cases admin finals

8/12/2019 Cases Admin FINALS

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Board of Medical Education vs. Alfonso

Facts:

In 1985, the Commission on Medical Education wasauthorized by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports(DECS) and the Board of Medical Education, herein petitioners,to conduct a study of all medical schools in the Philippines. Onereport showed that the Philippine Muslim-Christian College ofMedicine Foundation Inc., the private respondent and herein

referred to as the College, had failed to comply with theminimum standards set forth for medical schools and the teamof inspectors sent by the Commission recommended its closure.The College contended that the findings were biased anddiscriminatory. Thereafter, the Board of Medical Education sentanother team of inspectors to re-evaluate it which affirmed the

previous report and recommended the closure of the College.Third and fourth inspections were made and the College wasstill found to be inadequate in all aspects of the survey. Withregards to the results of the evaluations, the Board of MedicalEducation recommended the closure of the College to theDECS. Lourdes R. Quisumbing, then Secretary of the

Department, informed the Chairman of the Colleges Board ofTrustees about the decision to close the college who insteadproposed a gradual phase out in order to minimize financiallosses. On 1989, the College appealed the decision to the Officeof the President alleging grave abuse of discretion to theSecretary of DECS but the Executive Secretary affirmed the

decision. On 1989, the College filed Civil Case No. 1385 in thecourt of Judge Daniel P. Alfonso, herein respondent, against theSecretary of DECS, questioning the evaluation as illegal. Therespondent ruled that there was no evidence supporting thefindings of the report and that the deficiencies mentioned were


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non-existent and issued a writ of injunction to restrain theimplementation of the decision of the Secretary.

Issue:

Whether or not the Secretary of Department of Education,Culture and Sports has acted within the scope of powersgranted by the law and the Constitution?

Whether or not the respondent Judge Alfonso committedgrave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of preliminaryinjunction to restrain the implementation of the decision of theSecretary of DECS

Held:

It is not the function of any Court to review the decisionsof the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational

institution meets the standards required to operate. No courthas the power to substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary.The only authority the Courts have is to determine whether ornot the Secretary has acted within the scope of powers grantedby law. It is well settled that the courts of justice should notinterfere with purely administrative functions because they are

in better position to render judgment on such matters due totheir special knowledge and expertise. The Supreme Court heldthat the respondent judge committed a grave abuse ofdiscretion in substituting his judgment for that of the Secretaryand for issuing the questioned injunction.


3/42

Francisco Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority and Amari

Coastal Bay Development Corporation

Facts:On the 20 th day of November 1973, the government signed

a contract with the Construction and Development Corporationof the Philippines through the Commissioner of PublicHighways to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas ofManila Bay. On the 4 th day of February 1977, then President

Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creatingPublic Estates Authority, herein respondent. Such Decreeassigned the Public Estates Authority to reclaim land, includingforeshore and submerged areas and to develop, improve,acquire, lease and sell all kinds of lands. The President alsoissued Presidential Decree No. 1085 which transfers the lands

reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay tothe Public Estates Authority under the Manila Cavite CoastalRoad and Reclamation Project. On the 19 th day of January 1988,then President Corazon Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517transferring the parcel of lands so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project. The Public Estates

Authority and the AMARI, a private corporation and one of therespondents herein, entered into a Joint Venture Agreementwithout public bidding. Such agreement also required thereclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas.It was approved by the then President Fidel V. Ramos. ThenSenate President Ernesto Maceda delivered his privilege speech

and alleged that the Joint Venture Agreement as thegrandmother of all scams. This resulted to the investigation ofits legality. Frank Chavez, a taxpayer and herein petitioner fileda Petition for Mandamus and prays that the Public EstatesAuthority publicly disclose the terms of the negotiation of the


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Joint Venture Agreement invoking the right of the people toinformation on matters of public concern as provided by theConstitution. The respondent contends that the petitioner

erred in seeking judicial intervention without first asking theneeded information which violates the principle of exhaustionof administrative remedies.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner merits the dismissal for non

exhaustion of administrative remedies

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Public Estates Authorityhas the duty to disclose all the terms and conditions for the saleof its islands to the public. The respondent is obliged to make

public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or fromanyone. The respondent failed to make this public because suchagreement was a result of a negotiation not of a public bidding.The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does notapply if the issue involved is a purely legal question.


5/42

Provident Tree Farms Inc. vs. Batario

Facts:

The Provident Tree Farms Inc. , the petitioner herein , is aPhilippine Corporation engaged in industrial tree planting solelyfor production of matches. In accordance with the state policyto encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial treeplantation, Sec. 36 of the Revised Forestry Code givesincentives to the petitioner, including the qualified ban against

importation of wood products. On the 5 th day of April 1989, theA.J. International Corporation, one of the private respondentsherein, imported four containers of matches from Indonesia,and two more containers of matches from Singapore. Due tothe request of the petitioner, the Department of Environmentand Natural Resources issued a certification that there are

enough available wood supply in the Philippines for the matchindustry. On 5 th day of May 1989, the petitioner filed acomplaint for injunction and damages with prayer fortemporary restraining order against the Commissioner ofBureau of Customs, one of the respondents herein, to stop thelatter from allowing importations. One of the private

respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the groundthat Sec. 1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that theCommissioner of the Bureau of Customs has exclusive

jurisdiction to determine the legality of an importation and notthe regular courts. The motion to dismiss was denied. However,upon motion for reconsideration, the Court reconsidered its

order and dismissed the case on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to determine whether the importation is legal ornot.

Issue:


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Whether or not the determination of the legality theimportation falls under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner ofCustoms

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the enforcement of theimportation ban provided by Sec. 36 of the Revised ForestryCode is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CommissionerBureau of Customs. Allowing the regular courts to direct the

Commissioner to impound the imported matches is a clearinterference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau ofCustoms over seizure and forfeiture cases. Under the Doctrineof Primary Jurisdiction, the courts cannot determine acontroversy involving a question which is within the jurisdictionof an administrative agency where the question demands the

exercise of purely administrative discretion requiring the use ofspecial knowledge of such administrative agency.


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Antipolo Realty Corporation vs. National Housing Authority

Facts:

On the 18 th day of August 1970, Jose Hernando, through aContract to Sell, acquired Lot No.15, Block IV of the PonderosaHeights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal from the Antipolo RealtyCorporation, herein petitioner. Mr. Hernando transferred hisrights through a Deed of Assignment and Substitution ofObligor with the Consent of the Antipolo Realty Corporation to

Virgilio Yuson, herein private respondent. The privaterespondent assumed the performance of all obligations underthe original contract. However, for failure of petitioner todevelop the subdivision project pursuant to Clause 17 of thecontract, the private responded stopped all monthlyinstallment payments. Such Clause provides that failure by the

seller shall permit the buyer to suspend monthly installmentsuntil such time that improvement have been completed.

On the 14 th day of October 1976, the President of Antipolorealty corporation sent a notice to private respondent statingthat the improvements required according to Clause 17 hadalready been completed. The notice also requested resumptionof payment of the monthly installments. The privaterespondent replied that he would pay as soon as he was able toverify the truth about it. A second letter was sent repeating therequest of resumption of payment citing the decision renderedby the National Housing Authority in Case No. 252 declaringthat petitioner had substantially complied with its commitment

to the lot buyers in accordance to the Contract to Sell. Theprivate respondent refused to pay the monthly installments forSeptember 1972-October 1976 but agreed to pay postinstallments. The petitioner responded by rescinding thecontract. The private respondent brought the dispute before


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the National Housing Authority, herein public respondentthrough a complaint. The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismisswhich was denied. The public respondent rendered a decision

ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell. Thepetitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the groundthat the jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint is withthe regular courts and not the public respondent since itinvolves interpretation of the Contract to Sell which wasdenied. The petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to the

Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the National Housing Authority committedgrave abuse of discretion or acted in excess of its jurisdictionwhen it ordered the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell.

Held:

Administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatorypowers and functions to a limited extent. Quasi judicialauthority had been delegated to administrative agenciesbecause of the need for special competence and experience.

The extent to which an administrative body may exercise suchpowers depend on the provisions of the statute granting thepower to such agency. In the case at bar, the National HousingAuthority has been granted with quasi judicial authority byPresidential Decree No. 957 which provides that it shall haveexclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade andbusiness. The Supreme Court held that the public respondentdid not commit any grave abuse of discretion or act in excess ofits jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of theContract to Sel.


9/42

Industrial Enterprises Inc vs. CA

Facts:

The industrial enterprises inc., herein petitioner, wasgranted a coal operating contract by the Government for theexploration of two blocks of coal in Eastern Samar through theBureau of Energy Development. Thereafter, the petitioner alsoapplied with the then Ministry of Energy for another coaloperating contract for the exploration of three additional coal

blocks. Subsequently, the petitioner was later on advised thatin line with the objective of making the countrys coal supplydemand balance, the coal operator in the areas should be theMarinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation which wasalready developing the coal deposit in another area. Hence,theIndustrial Enterprises Inc and the Marinduque Mining and

Industrial Corporation executed a Memorandum of Agreementwhereby all the rights and interests in the two coal blocks ofthe petitioner was assigned and transferred to MMIC.However, the petitioner filed an action for rescission of theMemorandum of Agreement with damages against MMIC andMinister of Energy before the Regional Trial Court of Makati on

the ground that the MMIC took possession of the subject coalblocks even before the Memorandum of Agreement wasapproved. The petitioner also prayed that the Minister ofEnergy be ordered to approve the return of the coal operatingcontract to the petitioner. The trial court rendered its decisionordering the recission of such Memorandum and the reversion

of two coal blocks to the petitioner. However, the Court ofAppeals reversed the tria l courts decision and held that thetrial court had no jurisdiction over the action since the BED hasthe power to decide controversies relating to exploration and


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development of coal blocks as provided by Presidential DecreeNo. 1206.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to hear anddecide the suit for rescission of the Memorandum ofAgreement

Held:The BED has the power to decide controversies relative to theexploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks. Thedoctrine of primary jurisdiction applies in this case since thequestion of what coal areas should be exploited and developedand which entity should be granted coal operating contracts

involves a technical determination by the BED as theadministrative agency in possession of the specialized expertiserelative to the exploration, exploitation, development andextraction of mineral resources. These issues preclude an initial

judicial determination. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take

cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matterinvolved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is suchthat its determination requires the expertise, specialized skillsand knowledge of the proper administrative bodies becausetechnical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved,then relief must first be obtained in an administrative

proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts eventhough the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.


11/42

Miriam College Foundation Inc. vs CA

Facts:

The members of the Miriam College Communityallegedly describes the contents of the September-October1994 issue of Miriam Colleges School Paper and Magazine asobscene, indecent, and sexually explicit. After the publicationof the schools paper and magazine, the members of theeditorial Board received a letter signed by the Chair of the

Miriam College Discipline Committee. It provides that thestudents committed major and minor offenses in the studenthandbook. The students were required to submit their answer.However, they requested the chair to transfer the case to theRegional Office of the DECS which, under Rule XII Order No. 94,had jurisdiction over the case. On the 21 st day of November

1994, the Chair, again, requested the students to file theiranswers. The lawyer for the students submitted a letter to theDiscipline Committee reiterating that it had no jurisdiction overthem. Subsequently, the Discipline Committee continued itsinvestigation without the other party. After such investigation,the Discipline Committee imposed disciplinary sanctions upon

the students involved. The students filed a petition forprohibition and certiorari with preliminary restraining orderbefore the regional trial court of Quezon City questioning the

jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of Miriam College overthem. The court ruled that there is nothing in the DECS OrderNo. 94 that excludes school administrators from exercising

jurisdiction over cases like the present case. The said ordernever mentioned that it has exclusive jurisdiction over casesfalling under RA 7079. The court granted the writ of preliminaryInjunction. Both parties moved for reconsideration.Subsequently, the court dismissed the petition ruling that since


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both parties do not want the court to assume jurisdiction, thecase is dismissed without prejudice to the parties going toanother forum. The Court referred the case to the Court of

Appeals. On the 26 th day of September, the court of appeals,herein respondent, granted the students petition. MiriamCollege filed a petition with the supreme court.

Issue:

Whether or not Miriam College has the jurisdiction over the

complaints against the students.

Held:

YES,Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act should be read in amanner as not to infringe upon the school's right to disciplineits students. At the same time, however, we should not

construe said provision as to unduly restrict the right of thestudents to free speech. Consistent with jurisprudence, we readSection 7 of the Campus Journalism Act to mean that the schoolcannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of thearticles he or she has written, except when such articlesmaterially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or

invasion of the rights of others The power of the school toinvestigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is anecessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulationsand the maintenance of a safe and orderly educationalenvironment conducive to learning. That power, like the powerto suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academicfreedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by theConstitution.SC rule that Miriam College has the authority tohear and decide the cases filed against students.


13/42

PAAT vs. CA

Facts:

On the 19 th day of May 1989, the truck of Victoria deGuzman, herein private respondent, was seized by a personnelof the Department of Environment and Natural resourcesbecause the driver of the said truck could not produce thenecessary documents for the forest products found in the truck.Jovito Layugan, a Community Environment and Natural

Resources Officer and one of the petitioners herein issued anorder of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner fifteen 15days to submit an explanation why the truck should not beforfeited. However, the owner failed to submit the requiredexplanation. Rogelio Bagayan, the Regional Executive Directorof Department of environment and natural resources and one

of the petitioners herein, ordered the forfeiture of truckpursuant to Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705.Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration of theOrder, however, it was denied. Subsequently, the case wasbrought to the Secretary of Department of environment andNatural Resources by the petitioners. Meanwhile, the private

respondents filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Courtagainst the petitioner. The court issued a writ ordering thereturn of the truck forfeited. The petitioners filed a motion todismiss on the ground that the private respondents failed toexhaust all administrative remedies which was however denied.A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was also denied.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court ofAppeals which however, sustained the trial courts decision.The petitioners filed a petition with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Held:


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The Supreme Court held that a party is allowed toseek court intervention on the condition that all administrativeremedies should have been exhausted first. If a remedy within

the administrative agency can still be resorted to by giving theadministrative officer concerned the opportunity to decide amatter within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must beresorted first before resorting to the courts. However, thisprinciple is subject to certain exceptions. In the case at bar, thecontroversy was still pending before the Secretary of

Department of Environment and Natural Resources when theprivate respondents resorted to the court. This is a clearviolation of the principle of exhaustion of administrativeremedies. Furthermore, the enforcement of forestry laws fallwithin the responsibilities of the Department of.. It must begiven the opportunity to decide a controversy within its

jurisdiction.


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Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp vs. Factoran

Facts:

On the 9 th day of February 1972, the AtlasConsolidated Mining and Development Corporation registeredthe location of its mining claim with the Mining recorder ofToledo City. On the 10 th day of September 1973, AsterioBuqueron, herein private respondent, registered the location ofhis mining claims with the same Mining Recorder. Atlas

registered the declarations of locations of its other miningclaims to the same Mining recorder.

Buquerons claims were surveyed and the surveysthereof were duly approved by the Director of Mines and GeoSciences. Such notice of Buquerons lease application waspublished. During the said publication, herein petitioner filed aclaim against Buquerins mining claims on the ground that theyoverlapped its own mining claims. On the 17 th day of April 1978,the Director of Mines decided that Buqueron is given thepreferential rights to possess and operate the areas coveredby his mining claims except the area covered which is in conflictwith the claims of petitioner. The petitioner appealed to theMinister of Natural Resources who decided on the 10 th day ofNovember 1978, that the mining claims of Buqueron are nulland void while the mining claims of Atlas Consolidated MiningDevelopment Corporation are valid. On further appeal, theDeputy Executive Secretary and the Office of the Presidentreversed the decision of the Minister and reinstated decision of

the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences.

Issue:

Whether or not the private respondents appeal to the Office o fthe President was time barred


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Held:

Under Presidential Decree No. 463, the decision ofthe Minister is appealable to the Office of the President withinfive (5) days from receipt thereof. In the case at bar, the privaterespondent received the copy of the decision of the Minister ofNatural Resources on the 27 th day of November 1978. Itappears that the 5-day period expired on the 2 nd day ofDecember 1978, a Saturday. The private respondent filed hisappeal on the 4 th day of December 1978, a Monday. ThePetitioner contends that the appeal was filed out of time,hence, when it was filed before the Office of the President, itshould have been dismissed. However, at the time of filing ofthe appeal in question, Saturday, was observed as a legalholiday. Section 31 of the Administrative Code provides thatwhere the last day for doing any act required by law falls on aholiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding businessday, In the case at bar, Monday was the next succeedingbusiness day, thus, the appeal was filed on time.


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Ang Tibay vs. CIR

Facts:

Ang Tibay, a manufacturer of rubber slippers, is acompany owned and controlled by Toribio Teodoro. Thecompany has two major labor unions namely, the NationalLabor Union Inc., which is dominated mostly of laborers of AngTibay and the National Workers Brotherhood, which isallegedly dominated by Toribio Teodoro. Ang Tibay had a

contract with the Philippine Army secured by a bond. Thecontract was breached by Ang Tibay because of an allegeddelay of supply of leather soles from the United States. Sincethere was shortage of leather shoes, Teodoro felt that it wasnecessary to temporarily dismiss some employees, particularly,the members of the National Labor Union Inc. However,

according to the National Labor Union, it was merely a schememade by the owner, Teodoro Toribio, to systematicallyterminate the employees from work because the allegedshortage of soles is unsupported. This resulted to a casebetween ANg Tibay and the aggrieved labor union, wherein AngTibay won. A motion for reconsideration was filed with the

Court of Industrial Relations by the National Labor Union on thegrounds that 1). Teodo ros claim of shortage of leather soles isentirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau ofCustoms and Book of accounts of native dealers; 2). Thesupposed lack of leather materials was just a scheme toprevent the forfeiture of the bond despite breach of contract

with the Philippine Army; 3) The National Worker sBrotherhood of Ang Tibay is an employer union dominated byTeodoro therefore, its existence is illegal; 4). The employerTeodoro was guilty of Unfair Labor Practices for discriminatingagainst the members of the National Labor Union Inc, and


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unjustly favoring the members of the National WorkersBrotherhood.

Issue: Whether or not there is violation of procedural dueprocess of law.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Court of IndustrialRelations cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental andessential requirements of due process in trial and investigationsof an administrative character which are 1). The right tohearing, which includes the right of the party interested oraffected to present his own case and submit evidence insupport thereof; 2). Tribunal must condsider the evidencepresented; 3). The decision must have something to supportitself; 4). The Evidence must be substantial; 5). The decisionmust be rendered on th evidence presented at the hearing; 6).The court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges must act onits own or his independent judgment; 7). The Court of IndustrialRelations should render its decision in such a manner that theparties to the proceeding can know the various issues involvedand the reasons for the decisions rendered.


19/42

Macailing vs. Andrada

Facts:

A dispute arose between plaintiffs and the defendantheirs of Salvador Andrada over four (4) parcels of land locatedin Lobak, Cotabato, because the plaintiffs were settling andoccupying four hectares of each parcel of land. The DistrictLand Officer of Cotabato decided in favor of the plaintiffs andexcluded the four parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs.

However, the Director of Lands reversed the decision of theDistrict Land Officer and declared that the portion of land shallbe restored to the heirs of Salvador Andrada, hereindefendants.

An appeal was made by the plaintiffs with theSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and on the 27 th day of October 1956, the decision of the Director of Lands wasreversed and the lands claimed were awarded to the plaintiffs.The defendants moved for reconsideration, however, it wasdenied on the 30 th day of May 1957. The defendants, again,filed a second motion for reconsideration but on the 14 th day ofOctober 1957, they received a copy that the Secretary ofAgriculture and Natural Resources rejected it on and ruled thathis judgment on the case had long become final and executorytherefore, he had no more jurisdictions to entertain the secondmotion. Subsequently, the defendants appealed to the Office ofthe President. On the 20 th day of August 1959, the AssistantExecutive Secretary Enrique Quema, by authority of the

President, reversed the decision of the Secretary of Agricultureand Natural Resources and declared that the lands involvedshould be restored to the hairs of Andrada. The plaintiffs filed acase in the Cotabato Court on the 23 rd day of December 1959raising the issue of finality of the decision of the Secretary. The


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court declared the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture andNatural Resources as valid, final and executory. The defendantsappealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the Secretary ofAgriculture and Natural Resources is final and executory

Held:

Yes, the decision of the Secretary is final andexecutory. It is provided in Section 12 of Administrative OrderNo. 6 tat decisions of the Secretary of Agriculture and Naturalresources shall of an appealed case shall become final after thelapse of thirty 30 days from the date of its receipt by theinterested parties. Section 13 of the same Administrative Order

provides that after a decision of the Secretary has become final,no motion or petition for reconsideration of such decision shallbe entertained by the Secretary. In the case at bar, defendantsdid not comment on the plaintiffs issue that there motion forreconsideration lapsed the reglementary period of thirty 30days. They merely contended that their appeal to the Office of

the President was made 9 days after receiving the ruling of theSecretary. The Supreme Court held that the decision of theAssistant Executive Secretary by the authority of the Presidentreversing the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture andNatural Resources in this case is null and void and of no forceand effect.


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Quintos Jr. vs. National Stud Farm

Facts:

Eduardo Quintos Jr., the plaintiff herein, was theowner or a race horse named Kings Toss. On the 17 th day ofFebruary 1970, he duly and officially registered the horse withthe National Stud Farm, herein respondent. The defendantissued Certificate of Registration No. 002426 for the said horsewhich acknowledged it to participate in horse races and

sweepstakes draws held in legally authorized racing tracks. Onthe 15 th day of March 1970, the race horse Kings Toss, byvirtue of the official registration started participating in horseraces. On the 13 th day of June 1972, the plaintiff submitted thename of his race horse Kings Toss to the Philippine RacingClub, Inc. and applied for the races programmed for June 17 or

18, 1972. Kings Toss was declared eligible to participate andtake part in the actual race and such application was acceptedand was approved by the Philippine Racing Club, Inc. On the17 th day of June , the day when plaintiffs horse, Kings Tosswas scheduled to participate at the race tracks, anannouncement was made through the public address system

that Kings Toss had been excluded from taking part in therace where it was supposed to run that day. The plaintiffalleged that said withdrawal of the certificate of registration ofthe plaintiffs horse was oppressive and was done without dueprocess because of the absence of a formal investigation andinquiry. On the 9 th day of October 1972, the lower court

dismissed herein plaintiffs complaint on the ground of violationof the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thelower court ruled that the complaint was filed prematurely. Theplaintiff should have asked the Board of Trustees of NationalStud Farm to reconsider its resolution and in case suchreconsideration is denied, an appeal to the Games and


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Amusements Board or to the Office of the Philippines may bedone.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissingappellant s complaint for failure to exhaust administrativeremedies

Held:

No. Quintos instant complaint was prematurelyinstituted. The failure to apply the basic concept of exhaustionof administrative remedies is what further lends support to theorder of dismissal. The question could have been resolved in amanner satisfactory to the parties if the Board of Trustees ofNational Stud Farm and subsequently, the Games and

Amusements Board, which certainly had the necessaryqualifications to view its manifold aspects, were appealed to, oran appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines incase reconsideration is denied.


23/42

Gordon vs. Veridiano

Facts:

On the 21 st day of March 1980, a team composed ofagents from the Food and Drug Administration and narcoticagents from the Philippine Constabulary conducted a test buyat San Sebastian Drug Store where they were sold 200 tabletsof Valium without a doctors prescription. A report of the saidoperation was submitted to Hon. Richard Gordon, then Mayor

of Olongapo City and the petitioner herein. On the 17th

day ofApril 1980, he issued a letter for the revocation of MayorsPermit No. 1954 for violation of Republic Act 6425, also knownas the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Subsequently, the vicemayor of the city ordered the posting of a sign board at the SanSebastian Drug Store announcing its permanent closure.

Meanwhile, the Administrator of the Food and DrugAdministration, after the fearing about the case, directed theclosure of the drug store for three (3) days and the payment ofa fine of P100 for the violation of Republic Act No. 3720. Threedays later, the order of closure was lifted and the drug storewas allowed to resume operations. Rosalinda Yambao, the

owner of the drug store and herein private respondent, wrote aletter to the Mayor, seeking for reconsideration of therevocation of Permit No. 1954 which merit no reply. Thereafter,she filed a complaint against the Mayor and Vice Mayor withthe Regional Trial Court. The petitioner wrote to the Food andDrug Administration requesting reconsideration of its order

allowing the resumption of operations of the drug store whichwas denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration which wasalso denied and the revocation of Mayors Permit was declare dnull and void.

Issue:


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Whether the Food and Drug Administration or theMayor of Olongapo City has the power to grant and revoke thelicense for operation of the drug store.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the authorization tooperate issued by the Food and Drug Administration is acondition precedent to the grant of a Mayors Permit tooperate to the drug store. Therefore, if the FDA grants license

upon its finding that the applicant drug store has complied withthe requirements of the general laws and the implementingadministrative rules and regulations, it is only for their violationthat the FDA may revoke the said license. At the same time,having granted the permit upon his ascertainment that theconditions thereof as applied particularly to Olongapo City have

been complied with, it is only for the violation of suchconditions that the mayor may revoke the said permit. Factualfindings of administrative authorities are accorded greatrespect because of their acknowledged expertise in the fields ofspecialization to which they are assigned. The petitioner cannotclaim he has superior knowledge than the FDA in the

enforcement of the pharmacy and drug addiction laws.


25/42

San Miguel Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor

Facts:

Gregorio Yanglay Jr. was an operator in the crowncork department of the Metal Closure and Lithography Plant ofthe San Miguel Corporation. He was dismissed by the plantmanager therein. On the 22 nd day of April, after leaving theplant, Yanglay was apprehended by a Patrolman of the ManilaPolice Department outside the company compound whilecarrying a bagful of drugs worth P267. The bag of drugs wasturned over to the nurse in charge of the companys clinic. Inhis written statement, Yanglay admitted that he was caught inpossession of the said drugs which he had bought from his co-workers and which had been given to him free of charge. At theinvestigation, Yanglay denied that he was trafficking, illegally,the drugs of the company. He said that he bought the drugsfrom his co-workers and contended that he had not violatedany rule of the company. After the investigation, he wasdismissed. At the meeting of the management and the union,the union representative contended that there was nocompany rule against trafficking drugs, which were no longerowned by the company after having been issued to theworkers. The management said that Yanglays didmissal wasnot due to union activities but due to the fact that the sale ofdrugs was a subversion of the companys efforts to give medicalbenefits to its workers. Yanglay filed a complaint with the NLRC

alleging that his dismissal was not justified and that he wasdismissed because of union activities. The mediator fact finderrecommended yanglays reinstatement with back wages whichthe NLRC applied. The petitioner moved for reconsideration ofthe decision on the ground that the mediators fact findin g


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report was not passed upon an arbitrator pursuant to theNLRCs Rules. The Secretary of Labor denied it. The companyinstituted a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to reviewthe decisions of the NLRC and the Secretary of Labor under theprinciple of Separation of Powers

2. Whether or not the San Miguel Corporation was denied dueprocess because the NLRC did not strictly conform to theprocedure for arbitration

Held:

1. Yes, it is understood that as to administrative agenciesexercising quasi judicial powers, there is an underlying

power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencieson questions of law and jurisdiction. The purpose of

judicial review is to keep the administrative agency withinits jurisdiction. It is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction,grave abuse o discretion, error of law, fraud and collusion.It is part of the system of check and balances.

2. The petitioner contends that the NLRC gravely abused itsdiscretion and denied them due process of law when itdecided the case without giving the employer a chance tosubmit the case for arbitration pursuant to Section 14 ofthe NLRCs Rules and Regulatio ns. The Supreme Court held

that company was given the chance to be heard. If thecase will be referred to an arbitrator, it would only causeundue delay to its final disposition. Also, Yanglaysdismissal was a severe punishment and that he should be


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reinstated but without back wages because the companyacted in good faith in dismissing him.


28/42

Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Aznar

Facts:

On the 28 th day of November 1952, the Collector ofInternal Revenue demanded the payment of P732,032.66 fromMatias H. Aznar, herein defendant. The payment was for thelatters alleged income tax deficiencies for the years 1945 to1951. The Collector of Internal Revenue also instructed the CityTreasurer of Cebu to place the properties of the defendant

under constructive distraint to guarantee the payment of taxesassessed. This instruction was complied with by the CityTreasurer by virtue of a warrant of distraint and levy and issuingit to the defendant. An exchange of communications betweenthe Internal Revenue Office and the taxpayer took place and asresult of which, a reinvestigation of the income tax assessment

was made and it was reduced to P380,999.70. When thedefendant received the corrected assessment, he filed apetition with the Court of Tax Appeals to review it and filed anurgent petition was also filed to restrain the Collector ofInternal Revenue from proceeding with the collection of thealleged tax deficiencies by means of the summary methods of

distraint and levy on the ground that the right of the Collectorhad already prescribed and the employment of these meanswould cause injustice and injury. The lower court issued theinjunction for enjoining the means of summary methods ofdistraint and levy after finding that the warrant issued by theCity Treasurer was not actually served on the petitioner and

that the placing of the properties of the taxpayer underdistraint and levy was made beyond the prescriptive period ofthree years as provided by the National Internal Revenue Code.Thereafter, the Collector of Internal Revenue filed a petition toreview by certiorari alleging that the collection of taxes cannotbe restrained by injunction and that even if the court could


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have lawfully issued the same, it acted with grave abuse ofdiscretion when it did not require the payment of the taxpayerof his taxes.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals erred in issuingthe injunction restraining said official from employing the same

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the requirement of issuing abond before a writ of injunction could be issued by the TaxCourt applies only to cases where the means sought to beemployed are legal and not where it is declared null and void.The Collector of Internal Revenue placed the properties of thetaxpayer under distraint and levy to secure payment of alleged

tax deficiencies, and as with respect to the taxes demanded,the warrant was issued beyond the 3year period of limitationsas prescribed by the Tax Code. Following the ruling adopted bythis Court as regards with the issuance by the Tax Courts ofwrits of injunction, the respondent court did not err inenjoining the Collector from using summary administrative

methods without requiring posting of bond to make a deposit.


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Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board

Facts:

On the 26 th day of February 1952, proceedings wereinstituted before the Deportation Board, the defendant herein,against Federico Chua Hiong, herein petitioner. Allegedly, thepetitioner secured the cancellation of his alien certificate ofregistration with the Bureau if Immigration through fraud andmisrepresentation and to have exercised illegally, the privileges

and rights belonging only to citizens of the Philippines. OnFebruary 1952, a warrant of arrest was issued upon institutionof proceedings. The petitioner filed a petition for the dismissalof such proceedings on the grounds that the jurisdiction todeport aliens exists only with regard to aliens and that hisFilipino citizenship has already been declared by the Secretary

of Labor, by the authority of the President which is binding onthe other executive branches including the Deportation Board.Such motion was denied by the defendant on the grounds thatmere plea of citizenship does not deprive it the power overdeportation proceedings and that it is not barred fromdetermining the claim of respondents citizenship

notwithstanding previous findings of other executive officials.Also according to the Board of Deportation, it may only beprohibited from continuing the proceeding if it is convincedthat the evidence submitted by the respondent shows that heis a Filipino Citizen. The petitioners claim had the followinglegal foundations. 1). only an alien is subject to deportation or

repatriation and that when a resident denies that he is an alienand claims to be a citizen of the Philippines, he challenges a

jurisdictional fact; 2) that the evidence which he submitted tothe Deportation Board to prove his Filipino Citizenship issubstantial because as matter of fact, officials of executivedepartment recognized his citizenship.


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Issue:

Whether or not the evidence submitted by petitioner asregards to his Filipino citizenship is substantial

Held:

The contention of the petitioner appears to be justified bythe documents attached to the record such as the letter of theVice Minister of Foreign Affairs, the letter of the Secretary ofLabor and the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.However, these documents contradicted the findings of theBureau of Immigration. The Secretary of Justice also found thecitizenship of the petitioner not proved satisfactorily. There isno question that the power to deport is limited only to aliensand the alienage of the petitioner is the basic fact upon whichthe jurisdiction of the Deportation Board rests. The SupremeCourt held that the evidence of which petitioner and the Statemay avail is of substantial nature as to afford belief that only animpartial judicial investigation can evaluate it with fairness tothe petitioner and with justice to all concerned.


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Jaime Hernandez vs. Albano

Facts:

A complaint was filed by Delfin Albano, therespondent herein, with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manilaagainst Jaime Hernandez, herein petitioner and then Secretaryof Finance and Presiding Officer of the Monetary Board of theCentral Bank. The complaint was about the allegedshareholdings of the petitioner in different corporations. At the

joint investigation of the charges before the investigating fiscal,the complainant, Delfin Albano and the respondent herein,moved to exclude the alleged violation of Article 216 of theRevised Penal Code because during that time, the applicabilityof this statue was in question. The petitioner sought dismissalof the remaining charges on the grounds that a). the violation

of Article VII, Section 11, subsection 2 of the Constitution,should be prosecuted at the domicile of the private enterprisesaffected thereby; and b). that the violation of Section 13 ofRepublic Act 265 is not criminal in nature. The dismissal wasdenied. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,however, it was also denied. Thus, to restrain the respondent

Fiscals from continuing the investigation, herein petitionerwent to the Court of First Instance of Manila and filed a petitionfor certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminaryinjunction. On the 13 th day of October 1961, the decisionreached upon a stipulation of facts and dismissed the petition.Hence, the petitioner appealed.

Issue:

W/n the prosecuting arm of the City of Manila shouldbe restrained from proceeding with the investigation of thecharges against petitioner


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Held:

Ordinarily criminal prosecution may not be blockedby a court prohibition or injunction. Extreme cases may existwhere relief in equity may be availed of to stop a purportedenforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for theorderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of thestrong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner;(c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequateprotection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases,because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional, or was heldinvalid.


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Azajar vs. Bureau of Lands

Facts:

The plaintiff, Maria De Azajar filed a complaint in theCourt of First Instance of Albay seeking a declaratory judgmentor relief pleading that she applied for the purchase of a parcelof land belonging to the public domain located in the Provinceof Albay and that an opposition to such application was filed byFrancisco Ardales, one of the respondents herein. The

respondent contended that the applicant cannot be entitled toacquire said lands being a Chinese Citizen. Such opposition,according to the plaintiff, raises uncertainty and insecurity toher citizenship which is prejudicial to her. She contended thatunless such question of citizenship be judicially determined, theBureau of Lands should not deny her application. Moreover,

she contended that her father is a Filipino Citizen. Thepetitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be rendereddeclaring her to be a Filipino Citizen and as such, entitled her toacquire lands of the public domain and that she possessed allthe rights and privileges accorded to the Filipino Citizens. Afterhearing, the court rendered a decision stating that the plaintiff

is a Chinese Citizen and being such, she is not entitled toacquire lands of the public domain. The petitioner moved forreconsideration but it was denied. The appeal was forwarded tothe Court of Appeals. While it was pending, the First AssistantSolicitor General filed a motion praying that the appeal bedismissed on the grounds that an action for declaratory relief is

not the proper proceedings for the purpose of securing a judicial declaration of Filipino Citizenship and that the actionbrought by the plaintiff was not the proper remedy because thetrial court had no authority or jurisdiction to decide on themerits but to dismiss it. The appellant objected to this motionand moved that the appeal be forwarded to the Supreme Court


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because it involves pre questions of law. However, the FirstAssistant Solicitor General objected and appealed for the caseto be dismissed on the ground that the case involved not only

questions of law but also questions of fact being such the courtlacked jurisdiction to hear and render judgment therein.

Issue:

Whether or not the plaintiffs citizenship can be determined ina complaint for declaratory judgment or relief.

Held:

From a decision of the Director of Lands, an appeal lies to theSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Until all theadministrative remedies had been exhausted, no court maycompel the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture to

decide any sales application as such is exclusively vested uponthem. The Supreme Court held that the appellants citizenshipcannot be determined in the complaint for declaratory

judgment/relief as such is not proper remedy for determinationof citizenship. The appellant may resort to the courts if theexercise of her rights as citizens be prevented or denied.

However, such was not the action brought in the case at barand the lower court should have dismissed it.


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The Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Reyes

Facts:

On the 13 th day of October 1954, the Collector ofInternal Revenue, herein petitioner, demanded the payment ofalleged deficiencies of income taxes, surcharges, interests andpenalties from Aurelio P. Reyes, one of the respondents herein,through a letter. Together with the letter, the respondent alsoreceived a warrant of distraint and levy on his properties in

case he should fail to pay the alleged deficiency. Therespondent filed a petition for review of the collectorsassessment with the Court of Tax Appeals. The petitioner alsofiled an urgent petition to restrain the Collector of Internalrevenue from executing the warrant of distraint and levy on hisproperties on the grounds that the right of the respondent to

collect the alleged deficiencies by summary proceedings hadalready prescribed as provided by Section 51 of the NationalInternal Revenue Code, that a distraint and levy on hisproperties would cause him irreparable damage and injury andthat the requisite of Section 11 of RA No. 1125 for the filing of abond before a writ of distraint may be suspended was not

applicable in this case. The Collector of Internal Revenueopposed said petition on the grounds that the Court of TaxAppeals had no authority to restrain him from executing thewarrant of distraint and levy and that Section 51 does notpreclude distraint and levy. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled infavor of the petitioner and ordered the Collector of Internal

Revenue to desist from collecting the taxes allegedly due byadministrative method.

Issue:

1. Whether the Court of Tax Appeals could restrain theCollector of Internal Revenue from enforcing collection of


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income tax deficiency by summary proceedings after theexpiration of the three-year period provided for in section51 (d) of the National Internal Revenue Code

2. Whether the Court of Tax Appeals had any power to grantan injunction without requiring the filing of a bond ormaking a deposit as prescribed by section 11 of RepublicAct No. 1125.

Held:

1. The court construed the provision of Section 51 of theNational Internal Revenue Code that the three yearprescriptive period constituted a limitation to the right ofthe Government to enforce the collection of income taxesby the summary proceedings of distraint and levy though it

could proceed to recover the taxes due by the institutionof the corresponding civil action.

2. Sec 305 of the NIRC provides that no court shall haveauthority to grant an injunction to restrain the collectionof any internal revenue tax, fee, or charge. But there maybe instances when the Collector of Internal Revenue could

be restrained from proceeding with the collection, levy,distraint and/or sale of any property of the taxpayer. Therequirement of the bond as a condition precedent to theissuance of the writ of injunction applies only in caseswhere the processes by which the collection sought to bemade by means thereof are carried out in consonance

with the law for such cases provided and not when saidprocesses are obviously in violation of the law to theextreme that they have to be SUSPENDED for jeopardizingthe interest of the taxpayer.


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Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:

A complaint was filed with the City Fiscal of QuezonCity charging Thomas Tan of qualified theft. Lauro G. bnmm ,herein petitioner and Assistant City Fiscal then, was assignedfor the investigation of the aforementioned case. During theinvestigation, the petitioner allegedly demanded P4,000 fromThomas Tan in return for dismissing the case. Tan reported the

incident and the demand to the National Bureau ofInvestigation which set up an entrapment. The entrapmentsucceeded and an information was filed with theSandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 7393 which providesaccusation to Lauro G. Soriano for violation of Section 3 ofRepublic Act 3019 also known as the Anti Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act in taking advantage of his position with graveabuse of authority by his demand and request from ThomasTan of an amount of P4,000 in consideration for a favorableresolution of dismissing the the Qualified Theft Case. After thetrial in Sandiganbayan, the petitioner was found to be guilty ofSection3 of Republic Act No. 3019 beyond reasonable doubt

and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from six years andone month to nine years and one day; to suffer disqualificationfrom public office; and to suffer loss of retirement benefits; andto pay costs. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,however, it was denied by the Sandiganbayan. This resulted tothe filing by the petitioner an instant petition in the Supreme

Court.Issue:

Whether or not the preliminary investigation of acriminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a contract ortransaction so as to bring it within the ambit of RA No. 3019


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Held:

The investigation conducted by the petitioner was nota contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term mustbe construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. Atransaction, like a contract, is one which involves someconsideration as in credit transactions and this element isabsent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner. TheSupreme Court agreed that the Sandiganbayan committed anerror for convicting him for violation of Section 3 of RepublicAct No. 3019. The Supreme Court modified the judgment of theSandiganbayan in deciding that the petitioner is guilty ofbribery.


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Ignacio vs. CA

Facts:

In 1953, Anterio Ignacio, herein petitioner filed aprotest with the Bureau of Lands representing the heirs ofFernandez Uguiz. His protest alleged that the homesteadapplication of Mariano Bautista and the sales of application ofAnazaria Bautista overlapped portions B and C of thehomestead of Uguiz. After investigation of the case, the

Regional Land Officer for Davao decided in favor of Bautista,excluding Portions B and C from the homestead of Uguiz. TheDirector of Lands affirmed sunch decision. The petitionerappealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resourceswhich modified the previous decision in deciding that Portion Bmust be excluded from the homestead application of Bautista.

Both parties moved for reconsideration of the decision of theSecretary but he awarded Portion C to them and denied themotion for reconsideration of Bautista for being filed out oftime. Bautista moved for reconsideration and the Secretaryrendered its third decision stating the Portion C should beretained as part of sales application of Bautista while Portion B

shall be part of homestead of Uguiz because the first decisionpertaining to Portion B already became final and executory. Theheirs of Bautista appealed to the Office of the President whichmodified the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture byincluding both Portions B and C in the homestead application ofUguiz. Bautista moved for reconsideration but it was denied.

Subsequently, Bautista filed a petition for certiorari with theCourt of First Instance on the ground that the ExecutiveSecretary decided abuse of discretion and in excess of

jurisdiction. The court dismissed the petition and assailed thatthe petition is defective as it does not allege any specific errorcommitted by the Executive Secretary nor does it contain any


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allegation of facts which constituted the alleged grave abuse ofdiscretion. The court further stated that the alleged error ofgrave abuse of discretion is not annullable by certiorari. Upon

denial of Motion for Reconsideration, an appeal was made tothe Court of Appeals. The Exective Secretary alleged that theissues involved questions of law hence; it should have beenfiled with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition for certiorari of Bautista issufficient in form and substance which is a pure question of lawand beyond the competence of the Court of Appeals

Held:

The Supreme Court agreed that only questions of law were

involved in the appeal. No evidence was presented before thetrial court. The only issue is the correctness of the legalconclusions made by the trial judge. It is well established that aquestion of law must not involve an examination of theprobative value of evidence presented by the litigants. There isa question of law when the doubt or difference of opinion

arises . in the case at bar, it is evident that the primary issuedhave become moot and academic. The Supreme Court ruledthat the court did not commit any error in dismissing thepetition. The petition failed to allege an error committed by theExecutive Secretary which would shoe grave abuse ofdiscretion. The alleged error of the respondent official is merelyan error of judgment which does not constitute grave abuse ofdiscretion, thus it is not annullable by certiorari. In the case atbar, the petitioner failed to state enough facts to constitute aprima facie cause of action against respondent Secretary.


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