cases 7 - public corporation & public office

7/31/2019 Cases 7 - Public Corporation & Public Office

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MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA vs. SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA G.R. No. 86439, April 13,1989.........................................................................................................................................................2

DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC vs.REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA et.al G.R. No. 97710,September 26, 1991.................................................................................................................................6

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE DOMINGO IMPERIAL G.R. No. L-8684, March31, 1955.................................................................................................................................................10

DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR, G.R.No. 192791 April 24, 2012.....................................................................................................................12

THELMA P. GAMINDE vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT [G. R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000].........17

Primarily Confidential Positions...............................................................................................................20

MEDARDO AG. CADIENTE vs. LUIS T. SANTOS(G.R. No. L-35592 ,June 11, 1986)........................20

HONORABLE SIMPLICIO C. GRIO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. 91602, February26, 1991.................................................................................................................................................20

ROSALINDA DE PERIO SANTOS vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG G.R. No94070, April 10, 1992.............................................................................................................................22

Dont worry about tomorrow. It will take care of itself. You have enough to worry about today. Matthew 6: 34 CEV


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Term of Office vs. Tenure of Incumbent

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA vs. SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989

The Court had hoped that its decision in Sarmiento III vs. Mison, 1 would have settled the question of which appointments by the

President, under the 1987 Constitution, are to be made with and without the review of the Commission on Appointments. The Misoncase was the first major case under the 1987 Constitution and in construing Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint theheads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the

armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are

vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whoseappointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to

appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in thePresident alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether

voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by theCommission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

this Court, drawing extensively from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and the country's experience under the

1935 and 1973 Constitutions, held that only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII are tobe reviewed by the Commission on Appointments, namely, "the heads of the executive department, ambassadors, other publicministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whoseappointments are vested in him in this Constitution." All other appointments by the President are to be made without the participation

of the Commission on Appointments. Accordingly, in the Mison case, the appointment of therein respondent Salvador M. Mison ashead of the Bureau of Customs, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, was held valid and in accordance withthe Constitution.

The Mison case doctrine did not foreclose contrary opinions. So with the very provisions of Sec. 16, Art. VII as designed by the

framers of the 1987 Constitution. But the Constitution, as construed by this Court in appropriate cases, is the supreme law of the land.And it cannot be over-stressed that the strength of the Constitution, with all its imperfections, lies in the respect and obedience

accorded to it by the people, especially the officials of government, who are the subjects of its commands.

Barely a year after Mison, the Court is again confronted with a similar question, this time, whether or not the appointment by thePresident of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an "independent office" created by the 1987 Constitution, is

to be made with or without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments (CA, for brevity). Once more, as in Mison, theCourt will resolve the issue irrespective of the parties involved in the litigation, mindful that what really matters are the principles thatwill guide this Administration and others in the years to come.

Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence ofSec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the Commission onAppointments, it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the (CHR), is to be made without the review or

participation of the Commission on Appointments.

To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights is not specifically providedfor in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections andthe Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the

Commission on Appointments. 2

The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments because they are among the officers of

government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." And Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May1987, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. It provides:

(c) The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed by the President for a term of

seven years without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.

The above conclusions appear to be plainly evident and, therefore, irresistible. However, the presence in this case of certain elements

absent in the Mison case makes necessary a closer scrutiny. The facts are therefore essential.

On 27 August 1987, the President of the Philippines designated herein petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as "Acting C

Commission on Human Rights." The letter of designation reads:

27 August 1987

M a d a m:

You are hereby designated ACTING CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, to succeed the late SenatoDiokno and Justice J. B. L. Reyes.

Very truly yours,

CORAZON C. AQUINO

HON. MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA 3

Realizing perhaps the need for a permanent chairman and members of the Commission on Human Rights, befitting an indoffice, as mandated by the Constitution, 4 the President of the Philippines on 17 December 1988 extended to petitioner B

permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission. The appointment letter is as follows:

17 December 1988

The Honorable

The Chairman

Commission on Human Rights

Pasig, Metro Manila

M a d a m:

Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, the following are hereby appointed to the positions indicated opposite their r

names in the Commission on Human Rights:

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA Chairman

ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, JR Member

SAMUEL SORIANO Member

HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN Member

NARCISO C. MONTEIRO Member

By virtue hereof, they may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office furnishing this Office andService Commission with copies of their oath of office.

Very truly yours,

CORAZON C. AQUINO 5

It is to be noted that by virtue of such appointment, petitioner Bautista was advised by the President that she could qualify upon the performance of the duties of the office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, requiring her to furnish

of the President and the Civil Service Commission with copies of her oath of office.

On 22 December 1988, before the Chief Justice of this Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan, petitioner Bautista took her oath ofvirtue of her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. The full text of the oath of office is as follows

OATH OF OFFICE

I, MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA of 3026 General G. del Pilar Street, Bangkal, Makati, Metro Manila having been app


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the position of CHAIRMAN of the Commission on Human Rights, do solemnly swear that I will discharge to the best of my ability

all the duties and responsibilities of the office to which I have been appointed; uphold the Constitution of the Republic of thePhilippines, and obey all the laws of the land without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

SO HELP ME GOD.

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 22nd day of December in the year of Our Lord, 1988 in Manila.

MARCELO B. FERNAN

Chief Justice

Supreme Court of the Philippines 6

Immediately, after taking her oath of office as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, petitioner Bautista discharged thefunctions and duties of the Office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights which, as previously stated, she had originallyheld merely in an acting capacity beginning 27 August 1987.

On 9 January 1989, petitioner Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments requesting her to

submit to the Commission certain information and documents as required by its rules in connection with the confirmation of herappointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. 7 On 10 January 1989, the Commission on Appointments' Secretaryagain wrote petitioner Bautista requesting her presence at a meeting of the Commission on Appointments Committee on Justice,

Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights set for 19 January 1989 at 9 A.M. at the Conference Room, 8th Floor, Kanlaon Tower I,Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City that would deliberate on her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. 8

On 13 January 1989, petitioner Bautista wrote to the Chairman of the Commission on Appointments stating, for the reasons therein

given, why she considered the Commission on Appointments as having no jurisdiction to review her appointment as Chairman of theCommission on Human Rights. The petitioner's letter to the Commission on Appointments' Chairman reads:

January 13, 1 989

SENATE PRESIDENT JOVITO R. SALONGA

Chairman

Commission on Appointments

Senate, Manila

S i r:

We acknowledge receipt of the communication from the Commission on Appointments requesting our appearance on January 19,1989 for deliberation on our appointments.

We respectfully submit that the appointments of the Commission commissioners of the Human Rights Commission are not subject to

confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

The Constitution, in Article VII Section 16 which expressly vested on the President the appointing power, has expressly mentionedthe government officials whose appointments are subject to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of Congress. TheCommissioners of the Commission on Human Rights are not included among those.

Where the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments is required, as in the case of the Constitutional Commissions such as the

Commission on Audit, Civil Service Commission and the Commission on Elections, it was expressly provided that the nominationswill be subject to confirmation of Commission on Appointments. The exclusion again of the Commission on Human Rights, a

constitutional office, from this enumeration is a clear denial of authority to the Commission on Appointments to review ourappointments to the Commission on Human Rights.

Furthermore, the Constitution specifically provides that this Commission is an independent office which:

a. must investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

b. shall monitor the government's compliance in all our treaty obligations on human rights. We submit that, the m

of all agencies of government, includes even Congress itself, in the performance of its functions which may affect human rig

c. may call on all agencies of government for the implementation of its mandate.

The powers of the Commission on Appointments is in fact a derogation of the Chief Executive's appointing power and ther

grant of that authority to review a valid exercise of the executive power can never be presumed. It must be expressly granted.

The Commission on Appointments has no jurisdiction under the Constitution to review appointments by the PreCommissioners of the Commission on Human Rights.

In view of the foregoing considerations, as Chairman of an independent constitutional office. I cannot submit mys

Commission on Appointments for the purpose of confirming or rejecting my appointment.

Very truly yours,

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA

Chairman 9

In respondent Commission's comment (in this case), dated 3 February 1989, there is attached as Annex 1 a letter of the Comon Appointments' Secretary to the Executive Secretary, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr. making reference to the "ad interim appwhich Her Excellency extended to Atty. Mary Concepcion Bautista on 14 January 1989 as Chairperson of the Commission o

Rights" 10 and informing Secretary Macaraig that, as previously conveyed to him in a letter of 25 January 1989, the CommAppointments disapproved petitioner Bautista's "ad interim appointment' as Chairperson of the Commission on Humanview of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments. The letter reads:

1 February 1989

HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.

Executive Secretary

Malacanang, Manila

S i r:

This refers to the ad interim appointment which Her Excellency extended to Atty. Mary Concepcion Bautista on 14 Januar

Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights.

As we conveyed to you in our letter of 25 January 1989, the Commission on Appointments, assembled in plenary (sessiosame day, disapproved Atty. Bautista's ad interim appointment as Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights in vie

refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.

This is to inform you that the Commission on Appointments, likewise assembled in plenary (session) earlier today, denieMamintal A. J. Tamano's motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of Atty. Bautista's ad interim appointment as Chairp

the Commission on Human Rights.

Very truly yours,

RAOUL V. VICTORINO

Secretary 11

On the same date (1 February 1989), the Commission on Appointments' Secretary informed petitioner Bautista that the m


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reconsideration of the disapproval of her "ad interim appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights" was denied by

the Commission on Appointments. The letter reads as follows:

1 February 1989

ATTY. MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTACommission on Human RightsIntegrated Bar of the Philippines

Bldg. Pasig, Metro ManilaDear Atty. Bautista:Pursuant to Sec. 6 (a), Chapter II of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, the denial by the Commission on Appointments,

assembled in plenary (session) earlier today, of Senator Mamintal A.J. Tamano's motion for reconsideration of the disapproval ofyour ad interim appointment as Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights is respectfully conveyed.

Thank you for your attention.

Very truly yours,

RAOUL V. VICTORINO

Secretary 12

In Annex 3 of respondent Commission's same comment, dated 3 February 1989, is a news item appearing in the 3 February 1989issue of the "Manila Standard" reporting that the President had designated PCHR Commissioner Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting

Chairman of the Commission" pending the resolution of Bautista's case which had been elevated to the Supreme Court. The newsitem is here quoted in full, thus

Aquino names replacement for MaryCon

President Aquino has named replacement for Presidential Commission on Human Rights Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista whoseappointment was rejected anew by the Congressional commission on appointments.

The President designated PCHR commissioner Hesiquio R. Mallillin as acting chairman of the Commission pending the resolution of

Bautista's case which had been elevated to the Supreme Court.

The President's action followed after Congressional Commission on Appointments Chairman, Senate President Jovito Salongadeclared Bautista can no longer hold on to her position after her appointment was not confirmed for the second time.

For all practical purposes, Salonga said Bautista can be accused of usurpation of authority if she insists to stay on her office.

In effect, the President had asked Bautista to vacate her office and give way to Mallillin (Mari Villa) 13

On 20 January 1989, or even before the respondent Commission on Appointments had acted on her "ad interim appointment asChairman of the Commission on Human Rights" petitioner Bautista filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari with a

prayer for the immediate issuance of a restraining order, to declare "as unlawful and unconstitutional and without any legal force and

effect any action of the Commission on Appointments as well as of the Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and HumanRights, on the lawfully extended appointment of the petitioner as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, on the ground thatthey have no lawful and constitutional authority to confirm and to review her appointment." 14

The prayer for temporary restraining order was "to enjoin the respondent Commission on Appointments not to proceed further withtheir deliberation and/or proceedings on the appointment of the petitioner ... nor to enforce, implement or act on any order, resolution,

etc. issued in the course of their deliberations." 15

Respondents were required to file comment within ten (10) days. 16 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an amended petition, withurgent motion for restraining order, impleading Commissioner Hesiquio R. Mallillin the designated acting chairman as partyrespondent and praying for the nullification of his appointment. The succeeding day, a supplemental urgent ex-parte motion was filed

by petitioner seeking to restrain respondent Mallillin from continuing to exercise the functions of chairman and to refrain fromdemanding courtesy resignations from officers or separating or dismissing employees of the Commission.

Acting on petitioner's amended petition and supplemental urgent ex-parte motion, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restrainingorder directing respondent Mallillin to cease and desist from effecting the dismissal, courtesy resignation, i removal and

reorganization and other similar personnel actions. 17 Respondents were likewise required to comment on said amended pet

allowance for petitioner to file a reply within two (2) days from receipt of a copy thereof.

Respondents Senator Salonga, the Commission on Appointments the Committee on J & BC and Human Rights filed a comthe amended petition on 21 February 1989. 18 Petitioner filed her reply. 19 On 24 February 1989, respondent Mallilliseparate comment. 20 The Court required petitioner to reply to respondent Mallillin's comment . 21 Petitioner filed her reply

In deference to the Commission on Appointments, an instrumentality of a co-ordinate and co-equal branch of government, did not issue a temporary restraining order directed against it. However, this does not mean that the issues raised by the pemet by the respondents' comments, will not be resolved in this case. The Court will not shirk from its duty as the final

constitutional issues, in the same way that it did not in Mison.

As disclosed by the records, and as previously adverted to, it is clear that petitioner Bautista was extended by Her Excell

President a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 17 December 1988. Before thiswas merely the "Acting Chairman" of the Commission. Bautista's appointment on 17 December 1988 is an appointment thathe President solely to make, i.e., not an appointment to be submitted for review and confirmation (or rejection) by the Coon Appointments. This is in accordance with Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine in Mison whi

reiterated.

The threshold question that has really come to the fore is whether the President, subsequent to her act of 17 December 1988petitioner Bautista had qualified for the office to which she had been appointed, by taking the oath of office and actuallyand discharging the functions and duties thereof, could extend another appointment to the petitioner on 14 January 198

interim appointment" as termed by the respondent Commission on Appointments or any other kind of appointment to the saof Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights that called for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

The Court, with all due respect to both the Executive and Legislative Departments of government, and after careful delibeconstrained to hold and rule in the negative. When Her Excellency, the President converted petitioner Bautista's designation Chairman to a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 17 December 1988, signific

advised Bautista (in the same appointment letter) that, by virtue of such appointment, she could qualify and enter performance of the duties of the office (of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights). All that remained for Bautista

to reject or accept the appointment. Obviously, she accepted the appointment by taking her oath of office before the Chief the Supreme Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan and assuming immediately thereafter the functions and duties of the ChairmCommission on Human Rights. Bautista's appointment therefore on 17 December 1988 as Chairman of the Commission oRights was a completed act on the part of the President. To paraphrase the great jurist, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in the c

case of Marbury vs. Madison. 23

xxx xxx xxx

The answer to this question seems an obvious one. The appointment being the sole act of the President, must be coevidenced, when it is shown that he has done everything to be performed by him.

xxx xxx xxx

Some point of time must be taken when the power of the executive over an officer, not removable at his will must cease. Thatime must be when the constitutional power of appointment has been exercised. And this power has been exercised when threquired from the person possessing the power, has been performed. ....

xxx xxx xxx

But having once made the appointment, his (the President's) power over the office is terminated in all cases, where by law th

is not removable by him. The right to the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute, unconditionalaccepting or rejecting it.

xxx xxx xxx

THE "APPOINTMENT" OF PETITIONER BAUTISTA ON 14 JANUARY 1989

It is respondent Commission's submission that the President, after the appointment of 17 December 1988 extended to

Bautista, decided to extend another appointment (14 January 1989) to petitioner Bautista, this time, submitting such app(more accurately, nomination) to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. And yet, it seems obvious enough, bot


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and in fact, that no new or further appointment could be made to a position already filled by a previously completed appointment

which had been accepted by the appointee, through a valid qualification and assumption of its duties.

Respondent Commission vigorously contends that, granting that petitioner's appointment as Chairman of the Commission on HumanRights is one that, under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, as interpreted in the Mison case, is solely for the President to make, yet,it is within the president's prerogative to voluntarily submit such appointment to the Commission on Appointment for confirmation.

The mischief in this contention, as the Court perceives it, lies in the suggestion that the President (with Congress agreeing) may, fromtime to time move power boundaries, in the Constitution differently from where they are placed by the Constitution.

The Court really finds the above contention difficult of acceptance. Constitutional Law, to begin with, is concerned with power not

political convenience, wisdom, exigency, or even necessity. Neither the Executive nor the Legislative (Commission onAppointments) can create power where the Constitution confers none. The evident constitutional intent is to strike a careful anddelicate balance, in the matter of appointments to public office, between the President and Congress (the latter acting through the

Commission on Appointments). To tilt one side or the other of the scale is to disrupt or alter such balance of power. In other words, tothe extent that the Constitution has blocked off certain appointments for the President to make with the participation of theCommission on Appointments, so also has the Constitution mandated that the President can confer no power of participation in the

Commission on Appointments over other appointments exclusively reserved for her by the Constitution. The exercise of politicaloptions that finds no support in the Constitution cannot be sustained.

Nor can the Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review presidential

appointments, create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has reserved to the President alone. Stated differently,when the appointment is one that the Constitution mandates is for the President to make without the participation of the Commissionon Appointments, the executive's voluntary act of submitting such appointment to the Commission on Appointments and the latter'sact of confirming or rejecting the same, are done without or in excess of jurisdiction.

EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT MAY VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS ANAPPOINTMENT THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION SOLELY BELONGS TO HER, STILL, THERE WAS NO VACANCYTO WHICH AN APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE ON 14 JANUARY 1989

Under this heading, we will assume, ex gratia argumenti, that the Executive may voluntarily allow the Commission on Appointmentsto exercise the power of review over an appointment otherwise solely vested by the Constitution in the President. Yet, as alreadynoted, when the President appointed petitioner Bautista on 17 December 1988 to the position of Chairman of the Commission on

Human Rights with the advice to her that by virtue of such appointment (not, until confirmed by the Commission on Appointments),she could qualify and enter upon the performance of her duties after taking her oath of office, the presidential act of appointment tothe subject position which, under the Constitution, is to be made, in the first place, without the participation of the Commission on

Appointments, was then and there a complete and finished act, which, upon the acceptance by Bautista, as shown by her taking of theoath of office and actual assumption of the duties of said office, installed her, indubitably and unequivocally, as the lawful Chairmanof the Commission on Human Rights for a term of seven (7) years. There was thus no vacancy in the subject office on 14 January

1989 to which an appointment could be validly made. In fact, there is no vacancy in said office to this day.

Nor can respondents impressively contend that the new appointment or re-appointment on 14 January 1989 was an ad interimappointment, because, under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the Presidentto make, i.e., without the participation of the Commission on Appointments. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the

1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why adinterim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment ofCongress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on

Appointments, can not be ad interim appointments.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 163-A, 30 JUNE 1987, PROVIDING THAT THE TENURE OF THE CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERSOF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS SHALL BE AT THE PLEASURE OF THE PRESIDENT IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Respondent Mallillin contends that with or without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, petitioner Bautista, asChairman of the Commission on Human Rights, can be removed from said office at anytime, at the pleasure of the President; and that

with the disapproval of Bautista's appointment (nomination) by the Commission on Appointments, there was greater reason for herremoval by the President and her replacement with respondent Mallillin Thus, according to respondent Mallillin the petition at bar has

become moot and academic.

We do not agree that the petition has become moot and academic. To insist on such a posture is akin to deluding oneself that day is

night just because the drapes are drawn and the lights are on. For, aside from the substantive questions of constitutional law raised by

petitioner, the records clearly show that petitioner came to this Court in timely manner and has not shown any ind

abandoning her petition.

Reliance is placed by respondent Mallillin on Executive Order No. 163-A, 30 June 1987, full text of which is as follows:

WHEREAS, the Constitution does not prescribe the term of office of the Chairman and Members of the Commission oRights unlike those of other Constitutional Commissions;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. Section 2, sub-paragraph (c) of Executive Order No. 163 is hereby amended to read as follows:

The Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed by the President. Their tenure in officeat the pleasure of the President.

SEC. 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. DONE in the City of Manila, this 30th day of June, in the yLord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.

(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO

President of the Philippines

By the President:

(Sgd.) JOKER P. ARROYO

Executive Secretary 24

Previous to Executive Order No. 163-A, or on 5 May 1987, Executive Order No. 163 25 was issued by the President, Sec

which provides:

Sec. 2(c). The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed by the President forseven years without reappointment. Appointments to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.

It is to be noted that, while the earlier executive order (No. 163) speaks of a term of office of the Chairman and Memb

Commission on Human Rights which is seven (7) years without reappointment the later executive order (163-A) spetenure in office of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights, which is "at the pleasure of the Presiden

Tenure in office should not be confused with term of office. As Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Concepcion in his c

opinion in Alba vs. Evangelista, 26 stated:

The distinction between "term" and "tenure" is important, for, pursuant to the Constitution, "no officer or employee inService may be removed or suspended except for cause, as provided by law" (Art. XII, section 4), and this fundamental

would be defeated if Congress could legally make the tenure of some officials dependent upon the pleasure of the Preclothing the latter with blanket authority to replace a public officer before the expiration of his term. 27

When Executive Order No. 163 was issued, the evident purpose was to comply with the constitutional provision that "the

office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission (on Human Rights) shall be provided by l17(2), Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).

As the term of office of the Chairman (and Members) of the Commission on Human Rights, is seven (7) yearsreappointment, as provided by Executive Order No. 163, and consistent with the constitutional design to give the Comm

needed independence to perform and accomplish its functions and duties, the tenure in office of said Chairman (and Membebe later made dependent on the pleasure of the President.

Nor can respondent Mallillin find support in the majority opinion in the Alba case, supra, because the power of the

sustained therein, to replace a previously appointed vice-mayor of Roxas City given the express provision in Sec. 8, Rep. Ac(creating the City of Roxas) stating that the vice-mayor shall serve at the pleasure of the President, can find no applicatChairman of an INDEPENDENT OFFICE, created not by statute but by the Constitution itself. Besides, unlike in the Alba c

the Constitution has decreed that the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall have a "term of offic

Indeed, the Court finds it extremely difficult to conceptualize how an office conceived and created by the Constitutindependent as the Commission on Human Rights-and vested with the delicate and vital functions of investigating vio

human rights, pinpointing responsibility and recommending sanctions as well as remedial measures therefor, can truly func


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independence and effectiveness, when the tenure in office of its Chairman and Members is made dependent on the pleasure of the

President. Executive Order No. 163-A, being antithetical to the constitutional mandate of independence for the Commission onHuman Rights has to be declared unconstitutional.

The Court is not alone in viewing Executive Order No. 163-A as containing the seeds of its constitutional destruction. Theproceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission clearly point to its being plainly at war with the constitutional intent of

independence for the Commission. Thus

MR. GARCIA (sponsor). Precisely, one of the reasons why it is important for this body to be constitutionalized is the fact thatregardless of who is the President or who holds the executive power, the human rights issue is of such importance that it should be

safeguarded and it should be independent of political parties or powers that are actually holding the reins of government. Ourexperience during the martial law period made us realize how precious those rights are and, therefore, these must be safeguarded atall times.

xxx xxx xxxMR. GARCIA. I would like to state this fact: Precisely we do not want the term or the power of the Commission on Human Rights to

be coterminous with the president, because the President's power is such that if he appoints a certain commissioner and that

commissioner is subject to the President, therefore, any human rights violations committed under the person's administration will besubject to presidential pressure. That is what we would like to avoid to make the protection of human rights go beyond thefortunes of different political parties or administrations in power. 28

xxx xxx xxxMR. SARMIENTO (sponsor). Yes, Madam President. I conferred with the honorable Chief Justice Concepcion and retired JusticeJ.B.L. Reyes and they believe that there should be an independent Commission on Human Rights free from executive influence

because many of the irregularities on human rights violations are committed by members of the armed forces and members of theexecutive branch of the government. So as to insulate this body from political interference, there is a need to constitutionalize it. 29xxx xxx xxx

MR. SARMIENTO: On the inquiry on whether there is a need for this to be constitutionalized, I would refer to a previous inquiry thatthere is still a need for making this a constitutional body free or insulated from interference. I conferred with former Chief JusticeConcepcion and the acting chairman of the Presidential Committee on Human Rights, retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes, and they are one in

saying that this body should be constitutionalized so that it will be free from executive control or interferences, since many of theabuses are committed by the members of the military or the armed forces. 30xxx xxx xxx

MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Congress can create this body, but as I have said, if we leave it to Congress, this commission will bewithin the reach of politicians and of public officers and that to me is dangerous. We should insulate this body from political controland political interference because of the nature of its functions to investigate all forms of human rights violations which are

principally committed by members of the military, by the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 31xxx xxx xxxMR. GARCIA. The critical factor here is political control, and normally, when a body is appointed by Presidents who may change,

the commission must remain above these changes in political control. Secondly, the other important factor to consider are the armedforces, the police forces which have tremendous power at their command and, therefore, we would need a commission composed ofmen who also are beyond the reach of these forces and the changes in political administration. 32

xxx xxx xxxMR MONSOD. Yes, It is the committee's position that this proposed special body, in order to function effectively, must be investedwith an independence that is necessary not only for its credibility but also for the effectiveness of its work. However, we want tomake a distinction in this Constitution. May be what happened was that it was referred to the wrong committee. In the opinion of the

committee, this need not be a commission that is similar to the three constitutional commissions like the COA, the COMELEC, andthe Civil Service. It need not be in that article. 33

xxx xxx xxx

MR. COLAYCO. The Commissioners earlier objection was that the Office of the President is not involved in the project. How sure

are we that the next President of the Philippines will be somebody we can trust? Remember, even now there is a growing concernabout some of the bodies, agencies and commission created by President Aquino. 34

xxx xxx xxx.... Leaving to Congress the creation of the Commission on Human Rights is giving less importance to a truly fundamental need to setup a body that will effectively enforce the rules designed to uphold human rights. 35

PETITIONER BAUTISTA MAY OF COURSE BE REMOVED BUT ONLY FOR CAUSE

To hold, as the Court holds, that petitioner Bautista is the lawful incumbent of the office of Chairman of the Commission on HumanRights by virtue of her appointment, as such, by the President on 17 December 1988, and her acceptance thereof, is not to say that she

cannot be removed from office before the expiration of her seven (7) year term. She certainly can be removed but her remo

be for cause and with her right to due process properly safeguarded. In the case of NASECO vs. NLRC, 36 this Court held ta rank-and-file employee of the NASECO, a government-owned corporation, could be dismissed, she was entitled to a hedue process. How much more, in the case of the Chairman of a constitutionally mandated INDEPENDENT OFFICECommission on Human Rights.

If there are charges against Bautista for misfeasance or malfeasance in office, charges may be filed against her with the OmbIf he finds a prima facie case against her, the corresponding information or informations can be filed with the Sandiganbaymay in turn order her suspension from office while the case or cases against her are pending before said court. 37 This is due

in action. This is the way of a government of laws and not of men.

A FINAL WORD

It is to the credit of the President that, in deference to the rule of law, after petitioner Bautista had elevated her case to this Her Excellency merely designated an Acting Chairman for the Commission on Human Rights (pending decision in this casof appointing another permanent Chairman. The latter course would have added only more legal difficulties to an alreadysituation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed Chairm

Commission on Human Rights and the lawful incumbent thereof, entitled to all the benefits, privileges and emoluments of saThe temporary restraining order heretofore issued by the Court against respondent Mallillin enjoining him from dismterminating personnel of the Commission on Human Rights is made permanent. SO ORDERED.

DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOCD vs.v REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA et.al G.R. No. 97710, September 2

This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political part

change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reachtribunal in an election contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?

Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had hesitated to

upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of the Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as because it could be considered by some as "an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to intermeddle prerogatives.

In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was all too willing to avoid a

confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-like in the sands of the "political question" docaccepted meaning of which is that 'where the matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacthe sole determination by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond judicial cogniza

it was that in suits where the party proceeded against was either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that mcourts refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)

In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action,

when private rights are affected came to be recognized. As we pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing thapower is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercabuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unre

limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becresponsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundameThe question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution i

(Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).

That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Coof the Philippines which defines judicial power as both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual controversies involv

which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion ato lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and legislative branchGovernment, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the

may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action


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justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case.

It is

a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to administer justice according to law. ... It is simplya necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the determination ofwhich must be brought the test and measure of the law. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)

In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP)and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the FourthDistrict of the province of Pampanga. Each received the following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers

of Pampanga:

Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes

Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votesDifference...................................... 3,300 votes

On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for short) which is composed of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of theSupreme Court and the remaining six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representationfrom the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI,

1987 Constitution) as follows:

AMEURFINA M. HERRERA ChairmanAssociate JusticeSupreme Court

ISAGANI A. CRUZ MemberAssociate JusticeSupreme Court

FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO MemberAssociate JusticeSupreme Court

HONORATO Y. AQUINO MemberCongressman1st District

Benguet LDPDAVID A. PONCE DE LEON MemberCongressman

1st District PalawanLDPSIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member

Congressman2nd District Nueva EcijaLDP

JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. MemberCongressman1st District Davao del Sur

LDPJOSE E. CALINGASAN Member Congressman

4th District BatangasLDPANTONIO H. CERILLES Member

Congressman2nd District Zamboanga del Sur(formerly GAD, now NP)

After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda, Bondoc's protest was submitted fordecision in July, 1989.

By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) vote

point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precinctdelaying by at least four (4) months the finalization of the decision in the case.

The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. ConCamasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief," Congressman Jose S. CoJr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with

justice and self- respect," and to honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the HRET that they would "ab

result of the appreciation of the contested ballot 1 Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP whinto a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.

On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case Ncopy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.

On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed Congressman Cby letter 2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 0already expelled him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido

of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political pthat as those acts are "not only inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cobjectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee unanimously confir

expulsions. 3

At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen fromand asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of it 'especially in matters where party membe

prerequisite. 4

At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina M. Herrera, received the letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, informing the Tribun

the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. The letter reads a

13 March 1991

Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution Hills Quezon City

Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:

I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House of Representatives during its plenaron 13 March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to t

Electoral Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication which is self-explanatory and copies of which are hereto attached.

Thank you.

For the Secretary-General

(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations Department (p. 10, Rollo.)

Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in wthis "distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET because

By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the electoral protest entitled "B

Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777-78 promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there wereimpediment to its promulgation, the decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be o

on a motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated.

The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor of protestantBecause some members of the Tribunal requested re-appreciation of some ballots, the finalization of the decision had to be

by at least 4 months.


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With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by

Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura andAntonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de LeonSimeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.

Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was, in our view, a conscience vote, for which he earned the respect of

the Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of the leader of his party.

Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has come about. It is extremely difficult to continue with membership in theTribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve it. 8 integrity and credibility as a constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is clear

to us that the unseating of an incumbent member of Congress is being prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should notbe hampered in the performance of its constitutional function by factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases beforeit.

In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional representation in the Tribunal found in Article VI,Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should be amended to provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of

votes and three (3) of the party having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justicesfrom the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can dominate the legislative component in the Tribunal.

In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns andqualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Similarly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the

sole judge of all such contests involving members of the Senate. In this way, there should be lesser chances of non-judicial elementsplaying a decisive role in the resolution of election contests.

We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal,

those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their independence andobjectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations.

There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have been promulgated today, 14 March 1991.

Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET CaseNo. 45), after the Holy Week recess.

But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated task of the Tribunal well ahead of thecompletion of the present congressional term.

Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship and membership in the Tribunal.

xxx xxx xxx

At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling thepromulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:

In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 tills morning from the House of Representatives that at its plenarysession held on March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to theHouse of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda

(HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is because, without Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision lacks theconcurrence of five members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.

The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being of the opinion that this development undermines

the independence of the Tribunal and derails the orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in a letterof even date, for their relief from membership in the Tribunal.

The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to resign as a member of the Tribunal.

The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also manifested a similar intention.

(p. 37, Rollo.)

On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, resolved to directthem to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed that:

... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all contests relationship to the

election, returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only

legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the mlegislators, thereof, upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective

parties but as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to further bolster the independence of the Tribunals, thoffice of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not

terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloya

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to be relieved fmembership in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties there

EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the proceedings of the House of Representatives ETribunal, which performs functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its membership; and c) the view that the term of all the members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is co-extensive

corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-of the Tribunal to submit the issue to the said Tribunal in the first instance.

Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep. Camasura should be allowed to cast his

vote in favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise a political and judicial travesty will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and FJJ., took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave.

On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against Repres

Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., or any other representative who may be appoinRepresentative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:

1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the noof Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"

2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place of respondent Camaassuming, occupying and discharging functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;

3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a mem

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and

4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to comment 5 on the petition wdays from notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing and allowing participation in its proceedings of Honorable M

M. Palacol or whoever is designated to replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House of Representatives Electoral until the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of said Congressman Camasura as membHRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)

Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.

Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on Congress' being the sole authonominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by the political parties therein, those who are to sit in the Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole

remove any of them whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is materially chaaccount of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party; 6 that a Tribunal member's term of office extensive with his legislative term, 7 for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed

Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating representation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified; 8the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP 9 and the decision to remembership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives, henc

purely political question beyond the reach of judicial review. 10In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action aga

because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET. 11 Moreover, the petition failed to im

House of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded CongCamasura's membership in the HRET. 12

The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of the HETH as a party resp

erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or ordHRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the House of Representatives of withdrawing the nomina


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rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanita nito Camasura as a member of the HRET. 13

Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed had nothing to do with the

assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by cancelling the promulgation of its decision inHRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's) prejudice. 14 Hence, although the Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary

party to the suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to

acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to whether the relief of respondent CongressmanCamasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid." 15

In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol was impleaded as one of the

respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives had announced the termination of Congressman Camasura'smembership in the HETH several newspapers of general circulation reported that the House of Representatives would nominate andelect Congressman Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal. 16

Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with the disposition of an electioncontest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority party?

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all

contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed ofnine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining sixshall be Members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional

representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. Thesenior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation of the main political

parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representationof three members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature. The 1935 constitutional provisionreads as follows:

Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests

relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nineMembers, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall beMembers of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon

nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest member of votes therein.The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the Philippines.)

Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it was impossible for any political party to control the voting in

the tribunal.

The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa.

The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores theexclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the

members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5,1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-

political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral

tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunalfor the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers

previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members.

The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and qualification of members of the NationalAssembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.

The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be the sole judge of all

contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodieswhich must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and control them, without any legislative interference.(Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)

To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear an

congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.

The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a power in the tripartitof government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ; while cof a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.

xxx xxx xxx

The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating to electioand qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting

limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determcharacter, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the ele

qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)

The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the following exchang

subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, attest:

MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.

My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal, either of the House

Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the Taand the Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is thdistinction?

MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.

MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral Tribconstitutional body.?

MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?

MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.

MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be applthe present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are not separate departments of the governmen

that ruling still be valid?

MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the legislative, the executivjudiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.

MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of government, I would like to know again if the ruling i

vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be applicable to the present bodies we are deciding on, when the Supresaid that these electoral tribunals are independent from Congress, devoid of partisan influence or consideration and, tCongress has no power to regulate proceedings of these electoral tribunals.

MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they are not a separate branch of government.

MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of the world, the invariable rule is to leave unto themdetermination of controversies with respect to the election and qualifications of their members, and precisely they

Committee on Privileges which takes care of this particular controversy.

Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is an exception to this rule because apparently weindependent electoral tribunal?

MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent, but the Gentleman will notice that the wordings

Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal. 'It is still the Senate Electoral Tribunal and thElectoral Tribunal. So, technically, it is the tribunal of the House and tribunal of the Senate although they are independent.

MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are independent from both bodies?

MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.


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MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we say that these bodies are independent when we still have six

politicians sitting in both tribunals?

MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of this in the Committee on the Executive, there was a commentby Chief Justice Concepcion-Commissioner Concepcion-that there seems to be some incongruity in these electoral tribunals,

considering that politicians still sit in the tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in the case of Sanidad vs. Vera, SenateElectoral tribunal Case No. 1, they are supposed to act in accordance with law and justice with complete detachment from an politicalconsiderations. That is why I am asking now for the record how we could achieve such detachment when there are six politicians

sitting there.

MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the opposition, has, with sterling competence, shown

independence in the proceedings of this Commission. I think we can also trust that the members of the tribunals will be independent.(pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986, Emphasis supplied.)

Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET.

The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would, however, by amyth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the

political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.

The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty tothe LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional

prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunalto a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NPmember would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.

Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment,

impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and"breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasurafrom the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciationof the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an

injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura'sright to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure

just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore,membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member'scongressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal

affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House ofRepresentatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of thiscase fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP

and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.

There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to security of

tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the end of the congressionalterm, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by JusticeFlorentino P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took aleave of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed, however, that those changes in the judicial composition

to the HRET had no political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove Congressman Camasura. No coercion wasapplied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on theirown free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert design to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.

The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish him for "party disloyalty" after he

had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion of Con

Camasura was to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so that the wbe cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDHouse of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgmeHRET in the Bondoc case.

The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against the strong arm of theparty in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that theRepresentatives had acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Trib

calls upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rigparty aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the violahighest official of the land or the Government itself" (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-

SCRA 183, 207).

Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives waslawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of

of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional(Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the electio

between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the

Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Camasura as a member of tElectoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of Represwithdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House

Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camis ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs.

A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prethe speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justicdeclares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done imm

by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda. SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE DOMINGO IMPERIAL G.R. No. L-8684, March 31, 1955

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Solicitor General against Honorable Domingo Imperial and HonorablePerez, to test the legality of their continuance in office as Chairman and Member, respectively, of the Commission on Electi

According to the Solicitor General, the first commissioners of Elections were duly appointed and qualified on July 12, 1945,following terms of office:

Hon. Jose Lopez Vito, Chairman, for 9 years, expiring on July 12, 1954.

Hon. Francisco Enage, Member, for 6 years, expiring on July 12, 1951.

Hon. Vicente Vera, Member, for 3 years, expiring on July 12, 1948;

that upon the death of Chairman Jose Lopez Vito in May, 1947, Member Vicente de Vera was promoted Chairman by appdated May 26, 1947; that in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 47 Off. Gaz., 2

Nacionalista Party vs. Felix Angelo Bautista, 47 Off. Gaz., 2356, the term of office of Chairman De Vera would have expir12, 1954, that is, the date when the term of office of the first Chairman, Honorable Jose Lopez Vito, would have expChairman Vicente de Vera died in August, 1951, before the expiration of the maximum term of nine years (on July 12, 195

first Chairman of the Commission; that on August 11, 1951, the respondent Honorable Domingo Imperial was appointed Chsucceed Honorable Vicente de Vera; that while the appointment of the respondent Honorable Imperial provided that he wa"for a term expiring July 12, 1960", the term for which he could legally serve as Chairman legally expired on July 12, 1954

the expiration of the nine-year term for which the first Chairman, Honorable Jose Lopez Vito, was appointed; that the reHonorable Rodrigo Perez was appointed Member of the Commission on December 8, 1949, for "a term of nine years ex


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November 24, 1958", vice Honorable Francisco Enage, who was retired on November, 1949; that the term of office of respondent

Perez legally expired on July 12, 1951, the expiration of the term of six years for which Commissioner Enage, his predecessor, wasappointed. Wherefore, the Solicitor General concludes that the respondents Commissioners Imperial and Perez have ceased to haveany legal or valid title to the positions of Chairman and Member, respectively, of the Commission on Elections, and that therefore,their positions should be declared vacant.

The respondents filed separate answer to the petition for quo warranto, both of which pray for the dismissal of the petition.

The defense of respondent Honorable Domingo Imperial is substantially that Honorable Jose Lopez Vito was first appointedChairman of the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1941, for a term of nine years expiring on May 12, 1950; that when

Commissioner Lopez Vito was again appointed Chairman on July 12, 1945, his nine-year, term of office under this secondappointment should not be reckoned from the date thereof, that is, July 12, 1945, but from the date of his first appointment in 1941, sothat the term under his second appointment expired on May 12, 1950; that respondent Imperial having been appointed after the

expiration of Chairman Lopez Vito's full term of nine years in 1950, he (respondent Imperial) should serve office for a full term ofnine years, ending only on August 10, 1960. Respondent Imperial stresses the unconstitutionality of Chairman Lopez Vito's secondappointment to serve up to July 12, 1954, upon the ground that under the Constitution, he (Chairman Lopez Vito) could neither be

appointed for more than nine years nor be allowed to succeed himself.

The other respondent, Honorable Rodrigo Perez, alleges that since Chairman Lopez Vito was the first to be appointed under theConstitution on May 13, 1941, the terms of office of all the Commissioners on Election should be reckoned from that date, May 13,

1941, to maintain the three-year difference between the dates of expiration of their respective terms as provided for by theConstitution; that the term of office of Member Francisco Enage (his predecessor) should therefore be considered as having started onMay 13, 1941, and since Enage was appointed only for six years, his term of office expired on May 12, 1947; and that sincerespondent Perez was appointed (on December 8, 1949) after Commissioner Enage's six-year term of office had already expired, he

should serve for a full term of nine years from the expiration of Enage's term of office on May 12, 1947; hence, his own term ofoffice would expire only on May 12, 1956. Respondent Perez argues that if the computation of the Solicitor General were to befollowed, that is, that Commissioner Enage's term be counted from July 12, 1945 ending on July 12, 1951, this term would end at a

date very close to the expiration of Commissioner Lopez Vito's term on May 12, 1950, so there would be only a difference offourteen months between the expiration of the terms of office of Commissioners Lopez Vito and Enage, a situation which is contraryto and violative of the Constitution that prescribes a difference of three years between the dates of the expiration of the terms of the

Members of the Commission.

The issues now posed demand a re-examination and application of the Constitutional amendment establishing an independentCommission on Elections (Article X) that became operative on December 2, 1940, superseding the purely statutory Commission

previously created and organized along the same lines by Commonwealth Act No. 607. While this Court already had occasion tomake pronouncements on the matter in previous decisions, the same are not considered decisive in view of the divergence of opinionsamong the members of the Court at the time said decisions

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