Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

43 SCRA 177

FACTS:

Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953.  They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days.  They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her.  They acquired properties during their marriage.  Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949.  She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. 

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok.  Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence.  However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969.  Her counsel duly notified the court of her death.  Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.  Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. 

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.

The petition of  Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union.  Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

G.R. No. 16902 : March 5, 2010Maria Virginia V. Remo,Petitioner, vs.The Honorable Secretary of ForeignAffairs,

FACTSMaria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose passport was then expiring on October 27, 2000 Being married to Francisco R. Rallonza the following entries appear:surname: Rallonza given name: Maria Virginia middle name: Remo Prior to expiry of her passport, the petitioner (marriage still subsists) applied for renewal in DFA Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. Petitioner’s request having been denied (#1), Atty. Manuel Joseph R. BretanaIII, representing petitioner, wrote on the Secretary of DFA expressing a similar request on August 28, 2000, DFA through Asst. Sec. Belen F. Anota, denied (#2) therequest, stating:“…it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husband’s name. Use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippines Passport Act of 1996 (RA 8239) clearly defines the conditions when a woman may revert to her maiden name, that is, of only incases annulment of marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remo’s case does not meet any of these conditions.”Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution wasdenied (#3) in a letter dated October 13, 2000 on November 15, 2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of thePresident. On July 27, 2004, the Office of the President dismissed (#4) theappeal with the same argument as the Asst. Secretary of DFA (RA 8239) The Office of the President further held that “in case of conflict between ageneral and special law, the latter will control over the former regardless of the respective dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general rule, itshould yield to RA 8239.” The petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration and on October 28, 2004,the Office of the President denied (#5) the motion.Petitioner filed with the court of Appeals for a petition for review and on May27, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied (#6) the petition and affirmed theruling of the Office of the President.Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied (#7)in its Resolution dated August 2, 2005.Hence, this petition.

ISSUES1. Whether the petitioner, who originally used her husband’s surname in

herpassport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacementpassport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.

2. Whether there is a conflict between the general law (Civil Code Article 370)and the special law (RA 8239).

RULES/LAW

1.Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of a married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides:A married woman may use:(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname, or(2) Her maiden first name and her husband’s surname, or(3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is hiswife, such as “Mrs.”2.RA 8239: The Implementing Rules and Regulations for PhilippinePassport Act of 1996Section 5.Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. No passport shall beissued to an applicant unless the Secretary or his duly authorized representativeis satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has complied with thefollowing requirements: xxx(d)In case of a woman who is married, separated, divorced, or widowed, or whose marriage has been annulled or declared by court as void, a copy of the certificate of marriage, court decree of separation, divorce or annulment or certificate of death of the

deceased spouse duly issued and authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar General: Provided, That in case of a divorce decree, annulment or declaration of marriage as void, the woman applicant may revert the use of her maiden name Provided, further, That such divorce is recognized under the existing laws of the Philippines; xxx3. Section I, Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8239 The passport can be amended only in the following cases:(a)Amendment of woman’s name due to marriage(b)Amendment of woman’s name due to death of spouse, annulment of marriage or divorce initiated by a foreign spouse; or(c)Change of surname of a child who is legitimated by virtue of a subsequent marriage of his parents4. The DFA allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt to her husband’s name5.In case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name.6.Once a the woman adopted her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in cases enumerated inspection 5(d) of RA 8239.APPLICATION1. The petitioner used her maiden first name and her husband’s last name, thus, Maria Virginia V. Remo. This is in accord to Article 370(2), Title XIII of the Civil Code of the Philippines.2.“…it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husband’s name. Use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippines Passport Act of 1996 (RA 8239) clearly defines the conditions when a woman may revert to her maiden name, that is, of only incases annulment of marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remo ‘case does not meet any of these conditions.” –DFA Asst. Sec. Belen F. Anota

CONCLUSION•No.Ms. Remo cannot revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage because she used her husband’s last name when she applied for her passport for the first time. According to the rule, upon renewal of passport, “a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name”. And “once a the woman adopted her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in cases enumerated in section 5(d) of RA 8239.”•No. There is no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code and Section5(d) of RA 8239.“Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is a general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that special law prevails over a general law.”• The Court

DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the May 27, 2005 Decision and August 2, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.87710.

Case: People vs Sansano and Ramos 59 Phil. 73

Facts of the Case: A and B, husband and wife, respectively, were legally married. Later, B abandoned A. B Lived with C. A did nothing to interfere with the relations of his wife and her paramour. He event went to Hawaii, completely abandoning his wife B for more than seven years. Later, A returned and charged B and C with adultery.

Issue: Is B guilty of adultery?

Decision of the Supreme Court: B should be acquitted because A's conduct warranted the inference that in truth, as well as in fact, he had consented to the philandering of his wife. - See more at: http://tubagbohol.mikeligalig.com/laws/filipina-wife-no-longer-guilty-of-adultery/#sthash.R8GmBlF6.dpuf

Laperal vs. RepublicGR No. 18008, October 30, 1962

FACTS:

The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March 1939.  However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses.  Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique.  During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria.  She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal.  This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code.  She was claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband.   

HELD:

In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum.  The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis.  It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated.  Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.

Petition was dismissed.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,,vs. RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, ET

Topic: Consent as a defense in an action for legal separation

FACTS:

May 15, 1926: accused Rodolfo married the complainant Elena RamirezCartagena After 7 years (due to incompatibility of characters) they agreed to liveseparately from each other May 25, 1935: they executed document agreement, which states that “Que ambos comparecientes convienen en vivir separados el uno del otro por el resto de su vida y se comprometen, y obligan reciprocamente a no molastarse ni intervenir ni mezclarse bajo ningun concepto en la vida publica o privada de los mismos, entre si, quendado cada uno de los otorgantes en completa libertad de accion en calquier acto y todos concepto. June 15, 1935: accused w/o leaving the Philippines secured a divorce decree from civil court of Juarez, Bravos District of Chihuahua Mexico

May 11, 1936: he contracted another marriage with co-accused JuliaMedel before the justice of the peace of Malabon because of the nullity of the divorce decree, complainant herein instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy and another for concubinage charge for bigamy culminated in the conviction of accused;

Meanwhile, before the trial for the charge of concubinage commenced, accused interposed the plea of double jeopardy and the case was initially dismissed; upon appeal, the CA held the dismissal before trial to be premature and without deciding the question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for trial on the merits

TC: Accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence

ISSUE: Whether the accused should be acquitted of concubinage in view of the agreement executed by Rodolfo and Elena upon their separation

HELD:

Yes. The agreement constituted a consent given by Elena to Rodolfo, hence, Rodolfo should be acquitted. Judgment is reversed.

No double jeopardy - the defense of bigamy for which he was convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial in the court are two distinct offenses in the law

BIGAMY: celebration of second marriage while the first still exists; offense against civil status which may be prosecuted at the instance of the state

CONCUBINAGE: mere cohabitation by the husband with a woman who is not his wife; offense against chastity and may be prosecuted only at the instance of the offended party Upon the other hand, the accused should have been acquitted of the crime of concubinage the document executed by and between the accused and the complainant in which they agreed , while illegal for the purpose for which it was executed , constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of concubinage within the meaning of Art. 344 of the RPC by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego the illicit acts of the other Previously, the court held that the consent which bars the offended party from instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of adultery,concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness is that which has been given expressly or impliedly after the crime has-been committed. However, in this case, the Court sees this to be a narrow view. As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must have been intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong Prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense

An agreement of the tenor entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the plain language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense Article 344 of the RPC provides: The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offender.

Vicente Benedicto vs. Esteban de La Rama

Jesus Tejico was born on the 6th day of August, 1894. His mother is Encarnacion Tejico. Isidro de la Rama died on the 10th of June, 1897. This action was brought on the 19th day of February, 1904, by Jesus Tejico, through his guardian, against the heirs of Isidro de la Rama, to compel the recognition of the plaintiff as the natural child of Don Isidro. The complaint was based upon the three cases mentioned in article 135 of the Civil Code. Judgment was entered in the court below in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff has brought this case here by bill of exceptions. There was no motion for a new trial made in the court below, but the appellant relies upon exceptions taken to rulings of the court excluding evidence.

The only document presented by the plaintiff to prove his case under the first paragraph of article 135 was the letter marked "Exhibit 8," which is as follows:

MANILA, 16 de Octubre de 1894.

MI QUERIDA CANA: Contesto tus cartas, que he recibido con bastante retrazo, y me alegro mucho que hayas salido del paso conservando al pequeño bien como yo deseo.

Cuanto deseo abrazarte pronto como tu sabes que la quiero pero los intereses de la case, como tu tambien los disgustos que me estan dando mis hijos que tu no ignoras, me detiene por ahora volver en esa, pero tan pronto mi animo calme enseguida me retiro, asi te suplico tenga un poco mas de paciencia porque sin duda ninguna procurare volver pronto y gozaremos, cuida al niño como Dios manda y procura conservar bien tu honra como es debido. Ten cuidado de no admitir mas visitas que el primo Santos y asi conservaras mi cariño de veras,, otro vapor te escribire mas extenso hoy no puedo disponer de tiempo.

Tuyo Isidro.

It as proved that this letter was in the handwriting of Don Isidro, and was addressed to the mother of the plaintiff. A reading of it is sufficient to show that in it Don Isidro did not expressly recognize the plaintiff as his child. (Buenaventura vs. Urbano1 (No. 2205), just decided.)

To prove his case under the second paragraph of article 135, plaintiff proved that Don Isidro de la Rama lived in Manila from the time of the birth of the plaintiff until the death of Don Isidro, and went to Iloilo only twice during that period. The plaintiff then offered to prove that upon one of his visits he went to the house of the mother of plaintiff, in Molo, asked where his child was, was taken into a room where the child was sleeping, and that he kissed the child, and said that it resembled his other son Isidro; that afterwards, on the same day, he gave to the mother of the child 150 pesos, which he said was for the support of the child until he should send more money. The court rejected this evidence, to which the plaintiff excepted.

The plaintiff also offered to prove that Don Isidro paid money for the support of the mother and the purchase of certain articles for her, before the child was born; that he visited Iloilo twice after the birth of the child; that on the first occasion he gave the mother for its support 150 pesos, and on the second 200 pesos; that he stated in these interviews to the mother, in the presence of other witnesses, that he was the father of the child, and that he would always take care of it; that afterwards he sent money from Manila to the mother in Molo, for the purpose of supporting and maintaining the child. The court rejected this evidence, to which the plaintiff excepted.

The plaintiff also offered in evidence twelve letters proved to have been written by Don Isidro to the mother of the plaintiff. These were all rejected, to the rejection of which the plaintiff excepted. Seven of them were In the others no mention whatever was made of the child. In the others no mention whatever was made of the child They indicate that certain relations existed between the mother of the plaintiff and Don Isidro, but nothing in regard to the plaintiff.

An examination of the case of Buenaventura vs. Urbano, above cited, will show that this evidence falls far short of proving the continuous possession of the status of a natural child. As was said in that case, it is not sufficient to prove that the defendant, Don Isidro, was the father of the child, and that is practically all that the evidence offered tended to show.

In the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez2 (2 Off. Gaz., 535), cited by the appellant in his brief, the court was considering the case of a child born before the Civil Code went into effect, and of the obligation of the mother to recognize it. It therefore has no bearing upon this case.

To support the complaint so far as it is based upon the third case mentioned in article 135, viz, the cases provided for by the Penal Code, the plaintiff offered to prove that in the year 1893 Don Isidro de la Rama visited the house of the mother at Molo, abducted her, and carried her away by force. The court rejected this evidence, to which ruling the plaintiff excepted.

Article 449 of the Penal Code provides as follows:

Los reos de violacion, estupro o rapto seran tambien condenados por via de indemnizacion:

1.º A dotar a la ofendida, si fuere soltera o viuda.

2.º A reconocer la prole, si la calidad de su origen no lo impidiere.

3.º En todo caso a mantener la prole.

This case presents the question whether the liability declared in that article of the Penal Code must be enforced exclusively in a criminal proceeding or whether it can be enforced in a civil proceeding, without resort to the criminal courts. No criminal prosecution was ever commenced against Don Isidro de la Rama during his lifetime for this alleged crime of abduction. It is evident that if this action can be maintained against the heirs of Isidro de la Rama, it could have been maintained against him in his lifetime without first proceeding against him criminally. The appellant has cited no authority to show that such action can be maintained, and we do not think any such exists. Manresa says in his commentaries on article 135 of the Civil Code that a civil action can not be maintained in such cases unless a final judgment in a criminal proceeding for abduction is attached to the complaint. (1 Commentaries on the Civil Code, p. 508.)

Alcubilla says:

O se limita a hacer eficaces las senticias en que se impone comopena el reconocimiento de la prole, conforme al articulo 464 del Codigo Penal. (Diccionario de la Administracion Española, vol. 6 p. 14.)

Groizard says:

El logico enlace de la ley criminal y de la ley civil en esta delicada materia, se demuestra por el articulo 135 del novisimo Codigo Civil. En el se fijan los casos

en que el padre esta obligado a reconocer al hijo natural y despues se añade: "En los casos de violacion, estupro o rapto, se estara a lo dispuesto en el Codigo Penal, en cuanto al reconocimiento de la prole." Lo cual equivale a decir que tambien el padre estara obligando a reconocer la prole cuando deba hacerlo, con areglo a lo que la ley penal tiene establecido. Pero como sobre la forma y medios de realizar ese reconocimiento, nada el Codigo Penal nos ha dicho, lo logico es que, una vez declarada por sentencia la obligacion, esta se consigne, en cuanto sea posible, en una de las formas legales, establecidas por el articulo 131 del Codigo Civil. (Codigo Penal, vol. 5, p. 259.)

Scaevola says, speaking of the exception in regard to the investigation of paternity, made in cases of abduction:

Tal exception es la consecuencia de un crimen, y de un crimen probado. (Comentarios al Codigo Civil, vol. 3, p. 184.)

As far as we have been able to ascertain, this is the first time that such a case as this was ever presented, and therefore it is not surprising that no judgments can be found relating to the question, and no positive statements by the commentators, but it is apparent that all of the commentators have taken it for granted that this liability was a consequence of a criminal prosecution, and that could not be enforced except by means of a criminal prosecution, or if attempted to be enforced in a civil suit there must necessarily exist a final judgment, rendered in a criminal case. We hold that this action can not be maintained on the ground that the crime of abduction was committed by Don Isidro de la Rama, he not having been prosecuted criminally for that act during his lifetime.

The contention of the appellant is that article 449 of the Penal Code imposes a civil responsibility upon the criminal, and by the terms of article 133 of the same code, that civil responsibility survives the death of the criminal. It is to be borne in mind, however, that the liability declared by article 449 can not exist independently of the crime, and we have just held in the cases of Infante vs. Figueras3 (No. 1884) andBuenaventura vs. Urbano et al. (No. 2205) that the fact of paternity, in cases where no crime is committed, imposes no liability upon the father. This is not true in those cases of civil responsibility mentioned in the other articles cited from the Penal Code.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant, and after the expiration of twenty days judgment should be entered in accordance herewith, and the case remanded to the court below for execution of said judgment. So ordered.

Matubis v. Praxedes

Facts:

Petitioner and respondent agreed to separate. Petitioner filed a complaint for legal separation and change of surname. In January 1955, respondent begun cohabitating with another. Petitioner instituted the complaint in April 1956.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the action had not yet prescribed.

2. Assuming it had not yet prescribed, WON the agreement amounts to consent precluding the action for legal separation.

Held:

1. No, it aready prescribed.

Article 102 of the new Civil Code provides:

An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the date when cause occurred.

2. Yes, there was are already an express consent.

The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. The law (Art. 100 Civil Code), specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy (People vs. Scheneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413).

Jimenez vs. CanizaresL-12790, August 31, 1960

FACTS:

Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Remedios Canizares on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ for copulation.  It has existed at the time of the marriage and continues to exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after the marriage.  The court summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the latter did not file any answer.  The wife was ordered to submit herself to physical examination and to file a medical certificate within 10 days.  She was given another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed lack of interest on her part and therefore rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the testimony of the husband.

HELD:

The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did not avail of the opportunity to defend herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly be concluded.  It is a well-known fact that women in this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly submit to a physical examination unless compelled by competent authority.  Such physical examination in this case is not self-incriminating.  She is not charged with any offense and likewise is not compelled to be a witness against herself.  Impotence being an abnormal condition should not be presumed.  The case was remanded to trial court.

WILLIAM H. BROWN, vs. JUANITA YAMBAO, 

On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment; that thereafter the spouse lived separately and later executed a document (Annex A ) liquidating their conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share. The complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage; that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and equitable.

Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court subsequently declared the wife in default, for failure to answer in due time, despite service of summons; and directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to—

investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, whether or not a collusion exists between the parties and to report to this Court the result of his investigation within fifteen (15) days from receipt of copy of this order. The City Fiscal or his representative is also directed to intervene in the case in behalf of the State. (Rec. App. p. 9).

As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-examined plaintiff Brown. His questions (strenuously objected to by Brown's counsel) elicited the fact that after liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that, while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code, providing:

ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation or of consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.

that there had been consent and connivance, and because Brown's action had prescribed under Article 102 of the same Code:

ART. 102 An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after date when such cause occurred.

since the evidence showed that the learned of his wife's infidelity in 1945 but only filed action in 1945.

Brown appeared to this Court, assigning the following errors:

The court erred in permitting the Assistant Fiscal Rafel Jose of Manila to act as counsel for the defendant, who defaulted.

The court erred in declaring that there was condonation of or consent to the adultery.

The court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.

Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him with regard to his marital relation with Lilia Deito, who was not his wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as consel for the defaulting wife, "when the power of the prosecuting officer is limited to finding out whether or not there is collusion, and if there is no collusion, which is the fact in the case at bar, to intervene for the state which is not the fact in the instant case, the truth of the matter being that he intervened for Juanita Yambao, the defendant-appellee, who is private citizen and who is far from being the state.".

The argument is untenable. Collusion in matrimonial cases being "the act of married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of agreement to defend divorce proceedings" (Cyclopedia Law Dictionary; Nelson, Divorce and Separation, Section 500), it was legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference that the wife's default was calculated, or agreed upon, to enable appellant to obtain the decree of legal separation that he sought without regard to the legal merits of his case. One such circumstance is obviously the fact of Brown's cohabitation with a woman other than his wife, since it bars him from claiming legal separation by express provision of Article 100 of the new Civil Code. Wherefore, such evidence of such misconduct, were proper subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be considered circumstantial evidence of collusion between the spouses.

The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be made depend upon the parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs, Cheong Gee, 43 Phil, 43; Ramirez vs. Gmur 42 Phil. 855; Goitia vs. Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It is consonant with this policy that the injury by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not.

The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation can not be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion.

It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.

Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying the remedy sought (commission of similar offense by petitioner and prescription of the action), it becomes unnecesary to delve further into the case and ascertain if Brown's inaction for ten years also evidences condonation or connivance on his part. Even if it did not, his situation would not be improved. It is thus needless to discuss the second assignment of error.

The third assignment of error being a mere consequence of the others must necessarily fail with them.

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

MANUEL J. C. REYES, petitioner, vs.HON. LEONOR INES-LUCIANO, as Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, Quezon City, COURT OF APPEALS and CELIA ILUSTRE-REYES, 

 

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 06928-SP entitled "Manuel J. C. Reyes, petitioner, versus, The Hon. Leonor Ines-Luciano as Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court (Quezon City) and Celia Ilustre-Reyes, Respondents", dismissing the petition to annul the order of the respondent Judge directing the petitioner to give support pendente lite to his wife, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, private respondent herein, in the amount of P40,000.00 a month. 1

The private petitioner, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City a complaint dated June 3, 1976 against her husband, Manuel J. C. Reyes, for legal separation on the ground that the defendant had attempted to kill plaintiff. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are:

6.8 On March 10, 1976, defendant went to V. Ilustre and attacked plaintiff. He pummeled her with fist blows that floored her, then held her head and, with intent to kill, bumped it several times against the cement floor. When she ran upstairs to her father for protection, he pushed her at the stairway of 13 flights and she fell sliding to the ground floor. Determined to finish her off, he again gave her a strong swing at her abdomen which floored her half unconscious. Were it not for plaintiff's father, he would have succeeded killing her;

6.9. On May 26, 1976, although on May 11 previous she ceased holding office with defendant at Bel-Air Apartments elsewhere adverted to, she went thereto to get her overnight bag. Upon seeing her, defendant yelled at her to get out of the office. When he did not mind him, he suddenly doused her with a glass of grape juice, kicked her several times that landed at her back and nape, and was going to hit her with a steel tray as her driver, Ricardo Mancera, came due to her screams for help. For fear of further injury and for life, she rushed to Precinct 5 at united Nations Avenue, Manila Metropolitan Police, for assistance and protection; 2

The plaintiff asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children. The defendant, petitioner herein, opposed the application for support pendente lite on the ground that his wife had committed adultery with her physician.

The application for support pendente lite was set for hearing and submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and the documents attached thereto by the parties.

The respondent Judge issued an order dated March 15, 1977 granting plaintiff's prayer for alimony pendente litein the amount of P5,000.00 a month commencing from June 1976. 3

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to support during the pendency of the case, and, alleging that even if she entitled, the amount awarded was excessive. The respondent Judge reduced the amount from P5,000.00 to P44,00.00 a month in an order dated June 17, 1977. 4

Manuel J. C. Reyes filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals dated July 25, 1977 asking that the order granting support pendente lite to private respondent. Celia Ilustre-Reyes, be annulled on the ground that the respondent Judge, Leonor Ines-Luciano, had committed a grave abuse of discretion or that said order be modified inasmuch as the amount awarded as support pendente lite is excessive.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because:

Considering the plight of the wife during the pendency of the case for legal separation and that the husband appears to be financially capable of giving the support, We believe that the petitioner has not presented a clear case of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent in issuing the questioned orders. We see no compelling reason to give it due course. 5

The petitioner contends that the Court of Appeal committed the following error:

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN A MANNER AMOUNTING IT CAN ERROR OF LAW AND A DEPARTURE FROM THE ACCEPTED NORMS LAID DOWN BY THIS HON. COURT IN THE CASES WE SHALL LATER ON DISCUSS, IN REFUSING TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE ORIGINAL PETITION FOR certiorari HEREIN AGAINST RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES, AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDERS FOR SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE ANNEXES "F" AND "H" OF THIS PETITION WHEN HELD THAT RESPONDENT-APPELLEE JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT ANY ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING SAID ORDERS, FOR THE REASONS THAT:

A. IN ACTIONS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION THE WIFE IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM THE HUSBAND DESPITE THE FACT THAT A CASE FOR ADULTERY HAD BEEN FILED BY THE HUSBAND AGAINST HER; AND

B. IN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE COURT ASCERTAIN THE KIND AND AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE EVEN BY AFFIDAVITS ONLY OR OTHER DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE APPEARING IN THE RECORDS. 6

It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support however, the alleged adultery of wife must be established by competent evidence. The allegation that the wife has committed adultery will not bar her from the right receive support pendente lite. Adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained wig defeat the action. 7

In the instant case, at the hearing of the application for support pendente lite before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court presided by the respondent Judge, Hon. Leonor Ines-Luciano the petitioner did not present any evidence to prove the allegation that his wife, private respondent Celia Ilustre-Reyes, had committed adultery with any person.

The petitioner has still the opportunity to adduce evidence on the alleged adultery of his wife when the action for legal separation is heard on the merits before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City. It is to be noted however, that as pointed out by the respondents in their comment, the "private respondent was not asking support to be taken from petitioner's personal funds or wherewithal, but from the conjugal property—which, was her documentary evidence ...". 8 It is, therefore, doubtful whether adultery will affect her right to alimonypendente lite. In Quintana vs. Lerma, 9 the action for support was based on the obligation of the husband to support his wife.

The contention of the petitioner that the order of the respondent Judge granting the private respondent support pendente lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month is not supported by the allegations of the complaint for legal separation and by competent evidence has no merit.

The complaint or legal separation contains allegations showing that on at least two occasions the defendant, petitioner herein, had made attempts to kill the private respondent. Thus it is alleged that on March 10, 1976, the defendant attacked plaintiff, pummeled her with fist blows that floored her, held her head and with intent to kill, bumped it several times against the cement floor and when she ran upstairs to her father for protection, the petitioner pushed her at the stairway of thirteen (13) flights and she fell sliding to the ground floor and defendant gave her a strong swing at her abdomen which floored her half unconscious and were it not for plaintiff's father, defendant would have succeeded in killing her. 10 It is also alleged that on May 26, 1976, the defendant doused Celia Ilustre-Reyes with a glass of grape juice, kicked her several times at her back and nape and was going to hit her with a steel tray if it were not for her driver who came due to her creams for help." 11

In fixing the amount of monthly support pendente lite of P4,000,00, the respondent judge did not act capriciously and whimsically. When she originally fixed the amount of P5,000.00 a month, the respondent Judge considered the following:

On record for plaintiff's cause are the following: that she and defendant were married on January 18, 1958; that she is presently unemployed and without funds, thus, she is being supported by her father with whom she resides: that defendant had been maltreating her and Cried to kill her; that all their conjugal properties are in the possession of defendant who is also president, Manager and Treasurer of their corporation namely:

1. Standard Mineral Products, which was incorporated on February 9, 1959: presently with paid-in capital of P295,670.00; assets and liabilities of P757,108.52; Retained Earnings of P85,654.61: and majority stockholder is defendant;

2. Development and Technology Consultant Inc. incorporated on July 12, 1971, with paid-in capital of P200,000.00; Assets and liabilities of P831,669.34; defendant owns 99% of the stocks; and last Retained Earnings is P98,879.84.

3. The Contra-Prop Marine Philippines, Inc. which was incorporated on October 3, 1975, with paid-in capital of P100,000 defendant owns 99% of the stocks.

To secure some of the of said Agreement of Counter-Guaranty Mortgage with Real Estate, and Real Estate Mortgage were undertaken by plaintiff of their properties outside of other accommodations; and that she needs of P5,000.00 a month for her support in accordance with their station in life. 12

The amount of support pendente lite was reduced to P4,000.00 inasmuch as the children are in the custody of the petitioner and are being supported by him.

It is thus seen that the respondent judge acted with due deliberation before fixing the amount of support pendente lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month.

In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite it is not necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind

and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered. Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for supportpendente lite. 13 It is enough the the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. 14

The private respondent has submitted documents showing that the corporations controlled by the petitioner have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of the Ministry of Public Highways.

Considering the high cost of living due to inflation and the financial ability of the petitioner as shown by the documents of record, We find that the amount of P4,000.00 a month granted by the respondent Judge as alimonypendente lite to the private respondent is not excessive. There is no showing that the respondent Judge has committed a grave abuse of discretion in granting said support.

In a resolution dated July 31, 1978, this Court issued a temporary restraining order effective immediately against the enforcement of the lower court's order giving support pendente lite to private respondent in the sum of P4,000.00 monthly commencing June 1976 and in lieu thereof to allow such support only to the extent of P1,000.00 a month. 15

Later the petitioner was required to pay the support at the rate of P1,000.00 a month which had accumulated since June 1976 within ten (10) days from notice of the resolution: 16

The private respondent acknowledged on November 20, 1978 having received from the petitioner, through his counsel a check in the amount of P30,000.00 as payment of support for the period from June 1976 to November 1978 or thirty (30) months at P1,000.00 a month in compliance with the resolution of this Court dated October 9, 1978.

In view of the foregoing, the support of P4,000.00 should be made to commence or, March 1, 1979.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby denied and the decision of the Council of Appeals sought to be reviewed is affirmed with the modification that the support pendente lite at the rate of Four Thousand Pesos (P4.000.00) a month should commence from March 1, 1979 without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

 

G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970

ELENA CONTRERAS,  vs.CESAR J. MACARAIG, 

DIZON, J.:

Appeal taken by Elena Contreras from a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 00138 dismissing her complaint upon the ground that the same was filed more than one year from and after the date on which she had become cognizant of the cause for legal separation.

The following, facts found by the trial court are not in dispute:

Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the Catholic Church of Quiapo, Manila. Out of their Marriage, three children were born: Eusebio C. Macaraig, on January 11, 1953; Victoria C. Macaraig, on March 26, 1956; and Alexander C. Macaraig, on August 4, 1958. All the children are in the care of plaintiff wife.

Sometime in 1958, the couple acquired rights, as lessee and purchaser under a conditional sale agreement, to own a house and lot, known as Lot 4, Block 8 of the Philamlife Homes in Quezon City which they transferred in favor of their three children on October 29, 1958 (Exh. F). Installment payments are being made by plaintiff's father. The spouses own no other conjugal property.

Immediately before the election of 1961, defendant was employed as manager of the printing establishment owned by plaintiff's father known as the MICO Offset. In that capacity, defendant met and came to know Lily Ann Alcala, who place orders with MICO Offset for propaganda materials for Mr. Sergio Osmeña, who was then a Vice-Presidential candidate. After the elections of 1961, defendant resigned from MICO Offset to be a special agent at Malacañang. He began to be away so often and to come home very late. Upon plaintiff's inquiry, defendant explained that he was out on a series of confidential missions.

In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. When defendant, the following October, returned to the conjugal home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos' report from defendant in her desire not to anger nor drive defendant away. Although plaintiff, in April 1963, also received rumors that defendant was seen with a woman who was on the family way on Dasmariñas St., she was so happy that defendant again return to the family home in May, 1963 that she once more desisted from discussing the matter with him because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away. All this while, defendant, if and whenever he returned to the family fold, would only stay for two or three days but would be gone for a period of about a month.

After plaintiff received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth to a baby, she sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her father's employee, to verify the reports. The latter was driven by Lubos to the house in Singalong and between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock that afternoon, she saw defendant was

carrying a baby in his arms. Mrs. Antioquia then went to the parish priest of Singalong where she inquired about the child of Cesar Macaraig and Lily Ann Alcala and she was given a copy of the baptismal certificate of Maria Vivien Mageline Macaraig (Exh. G) which she gave to plaintiff sometime in October, 1963.

Plaintiff then entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to convince him to return to his family. Mr. Macaraig, after talking to his son and seeking him with the latter's child told plaintiff that he could not do anything.

In November, 1963, plaintiff requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs. Enriqueta Majul, and the latter obliged and arranged a meeting at her home in Buendia between plaintiff and Lily Ann Alcala. Lily Ann said she was willing to give up defendant as she had no desire to be accused criminally but it was defendant who refused to break relationship with her.

In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children, Victoria and Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia Lagronio went to talk to defendant at his place of work on España Extension in front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to Victoria Peak, a nearby restaurant, where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.

On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation. When defendant did not interpose any answer after he was served summons, the case was referred to the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to the provisions of Article 101 of the Civil Code. After a report was received from Asst. Fiscal Primitivo M. Peñaranda that he believed that there was no collusion present, plaintiff was allowed to present her evidence. Defendant has never appeared in this case.

The reasons relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the complaint are set forth in the appealed decision as follows:

Under the facts established by plaintiff's evidence, although the infidelity of the husband is apparent, yet the case will have to be dismissed. Article 102 provides that, an action for legal separation cannot be instituted except within one year after plaintiff "became cognizant of the cause." In the absence of a clear-cut decision of the Supreme Court as to the exact import of the term "cognizant," the practical application of said Article can be attended with difficulty. For one thing; that rules might be different in case of adultery, which is an act, and for concubinage, which may be a situation or a relationship.

In respect of concubinage, the word 'cognizant' may not connote the date when proof thereof sufficient to establish the cause before a court of law is possessed. Otherwise, the one year period would be meaningless for practical purposes because all a wife would have to do would be to claim that the necessary proof was secured only within one year before the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, it should be hard to concede that what the law envisages (and, in a way, encourages) is the filing of a complaint within one year after the innocent spouses has received

information of the other's infidelity, howsoever baseless the report might be.

The Court believes that the correct rule lies between the two extremes. At the time a wife acquired information, which can be reasonably relied upon as true, that her husband is living in concubinage with another woman, the one-year period should be deemed to have started even if the wife shall not then be in possession of proof sufficient to establish the concubinage before a court of law. The one-year period may be viewed, inter alia, as an alloted time within which proof should be secured. It is in the light of this rule that the Court will determine whether or not plaintiff's action for legal separation has prescribed.

After her husband resigned from MICO Offset to be a special agent in Malacañan, subsequent to the elections of 1961, he would seldom come home. He allayed plaintiff's suspicions with the explanation that he had been away on 'confidential missions.' However, in September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, plaintiff's driver, reported to plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. As a matter of fact, it was also Lubos who brought Mrs. F. Antioquia (when plaintiff had asked to verify the reports) to the house in Singalong where she saw defendant, Lily Ann and the baby.

The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one year after the date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the essence of the cause of action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable social institution so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of its status.

In the instant action, the Court has to find that plaintiff became cognizant of defendant's infidelity in September, 1962. Plaintiff made successive attempts to induce the husband to amend his erring ways but failed. Her desire to bring defendant back to the connubial fold and to preserve family solidarity deterred her from taking timely legal action.

The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should be counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from September 1962 or from December 1963. Computing the period of one year from the former date, it is clear that plaintiff's complaint filed on December 14, 1963 came a little too late, while the reverse would be true if said period is deemed to have commenced only in the month of December 1963.

The period of "five years from after the date when such cause occurred" is not here involved.

Upon the undisputed facts it seems clear that, in the month of September 1962, whatever knowledge appellant had acquired regarding the infidelity of her husband, that is, of the fact that he was then living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala, was only through the information given to her by Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car. Much as such hearsay information had pained and anguished her, she apparently thought it best — and no reasonable person may justifiably blame her for it — not to go deeper into the matter herself because in all probability even up to that time, notwithstanding her husband's obvious neglect of his entire family, appellant still cherished the hope — however forlorn — of his coming back home to them. Indeed, when her husband returned to the conjugal home the following October, she purposely refrained from bringing up the matter of his marital infidelity "in her desire not to anger nor drive

defendant away" — quoting the very words of the trial court. True, appellant likewise heard in April 1963 rumors that her husband was seen with a woman on the family way on Dasmariñas Street, but failed again to either bring up the matter with her husband or make attempts to verify the truth of said rumors, but this was due, as the lower court itself believed, because "she was so happy that defendant again returned to the family home in May 1963 that she once more desisted from discussing the matter with him because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away." As a matter of fact, notwithstanding all these painful informations which would not have been legally sufficient to make a case for legal separation — appellant still made brave if desperate attempts to persuade her husband to come back home. In the words of the lower court, she "entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to convince him to return to his family" and also "requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs. Enriqueta Majul" for the same purpose, but all that was of no avail. Her husband remained obdurate.

After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the only time when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of December 1963 when, quoting from the appealed decision, the following happened —

In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children, Victoria and Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia Lagronio went to talk to defendant at his place of work on España Extension in front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to Victoria Peak, a nearby restaurant, where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.

From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the preceding paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the legal period of one year must be deemed to have commenced.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside and another is hereby rendered holding that appellant is entitled to legal separation as prayed for in her complaint; and the case is hereby remanded to the lower court for appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.

G.R. No. L-37720             March 27, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.URSULA SENSANO and MARCELO RAMOS, 

BUTTE, J.:

The appellants were sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte for the crime of adultery to three years, six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional and appealed to this court, assigning the following error: "The court below erred in not holding that the offended husband contested to the adultery committed by his wife Ursula Sensano in that he refused to live with her after she extinguished her previous sentence for the same offense, and by telling her then that she could go where she wanted to and do what she pleased, and by his silence for seven years notwithstanding that he was informed of said adultery."

The facts briefly stated as follows:

Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. They had one child. Shortly after the birth of his child, the husband left his wife to go to the Province of Cagayan where he remained for three years without writing to his wife or sending her anything for the support of herself and their son. Poor and illiterate, without relatives upon whom she could call, she struggled for an existence for herself and her son until a fatal day when she met the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child to live with him. On the return of the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge against his wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to four months and one day of arresto mayor. The court, in its decision, stated the following: "In the opinion of the court, the husband of the accused has been somewhat cruel in his treatment of his wife having abandoned her as he did." After completing her sentence, the accused left her paramour. She thereupon appealed to this municipal president and the justice of the peace to send for her husband so that she might ask his pardon and beg him to take her back. At the house of the president she begged his pardon and promised to be a faithful wife it he would take care her back. He refused to pardon her to live with her and said she could go where she wished, that he would have nothing more to do with her, and she could do as she pleased. Abandoned for the second time, she and her child went back to her coaccused Marcelo Ramos (this was in the year 1924) and they have lived with him ever since. The husband, knowing that she resumed living with her codefendant in 1924, did nothing to interfere with their relations or to assert his rights as husband. Shortly thereafter he left for the Territory of Hawaii where she remained for seven years completely abandoning his said wife and child. On his return to these Islands, he presented the second charge of adultery here involved with the sole purpose, as he declared, of being able to obtain a divorce under the provisions of Act No. 2710.

Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraphs 1 and 2, are as follows:

Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. — The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.

The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.

Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose when he signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have come to the conclusion that the

evidence in this case and his conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between the accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding.

We cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the seven years of acquiescence on his part in the adultery of his wife is explained by his absence from the Philippine Islands during which period it was impossible for him to take any action against the accused. There is no merit in the argument that it was impossible for the husband to take any action against the accused during the said seven years.

The judgment below is reversed with costs de oficio.

LACSON VS LACSON

Facts:

- Feb 14, 1953 – when they got married

- Jan 9, 1963 – when Carmen (respondent) left home in Bacolod to go to Manila

- March 12, 1963 – Carmen filed a complaint for custody of children as well as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila

o Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two eldest kids would go to petitioner Alfonso and the youngest would stay with Carmen

o This was affirmed by the CFI

- May 7, 1963 – respondent filed a motion for the custody of all children be given to her in JDRC since she said she only entered into agreement to gain custody of her younger children and thus should be given custody of the older ones as well who are all below 7 years old.

- CA: ruled that compromise agreement as relating to custody of children should be declared null and void and as such the execution of said judgment is void too.

ISSUE: Whether or Not support should be awarded to the wife

HELD: Yes, should have but was filed out of time

- NCC Art 363 - "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure."

o Older children at that time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have been declared null and void since no compelling reasons were stated otherwise

o However the children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old may choose which parent they want to live with (sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, as long as above ten) – already 1968

o Court may also award custody to who they deem more fit through evidence.

Art 356 of the NCC - Every child:

(1) Is entitled to parental care;

(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;

(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;

(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development.

- However even if custody should have been null and void, the rest of the agreement is valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership since it had judicial sanction. (art 190/191 of NCC)

Corroborated by already 5-year separation.

MAQUILAN vs. MAQUILAN Case DigestVIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007 

FACTS: Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latter's paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime charged. 

Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. 

Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed. 

ISSUE: Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for her to share in the conjugal property? 

HELD: No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction: 

Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos. 

Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides: 

Art. 43. Prision correccional — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. 

It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.

Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012

FACTS: Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in 1977. They had no separate properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage, they produced four children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal age), the three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.

The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to the respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigido’s share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the FC.

A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.

After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define “Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.”

Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that NET PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC. However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couple’s property relations.

HELD: Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of exchange of martial vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between them is the system of relative community or the conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property relation, “the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work and industry. The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.

.

Valdes vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.  Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity.  Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”.  During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership.  Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.  A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family. 

ALAIN M. DIÑO v. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO

October 25, 2012 §   Leave a comment

FACTS:January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological incapacity under article 36. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him. The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio.

The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it to” A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code”

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code

HELD:The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is voidAll these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Carino vs carino

Facts:

In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao Cariño. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cariño. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was  solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4’s funeral.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.

HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.  Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.  For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.  These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party – this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.

Alcazar v Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009

FACTS: Veronica and Rey got married. After their wedding, they lived in Rey’s house in Occidental Mindoro. Then they returned to Manila, but Rey did not live with Veronica in her home in Tondo. Rey then left for Riyahd where he was working. He never contacted his wife since he left. About a year and a half, Veronica was informed that her husband is coming home. But she was surprised that he did not go directly to her in Tondo but to his house in Mindoro instead. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code. Respondent has been uncooperative to the investigation. Dr. Tayag testified that Rey was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, hence, it is a sufficient ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. RTC denied. CA also denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE W/N the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marriage obligations

HELD: SC denied. The action originally filed was annulment of marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code. Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate.[16] Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse. No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. Petitioner was actually seeking for declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. he Court declared that “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (

Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 132955    October 27, 2006PROCEDURAL   HISTORY: This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:In April 1988, Orlando Villanueva married Lilia Canalita- Villanueva before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orlando filed before the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia who was then pregnant. Orlando anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to Lilia. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from Lilia and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by Lilia and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her. On the other hand Lilia denied Orlando’s allegations and she said that Orlando freely cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows Orlando’s affection and care towards her.

ISSUE:(a)   Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent under Article 45 of the Family Code; and

ANSWER: No. The court ruled that vitiation of consent is not attendant in this case.Therefore, the petition for annulment, which is anchored to his allegation that he did not freely give his consent, should be dismissed. REASONING:The SC ruled that Orlando’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is obvious that Orlando is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed.

On the merits of the case, Orlando’s allegation of fear was not concretely established. The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as

well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with Lilia.

HOLDING:Thus, the petition for annulment was granted, but the award of moral and exemplary damages is deleted for lack of basis.

TITLE: ONE ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner vs. LUCITA ONG, respondentDATE: October 2006PONENTE: J. Austria-Martinez

FACTS:

William Ong and Lucita Ong were married on July 13, 1975. Union was blessed with3 children. On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation under Art 55 (1) of FC on grounds of physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct of petitioner. RTC granted prayer for legal separation. CA upheld RTC’s decision when herein petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The climax of the couple’s drama was on December 14, 1995 when the respondent asked petitioner to bring Kingston, their son, back from Bacolod which turned into a violent quarrel with the petitioner hitting the respondent on the head, left cheek, eye, stomach, arms, and ultimately pointing a gun at respondent’s head askingher to leave the conjugal house.

ISSUES: Whether or not CA erred in upholding the RTC’s decision granting legal separationto Lucita when she herself has given ground for legal separation when abandoned her family.

HELD: No.RATIO: It is true that a decree of legal separation should not be granted when both parties have given ground for legal separation (Art 56 (4) FC). However, the abandonment referred to inthe Familu Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. Also, it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct which does not constitute the abandonment contemplated in the said provision

.DISPOSITION: Petition denied for lack of merit.

Mario Siochi vs. Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Elvira Gozon Inter-Deimensional Realty, Inc; GR No. 169900; March 18, 2010

FACTS: Alfredo and Elvira are married. Winifred is their daughter. The property involved in this case is a 30,000 sq. m. lot in Malabon which is registered in the name of Alfredo. The property regime of the couple is conjugal partnership of gains.

Elvira filed for legal separation. B filed a notice of lis pendens over the title of the lot in Malabon. 

While the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo entered into an agreement with Mario who paid P5 million in earnest money and took possession of the property. Title still with notice of lis pendens. 

Cavite RTC granted legal separation. CPG was dissolved andliquidated. Alfredo, the guilty spouse, did not receive his share in the net profits, which instead went to their daughter, Winifred. Cavite RTC ruled land in Malabon as conjugal property. 

Alfred executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favour of Winifred. Malabon RTC issued new TCT in the name of Winifred without annotating the agreement between Alfredo and Mario Siochi, nor the notice of lis pendens filed by Elvira, the wife. Then, through an SPA, Winifred gave authority to her father, Alfred, to sell the lot. Alfred sold it to Inter-Dimensional Realty for P18 million. A TCT was issued to Inter-Dimensional Realty. 

Mario filed a case with Malabon RTC (property was in Malabon) to Annul donation to Winifred, Annul the Sale to Inter-Dimensional, and to remove notice of lis pendens over title of land. 

Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell between Mario and Alfredo and declared void the sale by Alfredo and Winifred to Inter-Dimensional. 

However, Court of Appeals said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is void because (1) it was entered into without the consent of Elvira, Alfredo’s wife; and, (2) Alfredo’s ½ undivided share has been forfeited in favour of Winifred by the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. (Note these reasons given by the CA.) 

ISSUES:

(1) Was the agreement between Mario and Alfredo valid? Mario argues that even if the sale to Mario was done without the consent of Elvira, the sale should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Mario alleges that Elvira’s conduct showed her acquiescence to the sale. 

SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and Alfredo as void. Under Art 124 of the Family Code, if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber the properties which require a court order or the written consent of the other spouse. The agreement is void in its entirety, not just to the share of the husband, Alfredo. The Court however said that the CA erred in saying that the ½ undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in favour of Winifred. As regards Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was

already withdrawn. 

The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his ½ share in the conjugal property as a result of the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal separation) in relation to Art 43(2) (Effects of termination of subsequent marriage) provides that the guilty spouse in legal separation forfeits his share in the net profits of the property. The Court said, “Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugalpartnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugalpartnership property.” Thus, as regards this point, the CA erred. 

(2) Was the donation to Winifred valid? No, the donation was not valid. Elvira’s consent was absent. 

(3) Was the sale to Inter-Dimensional valid? Inter-Dimensional says it is a buyer in good faith. SC says no. Inter-Dimensional knew of the notice of lis pendens.

JOAQUINO v. REYES 434 SCRA 260

FACTS: Respondent Reyes is the widow of Rodolfo Reyes. Reyes had illicit relations with petitioner Joaquino. A property in BF Homes Paranaque was executed in favor of Joaquino. Joaquino had no means to pay for this property. The funds used to purchase this property were earnings of Reyes from his position as corporate executive and from a loan secured fromCommonwealth Insurance Corporation. Joaquino and Reyes had 3 illegitimate children.

HELD:Article 148 is the property regime that will apply in case where the partners have a legal impediment to marry each other. In this property regime, only theproperty acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. The registration of a property in the name of the paramour who had no income whatsoever at the time of the donation by ahusband is tantamount to a donation which is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. The paramour then holds the property under a constructive trustunder Article 1456 in favor of the conjugal partnership of the husband with the legitimate spouse. Status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent�s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action such as in a case for recovery of property.

Ching vs Goyanko Digest

Facts: 

Joseph Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz were married. During the marriage, they acquire a certain property in Cebu. In 1993, Joseph executed a deed of sale over the property in favor of his common-law-wife Maria B. Ching. After Joseph's death, his children with Epifania discovered the sale. They thus filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint for recovery of property and damages against Ching, praying for the nullification of the deed of sale and of the TCT and the issuance of a new one in favor of their father Goyanko.

Issue: 

Was the sale made by Joseph Goyanko in favor of his common-law wife valid?

Held: 

No. The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common law relationships.

Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause, object, or purposes is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning.

Article 1352 also provides that: “Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.”

Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling  property to each other subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, “the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.”

As the conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in favor of his common- law-wife, it was null and void. 

ABALOS VS MACATANGAY, JR.Posted by kaye lee on 10:00 PM

G.R. No. 155043 September 30 2004

FACTS:

Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land with improvements. Arturo made a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in favor of Macatangay, binding himself to sell to latter the subject property and not to offer the same to any other party within 30 days from date. Full payment would also be effected as soon as possession of the property shall have been turned over to Macatangay. Macatangay gave an earnest money amounting to P5,000.00 to be deducted from the purchase price of P1,300,000.00 in favor of the spouses.

Subsequently, Arturo and Esther had a marital squabble brewing at that time and Macatangay, to protect his interest, made an annotation in the title of the property. He then sent a letter informing them of his readiness to pay the full amount of the purchase price. Esther, through her SPA, executed in favor of Macatangay, a Contract to sell the property to the extent of her conjugal interest for the sum of P650,000 less the sum already received by her and Arturo. She agreed to surrender the property to Macatangay within 20 days along with the deed of absolute sale upon full payment, while he promised to pay the balance of the purchase price for P1, 290,000.00 after being placed in possession of the property. Macatangay informed them that he was ready to pay the amount in full. The couple failed to deliver the property so he sued the spouses.

RTC dismissed the complaint, because the SPA could not have authorized Arturo to sell the property to Macatangay as it was falsified. CA reversed the decision, ruling the SPA in favor of Arturo, assuming it was void, cannot affect the transaction between Esther and Macatangay. On the other hand, the CA considered the RMOA executed by Arturo valid to effect the sale of his conjugal share in the property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale of property is valid.

RULING:

No. Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no indication that they have adopted a different property regime, their property relations would automatically be governed by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The subject land which had been admittedly acquired during the marriage of the spouses forms part of their conjugal partnership.

Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. This right is clearly granted to him by law. More, the husband is the sole administrator. The wife is not entitled as of right to joint administration.

The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as administrator of the conjugal partnership, cannot validly alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. Similarly, the wife cannot dispose of any property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the conformity of the husband. The law is explicit that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law.

More significantly, it has been held that prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or “remanente liquido” (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.

The Family Code has introduced some changes particularly on the aspect of the administration of the conjugal partnership. The new law provides that the administration of the conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal partnership, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. However, the power of administration does not include the power to dispose or encumber property belonging to the conjugal partnership. In all instances, the present law specifically requires the written consent of the other spouse, or authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal partnership property without which, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.

Inescapably, herein Arturo’s action for specific performance must fail. Even on the supposition that the parties only disposed of their respective shares in the property, the sale, assuming that it exists, is still void for as previously stated, the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non habet. No one can give what he has not.

CASE DIGESTTHELMA A. JADER-MANALO vs. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA

G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002.

FACTS: 

Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the properties of the respondents from the husband of Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent Edilberto Camaisa. After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price and terms of payment. The agreement handwritten by the petitioner was signed by Edilberto, with assurance from him that he would secure his wife’s consent. Petitioner was later on surprised when she was informed that respondent spouses were backing out of the agreement. Hence, she filed a complaint for specific performance and damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's written consent.

HELD: 

Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: “In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.”

The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must be obtained. Respondent Norma Camaisa did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. She may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties, however that is not sufficient to demonstrate consent.

Pelayo vs. PerezG.R. No. 141323

Facts: David Pelayo through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed a deed of sale and transferred to Melki Perez two parcel of agricultural lands. Loreza Pelayo and another one whose signature is eligible witnesses such execution of deed.Loreza signed only on the third page in the space provided for witnesses, as such, Perez application was denied.Perez asked Loreza to sign on the first and should pages of the deed of sale but she refused. He then filed a complaint for specific performance against the Pelayo spouses.The spouses moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground for lack of marital consent as provided by art166 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale was null and viol for lack of marital consent.

Held: Under Art 173, in relation to Art166, both of the NCC, W/C was still in effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract viol of initio but Merely violable. Said provisions of law provide:Art 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compass mentis or a spedthriff, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a lepresarium, the husband connot alienate or encumber any real property not the Longugal property w/o the wife’s consent. It she refuses nreasonable to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.Art 173. The wife may during the marriage and w/in 10 years the transaction questioned, ask the court for the annulment of any contract of the husband w/c tends to defraud her or impair interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right she her heir, after the dissolution of the marriage may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.

PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, Petitioners, vs.MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK D'WIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:

For review are the Decision1 dated February 21, 2002 and the Resolution2 dated October 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54560. The appellate court modified the Decision3 dated September 26, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 15.

Simply stated, the facts as found by the Court of Appeals4 are as follows:

Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.

In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, located at Kamuning Street, Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471.

Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. The house was finished in the early 1980’s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex.

In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale5 dated June 21, 1991. It appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name.

On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school, Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance with petitioners6 began transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment.

When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from entering it. They waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought help from the Talomo Police Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her children, so much so that one flunked at school. Thus, respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and Attorney’s Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction7 against Pedro and herein petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City.

During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that they bought the house and lot from Pedro, and that her husband, petitioner Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles when they bought the property.

On September 26, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of herein respondent Mary Ann P. Villa Abrille as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The sale of lot 8 covered by TCT No. 26471 by defendant Pedro Abrille appearing in the Deed of Sale marked as Exh. "E" is void as to one half or 277.5 square meters representing the share of plaintiff Mary Villa Abrille.

2. That sale of Lot 7 covered by TCT No. [88674] by defendant Pedro Villa Abrille in the Deed of Sale (Exh. "A") is valid as to one half or 277.5 square meters of the 555 square meters as one half belongs to defendant Pedro Abrille but it is void as to the other half or 277.5 square meters as it belongs to plaintiff Mary Abrille who did not sell her share nor give her consent to the sale.

3. That sale of the house mentioned in the Deed of Sale (Exh. "A") is valid as far as the one half of the house representing the share of defendant Pedro Abrille is concerned but void as to the other half which is the share of plaintiff Mary Abrille because she did not give her consent/sign the said sale.

4. The defendants shall jointly pay the plaintiffs.

4. A. Seventeen Thousand Pesos (P17,000.00) representing the value of the movables and belonging[s] that were lost when unknown men unceremoniously and without their knowledge and consent removed their movables from their house and brought them to an apartment.

4. B. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P 100,000.00) to plaintiff Mary Abrille as moral damages.

4. C. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to each of the four children as moral damages, namely:

a) Ingrid Villa Abrille – Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), b) Ingremark Villa Abrille – Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), c) Ingresoll Villa Abrille – Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and d) Ingrelyn Villa Abrille – Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

5. Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages by way of example and correction for the public good.

6. The costs of suit.8

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1. The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 26471 in favor of defendants spouses Wilfredo and Patrocinia Ravina is declared valid.

2. The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 88674 in favor of said defendants spouses Ravina, together with the house thereon, is declared null and void.

3. Defendant Pedro Abrille is ordered to return the value of the consideration   for the lot covered by TCT No. 88674 and the house thereon to co-defendants spouses Ravina.

4. Defendants spouses Ravina [a]re ordered to reconvey the lot and house covered by TCT No. 88674 in favor of spouses Pedro and Mary Villa Abrille and to deliver possession to them.

5. Plaintiffs are given the option to exercise their rights under Article [450] of the New Civil Code with respect to the improvements introduced by defendant spouses Ravina.

6. Defendants Pedro Villa Abrille and spouses Ravina are ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs as follows:

a) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) to plaintiff Mary Villa Abrille as moral damages.

b) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages to each of the four children, namely: Ingrid Villa Abrille, Ingremark Villa Abrille, Ingresoll Villa Abrille and Ingrelyn Villa Abrille.

c) Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages by way of example and correction for the public good.

SO ORDERED.9

Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this petition. Petitioners argue that:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED x x x THE SALE OF LOT COVERED BY TCT NO. 88674 IN FAVOR OF SPOUSES RAVINA, TOGETHER WITH THE HOUSE THEREON, AS NULL AND VOID SINCE IT IS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS PATROCIN[I]A RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE NOT INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE, THE SAME BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS PATROCIN[I]A RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES, THE SAME BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.10

In essence, petitioners assail the appellate court’s declaration that the sale to them by Pedro of the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 is null and void. However, in addressing this issue, it is imperative to determine: (1) whether the subject property covered by TCT No. T-88674 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property, and (2) whether its sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Ann’s consent.

Petitioners assert that the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was the exclusive property of Pedro having been acquired by him through barter or exchange.11 They allege that the subject lot was acquired by Pedro with the proceeds of the sale of one of his exclusive properties. Allegedly, Pedro and his sister Carmelita initially agreed to exchange their exclusive lots covered by TCT No. T-26479 and TCT No. T-26472,

respectively. Later, however, Pedro sold the lot covered by TCT No. T-26472 to one Francisca Teh Ting and purchased the property of Carmelita using the proceeds of the sale. A new title, TCT No. T-88674, was issued thereafter. Thus, petitioners insist that the subject lot remains to be an exclusive property of Pedro as it was acquired or purchased through the exclusive funds or money of the latter.

We are not persuaded. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."

There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.12 Petitioners’ bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT No. T-88674, acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.1avvphi1

Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court. Article 124 of the Family Code, the governing law at the time the assailed sale was contracted, is explicit:

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied.)

The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without the consent of the wife is null and void.

Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.13

Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without Mary Ann’s consent.

On the second assignment of error, petitioners contend that they are buyers in good faith.14 Accordingly, they need not inquire whether the lot was purchased by money exclusively belonging to Pedro or of the common fund of the spouses and may rely on the certificates of title.

The contention is bereft of merit. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, a purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property.15 To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller need only show that he relied on the face of the seller’s certificate of title. But for a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted, such as by Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of the Family Code, he must show that he inquired into the latter’s capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith.161avvphi1

In the present case, the property is registered in the name of Pedro and his wife, Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that during the time of the sale in 1991, Pedro was married to Mary Ann. However, Mary Ann’s conformity did not appear in the deed. Even assuming that petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the exclusive property of Pedro, they were apprised by Mary Ann’s lawyer of her objection to the sale and yet they still proceeded to purchase the property without Mary Ann’s written consent. Moreover, the respondents were the ones in actual, visible and public possession of the property at the time the transaction was being made. Thus, at the time of sale, petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the subject properties and yet they failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the protection accorded to purchasers in good faith.

Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper. The relationship between the parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled must always be characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing.17 Hence, in consonance with justice and equity and the salutary principle of non-enrichment at another’s expense, we sustain the appellate court’s order directing Pedro to return to petitioner spouses the value of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 and the house thereon.

However, this court rules that petitioners cannot claim reimbursements for improvements they introduced after their good faith had ceased. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner Patrocinia Ravina made improvements and renovations on the house and lot at the time when the complaint against them was filed. Ravina continued introducing improvements during the pendency of the action.18

Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides that, "(h)e who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity."19

On the last issue, petitioners claim that the decision awarding damages to respondents is not supported by the evidence on record.20

The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her children were removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. On July 5, 1991, while respondent was out and her children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance with the petitioners21 surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to another place. The respondents then were not allowed to enter their rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas.

Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."22 When a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform with such norms and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused.23 It is patent in this case that petitioners’ alleged acts fall short of these established civil law standards.

WHEREFORE, we deny the instant petition for lack of merit. The Decision dated February 21, 2002 and the Resolution dated October 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54560 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. MAR TIERRA CORP, WILFRIDO MARTINEZ, MIGUEL LACSON, and RICARDO LOPANovember 29, 2006 (508 SCRA 419)

FACTS:Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company. Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan.

Respondent corporation was not able to pay all its debt balance as it suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent corp and individual respondents.

RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez including the conjugal house and lot of the spouses but it found that it did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez.

Petitioner appealed to CA. It affirmed RTC decision. Petitioned to SC.

ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party

HELD:No. SC upheld the CA. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for “all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”

The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party.

In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that, if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls within the term “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” In other words, where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family.

In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden.

Tumlos vs FernandezGR No. 137650, April 12, 2000

FACTS:

Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos.  In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos’ to occupy the apartment for the last 7 years without payment of any rent.  It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not complied with.  Demand was made several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building. 

Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest.  It was likewise alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage. 

ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.

HELD:

SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property.  The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence presented to validate it except for the said affidavit.  Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted.  Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other.  The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code.  Actual contribution is required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary, income, work or industry.  Such is not included in Art 148.  If actual contribution is not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.  Posted by hyper_jetsetter at 7:26:00 AM 

 

VILLEGAS VS LINGAN

Before the Court is a Petit ion for Review on  Certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assail ing the Decision [ 1 ]  dated November 28, 2001 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 55837, which aff irmed  in toto  the Decision dated December 19, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao, Cagayan in Civi l Case No. 5036; and the CA Resolution [ 2 ]  dated June 10, 2002, denying the Motion for Reconsideration f i led by Isaac Vil legas (petit ioner).

 

This case originated from a Complaint for Annulment of Tit le and Instrument with Damages fi led by the petit ioner against Victor Lingan (respondent) and Atty. Ernesto Carreon as the Register of Deeds of Cagayan. The respondent f i led his Answer and pre-trial ensued.  The RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order wherein it declared that no factual issue exists and that the sole legal issue to be resolved is:

 

Whether or not the power of attorney is a general power of attorney or a special power of attorney.  Corrolari ly, whether upon the terms thereof, the attorney-in-fact Gloria Roa Catral, had authority, or none at all, to execute the deed of sale in favor of [respondent] Victor Lingan. [ 3 ]

 

 

On the basis of the pre-trial order and upon motion of counsel for petit ioner, without any objections from respondent, the case was submitted for summary judgment.

 

As found by the RTC and confirmed by the CA, the undisputed facts are as follows:

 

[Petit ioner] Isaac Vil legas was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, known as Lot 2637-C of the Subdivision plan Psd.2-01-019664, being a portion of Lot 2637, Cad. 151, containing an area of 1,267 square meters, more or less, situated at Bgy. Pengue, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, covered by Transfer Certif icate of Tit le No. T-63809 of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan.  In order to secure the payment of a loan from the Development Bank of the Phil ippines (DBP) the [petit ioner] constituted a real estate mortgage over the said parcel of land in favor of DBP.  The said loan and mortgage was subsequently transferred by the DBP to the Home Mutual Development Fund (HMDF).  When the [petit ioner] fai led to sett le his loan, the real estate mortgage he constituted over the property was foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction and, as the HMDF was itself the highest bidder at such public auction, a certif icate of sheriffs sale was issued and, thereafter, registered with the Register of Deeds on March 8, 1996.  By virtue of a power of

attorney executed by [petit ioners] wife, Marilou C. Vil legas in favor of Gloria Roa Catral, the latter redeemed the property from the HMDF. x x x [ 4 ]

 

 

On May 17, 1996, Gloria R. Catral (Catral), by virtue of the same power of attorney, executed a Deed of Sale in favor of respondent. [ 5 ]

 

Petit ioner claims that the power of attorney executed in favor of Catral, petit ioners mother-in-law, created a principal-agent relationship only between his wife, Marilou Catral-Vil legas (Marilou) as principal, and Catral, as agent, and then only for the latter to administer the properties of the former; that he never authorized Catral to administer his properties, particularly, herein subject property; and that Catral had no authority to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the respondent, since from the very wordings of the power of attorney, she had no special authority to sell or convey any specif ic real property. [ 6 ]

 

On December 19, 1996, the RTC dismissed the Complaint, rul ing that the tenor of the power of attorney in question is broad enough to include the authority to sell any property of the principal, who, in this case, is the petit ioner; that the act of the agent, Catral, in executing the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent was within her power or authority; that the power to enter into any and all contracts and agreements qualif ied the said power of attorney as a special power of attorney; that the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid and binds the principal, herein petit ioner; that the authority to sell came from both the petit ioner and his wife, Marilou, since the petit ioner himself signed the power of attorney aff irming the authority of the agent, Catral; and that even if Catral in fact exceeded her authority, the act is deemed to have been performed within the scope of the agents authority if such is within the terms of the power of attorney as written.

 

Dissatisfied, the petit ioner appealed the adverse judgment to the CA claiming that the trial court erred in f inding that there was a principal-agent relationship between petit ioner and Catral; and that the trial court erred in concluding that the power of attorney is a special power of attorney with an authority to sell. [ 7 ]

 

On November 28, 2001, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, aff irming  in toto   the RTC Judgment and dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. [ 8 ]

 

The CA held that when the redemption of the property had been made by Catral by virtue of a General Power of Attorney executed in her favor by Marilou, i t fol lows that the petit ioner is no longer the owner of the subject property but his wife, Marilou; that the issue as to whether the power of

attorney was a special or general one is of no moment, because the petit ioner was no longer the owner of the property when it was sold; in other words, any disposit ion of the property needs no power of attorney from the petit ioner himself; that the petit ioner signed the General Power of Attorney above the word conforme, connoting an implied admission that he was not anymore the owner of the said property; and, f inally, that the Deed of Sale between Marilou (through Catral) and respondent is valid.

 

Hence, herein Petit ion, on the following grounds:

 

I.

 

IT IS SUBMITTED THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER WAS NO LONGER THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THE CASE. AS A CONSEQUENCE, IT DID NOT MATTER WHETHER OR NOT THE GENERAL POWER OF ATTORNEY OR A SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY WAS ISSUED IN THIS INSTANT CASE.

 

II.

 

IT IS FURTHER SUBMITTED THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF VICTOR LINGAN. [ 9 ]

 

In his Memorandum, petit ioner argues that the general power of attorney of Catral did not clothe her with authority to sell the property of petit ioner; and that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between the respondent and Catral was not valid. [ 10 ]

On the other hand, respondent, in his Memoranda, contends that the petit ioner has no cause of action against him.  He maintains that petit ioner lost his ownership of the property after it was extra-judicially foreclosed and sold to HMDF; that what was left for petit ioner was only the right of redemption, a right he shared with his wife;  that i f there was really a legal defect in the sale, the person who has the legal standing and the right to question the validity of the sale in his name is Marilou, the person who exercised the right of redemption and the person in whom the right to dispose legally resides; and that Marilou has all this t ime remained passive. [ 11 ]

 

The petit ion must fai l .

There are two principal issues raised by the pleadings in the present petit ion that must be resolved:  First, whether Marilou, the wife of the petit ioner, as successor-in-interest, may validly redeem the property in question; and second, whether the petit ioner has a cause of action against the respondent.

 

Was there a valid redemption effected by Marilou?

 

The answer is in the aff irmative.

 

Section 6 of Act No. 3135 provides:

 

Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to,  the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a l ien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.  (emphasis supplied)

 

Section 27, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civi l Procedure, provides:

 

SEC. 27. Who may redeem real property so sold.  Real property sold as provided in the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the following persons:

 

(a) The judgment obligor, or his successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of the property;

 

x x x x

 

The successor-in-interest of the judgment debtor referred to in the above provision includes a person who succeeds to his property by operation of law, or a person with a joint interest in the property, or his spouse or heirs. [ 12 ]

 

Section 33, Rule 39, Rules of Court, states:

 

SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given.   If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certif icate of sale, the purchaser is entit led to a conveyance and possession of the property;  or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has been made, and notice thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire period of one (1) year from the date of the registration of the sale to redeem the property.  The deed shall be executed by the off icer making the sale or by his successor in off ice, and in the latter case shall have the same validity as though the off icer making the sale had continued in off ice and executed it.

 

Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property at the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor.  (emphasis supplied)

 

Under the above provision, petit ioner could have redeemed the property from Marilou after she had redeemed it. The pleadings fi led and the records of this case do not show that petit ioner exercised said right. Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired ownership of the subject property. All r ights and tit le of the judgment obligor are transferred upon the expiration of the right of redemption. [ 13 ]

 

And where the redemption is made under a property regime governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, Article 109 of the Family Code provides that property acquired by right of redemption is the exclusive property of the spouses redeeming the property.

 

Clearly, therefore, Marilou, as owner, had the right to sell the property to another.

 

This brings us to the resolution of the second issue -- whether petit ioner has a cause of action against respondent -- and the answer is in the negative.

 

A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal r ight of the plaintiff. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements:  (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff. [ 14 ]

 

In the present case, there is no property right that exists in favor of the petit ioner, and, with more reason, no such obligation arises in behalf of the defendant, herein respondent, to respect such right.  There was no violation of a legal r ight of the petit ioner.

 

It must be stressed that there is no allegation or proof that Marilou redeemed the property in behalf of the petit ionerMarilou did not act as agent of the petit ioner. Rather, she exercised the right of redemption in her own right as successor-in-interest of the petit ioner.  Under the circumstances, should there be any right violated, the aggrieved party is Marilou, petitioners wife. The property in question was the exclusive property of Marilou by virtue of her redemption.  Thus, petit ioner has no valid cause of action against the respondent.

 

Consequently, the question whether Catral had validly sold the subject property to respondent by virtue of the General Power of Attorney executed by Marilou, is not within the realm of the Courts jurisdiction to resolve in this case as said issue is not properly raised by the right person, Marilou.

 

Divested of all interest over the property, the petit ioner has ceased to be the proper party who may challenge the validity of the sale. Moreover, since, as a rule, the agency, as a contract, is binding only between the contracting parties, [ 15 ]   then only the parties, as well as the third person who transacts with the parties themselves, may question the validity of the agency or the violation of the terms and condit ions found therein.  This rule is a corollary of the foregoing doctrine on the rights of real parties in interest.

The Court cannot grant the relief prayed for in petit ioners Complaint as to damages, considering that the issue on damages was deemed waived when the parties l imited themselves to the legal issue arrived at during the pre-trial in the RTC. [ 16 ]

 

WHEREFORE , the petit ion is DENIED .   The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petit ioner.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO,G.R. No. 153802March 11, 2005FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailo’s house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.[Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.

In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property, Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.

Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the said documents null and void and further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff,  to pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car which was burned, the attorney’s fees, moral and exemplary damages.The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s Decision, but deleted the award for damages and attorney’s fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition 

ISSUE:1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.

2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.

HELD: the petition is denied.1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . .

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .

In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.

Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community orconjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.

The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondent’s consent.2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, “[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . .

(1)       Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . .”

Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.NOTES:In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. A party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.

FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA, DOMINADOR CALPATURA and TOMAS CALPATURA, JR., Heirs of TOMAS CALPATURA, SR., petitioners, vs. ROBERTO, ERLINDA, DANIEL, GLORIA, PATRICIO, JR. and EDNA, all surnamed PRADO and NARCISA PRADO, respondents.

The property under litigation is the northern half portion of a residential land consisting of 552.20 square meters, more or less, situated at 19 th Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 71344 issued on August 15, 1963 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of Narcisa Prado and her children by her first husband, Patricio Prado, Sr., namely, Roberto, Erlinda, Daniel, Gloria, Patricio, Jr. and Edna, respondents herein.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

On December 19, 1959, Patricio Prado, Sr. died. Narcisa subsequently married Bonifacio Calpatura. In order to support her minor children with her first husband, Narcisa and her brother-in-law, Tomas Calpatura, Sr., executed on April 26, 1968 an Agreement of Purchase and Sale whereby the former agreed to sell to the latter the northern half portion of the property for the sum of P10,500.00.[1] On July 28, 1973, Narcisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Tomas over the said property.[2]

In 1976, Tomas daughter, Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, built a two-storey duplex with firewall[3] on the northern half portion of the property. Respondents, who occupied the southern half portion of the land, did not object to the construction. Flordeliza Flora and her husband Wilfredo declared the property for taxation purposes[4] and paid the corresponding taxes thereon.[5]Likewise, Maximo Calpatura, the son of Tomas cousin, built a small house on the northern portion of the property.

On April 8, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and delivery of possession of the northern half portion of the subject property against petitioners Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, Dominador Calpatura and Tomas Calpatura, Jr. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 100, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-8404.[6]Respondents alleged that the transaction embodied in the Agreement to Purchase and Sale between Narcisa and Tomas was one of mortgage and not of sale; that Narcisas children tried to redeem the mortgaged property but they learned that the blank document which their mother had signed was transformed into a Deed of Absolute Sale; that Narcisa could not have sold the northern half portion of the property considering that she was prohibited from selling the same within a period of 25 years from its acquisition, pursuant to the condition annotated at the back of the title; [7] that Narcisa, as natural guardian of her children, had no authority to sell the northern half portion of the property which she and her children co-owned; and that only P5,000.00 out of the consideration of P10,500.00 was paid by Tomas.

In their answer, petitioners countered that Narcisa owned 9/14 of the property, consisting of as her share in the conjugal partnership with her first husband and 1/7 as her share in the estate of her deceased husband; that the consideration of the sale in the amount of P10,500.00 had been fully paid as of April 1, 1968; that Narcisa sold her conjugal share in order to support her minor children; that Narcisas claim was barred by laches and prescription; and that the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation, not the respondents, was the real party in interest to question the sale within the prohibited period.

On April 2, 1997, the court a quo[8] dismissed the complaint. It found that the sale was valid; that the Agreement to Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale were duly executed; that the sum of P10,500.00 as selling price for the subject property was fully paid there being no demand for the payment of the remaining balance; that the introduction of improvements thereon by the petitioners was without objection from the respondents; and that Roberto and Erlinda failed to contest the transaction within four years after the discovery of the alleged fraud and reaching the majority age in violation of Article 1391 of the Civil Code.[9]

Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56843. On October 3, 2002, a decision[10] was rendered by the Court of Appeals declaring that respondents were co-owners of the subject property, thus the sale was valid only insofar as Narcisas 1/7 undivided share thereon was concerned. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the sale in dispute is declared valid only with respect to the one-seventh (1/7) share of plaintiff-appellant NARCISA H. PRADO in the subject property, which is equivalent to 78.8857 square meters. In all other respects, the same decision stands. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution dated January 14, 2003.[12] Hence this petition for review on the following assigned errors:

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN MODIFYING THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WITHOUT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THAT, ASIDE FROM THE DECLARATION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE SALE, THE PETITIONERS HEREIN HAVE TAKEN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE SAID ONE-HALF (1/2) TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE RESPONDENTS AND INTRODUCED IMPROVEMENTS THEREON.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN MODIFYING THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WITHOUT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT IN THE SALE THAT THE SAME PERTAINS TO THE CONJUGAL SHARE OF RESPONDENT NARCISA PRADO AND THE OTHER RESPONDENTS HAD NO FINANCIAL CAPACITY TO ACQUIRE THE SAID PROPERTY SINCE THEY WERE MINORS THEN AT THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID TCT NO. 71344 ON AUGUST 15, 1963.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT DECLARING THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS GUILTY OF LACHES IN FILING THE INSTANT CASE ONLY ON APRIL 8, 1991, THAT IS 18 YEARS AFTER THE SAID SALE WITH THE PETITIONERS TAKING ACTUAL POSSESSION OF SAID PORTION OF THE PROPERTY.

IV

THAT THE DECISION OF THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS WILL UNDULY ENRICH THE RESPONDENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE HEREIN PETITIONERS.[13]

At the outset, it must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review before this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. [14] It was thus error for petitioners to ascribe to the Court of Appeals grave abuse of discretion. This procedural lapse notwithstanding, in the interest of justice, this Court shall treat the issues as cases of reversible error.[15]

The issues for resolution are: (1) Is the subject property conjugal or paraphernal? (2) Is the transaction a sale or a mortgage? (3) Assuming that the transaction is a sale, what was the area of the land subject of the sale?

Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the sale was entered into, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non in order for the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to operate.[16]

In the instant case, while Narcisa testified during cross-examination that she bought the subject property from Peoples Homesite Housing Corporation with her own funds,[17] she, however admitted in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale that the property was her conjugal share with her first husband, Patricio, Sr.[18] A verbal assertion that she bought the land with her own funds is inadmissible to qualify the terms of a written agreement under the parole evidence rule. [19] The so-called parole evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before the execution of the parties written agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned.[20]

Anent the second issue, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Narcisa in favor of Tomas is contained in a notarized[21] document. In Spouses Alfarero, et al. v. Spouses Sevilla, et al . ,[22] it was held that a public document executed and attested through the intervention of a notary public is evidence of the facts in a clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. Otherwise stated, public or notarial documents, or those instruments duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. In order to contradict the presumption of regularity of a public document, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.

It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.[23] Except for the bare allegation that the transaction was one of mortgage and not of sale, respondents failed to adduce evidence in support thereof. Respondents also failed to controvert the presumption that private transactions have been fair and regular.[24]

Furthermore, Narcisa, in fact did not deny that she executed an Affidavit allowing spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza Flora to construct a firewall between the two-storey duplex and her house sometime in 1976. The duplex was made of strong materials, the roofing being galvanized sheets. While the deed of sale between Tomas and Narcisa was never registered nor annotated on the title, respondents had knowledge of the possession of petitioners of the northern half portion of the property. Obviously, respondents recognized the ownership of Tomas, petitioners predecessor-in-interest.

Respondents belatedly claimed that only P5,000.00 out of the P10,500.00 consideration was paid. Both the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale state that said consideration was paid in full. Moreover, the presumption is that there was sufficient consideration for a written contract.[25]

The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Narcisa, as her share in the conjugal partnership. Particios rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death to his heirs, which includes his widow Narcisa, who is entitled to the same share as that of each of the legitimate children. Thus, as a result of the death of Patricio, a regime of co-ownership arose between Narcisa and the other heirs in relation to the property. The remaining one-half was transmitted to his heirs by intestate succession. By the law on intestate succession, his six children and Narcisa

Prado inherited the same at one-seventh (1/7) each pro indiviso.[26]Inasmuch as Narcisa inherited one-seventh (1/7) of her husband's conjugal share in the said property and is the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 9/14 of the subject property. Hence, Narcisa could validly convey her total undivided share in the entire property to Tomas. Narcisa and her children are deemed co-owners of the subject property.

Neither can the respondents invoke the proscription of encumbering the property within 25 years from acquisition. In Sarmiento, et al. v. Salud, et al.,[27] it was held that:

xxx The condition that the appellees Sarmiento spouses could not resell the property except to the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC for short) within the next 25 years after appellees purchasing the lot is manifestly a condition in favor of the PHHC, and not one in favor of the Sarmiento spouses. The condition conferred no actionable right on appellees herein, since it operated as a restriction upon their jus disponendi of the property they bought, and thus limited their right of ownership. It follows that on the assumption that the mortgage to appellee Salud and the foreclosure sale violated the condition in the Sarmiento contract, only the PHHC was entitled to invoke the condition aforementioned, and not the Sarmientos. The validity or invalidity of the sheriff's foreclosure sale to appellant Salud thus depended exclusively on the PHHC; the latter could attack the sale as violative of its right of exclusive reacquisition; but it (PHHC) also could waive the condition and treat the sale as good, in which event, the sale can not be assailed for breach of the condition aforestated.

Finally, no particular portion of the property could be identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale considering that the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court.[28] While Narcisa could validly sell one half of the subject property, her share being 9/14 of the same, she could not have particularly conveyed the northern portion thereof before the partition, the terms of which was still to be determined by the parties before the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals on October 3, 2002, as well as the Resolution dated January 14, 2003 is PARTLY AFFIRMED subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:

1) Narcisa Prado is entitled to 9/14 of the residential land consisting of 552.20 square meters, more or less, situated at 19th Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 71344;

2) the sale of the undivided one half portion thereof by Narcisa Prado in favor of Tomas Calpatura, Sr. is valid.

Furthermore, the case is REMANDED to the court of origin, only for the purpose of determining the specific portion being conveyed in favor of Tomas Calpatura, Sr. pursuant to the partition that will be agreed upon by the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Carlos vs. AbelardoGR No. 146504, April 4, 2002

FACTS:

Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the $25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque.  It was in October 1989 when the petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting their married life independently.  The seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full payment.  In July 1991, the petitioner inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the spouses pleaded that they were not yet in position to make a definite settlement.  Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner.  In 1994, petitioner made a formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation.  The spouses were separated in fact for more than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence spouses filed separate answers.  Abelardo contended that the amount was never intended as a loan but his share of income on contracts obtained by him in the construction firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt from his share in the profits.  RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial court’s decision for insufficiency of evidence.  Evidently, there was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses.  The wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign.

ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the conjugal partnership.

HELD:

Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family.  They did not deny that the same served as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family.  Hence, the spouses are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.  Abelardo’s contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company.

Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of $25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

Ong Ching Po vs. CAG.R. Nos. 113472-73December 20, 1994FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision of the CA, which dismissed the petition forcertiorari in the 2 civil cases.On July 1947, Joi Jong sold a parcel of land to private respondent Soledad Parian, the wife of Ong Yee, who died in January 1983. The said sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale written in English. Subsequently, the document was registered with the RD of Manila, which issued a TCT dated September 2, 1947 in the name of private respondent Parian.According to private respondent, she entrusted the administration of the lot and building to the brother of her husband, petitioner Ong Ching Po when the spouses settled in Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded that the lot be vacated because she was going to sell it. Unfortunately, petitioners refused to vacate the said premises.

On March 19, 1984, Parian filed a case for unlawful detainer against petitioner Ong Ching Po before the MTC of Manila. The inferior court dismissed her case, and so did the RTC, Manila and the CA, the CA decision final and executory.

Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1946, petitioner Ong Ching Po bought the said parcel of land from Joi Jong. The sale was evidenced by a photo copy of a Deed of Sale written in Chinese. An English translation of said document read as follows:Deed of Sale

I, Ong Joi Jong, a party to this Deed of Sale hereby sell in absolutely (sic) manner a lot located on No. 4 Fundidor Street, San Nicolas an (sic) area consisting 213 square meters including a one-story house erected thereon unto Mr. Ong Ching Po for the sum of P6,000.00 the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by me and consequently I have executed and signed the government registered title (sic) the said lot inclusive of the house erected thereon, now belong (sic) to Mr. Ong Ching Po unequivocally. And the purpose of this document is to precisely serve as proof of the sale.

Addendum: I have acceded to the request of Mr. Ong Ching Po into signing another document in favor of Soledad Parian (She is the Filipino wife of Ong Yee, brother of Ong Ching Po) for the purpose of facilitating the issuance of the new title by the City Register of Deeds and for the reason that he is not yet a Filipino. I certify to the truthfulness of this fact.Lot Seller: Ong Joi Jong

On Dec. 6, 1983, petitioner Ong Ching Po executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to his children, petitioners Jimmy and David Ong, the same property sold by Joi Jong to private respondent Parian  in 1947.

On Dec. 12 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po, Jimmy and David filed an action for reconveyance and damages against private respondent in the RTC, Manila.

On July 26, 1986, private respondent Parian  filed an action for quieting of title against petitioners Ong Ching Po and his wife, petitioner Yu Siok Lian, in the RTC, Manila. Upon her motion, the case was consolidated with the earlier civil case. (petitioner Ong Ching Po died in October 1986.)

On May 30 1990, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent.On appeal by petitioners to the CA, the said court affirmed the decision of the RTC.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: According to petitioners, the CA erred:(1) When it gave full faith and credit to the Deed of Sale (Exh. A) in favor of private respondent, instead of the Deed of Sale (Exh, B) in favor of petitioner Ong Ching Po.

(2) When it concluded that the acts of petitioners were not acts of ownership; and

(3) When it ruled that no express nor implied trust existed between petitioners and private respondent (as stated in Exh. B)

HELD: The petition is dismissed1. The CA did not give any credence to Exhibit “B” and its translation, because these documents had not been properly authenticated. Petitioners likewise failed to adduce evidence as to the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale, Exhibit “B”.

On the other end of the legal spectrum, the deed of sale executed by Joi Jong in favor of private respondent (Exh. “A”) is a notarized document.

2. As to the contention of petitioners that all the tax receipts, tax declaration, rental receipts, deed of sale (Exh. “B”) and transfer certificate of title were in their possession, private respondent explained that she and her husband entrusted said lot and building to petitioners when they moved to Iloilo.

As observed by the Court of Appeals:

We find, however, that these acts, even if true, are not necessarily reflective of dominion, as even a mere administrator or manager may lawfully perform them pursuant to his appointment or employmentIt is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the name of private respondent and her husband. The rental receipts were also in the name of her husband.

3. We cannot go along with the claim that petitioner Ong Ching Po merely used private respondent as a dummy to have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name because being an alien he was disqualified to own real property in the Philippines. To sustain such an outrageous contention would be giving a high premium to a violation of our nationalization laws.

Assuming that Exhibit “B” is in existence and that it was duly executed, still petitioners cannot claim ownership of the disputed lot by virtue thereof.

Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provides, as follows:Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain.

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain.

The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the “disposition, exploitation, development and utilization” of all “lands of the public domain and other natural resources of the Philippines” for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real property. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of Exhibit “B” has been established, the same is null and void, it being contrary to law.

On expressed trust:There is no document showing the establishment of an express trust by petitioner Ong Ching Po as trustor and private respondent Parian as trustee. Not even Exhibit “B” can be considered as such a document because private respondent, the registered owner of the property subject of said “deed of sale,” was not a party thereto. The oral testimony to prove the existence of the express trust will not suffice.Under Article 1443 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, “No express trust concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved by parole evidence.”

On implied trust:Undaunted, petitioners argue that if they cannot prove an express trust in writing, they can prove an implied trust orally. While an implied trust may be proved orally (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1457), the evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, because such kind of evidence may be easily fabricated. It cannot be made to rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.

Petitioners do not claim that Ong Yee was not in a financial position to acquire the land and to introduce the improvements thereon. On the other hand, Yu Siok Lian, the wife of petitioner Ong Ching Po, admitted in her testimony in court that Ong Yee was a stockholder of Lam Sing Corporation and was engaged in business.

NOTES:1. It is not correct to say that private respondent never took possession of the property. Under the law, possession is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, “when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.” If what petitioners meant was that private respondent never lived in the building constructed on said land, it was because her family had settled in Iloilo.

2. Under Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court:

Secondary Evidence when Original is lost or destroyed. When the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and lost or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of the witnesses.Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the document. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.

The due execution of the document may be established by

1. the person or persons who executed it;2. by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged;3. or by any person who was present and saw it executed or who after its execution,

saw it and recognized the signatures;4. or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the

execution thereof.Petitioner Yu Siok Lian testified that she was present when said document was executed, but the trial court rejected her claim and held:

If it is true that she was present, why did she not sign said document, even merely as a witness? Her oral testimony is easy to concoct or fabricate. Furthermore, she was married only on September 6, 1946 to the plaintiff, Ong Ching Po, in Baguio City where she apparently resided, or after the deed of sale was executed. The Court does not believe that she was present during the execution and signing of the deed of sale involved therein, notwithstanding her pretensions to the contrary.

ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS[G.R. No. 124642. February 23, 2004.]

CALLEJO, SR.

FACTS:

The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9,000,000 fromthe Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this loan, the PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note for the said amount promising to pay onDecember 22, 1978 at an interest rate of 14% per annum. As an added security for the said loan,Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guarantywith the ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCIobligations owing to the ABC. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence, on August21, 1981, the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminaryattachment against the PBMCI to collect the P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties andother bank charges. Impleaded as co-defendants in the complaint were Alfredo Ching, EmilioTañedo and Chung Kiat Hua in their capacity as sureties of the PBMCI. Citing as one of the groundsfor the writ was the fraud defendants employed in incurring the obligations by representingthemselves as having the financial capacity to pay the loan when in fact they did not have suchcapacity.In the meantime, on July 26, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied onattachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching. OnNovember 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion toSet Aside the levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied onby the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal fundsafter the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtednesscovered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed by petitionerAlfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.She, likewise, alleged that being the wife of Alfredo Ching, she was a third-party claimant entitledto file a motion for the release of the properties. She attached therewith a copy of her marriagecontract with Alfredo Ching.The petitioner-spouses aver that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied sharesof stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature ofstocks under Art. 160 and that such presumption subsists even if the property is registered only inthe name of one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. According to the petitioners,the suretyship obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-husband's profession orbusiness. And where conjugal assets are attached in a collection suit on an obligation contracted bythe husband, the wife should exhaust her motion to quash in the main case and not file a separatesuit. Furthermore, the petitioners contend that under Art. 125 of the Family Code, the petitioner-husband's gratuitous suretyship is null and void ab initio, and that the share of one of the spouses inthe conjugal partnership remains inchoate until the dissolution and liquidation of the partnership.The trial court initially granted the lifting of the preliminary attachment but on appeal, thedecision was reversed, the appellate court holding that petitioner Encarnacion Ching was not aproper party to the action and that even if she possessed such right, her action was already barredby laches. The appellate court also ruled that the presumption under Art. 160 was inapplicable inthe present case, when petitioner-spouses failed to prove the source of the money used to acquirethe shares of stock. Hence this present petition.

ISSUES:

1.Do the 100,000 shares of stock in the name of Alfredo Ching belong to the conjugalpartnership?2.Is the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the liability?

HELD:

1.

YES.

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired duringthe marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that itpertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. In Tan v. Court of Appeals, we held that it isnot even necessary to prove that the properties were acquired with funds of the partnership. Aslong as the properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are presumed to beconjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does notappear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. Thepresumption of the conjugal nature of the properties acquired during the marriage subsists in theabsence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the same.In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 sharesof stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate booksin the name of the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14,1979. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares ofstocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The privaterespondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with hisexclusive money. The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporatebooks of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does notconstitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.2.

NO.

For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to thehusband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly,to make a conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one of thespouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for thesolidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power toassume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership.In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitionerswas benefited by the petitioner-husband's act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyshipagreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan wasbetween the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumptioncan be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodationagreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. Theprivate respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugalpartnership.

BUADO VS CA

FACTS:

On 30 April 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado (petitioners) filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda) with Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite. Said action originated from Erlinda Nicol’s civil liability arising from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by petitioners. On 6 April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages. Said decision was affirmed, successively, by the Court of Appeals and this Court. Finding Erlinda Nicol’s personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Two (2) days before the public auction sale on 28 January 1993, an affidavit of third-party claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff prompting petitioners to put up a sheriff’s indemnity bond. The auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest bidder. On 4 February 1993, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioners. Almost a yearlater on 2 February 1994, Romulo Nicol (respondent), the husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff. Respondent, as plaintiff therein, alleged that the defendants, now petitioners, connived and directly levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol. Respondent averred that there was no proper publication and posting of the notice of sale. Furthermore, respondent claimed that his property which was valued at P500,000.00 was only sold at a “very low price” of P51,685.00, whereas the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only P40,000.00. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied on 23 August 2000. Hence, the instant petition attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:•

WON the wife's criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership• WON the husband of the judgment debtor may file an independent action to protect the conjugal property subject to execution.

HELD:

There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. Hence, the filing of a separate action by respondent is proper and jurisdiction is thus vested on Branch 21. Petitioners failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in remanding the case to Branch 21 for further proceedings. WHEREFORE, the petition is

DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Francisco vs. Master Iron Works Construction CorporationGR. No. 151967, February 16, 2005

FACTS:

Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and Eduardo Francisco got married on January 1983.  The latter was then employed as Vice President in a Private Corporation.  Josefina acquired two parcels of land where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina, married to Eduardo.  An affidavit of waiver was executed by Eduardo where he declared that prior to his marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased the land with her own savings and that he waived whatever claims he had over the property.  When Josefina mortgaged the property for a loan, Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed.  In 1990, Eduardo who was then a General Manager, bought bags of cement from defendant but failed to pay the same.  The latter filed a complaint for recovery and trial court rendered judgment against Eduardo.  The court then issued a writ of execution and the sheriif issued a notice of levy on execution over the alleged property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the amount due under the decision of the trial court.  Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2 parcels of land in which she claimed as her paraphernal property.

ISSUE: WON the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo.

HELD:

The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the sole owner.  The Deed of Absolute Sale on record showed it was issued after her marriage.  Their case fall under Article 148 and since they got married before the Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights.  Petitioner likewise failed that she had any vested right.

Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates such marriage, Art 148 should be applied.  In the absence of proof that the wife/husband has actually contributed money, property, or industry to the properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership will not arise.

The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of CA that the property was conjugal was affirmed.

Carlos vs Sandoval

Facts:

Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death, two parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos commenced an action against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

HELD: The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided. Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition forannulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application.

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate   “proper interest”   can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions,   must be prosecuted or defended  in the name of the real party-in-interest   and   must be based on a  cause of action . Thus, in   Niñal v. Badayog,   the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

Metrobank vs Spouses Tan

In 1974, the company co-owned by Tan, acquired a P250k loan from Metrobank. In 1976, the same company acquired another P150k loan from Metrobank. In 1979, it again got a P600k loan from Metrobank. These 3 loans were secured by a mortgage executed by spouses See in favor of Metrobank. See was not part of Tan’s company not until 1979 but they’ve been securing the loans. The loans were consolidated as a P1 Million loan in 1980 payable at P125k in 8 quarterly payments until fully paid.

Meanwhile, Tan had a separate unsecured loan of P970k owed from Metrobank which it failed to pay. Metrobank won a collection suit against Tan for said sum of money. Loan was still unpaid.

In 1984, Tan defaulted from paying the P1 M loan. Metrobank foreclosed the property of See located in Paco, Manila (June 1984). Metrobank was the highest bidder at P1.7M. The Sale was registered same month/year.

In December 1984, See assailed the foreclosure averring that the P1M loan is no longer covered by the mortgage for the same was novated when the 3 loans were consolidated. The CA ruled the foreclosure to be valid but proceeds therefrom should only cover the P1M loan, excess has to be returned.

While pending on appeal before SC, Tan offered to pay P2M: P600k as downpayment and the rest payable in 2 years w/o interest in order to release the foreclosed mortgaged property. This was denied by the bank.

Tan and See then petitioned that Metrobank allow them to redeem the property at P1.6M. This was in 1997.

SC’s decision (G.R. 118585) finally went out and made final CA’s ruling that the foreclosure is valid. This was interpreted later by the RTC and the CA as giving the right to Tan to repurchase the property.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tan may redeem the said property?

HELD: No. The decision of the SC in GR 118585 did not give the right to redeem way past the period of redemption. This was an error in the RTC and the CA.

Tan was clearly in default hence Metrobank had the right to foreclose which it did in ’85. Tan had a year to redeem. Though See was the registered owner, Tan had the right of redemption because they were the actual mortgagors. But Tan never redeemed the property within the redemption period of 1 year.

The filing of a civil suit did not forestall the period of redemption though said suit drag for more than ten years until a decision was laid down in ’97.

Though Tan made offers and proposals to redeem property, Tan did not make simultaneous payments (which is required in redemption) which further bolstered the fact that he did not make valid offers of redemption (considering arguendo).

After the 1 year redemption period, the right has already vested in Metrobank, hence it could provide for any purchase price i.e. P11M offer to sell property to spouses See.

Pana v Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr. December 10, 2012

FACTS:

The prosecution accused Efren Pana, his wife Melencia, and others of murder before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, and eventually a decision was rendered acquitting Efren of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melencia and another person guilty as charged and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed RTC’s decision but modified the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua. As for the monetary awards, the court affirmed the award of civil indemnity and moral damages but deleted the award for actual damages for lack of evidentiary basis. In its place the court made an award of php15, 000 each by way of temperate damages. In addition, the court awarded Php50, 000.00 exemplary damages per victim to be paid solidarily by them. The decision became executory of October 1, 2001. Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melencia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued. On April 3, 2002, Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution claiming that the properties levied were conjugal assets and not paraphernal of Melecia. On September 16, 2002, the RTC denied the motion. The spouses moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same. In this case, it is submitted that Efren and Melencia were married when the Civil Code was still in effect. They did not execute a pre-nuptial agreement, hence CPG governed their property relations. However, both RTC and CA held that property regime changed into ACP when family code took effect it reason out that Art. 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive effect in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Both the RTC and the Court of the Appeals are in error on this point. While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouses in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of hains and, therefore none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets , it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to react back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relations all conjugal partnership of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melencia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melencia’s civil liability in the aforesaid murder case.

SUPREME COURT: YES, provided that the conditions under Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

First of all, the Supreme Court explained that it is clear from the facts that Efren and Melencia were married when the Civil code was still the operative law on marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. Furthermore, Article 119 of the Civil Code provides that the future spouses main in marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community or conjugal partnership of gains or upon a complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The family code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage, and clearly, under this situation, the spouses cannot modify their regime. Post marriage modification of settlements can take place only where (a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime; (c)judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a

spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family; (d) there was judicial separation of property under article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains. None of these circumstances exists in this case Furthermore, Article 119 provides as well, that in the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same is void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains established under the civil code shall govern the property regime of the spouses. the family code contains terms governing the conjugal partnership of gains that supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the civil code. Article 105 of the family code states that the provisions of such chapter on the conjugal partnership of gains shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the affectivity of this code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the civil or other laws as provided in Article 256.

Ferrer vs. Ferrer (508 SCRA 570)

Facts:

• J was the widow of A, half-brother of respondents and I. Before their marriage, A acquired a lot.

• Through a loan with SSS, improvements were made thereon, such as a residential house and a two-door

apartment building. However, the loan was paid during the marriage using their conjugal funds.

• J claimed that a warehouse was constructed on the lot using conjugal funds

• J also averred that M occupied one door of the apartment building, as well as the warehouse but stopped paying rentals in September 1991 claiming that she had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by A in favor of M and I and their spouses

• J contended that I and F deceived into signing what he thought was his last will and testament but in fact was a Deed of Sale

• Upon discovery of this, A filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale but was dismissed both in the RTC and CA

• J contended that she had the right to be reimbursed for half of the cost of the improvements on the lot which amounted to P500,000.

• J sought from M and I moral and exemplary damages, litigation and incidental expenses.

• M and I’s motion to dismiss was denied by RTC but was granted by CA for failing to state a cause of action

Issue:

• Whether or not J has the right to be reimbursed for half of the cost of the improvements on the lot

Held:

· Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership.

· When the cost of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.

· Subject property of Alfredo was declared as exclusive property based on Article 120 of the Family Code; Owner-spouse has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts of efforts

· Respondents were the buyers of the property. Hence, they don’t have the obligation to respect petitioner’s right to be reimbursed

· Validity of Deed of Sale was upheld with finality.

Aguete v. PNB, G.R. No. 170166 April 6, 2011

FACTS: Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch before the CFI of Ilocos Norte.

The information disclosed that Jose Ros (petitioner) obtained a loan of P115,000 from ONB and executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land as security thereof. Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and as a result, PNB initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the said property. After which, the lot was sold to PNB as the highest bidder. Petitioner claims that she had no knowledge of the loan incurred by her husband nor did she consent to the mortgage instituted on their conjugal property. She then filed a complaint to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property (after the lapse of 1 year). The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners but was later reversed by the appellate court upon appeal.

ISSUE: WON the property is considered as redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

HELD: Yes. Petition denied.

The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable.17 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent.

It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Ros’ loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda De BatocaelGR No. 146683, November 22, 2001

FACTS:

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956.  Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property in favor of Francisco.  Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room.  On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress.  However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the master’s bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her.  She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco.  When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower.  The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was provided with food and lodging.  Francisco’s health deteriorated and became bedridden.  Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets. 

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same.  The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name.  This was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner.  Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550.  The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was valid.

HELD:

The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid.   The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco.  Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

ARTURO SARTE FLORES, Petitioner, vs.SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. and EDNA C. LINDO,Respondents.G.R. No. 183984April 13, 2011Carpio, J.:

Topic: Unjust Enrichment Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment, and Disposition of the Community Property Administration of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains Real Mortgage

FACTS:

Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Arturo Flores amounting to Php 400,000.00 with monthly interest and surcharge in case of late payment. Edna executed a deed of real mortgage and promissory note to secure the said loan. Edna issued three checks as partial payments which were dishonored later for insufficiency of funds. This prompted petitioner to file a complaint for the foreclosure of mortgage with damages against the respondents.RTC branch 33 held that Flores was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage because it found out that the Deed was executed by Edna without her husband’s consent. Special Power of Attorney by Enrico was only constituted days after the Deed. However, it further ruled that petitioner Flores was not precluded from recovering the loan from Edna as he could file a personal action against her. Petitioner then filed a complaint for Sum of Money with damages against respondents. It was raffled to Branch 42. Respondents admitted their loan but in the tune of Php340,000.00 and prayed for dismissal on the grounds of improper venue, res judicata, and forum shopping. RTCBranch 42 denied the motion to dismiss. CA set aside decision of RTC Branch 42 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. CA ruled in general that the creditor may institute two alternative remedies: either a personal action for the collection of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners can no longer file complaint for collection of sum of money on the ground of multiplicity of suits

Held: The Court ruled that generally, it is true that

the mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose onthe mortgage security.An election of the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise therewould be multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to another depending on the location of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties.

In this case, however, there are circumstances that the Court takes into consideration. Accordingly since the Deed was executed by respondent Edna without the consent and authority of her husband, it is void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code.

Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that "the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouseand the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spousex x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors."

The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.

But, as noted by CA, petitioner allowed the decision of RTC Branch 33 to become final and executory without asking for an alternative relief. Nevertheless, the petitioner is not without remedy. The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another applies. Article 22 of the Civil Code provides:

Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience."

The principle of unjust enrich

hment requires two conditions :(1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another. The principle against unjust enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over the procedural rule on multiplicity of suits. The Court directed RTC Branch 42 to proceed with the trial of collection of sum.

ESTELA COSTUNA, petitioner, vs.LAUREANA DOMONDON THE HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XCVIII, QUEZON CITY, THE HON. PRESIDING JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, 13TH DIVISION, MANILA,respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The reversal and setting of the decision* of the Court of Appeals' Thirteenth Division, in CA-G.R. CV No. 10948, entitled Laureana Domondon, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Estela Costuna, defendant-appellant, promulgated on March 28, 1988, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XCVIII, Quezon City, dated November 22, 1984, are sought by the petitioner in this petition for review on certiorari.

Culled from the records, the facts are as follows:

The spouses Amadeo and Estela Costuna (hereinafter referred to as Amadeo and the petitioner, respectively) during their marriage acquired three parcels of land with an aggregate area of 599 square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificates of title Nos. 1235,18118, and 24365, all of which lots are located in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, and registered in the name of Amadeo Costuna.

On November 8,1976, Amadeo executed his last will and testament. He was then 68 years old. Following the execution of the last will and testament aforesaid, the spouses were beset with marital problems.

Sometime in November, 1977, Amadeo sustained third degree burns on his legs for which he was treated at various hospitals, such as the Bonifacio Maternity Clinic and the Bago-Bantay General Hospital, on different dates. While already ill, or on April 17,1977, relatives of Amadeo requested that he be brought to Samar as there were documents that needed his signature pertaining to his Samar properties. Since then, Amadeo was never returned to the petitioner and stayed with his sister. Thus, a feud ensued among Amadeo's relatives (sister Zosima Barada, nephews, and nieces) and the petitioner over his custody prompting the latter to institute a petition for habeas corpus on June 1 8, 1978, before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon City, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 25601. Five days later, or on June 23, 1978, Amadeo filed an action for partition before the then Juvenile Domestic and Relations Court, docketed as Case No. Q-25545. Failing to get the petitioner's consent to the desired partition notwithstanding repeated demands therefor, Amadeo was constrained to execute a deed of sale, on July 10, 1978, over the one-half (1/2) undetermined portion of the conjugal property, without his wife's consent, in favor of Laureana Domondon (hereinafter referred to as the respondent). The death of Amadeo on November 5, 1978, however, rendered the aforecited cases moot and academic.

With Amadeo's death, Special Proceedings No. Q-26351 was instituted by his widow (petitioner) with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch LVIII. Claiming pro indiviso one half (1/2) share over the earlier mentioned three lots by virtue of the deed of sale executed in her favor by Amadeo on July 10, 1978, the respondent opposed the allowance of the will. For lack of jurisdiction, no ruling was however made on her claim, but the probate court decreed the allowance of the last will and testament and ordered the issuance of Letters of Administration (should correctly be letters testamentary) in favor of petitioner in a decision rendered on December 29,1981. 1

Consequently, an action to compel the petitioner to give her conformity to the deed of sale executed by her husband in favor of the respondent was instituted by the latter in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XCVIII, docketed as Q34527, which court, making the following disquisition:

On the confronting issue of whether or not the defendant can be compelled to signify her conformity in the deed of sale, it is the considered opinion of the court that weighing their respective evidence and the end line of arguments of the parties in view of the peculiar circumstances attendant to the case that the refusal of the defendant to give consent to the sale of what rightly belongs to her husband was unreasonable. Consequently, the court believes and so holds that defendant can be compelled to grant the same consistent with the last provision of Article 166 of the New Civil Code whichever one-half (1/2) portion of the whole estate she may choose from the survey plan of the project of partition (Exh. 28, Q- 25601) shall be segregated.

As can be gathered from the records, the present case presupposes a situation where the husband disposed of his legitimate share one-half (1/2) of the conjugal property so that his pressing financial needs for medical and hospitalization expenses could be met. The defendant appears to have been accorded all the formalities required of the marital companionship in securing her consent but none of the representations were heeded. The fact that letters (Exh. E, Q-34527; Exh. 28, Q-25601) for a proposed partition and seeking of conformity for her to stamp approval of the deed of sale were never denied since this was confirmed by the records of the proceedings (t.s.n. July 28,1978, pp. 1920, Q-25601). While it is argued that tills has been done upon the prodding of other interested parties, nowhere has it been shown that the defendant ever reacted when she acknowledged the subject letters. The contents of said letters were significant since the proposed partition and/or conveyance of the husband's one-half share means life and death to the latter. To the husband's mind, this so far is the only remaining alternative to keep him alive. There is a wife who is so near yet so far and while there are relatives who are willing to help, they themselves are similarly poor and impoverished. In the case of Baello vs. Villanueva," 54 Phil. 213, the Court held that "For as conjugal properties belong equally to husband and wife, any alienation by the husband without the consent of his wife prejudices her in so far as it includes a part or whole of the wife's half and is to that extent invalid." This decision of the court fortifies the relative significance of article 900 of the Civil Code providing that if the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, and the testator may freely dispose of the other half. The aforesaid decision sustains the belief of the court that the disposition or alienation of the conjugal property is not valid only to the extent of prejudicing the wife's one-half share of the realty and with respect to his own one-half share, the disposition has been done in its right perspective. In the present situation, consent to alienate his onehalf (1/2) share of the conjugal property has been sought and this was manifested in plaintiff s letters (Exh. E, Q-34527 and Exh. 28, Q-25601) and defendant's refusal was never justified. To the mind of the court, the defendant's failure to give the rationale of her refusal to act on a situation that demands the propriety of a reply is unreasonable in the concept of Article 166 and therefore, the court may compel her to grant the same. 2

decided in favor of plaintiff Laureana Domondon and ordered the defendant Estela Costuna to affix her signature on the deed of sale.

Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, Estela Costuna appealed to the Court of Appeals, which appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 10948. In disposing the issue as to the validity of the sale, the Court of Appeals stated thus:

The third assignment of error is primarily based on the allegation that no sale of conjugal properties by the husband may be validly made without the consent of the wife. Appellant cited Articles 166 and 167 of the New Civil Code which provide, viz:

Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.

This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership before the effective date of this Code. (1413a).

Art. 167. In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, the courts, on petition of the wife, may provide for a receivership, or administration by the wife, or separation of property. (n).

The general rule is, the husband may not validly sell real estates belonging to the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. However, this rule accepts exceptions, wherein the husband may sell the real properties owned by the conjugal partnership even without the consent of the wife: 1) sale of personal properties; 2) real properties acquired before the effectivity of the New Civil Code; 3) real properties acquired after effectivity of the New Civil Code if wife is confined in a leprosarium, declared non compos mentis or spendthrift, or under civil interdiction; 4) if the purpose is to pay conjugal liabilities (Article 161); 5) if the purpose is to secure the future of their chi1dren or finishing a career (Art. 162); and 6) moderate gift for charity (Art. 174).

The sale by Amadeo of one-half (1/2) of each of the conjugal properties to Domondon was allegedly for the purpose of paying the husband's hospital expenses in order that he would get well. In a decided case, it was held that while the marriage and the legal conjugal partnership subsists, the support of the wife, conversely, of the husband, is a charge upon the partnership. (Sumulong v. Cembrano, 51 Phil. 719). The partnership is not relieved of this obligation by the mere fact that the spouses do not live under the same roof (Ibid.). The amounts advanced by third persons for the subsistence of the wife (or husband) are chargeable against the property of the conjugal partnership (Sochayseng v. Trijillo, 31 Phil. 153; Galang v. CA, 103 SCRA 90).

Estela Costuna never rebutted the appellee's assertion that the proceeds of the sale were utilized for the hospitalization and medication of Amadeo. Whether her refusal to support her ailing and aging husband was because of her outright refusal to do so or her financial incapability to give, does not matter. It was sufficient that Amadeo had no other recourse but to sell his share in the conjugal property.

Article 171 of the New Civil Code provides that "the husband may dispose of the conjugal partnership property for purposes specified in Articles 161 and 162". This means that the husband may alienate the conjugal properties even without the consent of the wife if the proceeds thereof will be utilized for those provided under Articles 161 and 162.

In the case at bar, the applicable provision is paragraph (1) of Article 161 which provides:

(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership;

The support of either spouses (sic) is definitely for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. For if either of them is physically ill, the conjugal partnership likewise suffers.

Considering the above reasons, We are predisposed to decree that the sale of one-half of the conjugal properties made by the husband for his hospitalization and medical purposes was valid.

Lastly, Estela Costuna alleged that the sale was void because it was merely simulated and in fact the consideration thereof was not given.

After a careful and thorough perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes and the evidence presented therein, We find that the consideration was paid and indeed utilized for the hospitalization and medication of Amadeo Costuna. Appellant's allegation is conjectural. She failed to prove her assertions. The documentary evidence on record showed that the consideration was received and utilized for the purpose alleged in the deed of sale.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against appellant. 3

In view of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petitioner filed the present petition.

In her petition, the petitioner faults the Court of Appeals in deciding a question of substance not in accordance with the applicable law (Articles 166 and 167) of the new Civil Code and jurisprudence. 4

The central issue is the validity or nullity of the deed of sale executed by Amadeo in favor of the respondent over his one-half (1/2) aliquot share in the conjugal partnership without the consent of his wife. The ancillary issue is whether or not the conjugal partnership should be made liable for the payment of the hospital and medical expenses of Amadeo who allegedly abandoned the conjugal home and his wife.

The petitioner submits that the deed of sale executed by Amadeo in favor of private respondent over his undetermined one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal partnership is spurious and simulated, hence invalid. Firstly, the element of consent (her consent) is wanting. Secondly, the alleged sale was not a voluntary act of Amadeo but was orchestrated by the persons who were desirous of depriving her of her inheritance which fact is bolstered by the following: a) at the time of the execution of the deed of sale, Amadeo was 81 years old and gravely ill; b) while the deed of sale was signed by Amadeo, his signature was illegible; c) the probability that he was unconscious at the time that he signed the document and that somebody may have guided his hand is not remote; d) the absence of the signature of both parties in the acknowledgment portion of the deed, and e) the variance between the dates appearing in the deed itself and the acknowledgment; thirdly, because of want of consideration. Not only is the supposed buyer financially incapable to pay the purchase price, there is also the uncertainty of the amount actually paid. The petitioner maintains that Amadeo's hospital and medical expenses should not be chargeable against the conjugal partnership as Amadeo by his own free will deserted and abandoned her and their conjugal home when he opted to

live with his relatives. She claims that never was she remiss in her duties to her husband. She asserts that her husband's relatives held him (husband) in "captivity" making it impossible for her to give him the care, attention, and love that he most needed. Nonetheless, she avers that all efforts were exerted by her, to regain custody of her husband but in vain. In fact, as a last ditch effort, she filed habeas corpus proceedings which case was unfortunately rendered moot and academic by the death of Amadeo on November 5,1979. She claims to have shouldered the funeral bills and other miscellaneous expenses of Amadeo as the relatives suddenly abandoned him. Finally, she theorizes that Art. 161 of the new Civil Code does not include illness or old age of one or both of the spouses as among the expenses for which the conjugal partnership may be held hable and that the case of Sumulong vs. Cembrano 5 is not applicable to the case at bar because here Amadeo abandoned her and the conjugal home.

The private respondent on the other hand naturally supports the common ruling of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the deed of sale is valid, notwithstanding the absence of consent, because the disposition of the one-half (1/2) undivided portion of the conjugal partnership properties was intended to generate funds to cover Amadeo's hospital and medical expenses. She argues that the disposition of one half (1/2) of the conjugal estate should be effected by either one of the spouses without the consent and conformity of the other for as long as what belongs to the other by such act would not suffer or be prejudiced. She submits that if consent is wanting, it was not Amadeo's fault as it can not be denied that the petitioner's consent, first to the intended partition and later to the sale, was repeatedly sought by Amadeo, as required by law and out of marital courtesy, but the petitioner tenaciously withheld her consent. She asserts that the petitioner's refusal was not only unreasonable, unjustified, but above all, cruel, for Amadeo was asking for his legitimate share not to squander but to enable him to settle his hospital bills and defray the cost of his medication. The private respondent theorizes that the petitioner in turning her back and denying her husband the moral and financial assistance at the time when most needed and her refusal to stamp her approval on the deed of sale are devoid of cogent reason. She asserts that no other motive could be attributed to the petitioner but her selfishness and cupidity thinking that perhaps she could own all the conjugal partnership properties upon her husband's death, they having no children. She contends that the Court of Appeals did not err when it applied the provisions of Art. 161 of the Civil Code because the payment of the hospital and medical expenses no doubt redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. She maintains that there is here no case of abandonment. That while it is true that Amadeo left the conjugal home, the reason for his leaving was his desire for survival.

There is no denying that Amadeo sought the petitioner's consent to the deed of sale which consent was adamantly withheld by the petitioner. As may be gleaned from the records, her refusal stemmed from her belief that the deed of sale was executed in fraud of her, yet she did not do anything to impugn the said deed notwithstanding that the right is vested on her by law. 6 She assailed for the first time the validity of the sale only when Civil Case No. Q-34527 was instituted by the respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, to compel her to give her consent.

Notably, what was sold by Amadeo without the petitioner's consent was only an undetermined one-half (1/2) share in the community properties. He left intact that other undetermined 1/2 share which should belong to the petitioner. And the reason for the sale was, as correctly found by the trial court and Court of Appeals, for Amadeo's hospitalization and medication. It was therefore Amadeo's understandable human spirit to live longer that induced him to execute the deed of sale without the consent of the petitioner.

We concede that the consent of the petitioner is essential for the validity of the sale, but, in this case, where consent was unreasonably withheld, we are constrained to relax the

application of the law and consider the sale as falling within the recognized exceptions, The Court can not overlook the vital fact that Amadeo executed a last will and testament designating the petitioner as his sole heir. In this connection, we find merit in the respondent's assertion that no other motive could be attributed to the petitioner but her greed.

The question of whether or not Amadeo's hospital and medical expenses are chargeable to the conjugal partnership is answered in the affirmative and finds firm support in Art. 161 of the Civil Code, which provides inter alia:

The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.

The benefit required by this article need not be quantified into pesos or square meters of real property. It is enough that the transaction would result to some discernible advantage or good to the conjugal partnership, directly or indirectly. Thus, the health and well-being of both or either of the spouses would undeniably redound to the benefit of their conjugal partnership. The advancement of the interests of the conjugal partnership depends in great measure on the soundness of the body and mind of the partners.

Considering all the foregoing, we hold that the conjugal partnership property is liable for the hospital and medical expenses of Amadeo.

There is in this case no convincing reason to disturb the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals which are generally binding on this Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

 

MATABUENA V.S. CERVANTESAug 29

Facts:

In 1956, Felix Matabuena, the brother of the plaintiff, donated a property to his common-law spouse, Petronila Cervantes. In 1962, six years after the donation of property, Felix Matabuena and Petronila Cervantes got married. In the same year, after five months, Felix Matabuena died. Being the only sister and the nearest collateral relative of the deceased, Cornelia Matabuena filed a claim over the property. The lower court of Sorsogon then declared that the donation was valid as long as it happened before Felix Matabuena and Petronila Cervantes got married. This decision was in accordance with the Article 133 of Civil Code which states that donation made between spouses is null and void.

Issue:

Whether or not the ban of donation between spouses applies to a common-law relationship.

Rulings:

Supplying the legislative omission, the court ruled that the ban of donation between spouses applies to a common-law relationship. However, the lack of validity of the donation of Felix Matabuena to Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result to plaintiff having exclusive rights to the disputed property. Because Petronila and Felix Matabuena were legally married before Felix died, Petronila is his widow. Hence, she is entitled to 1/2 of the property of the deceased. The other half would be given to Felix Matabuena’s sister, Cornelia Matabuena.

Fuentes vs. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010

Facts: Tarciano Roca sold a conjugal land to the Fuentes couple with an alleged consent from his separated wife through attorney Plagata. Attorney made Rosario Roca sign an affidavit of consent and had it notarized in Zamboanga. On January 11, 1989, Tarciano executed the deed of absolute sale. On January 28, 1990, Tarciano Roca passed away and subsequently after nine months his wife passed away. Eight years later, the Rocas (children, nephew) filed an action of annulment and reconveyance of the land since there was no consent given by Rosario Roca. The marriage of Rocas occurred in the 1950s which the conjugal property is subject to the CC Art 173 and the deed of absolute sale transpired in the 1989 which is already in the scope of FC Art 124. 

Issue: WON the the FC is given retroactive effect and/or the right of reconveyance/annulment has prescribed

Held: Yes. Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to the transaction as the CA held, Article 173 provides that the wife may bring an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale.  It did not yet prescribe.

 

Notes:

CC Art. 173: The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.

FC Art. 124:  x x x  In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.  These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.  In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.  x x x

JACINTO SAGUID vs. CA, RTC, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE and GINA S. REY

October 25, 2012 §   Leave a comment

FACTS:Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met and cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation. private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.

ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the parties

HELD:it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, “…only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions …” Proof of actual contribution is required.

Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.

In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials.

While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.

BOBBY TAN vs GRACE ANDRADE,

D E C I S I O N

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

 Before the Court are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated July 26, 2005 and Resolution3 dated March 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71987 which affirmed with modification the Judgment4 dated April 6, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19 (RTC) in Civil Case No. CEB 20969.

The Facts

Rosario Vda. De Andrade (Rosario) was the registered owner of four parcels of land known as Lots 17, 18, 19, and 205 situated in Cebu City (subject properties) which she mortgaged to and subsequently foreclosed by one Simon6 Diu (Simon).7 When the redemption period was about to expire, Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan (Bobby) who agreed to redeem the subject properties.8 Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son, Proceso Andrade, Jr. (Proceso, Jr.), for P100,000.00 as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale9 dated April 29, 1983 (subject deed of sale). On July 26, 1983, Proceso, Jr. executed a Deed of Assignment,10 ceding unto Bobby his rights and interests over the subject properties in consideration of P50,000.00. The Deed of Assignment was signed by, among others, Henry Andrade (Henry), one of Rosario’s sons, as instrumental witness. Notwithstanding the aforementioned Deed of Assignment, Bobby extended an Option to Buy11 the subject properties in favor of Proceso, Jr., giving the latter until 7:00 in the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the same for the sum of P310,000.00. When Proceso, Jr. failed to do so, Bobby consolidated his ownership over the subject properties, and the TCTs12 therefor were issued in his name.

On October 7, 1997, Rosario’s children, namely, Grace, Proceso, Jr., Henry, Andrew, Glory, Miriam Rose, Joseph (all surnamed Andrade), Jasmin Blaza, and Charity A. Santiago (Andrades), filed a complaint13 for reconveyance and annulment of deeds of conveyance and damages against Bobby before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB 20969. In their complaint, they alleged that the transaction between Rosario and Bobby (subject transaction) was not one of sale but was actually an equitable mortgage which was entered into to secure Rosario’s indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed that since the subject properties were inherited by them from their father, Proceso Andrade, Sr. (Proceso, Sr.), the subject properties were conjugal in nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective shares therein. In this light, they argued that they remained as co-owners of the subject properties together with Bobby, despite the issuance of the TCTs in his name.

In his defense, Bobby contended that the subject properties were solely owned by Rosario per the TCTs issued in her name14 and that he had validly acquired the same upon Proceso, Jr.’s failure to exercise his option to buy back the subject properties.15 He also interposed the defenses of prescription and laches against the Andrades.16cralaw virtualaw library

The RTC Ruling

On April 6, 2001, the RTC rendered a Judgment17 dismissing the Andrades’ complaint.

It ruled that the subject transaction was a bona fide sale and not an equitable mortgage as can be gleaned from its terms and conditions, noting further that the subject deed of sale was not even questioned by the Andrades at the time of its execution. As Proceso,

Jr. failed to exercise his option to buy back the subject properties, the titles thereto were validly consolidated in Bobby’s favor, resulting to the issuance of TCTs in his name which are deemed to be conclusive proof of his ownership thereto.18 As regards the nature of the subject properties, the RTC found that they “appeared to be the exclusive properties of Rosario.”19 Finally, it found that the Andrades’ claim over the subject properties had already prescribed and that laches had already set in.20cralaw virtualaw library

Dissatisfied, the Andrades elevated the matter on appeal.

The CA Ruling

On July 26, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed Decision21 upholding in part the RTC’s ruling.

It found that the subject deed of sale was indeed what it purports to be, i.e., a bona fide contract of sale. In this accord, it denied the Andrades’ claim that the subject transaction was an equitable mortgage since their allegation that the purchase price was unusually low was left unsupported by any evidence. Also, their averment that they have been in continuous possession of the subject properties was belied by the testimony of Andrew Andrade (Andrew) who stated that Bobby was already in possession of the same. 22cralaw virtualaw library

Nevertheless, the CA ruled that the subject properties belong to the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her late husband, Proceso, Sr., and thus, she co-owned the same together with her children, the Andrades.23 In this respect, the sale was valid only with respect to Rosario’s pro-indiviso share in the subject properties and it cannot prejudice the share of the Andrades since they did not consent to the sale.24 In effect, a resulting trust was created between Bobby and the Andrades25 and, as such, prescription and/or laches has yet to set in so as to bar them from instituting the instant case.26Accordingly, the CA ordered Bobby to reconvey to the Andrades their share in the subject properties.27cralaw virtualaw library

In view of the CA’s pronouncement, the parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. For the Andrades’ part, they sought the reconsideration of the CA’s finding as to its characterization of the subject transaction as one of sale, insisting that it is actually an equitable mortgage.28 As for Bobby’s part, he maintained that the sale should have covered the entirety of the subject properties and not only Rosario’s pro-indiviso share.29 Both motions for reconsideration were, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution30 dated March 3, 2006.

Hence, the present consolidated petitions.

Issues Before the Court

The present controversy revolves around the CA’s characterization of the subject properties as well as of the subject transaction between Rosario and Bobby.

In G.R. No. 172017, the Andrades submit that the CA erred in ruling that the subject transaction is in the nature of a sale, while in G.R. No. 171904, Bobby contends that the CA erred in ruling that the subject properties are conjugal in nature.

The Court’s Ruling

A. Characterization of the subject transaction.     

Settled is the rule that when the trial court's factual findings have been affirmed by the

CA, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon the Court, and may no longer be reviewed on Rule 45 petitions.31 While there exists exceptions to this rule – such as when the CA’s and RTC’s findings are in conflict with each other32 – the Court observes that none applies with respect to the ruling that the subject transaction was one of sale and not an equitable mortgage. Records readily reveal that both the RTC and the CA observed that there is no clear and convincing evidence to show that the parties agreed upon a mortgage. Hence, absent any glaring error therein or any other compelling reason to hold otherwise, this finding should now be deemed as conclusive and perforce must stand. As echoed in the case of Ampo v. CA:33cralaw virtualaw libraryx x x Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court – and they carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court, and in the absence of any showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the evidence on record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand.34cralaw virtualaw libraryConsequently, the Andrades’ petition in G.R. No. 172017 must therefore be denied.

B. Characterization of the subject properties.

With respect to the nature of the subject properties, the courts a quo were at variance such that the RTC, on the one hand, ruled that the said properties were exclusive properties of Rosario,35 while the CA, on the other hand, pronounced that they are conjugal in nature.36 In this regard, the consequent course of action would be for the Court to conduct a re-examination of the evidence if only to determine which among the two is correct, 37 as an exception to the proscription in Rule 45 petitions.

Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code38 which states that “[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” For this presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed acquired during the marriage. As held in Go v. Yamane:39cralaw virtualaw libraryx x x As a condition sine qua non for the operation of [Article 160] in favor of the conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage.

In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.40 (Citations omitted)Corollarily, as decreed in Valdez v. CA,41 the presumption under Article 160 cannot be made to apply where there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired:x x x The issuance of the title in the name solely of one spouse is not determinative of the conjugal nature of the property, since there is no showing that it was acquired during the marriage of the Spouses Carlos Valdez, Sr. and Josefina L. Valdez. The presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code, that property acquired during marriage is conjugal, does not apply where there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. The presumption cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Moreover, when the property is registered in the name of only one spouse and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by same spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to the said spouse.

In this case, there is no evidence to indicate when the property was acquired by petitioner Josefina. Thus, we agree with petitioner Josefina’s declaration in the deed of

absolute sale she executed in favor of the respondent that she was the absolute and sole owner of the property. x x x.42cralaw virtualaw libraryIn this case, records reveal that the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband was terminated upon the latter’s death on August 7, 197843 while the transfer certificates of title over the subject properties were issued on September 28, 1979 and solely in the name of “Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of legal age, widow, Filipino.”44 Other than their bare allegation, no evidence was adduced by the Andrades to establish that the subject properties were procured during the coverture of their parents or that the same were bought with conjugal funds. Moreover, Rosario’s declaration that she is the absolute owner of the disputed parcels of land in the subject deed of sale45 was not disputed by her son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the same. Hence, by virtue of these incidents, the Court upholds the RTC’s finding46 that the subject properties were exclusive or sole properties of Rosario.

Besides, the Court observes that laches had already set in, thereby precluding the Andrades from pursuing their claim. Case law defines laches as the “failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it.”47cralaw virtualaw library

Records disclose that the Andrades took 14 years before filing their complaint for reconveyance in 1997. The argument that they did not know about the subject transaction is clearly belied by the facts on record. It is undisputed that Proceso, Jr. was a co-vendee in the subject deed of sale,48 while Henry was an instrumental witness to the Deed of Assignment49 and Option to Buy50 both dated July 26, 1983. Likewise, Rosario’s sons, Proceso, Jr. and Andrew, did not question the execution of the subject deed of sale made by their mother to Bobby.51 These incidents can but only lead to the conclusion that they were well-aware of the subject transaction and yet only pursued their claim 14 years after the sale was executed.

Due to the above-stated reasons, Bobby’s petition in G.R. No. 171904 is hereby granted.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby (a) GRANTS the petition of Bobby Tan in G.R. No. 171904; and (b)DENIES the petition of Grace Andrade, Charity A. Santiago, Henry Andrade, Andrew Andrade, Jasmin Blaza, Miriam Rose Andrade, and Joseph Andrade in G.R. No. 172017. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 26, 2005 and Resolution dated March 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71987 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the April 6, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19 in Civil Case No. CEB 20969 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

the Comma (,)

The comma is useful in a sentence when the writer wishes to:

pause before proceeding

add a phrase that does not contain any new subject

separate items on a list

use more than one adjective (a describing word, like beautiful)

For example, in the following sentence the phrase or clause between the commas gives us more information behind the actions of the boy, the subject of the sentence:

The boy, who knew that his mother was about to arrive, ran quickly towards the opening door.

Note that if the phrase or clause were to be removed, the sentence would still make sense although there would be a loss of information. Alternatively, two sentences could be used:

The boy ran quickly towards the opening door. He knew that his mother was about to arrive.

Commas are also used to separate items in a list.

For example:

The shopping trolley was loaded high with bottles of beer, fruit, vegetables, toilet rolls, cereals and cartons of milk.

Note that in a list, the final two items are linked by the word ‘and’ rather than by a comma.

Commas are used to separate adjectives.

For example:

The boy was happy, eager and full of anticipation at the start of his summer holiday.

As commas represent a pause, it is good practice to read your writing out loud and listen to where you make natural pauses as you read it. More often than not, you will indicate where a comma should be placed by a natural pause. Although, the ‘rules’ of where a comma needs to be placed should also be followed.

For example:

However, it has been suggested that some bees prefer tree pollen.

Full Stop (.)

A full stop should always be used to end a sentence. The full stop indicates that a point has been made and that you are about to move on to further explanations or a related point.

Less frequently, a series of three full stops (an ellipsis) can be used to indicate where a section of a quotation has been omitted when it is not relevant to the text, for example:

“The boy was happy… at the start of his summer holiday.”

A single full stop may also be used to indicate the abbreviation of commonly used words as in the following examples:

Telephone Number = Tel. No.

September = Sept.

Pages = pp.

Exclamation Mark (!)

An exclamation mark indicates strong feeling within a sentence, such as fear, anger or love. It is also used to accentuate feeling within the written spoken word.

For example:

“Help! I love you!”

In this way, it can also be used to indicate a sharp instruction

“Stop! Police!”

or to indicate humour

“Ha! Ha! Ha!”

The exclamation mark at the end of a sentence means that you do not need a full stop.

Exclamation marks are a poor way of emphasising what you think are important points in your written assignments; the importance of the point will emphasise itself without a sequence of !!! in the text. An exclamation mark should only be used when absolutely essential, or when taken from a direct quote.

The exclamation mark should be used sparingly in formal and semi-formal writing.

Question Mark (?)

The question mark simply indicates that a sentence is asking a question. It always comes at the end of a sentence:

For example:

Are we at the end?

Note that the question mark also serves as a full stop.

Semi-colon (;)

The semi-colon is perhaps the most difficult sign of punctuation to use accurately. If in doubt, avoid using it and convert the added material into a new sentence.

As a general rule, the semi-colon is used in the following ways:

When joining two connected sentences.

For example:

We set out at dawn; the weather looked promising.

or

Assertive behaviour concerns being able to express feelings, wants and desires appropriately; passive behaviour means complying with the wishes of others.

The semi-colon can also be used to assemble detailed lists.

For example:

The conference was attended by delegates from Paris, France; Paris, Texas; London, UK; Stockholm, Sweden; Colombo, Sri Lanka; and Mumbai, India.

Colon (:)

The colon within a sentence makes a very pointed pause between two phrases. There are two main uses of the colon:

It is most commonly used when listing.

For example:

She placed the following items into the trolley: beer, fruit, vegetables, toilet rolls, cereals and cartons of milk.

Or it can be used within a heading, or descriptive title.

For example:

Human Resource Management: Guidelines for Telephone Advisers

Apostrophe (’)

The apostrophe, sometimes called an inverted comma has two main uses.

The apostrophe indicates possession or ownership.

For example:

The girl's hat was green, (girl is in the singular).

This shows the reader that the hat belongs to the girl.

The girls' hats were green, (girls in this instance are plural, i.e. more than one girl, more than one hat).

This indicates that the hats belong to the girls.

Another use of the apostrophe is to indicate where a letter is omitted:

For example:

We're going to do this course. (We are going to do this course.)

Isn’t this a fine example of punctuation? (Is not this a fine example of punctuation?)

The time is now 7 o’ clock. (The time is now 7 of the clock)

Note that a common mistake is to confuse its with it’s.

It’s indicates to the reader that a letter has been omitted.

For example:

It’s a lovely day is an abbreviated way of saying: It is a lovely day.

Note that in most formal writing, the practice of using abbreviated words is inappropriate.

See also: Common Mistakes in Writing for more on using apostrophes correctly.

Quotation or Speech Marks (“….”)

Quotation or speech marks are used to:

To mark out speech

When quoting someone else's speech

For example:

My grandpa said, "Share your chocolates with your friends."

"George, don't do that!"

"Will you get your books out please?” said Mrs Jones, the teacher, “and quieten down!"

It is worth noting that to report an event back does not require speech or quotation marks.

For example:

Mrs Jones told the pupils to take out their books and to quieten down.

Hyphen (-)

The hyphen is used to link words together.

For example:

sub-part

eighteenth-century people

week-end

second-class post

gender-neutral

non-verbal

The hyphen is also used when a word is split between two lines. The hyphen should be placed between syllables at the end of the upper line and indicates to the reader that the word will be completed on the next line.

Computer applications such as Word Processors can be set to automatically hyphenate words for you, although it is more common to use extra spacing to avoid hyphenation.

Brackets ( )

Brackets always come in pairs ( ) and are used to make an aside, or a point which is not part of the main flow of a sentence. If you remove the words between the brackets, the sentence should still make sense.

For example:

“The strategy (or strategies) chosen to meet the objectives may need to change as the intervention continues.”

Another example is as follows:

“We can define class as a large-scale grouping of people who share common economic resources, that strongly influence the types of lifestyle they are able to lead. Ownership of wealth, together with occupation, are the chief basis of class differences. The major classes that exist in Western societies are an upper class (the wealthy, employers and industrialists, plus tops executives – those who own or directly control productive resources); a middle class (which includes most white-collar workers and professionals); and a working class (those in blue-collar or manual jobs).” (Giddens, 1997, p.243)

Square Brackets […]

A different set of square brackets [ ] can be used:

to abbreviate lengthy quotations

to correct the tense of a quotation to suit the tense of your own sentence

to add your own words to sections of an abbreviated quotation.

To abbreviate lengthy quotations in an essay or report

“We can define class as a large-scale grouping of people who share common economic resources, that strongly influence the types of lifestyle they are able to lead. Ownership of wealth, together with occupation, are the chief basis of class differences. The major classes that exist in Western societies are an upper class […]; a middle class […] and a working class […].”

(Giddens, 1997, p.243)

To adjust a quotation to suit your own sentence

For example, if you were writing about class structure, you might use the following:

According to Giddens, (1997, p.243) the “[o]wnership of wealth, together with occupation, are the chief basis of class differences”.

Note, that when using square brackets, only the occasional letter as in the above example or the occasional word (for example when changing the tense of the sentence) would be placed in square brackets in this way.

Slash (/)

Many people use the slash instead of or, and etc., but this is not always helpful to the reader. There is, however, a modern convention in gender-neutral writing to use ‘s/he’.

Calimlim-Canullas v. FortunFacts:

Petitioner Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas and Fernando Canullas were married in 1962, with 5 children, and were living on a house situated on a land inherited by the latter. In 1978, Fernando abandoned his family and lived with Corazon Daguines. In 1980, Fernando sold the house and lot to Daguines, who initiated a complaint for quieting of title. Mercedes resisted, claiming that the house and lot were conjugal properties, and the sale was null nad void for she had not consented thereto.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the character of conjugal property

(2) Whether or not the sale of the lot together with the house and improvements thereon was valid under the circumstances surrounding the transaction

Held:

(1) Both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. FERNANDO could not have alienated the house and lot to DAGUINES since MERCEDES had not given her consent to said sale.

(2) The contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. That sale was subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. The law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or con conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, "the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union." Those provisions are dictated by public interest and their criterion must be imposed upon the wig of the parties.

FERRER VS. FERRER (508 SCRA 570)

Facts:

• J was the widow of A, half-brother of respondents and I. Before their marriage, A acquired a lot.

• Through a loan with SSS, improvements were made thereon, such as a residential house and a two-door

apartment building. However, the loan was paid during the marriage using their conjugal funds.

• J claimed that a warehouse was constructed on the lot using conjugal funds

• J also averred that M occupied one door of the apartment building, as well as the warehouse but stopped paying rentals in September 1991 claiming that she had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by A in favor of M and I and their spouses

• J contended that I and F deceived into signing what he thought was his last will and testament but in fact was a Deed of Sale

• Upon discovery of this, A filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale but was dismissed both in the RTC and CA

• J contended that she had the right to be reimbursed for half of the cost of the improvements on the lot which amounted to P500,000.

• J sought from M and I moral and exemplary damages, litigation and incidental expenses.

• M and I’s motion to dismiss was denied by RTC but was granted by CA for failing to state a cause of action

Issue:

• Whether or not J has the right to be reimbursed for half of the cost of the improvements on the lot.

Held:

Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership.

When the cost of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.

Subject property of Alfredo was declared as exclusive property based on Article 120 of the Family Code; Owner-spouse has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts of efforts

Respondents were the buyers of the property. Hence, they don’t have the obligation to respect petitioner’s right to be reimbursed

Validity of Deed of Sale was upheld with finality

San Luis vs. San LuisShort Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him, then married again to an American citizen who divorced him, then remarried again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the children in the 1st marriage contested the standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage was bigamous since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting under RP law (can't apply FC retroactively). Court held that even with FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn and other jurisprudence sufficiently provides the validity to the 3rd marriage, thus recognizing divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse. However, as the 3rd marriage was not sufficiently proved, the case was remanded in order for the 3rd spouse to present further evidence on this.FactsFELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages:

1. VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he did in 19632. MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias, divorced him before Hawaiian courts which was granted in 19733. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married before a Presbyterian Church in California n 1974, lived with him until he died for 18 years in their Alabang residence

-when Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND SETTLEMENT OF FELICISIMO'S ESTATE, filing for a letter of administration before RTC Makati-petition was contested (MTD) by Felicisimo's children for 2 grounds:

1. Venue improperly laid: should have filed petition in Laguna (domicile) and not in Makati (covers Alabang, decedent's residence at the time of his death)2. No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a mistress - marriage to Merry Lee was still valid (Family Code provision cannot be applied retroactively as it would impair their vested rights in accordance with Article 256, FC)

---these were denied but Felicidad still filed Opposition to MTD, showing evidence of the ff: Felicisimo exercised office in Laguna, but went home in Alabang - to prove proper venue Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii dissolving the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee - to prove capacity to sue

RTC Makati: Dismissed petitionCA: reversed and set aside

Place of residence should be understood in as the personal, actual or physical habitation so petition was properly filed Art26.2, FC should be given effect, allowing a Filipino to remarry under Philippine law

1. WON Venue properly laid? YES-The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases.-there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.2. WON Felicidad had capacity to sue? YES

As the legal wife: even if FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn v. Romillo (1985) sufficiently provides the legal basis for holding valid divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse (as well as other cases which were in Ma'am's book)

-it look at the legislative intent of FC provision assailed, it was based on the Van Dorn ruling which validates a divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse, thus capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry again---In this case, as Merry Lee obtained a divorce, Felicisimo now is capacitated to marry Felicidad. However, as the marriage between Felicidad and Felicisimo was not sufficiently proven, remand the case to RTC

Even if not qualified as the legal spouse, she could still petition for a letter of administration as an "INTERESTED PARTY" with Art144, CC and A148 FC both stating that she is considered a co-owner of properties owned by persons living as husband and wife but whose marriage is void.

Pana v Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr. December 10, 2012 FACTS:

The prosecution accused Efren Pana, his wife Melencia, and others of murder before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, and eventually a decision was rendered acquitting Efren of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melencia and another person guilty as charged and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed RTC’s decision but modified the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua. As for the monetary awards, the court affirmed the award of civil indemnity and moral damages but deleted the award for actual damages for lack of evidentiary basis. In its place the court made an award of php15, 000 each by way of temperate damages. In addition, the court awarded Php50, 000.00 exemplary damages per victim to be paid solidarily by them. The decision became executory of October 1, 2001. Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melencia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued. On April 3, 2002, Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution claiming that the properties levied were conjugal assets and not paraphernal of Melecia. On September 16, 2002, the RTC denied the motion. The spouses moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same. In this case, it is submitted that Efren and Melencia were married when the Civil Code was still in effect. They did not execute a pre-nuptial agreement, hence CPG governed their property relations. However, both RTC and CA held that property regime changed into ACP when family code took effect it reason out that Art. 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive effect in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Both the RTC and the Court of the Appeals are in error on this point. While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouses in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of hains and, therefore none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets , it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reac back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relations all conjugal partnership of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melencia can be levied and

executed upon for the satisfaction of Melencia’s civil liability in the aforesaid murder case.

SUPREME COURT: YES, provided that the conditions under Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

First of all, the Supreme Court explained that it is clear from the facts that Efren and Melencia were married when the Civil code was still the operative law on marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. Furthermore, Article 119 of the Civil Code provides that the future spouses main in marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community or conjugal partnership of gains or upon a complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The family code itself provides in Article 76 that

marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage, and clearly, under this situation, the spouses cannot modify their regime. Post marriage modification of settlements can take place only where (a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime; (c)judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family; (d) there was judicial separation of property under article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains. None of these circumstances exists in this case.

Furthermore, Article 119 provides as well, that in the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same is void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains established under the civil code shall govern the property regime of the spouses. the family code contains terms governing the conjugal partnership of gains that supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the civil code. Article 105 of the family code states that the provisions of such chapter on the conjugal partnership of gains shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the affectivity of this code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the civil or other laws as provided in Article 256.

Aguete v. PNB, G.R. No. 170166 April 6, 2011

FACTS: Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch before the CFI of Ilocos Norte.

The information disclosed that Jose Ros (petitioner) obtained a loan of P115,000 from ONB and executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land as security thereof. Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and as a result, PNB initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the said property. After which, the lot was sold to PNB as the highest bidder. Petitioner claims that she had no knowledge of the loan incurred by her husband nor did she consent to the mortgage instituted on their conjugal property. She then filed a complaint to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property (after the lapse of 1 year). The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners but was later reversed by the appellate court upon appeal.

ISSUE: WON the property is considered as redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

HELD: Yes. Petition denied.

The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable.17 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent.

It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Ros’ loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

Arcaba vs Tabancura Vda de BatocaelArcaba vs. Tabancura Vda De BatocaelGR No. 146683, November 22, 2001

FACTS:

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956.  Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property in favor of Francisco.  Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room.  On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress.  However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the master’s bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her.  She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco.  When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower.  The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was provided with food and lodging.  Francisco’s health deteriorated and became bedridden.  Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets. 

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same.  The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name.  This was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner.  Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550.  The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was valid.

HELD:

The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid.   The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of

Francisco.  Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

Arturo Flores vs Spouses Enrico and Edna Lindo

In October 1995, Edna Lindo obtained a loan amounting to P400k from Arturo Flores. To

secure the loan, Edna executed a deed of real estate mortgage on a property which is

however part of the conjugal property (it was both in her name and her husband’s name

Enrico Lindo). Only Edna signed the deed. But in November 1995, Enrico executed a

special power of attorney authorizing Edna to mortgage the property.

Edna was not able to pay the loan despite repeated demands from Flores. Flores then filed

an action to foreclose the mortgage.

The trial court (RTC Manila, Branch 33) ruled that the action for foreclosure cannot prosper

because it appears that there was no valid mortgage between Edna and Flores. Edna

mortgaged the property without the consent of her husband and the special power of

attorney executed by Enrico a month after the execution of the deed did not cure the defect.

The trial court however ruled that Flores can instead file a personal action (collection suit)

against Edna.

Eventually, Flores filed a suit for collection of sum of money against Edna and Enrico

(raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 42). The Lindo spouses filed a motion to dismiss on the

ground of res judicata. The trial court denied the motion. The spouses then filed a petition

for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

The CA ruled in favor of the spouses. It ruled that when Flores filed an action for the

foreclosure of the mortgage, he had abandoned the remedy of filing a personal action to

collect the indebtedness. These remedies are mutually exclusive.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD: No. It is true that as a rule, a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against

a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt; and that he has the option of either filing a

personal action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the

mortgage security. These remedies are indeed mutually exclusive. However, in this case,

the Supreme Court made a pro hac vice decision (applicable only to this case and as an

exception to the rule) which allows Flores to recover via a personal action despite his prior

filing of a real action to recover the indebtedness. This procedural rule cannot be

outweighed by the rule on unjust enrichment. Here, Edna admitted her liability of

indebtedness.

Further, the ruling of the Manila RTC Branch 33 is erroneous when it ruled that the

mortgage between Edna and Flores is invalid. It is true that a disposition (or in this case a

mortgage, which is an act of strict dominion) of a conjugal property by one spouse without

the consent of the other spouse is VOID. However, under the second paragraph of Article

124 of the Family Code:

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the

administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of

administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority

of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or

consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be

construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third

person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the

other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or

both offerors. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus it is clear, the mortgage was void at the outset but it was ratified when a month later,

Enrico executed a special power of attorney authorizing Edna to mortgage the subject

property. (So I guess this is an exception to the rule that “no void act can be ratified”.)