THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 110315.January 16, 1998]RENATO CUDIA,petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON.CARLOS D. RUSTIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch LVI, Angeles City,respondents.D E C I S I O NROMERO,J.:Petitioner assails the decision[1]of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 1993 dismissing his petition and finding that he had not been placed in double jeopardy by the filing of a second information against him, although a first information charging the same offense had been previously dismissed, over petitioners vigorous opposition.The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:On June 28, 1989, petitioner was arrested in Purok 6, Barangay Santa Inez, Mabalacat,[2]Pampanga, by members of the then 174th PC Company, allegedly for possessing an unlicensed revolver.He was brought to Camp Pepito, Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, where he was detained. A preliminary investigation was thereafter conducted by an investigating panel of prosecutors. As a result thereof, the City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11542, which reads as follows:That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989,in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control one (1) .38 Cal. Revolver (paltik) without any Serial Number with six (6) live ammunitions, which he carried outside of his residence without having the necessary authority and permit to carry the same.ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.[3](Emphasis petitioners.)The case was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City (hereafter the Angeles City RTC).Upon his arraignment on August 14, 1989, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges.During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the attention of the parties to the fact that, contrary to the information, petitioner had committed the offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City.Inasmuch as there was an existing arrangement among the judges of the Angeles City RTCs as to who would handle cases involving crimes committed outside of Angeles City, the judge ordered the re-raffling of the case to a branch assigned to criminal cases involving crimes committed outside of the city.Thereafter, the case was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.On October 31, 1989 however, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an information charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11987.The case was likewise raffled to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.This prompted the prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 11542 to file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information, stating that thru inadvertence and oversight, the Investigating Panel was misled into hastily filing the Information in this case, it appearing that the apprehension of the accused in connection with the illegal possession of unlicensed firearm and ammunition was made in Bgy. Sta. Inez, Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga[4]and that the Provincial Prosecutor had filed its own information against the accused, as a result of which two separate informations for the same offense had been filed against petitioner.The latter filed his opposition to the motion, but the trial court nonetheless, granted said motion to dismiss in its order dated April 3, 1990.On May 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 11987 on the ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, and which had been dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.The trial court denied the motion to quash; hence, petitioner raised the issue to the Court of Appeals.The appellate court, stating that there was no double jeopardy, dismissed the same on the ground that the petitioner could not have been convicted under the first information as the same was defective.Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this appeal.Petitioner points out the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:1.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF ANGELES CITY DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO FILE THE FIRST INFORMATION.2.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FIRST JEOPARDY DID NOT ATTACH BECAUSE THE FIRST INFORMATION FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED WAS NOT VALID.We shall discuss the assigned errors jointly as they are closely related.Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that (n)o person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense x x x.Pursuant to this provision, Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Courtprovides in part that (w)hen an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, x x x.In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof.[5]In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary to prove the existence of the following:(a)Court of competent jurisdiction(b)Valid complaint or information(c)Arraignment(c)Valid plea(e)The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.[6]It is undisputed that petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, that he pleaded not guilty therein, and that the same was dismissed without his express consent, nay, over his opposition even.We may thus limit the discussion to determining whether the first two requisites have been met.As to the first requisite, it is necessary that there be a court of competent jurisdiction, for jurisdiction to try the case is essential to place an accused in jeopardy.The Court of Appeals and the Solicitor General agreed that Branch 60, which originally had cognizance of Criminal Case No. 11542, had no jurisdiction over the case.In the words of the Solicitor General:The first jeopardy did not also attach because Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City was not the proper venue for hearing the case. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, being an essential element of jurisdiction (Agbayani vs. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699).In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place (People vs. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77).Although both Branches 60 and 56 are sitting in Angeles City, it is Branch 56 which has jurisdiction to try offenses committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga.Petitioner was arraigned before Branch 60, not Branch 56.[7]It must be borne in mind that the question of jurisdiction of a court over cases filed before it must be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction.Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1983 provides that:Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 864 of the President of the Philippines, dated January 17, 1983, the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Region One to Twelve are hereby defined as follows:x x xx x xx x xPAMPANGAx x xx x xx x x1.Branches LVI to LXII, inclusive, with seats at Angeles City comprising ANGELES CITY and the municipalities of Mabalacat, Magalang, and Porac as well as part of Clark Field U.S. Airbase.x x xx x xx x xClearly, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned.Consequently, notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the judges of the Angeles City RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant case. Writ large in lawbooks is the doctrine that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not bymere administrative policy ofany trial court.With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction.Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:Section 11.The provincial or the city fiscal shall:x x xx x xx x xb)Investigate and/or cause to be investigatedall charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictionsand have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or his assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the purpose.x x xx x xx x x. (Emphasis supplied)It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor,who should prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City.An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another.[8]It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law.If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.[9]Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor in filing the information in question is deemed a waiver thereof.[10]As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioners plea to an information before he filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned.But by clear implication, if not by express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions,[11]questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused (herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation.In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.[12]In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution.If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded.As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to petitioners subsequent prosecution.Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.[13]Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was the error of the investigating panel and the same should not be used to prejudice and penalize him.It is an all too familiar maxim that the State is not bound or estopped by the mistakes or inadvertence of its officials and employees.[14]To rule otherwise could very well result in setting felons free, deny proper protection to the community, and give rise to the possibility of connivance between the prosecutor and the accused.Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its dismissal, should have been the remedy sought by the prosecution.Suffice it to say that this Court, inGalvez vs. Court of Appeals[15]has ruled that even if amendment is proper, pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also quite plausible under the same provision that, instead of an amendment, an information may be dismissed to give way to the filing of a new information.In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense for the simple reason that the absence of authority of the City Prosecutor to file the first information meant that petitioner could never have been convicted on the strength thereof.As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the instant petition must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 24958 isAFFIRMED.No costs.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco,andPanganiban, JJ.,concur.

[1]People v. Argawanon, 231 SCRA 614 (1994); People v. Quijada, G.R. Nos. 115008-09, July 24, 1996.[2]The Municipality of Mabalacat is approximately 10 kms. north of Angeles City, Pampanga.[3]Rollo, p. 12.[4]Ibid., p. 13.[5]Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 703 (1996).[6]Ibid.[7]Rollo, pp. 56-57.[8]42 CJS Indictments and Informations 67.[9]41 Am Jur 2d, Indictments and Informations, 41[10]See Section 8, Rule 117 in relation to Section 3(c), Rule117.[11]See Estrada vs. NLRC, 262 SCRA 709 (1996); Amigo vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 382 (1996); De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 166 (1995); Lozon vs. NLRC, 240 SCRA 1 (1995).[12]Villavs. Ibaez, 88 Phil. 402.[13]U.S.vs. McClure, 356 F2d 939.[14]DBP vs. COA, 231 SCRA 202 (1994) citing Cruz, Jr. vs. CA, 194 SCRA 145 (1991).[15]237 SCRA 685.

2

PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA [23 SCRA 1249; G.R. L-24447; 29 JUN 1968]Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted byCoffeeholic WritesLabels:Case Digests,Political Law

Facts:The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before theMunicipal Courtof Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for thedismissalof the charge for failure to allege vividdesignsin the info. Said motion was granted. From this order ofdismissalthe prosecution appealed.

Issue:Whether or Not thepresentappeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy.

Held:In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution, a) validcomplaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without hisexpressconsent.

In the case at bar, the converteddismissalwas ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The doctrine of double jeopardy as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed with theexpressconsent of the defendant, thedismissalwill not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.

In essence, where acriminalcase is dismissed provisionally not only with theexpressconsent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.

PEOPLE VS. COURT OF SILAY [74 SCRA 248; G.R. NO. L-43790; 9 DEC 1976]Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted byCoffeeholic WritesLabels:Case Digests,Political Law

Facts:That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochicowho werethen scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown that there was padding of the weight of the sugar canes and that the information on the tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be heavier than its actual weight. The three accused then were charged with Falsification by privateindividualsand use of falsified document. After the prosecution had presented, the respondent moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidences presented were not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion, respondent court issued its order dismissing the case on the ground that the acts committed by the accused do not constituted the crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the revisedpenal codedefining the crime of falsification which was charged earlier and that their case be dismissed. People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable even if the case at bar was dismissed because according to them, it was done with the consent of the accused therefore waiving theredefenseof double jeopardy. The accused on the other hand, reiterated the fact that thedismissalwas due to lack of merits of the prosecution which would have the same effect as an acquittal which will bar the prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and unconstitutional for the accused due to double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff.

Issue:Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico in double jeopardy

Held:Yes the revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. It is true that thecriminal caseof falsification was dismissed on a motion of the accused however this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for the evidence beyond reasonable ground which the prosecution had not been able to do which would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the prosecution of another case. As it was stated on the requirements of a validdefenseof double jeopardy it says: That there should be a validcomplaint, second would be that suchcomplaintbe filed before a competent court and to which the accused has pleaded and that defendant was previously acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise terminated without express consent of the accused in which were allpresentin the case at bar. There was indeed a valid, legitimatecomplaintand concern against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico which was filed at a competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It was also mentioned that the accused pleaded notguiltyand during the time of trial, it was proven that the case used against the accused were not sufficient to prove themguiltybeyond reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case which translates to acquittal. It explained further that there are two instances when we can conclude that there is jeopardy when first is that the ground for thedismissalof the case was due to insufficiency of evidence and second, when the proceedingshave beenreasonably prolonged as to violate the right of the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites given, it was the first on that is very much applicable to our case at bar where there wasdismissalof the case due to insufficiency of evidence which will bar the approval of the petition in the case at bar for it will constitute double jeopardy on the part of the accused which the law despises.

ESMENA VS. POGOY [102 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-54110; 20 FEB 1981]Wednesday, February 18, 2009 Posted byCoffeeholic WritesLabels:Case Digests,Political Law

Facts:Petitioners Esmea and Alba were charged withgravecoercion in the Court ofCebu Cityfor allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to be given to them because the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded Not Guilty. No trial came in after the arraignment due to the priests request to move it on another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed the court that it received atelegramstating that the complainant wassick. The accused invoked their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the accused and that the prieststelegramdid not have a medicalcertificateattachedto it in order for the court to recognize the complainants reason to be valid in order to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to revive the case andattachedthe medicalcertificateof the priest proving the fact that the priest was indeedsickofinfluenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy.

Issue:Whether or Not the revival ofgravecoercion case, which was dismissed earlier due to complainants failure to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy

Held:Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been dismissed already without the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an acquittal on the case filed. Thedismissalwas due to complainants incapability topresentits evidence due to non appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. For double jeopardy toexistthese three requisites should bepresent, that one, there is a validcomplaintor information filed second, that it is done before a court of competent jurisdiction and third, that the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to thecomplaintor information. In the case at bar, all three conditions werepresent, as the case filed wasgravecoercion, filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the accused were arraigned and has pleaded to thecomplaintor the information. When these three conditions arepresentthen the acquittal, conviction of the accused, and thedismissalor termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. In the case, it was evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its termination which would mean that respondents had no expressed consent to thedismissalof the case which would make the case filed res judicata and has been dismissed by the competent court in order to protect the respondents as well for their right to speedy trial which will be equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further prosecution.

9. Salcedo vs. Mendoza88 SCRA 811 (1979)Facts: As a result of a traffic accident that occurred atabout 9:00 o'clock in the morning of July 7, 1980 atBarangay Laguinbanua West, Numancia, Aklan, Edgarlbabao was charged for slight physical injuries throughreckless imprudence in a complaint that was filed onSeptember 5, 1980 in the Municipal Circuit Court ofMalinao,Aklan.ThecasewasdocketedasCriminalCase No.1028-Nwherein acertainCrispin Conananwastheoffendedparty.OnOctober1,1980,aninformation for serious physical injuries through recklessimprudence was filed against the same accused in theRegional Trial Court of Aklan. Thecase was docketed asCriminal Case No. 1421 with one Eduardo Salido as theoffended party. This second case arose from the sameincident.A criminal information for homicide through recklessimprudence against the petitioner Leopoldo Salcedo wasfiled in Oriental Mindoro.Upon arraignmenthe enterednot guilty and the case was set fort trial. The provincialfiscal asked for and was granted postponement becausethe accused failed to appear u until the 3rdhearing theprosecuting fiscal failed to appear.Issue: Can an order of dismissal of a criminal case uponmotion of the accused after arraignment forthe failure ofthe prosecution to appear on the first day of hearing be abar to another prosecution for the sameoffense?Ruling:PetitionIsgranted.Intheinstantcase,thecomplaining witness and the prosecutor failed to appearonly in the first hearing. Evenif the court did not dismissthe case but merely postponed the hearing to anotherdate, there would not have been a denial of the right ofthe accused to a speedy trial. The right of the accused tohaveaspeedytrialisviolatedwhenunjustifiedpostponements of the trial are asked for and secured, orwhen, without good cause or justifiable motive, a longperiodoftimeisallowedtoelapsewithouthis casebeingtried.10Noneofsaidsituationsexists inthepresent case. Surely, it cannot be said that there was aviolation of the constitutional right of the accused to aspeedy trial. As we observed, the more prudent step thatthe courta quoshould have taken was to postpone thehearing to give the prosecution another opportunity topresent its case. The courta quohad in fact reconsideredits order of dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1028-N andreset it for trial. lt should have maintained said actioninstead of granting the motion for reconsideration of theaccused. The dismissal of the case by the trial court onthe ground that the accused is entitled to a speedy trial isunwarranted under the circumstances obtaining in thiscase.Double jeopardy will apply even if the dismissal is madewith the express consent of theaccused, or upon his ownmotion, only if it is predicated on either of two grounds,i.e., insufficiency of the evidence or denial ofthe right toa speedy trial. In both cases, the dismissal will have theeffect of an acquittal. Since the dismissal in this casedoes not fall under either of these two instances and itwas made with the express consent of the accused, itwould not thereby be a bar to another prosecution for thesame offense.

22.PEOPLEvsJABINAL55 SCRA 607 (1974)FACTS:Accusedwas found guiltyofthe crime ofIllegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition (evolverCal..22,RG8GermanMadewithone(1)liveammunition and four (4) empty shells). He claimed thathehadanappointmentasSecretAgentfromtheProvincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment asConfidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander,and the said appointments expressly carried with themtheauthoritytopossessandcarrythefirearminquestion.ISSUE:Whether or not appellant should be acquitted onthebasisofthecourtsrulinginMacarandangandLuceroeven if was reversed inMapa.HELD:Yes.ThedoctrinelaiddowninLuceroandMacarandangwas part of the jurisprudence, hence ofthe law, of the land, at the time appellant was found inpossessionofthefirearminquestionandwhenhearraigned by the trial court (1964). It is true that thedoctrine was overruled in theMapacase in 1967, butwhen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a differentviewisadopted,thenew doctrineshould beappliedprospectively, and should not apply to parties who hadrelied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.This is especially true inthe construction and applicationof criminal laws, where it is necessary that an act shouldbe punished reasonably for the guidance of society. Thejudgmentappealedfromisherebyreversed,andappellant is acquitted.

24.PEOPLEvsFERRER48 SCRA 382 (1972)FACTS: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trialcourtjudgethatdeclaredRA1700ortheAnti-SubversiveAct of1957asabillofattainder.Thus,dismissing theinformationofsubversionagainstthefollowing: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader oftheCommunistPartyofthePhilippines(CPP)aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult topublic officers, subversion by a band and aid of armedmen to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, forbeing members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigatingpeopletouniteandoverthrowthePhilippineGovernment. The trial court is of opinion that:1) TheCongress usurped the powers of the judge;2) Assumedjudicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPPwithout any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial; 3) Itcreated a presumption of organizational guilt by beingmembers of theCPP regardless of voluntariness.The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20 June1957.ItisanacttooutlawtheCPPandsimilarassociationspenalizingmembershiptherein,andforother purposes. It defined the Communist Party beingalthoughapoliticalpartyisinfactanorganizedconspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only byforce and violence but also by deceit, subversion andother illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clearand present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge ofthe illegalactsofthe CPPis punishable; Section8allowstherenunciationofmembershiptotheCCPthrough writing under oath.ISSUE:(1)WhetherornotRA1700is abillofattainder/ex post facto law; (2) Whether or Not RA 1700violates freedom of expression.HELD:No. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act.Itpunisheswithoutthe benefitofthe trial.Itisthesubstitutionofjudicialdeterminationtoalegislativedetermination of guilt. In order for a statute be measuredas a bill of attainder, the following requisites must bepresent: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) thestatute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct.(A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post factolaw.)In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPPas anorganizedconspiracyfor theoverthrow oftheGovernment. The Act applies not only to the CPP butalso to other organizations having the same purpose andtheir successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct notperson.Furthermore,the statute isPROSPECTIVEinnature.Section 4 prohibits acts committedAFTERapproval ofthe act. The members of the subversive organizationsbefore the passing of this Act is given an opportunity toescapeliabilitybyrenouncingmembershipinaccordance with Section 8.The law, does not violates freedom of expression. TheEXISTENCEOFSUBSTANTIVEEVIL justifiesthelimitation to the exercise of Freedom of Expression andAssociation in this matter. Before the enactment of thestatuteandstatementsinthepreamble,carefulinvestigations bythe Congress weredone.The courtfurtherstressesthatwhateverinterestinfreedomofspeech and association is excluded in the prohibition ofmembershipintheCPPareweakconsideringNATIONALSECURITYandPRESERVATIONofDEMOCRACY.TheSupremeCourtsetasidetheresolution of the TRIALCOURT.

FIRST DIVISIONOSCAR Z. BENARES,[1]G.R. No. 173421Petitioner,Present:Panganiban,C.J. (Chairperson),*- versus -Ynares-Santiago,**Austria-Martinez,Callejo, Sr., andChico-Nazario,JJ.JOSEPHINE LIM,Respondent.Promulgated:December 14, 2006x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- xDECISIONYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:This petition for review assails the May 25, 2005 Decision[2]of the Court of Appeals setting aside the Resolution[3]dated May 5, 2004 and Order[4]dated July 9, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 132, which set aside the Orders dated June 11, 2002[5]and December 26, 2002[6]of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City granting respondents motion for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the complaint for estafa for failure to prosecute.Also assailed is theJuly 7, 2006Resolution[7]denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.The following facts are undisputed:Petitioner Oscar Beares was accused of estafa arising from two contracts of sale executed in 1976 where he sold two parcels of land to respondent.Records show that after respondent had fully paid the amortizations and after the deed of absolute sale was issued, petitioner mortgaged the same parcels of land to the Bank of Philippine Islands.Thus, when respondent demanded delivery of the properties, petitioner failed to comply, thus respondent was compelled to file a case for estafa against petitioner.Trial thereafter ensued.After the prosecution presented its last witness, it was given 15 days to formally offer its evidence.[8]However, the prosecution did not make any formal offer of evidence, hence petitioner filed a motion praying that the prosecutions submission of formal offer of evidence be deemed waived and the case dismissed for lack of evidence.[9]Despite receipt of notice of petitioners motion, respondent and her counsel failed to attend the hearing on the motion set onDecember 4, 2001.OnJanuary 28, 2002, the MeTC issued an Order[10]giving the prosecution another 15 days within which to formally offer its evidence which petitioner opposed.[11]OnFebruary 27, 2002, the MeTC issued the following Order:In view of the oral manifestation of counsel for the accused, showing that the private prosecutor received the Order of this Court dated January 28, 2002 on February 7, 2002 giving them an extension of another fifteen days to file their formal offer of evidence, yet failed to do so; the court finds reason to deny the submission of formal offer of evidence.Acting on the Motion of the accused for the dismissal of this case, for failure of the prosecution to prosecute this case, the motion is granted.This case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.[12]Respondent moved to reconsider the order of dismissal and prayed for the admission of Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits,[13]claiming that she had difficulty securing documents from the court which were marked during trial.Petitioner opposed the motion invoking his right against double jeopardy.[14]OnJune 11, 2002, the MeTC issued an Order which states in part:[I]n line with the long standing policy of the Courts to decide issues based on the substantial merits of the case and not simply dismiss cases on technical defects, the Court finds Merit in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Prosecution.Effectively, the Order of the Court datedJanuary 28, 2002[15]is set aside and the case is reinstated in the dockets of the Court.The Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence is admitted by the Court and the accused is given 15 days from receipt of this Order to filed (sic) their Comment or Opposition thereto.Thereafter, the incident is deemed submitted for resolution.[16]Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[17]was denied, hence a petition[18]for certiorari was filed with the RTC.In granting the petition, the RTC noted that the MeTC Order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute had the effect of an acquittal which is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged.[19]The RTC denied respondents motion for reconsideration.Alleging grave abuse of discretion, respondent filed a petition[20]for certiorari with the Court of Appeals arguing that there was no failure to prosecute and that double jeopardy did not attach as a result of the dismissal thereof.The Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs Resolution.It held that contrary to the findings of the RTC, there was no double jeopardy because the order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute had not become final and executory due to the timely motion for reconsideration filed by respondent.The appellate court also held that petitioners right to speedy trial was not violated when respondent failed to formally offer her evidence within the period required by the trial court.The Court of Appeals thus ordered the MeTC to set the case for further trial.Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence this petition on the following grounds:I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER TO SPEEDY TRIAL WAS NOT VIOLATED.II.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE BY MTC-61 WAS A DISMISSAL ON THE MERITS WHICH RESULTED IN THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PETITIONER.III.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT APPLYING THE RULE ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY.[21]The issue for resolution is whether the MeTCs Order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute amounted to an acquittal which gave petitioner the right to invoke double jeopardy.Petitioner argued that the six months delay by the prosecution to formally offer its evidence is vexatious, capricious and oppressive; that the private prosecutors claim that the documents could not be found is untrue considering that no manifestation was filed in court stating that fact; that the documents were available as early as January 2002 but the prosecution never asked for extension, nor explained the delay in filing its formal offer despite two orders to do so.Petitioner further argued that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, failure to comply with a court order without justifiable reason may cause the dismissal of the case, which shall have the effect of an adjudication on the merits unless otherwise stated by the court.Respondent, on the other hand, asserted that it was petitioner who delayed the proceedings in the instant case, when he questioned the finding of probable cause against him before the Department of Justice, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, which were all denied; and that the delay in the filing of a formal offer of evidence is justified because as noted by the MeTC, the records were missing.Respondent likewise insisted that even without documentary evidence, testimonial evidence were presented against petitioner; that petitioner admitted the documentary evidence formally offered.Respondent refuted petitioners invocation of double jeopardy because the case was dismissed with his express consent.The petition is without merit.Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court states in part:SEC. 7.Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.Double jeopardy attaches only(1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminatedwithout the express consent of the accused.[22]In the instant case, there is no question as to the presence of the first four elements.As to the last element, there was yet no conviction, nor an acquittal on the ground that petitioners guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt,[23]but the dismissal of the case was based on failure to prosecute.A dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result indouble jeopardy, except in two instances, to wit:(1) the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or (2) the case is dismissed for violation of the accuseds right to speedy trial.[24]Petitioners claim that the prosecutions delay in filing its formal offer of evidence violated his right to speedy trial is not well taken.The prosecutions delay in the filing of its formal offer of evidence in this case cannot be considered vexatious, capricious, and oppressive.It appears that there was justifiable reason for the prosecutions failure to formally offer its evidence on time,i.e., the documents which were previously marked in court were misplaced.As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals:Truly, the prosecution had failed twice to file the formal offer of evidence within the fifteen (15) day period set by the MeTC.Once was due to the fault of the MeTC judge who expressly admitted in his order that the documentary exhibits necessary for the formal offer of evidence were lost in his office.Thus, the prosecution was unable to submit its formal offer of evidence on time.In short, there was actually only one unjustified delay in the filing of formal offer of evidence in the proceedings below, which cannot be described as vexatious, capricious or oppressive.There is no showing that the criminal case was unreasonably prolonged nor there was deliberate intent on the part of the petitioner to cause delay in the proceedings resulting to serious and great prejudice affecting the substantial rights of the accused.[25]Indeed, delay is not a mere mathematical computation of the time involved. Each case must be decided upon the facts peculiar to it.The following factors must be considered and balanced: the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.[26]In the instant case, the totality of the circumstances excuses the delay occasioned by the late filing of the prosecutions formal offer of evidence.Since the delay was not vexatious or oppressive, it follows that petitioners right to speedy trial was not violated, consequently he cannot properly invoke his right against double jeopardy.[27]Petitioners reliance inPeople v. Cloribel[28]is misplaced because in said case, trial commenced almost four years from the date of filing of the complaint.Such delay, the Court held, can hardly be ignored or disregardedby any fair standard.Neither can petitioner rely on the doctrine that when ajudge dismisses a case for failure to prosecute, the termination amounts to an acquittal as the prosecution will fail to prove the case when the time therefor comes.In the instant case, testimonial evidence were presented against petitioner.Thus, even without documentary evidence, his guilt or innocence may be proven.Second, petitioner appears to have admitted the genuineness and due execution of respondents documentary evidence, thus the prosecution need not even present such documents in view of his admission.With or without these documents, therefore, the prosecution has enough evidence left for the trial courts determination of his guilt.Thus We agree with the OSGscontention that the trial court exceeded its authority when it dismissed the case without giving the prosecution a right to be heard, hence there was a violation of due process.Further, the failure of the prosecution to offer its exhibits is not a ground to dismiss the case.Even without any documentary exhibits, the prosecution could still prove its case through the testimonies of its witnesses.Thus, we find that when the trial court reconsidered its order of dismissal, it merely corrected itself.[29]WHEREFORE,the petition isDENIED.The Decision of the Court of Appeals setting aside the Resolution dated May 5, 2004 and Order dated July 9, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132, as well as its July 7, 2006 Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, areAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.Associate JusticeAssociate JusticeMINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice

ATTESTATIONI attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate JusticeWorking Chairman, First DivisionCERTIFICATIONPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

[1]Sometimes referred to as Beares or Bernares in the records.*Retired as ofDecember 7, 2006.**Working Chairman.[2]Rollo, pp. 9-20. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by Associate Justices Eliezer R. de losSantosand Arturo D. Brion.[3]Id.at 271-273.Penned by Judge Rommel O. Baybay.[4]Id.at 274.[5]Id.at 113-114.Penned by Judge Selma Palacio Alaras.[6]Id.at 144-145.[7]Id.at 67-68.[8]Id.at 69.[9]Id.at 70-73.[10]Id.at 74.[11]Id.at 75-82.[12]Id.at 83.[13]Id.at 84-90.[14]Id.at 91-102.[15]Should beFebruary 27, 2002.[16]Rollo, p. 114.[17]Id.at 115-129.[18]Id.at 146-169.[19]Id.at 272.[20]Id.at 260-269.[21]Id.at 36.[22]Almario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127772, March 22, 2001, 355 SCRA 1, 7.[23]Malanyaon v. Lising, 193 Phil. 425, 428 (1981).[24]Philippine Savings Bank v. Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 94, 105-106.[25]Rollo, p. 14.[26]Ty-Dazo v.Sandiganbayan, 424 Phil. 945, 951 (2002).[27]Almario v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22 at 10.[28]120 Phil. 775 (1964).[29]People v. Alberto, 436 Phil. 434, 443-444 (2002); emphasis added.

FIRST DIVISIONPHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK,G.R. No. 151912 Petitioner, Present: Davide, Jr.,C.J.,Chairman, Quisumbing, - versus - Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna,JJ.SPOUSES PEDRITO BERMOY Promulgated:and GLORIA BERMOY, Respondents. September 26, 2005x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xDECISIONCARPIO, J.:The Case This is a petition for review[1]of the Decision[2]dated 14 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals denying the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner and its Resolution dated 24 January 2002 denying reconsideration.The FactsBased on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (petitioner), respondents Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy (respondent spouses) were charged with estafa thru falsification of a public document in the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 38 (trial court). The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-154193, alleged:That on or about May 11, 1994, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Philippine Savings Bank a banking institution, duly organized and existing under Philippine Laws xxx, thru falsification of a public document in the following manner, to wit: the said accused prepared, forged and falsified or caused to be prepared, forged and falsified an owners copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207434, which is an imitation of, and similar to the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207434 issued by the Regist[er] of Deeds for the City of Manila, and therefore, a public document, by then and there typing on the blank spaces thereon the title no., description of a parcel of land containing an area of 350 square meters, located in Malate, this City, the names of the accused as the registered owners thereof, and then signing, falsifying and simulating the signature of ALICIA D. GANZON, Register of Deeds, appearing on the lower right hand portion of the 1stpage of said document; the name EDGARDO C. CASTRO, Actg. Deputy, appearing on the right hand middle portion of the 3rdpage, and imprinting thereon several entries purportedly showing that the annotation thereon was a mortgage in favor A. C. Aguila and Sons, which was cancelled on February 17, 1994, thereby making it appear, as it did appear, that accused are the registered owners of the said property, under said TCT No. 207434 which purportedly is the owners copy of said title, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused fully well knew, the same is an outright forgery, as the owners duplicate copy of said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207434 is in possession of the spouses EDGAR and ELVIRA ALAMO by reason of the previous mortgage of the said property in favor of the latter since February 17, 1994 and which was later sold to them on June 19, 1995; that once the said document has been forged and falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused presented the same to the Philippine Savings Bank and used the said title as collateral in obtaining, as in fact, they did obtain a loan in the sum ofP1,000,000.00 from the said bank, and once in possession of the said amount ofP1,000,000.00 with intent to defraud, they willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Philippine Savings Bank in the aforesaid amount ofP1,000,000.00, Philippine Currency.[3]Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded not guilty to the charge.The trial court set the pre-trial on 11 June 1997. After the hearing on that day, the trial court issued the following Order (11 June 1997 Order): When the case was called for hearing, Atty. Maria Concepcion Puruganan, who entered her appearance as private prosecutor and Atty. Albino Achas, defense counsel, appeared andupon their stipulation, they admitted the jurisdiction of the Court and the identities of the accused. Upon motion of Atty. Puruganan, private prosecutor, joined by public prosecutor Antonio Israel, without objection from Atty. Achas, let the initial hearing for the reception of the evidence for the prosecution be set on June 18, 1997 at 8:30 a.m., as previously scheduled.[4](Emphasis supplied)The minutes of the hearing, which respondent spouses signed, bore the following handwritten notation under the heading remarks: Postponed. Upon joint agreement of counsels.[5] This was the only notation made under remarks. Nowhere in the one-page minutes of the hearing did it state that any of the accused made any stipulation or admission. During the hearings of 18 June 1997 and 3 September 1997, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Felisa Crisostomo (Crisostomo), manager of petitioners Libertad Manila Branch, and one Hermenigildo Caluag (Caluag), also an employee of petitioner. Crisostomo testified that she came to know respondent spouses when they applied for a loan in February 1994. Crisostomo stated that respondent spouses presented to her Transfer Certificate Title No. 207434 (TCT No. 207434) issued in their name over a parcel of land in Malate, Manila (Malate lot) which they offered as collateral for the loan. Crisostomo further stated after the approval of respondent spouses loan application, respondent spouses executed in her presence a real estate mortgage of the Malate lot in favor of petitioner as security for their loan. Caluag testified that he was tasked to register petitioners certificate of sale over the Malate lot[6]with the Register of Deeds of Manila but the latter refused to do so because the Malate lot had been mortgaged and sold to the spouses Edgar and Elvira Alamo.[7]After presenting the testimonies of Crisostomo and Caluag, the prosecution rested its case. Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed, with leave of court, a demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to identify respondent spouses as the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-154193. The prosecution, through the private prosecutor, opposed the motion claiming that Crisostomo and Calang had identified respondent spouses. The prosecution also pointed out that as borne by the 11 June 1997 Order, respondent spouses stipulated on their identity during the pre-trial.[8]The Ruling of the Trial CourtIn its Order of 21 April 1998 (21 April 1998 Order), the trial court granted respondent spouses motion, dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-154193, and acquitted respondent spouses. The 21 April 1998 Order reads:The basic issues to resolve here boils down on (sic) the determination of whether the accused were identified by the prosecution witnesses as the perpetrators of the act complained of during the trial of the case and whether they admitted their identities as the accused named in the information. After carefully going over the length and breadth of the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses, there is nothing in the transcript which would slightly indicate that they identified the accused as the persons who obtained a loan from the Philippine Savings Bank and executed the corresponding documents. The identification of an accused [by the witness] may be made by pointing to him directly in open court xxx or [by] stepping down from the stand and tapping his shoulder. If the accused is not present during the trial, his identification may be effected through his pictures attached to the bail bond or some other means. The identification of an accused as the perpetrator of an offense is essential in the successful prosecution of criminal cases. By the accuseds entering a negative plea to the allegations in the information, he denies that he committed the offense. He cannot even be compelled to give his name during the arraignment and for which the Court may enter a plea of not guilty for him. As to the stipulation of facts regarding the admission of the jurisdiction of the court and the identities of the accused, a cursory reading of the Order of June 11, 1997 reveals that their express conformity to the stipulation of facts entered into by their counsel with the private prosecutor was never asked of them. Considering that the admission of the identities of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime here charged is a matter which adversely affects their substantial rights, such admission must have to involve their express concurrence or consent thereto. This consent is manifested in their signing the pre-trial order containing such admissions. As to the minutes of the proceedings of June 11, 1997, suffice it to state that there is nothing to it (sic) which would even hint that a stipulation of facts ever took place. WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, let this case be, as the same is hereby, DISMISSED and accused Pedrito Bermoy and Gloria Visconde [Bermoy] are, as they are hereby, acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.[9] The prosecution, again through the private prosecutor, sought reconsideration but the trial court denied its motion in the Order of 28 May 1998.Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Solicitor General joined the petition.The Ruling of the Court of Appeals In its Decision dated 14 November 2001, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, denied the petition. It held: In support of the demurrer to evidence, the defense counsel argued that neither of the witnesses presented by the prosecution was able to identify the accused as allegedly those who committed the crime they were prosecuted for.xxx Petitioner, however, argues that the testimonies of the two witnesses they presented identified the accused spouses as the perpetrators of the crime. xxxWe are not convinced. The xxx testimony proves only one thing: that a couple purporting to be the Bermoy spouses presented themselves to the Bank and obtained the loan. Whether they are the same husband and wife accused in this case for Estafa is a different story. The failure of the prosecution to point in open court to the persons of the accused as the same persons who presented themselves to the Bank is a fatal omission. They could be impostors who, armed with the fake title, presented themselves to the Bank as the persons named in the title. The prosecution goofed. Had the witnesses been asked to point to the two accused as the same couple who appeared before the Bank to obtain the loan, there would have been no doubt on their criminal liability.Petitioner further argued that the law itself does not prescribe the ways to identify the accused, xxx [.]True, there is no standard form provided by law [for] identifying the accused. Jurisprudence and trial practice show that the accused is usually identified by the witnesses, prompted by the counsel, by either pointing at him or stepping down the witness stand and tapping him on the shoulder, or by means of photographs. The trial court correctly pointed this out. How else can identification be done, it may be asked.The petitioner also argues that the identities of private [respondents] were clearly established as a result of the stipulation by and between the prosecution (thru the private prosecutor) and the defense. It insists that the Order dated June 11, 1997, is sufficient admission by the accused as to their identities, and [was] allegedly signed by them and their counsel as required under Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. There is no merit to this argument. If ever stipulations were made on June 11, 1997, these must be made in writing, which must be signed by the accused and counsel as their conformity to such stipulations. The records, however, show that the Order dated June 11, 1997, merely stated what transpired during that particular hearing and what the counsels signed was the minutes for the same hearing. Hence, the identities of the accused were not stipulated upon for failure to comply with the requirements under the Rules of Court. The trial court correctly ruled that there [was] nothing xxx which would even hint that a stipulation of facts ever took place.xxxIn fine, we are more than convinced that the trial court was correct in granting the demurrer to evidence for insufficiency of evidence on account of lack of proper identification of the accused. But even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. xxxIn the case at bench, it is clear that this petition seeks to review the judgment of the trial court, which already had jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the persons of this case. The trial court had jurisdiction to resolve the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused, either by denying it or by dismissing the case for lack of sufficient evidence. If the demurrer is granted, resulting [in] the dismissal of the criminal case and the acquittal of the accused, this can no longer be reviewed unless it can be shown that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. In this case, assuming the trial court committed an error, the petitioner has not shown that it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack [or] excess xxx of jurisdiction. The error, if any, is merely an error of judgment.[10] Petitioner sought reconsideration claiming that the Court of Appeals contradicted itself when it held, on one hand, that the trial courts error did not amount to grave abuse of discretion and stated, on the other hand, that any error committed by the trial court can no longer be reviewed without violating respondent spouses right against double jeopardy. Petitioner also contended, for the first time, that it is the trial courts duty to insure that the accused sign the pre-trial order or agreement embodying respondent spouses admissions and that its failure to do so should not be taken against the prosecution.The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion in the Resolution of 24 January 2002 which reads: The petitioner seems to have misunderstood our ruling regarding the issue on double jeopardy in connection with [the] petition for certiorari. Petitioner argues that our ruling has been contradictory for saying on one hand that even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either by appeal or on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy while saying on the other hand assuming that trial court committed an error, the petitioner has not shown that it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack excess (sic) or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner asks: Which is which then? meaning, it has not understood what a petition for certiorari is for. If the petitioner read the decision carefully, in between the above-quoted statements of the decision is the case ofPeople v. Bans, G.R. No. 104147, December 8, 1994, 238 SCRA 48, where the Supreme Court explicitly explained that review of the sufficiency of the evidence and of the propriety of the acquittal of the accused [as a result of the grant of the demurrer to evidence] lies outside the function of certiorari. True, a petition for certiorari alleges an error of the trial court but nowhere in our decision did it mention that the trial court in this case committed an error. We merely made an assumption, without saying that there was an error committed by the trial court, to make a point. We meant that if the trial court did commit an error in ruling that there was insufficient evidence resulting in the acquittal of the accused, such error can no longer be reviewed since it would be one of judgment, which is not within the ambit of a certiorari. xxx The petitioner again asks us: Who has the duty of requiring the accused to sign the pre-trial order, the prosecution or the trial court itself? It answers that it is the trial court because it has the sole and exclusive duty of seeing to it that all requirements in such proceedings be duly complied with x x x and that duty includes the act of requiring or compelling the accused to sign the pre-trial order, [hence] it is plainly fundamentally erroneous to suppose that such duty can be delegated by the trial court to the prosecution. The petitioner further argues that the respondent Court was right off ousted of jurisdiction when it deliberately and without legal basis refused to consider the stipulation of facts made by the parties in the eventual pre-trial order x x x despite the absence of signature of the accused in the said pre-trial order. The arguments of the petitioner are baseless. Nowhere in Rule 118 on Pre-Trial on the Revised Rules of Rules of Criminal Procedure does it require the prosecution or the accused to sign the pre-trial order. All that is required for the trial court to do is to hold a pre-trial conference and issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated upon by the parties, and evidence marked. And if there were any agreements or admissions made or entered into by the parties during the pre-trial conference, these should be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and his or her counsel. Otherwise, such agreements or admissions may not be used against the accused. xxxHence, it is not incumbent upon the trial court to require the parties to sign the pre-trial order to make the agreements and admissions as evidence against the accused. If the parties made such admission as to the identities of the accused in this case, it is the look-out of the counsels, particularly the prosecutor, to require the accused to sign. Why should the trial court remind the counsels what to do? If the private prosecutor wanted such admission as an evidence against the accused, then she should have required the admission in writing [sic] and signed by the accused and their counsel as required by the rules. But, as the records show, all that was signed was the minutes of the pre-trial conference. As already discussed in our decision, the trial court committed no error on this point.[11] Hence, this petition.The IssuesPetitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in:I. HOLDING THAT SUPPOSEDLY IT IS NOT THE DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT TO REQUIRE THE ACCUSED TO SIGN THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER;II FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MATTERS STATED IN THE 11 JUNE 1997 PRE-TRIAL ORDER AS STIPULATIONS MADE BY THE PARTIES AND SHOULD THUS BE BINDING ON THEM;III. REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED WERE SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED DURING THE TRIAL BY THE WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION; [AND]IV. HOLDING THAT DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAD ALLEGEDLY ATTACHED IN THE CASE.[12] In his Memorandum, the Solicitor General joins causes with petitioner. The Solicitor General contends that the trial courts dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was tainted with grave abuse of discretion thus, double jeopardy does not apply in this case.[13]The Ruling of the Court The petition has no merit.On Whether Double Jeopardy isApplicable Here Paragraph 1, Section 7, Rule 117 (Section 7) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure[14]on double jeopardy provides:Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements in the first criminal case:(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;(b)The court had jurisdiction;(c)The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and(d)He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.[15]On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy trial.[16] A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first exception.[17] Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal.[18] As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in Section 7 were all present in Criminal Case No. 96-154193. Thus, the Information for estafa through falsification of a public document against respondent spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned during which they entered not guilty pleas. Finally, Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense became vested on respondent spouses.The Extent of the Right AgainstDouble Jeopardy The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if (a) the accused is charged with the same offense in two separate pending cases, or (b) the accused is prosecuted anew for the same offense after he had been convicted or acquitted of such offense, or(c) the prosecution appeals from a judgment in the same case.[19]The last is based on Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court[20]which provides that [a]ny party may appeal from a final judgment or order,except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-154193 for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect appealing from a judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the Constitution[21] and Section 7, the courts are barred from entertaining such appeal as it seeks an inquiry into the merits of the dismissal. Thus, we held in an earlier case:In terms of substantive law, the Court will not pass upon the propriety of the order granting the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and the consequent acquittal of the accused, as it will place the latter in double jeopardy. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to a speedy trial xxx In the case before us, the resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence was based on the ground of insufficiency of evidence xxx Hence, it clearly falls under one of the admitted exceptions to the rule.Double jeopardy therefore, applies to this case and this Court is constitutionally barred from reviewing the order acquitting the accused.[22](Emphasis supplied) The strict rule against appellate review of judgments of acquittal is not without any basis. As the Court explained inPeople v. Velasco[23] The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x x Thus,Green[v. United States]expressed the concern that (t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty. It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction. The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for repose, a desire to know the exact extent of ones liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jurys leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding. Related to his right of repose is the defendants interest in his right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. xxx [S]ocietys awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As observed inLockhart v. Nelson, (t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process. Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.On Petitioners Claim that the Trial CourtsDismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was Void Petitioner, together with the Solicitor General, contends that the Court can inquire into the merits of the acquittal of respondent spouses because the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was void. They contend that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it disregarded evidence allegedly proving respondent spouses identity.[24]The contention has no merit. To be sure, the rule barring appeals from judgments of acquittal admits of an exception. Such, however, is narrowly drawn and is limited to the case where the trial court act[ed] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictiondue to a violation of due processi.e.the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case xxx orthat the trial was a shamxxx.[25] None of these circumstances exists here. There is no dispute that the prosecution, through petitioners counsel as private prosecutor, was afforded its day in court. Neither is there any question that the proceedings in the trial court were genuine. What petitioner points to as basis for the trial courts alleged grave abuse of discretion really concerns its appreciation of the evidence. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly held, any error committed by the trial court on this point can only be an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. What this Court held inCentral Bank v. Court of Appeals[26]applies with equal force here Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. The argument that the judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore, null and void, is flawed because whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecutionno matter how obvious the error may bexxx. (Emphasis supplied)On the Other Errors Assigned by Petitioner The Court will no longer rule on the other errors assigned by petitioner on who has the responsibility to insure that the pre-trial agreement is signed by the accused, on the effect of the 11 June 1997 Order, and on whether respondent spouses were identified during the trial. All these entail an inquiry into the merits of the 21 April 1998 Order, which, as earlier stated, cannot be done without violating respondent spouses right against double jeopardy.WHEREFORE, weDENYthe petition. WeAFFIRMthe Decision dated 14 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 24 January 2002 of the Court of Appeals.SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate JusticeWE CONCUR: HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. Chief Justice ChairmanLEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Associate JusticeADOLFO S. AZCUNAAssociate JusticeCERTIFICATIONPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. ChiefJustice

[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[2] Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner, with Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring.[3] Rollo, pp. 84-85.[4]Ibid., p. 78.[5] Annex D of Petition; Rollo, p. 79.[6] It appears that petitioner foreclosed respondent spouses mortgage, bought the Malate lot during the foreclosure sale, and obtained a certificate of sale in its favor.[7] Rollo, pp. 93-99.[8]Ibid., pp. 91-100.[9]Ibid., pp. 75-76. (Capitalization in the original)[10] Rollo, pp. 64-72.[11]Ibid., pp. 56-59.[12]Ibid., pp. 27-28.[13]Ibid., pp. 225-235.[14] Reiterated in Section 7, Rule 117 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure(effective 1 December 2000).[15] IIF. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 491 (10thed., 2004).[16] People v. Bans, G.R. No. 104147, 8 December 1994, 239 SCRA 48.[17]Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,(superseded by Section 23, Rule 119 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure) provides: Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the caseon the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (Emphasis supplied)[18] People v. City Court of Silay, G.R. No. L-43790, 9 December 1976, 74 SCRA 247.[19] IIF. Regalado,supranote 15.[20] Substantially reiterated in Section 1, Rule 122 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[21] Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. (Emphasis supplied)[22] People v. Bans,supranote 16 (internal citations omitted).[23] G.R. No. 127444, 13 September 2000, 340 SCRA 207 (internal citations omitted).[24] Rollo, pp. 47-50, 225-235.[25] People v. Sandiganbayan, 426 Phil. 453 (2002) (internal citations omitted).[26] G.R. No. 41859, 8 March 1989, 171 SCRA 49.

People v. Ylagan physical injuries A defendant is in legal jeopardy when he was put to trial in the following conditions:a. in a court of competent jurisdictionb. upon a valid complaint or informationc. after he has been arraignedd. after he has pleaded to the information

without the consent of the accused does not mean over the objection of the accused or against the will of the accused ; mere silence or failure to object

People v. Balisacan homicide Existence of a plea is an essential requisite in order that the accused may be in jeopardy. In this case, he first entered a plea of guilty and subsequently, he was ed to testify on the mitigating circumstances and he said he acted in self defense: this had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty;court should have required a new plea.

Cudia v. CA requisites in order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy/ substantiate an claim ofjeopardy

a. a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the secondb. first jeopardy must have been validly terminatedc. second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit of frustration thereof. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution

----- Termination of jeopardy -----

1. Bustamante v. Maceren reopening of a case No re-opening of a case may be ordered of a criminal case after accused hasstarted serving his sentence; a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served or the defendant ha waived in writing his appeal; withdrawal of plea of guilty does not constitute waiver of defense of double jeopardy timely invoked.

People v. Obsania rape In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the followingrequisites must have obtained in the original prosecution/ double jeopardy attaches when:a. a valid complaint or informationb. a competent courtc. defendant had pleaded to the charged. defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent dismissal with express consent of the defendant constitutes waiver

Rivera v. People transportation of marijuana VERBAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL which was not reduced into writing may be set aside by the judge and enter a new one duly signed by him, reinstating the case

Cuison v. CA double homicide The promulgation of only one part of the decision i.e. liability for civil indemnity, is NOT A BAR, to the subsequent promulgation of the other part, the imposition of the criminal accountability doctrine on double jeopardy same as in Cudia and Obsania cases.

People v. Velasco homicide and frustrated homicide Requisites to successfully invoke double jeopardy (refer to Obsania); Where an acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial court or an appeal on a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule; An acquittal is final and unappealable ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY whether it happens at the trial court of before the Court of Appeals; doctrine that double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial may apply only when the Court finds that the criminal trial was a sham because the prosecutionrepresenting the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process.

Salcedo v. Mendoza homicide through reckless imprudence General rule: dismissal of criminal case upon motion or with express consent of accused will not bea bar to the subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same offense. EXCEPTION TO THE RULE: when dismissal is grounded upon the right of the accused to a speedy trial. This amounts to a judgment of acquittal on the merits which bars the subsequent prosecution of accused for the same offense

Oriente v. People homicide; lead pipe It is well settled that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy; Courts have the inherent power to amend their decisions to make them conformable to law and justice; change in penalty by the RTC did not involvethe consideration of new evidence but a mere correction

People v. Cajigal homicide to murder

The change of the offense charged from homicide to murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution;

----- Same offense; ordinance and states -----

People v. Relova theft of electricity; punishable by an ordinance and the RPC A person who was charged for violating acity ordinance which was dismissed for prescription of the offense may not be charged again under the RPC; claim of double jeopardy is available even if prior offense charged under an ordinance is different from subsequent offense charged in a statue where both offenses spring from the same act; where an offense is punished by different sections of a statute, the inquiry, for the purpose of double jeopardy,is on identity of offenses charged. In contrast, where an offense is penalized by an ordinance and a statute, the inquiry is on the identity of acts; Identity of offenses (examining elements of the two offenses); identity of acts (examining the locus or such acts in time and place); For double jeopardyto be available, not all technical elements of the first offense need be present in the definition of the second offense; Damages, civil liability will continue to be heard

People v. City Court of Manila the defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper when there is no identity of the offenses charged. Evidence required to prove one offense is not the same evidence required to prove the other; An appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal by the trial court SHALL NOT constitute doublejeopardy if:a. the dismissal is made upon motion or with express consent of the defendant;b. dismissal is NOT an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case;c. question to be passed upon the appellate court is purely legal (if dismissal is incorrect, case will be remanded to the court of origin)

----- Rule on supervening facts

Melo v. People physical injuries; injured party dies; homicide The rule of identity does not apply when thesecond offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case, there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction, the injured person dies, the charged for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

People v. Buling [less] serious physical injuries; X-ray; two physicians; two complaints -The prosecution of the accused for less serious physical injuries is a bar for his prosecution with serious physical injuries. If the X-ray examination disclosed the existence of a fracture when the second examination was made, this must have been present during the first examination; There was therefore no supervening fact which would justify application of the rule of double jeopardy.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. L-41863 April 22, 1977PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and ASST. PROV'L FISCAL F. VISITACION, JR.,petitioners,vs.HONORABLE MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and MARGARITO FAMA, JR.,respondents.Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Alicia V. Sempio-Diy and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for petitioners.Fama & Jimenea for private respondent.BARREDO,J:Petition forcertiorari; to set aside the orders of respondent judge dated September 22, 1975 and October 14, 1975 dismissing Criminal Case No. 5241 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against private respondent Margarito Fama, Jr., said dismissal being predicated on the ground of double jeopardy, in view of the dismissal of a previous charge of slight physical injuries against the same respondent for the same incident by the Municipal Court of Janiuay, Iloilo in Criminal Case No. 3335, notwithstanding that in the information in the first-mentioned case, it was alleged that the injuries sustained by the offended party, aside from possibly requiring medical attendance from 6 to 9 days barring complications", as was alleged in the information in Criminal Case No. 3335, had left "a permanent sear and deform(ed) the right face of (said offended party) Miguel Viajar."The first criminal complaint filed against respondent Fama Jr. on April 15, 1975 (Case No. 3335) was as follows:That at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 12, 1975, at Aquino Nobleza St., Municipality of January, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, while armed with a piece of stone, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and use personal violence upon one Miguel Viajar by then hurling the latter with a stone, hitting said Miguel Viajar on the right cheek, thereby inflicting physical injuries which would have required and will require medical attendance for a period from 5 to 9 days barring complication as per medical certificate of the physician hereto attached.CONTRARY TO LAW. (Pp. 93-94, Record)Arraigned on July 7, 1975, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.Meanwhile, on June 8, 1975, complainant Viajar filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo charging Atty. Alfredo Fama, Raul Fama and herein respondent Margarito Fama, Jr. with serious physical injuries arising from the same incident alleged in above Criminal Case No. 3335. After conducting a preliminary investigation, under date of July 28, 1975, the Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an information, but only against respondent Fama Jr., (Case No. 5241) for serious physical injuries as follows:That on or about April 12, 1975, in the Municipality of January, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, and without any justifiable motive, armed with pieces of stone did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and throw pieces of stone at Miguel Viajar, hitting him on the lower right eye which would heal from five (5) to nine (9) days barring complications but leaving a permanent scar and deforming on the right face of said Miguel Viajar.CONTRARY TO LAW. (Pp. 94-95, Record)On August 1, 1975, Fama Jr. filed an urgent motion to defer proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5241, claiming that since he was already charged and pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 3335, he would be in double jeopardy, if Case No. 5241 were to be prosecuted. This motion was opposed by the Fiscal and the Court required both parties to file their respective memorandum on the issue of double jeopardy.In the meantime, the Fiscal after filing Case No. 5241, sought the dismissal of Case No. 3335, but the Municipal Court did not act on said motion. Instead, the case was set for hearing, and in view of the postponements asked by the Fiscal in order to await the resolution of the issue of double jeopardy in Case No. 5241, on September 11, 1975, the following order was entered:Under our democratic and constituted system of government litigants before our courts of justice, plaintiffs and defendants, complainants and accused are entitled to the equal protection of our laws. More is an accused, the trial of his case has been repeatedly postponed for several times by this Court in the exercise of its sound discretion at the instance of the prosecution. So, when this case was called for hearing on the afternoon of September 1, 1975 the accused through counsel vigorously objected to another postponement and moved for the dismissal of the case against him. To grant another postponement as sought by the Fiscal against the vehement, strong and vigorous objection of the accused is to the mind of the Court, no longer an exercise of sound discretion consistent with justice and fairness but a clear and palpable abuse of discretion amounting to a serious denial to, and a grave violation of, the right of the accused to a speedy trial to which he is rightfully entitled to under Section 16 of Article IV, (Bill of Rights) of the Philippine Constitution.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered dismissed. The Cash Bond posted by the accused is hereby or