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8/6/2019 Cases Evid

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8/6/2019 Cases Evid


8/6/2019 Cases Evid


She testified that Velasco, who was her tenant on a parcel of land used as a vegetable

garden, used endrine on bread which was then dried and later placed as a bait in the

barn and that several rats were killed by means of the bread dipped in the endrine

solution.The trial judge noted that Lucila had a "sharp, penetrating look" and on the witness stand

was always grinning (she had "unfading smiles"). The trial judge found that there was no

doubt that Lucila gave the poisoned bread to her deaf-mute brother who had no criminal

intent and who did not know that the bread was poisoned. Alfonsito exhibited somecompassion for the children after he noticed that something had happened to them. On

the other hand, Lucila did not make any effort to help the victims.

The trial court did not err in concluding that Lucila's guilt was proven beyond reasonable

doubt.The trial court and the Solicitor General regarded the two murders and the frustrated

murder as a complex crime resulting from the single act of Lucila in giving the poisoned

bread to Alfonsito with the instruction (made in sign language) that the same be fed to the

Velasco children. Hence, the death penalty was imposed.

The single criminal impulse of Lucila to poison the Velasco children gave rise to a complex

offense (See People vs. Peñas, 66 Phil. 682; People vs. Pincalin, L-38755, January 22, 1981,

102 SCRA 136).I vote for the imposition of reclusion perpetua on the accused, Lucila Valero. The trial courtdid not award any indemnity. Lucila should be adjudged liable to pay an indemnity of

P24,000 to the Velasco spouses for the death of Annabelle and Michael and to pay an

indemnity of P10,000 to Imelda Velasco.

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur. But I must say that the failure of the prosecution to present Imelda as witness

spoiled the cause of the prosecution. She could have clarified the whole issue of who gave

the poisoned bread to him.

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8/6/2019 Cases Evid


Private respondents contended that the Court in Misolas v. Panga

impliedly ruled that if an accused is simultaneously charged with

violation of P.D. 1866 and subversion, the doctrine of absorption of

common crimes as applied in rebellion would have found applicationtherein. The respondents relied on the opinion of this Court when it said:

. . . in the present case, petitioner is being charged

specifically for the qualified offense of illegal

possession of firearms and ammunition under PD1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX

CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF

FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED

FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OFFIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez,

Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this

case.

This is however a mere obiter. In the above case, the Court upheld the

validity of the charge under the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D.

1866. The Court opined that the dictum in the Hernandez case is not

applicable in that case, considering that the legislature deemed it fit toprovide for two distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearmsqualified by subversion (P.D. 1866) and (2) subversion qualified by the

taking up of arms against the Government (R.A. 1700). The practical

result of this may be harsh or it may pose grave difficulty on an accused

in instances similar to those that obtain in the present case, but the

wisdom of the legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws

is something that the Court cannot inquire into . . . (G.R. Nos. 83837-42,

April 22, 1992).Nonetheless, the evidence in hand is too weak to convict the accused-appellant of the

charge of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of, or incident to or in connection with

the crime of subversion, We are therefore, left with no option, but to acquit the accusedon reasonable doubt.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant is

ACQUITTED with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

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We are as perplexed as complainant judge Agcaoili why Wilma Anama, who apparently

witnessed the alleged crime or has personal knowledge thereof, was not summoned by

respondent for investigation. She could have been the key to determining whether or not

Rolando Anama was the probable perpetrator of the grisly killing.Respondent cannot pass the blame and burden to the provincial prosecutor. The

determination of probable cause is a function of the judge and is not for the provincial

fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this

determination.12

Liberty, in any part of the civilized world is a basic human right, the curtailment of which

must be in strict conformity with the procedure laid down by law. It is, therefore, this

constant reminder which compels us to remain ever v igilant.

WHEREFORE, respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to comply with thepertinent rules on the issuance of a warrant of arrest, with a warning that repetition of the

same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be

entered in his record.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, J r., Bellosillo and Hermosisima, J r., JJ., concur.

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