central objective of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade

negotiations is the exclusion of China. In his view, the desire to build an “anyone but China” club is due both to the perception that China got an easy pass when it joined the WTO and has continued to flaunt international trade and investment rules; and to the articulation of a larger political strategy to marginalize this emerging superpower. Pilling goes on to predict that the TPP will fail to deliver major liberalization as the traditional pattern of shielding sensitive sectors will emerge, and admonishes that only a much diluted trade agreement faces a realistic chance of ratification given the fractured consensus on the new proposed rules. In this rendition, the TPP appears politically myopic and

economically irrelevant. The argument that the TPP is a club that bars Chinese entry is inaccurate and unhelpful. China, like any other APEC economy, has the right to request entry into the TPP. Whether the Chinese leadership will judge TPP membership to be in their country’s national interest and whether TPP members can be persuaded that China is

prepared to abide by the negotiated disciplines is a separate matter. But it is important to dispel the notion that the TPP precludes Chinese entry. In fact, this trade agreement scores better than most in incorporating an accession mechanism that has already delivered membership expansion from four to twelve members –

now comprising 40% of world GDP. More fundamentally, it is hard to understand why TPP countries would pursue the counter-productive and unfeasible goal of marginalizing China. China sits at the apex of the world economy as

it ranks number two in share of world GDP and is at the center of global supply chains. A trade agreement that by fiat sought to defy these fundamental economic realities would be foolhardy indeed. Hence the TPP concept is

expansive: it aims to eventually develop an Asia-Pacific wide platform of economic integration, not to draw lines encircling China. If Chinese exclusion were the selling point of the TPP for countries like Japan , then

one would be hard pressed to explain why the Japanese government is concurrently negotiating two major trade agreements with China: a trilateral FTA in Northeast Asia and an East Asian trade agreement known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). And the same is true for all other Asian countries in the TPP who already partake in the ASEAN-

China FTA and are participating in the RCEP talks. The “us versus them” dynamic of security alliances is not really applicable to free trade agreements. The noodle bowl that characterizes the maze of FTAs illustrates the fact that in the world of international trade overlapping memberships render moot purely exclusive arrangements . Ascribing an anti-China objective to the TPP is not helpful on three main fronts: 1) it provides political cover to protectionist interests, who argue that they should not be asked to undertake painful economic adjustments for the sake of trade

agreements driven by geopolitical concerns; 2) it sends a chilling message to prospective members, who may fear that in joining TPP they will be seen as enlisted in the anti-China camp; and 3) it will discourage China from finding points of convergence with the TPP agenda if this is seen as capitulating to an American strategy of containment. The most fundamental challenge to the TPP project vis-à-vis China is not that it is built around a faulty notion of containment, but rather that it may not constitute a powerful enough enticement to propel China to sign on to these new standards on trade and investment. China so far has reacted by accelerating its own trade initiatives in Asia. The risk that the United States and China will remain for the foreseeable future in separate trade groupings, without a significant bilateral dialogue on trade and investment, is very real. TPP negotiators cannot postpone the task of fashioning a strategy to engage China until after the TPP agreement is completed. They must be mindful of the fact that rules must be evaluated both in terms of their quality and dissemination potential. China must see in the new trade agenda a deal not unlike its accession to the WTO: while hefty commitments are to be expected, the accompanying domestic reforms will pay off handsomely in terms of improved economic performance.

Deterrence SolvesDeterrence isn’t dead. It is a vital US military strategy, the US just has trouble applying it in the real worldKathleen H Hicks 2014 (Kathleen wrote this article for Global Forecast, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies) FROM: The Case for Deterrence http://csis.org/files/publication/141117_Hicks.pdf

The most damning critique of deterrence is far simpler: the concept is no longer useful because it does not work. Skeptics holding this view

can point to incidents such as Russia’s 2008 incursion into Georgia and 2014 annexation of Crimea, the recent rise of

ISIS in defiance of international condemnation, repeated North Korean nuclear tests in the face of sanctions, and the Syrian

regime’s use of chemical weapons despite President Obama’s “red line” as evidence that the United States does not have the credibility to deter threats. These incidents have taken place in the face of overwhelming U.S. military capability, the wielding of “exquisite” economic sanctions, and seemingly tireless diplomatic efforts (how many hours has Secretary of State Kerry been airborne these

past 12 months?). If the United States, with all its current advantages, cannot deter others from undertaking actions it opposes, who can? It is the United States itself that offers the most compelling case for the continuing relevance of deterrence: we are routinely deterred because we do not wish to risk the consequences— usually in blood and treasure—that

taking certain actions might bring. And the United States in turn can deter well, especially against potentially catastrophic activity. U.S. nuclear capability and overwhelming conventional military power have forced many would-be rivals and non-state actors to pursue action in less deadly spheres, where it is difficult for the United States to bring these same

advantages to bear. The problem, then, is not with the concept of deterrence but rather its successful application. Our failures stem from three important shortcomings: in clarifying our interests, to ourselves and to others; in convincing others of our credibility in threatening those who challenge our interests ; and in demonstrating the will and capability to fulfill those threats if deterrence fails. Moreover, U.S.

credibility is more elastic than our leaders might like—the more deterrence fails or appears to fail in a particular context, the less credible U.S. threats are in that context , and often in other spheres. The good news is that leaders can often increase their credibility relatively quickly, as the administration has done this year by stepping up its military capabilities along NATO’s eastern border following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. It is time to set aside tired theoretical debates about deterrence to focus on concrete applications that fit today’s

dynamic environment. In the coming year, deterrence will be an aspect of virtually all our security dealings. From continuing nuclear challenges, to the conventional military sphere, to cyber and “cross-domain” challenges, to counterterrorism,

deterrence will succeed only where American leaders can convince others that their actions (or

inactions) risk greater costs than rewards. The results will usually be far less than desired: competition of interests will continue, and in some cases, the United States will care less about the outcome than those with opposing goals. This was true in the Cold War,

from the creation of the Warsaw Pact to the Prague Spring, to, eventually, Vietnam, just as it was in 2014. In 2015, the United States will need to build on its strong record of deterring existential threats to better deter those who threaten us short of war. Better application of deterrence requires clearly communicating what we care about and our willingness and capability to act in defense of those interests . Importantly, it also requires us to carry out threats

when deterrence fails. Credibility can be gained just as it can be lost, but absent the wherewithal to carry out the deterrent threats we make—whether codified in our longstanding treaty commitments or simply stated by the president—more and potentially greater challenges to our interests will follow

A strong US presence in North East Asia will allow the US to push the point of escalation back to Beijing, they won’t want to attack because of our strong military forces and conflict will de-escalateElbridge Colby 4/1/2015 (Elbridge gave a testimony before the US-China economic and security review commission, he is a research fellow at Robert M. Gates at the center for a new American Society) FROM: China’s offensive missile forces: implications for the United States http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/Prepared%20Testimony%20for%20Formatting%20FINAL%20FORMATTED%20(1).pdf

In light of this analysis, it is reasonable to judge that China’s growing military power poses a major – and probably the most

significant – challenge to U.S. military primacy and ultimately to the nation’s legacy national security strategy in the coming years.

What, then, are we to do about it? The best way for the United States to mitigate the negative implications of rising

Chinese military power is relatively simple: to maintain its military advantage in the Western Pacific. Such superiority is the most reliable way to convince any leadership in Beijing that attempts to use its newfound military power for aggressive purposes would be futile , costly, and unwise , and thus to ensure Beijing’s respect for the interests of the United States and for those of its allies and partners. Put another way, it is the best way to effectively balance China’s growing military power.5 But, because of China’s growing wealth and sophistication as well as its evident resolve to continue building up a more formidable military that can challenge U.S. supremacy in the region and ultimately perhaps beyond, this is an illustration of

the old dictum that strategy is simple but very hard. It is crucial, nonetheless, to try to maintain such advantage where feasible, as even a diminished margin of strength is preferable to losing all such advantage. The pressing question is, however, how to do so in a way that is feasible, sustainable, and practical. In all candor, though, there do not appear to be clean “solutions” to this daunting problem. Rather, there are steps that can mitigate and limit the malign effects of China’s growing strength and minimize the decline of American relative military advantage, steps oriented around maintaining and, where the U.S. legacy posture is being rendered obsolete by China’s buildup or technology, building anew a military position in the Asia-Pacific that is potent, credible, and adapted to the potential conflicts with the PRC that plausibly could arise. These steps are crucial not only in the event of conflict but equally for preventing such a conflict on terms acceptable to

the United States and its allies. Deterrence, after all, derives most clearly and reliably from an evident ability to use force and to use it effectively and decisively.6 It therefore makes sense for the United States to dedicate itself to maintaining what military primacy it can in the Asia-Pacific. But what does maintaining such military primacy actually mean? And what does

that conception entail? What it means is the ability to fight a limited war in the Western Pacific better than China can. Why? The defining aspects of the strategic problem for the United States in this region are China’s growing military power and its increasing ability to escalate against the United States and its allies and partners in ways that negate their military capabilities or cause them grave harm. This means both that the United States and its affiliates will find it harder to defeat China and control escalation in ways they prefer and that they will be increasingly vulnerable to serious attack by the PRC. Given the fact that the stakes in any conflict in the Western Pacific are, by definition, important but still nevertheless partial for the United States, Washington as well as its allies and partners will have a strong interest in limiting the destructiveness of any conflict with China. Needless to say, China will also have immense incentives to limit a

conflict with the United States, given the enormous damage that it could wreak on the PRC. This means that, in any conflict with the PRC, both sides will almost certainly want to limit the war. Within this context, the U nited States and its allies and

partners will want to seek to favorably limit the war in ways that both protect themselves and that allow them to prevail. Put another way, because the United States and its affiliates are unlikely to enjoy untrammeled military dominance over China in the coming years, they must therefore find ways to retain or gain escalation advantage over Beijing. In simpler terms, the United States

and its allies and partners must be better at limited war than China. Being better at limited war basically means being able to shape a conflict in such a way that an adversary will accept some sort of defeat (albeit a limited one) rather than elect to resort to his ability to escalate further. The best way to accomplish this difficult objective is for the United States to ensure that the boundaries which both sides and third party observers accept as the established parameters of a limited conflict are ones within which it can prevail, and that the United States and its affiliates have the forces, strategies, and doctrines available to achieve their (necessarily

limited) aims within those bounds. 7 In such a context, the United States should seek to push the onus of escalation – the

burden of continuing and expanding the war – onto Beijing’s shoulders. In essence, the point would be to overcome China within the confines of a limited, bounded conflict and then force Beijing to bear the risk, the opprobrium, and the culpability for expanding or intensifying the war. Given that Beijing would have abundant reasons to want to limit any such war with the United States and its allies and partners,

shifting the burden of worsening a conflict onto the PRC would be a very significant strategic gain. In such an event, the United States

would not need to rely on Beijing’s good graces for it to make such a decision. Rather, the United States’ own reserve capabilities – including, in the extreme case, its nuclear forces – would form a powerful deterrent against China seeking to escalate its way out of defeat.

Containment Solves

Containment good – reduces the risk of conflict Colby in 15 ----Robert M. Gates Fellow Center for a New American Security

“China’s Offensive Missile Forces: Implications for the United States” (2015) (testimony of Elbridge Colby). Print

In light of this analysis, it is reasonable to judge that China’s growing military power poses a major – and probably the most significant – challenge to U.S. military primacy and ultimately to the nation’s legacy national security strategy in the coming years. What, then, are we to do

about it? The best way for the United States to mitigate the negative implications of rising Chinese military power is relatively simple: to maintain its military advantage in the Western Pacific. Such superiority is the most reliable way to convince any leadership in Beijing that attempts to use its newfound military power for aggressive purposes would be futile, costly, and unwise, and thus to ensure Beijing’s respect for the interests of the United States and for those of its allies and partners. Put another way, it is the best way to effectively balance China’s growing military power.5 But, because of China’s growing wealth and sophistication as well as its evident resolve to continue building up a more formidable military that can challenge U.S. supremacy in the region and ultimately

perhaps beyond, this is an illustration of the old dictum that strategy is simple but very hard. It is crucial, nonetheless, to try to maintain such advantage where feasible, as even a diminished margin of strength is preferable to losing all such advantage. The pressing question is, however, how to do so in a way that is feasible, sustainable, and practical. In all candor,

though, there do not appear to be clean “solutions” to this daunting problem. Rather, there are steps that can mitigate and limit the malign effects of China’s growing strength and minimize the decline of American relative military advantage, steps oriented around maintaining and, where the U.S. legacy posture is being rendered obsolete by China’s buildup or technology, building anew a military position in the Asia-Pacific that is potent, credible, and adapted to the potential conflicts with the PRC that plausibly could arise. These steps are crucial not only in the event of conflict but equally for preventing such a conflict on terms acceptable to the United States and

its allies. Deterrence, after all, derives most clearly and reliably from an evident ability to use force and to use it effectively and decisively.6 It therefore makes sense for the United States to dedicate itself to maintaining what military primacy it can in the Asia-Pacific. But what does maintaining such military primacy actually mean? And what does that conception entail? What it means is the ability to fight a limited war in the Western Pacific better than China can. Why? The defining aspects of the strategic problem for the United States in this region are China’s growing military power and its increasing ability to escalate against the United States and its allies and partners in ways that negate their military capabilities or cause them grave harm. This means both that the United States and its affiliates will find it harder to defeat China and control escalation in ways they prefer and that they will be increasingly vulnerable to serious attack by the PRC. Given the fact that the stakes in any conflict in the Western Pacific are, by definition, important but still nevertheless partial for the

United States, Washington as well as its allies and partners will have a strong interest in limiting the destructiveness of any conflict with China. Needless to say, China will also have immense incentives to limit a conflict with the United States, given the enormous damage that it could wreak on the PRC. This means that, in any conflict with the PRC, both sides will almost

certainly want to limit the war. Within this context, the United States and its allies and partners will want to seek to favorably limit the war in ways that both protect themselves and that allow them to prevail. Put another way, because the United States and its affiliates are unlikely to enjoy untrammeled military dominance over China in the coming years, they must therefore find ways to retain or gain escalation advantage over Beijing. In simpler terms, the United States and its allies and partners must be better at limited war than China. Being better at limited war basically means being able to shape a conflict in such a way that an adversary will accept some sort of defeat (albeit a limited one) rather than elect to resort to his ability to escalate further. The best way to accomplish this difficult objective is for the United States to ensure that the boundaries which both sides and third party observers accept as the established

parameters of a limited conflict are ones within which it can prevail, and that the United States and its affiliates have the forces, strategies, and doctrines available to achieve their (necessarily limited) aims within those bounds. 7 In such a context, the United States should seek to push the onus of escalation – the burden of continuing and expanding the war – onto Beijing’s shoulders. In essence, the point would be to overcome China within the confines of a limited, bounded conflict and then force Beijing to bear the risk, the opprobrium, and the culpability for expanding or intensifying the war.

Containment of china using a joint force solves US-China conflict Colby in 15 ----Robert M. Gates Fellow Center for a New American Security

“China’s Offensive Missile Forces: Implications for the United States” (2015) (testimony of Elbridge Colby). Print

Given that Beijing would have abundant reasons to want to limit any such war with the United States and its allies and partners, shifting the burden of worsening a conflict onto the PRC would be a very significant strategic gain. In such an event, the United States would not need to rely on Beijing’s good graces for it to make such a decision. Rather, the United States’ own reserve capabilities – including, in the extreme case, its nuclear forces – would form a powerful

deterrent against China seeking to escalate its way out of defeat. This logic dictates that the United States think carefully about the parameters it would promote and agree to in the event of conflict with China. These parameters would need to be plausibly acceptable boundaries of limitation not only for Washington but also for Beijing while at the same time allowing the United States and its allies and partners to exploit their advantages. But this logic also has significant implications for the kind of military force the United States should procure and the kind of doctrine and strategies it should develop. In particular, it means having a joint force that can prevail in a limited context – that does not, in other words, rely on escalation that would be foolhardy or ineffective – while retaining substantial advantages should the conflict escalate to higher, wider, or more intense levels of conflict. This latter part is crucial not only in deterring

Chinese escalation but also because the United States itself may be the party that wants to escalate, especially as China grows stronger. This logic dictates that the United States should develop a joint force that can contest and, ideally defeat, Chinese aggression through a “direct defense” approach; supplement or backstop that direct approach with indirect

strategies; and that together is designed to allow the United States to favorably control escalation in the event of conflict. Ideally, such a force would be able to meet any Chinese action at or near the point of attack (for instance Taiwan or islands in the

East China Sea), defeat the attack using conventional forces acting solely or at least overwhelmingly within a clearly understandable and justifiable geographical boundary (one that might well include Chinese territory, given its

vital role in such an attack), and deter China from escalating its way out of failure through the joint force’s evident ability to meet such escalation with an appropriate combination of military counteraction and cost-infliction. Alternatively, in the event that China gains the upper hand over contingencies about which the United States cares, such a force should be designed to expand or shift the boundaries of a war to a level at which U.S. forces have the upper hand but at which the United States can still plausibly seek to limit further escalation. In this eventuality, U.S. reserve (including nuclear) forces should provide a credible block to Chinese counter-escalation and in particular to unchecked Chinese aggression, especially should U.S. and allied defenses break down over truly crucial interests. Based on this logic, it is clear that the United States would be ill-advised to rely exclusively or primarily on “indirect” approaches such as blockades or the like to deter or defeat Chinese military action in the region. Such forces would be ill-suited for enabling the United States to prevail in limited wars with China because they would likely be either insufficient to coerce Beijing into backing down or too escalatory. In the former possibility, indirect approaches would cause pain for Beijing but would be too mild to persuade it to back away from the military action – say, over Taiwan or islands in the East or South China Seas – that had prompted the United States to resort to them. Alternatively, if such indirect approaches were sufficiently harsh, they would risk broadening or expanding conflicts that could otherwise remain limited, an expansion that could very well undermine U.S. interests in containing such a war. Indeed, precisely by reducing the flexibility of the U.S. joint

force, reliance on such approaches might actually spur escalation. More realistically, plausible U.S. leaders would likely be loath to implement such escalatory strategies and China would be able to shape its strategic and military actions to avoid triggering them. At the same time, such indirect approaches should be vital options and components in U.S. strategy. For instance, the United States should aggressively exploit the possibilities for indirect strategies such as blockade, maritime denial, and the like, and the United States might well elect to implement these options in the event of conflict. The crucial point is that these strategies should not be the exclusive or even necessarily primary mode by which the United States would respond to Chinese military action in maritime

Asia. Rather, the force the United States should seek to develop should focus firstly on seeking to defeat such Chinese action directly and rely on these indirect strategies as supplements to such direct responses or as methods of escalation. So what does developing such a joint force mean in practice?

Firstly it means continuing to seek to develop a “direct defense” force that can prevail over China in a limited war. As noted above, this effort is already receiving substantial merited attention, both within the Pentagon and from outside

experts. 8 The Department of Defense should be encouraged and supported in this endeavor, including with respect to initiatives vital for fielding an effective direct defense force such as the next-generation bomber, upgrades to the joint force’s C4ISR architecture, an active submarine building program, the development of a more resilient and adaptable basing structure in the Asia-Pacific, providing the joint force with higher stocks of munitions, among others. The Department should be particularly encouraged to exploit the opportunities afforded by new technologies, which it is already doing through its “Offset Strategy” initiative. Given organizational conservatism,

however, efforts to take advantage of the potential of new technologies, particularly unmanned and autonomous systems and novel approaches to missile defense, deserve particular backing.9 The United States will clearly need to find asymmetric ways to “offset” Chinese advantages in proximity and mass, and thus it is vital that the Department effectively exploit the potential latent in technology and in its effective integration into highly-skilled and relatively adaptable U.S. military organizations. Sustained support for these programs and initiatives is crucial. But it is not enough. For these steps need to be accompanied by the Department’s development and integration of capabilities, strategies, and doctrines for effectively fighting limited wars. This is a problem because the Pentagon – and much of the American policymaking and policy-influencing community – have become accustomed to the United States being able to wage wars in which it alone can set the parameters of conflict. A full generation after the collapse of the Soviet threat and after a period in which most U.S. military attention went towards “rogue” states and terrorist or insurgent groups, much of the U.S. military and the American defense policy world have lost mastery of or even much familiarity with what it means to face a highly-capable opponent able to contest seriously U.S. dominance of the battlespace. Yet China will increasingly present precisely this kind of challenge. It is therefore critical that the Department work to develop a much firmer understanding of limited war, escalation, brinksmanship, and related concepts and acculturate its officers and officials, especially those in the rising generation, with these concepts and their implications. This is vital because the capabilities the Department procures, the way it plans to use them to fight wars against China (or, for that matter, Russia), and the objectives it seeks to attain – all of these must be determined in light of the reality that the United States will want, indeed will need, to keep the conflict limited. This reality has implications for what kind of weapons the Department buys and what characteristics these weapons should have, what kinds of war plans it develops, and what kinds of warfighting doctrines it trains its personnel to be ready to implement. Importantly, it does not always mean excluding or disfavoring capabilities or approaches that risk escalation – since risking escalation is often necessary to prevail in a limited conflict – but it does mean that those risks must be understood and accounted for. In simpler terms, if the Department builds a joint force that cannot be used well in a limited war, it will have failed to build the right force for the coming competition with China and will have significantly damaged the nation’s deterrent power. Modernization of U.S. nuclear forces should play a crucial role in this effort to build a joint force designed for prevailing in a plausible conflict with China. Nuclear forces will form a vital component of an effective limited war strategy for the United States by deterring Chinese resort to nuclear escalation of its own or, in the event the United States loses the conventional upper hand, by deterring dramatic forms of PRC non-

nuclear escalation. To perform these missions most effectively, however, the U.S. nuclear force needs to be adapted to the emerging strategic and military-technological context. This means that, while the U.S. nuclear deterrent should continue to be developed and postured to deter general nuclear war, it should also have greater capabilities for discrimination and control such that it can be employed in tailored fashion. In other words, the U.S. nuclear force too should be designed to be better at limited war than its Chinese opposite. Accordingly, the U.S. nuclear force should be adapted to have as much discrimination and tailoring potential as possible, since the more it exhibits these qualities the more effective it would be in a limited war scenario. And, given that the parameters of such a limited war cannot be precisely envisioned in advance, this means that the U.S. nuclear force should be endowed with as much controllability and flexibility as possible in terms

of level of destructiveness, accuracy, radioactive release, utility against various targets, and redundancy. Such versatility would give

the United States a greater ability to employ these forces to gain escalation advantage over China in the event of a conflict – and, more to the point, demonstrate to China the futility and great danger of electing to use its own nuclear weapons or cross other U.S. red lines.10 U.S. arms control policy and commitments should also be adapted to conform to this emerging strategic environment and the approaches it will require from the United States. Broadly speaking, the United States should pursue an active arms control agenda with China for a number of reasons. Such an active approach can,

done well, reduce the incentives to and pressures for war and thus contribute to U.S. and allied security. It can also demonstrate the genuineness of U.S. interest in reducing such risks, which is crucial for maintaining the legitimacy of the U.S. posture in the region among allies, partners, “fencesitters,” and other influential countries. It is important that the United States be seen as meaningfully seeking to control and reduce risks. An arms control agenda is one of the best ways to do so. Even if it bears little fruit in terms of concrete agreements with the PRC, a genuine effort will still be useful in demonstrating U.S. good will and sense of responsibility. But such an arms control agenda should be strategically sensible rather than oriented towards pursuit of implausible and likely unattractive goals like a world without nuclear weapons. Accordingly, U.S. arms control vis a vis China should be oriented at promoting stability, developing mutual confidence where appropriate, and enabling each side’s better understanding of the other’s strategic approach and intentions to lessen the chances of misunderstanding or miscalculation.11

MAR?Policymakers need to make ethical policies to avoid conflict – mutually-assure-restraint would call for psychological space for China in order to decrease tensions and put an end to the possibility of conflict and miscalcNick Gvosdev professor of national security affairs 3-16-2014 https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2014/the-ethics-of-avoiding-conflict-with-china/

Whenever possible, the ethical statesman operating within the parameters of the current international order should “seek a way out of conflict within the constraints of the Westphalian system,” noted Stanley Hoffmann in his 1987 Morgenthau Memorial Lecture at Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs.1 Correspondingly, one can argue that policymakers should act from a related ethical obligation not simply to seek a way out from conflict but, whenever possible, take the steps that might avoid precipitating a conflict in the first place, creating the conditions for diplomacy which, as Hans Morgenthau observed, is the only “way to moderate power and pursue peace.”2 This question becomes much more salient when considering the rise of China, its desire to revise both the regional as well as global order (largely created and sustained by the United States over the last sixty years) to accommodate its interests and its new status, and the countervailing desire of the United States to preserve the status quo. Three years ago Aaron Friedberg noted “that the differences between China and the United States spring from deeply rooted sources and aren’t likely to be resolved anytime soon,” and he expressed concern that “it appears that the two nations are in for a long, tense and perhaps even dangerous struggle.”3 Similarly, the Australian Defence Force’s 2009 White Paper on security in the Asia-Pacific region concludes: “As other powers rise, and the primacy of the United States is increasingly tested, power relations will inevitably change. When this happens there will be the possibility of miscalculation. There is a small but still concerning possibility of growing confrontation between some of these powers.”4 Today, there is an entire cottage industry in both the United States and China that takes as an article of faith the coming clash between Washington and Beijing,5 and believes that it can only be averted if China undergoes some sort of collapse that will put an end to its meteoric rise or if the United States is no longer willing to expend the resources needed to maintain the status quo in the region. Ranged against these pessimists, such as John Mearsheimer, who see conflict (and with it a heightened risk of an armed clash) as inevitable, are the optimists (such as Aaron Friedberg), who maintain that a clash is indeed avoidable, and who argue for a robust U.S. “forward presence” and deep engagement in the area that will convince China of the futility of competing with the United States militarily and instead encourage accommodation. Some, such as Joseph Bosco, even argue for the United States to end its policy of “strategic ambiguity” and define clear red lines in the region so that China will not make any miscalculations that might lead to conflict.6 However, as former U.S. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley noted in a speech in Beijing in 2013, this approach still carries the risk of a “potential confrontation between the militaries of the two countries—particularly their naval forces.”7 Indeed, just weeks after Hadley’s remarks a near-collision between U.S. and Chinese naval vessels in the South China Sea (which occurred in international waters as an American vessel shadowed the deployment of China’s new aircraft carrier) highlighted the very dangers he was warning about. So a strategy that ostensibly seeks to prevent hostilities between China and the United States might end up inadvertently provoking

them—either setting up conditions for a new cold war or, even worse, for events to spiral out of control, as they did a century ago in the run-up to World War I, a concern voiced both by academics such as Margaret Macmillan and political leaders such as Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe.8 Given that the United States is not prepared to depart the Asia-Pacific region and that China is not going to voluntarily halt its rise as a great power, is there a policy prescription that can avoid turning predictions of a Sino-American clash into a self-fulfilling prophecy? Amitai Etzioni believes so. Drawing upon his earlier body of work developed at the height of the cold war—most notably The Hard Way to Peace (1962) and Winning Without War (1964)—Etzioni proposes what he terms a strategy of “mutually-assured restraint” (MAR) wherein “both sides limit their military build-up and coercive diplomacy as long as the other side limits itself in the same way—and the self-restraints are mutually vetted.”9 MAR is based on Etzioni’s longstanding contention that “psychological gestures initiated by one nation will be reciprocated by others with the effect of reducing international tensions” and that “this tension reduction, in turn, will lessen the probability of international conflicts and wars.”10 It seeks to build on what has been described as the “Kennedy experiment”—a period of time between June and November 1963 when unilateral measures were taken, first by the United States, then by the Soviet Union, to step back from their confrontational posture, which had nearly brought the world to the brink of nuclear war the previous year. These actions validated the assertion that creating the psychological space for the relaxation of tensions could lead to more substantive agreements designed to channel the U.S.-Soviet rivalry into more peaceful directions. While this fragile détente did not survive the assassination of John F. Kennedy and the overthrow of Nikita S. Khrushchev, elements of this approach resurfaced in the early 1970s and characterized the successful winding down of the cold war by the late 1980s. Skeptics of the mutually-assured restraint approach fear that it calls for a U.S. withdrawal from East Asia, leaving a vacuum that many believe a rising China would be only too happy to fill. Etzioni has always believed, however, that the modern-day revolution in military affairs—including recent developments in transport, logistics, and targeting—has given the United States a unique luxury: the ability to engage in what he termed sixty years ago as “remote deterrence.” In contrast to any other great power, only the United States is able to place over 100,000 troops 8,000 miles from home and sustain them indefinitely under combat conditions; only the United States can launch aircraft from its own territory to strike targets anywhere on the globe; only the United States can surge massive naval task forces into any maritime domain in any part of the world. As a result, Etzioni has maintained, the United States can afford to withdraw forces that are currently forward deployed in the Western Pacific in order to give Beijing the psychological space to, in turn, make diplomatic concessions—without significantly jeopardizing America’s overall strategic position should China fail to respond to such overtures. Etzioni maintains that a redeployment would not expose the American strategic position in the Western Pacific to unnecessary risk—even though it could complicate matters for U.S. strategic planners—while other means of technical collection would make up any of the gaps in intelligence that termination of the existing ship and air patrols would entail. Etzioni hopes that MAR might also make Beijing more willing to negotiate verifiable limits on the number of anti-ship missiles and other pieces of military equipment that it currently deploys in an offensive capacity against Taiwan and other neighbors. This, in turn, could be followed by a U.S. commitment to keep its most advanced weapons systems out of the region. Over time, it could lead both countries to agree to significant limitations on various types of arms produced or deployed by either country, which in turn could help promote strategic stability. This approach is an outgrowth of Etzioni’s 1964 recommendations for moving the cold war away from its reliance on the balance of nuclear terror as the basis for avoiding conflict. This approach does not, however, ask either

side to take any step based on faith alone. Indeed, as Etzioni argued The West does not have to “trust” the East or vice versa to lay down arms. The strategy . . . combines remote deterrence in third countries and a pure retaliatory posture . . . with inspection and observer forces. Its limitation to peaceful means is not based on trust, but on interest; it is not a question of giving or breaking one’s word, but of setting up the necessary machinery to verify and enforce commitments.11 With both sides pulling back their militaries, and thus reducing the prospects of an incident or accident that could spark confrontation, Etzioni is hopeful that MAR could lay the basis for a diplomatic settlement of the outstanding maritime territorial claims in the South and East China seas. If restraint prevails over a head-to-head approach—with the assumption being that the United States will back the claims of its allies to the hilt—Etzioni believes compromise solutions (including proposals for joint sovereignty over disputed islands or consortia to allocate resources to all claimants), which have been used to settle disputes over similarly contested territories in Europe and Eurasia, could similarly come to pass in East Asia. If the military postures now present in the area could be relaxed, it might be possible to discuss compromises, swaps, and collaborative regimes to share resources. Indeed, there is an important precedent: the seemingly-intractable border disputes between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, which flared up into open conflict in 1969 and which were similarly judged to be insolvable, began to be seriously addressed after Mikhail Gorbachev took deliberate steps to reduce the Soviet military posture in the Far East. All outstanding territorial claims between Beijing and the successor states of the Soviet Union were settled during the 1990s—in part because the collapse of the USSR removed what was seen as an existential threat to the People’s Republic and created the psychological space needed to conduct meaningful negotiations and to reach compromise settlements. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the MAR proposal, however, is Etzioni’s call for the creation of “buffer zones” surrounding China, “similar to Austria during the Cold War”12—composed of countries that are formally recognized by mutual agreement as neutral, belong to no military alliances, and have no U.S. (or Chinese) forces stationed on their territories. (He has, in the past, envisioned a post-Kim North Korea and Vietnam as two examples of states that could serve as buffers.13) However, the term (and the Austria analogy) conjures up the image of a belt of surrounding states that are at worst forced to become satellites of their powerful geographic neighbor—with significant interference in both their foreign and domestic affairs; and that are at best “Finlandized,” that is, expected to undertake a precarious balancing act to accommodate the wishes of the great power next door while preserving as much of its sovereignty as possible. Neither prospect fits in well with declared U.S. policy that every state should have the full right to freely choose its policies, alliances, and commitments—particularly when those commitments reflect the will of that country’s majority—without fear of coercion from any of the major powers. In 2013 Vice President Joe Biden reiterated the U.S. position: “We will not recognize any nation having a sphere of influence. It will remain America’s view that sovereign states have the right to make their own decisions and choose their own alliances. All that remains the U.S. position; it will not change.”14 Could Etzioni’s strategy of mutual restraint violate other ethical guidelines for foreign policy? Just as statesmen are expected to avoid conflict whenever possible, a competing (and sometimes contradictory) imperative is to fulfill one’s international obligations and commitments.15 The United States has a number of defensive alliances with states in the region that have territorial disputes with China (such as Japan) and has guaranteed, explicitly in some cases, implicitly in others, that it will take measures to prevent any country, including China, from changing the current status quo by force. A principal objection to MAR, therefore, is that it would effectively remove the United States as a necessary counterbalance to growing Chinese military power, abandoning U.S. allies and forcing neighboring countries to acquiesce

to a Chinese sphere of influence. Critics argue that such a policy would be doubly ethically unsound, as it would entail the United States breaching its covenants with other states while providing no guarantee that conflict would, in fact, be avoided. Indeed, the argument over Etzioni’s strategy fits into the much larger debate over whether a state ought to prioritize defense of “the right” (say, its claim to particular territories or the right to enter into binding alliances with other states) or peace (defined as the absence of open conflict). Nonetheless, one can respond to the criticism by noting that it is possible to reconcile Etzioni’s concept of buffer zones with maintaining U.S. promises to defend states in South and East Asia against aggression or assault. This has to do with the stationing of equipment and forces; the United States would not need to abrogate any of its alliance commitments, but would restrict where it might position its military assets in the region. The 1990 negotiations over the reunification of Germany can provide a useful template. Under the agreements reached, a united Germany would remain in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) rather than having to leave the alliance altogether and would adopt a “neutral” position (in essence, becoming a large version of Austria); however, no foreign NATO troops or nuclear weapons were to be permitted in the territories of the former east Germany. At the time there was still an expectation that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact would remain in existence; had the USSR not collapsed the following year, this arrangement would have created a guaranteed buffer between Soviet forward deployments in Poland and U.S. and other allied positions in western Germany.16 Similarly, the United States could maintain its commitments to defend allies in Asia, but acknowledge the existence of forward zones (both at sea and on land) where U.S. forces would not be stationed, thereby providing a degree of breathing room. The German precedent may also prove to be quite useful if and when the question of reunification on the Korean peninsula becomes a realistic prospect, since Beijing would look askance at any settlement that opened the possibility of U.S. forces being able to move directly to the Sino-Korean border. Indeed, China intervened in the Korean War not after the south had been liberated but once U.S. forces reached the Yalu River. MAR, in the end, is not a sure thing but a calculated risk—but one which, in Etzioni’s opinion, has a good chance to de-escalate a possible clash. Robert Merry has argued that, in order to prevent conflict from erupting between the United States and China, the Obama administration (and subsequent U.S. presidential teams) ought to “follow a carefully-calibrated policy in which America shows some empathy to legitimate Chinese security concerns while also demonstrating that it will not simply wink at bellicose actions. . . . Areas of cooperation should include proposing clearer rules of the game. A détente also needs to be encouraged between China and its neighbors.”17 The ethical tightrope that U.S. policymakers must walk is how to steer away from the apparent inevitability of conflict with a rising China without sacrificing U.S. interests or the interests of allies. The mutually-assured restraint approach may offer such a way forward.

Mutually assured restraint prevents securitization – Mutual vetting is keyAMITAI ETZIONI 2014 is professor of International Relations at George Washington University. He served as a senior advisor at the Carter White House and taught at Columbia University, Harvard Business School, and University of California at Berkeley. Brown journal of world affairs, volume 20 issue 2 “Mutually Assured Restraint: A New Approach for United States-China Relations”

To AVOID THE UNITED STATES and China falling into the Thucydides trap in which a dominant power's fear of a rising power leads to war, both nations would be well-served by further embracing a strategy of mutually assured restraint proposed here, of which some elements are already in place. Political scientists argue that when a new power arises and an old power does not yield ground and privileges, wars ensue., However, the record shows that there are 37 no historical iron laws or trends that inevitably unfold. Harvard

University's Graham Allison points to four cases out of 15 since the sixteenth century in which the emergence of a new power was not followed by war, including the United States' rise as a global power in the 1890s.2 Thus, it may not be written in the stars that the United States and China are fated to clash. War-to para- phrase the UNESCO Constitution-starts in the minds of men, and there it can be ended., It is precisely this kind of violent confrontation that mutually assured restraint, if embraced, could help the United States and China avoid by creating the conditions for addressing Chinas legitimate concerns while leaving ample room for the United States to discharge that which it considers to be its international obligations. Distrust between the United States and China has increased in recent years despite a close connection between the two countries' economic well- being and an increase in trade between the two nations. The United States is a key market for China's goods, and China is a leading foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities. A study by Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi illustrates the rising tensions reflected in statements in which China accuses the United States of attempting to "sabotage the Communist Party's leadership" and the United States holds that China's "mercantilist policies harm the chances of American economic recovery."' The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which maintains an inflation-adjusted database of military expenditure for each country worldwide, reports that China spent $33 billion in 2000 and $129 billion in 2011-an 11-year compound annual growth rate of about 13 percent.5 By contrast, the United States spent $382 billion in 2000 and $690 billion in 2011, an 11-year compound

annual growth rate of 5.5 percent. That China's economy is growing at a rapid pace suggests it could afford a still stronger military. Its annual GDP percentage growth rate is still more than twice that of the United States' GDP in 2012 despite a recent slowdown.6 Above all, China has developed a series of antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) weapons reportedly capable of preventing the United States from effectively protecting Taiwan and Japan or exercising free navigation in the region; these developments are viewed by the U.S. military as a challenge to the United States' position in the region. The most prominent example of these A2/AD weapons is antiship 38 missiles, which cost little and can incapacitate the expensive American aircraft carriers that

represent a key component of U.S. power projection. In response, the United States developed the Air-Sea Battle concept.7 It seeks to build faster, smaller ships and develop weapons-including direct energy arms, a type of laser that if positioned on ships could burn incoming missiles-that can neutralize the new Chinese A2/AD ones. Critics have been particularly alarmed that, because direct

energy arms have yet to be developed, the Air-Sea Battle concept calls for striking antiship missiles on the Chinese mainland. Such an attack is more likely to result in full-fledged war with China rather than a local skirmish over control of the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. If current trends continue, with tensions and militaries building up, the prophets of a war between a rising power and an established one may be proven correct. For this reason, curbing tensions and capping military buildups-both objectives of mutually assured restraint-are paramount. As a paradigm of action, mutually assured restraint seeks to inject substance into the vague phrases mouthed by both powers: China aims to have a "new model of major-country relations" with the United States, and the United States seeks to build a "cooperative partnership" with China.9 Mutually assured restraint is a foreign policy based on mutual respect, a quest for confidence building, and a set of new institutionalized arrangements that would move both powers away from situations that could escalate into major conflicts. Accordingly, each side would limit its own military buildup and use of coercive diplomacy as long as the other side does the same. Furthermore, these self-restraint measures would

be vetted in ways spelled out below. Thus, China would be free to take the steps it deems necessary for its self-defense and the maintenance of its ally relationships without threatening other nations or the international commons. At the same time, the United States would be free to take the steps it believes are necessary to preserve its self-defense, its obligations to its allies in the region, and the international order. Critics of mutually assured restraint might suggest that any strategy that includes the term "self-restraint" would be anathema to the militaries of both the United States and China. However, self-restraint-defined as not yielding to impulse but rather deliberating before acting and having the capacity to choose a course of action rather than following urges-is a mark of civilization. For militaries, self-restraint means planning and assembling the forces needed for an operation rather than charging forward unprepared at the slightest provocation. Self-

restraint also involves refraining from outrunning supply lines or exhausting one's stock of ammunition.0 Self-restraint, albeit of the kind that can be verified by the other side, is not to be conflated with externally imposed restraint, which 39 is frustrating as is typical for imposed

limitations. There is a precedent for one element of mutually assured restraint, that of mutual vetting. In this sense mutually assured restraint follows President Ronald Reagan's line "trust but verify," a concept whose value is reflected in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and New Start), the vetted treaties between the United States and Russia that limit strategic weapons. That both nations agreed to help each other verify the limitations each nation imposed on strategic forces was an essential element of both treaties. Aside from relying on satellite surveillance for verification, START stipulates on-site inspections in the United States by Russian officials and vice versa, including examinations of the location and number of intercontinental missiles and nuclear warheads." The following paragraphs provide outlines of the policies that could be instituted as part of mutually assured restraint. In some cases mutually assured restraint could build on existing elements of foreign policy; in other cases new elements must be introduced if the United States and China are to move toward mutually assured restraint. To proceed, the elements of mutually assured restraint require considerable deliberation, modification, and elaboration well beyond the scope of any essay, as well as give and take between the United States and China.

5 ways to solve for conflict – Clarifying the status of Taiwan, stop the militarization of nations surrounding China, agree to regulations in case of a North Korean collapse, end militarization of the South China Sea, and agree to defend populations from crimes against humanityAMITAI ETZIONI 2014 is professor of International Relations at George Washington University. He served as a senior advisor at the Carter White House and taught at Columbia University, Harvard Business School, and University of California at Berkeley. Brown journal of world affairs, volume 20 issue 2 “Mutually Assured Restraint: A New Approach for United States-China Relations”

Clarifying what appears to be an implicit understanding between China and the United States regarding the status of Taiwan would constitute a major step toward defusing tensions between the two powers. Although this implicit un- derstanding was introduced without awareness of or commitment to mutually assured restraint, it is a prime example of an existing element of foreign policy on which mutually assured restraint could build. The governments of both the United States and China have already demon- strated considerable self-restraint in the matter ofTaiwan. Beijing has not yielded to demands from those who call for employing force as a means of reclaiming Taiwan

as part of the mainland; meanwhile, Washington has not yielded to Americans who urge recognition of Taiwan as an independent country. These measures of self-restraint should be made more explicit by clarifying that so long as China does not violently coerce Taiwan to become part of China, the United States will continue to refrain from treating Taiwan as an independent state. This explication is specifically needed to further lock in the self-restraint commitments, which take place when such commitments are spelled out and openly declared. The prevailing understanding between the United States and 40 China is opaque; although some experts in international relations say an un- derstanding exists, some suggest that its substance is unclear and still others deny its existence entirely." This range of responses verifies that the issue could benefit from clarification. One may ask whether it is

best to let sleeping dogs lie. One reason to clarify both sides' policies is that hawks in both nations use the cause of Taiwan to justify building up the United States' and China's respective military forces in an era in which it is necessary for both nations to focus on economic, social, and environmental issues at home. A 2013 report to Congress from the U.S. Department of Defense concurs, stating, "Preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait appears to remain the principal focus and primary driver of China's military investment."13 For example, China carried out a military exercise in which the People's Liberation Army simulated "a Normandy-style invasion" of Taiwan.14 In the United States, a 2003 report from the Council on Foreign Relations examined China's growing military power and held that "[minimizing the chances that a cross-strait crisis will occur] means

maintaining the clear ability and willingness to counter any application of military force against Taiwan."" Making an explicit commitment to maintain the status quo standing of Taiwan-unless the people of Taiwan freely and peacefully choose otherwise- would reduce tensions between the United States and China and highlight the effectiveness of mutually assured restraint as an overarching strategy for United States-China

relations. The United States has formed military alliances, signed agreements allowing the placement of American troops and other military assets, and conducted joint military exercises with many of the countries neighboring China. The United States views these arrangements as agreements between sovereign nations, a way of burden sharing, and part of a drive to contain or counter-balance China; how- ever, China perceives these moves as an attempt at Cold War-era encirclement. China has also sought military alliances of its own with neighboring countries, adding to tensions in the region. These moves position U.S. and Chinese military forces closer to each other, a proximity that could potentially lead to accidental clashes and conflicts. This risk has been highlighted by multiple incidents, including the April 2001 42 collision of a U.S. Navy surveillance aircraft with a People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) fighter jet over the South China Sea nine days after an encounter between a PLAN Jianghu III-class frigate and an American surveillance ship in the Yellow Sea near South Korea." Moreover, several countries in East and Southeast Asia have treaties with the United States or China, which in effect give the smaller states in the region a finger on the trigger of a gun belonging to their superpower sponsor. These treaties or informal understandings often state or at least imply that if one of these smaller nations in question engages in a war with one superpower, the other superpower will come to its aid. Some treaties-such as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, which is said to cover the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands-explicitly entail such a commitment. Others are ambiguous and easily misconstrued by the countries involved-this has been the case in the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines and the relationship between China and North Korea. It is therefore particularly troubling that some of these smaller states have engaged in provocative behavior. Such provocative behavior could not only lead to war between them and other regional states but could also drag both super- powers into a confrontation with each other. This is most obvious in the case of the two Koreas. For example, some analysts have acknowledged a possible connection between the construction of a South Korean naval base on Jeju Island and the United States' strategic interests in Asia. Opponents of the base hold that giving the United States access to the base-as is likely to occur-will "provoke China" and "trigger a naval arms race."' Other examples are much less dramatic and conflict-prone but are nonetheless concerning. For example, in 2012 the Philippine Navy boarded several Chinese fishing vessels at Scarborough Shoal, allegedly discovering illegally collected corals and live sharks in the process, and attempted to arrest the Chinese fishermen. In response, Chinese surveillance crafts blocked the arrests by situating their vessels between the Chinese fishing boats and the Philippine Navy, leading to a tense standoff.20 Despite the shoal's location within the Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone, China has since blocked the Philippines from

accessing the area and continues to occupy the shoal with civil maritime law enforcement vessels. If China and the United States embrace mutually assured restraint, both should treat nations neighboring China similarly to the way Austria was treated during the Cold War: as a buffer zone. An additional model is that of East Germany following reunification; a 1990 agreement between Germany and the USSR stipulated that although the former East Germany would be given the status of NATO territory, neither NATO troops nor nuclear weapons would 43 be stationed in these parts." Both powers would be free to continue engaging these nations economically by investing, trading, and providing foreign aid, and they would be allowed to share information and promote educational programs. However, neither the United States nor China would be permitted to extend any new military commitments to countries within the buffer zone. Further, both countries would be required to gradually phase out existing military com- mitments. Mutually assured restraint would also require that they limit joint military exercises and the placement of military assets within the zone. Above all, both powers would make it clear to their allies that they should not assume the automatic, guaranteed involvement of the United States or China if they engage in armed conflict or war with either of these two powers. Mutually assured restraint would make an especially important contribution if applied to U.S. and Chinese approaches to the future of North Korea -

particu- larly if a government collapse occurred there. The RAND Corporation provides the following description of the currently probable actions of the United States and China in the case of such a collapse: As chaos develops in North Korea, the [Republic of Korea (ROK)], the United States, and China would all likely send special operations forces

(SOF) into the North for special reconnaissance, focused in particular on North Korean WMD facilities. Somewhere, the Chinese SOF

would make contact with ROK and U.S. SOF, and unintended or accidental conflict could develop... if conflict were to begin between the ROK-U.S. forces and the Chinese forces, that conflict could escalate significantly in ways that neither side would want."22 The RAND report further recommends that both the United States and China minimize the risk of confrontation by defining a "separation line for Chi- nese forces versus ROK and United States forces," according to which Chinese forces would stay north of

the line and both American and ROK forces would remain south of it.23 Policy makers implementing mutually assured restraint should draw on these RAND suggestions (and other similar ideas) to advance an understanding between the United States and China:

the concept that if North Korea's regime were to collapse, neither U.S. nor Chinese troops would move into the country. Countries in the region would be much better off if U.S. troops were not based next to the Yalu River and if Chinese forces

were not massed next to the demilitarized zone. Such a step would reduce the danger that the United States and China might clash as a result of misunderstandings or local provocations. The demilitarization of such a buffer zone would be easy to verify due to contemporary surveillance technology. Consideration should also be given to the possibility of positioning UN peacekeeping forces in the area to supervise the removal of nuclear weapons, facilitate the destruction of chemical weapons, and provide humanitarian aid to avoid a massive flood of refugees from North Korea into China or South Korea. Such understandings would encourage China to do more to motivate North Korea to stop developing its nuclear arsenal, consider returning to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and refrain from provocative behavior. This is significant because as a

major supplier of food and energy, China has considerable leverage over North Korea. In recent years, tensions between China and Japan have escalated over the Sen- kaku/Diaoyu Islands, a tiny chain of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea. Although according to a Center for Strategic and International Studies report "it is clear that the Senkaku Islands are an inherent part ofJapan, as evidenced both by historical facts and international law," China has nevertheless advanced a claim to the islands.24 Japan recently purchased three of the five islands from private owners, a step China views as provocative. Chinese surveillance and patrol ships have more frequently navigated the waters surrounding the islands, and China provoked Japan by conducting multiple flights near disputed airspace. China has since declared an Air Defense Identification Zone that covers the Senkakul Diaoyu Islands, a step that led South Korea to expand its own

zone resulting in overlapping and contested zones.25 China demanded that Japan consent to a no-entry zone of 12 nautical miles around the islands as a precondition for holding a Sino-Japanese summit; Japan refused.26 China criticized the United States' attempts to intervene in the dispute while insisting on bilateral negotia- tions as the mechanism for reaching a resolution." At the same time, both China and Japan have

taken steps that show a measure of self-restraint similar to mutually assured restraint standards. The Japanese coast guard prevented Japanese nationalists from landing on the con- tested islands, and China relied on its maritime law enforcement agencies and coast guard rather than involving its military in the area.28 To further defuse the tension, all countries involved should not merely curb the means by which Japan and China carry out their conflict over the Senkaku/ 45 Diaoyu Islands, but also find a resolution for the conflict itself. Experts have suggested several ways of doing so. Japan and China could submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.29 Alternatively, both countries could jointly administer and develop the resources in and around the islands. Sovereignty over the territory could be awarded to one state while resource-related rights could be assigned to all claimants.o Some observe the probability that the United States and China could en- ter a war over these small and uninhabited islands is low. However, wars have been known to begin over less important matters. When other factors already predispose the parties to

conflict and national pride and credibility are evoked, potential for war is high. The principles of mutually assured restraint should therefore be extended to conclusively settle the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands one way or another. China is highly dependent on imports of raw materials and energy, a great deal of which comes from maritime trade. China sees itself as highly vulnerable because the strong U.S. naval presence in the region gives the United States the ability to readily block these imports .3 Some U.S. commentators openly discuss the option of such a blockade, which is considered a moderate way of confronting China relative to the Air-Sea Battle concept.32 In response to these concerns and as a result of its broader interest in com- mercial expansion, China increased its naval presence in the South China Sea China sees itself as highly vulner- and developed a network of ports- able because the strong Amen- termed the string of pearls-in the Indian and Pacific Oceans." Additionally can naval presence in the re- gion, China attempted to reduction gives the United States the the country's reliance on shipping lanes by developing plans, including ability to readily block imports. new Silk Roads, for transporting oil and gas resources by land.34 Indeed, a system of roads, railways, and pipelines now extends across continental Asia.35 Some Americans view these pathways as a sign of China's expansionist tendencies and interest in asserting global dominance.6 Meanwhile, some Chinese view American opposition to select pathways (for instance, a pipeline 46 from Iran to China) as attempts to contain China's growth.

However, under mutually assured restraint the United States would assume-unless clear evidence is presented to the contrary-that extending land-based pathways for the flow of energy resources and raw materials will make China less inclined to build up its military, particularly the naval forces needed to secure ocean pathways. Therefore, China's creation of a system of pathways would be considered a win- win situation for both powers. China holds that it needs anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapons,

especially anti-ship missiles, for self-defense. Meanwhile, the United States views these weapons-which are designed to gain control of a territory and limit one's adversary's ability to conduct military operations there-as a threat to its abil- ity to discharge its obligations to Taiwan, Japan, and other states as well as the ability to freely navigate in the region." Both powers should agree to limit the number and range of their A2/AD missiles. These limitations should be verified using methods agreed upon by both parties. Such vetting could entail satellite surveillance or mutual inspections of the kind provided by START. Furthermore, small numbers of short-range, defensive missiles could also be provided to other nations in the region, such as Japan, thereby curbing one recent source of the pressure on China's neighbors to build up their military forces. The idea that A2/AD weapons should be limited has been criticized on the grounds that it is difficult to differentiate defensive from offensive weapons.9 Although it is possible to imagine circumstances in which defensive arms would aid an offensive strategy, there are clearly differences between the two. Indeed, a particular weapons system may be classified based on whether it is more ef- ficient as an offensive weapon or a defensive one. For example, although tanks can serve defensive purposes, they are much more effective for offensive pur- poses.40 Similarly, international relations scholars have pointed out that "nearly all historical advances in military mobility-chariots, horse cavalry, tanks, motor trucks, aircraft, mobile bridging equipment-are generally considered to have favored the offense, while major countermobility innovations-moats, barbed wire, tank traps, land mines-have favored defense.",, Similarly, the range, placement, and number of antiship missiles have bearing on whether they are more accurately classed as offensive or defensive weapons. If their range and number are limited and they are placed on a nation's shorelines it is likely that they are meant to ward off an attack and are defensive in nature. If an inordinate number of long-range missiles are placed on ships 47 or outlying islands it is more likely that they are offensive. Mutual surveillance, already in place, can help determine whether the placement and range of these weapons is more defensive-and thus evidence of restraint-or offensive. Critics may argue that China began its military buildup from a much weaker position than the United States and thus even-handed restraints would lock China into perpetual military inferiority. However, allowances might be made for this difference by permitting China to place a limited number of short-range anti-ship missiles in defensive locations without countermoves by the United States. Countermoves by the United States would be impossible if the number, range, and position of the antiship missiles were clearly associated with an offensive stance. Additionally, critics' conclusions assume that the best way for a weaker nation to respond to differences in military prowess is to dedicate its resources to a military buildup rather than

to urgent domestic needs. Mutu- ally assured restraint assumes the opposite, holding that if China restrains its military buildup the United States may do the same and devote its resources to the home front, thereby reducing fears of a sharp disparity between the United States' and China's military capabilities while defusing overall tensions. In 2005 188 countries, including China and the United States, endorsed the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (R2P). The international community pledged "to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect popula- tions" from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity if a state fails to meet its primary obligation to protect its own people.42 However, in 2011 the United Kingdom, France, and the United States turned an armed humanitarian intervention aimed at preventing large-scale killing of Libyan civilians into a coercive regime change. When the ongoing humanitarian crisis developed in Syria in 2011, Western powers openly called for not only a ceasefire but also the elimination of President Bashar al-Assad. Russia, supported by China, strongly opposed these interventions. The two countries invoked the long-established Westphalian norm of sovereignty, holding that no state should interfere by use

of force in the internal affairs of another nation. If the United States and its European allies restrain those who seek to use armed interventions for coercive regime changes and limit their future armed interventions to preventing crimes, specifically genocides, as outlined in the original R2P resolution, China and Russia might very well reactivate their sup- 48 port for R2P. Built into mutually assured restraint, such self-imposed restraint on the conditions under which armed humanitarian interventions could proceed would further serve to defuse tensions and reduce grounds for conflict between the United States and China.