cases - chapter 1-3

8/14/2019 Cases - Chapter 1-3

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G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998

TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, i !i" #$p$#it% $" Omb&'"m$( HON. )ES*S F. G*ERRERO, i !i" #$p$#it%$" Dep&t% Omb&'"m$ +or &-o( $' NESTOR . AG*STIN, respondents.

REGAADO, J.:

Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June 1, 1!! inO#$%&dm. Case 'o. (%!5%(411 )hich *ranted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondent from administrative char*es for interalia *rave misconduct committed by him as then &ssistant Re*ional +irector, Re*ion -%&, +epartment of Public or/s and 0i*h)ays +P02.

t appears from the statement and counter%statement of facts of the parties that petitioner 3eresita . abian )as the ma6or stoc/holder and president ofPRO#&3 Construction +evelopment Corporation PRO#&32 )hich )as en*a*ed in the construction business. Private respondent 'estor -. &*ustin )asthe incumbent +istrict 7n*ineer of the irst #etro #anila 7n*ineerin* +istrict #7+2 )hen he alle*edly committed the offenses for )hich he )asadministratively char*ed in the Office of the Ombudsman.

PRO#&3 participated in the biddin* for *overnment construction pro6ects includin* those under the #7+, and private respondent, reportedly ta/in*advanta*e of his official position, invei*led petitioner into an amorous relationship. 3heir affair lasted for some time, in the course of )hich privaterespondent *ifted PRO#&3 )ith public )or/s contracts and interceded for it in problems concernin* the same in his office.

8ater, misunderstandin*s and unpleasant incidents developed bet)een the parties and )hen petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, privaterespondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the e9tent of employin* acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. :he eventually filed theaforementioned administrative case a*ainst him in a letter%complaint dated July ;4, 1!!5.

3he said complaint sou*ht the dismissal of private respondent for violation of :ection 1!, Republic &ct 'o.


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:ec. 1. Rules of Procedure. @ 12 3he Office of the Ombudsman shall promul*ate its o)n rules of procedure for the effectivee9ercise or performance of its po)ers, functions, and duties.

999 999 999

:ec. ;=. ormal nvesti*ation. @ 12 &dministrative investi*ations by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance )ith itsrules of procedure and consistent )ith due process. . . . .

999 999 999

:ec. ;. 7ffectivity and inality of +ecisions. @ &ll previsionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective ande9ecutory.

& motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed )ithin five 52 days afterreceipt of )ritten notice and shall be entertained only on any of the follo)in* *roundsB

999 999 999

indin*s of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman )hen supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. &ny order, directive ordecision imposin* the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary shall be final andunappealable.

n all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the:upreme Court by filin* a petition for certiorari)ithin ten 1(2 days from receipt of the )ritten notice of the order, directive or decision

or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance )ith Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

3he above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of 6ustice may reuire.

Respondents conseuently contend that, on the fore*oin* constitutional and statutory authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules ofprocedure formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman *overnin* the conduct of proceedin*s before it, includin* those rules )ith respect to the availabilityor non%availability of appeal in administrative cases, such as :ection , Rule of &dministrative Order 'o. (.

Respondents also uestion the propriety of petitioner?s proposition that, althou*h she definitely prefaced her petition by cate*ori>in* the same as "anappeal by certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she ma/es the aforeuoted ambivalent statement )hich in effect as/s that, should the remedyunder Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be treated in the alternative as an ori*inal action for certiorariunder Rule


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3hen there is the consideration that :ection =(, &rticle - of the 1! Constitution provides that "n2o la) shall be passed increasin* the appellate6urisdiction of the :upreme Court asprovided in this Constitution )ithout its advice and consent," and that Republic &ct 'o. es this Court to revie), revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorarithe aforesaid final 6ud*ment or orders "as the la)or the Rules of Court may provide," said :ection ; does not increase this Court?s appellate 6urisdiction since, by providin* that the mode of appeal shallbe by petition for certiorariunder Rule 45, then )hat may be raised therein are only uestions of la) of )hich this Court already has 6urisdiction.

e are not impressed by this discourse. t overloo/s the fact that by 6urisprudential developments over the years, this Court has allo)ed appealsby certiorariunder Rule 45 in a substantial number of cases and instances even if uestions of fact are directly involved and have to be resolved by theappellate court. 18&lso, the very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate 6urisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be e9ercisedover "final 6ud*ments and orders of lo)er courts," that is, the courts composin* the inte*rated 6udicial system. t does not include the uasi%6udicial bodiesor a*encies, hence )henever the le*islature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the uasi%6udicial a*ency shall be revie)able by the :upremeCourt or the Court of &ppeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the la) creatin* that uasi%6udicial a*ency and, for that matter, any specialstatutory court. 'o such provision on appellate procedure is reuired for the re*ular courts of the inte*rated 6udicial system because they are )hat arereferred to and already provided for, in :ection 5, &rticle - of the Constitution.


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&propos to the fore*oin*, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revised Rules of Civil Procedure 19preclude appeals from uasi%6udiciala*encies to the :upreme Court via a petition for revie) on certiorariunder Rule 45. n the 1!! Rules of Civil Procedure, :ection 1 of Rule 45, on "&ppeaby Certiorarito the :upreme Court," e9plicitly statesB

:ec. 1. ilin of petition with $upreme Court. @ & person desirin* to appeal by certiorarifrom a 6ud*ment or final order or resolutionof the Court of 'ppeals, the $andianba%an, the Reional rial Court or other courts whenever authori!ed b% law, may file )ith the:upreme Court a verified petition for revie) on certiorari. 3he petition shall raise only uestions of la) )hich must be distinctly setforth. 7mphasis ours2.

3his differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1!


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:ubmitted )ith said position paper is an e9cerpt sho)in* that the :enate, in the deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the Office of theOmbudsman to this Court, )as a)are of the provisions of :ection =(, &rticle of the Constitution. t also reveals that :enator 7d*ardo &n*ara, as a co%author and the principal sponsor of :.$. 'o. 54= admitted that the said provision )ill e9pand this Court?s 6urisdiction, and that the Committee on Justiceand 0uman Ri*hts had not consulted this Court on the matter, thusB

'37RP788&3O' O :7'&3OR :0&0&'

999 999 999

3hereafter, )ith reference to :ection ;;42 )hich provides that the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the

:upreme Court, in reply to :enator :hahani?s uery )hether the :upreme Court )ould a*ree to such provision in the li*ht of :ection=(, &rticle - of the Constitution )hich reuires its advice and concurrence in la)s increasin* its appellate 6urisdiction, :enator

&n*ara informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the :upreme Court re*ardin* the matter. 0e a*reed that the provision )ille9pand the :upreme Court?s 6urisdiction by allo)in* appeals throu*h petitions for revie), addin* that they should be appealsoncertiorari. 27

3here is no sho)in* that even up to its enactment, Republic &ct 'o.


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G.R. No. 1/261 )$&$r% 19, 1999

EO E3HEGARA, petitioner, vs. SE3RETAR OF )*STI3E, ET AL., respondents.

5*NO, J.:

or resolution are public respondents? Dr*ent #otion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1!!( temporarily restrainin* thee9ecution of petitioner and :upplemental #otion to Dr*ent #otion for Reconsideration. t is the submission of public respondents thatB

1. 3he +ecision in this case havin* become final and e9ecutory, its e9ecution enters the e9clusive ambit of authority of the e9ecutiveauthority. 3he issuance of the 3RO may be construed as trenchin* on that sphere of e9ecutive authorityG

;. 3he issuance of the temporary restrainin* order . . . creates dan*erous precedent as there )ill never be an end to liti*ation becausethere is al)ays a possibility that Con*ress may repeal a la).

=. Con*ress had earlier deliberated e9tensively on the death penalty bill. 3o be certain, )hatever uestion may no) be raised on the+eath Penalty 8a) before the present Con*ress )ithin the ,et al., that they are a*ainst the repeal of the la)G

c. 3he fact that :enator Roco?s resolution to repeal the la) only bears his si*nature and that of :enator Pimentel.

n their :upplemental #otion to Dr*ent #otion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of 0ouse Resolution 'o. entitled "Resolution e9pressin* the sense of the 0ouse of Representative to re6ect any move to revie) Republic &ct 'o.


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and counsel. Respondents are hereby en6oined from enforcin* and implementin* Republic &ct 'o. 1 until theaforesaid :ections 1 and 1! of the Rules and Re*ulations to mplement Republic &ct 'o. 1 areappropriately amended, revised andEor corrected in accordance )ith this +ecision.

:O OR+7R7+.

and that the same has, on (ovember


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ri*hts. Rules of procedure of special courts and uasi%6udicial bodies shall remain effectiveunless disapproved by the :upreme Court.

3he rule ma/in* po)er of this Court )as e9panded. 3his Court for the first time )as *iven the po)er to promul*ate rules concernin* the protection andenforcement of constitutional ri*hts. 3he Court )as also *ranted for the first time the po)er to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and uasi%

6udicial bodies. $ut most importantly, the 1! Constitution too/ a)ay the po)er of Con*ress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concernin* pleadin*,practice and procedure. n fine, the po)er to promul*ate rules of pleadin*, practice and procedure is no lon*er shared by this Court )ith Con*ress, moreso )ith the 79ecutive. f the manifest intent of the 1! Constitution is to stren*then the independence of the 6udiciary, it is inutile to ur*e, as publicrespondents do, that this Court has no 6urisdiction to control the process of e9ecution of its decisions, a po)er conceded to it and )hich it has e9ercisedsince time immemorial.

3o be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the 6urisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the implementation of its decisionin the case at bar. &s aforestated, our +ecision became final and e9ecutory on 'ovember


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a )himper of protest from the public respondents and they are no) estopped from contendin* that this Court has lost its 6urisdiction to *rant said relief.3he 6urisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of liti*ants.

:econd. e li/e)ise re6ect the public respondents? contention that the "decision in this case havin* become final and e9ecutory, its e9ecution enters thee9clusive ambit of authority of the e9ecutive department . . .. $y *rantin* the 3RO, the 0onorable Court has in effect *ranted reprieve )hich is ane9ecutive function." 14Public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, :ection 1!, &rticle - of the Constitution )hich readsB

79cept in cases of impeachment, or as other)iseprovided in this Constitution, the President may *rant reprieves, commutations, and

pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final 6ud*ment. 0e shall also have the po)er to *rant amnesty )ith theconcurrence of a ma6ority of all the members of the Con*ress.

3he te9t and tone of this provision )ill not yield to the interpretation su**ested by the public respondents. 3he provision is simply the source of po)er ofthe President to *rant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final 6ud*ment. t also provides theauthority for the President to *rant amnesty )ith the concurrence of a ma6ority of all the members of the Con*ress. 3he provision, ho)ever, cannot beinterpreted as denyin* the po)er of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. n truth, an accused )ho has been convicted byfinal 6ud*ment still possesses collateral ri*hts and these ri*hts can be claimed in the appropriate courts. or instance, a death convict )ho become insaneafter his final conviction cannot be e9ecuted )hile in a state of insanity. 10&s observed by &ntieau, "today, it is *enerally assumed that due process of la))ill prevent the *overnment from e9ecutin* the death sentence upon a person )ho is insane at the time of e9ecution." 163he suspension of such a deathsentence is undisputably an e9ercise of 6udicial po)er. t is not a usurpation of the presidential po)er of reprieve thou*h its effects is the same @ thetemporary suspension of the e9ecution of the death convict. n the same vein, it cannot be denied that Con*ress can at any time amend R.&. 'o. in* capital punishmentG b.12 that :enator &uilino Pimentel?sresolution as/in* that clemency be *ranted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be revie)ed has been concurred by thirteen 1=2 other senatorsGb.;2 :enate President #arcelo ernan and :enator #iriam :. +efensor have publicly declared they )ould see/ a revie) of the death penalty la)G b.=2:enator Paul Roco has also sou*ht the repeal of capital punishment, and b.42 Con*ressman :alacrib $aterina, Jr., and thirty five =52 othercon*ressmen are demandin* revie) of the same la).

hen the -ery Dr*ent #otion )as filed, the Court )as already in its traditional recess and )ould only resume session on January 1, 1!!!. 7ven then,Chief Justice 0ilario +avide, Jr. called the Court to a :pecial :ession on January 4, 1!!1 17at 1(. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner?s -ery Dr*ent #otion.3he Court hardly had five 52 hours to resolve petitioner?s motion as he )as due to be e9ecuted at = p.m. 3hus, the Court had the difficult problem ofresolvin* )hether petitioner?s alle*ations about the moves in Con*ress to repeal or amend the +eath Penalty 8a) are mere speculations or not. 3o theCourt?s ma6ority, there )ere *ood reasons )hy the Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner?s alle*ations as mere speculations and surmises. 3heynoted that petitioner?s alle*ations )ere made in a pleadin* under oath and )ere )idely publici>ed in the print and broadcast media. t )as also of 6udicialnotice that the 11th Con*ress is a ne) Con*ress and has no less than one hundred thirty 1=(2 ne) members )hose vie)s on capital punishment are stilune9pressed. 3he present Con*ress is therefore different from the Con*ress that enacted the +eath Penalty 8a) R.&. 'o.


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reimposition of death penalty, notifyin* the :enate, the Judiciary and the 79ecutive +epartment of the position of the 0ouse of Representative on thismatter and ur*in* the President to e9haust all means under the la) to immediately implement the death penalty la)." 3he ole> resolution )as si*ned by11= con*ressman as of January 11, 1!!!. n a marathon session yesterday that e9tended up = o?cloc/ in the mornin*, the 0ouse of Representative )ithminor, the 0ouse of Representative )ith minor amendments formally adopted the ole> resolution by an over)helmin* vote. 0ouse Resolution 'o. ;5e9pressed the sentiment that the 0ouse ". . . does not desire at this time to revie) Republic &ct


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n the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. 3hey ar*ued that the 15%day re*lementary period to appeastarted to run only on July ;;, 1!! since this )as the day they received the final order of the trial court denyin* their motion for reconsideration. henthey filed their notice of appeal on July ;, 1!!, only five days had elapsed and they )ere )ell )ithin the re*lementary period for appeal.

On :eptember 1it!i +i+tee ?10@ '$%" +rom t!e oti#e o+ t!e &';met or +i$ or'er $ppe$e'+rom. here a record on appeal is reuired, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal )ithin thirty =(2 days from the notice of

6ud*ment or final order.

3he period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for ne) trial or reconsideration. 'o motion for e9tension of time to file a motion for ne) trial orreconsideration shall be allo)ed. emphasis supplied2

$ased on the fore*oin*, an appeal should be ta/en )ithin 15 days from the notice of 6ud*ment or final order appealed from. & final 6ud*ment or order isone that finally disposes of a case, leavin* nothin* more for the court to do )ith respect to it. t is an ad6udication on the merits )hich, considerin* theevidence presented at the trial, declares cate*orically )hat the ri*hts and obli*ations of the parties areG or it may be an order or 6ud*ment that dismissesan action.1;
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_141524_2005.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_141524_2005.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_141524_2005.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_141524_2005.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_141524_2005.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_141524_2005.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_141524_2005.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_141524_2005.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_141524_2005.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_141524_2005.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_141524_2005.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_141524_2005.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_141524_2005.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_141524_2005.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_141524_2005.html#fnt12


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&s already mentioned, petitioners ar*ue that the order of July 1, 1!! denyin* their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the "final order,"not the ebruary 1;, 1!! order )hich dismissed their complaint. :ince they received their copy of the denial of their motion for reconsideration only onJuly ;;, 1!!, the 15%day re*lementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed )hen they filed their notice of appeal on July ;, 1!!.

hat therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of )hich tri**ers the start of the 15%day re*lementary period to appeal the ebruary 1;,1!! order dismissin* the complaint or the July 1, 1!! order dismissin* the #RQ

n the recent case of 8uelnan v. V) #hilippines, Inc.,1=the trial court declared petitioner 8uelnannon%suited and accordin*ly dismissed his complaint.Dpon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. hen the omnibus motion )as filed, 1; days of the 15%day period toappeal the order had lapsed. 0e later on received another order, this time dismissin* his omnibus motion. 0e then filed his notice of appeal. $ut this )asli/e)ise dismissed for havin* been filed out of time.

3he court a &uoruled that petitioner should have appealed )ithin 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this )as the final order that )asappealable under the Rules. e reversed the trial court and declared that it )as the denial of the motion for reconsiderationof an order of dismissal of acomplaint )hich constituted the final orderas it )as )hat ended the issues raised there.

3his pronouncement )as reiterated in the more recent case of'pu%an v. )aldeman et al.14)here )e a*ain considered the order denyin* petitioner&puyanMs motion for reconsideration as the final order )hich finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

$ased on the aforementioned cases, )e sustain petitionersM vie) that the order dated "ul% 0, 0223 den%in their motion for reconsideration)as the finalordercontemplated in the Rules.

e no) come to the ne9t uestionB if July 1, 1!! )as the start of the 15%day re*lementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice ofappeal on timeQ

Dnder Rule 41, :ection =, petitioners had 05 da%s fromnotice of /udment or final orderto appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of theori*inal appeal period #arch 1, 1!!2, petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. &ccordin* to thetrial court, the #R only interrupted the runnin* of the 15%day appeal period.15t ruled that petitioners, havin* filed their #R on the last day of the 15%dayre*lementary period to appeal, had only one 12 day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their #R. Petitioners, ho)ever,ar*ue that they )ere entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 05 da%s from receipt of the 9final order9 or the order dismissin their motion forreconsideration.

n 8uelnanand'pu%an, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. e ruled there that they only had theremainin* time of the 15%day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. e consistently applied this rule in similar cases,1


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3he :upreme Court may promul*ate procedural rules in all courts.;e the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford liti*ants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allo) afresh period of 15 days )ithin )hich to file the notice of appeal in the Re*ional 3rial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissin* a motion for a ne)trial or motion for reconsideration. =(

0enceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 4( *overnin* appeals from the #unicipal 3rial Courts to the Re*ional 3rial CourtsG Rule 4; onpetitions for revie) from the Re*ional 3rial Courts to the Court of &ppealsG Rule 4= on appeals from uasi%6udicial a*encies=1to the Court of &ppeals andRule 45 *overnin* appeals by certiorarito the :upreme Court.=;3he ne) rule aims to re*iment or ma/e the appeal period uniform, to be counted fromreceipt of the order denyin* the motion for ne) trial, motion for reconsideration )hether full or partial2 or any final order or resolution.

e thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal )ithin the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July ;;, 1!! the date of receipt ofnotice denyin* their motion for reconsideration2. 3his pronouncement is not inconsistent )ith Rule 41, :ection = of the Rules )hich states that the appealshall be ta/en )ithin 15 days from notice of 6ud*ment orfinal order appealed from. 3he use of the dis6unctive )ord "or" si*nifies disassociation andindependence of one thin* from another. t should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in )hich it ordinarily implies.==0ence, the use of "or" in the aboveprovision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed )ithin 15 days from the notice of 6ud*ment or )ithin 15 days from notice of the "final order,")hich )e already determined to refer to the July 1, 1!! order denyin* the motion for a ne) trial or reconsideration.

'either does this ne) rule run counter to the spirit of :ection =! of $P 1;! )hich shortened the appeal period from =( days to 15 days to hasten thedisposition of cases. 3he ori*inal period of appeal in this case #arch =%1, 1!!2 remains and the reuirement for strict compliance still applies. hefresh period of 05 da%s becomes sinificant onl% when a part%opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. n this manner, the trial cour)hich rendered the assailed decision is *iven another opportunity to revie) the case and, in the process, minimi>e andEor rectify any error of 6ud*ment.hile )e aim to resolve cases )ith dispatch and to have 6ud*ments of courts become final at some definite time, )e li/e)ise aspire to deliver 6ustice

fairly.

n this case, the ne) period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to )hen the 15%day appeal period should be counted N from receipt of notice of6ud*ment #arch =, 1!!2 or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from July ;;, 1!!2.

3o recapitulate, a party liti*ant may either file his notice of appeal )ithin 15 days from receipt of the Re*ional 3rial CourtMs decision or file it )ithin 15 daysfrom receipt of the order the "final order"2 denyin* his motion for ne) trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the ne) 15%day period may be availedof onl%if either motion is filedG other)ise, the decision becomes final and e9ecutory after the lapse of the ori*inal appeal period provided in Rule 41,:ection =.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July ;, 1!! or five days from receipt of the order denyin* their motion for reconsideration on July ;;,1!!. 0ence, the notice of appeal )as )ell )ithin the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.=4

e deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of *enso >#hilippines?, Inc. v. I'C=5since the Court of &ppeals never even referred to it in its assaileddecision.

CHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTEDand the assailed decision of the Court of &ppeals REERSEDand SET ASIDE. &ccordin*ly, let therecords of this case be remanded to the Court of &ppeals for further proceedin*s. 'o costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 10909/ O#tober 12, 26

3OISSIONER OF INTERNA REEN*E,petitioner, vs. IRANT15AGBIAO 3OR5ORATION ?+ormer% SO*THERN ENERG *EON,IN3.@,respondent.

3HI3ONAARIO, J.

$efore this Court is a Petition for Revie);

under Rule 45 of the 1!! Rules of Civil Procedure assailin* the +ecision,=

dated =( July ;((=, of the Court of&ppeals in C&%.R. :P 'o.


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or the period &pril 1, 1!!< to +ecember =1, 1!!on 3:','ovember 1


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input -&3 on capital *oods and services for the period 1 &pril 1!!< to =1 +ecember 1!!


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accordance )ith the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of 6ustice. 3here have been some instances )hereinthis Court allo)ed a rela9ation in the application of the rules, but this fle9ibility )as "never intended to for*e a bastion for errin* liti*ants toviolate the rules )ith impunity." & liberal interpretation and application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases andunder 6ustifiable causes and circumstances.1ance of the said issue, althou*h it )asraised for the first time on appeal, entirely on the basis of this Court?s rulin* in $% v. Court of 'ppeals.;(0e contends that N

3he submission fails to ta/e into account that althou*h this 0onorable Court has repeatedly ruled that liti*ants cannot raise an issue for the firsttime on appeal, as this )ould contravene the basic rules of 6ustice and fair play, the observance of procedural rules may be rela9ed, notin* thattechnicalities are not ends in themselves but e9ist to protect and promote the substantive ri*hts of the liti*ants S% . 3o&rt o+ Appe$",==(:CR& 5( K;(((L2.

3his Court is unconvinced. 3here is no sufficient cause to )arrant the rela9ation of technical or procedural rules in the instant case. 3he *eneral rules ofprocedure still apply and the $R Commissioner cannot be allo)ed to raise an issue for the first time on appeal.

t should be emphasi>ed that the $R Commissioner is invo/in* a suspension of the *eneral rules of procedure or an e9ception thereto, thus, it isincumbent upon him to present sufficient cause or 6ustifiable circumstance that )ould ualify his case for such a suspension or e9ception. 3hat this Courthad previously allo)ed in another case such suspension of or e9ception to technical or procedural rules does not necessarily mean that the same shallalso be allo)ed in the present case. 3he $R Commissioner has the burden of persuadin* this Court that the same causes or circumstances that 6ustified

the suspension of or e9ception to the technical or procedural rules in the other case are also present in the case at bar.

3he $%case, on )hich the $R Commissioner fully anchored his claim for suspension of or e9ception to the technical or procedural rules, is not even onall fours )ith his case. t involves a petition for declaration of nullity of marria*e instituted by the therein petitioner ilipina :y before the Re*ional 3rialCourt R3C2 on the basis of the alle*ed psycholo*ical incapacity of her husband, ernando :y. 0er petition )as denied by the R3C because it found thaternando?s acts did not constitute psycholo*ical incapacity, a findin* later affirmed by the Court of &ppeals. n an appeal by certioraribefore this Court,ilipina raised the issue that her marria*e to ernando )as void from the very be*innin* for lac/ of a marria*e license at the time of the ceremony. 3hisCourt too/ co*ni>ance of the said issue, reversed the R3C and the Court of &ppeals, and ruled in favor of ilipina. ts ratiocination on the matter isreproduced in full belo) N

Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marria*e bein* void for lac/ of a valid marria*e license at the time of its celebration. tappears that, accordin* to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marria*e and the date of issuance of their marria*e certificate andmarria*e license are different and incon*ruous.

&lthou*h )e have repeatedly ruled that liti*ants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this )ould contravene the basic rules of

fair play and 6ustice, in a number of instances, )e have rela9ed observance of procedural rules, notin* that technicalities are not ends inthemselves but e9ist to protect and promote substantive ri*hts of liti*ants. e said that certain rules ou*ht not to be applied )ith severity andri*idity if by so doin*, the very reason for their e9istence )ould be defeated. 0ence, )hen substantial 6ustice plainly reuires, e9emptin* aparticular case from the operation of technicalities should not be sub6ect to cavil. n our vie), the case at bar reuires that )e address the issueof the validity of the marria*e bet)een ilipina and ernando )hich petitioner claims is void from the be*innin* for lac/ of a marria*e license, inorder to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. ote, however, that here the pertinentfacts are not disputed! and what is re"uired now is a declaration of their effects according to e#isting law.;1 K7mphasis supplied.L

n the instant case, the conflict bet)een the #PC and the $R Commissioner could be hardly described as "deeply seated and violent," it remainin* on aprofessional level.

#oreover, this Court pointed out in the $% case that the pertinent facts, i.e.,the dates of actual celebration of the marria*e, issuance of the marria*ecertificate, and issuance of the marria*e license, )ere undisputed. 3he same cannot be said in the case at bar. 3hat #PC is a public utility is not anundisputed factG on the contrary, the determination thereof *ives rise to a multitude of other uestions of fact and la). t is a mere deduction on the part ofthe $R Commissioner that since the #PC is en*a*ed in the *eneration of po)er, it is a public utility. 3he #PC contests this ar*uin* that it is not a public

utility because it sells its *enerated po)er to '&POCOR e9clusively, and not to the *eneral public. t asserts that it is sub6ect to -&3 and that its sale of*enerated electricity to '&POCOR is sub6ect to >ero%rated -&3.

:ubstantial 6ustice, in such a case, reuires not the allo)ance of issues raised for the first time on appeal, but that the issue of )hether #PC is a publicutility, and the correlated issue of )hether #PC is sub6ect to -&3 or franchise ta9, be raised and threshed out in the first opportunity before the C3& sothat either party )ould have fully presented its evidence and le*al ar*uments in support of its position and to contravene or rebut those of the opposin*party.

n'tlas Consolidated =inin @ *evelopment Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,;;this Court held that it )as too late for the $R Commissionerto raise an issue of fact of payment for the first time in his memorandum in the C3& and in his appeal to this Court. f raised earlier, the matter ou*ht tohave been seriously delved into by the C3&. On this *round, this Court )as of the opinion that under all the attendant circumstances of the case,substantial 6ustice )ould be served if the $R Commissioner be held as precluded from attemptin* to raise the issue at this sta*e. ailure to assert auestion )ithin a reasonable time )arrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.
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3herefore, the Court of &ppeals correctly refused to consider the issues raised by the $R Commissioner for the first time on appeal. ts discussion on)hether the #PC is a public utility and )hether it is sub6ect to -&3 or franchise ta9 is nothin* more than obiter dictum. t is best not at all to discuss theseissues for they do not simply involve uestions of la), but also closely%related uestions of fact;=)hich neither the Court of &ppeals nor this Court couldpresume or *arner from the evidence on record.

$nput %AT on capital goods and services may be the subject of a claim for refund.

3he #PC bases its claim for refund of its input -&3 on :ection 1(ed as creditable input ta9 by :ection1(4a2 of the 3a9 Code of 1!ation in accordance )ith the 3a9 Code,are considered capital *oods. nput -&3 on the purchase of such capital *oods is creditable a*ainst the ta9payer?s output -&3. 3he ta9payer is further*iven the option, under :ection 1(ero%rated sales of *oods or properties or services in :ection 4.1(


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hile it is true, as the $R Commissioner alle*es, that the #PC has the burden of provin* that it is entitled to the refund it is claimin* for, both the C3&and Court of &ppeals had ruled that the #PC presented substantial evidence to support its claim for refund of its input -&3 on capital *oods and servicesin the amount ofP;,44,on City, $ranch =


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to pay the cost of suit.=

Respondent filed her notice of appeal.43hereafter, the case )as raffled to the R3C of Hue>on City, $ranch ;;=, doc/eted as Civil Case 'o. H%(=%4!4=.

n the 'otice of &ppealed Case,5the R3C directed respondent to submit her memorandum in accordance )ith the provisions of :ection b2 of Rule 4( ofthe Rules of Court and petitioner to file a reply memorandum )ithin 15 days from receipt.

RespondentMs counsel havin* received the notice on 1! #ay ;((=, he had until = June ;((= )ithin )hich to file the reuisite memorandum. $ut on = June;((=, he filed a #otion for 79tension of 3ime of five days due to his failure to finish the draft of the said #emorandum. 0e cited as reasons for the delayof filin* his illness for one )ee/, lac/ of staff to do the )or/ due to storm and flood compounded by the *roundin* of the computers because the )irin*s

*ot )et.=CI''? vs. =anubat,;;)e held that late payment of doc/et fees may be admitted )hen theparty sho)ed )illin*ness to abideby the Rules by immediately payin* the reuired fees. =actan, ho)ever, cannot be a source of comfort for herein

petitioner. or there, the appellate doc/et fees )ere paid si9 e that invocation of substantial 6ustice is not a ma*ical incantation that )ill automatically compel this Court to suspend proceduralrules. Rules of procedure are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non%observance may have resulted in pre6udice to a partyMs substantiveri*hts. 8i/e all rules, they are reuired to be follo)ed. :o it must be here.

CHEREFORE, petition is DENIED and the assailed resolutions dated #ay 1(,1!!! and July =(, 1!!! of the Court of &ppeals AFFIRED.

Costs a*ainst petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 17488 De#ember 1, 212

3T3 INTERNATIONA AR:ETING 3OR5ORATION,Petitioner, vs. BHAGIS INTERNATIONA TRADING 3OR5ORATION,Respondents.

5ERATA, J.:

$efore this Court is a Petition for Revie) on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailin* the Resolutions dated &u*ust 1!, ;((51and'ovember 15, ;((5;of the ormer :pecial 3)elfth +ivision of the Court of &ppeals in C&%.R. C- 'o. 44;.
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;. 3he trial court did not state the facts upon )hich i t based its conclusion that petitionerMs trademar/ is stri/in*ly different and distinct from thatof defendantMs.

=. Respondent labeled its products in a manner confusin*ly similar to that of petitionerMs.

4. 3he trial court erred in findin* that respondent did not pass off its products as that of petitionerMs.11

:imply, the issue to be resolved is the propriety of the dismissal of petitionerMs appeal for its failure to file the appellantMs brief )ithin the re*lementaryperiod.

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in dismissin* its appeal, since dismissal of appeals on purely technical *rounds is fro)ned upon and therules of procedure ou*ht not to be applied in a very technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure substantial 6ustice.

or its part, respondent maintains that the appellate court did not err in dismissin* petitionerMs appeal for its failure to file the reuired appellantMs brief)ithin the re*lementary period. t stresses that in the absence of persuasive reason to deviate therefrom, rules of procedure must be faithfully follo)ed forthe prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and e9peditious dispatch of 6udicial business.

e find merit in the instant petition.

3ime and a*ain, this Court has emphasi>ed that procedural rules should be treated )ith utmost respect and due re*ard, since they are desi*ned tofacilitate the ad6udication of cases to remedy the )orsenin* problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of 6ustice. rom timeto time, ho)ever, )e have reco*ni>ed e9ceptions to the Rules, but only for the most compellin* reasons )here stubborn obedience to the Rules )oulddefeat rather than serve the ends of 6ustice.1;

n Obut v. Court of 'ppeals,1=

this Court reiterated that it "cannot loo/ )ith favor on a course of action )hich )ould place the administration of 6ustice in astrai*ht6ac/et, for then the result )ould be a poor /ind of 6ustice if there )ould be 6ustice at all. -erily, 6udicial orders are issued to be obeyed, nonethelessa non%compliance is to be dealt )ith as the circumstances attendin* the case may )arrant. hat should *uide 6udicial action is the principle that a party%liti*ant if to be *iven the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint of defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property ontechnicalities."

3he same principle )as hi*hli*hted in #hilippine (ational 7an< and *evelopment 7an< of the #hilippines v. #hilippine =illin Compan%, Incorporated, etal.H14 )here the Court ruled that even if an appellant failed to file a motion for e9tension of time to file his brief on or before the e9piration of there*lementary period, the Court of &ppeals does not necessarily lose 6urisdiction to hear and decide the appealed case, and that the Court of &ppeals hasdiscretion to dismiss or not to dismiss appellantMs appeal, )hich discretion must be a sound one to be e9ercised in accordance )ith the tenets of 6usticeand fair play havin* in mind the circumstances obtainin* in each case.

7r*o, )here stron* considerations of substantive 6ustice are manifest in the petition, the strict application of the rules of procedure may be rela9ed, in thee9ercise of its euity 6urisdiction.153hus, a ri*id application of the rules of procedure )ill not be entertained if it )ill obstruct rather than serve the broaderinterests of 6ustice in the li*ht of the prevailin* circumstances in the case under consideration.

n the instant case, it is apparent that there is a stron* desire to file an appellantMs brief on petitionerMs part.

hen petitioner filed its motion attachin* there)ith its appellantMs brief, there )as a clear intention on the part of petitioner not to abandon his appeal. &s amatter of fact, )ere it not for its counselMs act of inadvertently misplacin* the 'otice to ile $rief in another file, petitioner could have seasonably filed itsappellantMs brief as its counsel had already prepared the same even )ay before the receipt of the 'otice to i le $rief.

t bears stressin* at this point then that the rule, )hich states that the mista/es of counsel binds the client, may not be strictly follo)ed )here observanceof it )ould result in outri*ht deprivation of the clientMs liberty or property, or )here the interest of 6ustice so reuires. n renderin* 6ustice, proceduralinfirmities ta/e a bac/seat a*ainst substantive ri*hts of liti*ants. Corollarily, if the strict application of the rules )ould tend to frustrate rather than promote

6ustice, this Court is not )ithout po)er to e9ercise its 6udicial discretion in rela9in* the rules of procedure.1


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G.R. No. 14222 September 7, 20

INDANAO SAINGS ANDD OAN ASSO3IATION, IN3.,Petitioners, vs. I3ENTA DA. DE FORES, $' HEIRS OF FOREN3IO FORES, SR.,$me%, EDNA FORES EISEIDE, BEINDA FORES, FOREN3IO T. FORES, )R., ROBERTO T. FORES, SIA FORES SI3AT $'ORNA FORES FERNANDE,Respondent.

GAR3IA, J.

Dnder consideration is this petition for revie) on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the t)in resolutions dated October;, 1!!!1and ebruary 15, ;((;;of the Court of &ppeals )hich respectively dismissed petitionerMs appeal from an earlier decision of the Re*ional 3rial

Court at #alaybalay, $u/idnon for failure to file its appellantMs brief on time, and denied petitionerMs motion for reconsideration of the dismissal resolution.

Records reveal the essential follo)in* factsB

+urin* his lifetime, or more specifically on +ecember !, 1!;, lorencio lores, :r., husband of respondent -icenta -da. +e lores and predecessor%in%interest of the other respondents, entered into a "oint Venture 'reement )ith +: 0omes, nc. +:02 for the development and commercial utili>ation ofthe lores spousesM t)o ;2 ad6oinin* lots located at the center of the to)n of #alaybalay, $u/idnon. Pursuant to the "oint Venture 'reement, lores, :r.as capitalist partner, secured a loan of P1.5# from petitioner #indanao :avin*s and 8oan &ssociation, nc. #:8&2 usin* as collaterals therefor the t)o;2 aforementioned lots. Dnder the same a*reement, +:0, as industrial partner, shall have the full and complete authority to pursue the developmentpro6ect and the mana*ement thereof thereafter.

n time, out of the loan secured by lores, :r. from petitioner, a commercial buildin* /no)n as the lores 7uildin)as constructed on the lots in uestion.

$usiness operations of the 6oint venture commenced in &u*ust, 1!4. & portion of the first floor of the buildin* )as leased by +:0 to petitioner )hichused the space as office of its branch at #alaybalay, $u/idnon, )hile the rest of the same floor )ere occupied by a fastfood establishment, a dru*storeand a *rocery. 3he second floor of the buildin* )as used as a function room and the third floor as lod*in* inn.

n 1!


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t bears emphasi>in* that petitioner is represented by no less than the Office of the Chief 8e*al Counsel of the P+C )hich has, at its helm and commanda battery of la)yers. &s pointed out by respondents, on July , 1!!!, the handlin* counsel tendered his resi*nation from P+C effective on July =(,1!!!.5Petitioner, therefore, had ;! days from July , 1!!!, or until &u*ust 5, 1!!!, the last day for filin* the sub6ect brief. +urin* those ;! days, petitionerhad the lu9ury of time to file its appellantMs brief, or, at the very least, as/ for another e9tension from the appellate court. t did not.

Petitioner ou*ht to be reminded that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non%observance may have resulted inpre6udice to the partiesM substantive ri*hts. 8i/e all rules, they are reuired to be follo)ed e9cept only for the most persuasive of reasons as )hen"transcendental matters" of life, liberty or state security are involved.

3rue, liti*ation is not a *ame of technicalities. t is eually true, ho)ever, that every case must be presented in accordance )ith the prescribed procedureto ensure an orderly and speedy administration of 6ustice.alina Orti>%&*uila Ri>alina2G Ri>alinaMs dau*hter,7rlinda Pilapil 7rlinda2G and the other nephe)s and nieces of +onata, in representation of her t)o other sisters )ho had also passed a)ay. Respondentson the other hand, are the heirs of the late #a9imino $riones #a9imino2, composed of his nephe)s and nieces, and *randnephe)s and *randnieces, inrepresentation of the deceased siblin*s of #a9imino.

3he facts that *ave rise to the petition at bar are recounted as follo)s.

#a9imino )as married to +onata but their union did not produce any children. hen #a9imino died on 1 #ay 1!5;, +onata instituted intestateproceedin*s to settle her husbandMs estate )ith the Cebu City Court of irst nstance C2, 14th Judicial +istrict, desi*nated as :pecial Proceedin*s 'o.!;%R. On July 1!5;, the C issued 8etters of &dministration=appointin* +onata as the administratri9 of #a9iminoMs estate. :he submitted annventory4of #a9iminoMs properties, )hich included, amon* other thin*s, the follo)in* parcels of land N

1. 3ransfer Certificate of 3itle 3C32 'o. R3%5!!, acuired by #a9imino prior to his marria*e no) covered by 3C3 'o. ;154


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On ;1 January 1!5, :ilverio $riones :ilverio2, a nephe) of #a9imino, filed a Petition1;)ith the R3C for 8etters of &dministration1=for the intestateestate of #a9imino, )hich )as initially *ranted by the R3C. 3he R3C also issued an Order, dated 5 +ecember 1!5, allo)in* :ilverio to collect rentalsfrom #a9iminoMs properties. $ut then, re*orio filed )ith the R3C a #otion to :et &side the Order, dated 5 +ecember 1!5, claimin* that the saidproperties )ere already under his and his )ifeMs administration as part of the intestate estate of +onata.14:ilverioMs 8etters of &dministration for theintestate estate of #a9imino )as subseuently set aside by the R3C.15

On = #arch 1!, the heirs of #a9imino filed a Complaint1 $riones since 1!5; )hen the survivin* heirsof #a9imino $riones sold their ri*hts over the said properties to the late +onata Orti> $rionesG

=. 3hat even *rantin* ar*uendo that plaintiffs have the ri*ht to uestion the transfer to the name of the late +onata Orti> $riones the titles of thesaid lots any action of that effect has definitely prescribed for more than =( years have already occurred )hen the titles to said lots )eretransferred to the name of the late +onata Orti> $rionesG

4. 3hat moreover, even *rantin* ar*uendo that there is an implied trust, an implied trust prescribed in 1( years from the day titles to said lotshave been transferred to the name of the late +onata Orti> $riones. Conseuently, the plaintiffMs action to enforce an implied trust has definitelyprescribedG

5. $e that as i t may, plaintiffs )hose claim is merely in a representative capacity acuires no better ri*ht or title than that of their predecessor%ininterest.

&fter trial in due course, the R3C rendered its +ecision, dated &pril 1! $riones filed :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !;%R she )as fully a)are of the e9istence of the hereditary ri*hts of the brothers and sisters oher husband #a9imino :. $riones and their survivin* heirs and it )as her duty to have informed the Court of such fact instead of as/in* the Court to haveher declared as the sole heir of her deceased husband in the alle*ed order mentioned by the defendants )hich )as never presented at the trial but )asmade the basis of the transfer of all the titles of the real properties left by #a9imino :. $riones to the name of +onata Orti> $riones to the pre6udice of theheirs of the brothers and sisters of #a9imino :. $riones.

9 9 9 9

$y havin* the immovable properties of the deceased #a9imino :. $riones transferred in her name as the sole heir of the said deceased despite her/no)led*e of the e9istence of other co%heirs li/e the plaintiffs, +onata Orti> $rionesMs alle*ed o)nership and possession of the sub6ect properties inuestion )as that of a trustee in an implied trust under &rticle 1451 of the 'e) Civil Code 9 9 9.

9 9 9 9

n the absence of partition of the estate of #a9imino :. $riones all the properties left upon his death remained o)ned in common by his heirs consistin* ohis survivin* spouse and the heirs of his deceased brothers and sisters the herein plaintiffs. +onata Orti> $rionesMs possession and transfer of the title inher name of her late husbandMs properties )as no more than that of a co%o)ner and no prescription shall run in favor of a co%o)ner or co%heir a*ainst hisco%o)ners or co%heirs so lon* as he e9pressly or impliedly reco*ni>es the co%o)nership 8ast para*raph, &rt. 4!4, 'e) Civil Code2. :uch titles cannot beused as a shield to perpetrate fraud.

9 9 9 9

:ince the inventory filed by +onata Orti> $riones 79hibit $2 has been adopted as 79hibit = by defendants 7rlinda Pilapil, Ri>alina Orti> &*uila and the#endo>as, said defendants are bound by the contents thereof. +efendants, ho)ever, failed to sho) the order of the Court of irst nstance of Cebu datedOctober ;, 1!5; mentioned in the primary entry boo/ 79hibit 42 and mar/ed as 79hibit 4%C, an omission )hich amounts to suppression of evidence)hich is presumed adverse to the defendantMs interest )hen produced. 3his supposed declaration of heirs declarin* the late +onata O. $riones as thesole, absolute and e9clusive heir of the late #a9imino :. $riones entered in the primary entry boo/ in the office of the Re*ister of +eeds of Cebu City hasbeen made thru +onata O. $rionesMs misrepresentation to the Court as &dministratri9 of the estate of her husband #a9imino :. $riones by failin* tohonestly disclose to the Court that the decedent )as survived not only by his )ido) but also by his brothers and sisters andEor their children by ri*ht ofrepresentation )hich fact )as /no)n to her at the time of her husbandMs death.

0ence, the R3C declared that the heirs of #a9imino )ere entitled to T of the real properties covered by 3C3s 'o. ;154;, ;154=, ;1544, ;1545, ;154


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&R3. !!5. n the absence of le*itimate descendants and ascendants, and ille*itimate children and their descendants, )hether le*itimate or ille*itimate,the survivin* spouse shall inherit the entire estate, )ithout pre6udice to the ri*hts of brothers and sisters, nephe)s and nieces, should there be any, underarticle 1((1.

&R3. 1((1. :hould brothers and sisters or their children survive )ith the )ido) or )ido)er, the latter shall be entitled to one%half of the inheritance andthe brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

3he heirs of #a9imino asserted that +onata had fraudulently e9cluded them from the intestate proceedin*s of the estate of #a9imino before the C .3hey )ere not *iven notice of the institution of :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !;%R and the scheduled hearin*s therein. hen +onata )as declared the "sole,absolute, and e9clusive heir" of #a9imino in the C Order, dated ; October 1!5;, and )hen she mana*ed to have the real properties of #a9iminore*istered in her o)n name on the basis of the fore*oin* C Order, she should be deemed to have held the said properties in trust for her other co%heirs.

3he R3C in its +ecision, dated &pril 1!


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9 9 9 9

m2 3hat official duty has been re*ularly performedG

n2 3hat a court, or 6ud*e actin* as such, )hether in the Philippines or else)here, )as actin* in the la)ful e9ercise of 6urisdiction.

$y reason of the fore*oin* provisions, this Court must presume, in the absence of any clear and convincin* proof to the contrary, that the C in :pecialProceedin*s 'o. !;%R had 6urisdiction of the sub6ect matter and the parties, and to have rendered a 6ud*ment valid in every respectG; filed a petition to bedeclared sole heir accordin* to him the brothers and sisters of the late #a9imino $riones )ere notified of the said hearin*. hat can you say about this,#s. itnessQ

& 'o, donMt thin/ they )ere notified. 3hey )ould have contested their ri*ht to inherit their brotherMs property because he had no issue )ith his )ife.

H 8i/e)ise the same )itness testified that at the time the petition )as *ranted there )as no opposition from the heirs. hat can you say about this, #s.itnessQ

& donMt thin/ they )ere notified because /no) they )ill contest that declaration.

&ureliaMs testimony deserves scant credit considerin* that she )as not testifyin* on matters )ithin her personal /no)led*e. 3he phrase " donMt thin/" is aclear indication that she is merely voicin* out her opinion on ho) she believed her uncles and aunts )ould have acted had they received notice of :pecia

Proceedin*s 'o. !;%R.

n further support of their contention of fraud by +onata, the heirs of #a9imino even emphasi>ed that +onata lived alon* the same street as some of thesiblin*s of #a9imino and, yet, she failed to inform them of the C Order, dated ; October 1!5;, in :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !;%R, and the issuance inher name of ne) 3C3s coverin* the real properties )hich belon*ed to the estate of #a9imino. 3his Court, ho)ever, appreciates such informationdifferently. t actually )or/s a*ainst the heirs of #a9imino. :ince they only lived nearby, #a9iminoMs siblin*s had ample opportunity to inuire or discuss)ith +onata the status of the estate of their deceased brother. :ome of the real properties, )hich belon*ed to the estate of #a9imino, )ere also located)ithin the same area as their residences in Cebu City, and #a9iminoMs siblin*s could have re*ularly observed the actions and behavior of +onata )ithre*ard to the said real properties. t is uncontested that from the time of #a9iminoMs death on 1 #ay 1!5;, +onata had possession of the real properties.:he mana*ed the real properties and even collected rental fees on some of them until her o)n death on 1 'ovember 1!. &fter +onataMs death, 7rlindatoo/ possession of the real properties, and continued to mana*e the same and collect the rental fees thereon. +onata and, subseuently, 7rlinda, )ereso obviously e9ercisin* ri*hts of o)nership over the real properties, in e9clusion of all others, )hich must have already put the heirs of #a9imino on *uardif they truly believed that they still had ri*hts thereto.

3he heirs of #a9imino /ne) he died on 1 #ay 1!5;. 3hey even attended his )a/e. 3hey did not offer any e9planation as to )hy they had )aited == years

from #a9iminoMs death before one of them, :ilverio, filed a Petition for 8etters of &dministration for the intestate estate of #a9imino on ;1 January 1!5.&fter learnin* that the intestate estate of #a9imino )as already settled in :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !;%R, they )aited another t)o years, beforeinstitutin*, on = #arch 1!, Civil Case 'o. C7$%5!4, the Complaint for partition, annulment and recovery of the real property belon*in* to the estate of#a9imino. 3he heirs of #a9imino put off actin* on their ri*hts to the estate of #a9imino for so lon* that )hen they finally did, attributin* fraud to#a9iminoMs )ife, +onata, the latter had already passed a)ay, on 1 'ovember 1!, and )as no lon*er around to e9plain and defend herself. 3he delayof the heirs of #a9imino is not )ithout conseuence, as this Court e9plained in Ramos v. Ramos;!N

Parenthetically, it may be noted that the filin* of the instant case lon* after the death of Jose Ramos and other persons involved in the intestateproceedin* renders it difficult to determine with certitude whether the plaintiffs had really been defrauded% hat Justice :treet said in :inco vs.8on*a, 51 Phil. 5(, 51%! is relevant to this caseB

"$n passing upon controversies of this character e#perience teaches the danger of accepting lightly charges of fraud made many years afterthe transaction in "uestion was accomplished, when death may have sealed the lips of the principal actors and changes effected by time mayhave given a totally different color to the cause of controversy.n the case before us the *uardian, 7milio 3eve>, is dead. 3he same is true of3rinidad +ia*o, mother of the defendant &*ueda 8on*aG )hile &*apito 8on*a is no) livin* in :pain. t )ill be borne in mind also that, insofar as oral proof
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is concerned, the char*e of fraud rests principally on the testimony of a sin*le )itness )ho, if fraud )as committed, )as a participant therein and )honaturally )ould no) be an9ious, so far as practicable, to put the blame on others. n this connection it is )ell to bear in mind the follo)in* impressivelan*ua*e of #r. Justice :toryB

"9 9 9 *ut length of time necessarily obscures all human evidence! and as it thus removes from the parties all the immediate means to verifythe nature of the original transactions, it operates by way of presumption, in favor of innocence, and against imputation of fraud. t )ould beunreasonable, after a *reat len*th of time, to reuire e9act proof of all the minute circumstances of any transaction, or to e9pect a satisfactory e9planationof every difficulty, real or apparent, )ith )hich it may be encumbered. 3he most that can fairly be e9pected, in such cases, if the parties are livin*, fromthe frailty of memory, and human infirmity, is, that the material facts can be *iven )ith certainty to a common intentG and, if the parties are dead, and thecases rest in confidence, and in parol a*reements, the most that )e can hope is to arrive at probable con6ectures, and to substitute *eneral presumptionsof la), for e9act /no)led*e. &raud, or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to the living! for, the legal presumption is the other way! as

to the dead, who are not here to answer for themselves, it would be the height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and violate thesanctity of the grave, unless the evidence of fraud be clear, beyond a reasonable doubt Prevost vs. rat>, < heat. KD.:.L, 41, 4!2."

t is *ranted that the heirs of #a9imino had ri*hts to his intestate estate upon his death on 1 #ay 1!5;, by virtue of &rticles !!5 and 1((5 of the 'e) CivilCode. 'onetheless, the C, in :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !;%R, had declared +onata as the sole, absolute, and e9clusive heir of #a9imino in its Order,dated ; October 1!5;. 3his Court, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, can only presume that :pecial Proceedin*s 'o. !;%R )as fair and re*ular)hich )ould conseuently mean that the C complied )ith the procedural reuirements for intestate proceedin*s such as publication and notice tointerested parties, and that the C had carefully revie)ed and studied the claims of creditors, as )ell as the ri*hts of heirs to the estate, before issuin*the Order, dated ; October 1!5;. 3here is no sho)in* that the Order, dated ; October 1!5;, had been appealed and had, therefore, lon* attained finality)hich even this Court )ould be bound to respect. ithout doubt, if the action for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession instituted by the heirs o#a9imino in Civil Case 'o. C7$%5!4 succeeds, then, it )ould be a circumvention of the finality of the C Order, dated ; October 1!5;, in :pecialProceedin*s 'o. !;%R, because, necessarily, a reco*nition of the ri*hts of the other heirs to the estate of #a9imino )ould violate the sole, absolute, ande9clusive ri*ht of +onata to the same estate previously determined by the C. &s this Court had discussed in Ramos v. Ortu!ar=(N

f )e are to assume that Richard 0ill and #arvin 0ill did not formally intervene, still they )ould be concluded by the result of the proceedin*s, not only asto their civil status but as the distribution of the estate as )ell. &s this Court has held in #anolo vs. Paredes, 4 Phil. !=, The proceeding for probate

is one in rem /01 (yc., 2345- and the court ac"uires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed bysec. 41 (. 6. (.! and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them.:ee also in re 7state of Johnson, =! Phil. 15


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Considerin* that 9/udments of reional trial courts in the e+ercise of their oriinal /urisdiction are to be elevated to the Court of 'ppeals in cases whenappellant raises &uestions of fact or mi+ed &uestions of fact and law9, )hile9appeals from /udments of the Hsame courtsJ in the e+ercise of their oriinal

/urisdiction must be brouht directl% to the $upreme Court in cases where the appellant raises onl% &uestions of law911,petitioner should have appealedthe trial courtMs rulin* to this Court by )ay of a petition for revie) on certiorariin accordance )ith Rule 45 of the 1!! Rules of Civil Procedure, asamended,1;pursuant to Rule 41, :ection ; c2 of the same Rules, vi!B

:7C. ;. #odes of appeal. N

a2 999 999 999

b2 999 999 999

c2 &ppeal by certiorari. N n all cases )here only uestions of la) are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the :upreme Court by petition for revie)on certiorariin accordance )ith Rule 45.

$y reason, then, of the availability to petitioner of the remedy of a petition for revie) under Rule 45, his ri*ht to resort to a petition for certiorariunder Rule


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3he penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of 3hirty thousand pesos P=(,(((2 shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as hi*hpo)ered firearm )hich includes those )ith bores bi**er in diameter than .= caliber and ! millimeter such as caliber .4(, .41, .44, .45 and also lessercalibered firearms but considered po)erful such as caliber .=5 and caliber .;; center%fire ma*num and other firearms )ith firin* capability of fullautomatic and by burst of t)o or threeB 5roi'e', !o>eer, T!$t o ot!er #rime >$" #ommitte' b% t!e per"o $rre"te'. 7mphasis supplied2

$ased on the fore*oin*, petitioner contends that the reduced penalty under Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4 should be the one imposed on him. :i*nificantly, inits $i+e"t$tio I ie& o+ 3ommet,1the Office of the :olicitor eneral a*rees )ith the petitioner, positin* further that the statement made by thisCourt in #eople vs. "a%son1to the effect that the provisions for a li*hter penalty under Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4 does not apply if another crime has beencommitted, should not be applied to this case because the proviso in :ection 1 of said la) that "no other crime was committed9must refer only to thosecrimes committed )ith the &"eof an unlicensed firearm and not )hen the other crime is not related to the use thereof or )here the la) violated merelycriminali>es the possession of the same, li/e in the case of election *un ban, as here.

&s early as &u*ust 1!!, the month after Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4 too/ effect,1!this Court has pronounced inFon!ales vs. Court of 'ppeals;(that said la)must be *iven retroactive effect in favor of those accused under P.+. 'o. 1


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offense of ille*al possession of firearms, the Court declared that insofar as it is favorable to the appellant, the provisions of Rep. &ct 'o. ;!4 should beapplied liberally and retroactively in that appellant must be acuitted of the char*e of ille*al possession of firearms.

uided by the fore*oin*, the Court cannot but set aside petitionerMs conviction in Criminal Case 'o. !


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52 3he follo)in* copies of pleadin*s and other relevant documents referred to in the petition )hich )ould support the alle*ations therein are notattachedB

a2 ComplaintG and,

b2 &ns)er.;4

nvo/in* the liberal construction of procedural rules, petitioner &urora as/ed for reconsideration;5)ith the follo)in* 6ustificationsB

12 & certificationEverification of one of a number of principal parties is sufficient compliance. &lthou*h her certiorari petition named her, herspouse, and Fiu%o 7mployment &*ency, as Upetitioners,M her co%defendants )ere not held liable in the lo)er court. t is only she )ho isinterested in filin* the certiorari petition for her to be able to appeal, hence her lone si*nature.

;2 &nent the lac/ of e9planation of )hy personal service to the C& )as not resorted to, &urora averred that i t )as redundant to e9plain )hyre*istered mail )as used considerin* the distance bet)een Cebu, )here she is based, and the C& in #anila.

=2 3he professional ta9 receipt P3R2 and nte*rated $ar of the Philippines $P2 receipt numbers )ere inadvertently overloo/ed. 0o)ever, thedefect )as cured )hen &tty. Fcon* included the numbers )hen he subseuently filed on October 14, ;((4 his 'otice of Chan*e of

&ddress;


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3he si*naturesEauthori>ations of :an* and Fiu%o 7mployment &*ency in the verification and certification on non%forum shoppin* are not necessary.

n filin* a certiorari petition, one a**rieved by a courtMs 6ud*ment, order or resolution must verify hisEher petition and must also attach a s)orn certificationof non%forum shoppin*.;n dismissin* &uroraMs petition, the C& cited as one of its *rounds the lac/ of si*natures or authori>ations of :an* and Fiu%o7mployment &*ency in the verification and certification of non%forum shoppin*. :uch si*natures, ho)ever, may be dispensed )ith as these parties are noinvolved in the petition. &lthou*h the caption in &uroraMs petition before the C& erroneously included :an* and Fiu%o 7mployment &*ency as petitionersits contents reveal that it is solely &urora )ho is the Uperson a**rieved,M as she is the one )ho assailed before the C& the R3CMs Order that denied hernotice of appeal and, hence, she should be the one )ho should si*n the petition. 'otably, &urora is the only one held liable by the trial court for dama*esand thus is the one interested in filin* an appeal and in elevatin* the case to the C&. #oreover, only &urora filed her ans)er before the R3C )hile :an*and Fiu%o 7mployment &*ency did not file any.

'on%submission of certified true copy of the January ;ed, ho)ever, that provisions )ith respect to therules on the manner and periods for perfectin* appeals are strictly applied and are only rela9ed in very e9ceptional circumstances on euitableconsiderations.=4n the case at bar, the reason behind the filin* of an e9tension of time to file her notice of appeal )as not per se, a compellin* and a

hi*hly e9ceptional one. Just as it is the la)yerMs duty to safe*uard her clientMs interest, it is the responsibility of the client to ma/e herself available to hercounsel and open the lines of communication, even durin* the busy election period, for their discussions of le*al options. :he is obli*ed to be vi*ilant infi*htin* for her cause and in protectin* her ri*hts. t is &urora?s duty, "as a client, to be in touch )ith KherL counsel so as to be constantly posted about thecase. K:heL is mandated to inuire from KherL counsel about the status and pro*ress of the case from time to time and cannot e9pect that all KsheL has todo is sit bac/, rela9 and a)ait the outcome of the case."=5&dditionally, "motions for e9tension are not *ranted as a matter of ri*ht but in the sounddiscretion of the court, and la)yers should never presume that their motions for e9tension or postponement )ill be *ranted or that they )ill be *ranted thelen*th of time they pray for."=ed to file this instant case because the plaintiff see/s to enforce an obli*ation )hich the defendant o)es to the plaintiff by virtue of thene*otiable instruments la). 3he plaintiff in this case sued the defendant to enforce his liability as dra)er in favor of the plaintiff as payee of thechec/. &ssumin* the alle*ation of the defendant of the alle*ed circumstances relative to the issuance of the chec/, still )hen he delivered thechec/ payable to bearer to that certain Pedro +omin*o, as it )as payable to cash, the same may be ne*otiated by delivery by )ho ever )asthe bearer of the chec/ and such ne*otiation )as valid and effective a*ainst the dra)erG

5. ndeed, assumin* as true the alle*ations of the defendant re*ardin* the circumstances relative to the issuance of the chec/ it )ould beentirely impossible for the plaintiff to have been a)are that such chec/ )as intended only for a definite person and )as not ne*otiableconsiderin* that the said chec/ )as payable to bearer and )as not even crossedG


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5. +irect the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P5,(((.(( by )ay of attorneyMs fees.

:O OR+7R7+.

ChanMs motion for reconsideration )as denied on +ecember ;(, ;(((,vi>B

Considerin* that the plaintiffMs ar*uments appear to be a mere repetition of his previous submissions, and )hich submissions this court have alreadypassed uponG and ta/in* into account the inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in the 3actauin vs. Palileo case )hich the plaintiff cited as clearly in thatcase, the plaintiff therein e9pressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action, the #otion for Reconsideration is +7'7+ for lac/ of merit.

:O OR+7R7+.

On July =1, ;((1, the Re*ional 3rial Court R3C2 in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of ChanMs complaint, disposin*B!

07R7OR7, findin* no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby &R#7+ in toto.

:O OR+7R7+.

On :eptember ;B

999

&s a *eneral rule, an offense causes t)o ;2 classes of in6uries. 3he first is the social in6ury produced by the criminal act )hich is sou*ht to be repairedthrou*h the imposition of the correspondin* penalty, and the second is the personal in6ury caused to the victim of the crime )hich in6ury is sou*ht to becompensated throu*h indemnity )hich is also civil in nature. 3hus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."

3he offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arisin* from the commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is eitherdeemed instituted )ith the criminal action or is separately instituted.

Rule 111, :ection 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, )hich became effective on +ecember 1, ;(((, provides thatB

a2 hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arisin* from the offense char*ed shall be deemed instituted )ith thecriminal action unless the offended party )aives the civil action, reserves the ri*ht to institute it separately or institute the civil action prior to the criminalaction.

Rule 111, :ection ; further statesB

&fter the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arisin* therefrom cannot be instituted until final 6ud*ment has been entered in thecriminal action.

0o)ever, )ith respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under &rticles =;, ==, =4 and ;1< of the Civil Code arisin* from the same act oromission, the rule has been chan*ed.

n +#P 7mployees Credit &ssociation vs. -ele>, the :upreme Court pronounced that only the civil liability arisin* from the offense char*ed is deemedinstituted )ith the criminal action unless the offended party )aives the civil action, reserves his ri*ht to institute it separately, or institutes the civil actionprior to the criminal action. :pea/in* throu*h Justice Pardo, the :upreme Court heldB

"3here is no more need for a reservation of the ri*ht to file the independent civil action under &rticles =;, ==, =4 and ;1< of the Civil Code of thePhilippines. 3he reservation and )aiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arisin* from the offense char*ed. 3hisdoes not include recovery of civil liability under &rticles =;, ==, =4, and ;1< of the Civil Code of the Philippines arisin* from the same act or omission)hich may be prosecuted separately )ithout a reservation".

Rule 111, :ection = readsB

:ec. =. hen civil action may proceed independently. n the cases provided in &rticles =;, ==, =4, and ;1< of the Civil Code of the Philippines, theindependent civil action may be brou*ht by the offended party. t shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall reuire only apreponderance of evidence. n no case, ho)ever, may the offended party recover dama*es t)ice for the same act or omission char*ed in the criminalaction.
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3he chan*es in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertainin* to independent civil actions )hich became effective on +ecember 1, ;((( areapplicable to this case.

Procedural la)s may be *iven retroactive effect to actions pendin* and undetermined at the time of their passa*e. 3here are no vested ri*hts in the rulesof procedure. 999

3hus, Civil Case 'o. C-%!4%1;4, an independent civil action for dama*es on account of the fraud committed a*ainst respondent -ille*as under &rticle ==of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there )as no reservation as to its filin*."

t must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar )ith the instant suit. 3he complaint )as also brou*ht on alle*ation of fraud under &rticle == of the

Civil Code and committed by the respondent in the issuance of the chec/ )hich later bounced. t )as filed before the trial court, despite the pendency ofthe criminal case for violation of $P ;; a*ainst the respondent. hile it may be true that the chan*es in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedurepertainin* to independent civil action became effective on +ecember 1, ;(((, the same may be *iven retroactive application and may be made to apply tothe case at bench, since procedural rules may be *iven retroactive application. 3here are no vested ri*hts in the rules of procedure.

n vie) of the rulin* on the first assi*ned error, it is therefore an error to ad6ud*e dama*es in favor of the petitioner.

07R7OR7, the petition is hereby R&'37+. 3he +ecision dated July 1=, ;((1 rendered by the Re*ional 3rial Court of Pasay City, $ranch 1(affirmin* the dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner is hereby R7-7R:7+ and :73 &:+7. 3he case is hereby R7#&'+7+ to the trial court forfurther proceedin*s.

:O OR+7R7+.

On #arch 14, ;((=, the C& denied :imonMs motion for reconsideration.1=

0ence, this appeal, in )hich the petitioners submit that the C& erroneously premised its decision on the assessment that the civil case )as anindependent civil action under &rticles =;, ==, =4, and ;1< of the Civil CodeG that the C&Ms reliance on the rulin* in +#P 7mployees Credit Cooperativenc. v. -ele>14stretched the meanin* and intent of the rulin*, and )as contrary to :ections 1 and ; of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal ProcedureG thatthis case )as a simple collection suit for a sum of money, precludin* the application of :ection = of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.15

n his comment,1999
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Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. 3he payee of the chec/ is entitled to receive the payment of money for )hich the )orthlesschec/ )as issued. 0avin* been caused the dama*e, she is entitled to recompense.

:urely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of $atas Pambansa $l*. ;; to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty%handedby e9cludin* the civil liability of the offender, *ivin* her only the remedy, )hich in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of havin* to file a separate civilsuit. 3o do so may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the chec/ due her, thereby un6ustly enrichin* the errant dra)er at thee9pense of the payee. 3he protection )hich the la) see/s to provide )ould, therefore, be brou*ht to nau*ht.

999

0o)ever, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncin* chec/ issued in contravention of $P ;;. 3his is clear from Rule 111 of theRules of Court, effective +ecember 1, ;(((, )hich relevantly providesB

:ection 1. nstitution of criminal and civil actions. % a2 hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arisin* from theoffense char*ed shall be deemed instituted )ith the criminal action unless the offended party )aives the civil action, reserves the ri*ht to institute itseparately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

3he reservation of the ri*ht to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presentin* its evidence and undercircumstances affordin* the offended party a reasonable opportunity to ma/e such reservation.

hen the offended party see/s to enforce civil liability a*ainst the accused by )ay of moral, nominal, temperate, or e9emplary dama*es )ithoutspecifyin* the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filin* fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the 6ud*ment a)ardin* such dama*es.

here the amount of dama*es, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the correspondin* filin* fees shall be paid by the offendedparty upon the filin* thereof in court.

79cept as other)ise provided in these Rules, no filin* fees shall be reuired for actual dama*es.

'o counterclaim, cross%claim or third%party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action )hich could have been thesub6ect thereof may be liti*ated in a separate civil action. 1a2

b2 3he criminal action for violation of $atas Pambansa $l*. ;; shall be deemed to include the correspondin* civil action. 'o reservation to file such civilaction separately shall be allo)ed.1

Dpon filin* of the aforesaid 6oint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filin* fees based on the amount of the chec/ involved,)hich shall be considered as the actual dama*es claimed. here the complaint or information also see/s to recover liuidated, moral, nominal,temperate or e9emplary dama*es, the offended party shall pay the filin* fees based on the amounts alle*ed therein. f the amounts are not so alle*ed butany of these dama*es are subseuently a)arded by the court, the filin* fees based on the amount a)arded shall constitute a first lien on the 6ud*ment.

here the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated )ith the criminal action upon application)ith the court tryin* the latter case. f the application is *ranted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance )ith section ; of the Rule *overnin*consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

:ection =. hen civil action may proceed independently. N n the cases provided in &rticles =;, ==, =4 and ;1< of the Civil Code of the Philippines, theindependent civil action may be brou*ht by the offended party. t shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall reuire only apreponderance of evidence. n no case, ho)ever, may the offended party recover dama*es t)ice for the same act or omission char*ed in the criminalaction.

3he aforeuoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not

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