cases - election laws 1

7/28/2019 Cases - Election Laws 1

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Compiled by: Hernandez, Frauline Camille R.Election Laws set 1

Atty. Eliza Yamamoto

G.R. No. 129040 November 17, 1997NESTOR C. LIM, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELIMON C. ABELITA, III, inhis capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court ofMasbate, Branch 44, and SALVADOR O. SANCHEZ, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorarito annul the resolution dated April 17, 1997 ofCommission on Election, sustaining the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court(Branch 44) of Masbate of petitioner's counterprotest against privaterespondent Salvadora O. Sanchez in connection with the mayoralty contestfor Uson, Masbate.

Petitioner Nestor C. Lim and private respondent Salvadora O. Sanchez werecandidates for the off ice of mayor of the Municipality of Uson, Masbate in theMay 8, 1995 elections. Petitioner was credited 7,532 votes against 7,193votes for private respondent and declared winner by a margin of 339 votes.On May 11, 1995, he was proclaimed the duly-elected mayor of Uson,

Masbate by the municipal board of canvassers.

On May 22, 1995, private respondent filed an election protest allegingmassive and rampant fraud committed by petitioner's camp in 32 polling

precincts.

Petitioner was required to answer. Summons and copies of the electionprotest were served on him on June 2, 1995. 1 On June 15, 1995, Atty.Renato M. Cervantes entered his appearance as counsel for petitioner andmoved for an extension of 15 days from June 17, 1995 within which to filepetitioner's answer.

The trial court granted petitioner an extension of ten (10) days from June16, 1995, i.e., until June 26, 1995, within which to file his answer.

On June 22, 1995, petitioner instead filed a motion to dismiss the electionprotest on the ground that the protest was f iled beyond the reglementaryperiod of then (10) days counted from the proclamation of the results of theelections on May 11, 1995.

On August 23, 1995, the trial court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.Private respondent's protest, which was sent by registered mail on May 22,1995, was held to have been filed on time, considering that May 21, 1995,the last day of the ten-day reglementary period, fell on a Sunday. A copy ofthe order of denial was received by the petitioner on August 31, 1995.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the trial court denied hismotion. He then questioned the orders in a petition for certiorariin the Court

of Appeals. However, his petition was dismissed by the appellate court forwant of jurisdiction. 2

Petitioner also filed a motion for a bill of particulars upon the denial of hismotion to dismiss. Again, his motion was denied. Petitioner received a copyof the order of denial on November 8, 1995.

On November 13, 1995, petitioner filed his answer with counterprotest byregistered mail. The trial court thereafter ordered the parties to name theirrepresentatives to the revision c ommittee.

The revision of the ballots subject of private respondent's protest havingbeen finished on June 10, 1996, petitioner, on June 13, 1996, moved for therevision of ballots subject of his counterprotest. But the trial court denied hismotion in its order of August 7, 1996 on the ground that petitioner's answerwith counterprotest was filed out of time. In its order dated September 9,1996, it denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. A copy of the orderwas received by the petitioner on September 21, 1996.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorariin the COMELEC which, in itsresolution dated April 17, 1997, dismissed petitioner's petition for lack ofmerit. Petitioner received a copy of the resolution on the same day. On April22, 1997, he filed a motion f or reconsideration. Realizing that such motionwas not allowed under Rule 13, 1(d) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,

he brought this petition on May 17, 1997.

Meantime, on May 8, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision annulling theproclamation of petitioner as the duly-elected mayor of Uson, Masbate anddeclaring in his place private respondent as winner of the mayoralty contestby a margin of 111 votes. 3

Petitioner contends that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion inupholding the trial court's order denying his counterprotest. He argues thatthe Rules of Court, rather than those of t he COMELEC, govern therequirements and periods for pleading in election contests cognizable by t he

Regional Trial Courts. He argues that his pleadings were filed within theperiods prescribed by the Rules of Court. He avers that he f iled a motion todismiss the protest on June 22, 1995, within the extension to file an answergranted by the trial court; that he had fifteen (15) days to file an answerfrom August 31, 1995, the date he received notice of denial of his motion to

dismiss; that, in accordance with the Rules of Court, he had up to September4, 1995 within which to f ile a motion for a bill of particulars; and that upondenial of his motion, he had five (5) days from receipt of the order onNovember 8, 1995 within which to file his answer, which he did on

November 13, 1995, as provided in Rule 12, 1(b) of the Rules of Court.

After due consideration of the petition, to which an answer (commenfiled by private respondent, we think the petition should be dismissedlack of merit.

The COMELEC correctly found that petitioner's counterprotest was filof time. The basic flaw in petitioner's theory is his insistence that becthe election protest is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, the perfiling pleadings is governed by the Rules of Court. The Omnibus Elec

Code (B.P. No. 881) provides:

254. Procedure in election contests. The Commission sprescribe the rules to govern t he procedure and other matrelating to the election contests pertaining to all national, rprovincial, and city offices not later than thirty days beforeelections. Such rules shall provide a simple and inexpensivprocedure for the expeditious disposition of election contes

shall be published in at least two newspapers of generalcirculation.

However, with respect to election contest involving munici

barangay offices the following rules of procedure shall gov

(a) Notice of the protest contesting the election of a candia municipal or barangay office shall be served upon the ca

by means of a summons at the postal address stated in hiscertificate of candidacy except when the protestee, withoufor the summons, has made the court understand that he been notified of the protest or has filed his answer hereto;

(b) The protestee shall answer the protest within five daysreceipt of the summons, or, in case there has been no sumfrom the date of his appearance and in all cases before thecommencement of the hearing of the protest or contest. Tanswer shall deal only with the election in the polling placeare covered by the allegations of the contest;

(c) Should the protestee desire to impugn the votes receivthe protestant in other polling places, he shall file a counteprotest within the same period fixed for the answer servingthereof upon the protestant by r egistered mail or by perso

delivery of through the sheriff;

(d) The protestant shall answer the counter-protest withindays after notices;

(e) Within the period of five days counted from the f iling oprotest any other candidate for the same office may interv


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the case as other contestants and ask for affirmative relief in hisfavor by a petition in intervention, which shall be considered asanother contest, except that it s hall be substantiated within thesame proceedings. The protestant or protestee shall answer theprotest in intervention within five days after notice;

(f) If no answer shall be filed to the contest, counter-protest, or tothe protest in intervention, within the time limits respectively fixed,

a general denial shall be deemed to have been entered;

(g) In election contest proceedings, the permanent registry list ofvoters shall be conclusive in regard to the question as to who hasthe right to vote in said election.

Conformably to these provision, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure likewiseprovides:

PART VIPROVISIONS GOVERNING ELECTION

CONTEST AND QUO WARRANTOCASESBEFORE TRIAL COURTS

Rule 35 Election Contest Before Courts of General Jurisdiction

xxx xxx xxx

7.Answer, Reply, Counter-Protest and Protest in Intervention. (a) Within five (5) days after receipt of notice of the filing of thepetition and a copy of the petition, the respondent shall file hisanswer thereto specifying the nature of his defense, and serve acopy thereof upon the protestant. The answer shall deal only withthe election in the precincts which are covered by the allegations

of the protest.

(b) Should the protestee desire to impugn the votes received bythe protestant in other precincts, he shall file a counter-protest

within the same period fixed for the filing of the answer, serving acopy thereof upon the protestant by registered mail or by personaldelivery. In such a c ase, the counter-protest shall be verified.

(c) The protestant shall answer the counter-protest within five (5)days after notice.

(d) Within five (5) days from the f iling of the protest, any other

candidate for the same office may intervene in the case as othercontestants and ask for affirmative relief in his favor by a verifiedpetition in intervention, which shall be substantiated within the

same proceeding. The protestant or protestee shall answer theprotest-in-intervention within five (5) days after notice.

(e) If no answer shall be filed to the protest, counter-protest, orprotest-in-intervention within the time limits respectively fixed, ageneral denial shall be deemed to have been entered.

It will thus be seen that Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure merelyreproduced the provisions of Art. XXI, 254 of the Omnibus Election Code.There is no basis for petitioner's contention that the COMELEC has no powerto prescribe the procedure for election contests filed in the Regional TrialCourts and those filed in the Municipal Trial Courts. 4 The timeliness ofpetitioner's protest must therefore be determined in accordance with the ruleof the COMELEC.

As already noted, petitioner received summons and copies of the electionprotest on June 2, 1995. In accordance with Art XXI, 254(b) of theOmnibus Election Code and Rule 35, 7(a) of the COMELEC Rules ofProcedure, his answer should have been filed within fi ve (5) days, i.e., on orbefore June 7, 1995. But petitioner did not file his answer on or before that

date. On June 15, 1995, eight (8) days after the expiration of the period forfiling his answer, his counsel filed a motion for an extension of fifteen (15)days within which to file an answer or any r esponsive pleading to theelection protest. His motion was thus filed late. In Maliwanag

v. Herrera,5

the Court held that the provisions of the Rules of Court aresuppletory to the provisions of the Election Law. Hence a motion forextension of time to file answer to the election protest should be filed beforethe expiration of the fi ve-day reglementary period to answer, otherwise ageneral denial shall be deemed to have been entered against theprotestee. 6 Petitioner's answer with counterprotest, which was filed onNovember 13, 1995, was therefore filed more than five months late.

In the case ofMaliwanag v. Herrera, 7 the Court rule that a counterprotest isequivalent of a counterclaim in a civil action and, therefore, must bepresented as part of the answer within the time the protestee is required toanswer the protest. In Kho v. COMELEC, 8 this Court reiterated the long-standing rule 9 that the counterprotest must be filed within the periodprovided by law, otherwise, the court acquires no jurisdiction to entertain it.Conformably to these cases, we hold that the COMELEC did not commit agrave abuse of discretion in upholding the trial court's refusal to conduct arevision of the ballots subject of petitioner's counterprotest since the answer

with counterprotest was clearly filed out of time. The trial court had nojurisdiction to entertain the counterprotest.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 109713 April 6, 1995JOSE M. MERCADO, petitioner,vs.BOARD OF ELECTION SUPERVISORS OF THE MUNICIPALITY IBAAN, PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOLOCAL GOVERNMENT, CRISANTO P. PANGILINAN and HON.CONRADO R. ANTONA, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The novel issues presented in this petition may be reduced (1) the leand constitutionality of Section 24, Resolution No. 2499 of the Common Elections (COMELEC) creating, for purposes of the elections in theSangguniang Kabataan (SK), the Boards of Election Supervisors (BESmaking it the final arbiter of all election protests, and (2) the jurisdictRegional Trial Courts over contests involving sangguniang kabataan

elections.

Petitioner Jose M. Mercado was proclaimed winner in the 4 Decembeelection for chairman of the SK of Barangay Mabalor, Ibaan, Batanga

proclamation was made by the Board of Election Tellers (BET) actingBoard of Canvassers, on the basis of its tally which showed Mercado by one vote(49 to 48) o ver his rival, private respondent Crisanto P.Pangilinan. 1

Mercado' s victory was, however, short-lived. Immediately after Mercproclamation as the winner by the BET, Pangilinan filed a formal protthe BES questioning the results of the election. He alleged that the B

Chairman, drinking gin and Coke during the counting, had i nvalidatevotes without consulting the other board members. The BES orderedreopening of the ballot box and the recount of the votes for SK ChairThe recount reversed the earlier tally to 51 to 49 i n favor of Pangilinawas thereupon proclaimed the duly elected SK Chairman by the BES,issued for that purpose its own Certificate of Canvass and Proclamat

Mercado then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas Cpetition for certiorariand mandamuspraying for the annulment ofPangilinan's proclamation by the BES, and for the issuance of an ordcompel the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) torecognize him as the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay Mabalor

allow him to take his oath of office and discharge his duties as such.

In his petition docketed as Civil Case No. 3565, Mercado assailed thejurisdiction of the BES to act on the protest filed by Pangilinan as the

cited therein was allegedly in the nature of an election protest propecognizable by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court in accordanceSection 252 of the Omnibus Election Code. He further claimed that,assuming that the BES has jurisdiction over the protest, the grounds


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therein were deemed waived by Pangilinan's failure to invoke them at thelevel of the BET, and that the BES acted with grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the petitioner of dueprocess when it ordered the reopening of the ballot box and the recountingof the votes without affording him the opportunity to be heard.

In its Order dated 13 January 1993, the RTC dismissed the petition for lackof jurisdiction, The trial court stated that it was not aware of any law by

which it could act on the matters raised in Mercado's petition sinceResolution No. 2499 of the COMELEC did not vest in the RTC jurisdictionover controversies affecting Sangguniang Kabataan elections; constitutinginstead the BES, which is under COMELEC jurisdiction , as the final arbiter ofall election controversies within its level.

Mercado moved for a r econsideration of the dismissal order. He argued thatthe RTC was competent to act on his petition because (a) one mode of

seeking judicial review is through the writ ofcertiorariwhich may be issuedby the RTC under B.P. Blg. 129;(b) under its Resolutions Nos. 2499 and2520, the COMELEC was to provide only t echnical assistance in the conductof the SK election and therefore could not grant any relief from the action of

the BES; moreover, under said Resolution No. 2499, no appeal to a higheradministrative level wash allowed from the action of the BES and (c) theprinciple of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply to the caseat bar, the jurisdictional and due process issues raised therein being legal innature.

Unconvinced, the RTC, in its Order dated 2 March 1993, denied the motionfor reconsideration for lack of merit. It ruled that the r eopening of the ballotbox for Barangay Mabalor and the recounting of the votes cast therein wereperfectly within the ambit of the BES's authority, and that Mercado shouldhave gone to the DILG which has direct control and supervision of t he SKelections.

Hence, Mercado's present petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court forthe review on pure questions of law of the Orders of 13 J anuary 1993 and 2March 1993 of the Batangas RTC. He initially raises the same issues he

presented in Civil Case No. 3565 on the competency of the BES to takecognizance of Pangilinan' s protest and his right to due process, and hereiterates the arguments he adduced in his motion for reconsiderationregarding the jurisdiction of the RTC over Civil Case No. 3565. However, inrefutation of the Solicitor General's defense of the BES jurisdiction as

conferred by COMELEC Resolution No. 2499, Mercado, in his ConsolidatedReply, now contends that COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is null and voidbecause: (a) it prescribes a separate set of rules for the election of the SKChairman different from and inconsistent with that set f orth in the OmnibusElection Code, thereby contravening Section 2, Article I of the said Codewhich explicitly provides that "it shall govern all elections of public officers";and, (b) it constitutes a total, absolute, and complete abdication by theCOMELEC of its constitutionally and statutorily mandated duty to enforce and

administer all election laws as provided for i n Section 2 (1), Article IX-C ofthe Constitution; Section 52, Article VIII of the Omnibus Election Code; andSection 2, Chapter 1, Subtitle C, Title I, Book V of the 1987 AdministrativeCode.

The issues presented require a flashback into the history of the SK. It wasinitially organized by P.D. No. 684 (15 April 1975) as the KabataangBarangay (KB), a youth organization composed of all barangay residents who

were less than 18 years of age which aims to provide its members with theopportunity to express their views and opinions on issues of transcendentalimportance. Its affairs were administered by a barangay youth chairmantogether with six barangay youth leaders, who should at least be 15 years ofage or over but less than 18 The then Secretary of Local Government andCommunity Development was authorized to promulgate the implementingrules and r egulations.

Pursuant to P.D. No. 1191 (1 September 1977), the Pambansang Katipunanng Kabataang Barangay ng Pilipinas was constituted as "a body corporate"with "the powers and attributes of a corporation" and placed directly underthe Office of the President. Its affairs were to be administered by the

Executive Committee which was empowered to promulgate rules andregulations governing the KB. This youth organization was r ecognized in B.P.Blg. 337 (The Local Government Code), 2 which raised the maximum agerequirement of the members from 18 to 21.

Under R.A. No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991), the KabataangBarangay was changed to t he Sangguniang Kabataan.3 It remains as ayouth organization in every barangay, composed of a chairman and sevenmembers to be elected by the katipunan ng kabataan, and the secretary andthe treasurer to be appointed by the SK chairman with the concurrence ofthe SK. 4 The katipunan ng kabataan is composed of all citizens of thePhilippines actually residing in the barangay for at least six months who are15 but not more than 21 and who are duly registered in the list of t he SK orin the official barangay list in the custody of t he barangay secretary. 5 Thechairman, upon assumption of office, shall automatically become an ex-officiomember of the sangguniang barangay 6

Under subparagraph (5), paragraph (e) Article 203, Rule XXVII of the Rulesand Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 7 theconduct and administration of the elections for sangguniang kabataanmembers shall be governed by the rules promulgated by the COMELEC.

Pursuant to such authority and for purposes of the SK election authorizedunder Section 532 of R.A. No. 7160, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution

No. 2499 which closely followed the pattern set in the Constitution of theKabataang Barangay providing for a Board of Election Supervisors and Boardof Election Tellers, with the former having direct general supervision in the

conduct of such election and as the final arbiter of all election protestArticle V of Resolution No. 2499 expressly provides:

ARTICLE V

BOARD OF ELECTION SUPERVISORS AND BOARD OF ELECTELLERS

Sec. 24. Board of election supervisors. There shall be craboard of election supervisors (BES) in every city or municcomposed of the following: a) city/municipal local governm

operations officer as chairman; b) city/municipal election omember; and c) city/municipal secretary as member.

The board shall have direct general supervision in the cond

elections for sangguniang kabataan in the barangay and shas final arbiter in the resolution of all election protests.

No pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relathe election of sangguniang kabataan chairman and memb

The petitioner contends that COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is illegal unconstitutional because it makes the BES the final arbiter of election

contests involving the SK in contravention of Section 252 of the OmnElection Code which vests in the proper metropolitan or municipal trioriginal jurisdiction over such contests and, on a more f undamental gin contravention of Section 2, Article IX-C of t he Constitution which loon. such courts exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving barangay officials. 8

This contention is without merit for it assumes that t he SK election iselection involving elective barangay officials within the purview of theaforesaid statutory and constitutional provisions.

Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of paragr

Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution on the COMELEC's exclusivappellate jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officiato the elective barangay officials under the pertinent laws in force at the Omnibus Election Code was enacted and upon the ratification of

Constitution. That law was B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the LocGovernment Code, and the elective barangay officials referred to wepunong barangay and the six sangguniang bayan members. 9 They wbe elected by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage. 10Theyalso the same officers referred to by the provisions of the Omnibus ECode of the Philippines 11on election of barangay officials. 12Metropoand municipal trial courts had exclusive original The j urisdiction over


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relating to their election . The decisions of t hese courts were appealable tothe Regional Trial Courts. 13

These were the laws on elective barangay officials which the ConstitutionalCommission took into account when it debated on that portion of paragraph(2), Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution relating to contests involvingelective barangay officials. During such debates, the following discussionstook place:

MR. MAAMBONG:

Madam President and members of the Committee, I understandfrom the sponsorship speech that in matters of contests ofbarangay, municipal and provincial officials, the jurisdiction is allexclusive to the Commission on Elections. Under the present lawthat we have, cases involving election contests of barangayofficials are initiated in the municipal trial court or metropolitantrial court, subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court whosedecision is final. In other words, when it comes to barangayofficials, the COMELEC has nothing to do at all with the election

contest. In the case, however, of municipal officials, under thepresent law, the Omnibus Election Code, the original jurisdiction iswith the Regional Trial Court, and the decision is appealable to theCommission on Elections. We are suggesting and we would like

the Committee to take note of this that while we admit that in allcontests, whether it be barangay, municipal, provincial or cityofficials, the sole authority should be the Commission on Elections that there should be a two-tiered resolution of cases in thesense that when it comes to barangay officials, the municipal trialcourt or the metropolitan trial court should have jurisdiction first,then it is appealable to the COMELEC.

In the case of municipal officials, we are thinking that the regionaltrial court should have jurisdiction, and then it is appealable to theCOMELEC. And in the case of provincial or city officials, the firstjurisdiction, which is exclusive, would be the COMELEC. I wonder if

the Committee would take that into consideration consideringthese facts. If we will allow the COMELEC to have executive [sic]jurisdiction over cases involving barangay and municipal officials,one can just imagine the difficulty of the COMELEC, consideringthat we have thousands of barangay and municipal officials. And

as I understand from my private conversation with the Chairmanof the COMELEC, the Honorable Ramon Felipe, when it comes tocontests involving barangay and municipal officials, the COMELECmay have to send hearing officers; whereas if we will allow themunicipal trial court and the metropolitan trial court to havejurisdiction over these cases, they will be given the properconsideration by the court. In the case of contest involvingmunicipal officials, the regional trial court, which is also a court,

should have jurisdiction, not the hearing officers of the COMELEC.So we have a two-tiered situation here which we lawyers thinkwould be the best remedy considering again my allusion to thefact that there are so many barangays and municipalities all overthe country.

That is just my suggestion. I do not know if the Committee couldrespond to it so that we could perhaps present some amendments.

REGALADO:

In other words, insofar as the appellate jurisdiction of theCommission on Elections is concerned, it is still preseved despitethe fact that it involves barangay, municipal, city or provincialofficials.

MR. MAAMBONG:

Yes we would rather insist on that because that is a constitutionalmandate.

MR. REGALADO:

The Commissioner's proposal is only with respect to the originaljurisdiction; that is, insofar as election contests involving barangayofficials are concerned, the municipal trial courts have the originaljurisdiction; whereas in the case of city and provincial officials, theoriginal jurisdiction is vested in the regional trial courts.

MR. MAAMBONG:

No, Madam President. In the case of provincial and city officials,the original and exclusive jurisdiction should be with theCommission on Elections.

MR. REGALADO:

In the case of municipal officials, then it will be the regional trial

courts which will exercise original jurisdiction.

MR. MAAMBONG:

That is correctly put, Madam President.

MR. REGALADO:

But altogether, in the ultimate analysis on appellate jurisdi

they will all have to go to the Commission on Elections eve

MR. MAAMBONG:

Yes, Madam President. They will still be the sole judge of aelection contests.14

xxx xxx xxx

MR. REGALADO:

May I ask C ommissioner Maambong a question?

MR. MAAMBONG:

Yes, Madam President.

MR. REGALADO:

Is it his concern that we vest i n the municipal trial courts tmatter of election contests for barangay officials and in theregional trial courts election contests involving municipal ofthereby requiring a judicial officer to handle these cases,heightened by the fact that the decisions of the municipal tcourt or the regional trial court in those election contests inbarangay and municipal officials are f inal and immediatelyexecutory?

MR. MAAMBONG:

Under the present law, when it comes to appeals from themunicipal trial court to the regional trial court, these becomand executory, and we feel that in this regard, the jurisdictthe COMELEC has been diluted; And we do not like that, M

President.

MR. REGALADO:

Thank you.15

xxx xxx xxx


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MR. MAAMBONG:

In that case, Madam President, may I proceed to propose this

amendment in collaboration and with the advice and consent ofCommissioner de los Reyes and Commissioner Rodrigo.

THE PRESIDENT:

What is the amendment?

MA. MAAMBONG:

On line 9, Section 2(2), delete the words "Be the sole judge of"and in its instead insert the words EXERCISE EXCLUSIVEJURISDICTION OVER. On line 11, before the word "provincial,"

insert the word REGIONAL and a comma (,). After the word"provincial" on line 11, insert the word AND. After the word "city,"delete the comma (,) and the words "municipal and barangay."After the word "official," place a comma (,) and insert thefollowing: AND OF ALL CONTESTS INVOLVING MUNICIPAL ANDBARANGAY OFFICIALS ON APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIALCOURTS AND FROM THE METROPOLITAN OR MUNICIPAL TRIALCOURTS, RESPECTIVELY .

I move for the approval of the amendment, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT:

Is this amendment accepted by the Committee?

MR. REGALADO:


THE PRESIDENT:

So, this is an amendment jointly submitted by Commissioners

Rodrigo, Maambong and de los Reyes.

MR. MAAMBONG:


THE PRESIDENT:

Is there any objection to the amendment on Section 2(2), line 9and 11? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment isapproved.16

In the light of the foregoing, it is indisputable that contestsinvolving elections of SK (formerly KB) officials do not fall withinSection 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and paragraph 2,Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution and that no law in effect

prior to the ratification of the Constitution had made the SKchairman an elective barangay official. His being an ex-officiomember of the sangguniang barangay does not make himone for the law specifically provides who are its electivemembers, viz., the punong barangay and the seven regularsangguniang barangay members 17who are elected at large bythose who are qualified to exercise the right of suffrage underArticle V of the Constitution and who are duly registered voters of

the barangay.

The Court recognizes the consequences of the quasi-judicial actsperformed by the BES pursuant to Section 24 of COMELEC

Resolution No. 2499 under the operative fact doctrine; thus, wehold that the Regional Trial Court is competent to review thedecision of the BES in election controversies within its level. Ascorrectly stated by the petitioner, it is a basic principle inadministrative law that the absence of a provision for the review of

an administrative action does not preclude recourse to the courts.

It is generally understood that as to administrative agenciesexercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlyingpower in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies onquestions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review isgiven by statute. The purpose of judicial review is to keep theadministrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantialrights of parties affected by its decisions. it is part of the system ofchecks and balances which restricts the separation of powers andforestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. 18

The Court further holds that there was no need for the petitioner to exhaustadministrative remedies; firstly, because Section 24 of COMELEC Resolu tionNo. 2499 did not provide for r ecourse to a higher administrative body; andsecondly, the petitioner's cause falls within the exception to the rule in that

his petition in Civil Case No. 3565, aside from raising pure questions of lawand jurisdiction. 19 also alleges deprivation of due process. 20

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED The assailed orders of theRegional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 4, in Civil Case No. 3565 arehereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 3565 is REINSTATED forfurther proceedings The Hon. Judge Conrado R. Antona is directed to

proceed with the case with deliberate dispatch, and if necessary, to ca recount of the ballots to determine once and for all t he true winneDecember 1992 Sangguniang Kabataan Elections in Barangay MabaloIbaan, Batangas. This decision is immediately executory. No pronounas to cost.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 134340 November 25, 1999

LININDING PANGANDAMAN, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OFCANVASSERS OF LANAO DEL SUR, MAHED MUTILAN, ALEEM,AMERRODIN SARANGANI and NARRA ABDUL JABBARJIALIL, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Recently, this Court emphatically stated that "[U]pholding the soverethe people is what democracy is all about. When the sovereignty of tpeople expressed thru the ballot is at stake, it is not enough for this make a statement but it should do everything to have that sovereign

obeyed by all. Well done is always better than well said."1

Corollarilyand statutes governing election contests especially the appreciation omust be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.standards will be the legal matrix within which this controversy will badjudged.

Challenged in this petition for certiorariand prohibition with prayer fotemporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is the Omnibuof the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en bancdated July 14,1998, 3 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, special electionsfor thmunicipalities, namely

Butig Lumbayabague

Kapatagan Sultan Dumalondong

Maguing Sultan Gumander

Masiu Marawi City


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Lumbabayabao

shall be held on 18 July 1998.

Special electionsshall also be held on July 25, 1998for themunicipalities of

Ganassi Lumbatan

Malabang Pagayawan

Marantao Tubaran

There shall be machine counting and consolidation of votes for allmunicipalities except Maguing and those precincts where ballotsfor manual count will be used.

The Education and Information Department, the Acting PES ofLanao del Sur and the Election Officers in these municipalities arehereby directed to cause the immediate publication of thisOmnibus Order in their respective municipality (sic).

Schedule for special electionsin the municipalities of Madalum andTugaya is temporarily withheldpending unresolved issues beforethe Commission.

Let the Executive Director for Operation[s] of the Commissionexecute this order with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

The COMELEC's challenged Omnibus Order summarizes the relevant facts ofthe controversy thus:

The instant cases were filed by petitioners praying that theCommission declare [a] failure of elections in their respectivemunicipalities and to hold special elections thereafter. The

petitions were reinforced by reports received by the Commissionfrom its field officers and deputies. A pre-trial for all cases in Lanaodel Sur involving failure of elections was set and parties, theircounsels, and the election officers of concerned municipalities

appeared.

During the pre-trial of the above cases, it was shown and admittedby the parties that total failure of election[s] took place in thefollowing municipalities:

1. Butig 7. Maguing

2. Kapatagan 8. Masiu

3. Lumbatan 9. Sultan Dumalondong

4. Lumba Bayabao 10. Sultan Gumander

5. Lumbayanague 11. Tubaran

6. Madalum 12. Tugaya

No precinct in the above towns was able to function on electionday.

It was also shown and admitted by the parties that in the f ollowingmunicipalities, partial failure of election[s] took place as foll ows:

1. Ganassi

2. Malabang

3. Marantao

4. Pagayawan

5. Marawi City

TOTAL FAILURE OF ELECTIONS

It was found that the cause of f ailure of election[s] in the twelvemunicipalities where there was total failure of election[s] as

follows:

1. BUTIG armed confrontation of opposing political groups andvehement disagreement on the clustering of precincts.

+ Acting election officer r eported that all election paraphernaliaare available except for 200 ballots for precinct 5A.

2. KAPATAGAN allegedly, Camad Benito, husband of macandidate Bailo Benito, terrorized the Acting Municipal TreaOkuo Macaumbas thus preventing the distribution of ballotother election paraphernalia to the members of the Board Election Inspectors (BEIs for brevity). Similarly, there weretwenty two (22) public school teachers who were availableand eighteen (18) of them were disqualified to act due torelationship to candidates within the prohibited degree.

In Election Case No. 571, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court oKapatagan, Lanao del Sur issued an order dated April 30, 1ordering the Election Officer of Kapatagan, Lanao del Sur tdelete, erase, and cancel all Voters Registration Records wnumbers 3676001 to 3676500 after fi nding that said VRRsreceived only on December 15, 1998 by EA Camal CalandaAtty. Muslemin Tahir. And yet, said VRRs appeared to be f

used and dated 14 December 1997. A copy of s aid order wreceived on 10 May 1998 by the Election Officer. The courtfound by implication that said VRRs were irregularly/unlawissued, and its order having become final, this Commissioncompliance with said court order hereby orders the Electioof Kapatagan to delete from the records said VRRs with sefrom 36767001 to 3676500.

Pursuant to said order, the Law Department is directed to c

a joint investigation

administrative and preliminary invesfor election offenses against Camal Calandada and MusTahir to determine their criminal and administrative liabilitysubmit to the Commission its findings and recommendatio

sixty (60) days from receipt of this Order.

The PNP, thru the Criminal Investigation Group in Region Xsimilarly directed to initiate an investigation on the conducCamad Benito in contributing to the failure of election[s] inKapatagan.

+ All election paraphernalia are available.

3. LUMBATAN all the members of the different Board ofInspectors are disqualified to act as such by reason of relat

either by consanguinity or affinity, within the prohibited de

+ All election paraphernalia for 39 precincts are intact andavailable.


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acts shall be referred immediately to the office of the ProvincialProsecutor of Lanao del Sur for investigation.

During the special election, the members of t he Municipal Board ofCanvassers of Ganassi are hereby directed to suspend theproclamation of Baguio Macapodi for vice mayor, if winning, untilfurther orders from this Commission.

+ All election paraphemalia for the nine (9) precincts where therewas non-appearance of BEIs are available. The Commission shallcause the printing of ballots and other election forms for precincts1A1 (Poblacion), 17A1 (Brgy. Macabao), and 2A (Brgy. Bagoingud)for use in the special election since the snatched ballot box werenot recovered.

2. MALABANG twenty three (23) precincts failed to function dueto shooting incidents. Ballot boxes containing electionparaphernalia for five precincts out of these 23 precincts weresnatched and never recovered. The following are the precincts thatfailed to function on election day or whose ballot boxes were

snatched:

Barangay Name Precinct No.

1. Banday 4A2

2. Betayan 5A/5A1

3. BPS Billage 7A2/7A3

4. Bunkhouse < 8A1

5. Calumbog 11A/11A1

6. Campo Muslim < 12A2

7. Chinatown 13A

8. -do- 13A4

9. Curahab 14A

10. Diamaru 15A

11. -do- 15A1

12. Matampay < 26A

13. Pasir < 29A

14. -do- 29A1

15. -do- 29A2

16. Sumbagarogong 33A

17. -do- 33A1

18. Tacub < 34A

19. Tiongcop 36A

20. -do- 36A1/36A2

21. Tubok 37A2

22. -do- 37A5

23. -do- 37A6

< ballot box snatched

+ All election paraphernalia for eighteen precincts are intact andavailable. The Commission will cause the printing of 1,000 ballotsand other election forms for five precincts (8A1, 12A2, 26A, 34A).

3. MARANTAO thirty-five (35) precincts failed to function due toterrorism in the area. Out of these 35, eight (8) precincts lost toarmed groups their ballot boxes, ballots and other electionparaphernalia. These eight are:

Name of Barangay Precinct No.

1. Daana Ingud Proper 3A

2. -do- 3A1/3A2

3. Tuca Kialdan 7A

4. -do- 7A1

5. Banga Pantar 22A/22A-1

6. Inudaran Campong 29A

7. -do- 29A-2

8. Mapantao Goo 34A-2

Ballots are to be printed for these precincts by the CommisCanvassing forms and other paraphernalia shall also be proIn Precincts No. 12A, 24A and 24A -1, ballots were cast butnot yet counted due to complaints that their integrity had bviolated. There being no proof that the integrity of the ballbeen violated in these precincts, the members of the Muni

Board of Canvassers of Marantao are directed to include thin the canvass.

4. PAGAYAWAN casting of votes was aborted due to widterrorism. Fifteen (15) precincts failed to function.

+ All election paraphernalia are available. However, in prec5A/5A1, some commotion took place. Eleven voters out of

hundred and sixty-eight (268) have already cast their votetime but only one ballot was found inside the ballot box afcommotion. The Commission deems it proper that the castvotes by the eleven voters be annulled and a special electibe conducted therein.

5. Marawi City there was partial failure of election in sixtprecincts (16), namely

Name of Barangay Precinct No.

1. Brgy. Banggolo 6A2

2. -do- 6A3

3. Brgy. Lilod Madaya 42A-4

4. Brgy. South Madaya 85A


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5. Brgy. Sangkai Dansalan 83A-3

6. Brgy. Raya Madaya I 74A-6

7. Brgy. Bacolod Chico 3A

8. -do- 3A-1

9. -do- 3A-2

10. Brgy. Raya Saduc 76A

11. Brgy. Guimba 38A

12. -do- 38A-1/38A-2

13. Brgy. Lolod Saduc 73A-5

14. Brgy. Bangco 5A-5A-1

15. Brgy. Timbangalan 88A

16. -do- 88A-1/88A-2

due to non-appearance of the BEIs. All election paraphernalia arein order and available except for one ballot box intended forPrecinct 5A/5A-1 in Brgy. Banco which is missing or undelivered orwithout ballots contained t herein.

The petition for declaration of failure of election in the municipalityof Calanogas, Lanao del Sur will be covered by a differentresolution.

To avoid the risk of another failure of electionsand to encouragepublic trust in the process and results of the special elections, thefollowing changes shall be undertaken:

a. Only elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and thePhilippine National Police who are assigned to the affected areasshall serve as members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs).The Acting Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Lanao del Sur,Atty. Suharto Ambolodto, shall ensure that said BEIs are givenadequate briefing for this task;

Considering that under-aged persons succeeded in registeringvoters, a complaint that is common in many areas in L anao delSur, the BEIs are given explicit authority to prevent from voting allthose registered voters who are visibly under-aged and shallreflect their names and VRR numbers in the Minutes of Voting forfuture prosecution.

For this purpose, all poll watchers are encouraged to provide

themselves with camera and provide indubitable proof of under-aged voters.

b. Election officers from areas outside of Lanao del Sur shall betapped to act as Election Officers, while the regular electionofficers in Lanao del Sur shall perform such duties as directed bythe Acting PES;

c. The special election in the municipality of Madalum shall bescheduled only after t he Investigating Team aforementioned hasfinished its investigation of alleged ghost precincts therein and theCommission has acted on their findings of facts and

recommendation(s);

d. The special election in the municipality of Tugaya shall bescheduled after the controversy on the four thousand and seventy-

five (4,075) voters shall have been settled;

e. Considering the complaints received by the Commission againstcertain actuations of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, the sameshall be replaced with a new Provincial Board of Canvassers whosemembers shall be designated by the Commission;

f. The PNP, thru the Criminal Investigation Group in Region XIIand the Prosecution Offices in Lanao del Sur shall actively help inthe filing of criminal complaint for election offenses committedduring the election period.

Petitioner asserts that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Omnibus Order

1.] By insisting on holding special elections on July 18 and 25,1998 more than thirty (30) days after the failure to elect, in certainmunicipalities, in contravention of the clear and explicit provisionsof Section 6 of t he Omnibus Election Code;

2.] By failing to declare a total failure of elections in the entireprovince of Lanao del Sur and to certify t he same to the President

of the Philippines and Congress so that the necessary legismay be enacted for the holding of a special election;

3.] By ordering only elements of the Armed Forces of thePhilippines and the Philippine National Police who are not ato the affected areas as members of the Board of ElectionInspectors, in contravention of Sections 166, 170, 175 andthe Omnibus Election Code;

4.] By insisting on machine counting despite the provenunreliability and undependability of the counting of votes wof computer machines.

In support of his cause, petitioner insists on a s trict compliance with holding of special elections not later than thirty (30) days after failureelect pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code which provthat:

Sec. 6. Failure of elections. If, on account offorce majeviolence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the elany polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or hsuspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of tvoting, or after the voting and during the preparation andtransmission of the election returns or in the custody or ca

thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in ansuch cases the failure or suspension of election would affecresult of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis ofverified petition by any interested party and after due notic

hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the electionheld, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on areasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspewhich resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty after the cessation of the cause of such postponement orsuspension of the election or failure to elect.

Petitioner argues that the above-quoted provision is mandabecause of the word "shall". He further asserts that the pretime frame actually "delimits" COMELEC's authority to call special election and that instead, the power to call for a spelection after the 30th day now resides in Congress.

The provision invoked can not be construed in the manner as arguedpetitioner for it would defeat the purpose and spirit for which the lawenacted.

It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a s tatute should beinterpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rathe


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the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a s tatutemust be read according to its spirit and intent. 4 Thus, a too literalinterpretation of the law that would lead to absurdity prompted this Court to

. . . [a]dmonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this isapt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat theintention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the

letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth" . . .

5

Sec. 2 (1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives t he COMELEC the broadpower to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to theconduct of an election, plebiscite initiative, referendum and recall." Therecan hardly be any doubt that the text and intent of t his constitutionalprovision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it toachieve the objective of holding free, or derly, honest, peaceful and credible

elections.

Pursuant to this intent, this Court has been liberal in defining the parametersof the COMELEC's powers in conducting elections. As stated in the old but

nevertheless still very much applicable case ofSumulong v.COMELEC: 6

Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealtwith realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory. The

Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, itscontacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived fromactual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in apeculiarly advantageous position t o decide complex political

questions . . . . There are no ready made formulas for solvingpublic problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolvepatterns that will serve the ends of good government. In thematter of the administration of laws relative to the conduct ofelection . . . we must not by any excessive zeal take away fromthe Commission on Elections that initiative which by constitutionaland legal mandates properly belongs to it.

More pointedly, this Court recently stated in Tupay Loong v. COMELEC, etal., 7 that "[O]ur elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. Inrunning for public offices, candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post.Too often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen

circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of our voters. In the process,the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may even bedebatable. We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of theseactions often taken under very difficult circumstances."

The purpose of the governing statutes on the conduct of elections

. . . [i]s to protect the integrity of elections to suppress all evilsthat may violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters. Thepurity of the elections is one of the most fundamental requisites ofpopular government. The Commission on Elections, byconstitutional mandate, must do everything in its power to securea fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In theperformance of its duties, the Commission must be given aconsiderable latitude in adopting means and methods that willinsure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was

created

to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. Thechoice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unlessthey are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion,

should not be interfered with. 8

Guided by the above-quoted pronouncement, the legal compassfrom which the COMELEC should take its bearings in acting upon

election controversies is the principle that "clean elections controlthe appropriateness of the remedy." 9

In fixing the date for special elections the COMELEC should see to it that: 1.]

it should not be later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause ofthe postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect; and,2.] it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held,suspended or which resulted in the failure to elect. The first involves aquestion of fact. The second must be determined in the light of the peculiar

circumstances of a case. 10 Thus, the holding of elections within the next fewmonths from the cessation of the cause of the postponement, suspension orfailure to elect may still be considered "reasonably close to the date of theelection not held." 11

In this case, the COMELEC can hardly be faulted for tardiness. The dates setfor the special elections were actually the nearest dates from the timetotal/partial failure of elections was determined, which date fell on J uly 14,1998, the date of promulgation of the challenged Omnibus Order. Needlessto state, July 18 and 25, the dates chosen by the COMELEC for t he holdingof special elections were only a few days away from the time a total/partialfailure of elections was declared and, thus, these were "dates reasonablyclose" thereto, given the prevailing facts herein. Furthermore, it bearsstressing that in the exercise of the plenitude of its powers to protect theintegrity of elections, the COMELEC should not and must not bestraitjacketed by procedural rules in the exercise of its discretion to resolveelection disputes. 12

Petitioner's argument that respondent COMELEC gravely abused itsdiscretion by failing to declare a total failure of elections in the entireprovince of Lanao del Sur and to certify the same to the President andCongress so that the necessary legislation may be enacted for the holding ofa special election, likewise fails to persuade.

No less than petitioner himself concedes that there was total failure oelections in twelve (12) municipalities and partial failure in eleven (1he now insists a total failure of elections should have been declared entire province of Lanao del Sur. Suffice it to state that the proprietydeclaring whether or not there has been a tot al failure of elections inentire province of Lanao del Sur is a factual issue which this Court wdelve into considering that the COMELEC, through its deputized officthe field, is in the best position to assess the actual conditions prevathat area. Absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the findi

fact of the COMELEC or any administrative agency exercising particuexpertise in its field of endeavor, are binding on the Court. 13 There cogent reason to depart from the general rule in this case.

The insistence of petitioner that the COMELEC violated Sections 166,175 and 176 of t he Omnibus Election Code when it ordered elementArmed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Po

(PNP) who are not assigned to the affected areas as members of theof Election Inspectors (BEIs) is likewise unconvincing vis--visthe unreason of the public respondent to have an effective and impartial mpresence "to avoid the risk of another failure of election."

So too must fall the argument that machine counting being allegedly"undependable and unreliable" should not be resorted to as the reasopetitioner, by itself, invokes the answer. If the COMELEC saw it f it tomachine counting of votes in the municipalities enumerated, it could

mean that the decree of R.A. No. 8436 could be implemented withouinterference of the claimed "unreliability, inaccuracy and undependabthe computer sets. The absence of any satisfactory proof to supportpetitioner's allegations to the contrary reduces them to mere self-ser

claims.

Be that as it may, we agree with the Solicitor General that the petitiobeen rendered moot by supervening events. For one, it seeks to enjoholding of special elections scheduled for July 18 and 25, 1998. Howpetitioner himself admits that special elections were "conducted on astaggered basis" on July 4, 18 and 25, 1998. 14 For another, the petitquestions the membership of the Board of Election Inspectors for becomposed of elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and thePhilippine National Police as well as the machine counting of the votethese events have been superseded by the recent issuance of the CeOf Canvass Of Votes And Proclamation Of The Winning Candidates FProvincial Offices dated August 7, 1998. 15 In face of these supervenevents, the arguments proffered by the petitioner to seek the annulmthe challenged Omnibus Order rings hollow. Verily

At balance, the question really boils down to a choice ofphilosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply larelating to elections; literal or liberal; the letter or the spiritnaked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or


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substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of socialconditions; harshly against or gently in f avor of the voter's obviouschoice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err infavor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but littleunderstood legalisms. 16

Indeed, to embark upon the costly electoral exercise insisted upon bypetitioner in terms of time and taxpayer's money is an unwarranted

imposition on the people of the affected areas and is an unacceptable optionto the judicial conscience.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lackof merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118702 March 16, 1995

CIRILO ROY G. MONTEJO, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

SERGIO A.F. APOSTOL, intervenor.

PUNO, J.:

More than political fortunes are at stake in the case at bench. Petitioner CiriloRoy G. Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for t heannulment of section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistrictingcertain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of

equality of representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner seeksto transfer the municipality ofTolosafrom his district to the Second Districtof the province. Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the SecondDistrict, vigorously opposed the inclusion ofTolosain his district. We gavedue course to the petition considering that, at bottom, it involves the validityof the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative powerofredistricting and reapportionment.

The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed offive (5) legislative districts. 1

The first district 2 covers Tacloban City and t he municipalities of Alangalang,Babatngon, Palo, San Miguel, Sta. Fe, Tanauan and Tolosa.

The second district 3 is composed of the municipalities of Barugo, Barauen,Capoocan, Carigara, Dagami, Dulag, Jaro, Julita, La Pat, Mayorga,MacArthur, Pastrana, Tabontabon, and Tunga.

The third district 4 is composed of the municipalities of Almeria, Biliran,

Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval,San Isidro, Tabango, and Villaba.

The fourth district 5 is composed of Ormoc City and the municipalities ofAlbuera, Isabel, Kananga, Matagob, Merida, and Palompon.

The fifth district 6 is composed of the municipalities of Abuyog, Bate, Baybay,

Hilongos, Hindang, Inopacan, Javier, Mahaplag, and Matalom.

Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte , was made its sub-province byvirtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 of the law spelled out enacted onApril 8, 1959. 7

Section 1 of the law spelled out the municipalities comprising the sub-province, viz.: "Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan,

Maripipi and Naval and all the t erritories comprised therein."

On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took effect. Pursuant to itsSection 462, the sub-province of Biliran became a regular province. Itprovides:

Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provincesupon approvalby a majority of the vot es cast in a plebiscite to beheld in the sub-provinces and the original provinces directlyaffected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELECsimultaneously with the national elections following the effectivityof this code. The new legislative districts created as a result of

such conversion shall continue to be represented in Congress bythe duly-elected representatives of the original districts out ofwhich said new provinces or districts were created until their ownrepresentatives shall have been elected in the next r egular

congressional elections and qualified.

The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majorityof the votes cast in a plebiscite held on May 11, 1992. A s a consequence of

the conversion, eight (8) municipalities of t he Third District composed thenew province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba,Kawayan, Maripipi, and Naval. A further consequence was to reduce the

Third District to five (5) municipalities with a total population of 145,0per the 1990 census.

To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, vand municipalities in the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC heconsultation meetings with t he incumbent representatives of the provand other interested parties. On December 29, 1994, it promulgatedResolution No. 2736 where, among others, it transferred the municip

Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon ofFourth District to the Third District of Leyte. The composition of the FDistrict which includes the municipality ofTolosaand the compositionFifth District were not disturbed. After the movement of municipalitiecomposition of the five (5) legislative districts appeared as follows:

First District: Population RegisteredVoters(1990) (1994)

1. Tacloban City, 137,190 81,6792. Alangalang, 33,375 20,543

3. Babatngon, 17,795 9,9294. Palo, 38,100 20,8165. San Miguel, 13,438 8,1676. Sta. Fe, 12,119 7,497

7. Tanauan and, 38,033 22,3578. Tolosa; 13,299 7,700TOTAL 303,349 178,688

Second District: Population RegisteredVoters(1990) (1994)

1. Barugo, 23,817 13,2372. Barauen, 46,029 23,3073. Carigara 38,863 22,0364. Dagami, 25,606 16,5195. Dulag, 33,020 19,3756. Jaro, 31,727 17,1397. Julita, 9,944 6,196

8. La Paz, 14,311 9,0039. Mayorga, 10,530 5,86810. Mac Arthur, 13,159 8,62811. Pastrana, 12,565 7,348

12. Tabontabon, and 7,183 4,41913. Tunga; 5,413 3,387TOTAL 272,167 156,462


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Third District: Population RegisteredVoters(1990) (1994)

1. Calubian, 25,968 16,6492. Leyte, 32,575 16,4153. San Isidro, 24,442 14,9164. Tabango, 29,743 15,485. Villaba, 32,339 21,2276. Capoocan, and 23,687 13,5957. Palompon; 45,745 27,474TOTAL 214,499 125,763

Fourth District: Population RegisteredVoters(1990) (1994)

1. Ormoc City, 129,456 75,1402. Albuera, 32,395 17,493

3. Isabel, 33,389 21,8894. Kananga, 36,288 19,8735. Matagob, 15,474 9,4076. Merida, and 22,345 12,474

TOTAL 269,347 155,995

Fifth District: Population RegisteredVoters(1990) (1994)

1. Abuyog, 47,265 28,6822. Bato, 28,197 116,133. Baybay, 82,281 47,9234. Hilongos, 48,617 26,8715. Hindang, 16,272 9,6596. Inopacan, 16,894 10,4017. Javier, 18,658 11,7138. Mahaplag, and 22,673 13,6169. Matalom 28,291 16,247

TOTAL 309,148 181,242

Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling the attention of

respondent COMELEC, among others, to the inequitable distribution ofinhabitants and voters between the First and Second Districts. He allegedthat the First District has 178,688 registered voters while the Second Districthas 156,462 registered voters or a difference of 22,226 registered voters. To

diminish the difference, he proposed that the municipality ofTolosawith7,7000 registered voters be transferred from the First to the Second District.The motion was opposed by intervenor, Sergio A.F. Apostol. RespondentCommission denied the motion ruling that: (1) its adjustment ofmunicipalities involved the least disruption of the territorial composition ofeach district; and (2) said adjustment complied with the constitutionalrequirement that each legislative district shall comprise, as f ar as practicable,contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.

In this petition, petitioner insists that Section I of Resolution No. 2736violates the principle of equality of representation ordained in theConstitution. Citing Wesberry v. Sanders,8 he argues that respondentCOMELEC violated "the constitutional precept that as much as practicableone man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much asanother's." The Solicitor General, in his Comment, concurred with the viewsof the petitioner. The intervenor, however, opposed the petition on two (2)

grounds: (1) COMELEC has no jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No.2736; and (2) assuming it has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in accord withthe Constitution. Respondent COMELEC filed its own Comment alleging thatit acted within the parameters of the Constitution.

We find section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.

While the petition at bench presents a significant issue, our first inquiry will

relate to the constitutional power of the respondent COMELEC 9 to transfermunicipalities from one legislative district to another legislative district in theprovince of Leyte. The basic powers of respondent COMELEC, as enforcerand administrator of our election laws, are spelled out in black and white insection 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELECdoes not invoke this provision but relies on t he Ordinance appended to the1987 Constitution as the source of itspower of redistricting which istraditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. The Ordinance isentitled "Apportioning the Seats of the House of Representatives of t heCongress of the Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts in Pro vincesand Cities and the Metropolitan Manila Area." Its substantive sections state:

Sec. 1. For purposes of t he election of Members of the House ofRepresentatives of the First Congress of the Philippines under theConstitution proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commission andsubsequent elections, and until otherwise provided by law, theMembers thereof shall be elected from legislative districts

apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the MetropolitanManila Area as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered tomake minor adjustmentsof the reapportionment herein made.

Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or anywhose population may hereafter increase to more than twohundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediatelyfollowing election to at least one Member or such number Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the numbinhabitants and according to the standards set forth in par(3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The numberMembersapportioned to the province out of which such neprovince was created or where the city, whose population

increased, is geographically located shallbe correspondingadjusted by the Commission on Electionsbut such adjustmshall not be made within one hundred and twenty days be

election. (Emphasis supplied)

The Ordinance was made necessary because Proclamation No. 3 10 oPresident Corazon C. Aquino, ordaining the Provisional Constitution o

Republic of the Philippines, abolished the Batasang Pambansa. 11 Shexercised legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution. 12

The Ordinance was the principal handiwork of then Commissioner Hi

Davide, Jr., 13 now a distinguished member of this Court. The recordthat the Constitutional Commission had to resolve several prejudicialbefore authorizing the first congressional elections under the 1987Constitution. Among the vital issues were: whether the members of tHouse of Representatives would be elected by district or by

province; whoshall undertake the apportionment of the legislative diand, howthe apportionment should be made. 14Commissioner Davidoffered three (3) options for the Commission to consider: (1) allow PAquino to do the apportionment by law; (2) empower the COMELEC

the apportionment; or (3) let the Commission exercise the power by an Ordinance appended to the Constitution. 15 The different dimensithe options were discussed by Commissioners Davide, Felicitas S. AqBlas F. Ople. We quote the debates inextenso, viz.: 16

xxx xxx xxx

MR. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Padilrecognized.

MR. PADILLA. I think I have filed a very simple motion by wamendment by substitution and this was, I believe, a priorproposed amendment. Also, the chairman of the Committe

Legislative said that he was proposing a vote first by t he Con the concept of whether the election is by province and cthe one hand, or by legislative districts on the other. So I pthis simple formulation which reads: "FOR THE FIRST ELEC


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UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION THE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTSSHALL BE APPORTIONED BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS."I hope the chairman will accept t he proposed amendment.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

MR. DAVIDE. The effect is, more or less, t he same insofar as the

apportionment is concerned, but the Bernas-Sarmiento et al.

proposal would also provide for a mandate for the apportionmentlater, meaning after the first election, which will in effect embodywhat the Commission had approved, reading as follows: "Withinthree years following the return of every census, the Congressshall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on thestandards provided in this section."

So, Mr. Presiding Officer, may I request for a suspension of thesession, so that all the proponents can work together.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is suspended.

It was 3:33 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 3:40 p.m., the session was resumed.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is resumed.

Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, as a compromise, I wonder ifthe Commission will allow this. We will just delete the proposedsubparagraph (4) and all the capitalized words in paragraph (5).So that in paragraph (5), what would be left would only be the

following: "Within three years following the return of every census,the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districtsbased on the standards provided in this section."

But we shall have an ordinance appended to the new Constitutionindicating specifically the following: "FOR PURPOSES OF THEELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESIN THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION IMMEDIATELYFOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTIONPROPOSED BY THE 1986 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION ANDSUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS AND UNTIL OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY

LAW, THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESSHALL BE ELECTED FROM LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTSAPPORTIONED AMONG THE PROVINCES, CITIES AND THEMETROPOLITAN MANILA AREA AS FOLLOWS."

And what will follow will be the allocation of seats to MetropolitanManila Area, to the provinces and to the cities, without indicatingthe municipalities comprising each of the districts. Then, underSection 2, we will mandate the COMELEC to make the actualapportionment on the basis of the number of seats provided forand allocated to each province by us.

MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino i srecognized.

MS. AQUINO. I have to object to the provision which will givemandate to COMELEC to do the redistricting. Redistricting is vitallylinked to the baneful practices of cutting up areas or spheres ofinfluence; in other words, gerrymandering. This Commission, beinga nonpartisan, a nonpolitical deliberative body, is in the bestpossible situation under the circumstances to undertake thatresponsibility. We are not wanting in expertise and in time because

in the first place, the Committee on the Legislative has preparedthe report on the basis of t he recommendation of the COMELEC.

MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Ople isrecognized.

MR. OPLE. I would like to support the position taken byCommissioner Aquino in this respect. We know that thereapportionment of provinces and cities for the purpose of

redistricting is generally inherent in the constituent power or in thelegislative power. And I would feel very uncertain about delegatingthis to a quasi-judicial body even if it is one of the constitutionaloffices created under this Constitution. We have the assurance of

Commissioner Davide, as chairman of the Committee on the

Legislative, that even given the very short time remaining in thelife of this Commission, there is no reason why we cannotcomplete the work of reapportionment on the basis of theCOMELEC plan which the committee has already thoroughlystudied and which remains available to the ConstitutionalCommission.

So, I support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino, Presiding Officer. I think, it is the safest, the most reasonathe most workable approach that is available to this Comm

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does CommisDavide say:

MR. DAVIDE. The issue now is whether this body will make

apportionment itself or whether we will leave it to the COMSo, there arises, therefore, a prejudicial question for the bdecide. I would propose that the Commission should now dwhat body should make the apportionment. Should it be thCommission or should it be the COMELEC? And the Commithe Legislative will act accordingly on the basis of the decis

MR. BENGZON. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Bengrecognized.

MR. BENGZON.Aproposof that, I would like to inform the that I believe the Committee on the Legislative has preciseworked on this matter and they are ready with a list ofapportionment. They have, in fact, apportioned the whole

into various districts based on the recommendation of theCOMELEC. So they are ready with the list and if this body wwish to apportion the whole country by district itself, then we have the time to do it because the Committee on theLegislative is ready with that particular report which need obe appended to the Constitution. So if this body is r eady tothe work of the Committee on the Legislative we would haproblem. I just would like to give that information so t hat tpeople here would be guided accordingly when they vote.

MR. RODRIGO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Rodrigrecognized.

MR. RODRIGO. I just would like to ask Commissioner Daviquestions.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner David

yield if he so desires.

MR. DAVIDE. Gladly.


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MR. RODRIGO. Will this apportionment which we are consideringapply only to the first election after the enactment of theConstitution?

MR. DAVIDE. On the basis of the Padilla proposal, it will be for thefirst election; on the basis of the Sarmiento proposal, it will onlyapply to the first election.

MR. RODRIGO. And after that, Congress will have the power toreapportion.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

MR. RODRIGO. So, if we attach this to the Constitution thereapportionment based on the C OMELEC study and between the

approval of the Constitution and the first election the COMELECno longer has the power to change that even a bit.

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Regalado isrecognized.

MR. REGALADO. May I address a clarificatory question toCommissioner Davide?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Gentleman will pleaseproceed.

MR. REGALADO. On the basis of the Commissioner's proposed

apportionment and considering the fact that there will be acorresponding reduction to 183 seats, would t here be instancesrepresentation of under non-representation?

MR. DAVIDE. None at all, Mr. Presiding Officer. I can assure theCommission that there will be no case of inequitable distribution. Itwill come out to be one for every 350 to 400,000 inhabitants.

MR. REGALADO. And that would be within the standard that werefer.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. REGALADO. Thank you.

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Floor Leader is

recognized.

MR. RAMA. The parliamentary situation is that there was a motionby Commissioner Sarmiento to mandate COMELEC to do the

redistricting. This was also almost the same motion by

Commissioner Padilla and I think we have had some kind ofmeeting of minds. On the other hand, there seems to be aprejudicial question, an amendment to the amendment assuggested by Commissioner Aquino, that instead of the COMELEC,it should be this Commission that shall make the redistricting. Somay I ask Commissioner Aquino, if she insists on that idea, toplease formulate it into a motion so we can vote on that first as anamendment to the amendment.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).Commissioner Aquino isrecognized.

MS . AQUINO. The motion is for t his Commission to undertake theapportionment of the legislative districts instead of the proposalthat COMELEC be given the mandate to undertake theresponsibility.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. SARMIENTO. May I be clarified, Mr. Presiding Officer. Is it themotion or the proposed amendment?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The proposed amendment.

MR. SARMIENTO. May we move for the approval of this proposedamendment which we substitute for paragraphs 4 and 5.

MR. DAVIDE. May I request that it should be treated merely as amotion to be followed by a deletion of paragraph 4 because thatshould not really appear as a paragraph in Section 5; otherwise, itwill appear very ugly in the Constitution where we mandate a

Commission that will become functus officioto have the authority.As a matter of fact, we cannot exercise that authority until afterthe ratification of the new Constitution.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does CommissionerSarmiento say?

MR. SARMIENTO. It is accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer. So, move for the approval of this proposed amendment.


THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquinrecognized.

MS. AQUINO. Would that require a two-thirds vote or a simplurality to adopt that motion?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). That will require a tthirds vote.

MS. AQUINO. Thank you. Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. SARMIENTO. May I restate the motion, Mr. Presiding O

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) The Gentleman mayproceed.

MR. SARMIENTO. May I move that this Commission do the

reapportionment legislative districts.


THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What is the pleasurCommissioner Aquino?

MS. AQUINO. May I be clarified again on the motion. IsCommissioner Sarmiento, therefore, adopting my motion? not be right for him to move that the COMELEC be mandat

MR. SARMIENTO. No, we accepted the amendment. It is athe Commission that will be mandated.

MS. AQUINO. So, the Gentlemen has accepted the amendm

amendment.

Thank you.

MR. SARMIENTO. I am voting that this Commission do t hereapportionment.


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VOTING

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Let us proceed to vote.

As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Membersraised their hand.)

As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member

raised his hand.)

The results show 30 votes in f avor and none against; the motion is

approved.

Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to t heCOMELEC the majorpower of legislative apportionment as it itselfexercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empoweredthe COMELEC "to make minoradjustments of thereapportionmentherein made." The meaning of the phrase"minoradjustments was again clarified in the debates 17of theCommission, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

MR. GUINGONA. This is just clarificatory, Mr. Presiding Officer. InSection 2, the Commission on Elections is empowered to makeminor adjustments on the apportionment made here.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. GUINGONA. We have not set any time limit for this.

MR. DAVIDE. We should not set a time limit unless during theperiod of amendments a proposal is made. The authority conferredwould be on minor corrections or amendments, meaning to say,for instance, that we may have f orgotten an interveningmunicipality in the enumeration, which ought to be included in onedistrict. That we shall consider a minor amendment.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Romulo). Commissioner de Castrois recognized.

MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.

I was about to ask the committee the meaning of minor

adjustment. Can it be possible that one municipality in a district betransferred to another district and call it a minor adjustment?

MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done, Mr. Presiding Officer. Minor,meaning, that there should be no change in the allocations per

district. However, it may happen that we have forgotten amunicipalityin between which is still in the territory of oneassigned district, or there may be an error in the correct name of aparticular municipalitybecause of changes made by t he interimBatasang Pambansa and the Regular Batasang Pambansa. Therewere many batas pambansa enacted by both the interim and theRegular Batasang Pambansa changing the names of municipalities.

MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor adjustment may be made only ifone of the municipalities is not mentioned in the ordinanceappended to, and it will be up for the COMELEC now to adjust orto put such municipality to a certain district.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. For instance, we may nothave the data regarding a division of a municipality by the interimBatasang Pambansa or the Regular Batasang Pambansa into two

municipalities, meaning, a mother municipality and the newmunicipality, but still actually these are within the geographicaldistrict area.

MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor adjustment which the COMELECcannot do is that, if, for example, my municipality is in the FirstDistrict of Laguna, they cannot put t hat in any other district.

MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor correction. It is asubstantive one.

MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.

Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to

transfer municipalitiesfrom one legislative district to another district. Thepower granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjustthenumber ofmembers(not municipalities) "apportioned to the province out ofwhich such new province was created. . . ."

Prescinding from these premises, we hold that r espondent COMELECcommitted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it

promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring themunicipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.

It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to aprovince brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters andinhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the province of Leyteimbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a citizen's vote inviolation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Be that asit is not proper at this time for petitioner to raise this issue using the bench as his legal vehicle. The issue involves a problem of reapportioof legislative districts and petitioner's remedy lies with Congress. Sec5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the poreapportion, thus: "Within three (3) years fol lowing the return of evecensus, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative disbased on the standards provided in this section." In Maciasv. COMELEC,18 we ruled that the validity of a legislative apportionmejusticiable question. But while this Court can strike down an unconstireapportionment, it cannot itself make the reapportionment as petitiowould want us to do by directing respondent COMELEC to transfer thmunicipality of Tolosa from the First District to t he Second District ofprovince of Leyte.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as ittransferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and t

municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District ofprovince of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petitiopraying for the transfer of the municipality ofTolosafrom the First Dithe Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 107435-36 December 11, 1992

SAIDAMEN B. PAGARUNGAN, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MAHID MUTILAN, responde

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In this special civil action for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of relation to Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, petitionerhave this Court set aside and annul, for having been issued with gravof discretion or lack of jurisdiction, (a) the 18 September 19921jointResolution of the First Division of respondent Commission on Election(COMELEC) in SPC No. 92-349, SPC No. 92-378-379, SPC No. 92-387SPC NO. 92-391, and (b) the 23 October 1992 2en bancResolution o


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COMELEC affirming, in SPC No. 92-349 3and SPC No. 92-387, 4theabovementioned 18 September 1992 Resolution of the First Division.

In the Resolution of 29 October 1992, t his Court required the respondents toComment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days,and issued a temporary restraining order directing the respondent COMELECto cease and desist f rom enforcing the questioned resolutions, moreparticularly the portion thereof which directs the Provincial Board ofCanvassers to reconvene and prepare a new set of certificate of canvass onthe basis of the results taken from t he COMELEC's copies of the ElectionReturns for the uncontested 5Provincial Elective Positions.

On 6 November 1992, private respondent filed an Urgent Motion To Lift theTemporary Restraining Order to which, upon order of this Court, thepetitioner filed a Comment.

On 9 November 1992, respondent COMELEC, through the Office of theSolicitor General, filed its Comment to the petition.

Although this Court g

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