cases on judicial authority and duty

7/25/2019 Cases on Judicial Authority and Duty

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G.R. No. L-5162 January 31, 1952

ELISEO SILVA,petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE FELIIANO OA!"O, GABRIEL ". "RIETO an# $%INTIN "ARE&ES, JR., 'n ()*'r

+aa+'('* a o''on*r o/ ()* "u0'+ S*r'+* o''on an# BELEN ABRERA,respondents.

Rivera, Castano, Medina and Ampil for petitioner.

A.R. Aspillera for respondents Hons. Feliciano Ocampo, Gabriel P. Prieto and Quintin Paredes, Jr. varistoR. !andoval for respondent "elen Cabrera.

BA%TISTA ANGELO,J.

This is a petition for certiorari wherein it is prayed that, pending hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be

issued to restrain the respondent Belen Cabrera from operating her ice plant and that, after hearing, the

order granting said respondent a provisional permit to operate her ice plant be declared null and void.

Belen Cabrera filed in the Public Service Commission an application for a certificate of public convenience to

install, maintain and operate in the City of Lipa an ice plant with a !"ton daily productive capacity and to

sell the produce of said plant in said city as well as in several municipalities of the province of Batangas.#liseo Silva opposed the application on the ground that his ice plant was ade$uate to meet the needs of the

public and that public convenience did not re$uire the operation of another ice plant. Commissioner

%eliciano &campo commissioned 'ttorney 'ntonio (. 'spillera, chief of the legal division, to receive the

evidence. Based on the evidence received by 'spillera, the Commission granted the application. &n appeal,

however, the Supreme Court held that the proceedings had before 'ttorney 'spillera were null and void

being in violation of section ) of the Public Service 'ct, as amended, and set aside the decision of the

Commission and ordered that the case returned for re"hearing.

't the re"hearing before Commissioner &campo, counsel for the application offered to re"submit all the

evidence presented by her at the hearing before 'ttorney 'spillera. Counsel for oppositor objected to the

re"submission contending that said evidence can only be re"submitted if both parties agree to do so.Commissioner &campo ruled that the evidence could be re"submitted subject only to a revision by the

Commissioner of the rulings made by 'ttorney 'spillera, and Commissioner &campo in fact revised said

rulings and found them to be correct. *n the opinion of Commissioner &campo, the applicant has the right

either to re"submit her former evidence or to present evidence de novo and that it is not intended by the

decision of this Court to curtail her right to choose between these two alternatives. &n the basis of this

evidence, Commissioner &campo granted to the applicant a provisional permit subject to the condition that

it may be cancelled or revo+ed at any time and without prejudice to whatever final decision may be

rendered in the case. The motion for reconsideration of oppositor having been denied, he filed this petition

for certiorari.

The dispositive part of the decision invo+ed by petitioner in opposing the re"submission by the applicant of

her evidence says in part as follows

Setting aside the decision appealed from, let this case be returned to the Public Service Commission

so that evidence may be submitted by the parties in a hearing or hearings before the Commission in

banc or before any of the Commissioners if properly authori-ed, unless of course, said parties agree

at said hearing or hearings to re"submit the evidence already presented and ta+en down, with such

modifications and under such conditions as they may agree upon, including such other evidence

which they wish to present. /.0. 1o. L")2345.


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Petitioner contends that Commissioner &campo acted in a manner contrary to the ruling of the Supreme

Court when he allowed the re"submission of the evidence of the applicant, instead of re$uiring her to

present her evidence de novo, over the objection of the petitioner. %or this reason, petitioner contends, the

decision of Commissioner &campo should be set aside and rendered without effect.

The interpretation placed on the above ruling of this Court by Commissioner &campo is indeed erroneous,

as it fails to grasp its real import and significance. The rationale of the rule is none other than to ma+e the

Commission, or any of the Commissioners who may be authori-ed for this purpose, to try the case or,

receive the evidence itself, as the law re$uires, so that it may have the necessary opportunity forobservation and appreciation of the evidence to enable it to reach an accurate and intelligent conclusion.

6ere re"submission of the evidence already presented would not meet this compelling objective, the only

e7ception being when the opposing parties agree to such re"submission. This is a privilege that can

e7ercise or waive in the use of their discretion. *nasmuch as Commissioner &campo has not observed the

directive contained in the decision adverted to and it appearing that this decision has been concurred in by

the other two Commissioners, we are of the opinion that the respondent Commission has committed an

abuse of discretion in overruling the petitioner to the re"submission of the evidence presented by the

applicant before 'ttorney 'spillera.

8e notice, however, that the incident relative to the resubmission of the evidence of the application too+

place in connection only with the hearing set by the Commission for the purpose of determining if saidapplicant could be given a provisional or authority to continue operating her !"ton ice plant in Lipa City

pending hearing and final determination of the case. The hearing was set at the e7press instance of the

applicant in view of the attitude of the oppositor in as+ing for an indefinite postponement of the hearing on

the merits. The Commission found that the applicant had made considerable investment to ac$uire and

install her !"ton ice plant in the city of Lipa and that there was an urgent need for ice not only by the

people of that city but also of the towns of Cuenca, 'litagtag and *baan, which condition had e7isted and

continued to e7ist since the original decision in this case had been rendered, for which reasons the

Commission found sufficient warrant the issuance of a provisional permit. *n so granting such provisional

permit, the Commission partly said 9*f the best interests and convenience of the public are to be

subserved, applicant should be granted a provisional permit, to continue operating her plant while this case

is being litigated. To order the closing down of applicant:s plant in the face of the evidence showing that thepublic needs her service would be a disservice to the public. This provisional authority should be granted

because the public:s need for the service is urgent and the hearing and final determination of this case will

necessarily ta+e time.9

8e are of the opinion that while the evidence presented by the applicant has been admitted in violation of

the directive of this Court, however, such evidence may serve as justification, if the Commission so finds it,

to warrant the issuance of a provisional permit. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the Commission

from receiving any pertinent evidence for the purpose of acting on a petition for the provisional permit. The

law is silent as to the procedure to be followed with regard to provisional permit. The law even empowers

the Commission to act, without hearing, on certain matters of public interest, 9subject to established

limitations and e7ceptions and saving provisions, to the contrary9 section ;, Com. 'ct < to cover the same route theretofore operated on under certificates >3 and >) by the Blac+

(aw+ Lines, *nc. The Commission, without notice to the receiver or to the Blac+ (aw+s Lines, *nc., issued


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an order granting temporarily an e7tension of certificate 1o. >3 and >). &n appeal, the grant of this temporary permit was assigned as error. The Supreme

Court of &hio justified the action of the Commission saying on this point as follows

Believing in good faith that the public living along the line of this route was without transportation

service, that the transportation company then holding the certificate serving such territory did not

provide the service re$uired or the particular +ind of e$uipment necessary to furnish such service,

and that the public was practically without transportation, we cannot find that such temporary order

issued as an emergency measure, violated the letter or spirit of section 2


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#00&0 *. D That section ) prohibits a hearing before any person other than a Commissioner in

contested cases@ conse$uently, the delegation made by the Commission to 'ttorney 'spillera is

illegal and contrary to law.

#00&0 **. D That the decision is not supported by evidence to warrant the /rant of the certificate

to applicant"respondent Belen Cabrera.

8e shall address ourselves to the first assigned error because the determination of the same disposes of

this appeal. The legal point raised in this assignment of error was also raised before the Commission. 't thebeginning of the hearing before 'ttorney 'spillera, counsel for oppositors, Silva, now petitioner, as+ed that

the hearing be had before one of the Commissioners because it was a contested case. 8hen his petition

was overruled, he made it of record that his continuing 9with the hearing of this case shall not be

understood as a waiver of our objection9 t. s. n., p. )5. *t is therefore clear that petitioner is not raising

this issue here for the first time.

8hile petitioner Silva contends that the delegation made by the Commission to 'ttorney 'spillera to ta+e

the testimony of witnesses was illegal and contrary to the provisions of section ) of the Public Service 'ct

as amended by 0epublic 'ct 1o. ;>, respondent e$ually claims that said delegation is perfectly proper and

legal. *t will be remembered that the delegation to receive testimony was made under the provisions of

section )3 of the Public Service 'ct Com. 'ct 1o.


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Commissioners, who shall report to the Commission in banc, the evidence so received by him to

enable it to render its decision. =nderlining is ours5

'fter e7amining the law, particularly the language used in section ) and )3, above"$uoted, we agree with

the petitioner that the delegation made to 'ttorney 'spillera especially considering the manner in which he

received the evidence, was contrary to the provisions of the public Service 'ct.

The law sec. )5 is clear that in a contested case li+e the present, only the Commission in banc is

authori-ed to conduct the hearing, although said Commission may delegate the reception of the evidenceto one of the Commissioners who shall report to the Commission in banc, the evidence so received by him.

=nder Commonwealth 'ct 1o. amending sections 3 and ) of Commonwealth 'ct 2, 4!.5 'fter the submission of the evidence 'tty. 'spillera declared the 9Case

submitted9. t. s. n. p. 33;.5 *t is obvious that the evidence received by 'tty. 'spillera were not meredepositions or testimonies, and that his actuation that of a mere official li+e a justice of the peace receiving

a deposition under the provisions of 0ule > of the 0ules of Court. The role played by 'tty. 'spillera was

rather that of a Commissioner under 0ule )< wherein he acted as a representative of the Commission that

made the delegation to him, passed upon petitions and objections during the trial, either overruling or

sustaining the same and ordered witnesses to answer if the objection to the $uestion was overruled, and

then ma+ing his findings and report to the body that commissioned him.

0espondent cites the case of 'bel /. %lores, applicant vs.'. L. 'mmen Transportation Co., *nc., oppositor,

case 1o. 3;


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ta+e testimony was involved. The oppositor in that case believing that the Commission e7ceeded its

jurisdiction in ma+ing the delegation, brought the case to this Supreme Court under /.0. 1o. L"2); but its

petition for certiorari was dismissed for lac+ of merit. %rom this, respondent infers that even in contested

cases the reception of evidence may be delegated to a person other than one of the Commissioners. 8e

have e7amined that case and we find that the authority given there was not to receive evidence but to ta+e

a deposition and that the person delegated was a justice of the peace. 8e $uote a portion of the order of

'ssociate Commissioner /abriel P. Prieto in that case

#s verdad $ue el articulo ) de la Ley claramente dispone $ue en los asuntos contenciosos y en $ueenvuelven la fijacion de tarifas la Comision solo puede delegar la recepcion de lads pruebas a

cual$uiera de sus Comisionados. Pero tambien es cierto, $ue la deposicion no una delegacion de la

recepcion de las pruebas, por$ue al funcionario $ue la toma, la ley no le concede las facultades del

tribunal $ue ha ordenado dicha deposicion. #n efecto, la 0egla > de los 0eglamentos $ue regula

esta actuacion, no autori-a al funcionario $ue toma la deposicion para resolver las cuestiones $ue

surgen o se suscitan durante su actuacion@ no le faculta para hacer sus conclusiones de hecho o de

derecho@ ni le permite, si$uiera, rendir informe o report de todo lo actuado. Su unica ogligacion es

certificar la declaracion tal como ha sido prestada por el deponente. #l $ue toma la deposicion no es

como el arbitro o comisionado de $ue habla la 0egla )< de los 0eglamentos, $ue actua por

delegacion y obra en representacion del tribunal $ue le ha nombrado.

*t will readily be noticed from the portion of the order above"$uoted that Commissioner Prieto admits that

under section ) as amended, in contested cases and cases involving the fi7ing of rates, the Commission

may delegate the reception of evidence only to one of the Commissioners and to no one else.

The respondent also calls our attention to the case of Cebu )ransit Co. *nc., vs. Jere%a, A> Phil., ;2!5,

wherein this court held that the Commission was authori-ed to designate Commissioners for the purpose of

receiving evidence, and that the law did not contain any prohibition. That case is inapplicable for at that

time in the year 4)) when the case was decided, 0epublic 'ct ;> had not yet been promulgated, said

'ct having passed only in 4, the reception of evidence in a contested case may be delegated only to one of the

Commissioners and to no one else, it being understood that such reception of evidence consists in

conducting hearings, receiving evidence, oral and documentary, passing upon the relevancy and

competency of the same, ruling upon petitions and objections that come up in course of the hearings, and

receiving and rejecting evidence in accordance with said rulings. (owever, under section )3, of the same

'ct, even in contested cases or cases involving the fi7ing of rates, any attorney of chief of division of the

Commission, a cler+ of court of Courts of %irst *nstance, or a ?ustice of the Peace, may be authori-ed to

ta+e depositions or receive the testimonies of witnesses, provided that the same is done under provisions

of 0ule > of the 0ules of Court.

8e reali-e that our present ruling will greatly handicap the Public Service Commission and slow down itstempo in the disposal of contested cases and cases involving the fi7ing of rates, especially where the

witnesses reside in the provinces@ but where the law is clear, neither this court nor the commission may on

grounds of convenience, e7pediency or prompt dispatch of cases, disregard the law or circumvent the

same. The remedy lies with the Legislature if it could be convinced of the necessity of amending the law,

and persuaded to approve a suitable amendment.

%inding that the delegation of the reception of evidence in this case as well as the e7ercise of the authority

so given, are in violation of section ) of the Public Service 'ct as amended, we set aside the order of

delegation of ?uly


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aside the decision appealed from, let this case be returned to the Public Service Commission so that

evidence may be submitted by the parties in a hearings before the Commission in banc of before any of the

Commissioners if properly authori-ed, unless of course, said parties agree at said hearing or hearings to re"

submit the evidence already presented and ta+en down, with such modifications and under such conditions

as they may agree upon, including such other evidence which they may wish to present. There is no

pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-2231 Auu( 3, 1967

THE "EO"LE OF THE "HILI""INES,plaintiff"appellee,

vs.

!ARIO !A"A 4 !A"%LONG,defendant"appellant.

Francisco P. Cabi+ao for defendantappellant.

Office of t'e !olicitor General Arturo A. Alafri%, Assistant !olicitor General F. R. Rosete and !olicitor O. C.

Hernande% for plaintiffappellee.

FERNAN&O,J.:

The sole $uestion in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not theappointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a

sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. 8e hold

that it does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated 'ugust ;> in

connection with Section 3243 of the 0evised 'dministrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth 'ct 1o.

A2 and as further amended by 0epublic 'ct 1o.


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%orthwith, the fiscal announced that he was 9willing to submit the same for decision.9 Counsel for the

accused on his part presented four where a secret agent was ac$uitted on appeal on

the assumption that the appointment 9of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of

peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a 9peace

officer9 e$uivalent even to a member of the municipal police e7pressly covered by section >;4.9 Such

reliance is misplaced. *t is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and e7plicit mandate of

a statutory provision. To the e7tent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v.

Macarandan+, it no longer spea+s with authority.

8herefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

G.R. No. 28116-17 Auu( 22, 196

EB% "ORTLAN& E!ENT O!"AN4,plaintiff"appellant,

vs.

!%NII"ALIT4 OF NAGA, EB%, ET AL.,defendants"appellees.

)omas P. Matic, Jr. and $oren%o R. Mos1ueda for plaintiffappellant.

Fernan, Osme#a and "ellaflor for defendantsappellees.


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FERNAN&O,J.:

*n two separate actions, plaintiff"appellant Cebu Portland Cement Company sought to test the validity of

the distraint and thereafter the sale at public auction by the principal defendant"appellee, 6unicipality of

1aga, Cebu, of !!,!!! bags of cement for the purpose of satisfying its alleged deficiency in the payment

of the municipal license ta7 for 42!, municipal license ta7 for 42 as well as the penalty, all in the total

sum of P3!


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the letter of defendant"appellee dated ?une 32, 42, re$uiring plaintiff"appellant to settle its account of

P3!the sale of the distrained property cannot ta+e place 9less than twenty days after notice to the owner

or possessor of the property IdistrainedJ ... and the publication or posting of such notice.9

8hy such a contention could not prosper is e7plained clearly by the lower court in the appealed decision.

Thus 98ith respect to the claim that the auction sale held on ?anuary )!, 423 pursuant to the distraint

was null and void for being contrary to law because not more than twenty days have elapsed from the date

of notice, it is believed that the defendant 6unicipality of 1aga and 6unicipal Treasurer of 1aga have

substantially complied with the re$uirements provided for by Section 3)!A of the 0evised 'dministrative

Code. %rom the time that the plaintiff was first notified of the distraint on ?uly 2, 42 up to the date of the

sale on ?anuary )!, 423, certainly, more than twenty days have elapsed. *f the sale did not ta+e place, as

advertised, on ?uly 3;, 42, but only on ?anuary )!, 423, it was due to the re$uests for deferment made

by the plaintiff which unduly delayed the proceedings for collection of the ta7, and the said ta7payer should

not be allowed now to complain that the re$uired period has not yet elapsed when the intention of the ta7

collector was already well"publici-ed for many months.94The reasonableness of the above observation ofthe lower court cannot be disputed. =nder the circumstances, the allegation that there was no observance

of the twenty"day period hardly carries conviction.

The point is further made that the auction sale too+ place not on ?anuary 34, 423, as stated in the notice

of sale, but on the ne7t day, ?anuary )!, 423. 'ccording to plaintiff"appellant 9&n this score alone, the

sale ..., was illegal as it was not made on the time stated in the notice.9 !

There is no basis to sustain such a plea as the finding of the lower court is otherwise. Thus 9&n ?anuary

2, 423, the defendant Treasurer informed /araygay that he would cause the readvertisement for sale at


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public auction of the !!,!!! bags of 'po cement which were under constructive distraint ... &n ?anuary

4, 423, the said defendant issued the corresponding notice of sale, which fi7ed ?anuary )!, 423, at

!!! '.6., as the date of sale, posting the said notice in public places and delivering copies thereof to the

interested parties in the previous notice, ... =ltimately, the bidding was conducted on that day, ?anuary )!,

423, with the representatives of the Provincial 'uditor and Provincial Treasurer present. &nly two bidders

submitted sealed bids. 'fter the bidding, the defendant"treasurer informed the plaintiff that an award was

given to the winning bidder, ...9

This being a direct appeal to us, plaintiff"appellant must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive whatthe lower court found as established by the evidence, only $uestions of law being brought to us for review.

*t is the established rule that when a party appeals directly to this Court, he is deemed to have waived the

right to dispute any finding of fact made by the court below. 3

8(#0#%&0#, the decision of the lower court dated 3), 42


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&n 6ay 3A, 422, respondent System filed a 6otion to ismiss on the ground that 9the Social SecurityCommission has no power or authority to condone penalties for late premium remittance, to whichpetitioners filed their opposition of ?une A, 422, and in turn, respondent filed its reply thereto of ?une 33,422.

0espondent Commission set the 6otion to ismiss for hearing and oral argument on ?uly 3!, 422. 't thehearing, petitioners: counsel made no appearance but submitted their 6emorandum in lieu of oralargument. =pon petition of the System:s Counsel, the Commission gave the parties a further period offifteen days to submit their 6emorandum consolidating their arguments, after which the motion would be

deemed submitted for decision. Petitioners stood on their original memorandum, and respondent Systemfiled its memorandum on 'ugust , 422, wherein the Commission adopting the recommendationof the Committee on Legal 6atters and Legislation of the Social Security Commission ruled that it9has no power to condone, waive or relin$uish the penalties for late premium remittances which

may be imposed under the Social Security 'ct.9

8(#0#%&0#, the petition is hereby dismissed and petitioners are directed to pay the respondentSystem, within thirty )!5 days from receipt of this &rder, the amount of P24,


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=pon failure of the petitioners to comply with this &rder within the period specified herein, a warrantshall be issued to the Sheriff of the Province of 0i-al to levy and sell so much of the property of thepetitioners as may be necessary to satisfy the aforestated liability of the petitioners to the System.

This Court is thus confronted on appeal with this $uestion of first impression as to whether or notrespondent Commission erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social Security 'ct to condone thepenalty prescribed by law for late premium remittances.

8e find no error in the Commission:s action.

. The plain te7t and intent of the pertinent provisions of the Social Security 'ct clearly rule out petitioners:posture that the respondent Commission should assume, as against the mandatory imposition of the )Kpenalty per month for late payment of premium remittances, the discretionary authority of condoning,waiving or relin$uishing such penalty.

The pertinent portion of Section 33 a5 of the Social Security 'ct peremptorily provides that

S#C 33. Remittance of premiums. D a5 The contributions imposed in the preceding sections shallbe remitted to the System within the first seven days of each calendar month following the monthfor which they are applicable or within such time as the Commission may prescribe. 9ver2emplo2er re1uired to deduct and to remit suc' contribution s'all be liable for t'eir pa2ment and if

an2 contribution is not paid to t'e s2stem, as 'erein prescribed, 'e s'all pa2 besides t'econtribution a penalt2 t'ereon of t'ree per centum per mont' from t'e date t'e contribution fallsdue until paid. . .3

1o discretion or alternative is granted respondent Commission in the enforcement of the law:s mandatethat the employer who fails to comply with his legal obligation to remit the premiums to the System withinthe prescribed period shall pay a penalty of three )K per month. The prescribed penalty is evidently of apunitive character, provided by the legislature to assure that employers do not ta+e lightly the State:se7ercise of the police power in the implementation of the 0epublic:s declared policy 9to develop, establishgradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughoutthe Philippines and to5 provide protection to employers against the ha-ards of disability, sic+ness, old ageand death.9)*n this concept, good faith or bad faith is rendered irrelevant, since the law ma+es no

distinction between an employer who professes good reasons for delaying the remittance of premiums andanother who deliberately disregards the legal duty imposed upon him to ma+e such remittance. %rom themoment the remittance of premiums due is delayed, the penalty immediately attaches to the delayedpremium payments by force of law.

3. Petitioners contend that in the e7ercise of the respondent Commission:s power of direction and controlover the system, as provided in Section ) of the 'ct, it does have the authority to condone the penalty forlate payment under Section < 5, whereby it is empowered to 9perform such other acts as it may deemappropriate for the proper enforcement of this 'ct.9 The law does not bear out this contention. Section < ofthe Social Security 'ct precisely enumerates the powers of the Commission. 1owhere from said powers ofthe Commission may it be shown that the Commission is granted e7pressly or by implication the authorityto condone penalties imposed by the 'ct.

). 6oreover, the funds contributed to the System by compulsion of law have already been held by us to be9funds belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the /overnment.9


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discretionary powers that are not actually provided therein, and hindering and defeating the plain purposeand intent of the legislature.

A. Petitioners cite fourteen instances in the past wherein respondent Commission had granted condonationof penalties on delayed premium payments. They charge the Commission with grave abuse of discretion innot having uniformly applied to their cases its former policy of granting condonation of penalties. Theyinvo+e more compelling considerations of e$uity in their cases, in that they are non"profit religiousorgani-ations who minister to the spiritual needs of the %ilipino people, and that their delay in the paymentof their premiums was not of a contumacious or deliberate defiance of the law but was prompted by a well"

founded belief that the Social Security 'ct did not apply to their missionaries.

The past instances of alleged condonation granted by the Commission are not, however, before the Court,and the unilateral conclusion asserted by petitioners that the Commission had granted such condonationswould be of no avail, without a review of the pertinent records of said cases. 1evertheless, assuming suchconclusion to be correct, the Commission, in its appealed &rder of September 33, 422 ma+es of recordthat since its 0esolution 1o. A)2, series of 42


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THE &EVELO"!ENT BAN; OF THE "HILI""INES an# THE EX-OFICIOSHERIFF OF !ISA!IS

OI&ENTAL, respondents"appellees.

J. Alaric P. Acosta for petitionersappellant.

speran%a 3alen%o+a for respondentsappellees.

BARRE&O,J.:.

'ppeal from the decision of the Court of %irst *nstance of 6isamis &ccidental in its Special Civil Case 1o.

3A4, dismissing the petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction filed therein by

the herein petitioners"appellants /edeon /. Huijano and #ugenio T. Huijano to compel the herein

respondent"appellee evelopment Ban+ of the Philippines to accept said petitioners"appellants: bac+ pay

certificate payment of their loan from the said appellee Ban+, and to restrain the herein respondent"

appellee e4oficio sheriff of the province of 6isamis &ccidental from proceeding with the scheduled

foreclosure sale of the real properties the above"named appellant spouses had mortgaged with the

evelopment Ban+ of the Philippines to secure the loan aforementioned.

The said appealed decision was based on the following

ST*P=L'T*&1 &% %'CTS.

The undersigned parties, thru counsels, hereby submit the foregoing stipulation of facts, to

wit

*. That the petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the 0ehabilitation

%inance Corporation 0%C5, predecessor"in"interest of the herein respondent"ban+, in the

amount of P4,A!!.!!@

**. That the petitioners: urban real estate loan was approved per 0%C Board 0esolution 1o.

3A)) on 'pril )!, 4A)@

***. That the mortgage contract was e7ecuted by the petitioners in favor of the respondent"

ban+ on 6arch 3), 4A


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9e5 the submission of evidence showing full payment of current

estate ta7es@

35 That the subse$uent releases shall not be more than !!K of the value of

the construction completed in e7cess of P2,A!!.!!@ that all releases shall be

made against the payroll of wor+ers engaged in the project, receipts of all

materials used and that there are no unpaid labor or unpaid materials@

)5 That a sufficient amount may be withheld until the building is completedand painted and found in accordance with the plans and specifications

submitted@

,!!!.!!, which shall be secured by the mortgagee, in accordance

with its Board 0esolution 1o. ))4A, series of 4).A4@

9**. That on ?uly 3;, 42A, petitioner /edeon Huijano, as holder of 'c+nowledgment 1o.

!>, wrote the respondent"ban+ in 6anila offering to pay in the amount of P, 422, without the necessity of republication of the notice of sale.9


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=pon these facts and the submission of the parties that the only issue is whether or not the obligation of

the petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of 0epublic 'ct 1o. >4;, the 'mendatory 'ct of

?ulie 3!, 4A) to 0epublic 'ct )!!, 4A). *t appears, however, that appellants did not avail of it until much later, as in fact, they e7ecuted

the mortgage contract only on 6arch 3), 4A


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*n that case, 0odrigue- obtained a loan from the said evelopment Ban+ of the Philippines to be received

by him in several releases and to be paid later in installments, under the terms and conditions specified in

the loan agreement. Pursuant to said agreement, 0odrigue- received the first release in the sum of

PA,!!!.!! on 6ay 3;, 4A), while the subse$uent releases covering the P4,!!!.!! D balance of the loan

were all availed of and received by him later than ?une, 4A). Later, 0odrigue- paid the installments as

they fell due. 8hen a balance of about P!,!!!.!! remained unpaid, 0odrigue- offered to pay the said

outstanding balance of the loan with his bac+ pay certificate. The Ban+ refused at first to accept the said

tender of payment in certificate, and when it accepted the same later, it limited its acceptance only to the

amount of PA,!!!.!! representing the portion of the loan released before the passage of 0epublic 'ct 1o.>4;, although the amount of the bac+ pay certificate offered by 0odrigue- was more than sufficient to

cover the total unpaid balance of the loan. So, 0odrigue- instituted an action for mandamus in the Court of

%irst *nstance of avao to compel the Ban+ to accept his bac+ pay certificate in payment of his whole

outstanding obligation or, in other words, even for the portions of the loan corresponding to the releases

made after ?une 3!, 4A). This action was dismissed by the trial court and upon appeal to this Court, the

dismissal was affirmed upon the following rationale.

*t can not be said that appellant became indebted to the Ban+ for the total amount of

P5 relied upon by appellant is

irrelevant, as the mortgage indebtedness sought to be paid with appellee:s bac+ pay

certificate therein, appears to have subsisted prior to the approval of 0epublic 'ct 1o.

>4;. ...

(erein appellants: situation is even worse than that of 0odrigue-. (ere appellants actually availed of their

approved loan only about nine 45 months after the enactment of 0epublic 'ct >4; and the corresponding

releases thereof were received by appellants only after the e7ecution of the mortgage contract on 6arch

3), 4A4; on ?une 3!, 4A).

*t may be truly said, as contended by appellants, that when their application for the loan was approved by

the appellee Ban+ on 'pril )!, 4A), an agreement was perfected between them and said Ban+, but it

should be noted that under such agreement the only enforceable obligation that was created was that of

the Ban+ to grant the loan applied for, whereas the obligation of appellants to pay the same could not have

arisen until after the amount of the loan has been actually released to them@ and said release was even


19/35

subject to their compliance with certain conditions specified in the mortgage contract e7ecuted after the

approval already of 0epublic 'ct >4;. 'ppellants: appeal that a more liberal construction of the law would

enable 9many crippled or disabled veterans, or their wives and orphans, or those who had in one way or

another unselfishly sacrificed or contributed to the cause of the last war9 to ta+e advantage of their bac+

pay certificates, does deserve sympathy, for indeed, among the avowed purposes of the said law are

9%irst, to serve as a source of financial aid to needy veterans, li+e crippled or disabled veterans, and to

their wives and orphans. Secondly, to give recognition to the sacrifices of those who joined the last war,

and particularly to those who have given their all for the cause of the last war.9 Congressional 0ecord 1o.

2, 3nd Congress,


20/35

*n the decision of respondent Court now sought to be reviewed, after stating that what was before it was

an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Customs holding petitioner liable for the sum of

P;,4.!! as wharfage due the facts were set forth as follows 9Petitioner, 0epublic %lour 6ills, *nc., is a

domestic corporation, primarily engaged in the manufacture of wheat flour, and produces pollard dara+5

and bran ipa5 in the process of milling. uring the period from ecember, 42) to ?uly, 42


21/35

been stressed time and time again as to limits of judicial freedom in the construction of statutes to accept

their view advanced by petitioner.

). Then, again, there is the fundamental postulate in statutory construction re$uiring fidelity to the

legislative purpose. 8hat Congress intended is not to be frustrates. *ts objective must be carried out. #ven

if there be doubt as to the meaning of the language employed, the interpretation should not be at war with

the end sought to be attained. 1o undue reflection is needed to show that if through an ingenious

argument, the scope of a statute may be contracted, the probability that other e7ceptions may be thought

of is not remote. *f petitioner were to prevail, subse$uent pleas motivated by the same desire to bee7cluded from the operation of the Tariff and Customs Code would li+ewise be entitled to sympathetic

consideration. *t is desirable then that the gates to such efforts at undue restriction of the coverage of the

'ct be +ept closed. &therwise, the end result would be not respect for, but defiance of, a clear legislative

mandate. That +ind of approach in statutory construction has never recommended itself. *t does not

now. 12

8(#0#%&0#, the decision of respondent Court of Ta7 'ppeals of 1ovember 3;, 42; is affirmed. 8ith

costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. L-61236 January 31, 198

NATIONAL FE&ERATION OF LABOR an# =A!BO:OO& !ONTHL4 E!"LO4EES %NION, ITS

OFFIERS AN& !E!BERS, petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE ARLITO A. EIS!A, LT. OL. JAOB AR%NHO, O!!AN&ING OFFIER,

=A!BOANGA &ISTRIT O!!AN&, ", AF", an# =A!BOANGA :OO& "RO&%TS, respondents.

Jose C. spina and Potenciano Flores for petitioners.

)'e !olicitor General for public respondents.

Gaspar 3. )a+alo for private respondent =amboan+a >ood Products.

FERNAN&O, C.J.:

This Court is confronted once again with the $uestion of whether or not it is a court or a labor arbiter that

can pass on a suit for damages filed by the employer, here private respondent Oamboanga 8ood Products.

0espondent ?udge Carlito '. #isma 1then of the Court of %irst *nstance, now of the 0egional Trial Court of

Oamboanga City, was of the view that it is a court and denied a motion to dismiss filed by petitioners

1ational %ederation of labor and Oambowood 6onthly #mployees =nion, its officers and members. *t was

such an order dated ?uly 3!, 4>3 that led to the filing of this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. *n the

order assailed, it was re$uired that the officers and members of petitioner union appear before the court to

show cause why a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued against them and in the meanwhile

such persons as well as any other persons acting under their command and on their behalf were

9temporarily restrained and ordered to desist and refrain from further obstructing, impeding and impairing

plaintiff:s use of its property and free ingress to or egress from plaintiff:s 6anufacturing ivision facilities at

Lumbayao, Oamboanga City and on its road right of way leading to and from said plaintiff:s facilities,

pending the determination of the litigation, and unless a contrary order is issued by this Court.9 2


22/35

The record discloses that petitioner 1ational %ederation of Labor, on 6arch A, 4>3, filed with the 6inistry

of Labor and #mployment, Labor 0elations ivision, Oamboanga City, a petition for direct certification as

the sole e7clusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of the respondent

Oamboanga 8ood Products, *nc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao, Oamboanga City. 3Such

employees, on 'pril ;, 4>3 charged respondent firm before the same office of the 6inistry of Labor for

underpayment of monthly living allowances. 8Then came, on 6ay ), 4>3, from petitioner union, a notice

of stri+e against private respondent, alleging illegal termination of ionisio #stioca, president of the said

local union@ unfair labor practice, non"payment of living allowances@ and 9employment of oppressive alien

management personnel without proper permit. 5*t was followed by the union submitting the minutes of thedeclaration of stri+e, 9including the ninety 4!5 ballots, of which ;4 voted for yes and three voted for

no.9 6The stri+e began on 6ay 3), 4>3. 7&n ?uly 4, 4>3, private respondent Oambowood filed a

complaint with respondent ?udge against the officers and members of petitioners union, for 9damages for

obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction andNor restraining order.9 *t was

alleged that defendants, now petitioners, bloc+aded the road leading to its manufacturing division, thus

preventing customers and suppliers free ingress to or egress from such premises. 9Si7 days later, there

was a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order and opposition to the

issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners. *t was contended that the acts complained

of were incidents of pic+eting by defendants then on stri+e against private respondent, and that therefore

the e7clusive jurisdiction belongs to the Labor 'rbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 33;, not to a court

of first instance.1There was, as noted earlier, a motion to dismiss, which was denied. (ence this petitionfor certiorari.

%our days after such petition was filed, on 'ugust ), 4>3, this Court re$uired respondents to answer and

set the plea for a preliminary injunction to be heard on Thursday, 'ugust A, 4>3. 11'fter such hearing, a

temporary restraining order was issued, 9directing respondent ?udge and the commanding officer in

Oamboanga and his agents from enforcing the e4parte order of injunction dated ?uly 3!, 4>3@ and to

restrain the respondent ?udge from proceeding with the hearing of the until otherwise case effective as of

IthatJ date and continuing ordered by ItheJ Court. *n the e7ercise of the right to peaceful pic+eting,

petitioner unions must abide strictly with Batas Pambansa Blg. 33;, specifically Section 2 thereof,

amending 'rticle 32A of the Labor Code, which now reads :e5 1o person engaged in pic+eting shall

commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from theemployer:s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.: 9 12

&n 'ugust ), 4>3, the answer of private respondent was filed sustaining the original jurisdiction of

respondent ?udge and maintaining that the order complained of was not in e7cess of such jurisdiction, or

issued with grave abuse of discretion. Solicitor /eneral #stelito P. 6endo-a, 13on the other hand, instead

of filing an answer, submitted a 6anifestation in lieu thereof. (e met s$uarely the issue of whether or not

respondent ?udge had jurisdiction, and answered in the negative. (e i5ncluded that 9the instant petition

has merit and should be given due course.9

(e traced the changes undergone by the Labor Code, citing at the same time the decisions issued by this

Court after each of such changes. 's pointed out, the original wording of 'rticle 3; vested the laborarbiters with jurisdictional. 18So it was applied by this Court in Garcia v. Martine% 15and in "en+%on v.

*ncion+. 16&n 6ay , 4;>, however, Presidential ecree 1o. )2; was issued, amending 'rticle 3;, and

provided 9that the 0egional irectors shall not indorse and Labor 'rbiters shall not entertain claims for

moral and other forms of damages.9 17The ordinary courts were thus vested with jurisdiction to award

actual and moral damages in the case of illegal dismissal of employees. 1That is not, as pointed out by

the Solicitor /eneral, the end of the story, for on 6ay , 4>!, Presidential ecree 1o. 24 was issued,

further amending 'rticle 3;, returning the original jurisdiction to the labor arbiters, thus enabling them to

decide 9). 'll money claims of wor+ers, including those based on non"payment or underpayment of wages,

overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement,


23/35

e7cept claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits@ IandJ A5 'll

other claims arising from employer"employee relations unless e7pressly e7cluded by tills Code.9 19'n

e$ually conclusive manifestation of the lac+ of jurisdiction of a court of first instance then, a regional trial

court now, is Batas Pambansa Blg. )!, amending 'rticle 3; of the Labor Code. *t too+ effect on 'ugust

3, 4>. Subparagraph 3, paragraph a5 is now worded thus 935 those that involve wages, hours of wor+

and other terms and conditions of employment.9 2This is to be compared with the former phraseology 935

unresolved issue in collective bargaining, including those that involve wages, hours of wor+ and other terms

and conditions of employment.9 21*t is to be noted that Batas Pambansa Blg. )! made no change with

respect to the original and e7clusive jurisdiction of Labor 'rbiters with respect to money claims of wor+ersor claims for damages arising from employer"employee relations.

1othing becomes clearer, therefore, than the meritorious character of this petition. certiorari and

prohibition lie, respondent ?udge being devoid of jurisdiction to act on the matter.

. 'rticle 3; is to be applied the way it is worded. The e7clusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is

therein provided for e7plicitly. *t means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a

regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law

when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from pic+eting that accompanied a stri+e. That was

s$uarely within the e7press terms of the law. 'ny deviation cannot therefore be tolerated. So it has been

the constant ruling of this Court even prior to $i%arra+a Hermanos v. ?ap )ico, 22a 4) decision. Theringing words of the ponencia of ?ustice 6oreland still call for obedience. Thus, 9The first and fundamental

duty of courts, in our judgment, is to appl2 the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has

been demonstrated that application is impossible or inade$uate without them.923*t is so even after the

lapse of si7ty years. 28

3. &n the precise $uestion at issue under the law as it now stands, this Court has spo+en in three

decisions. They all reflect the utmost fidelity to the plain command of the law that it is a labor arbiter, not a

court, that ossesses original and e7clusive jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages arising from pic+eting

or a stri+e. *n PepsiCola "ottlin+ Co. v. Martine%, 25the issue was set forth in the opening paragraph, in

the ponencia of ?ustice #scolin 9This petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises anew the

legal $uestion often brought to this Court 8hich tribunal has e7clusive jurisdiction over an action filed byan employee against his employer for recovery of unpaid salaries, separation benefits and damages D the

court of general jurisdiction or the Labor 'rbiter of the 1ational Labor 0elations Commission I1L0CJG9 26*t

was categorically held 98e rule that the Labor 'rbiter has e7clusive jurisdiction over the case.9 27Then

came this portion of the opinion 9?urisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred

by the sovereign authority which organi-es the court@ and it is given only by law. ?urisdiction is never

presumed@ it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts

and judicial tribunals is derived e7clusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue before us should be

resolved on the basis of the law or statute now in force. 8e find that law in presidential ecree 24 which

too+ effect on 6ay , 4>!, Section ) of which reads as follows ... 'rticle 3;. ?urisdiction of Labor

'rbiters and the Commission. D a5 The Labor 'rbiters shall have the original and e7clusive jurisdiction to

hear and decide the following cases involving all wor+ers, whether agricultural or non"agricultural ... ). 'llmoney claims of wor+ers, including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime

compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, e7cept claims

for employees: compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits@


24/35

later. 31&n this point, reference may be made to our decision in ational Federation of $abor, et al. v. )'e

Honorable Minister of $abor and mplo2ment, 32promulgated on September A, 4>). *n that case, the

$uestion involved was the failure of the same private respondent, Oamboanga 8ood Products, *nc., to

admit the stri+ing petitioners, eighty"one in number, bac+ to wor+ after an order of 6inister Blas %. &ple

certifying to the 1ational Labor 0elations Commission the labor dispute for compulsory arbitration pursuant

to 'rticle 32< g5 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. *t was noted in the first paragraph of our opinion in

that case 9&n the face of it, it seems difficult to e7plain why private respondent would not comply with

such order considering that the re$uest for compulsory arbitration came from it. *t ignored this notification

by the presidents of the labor unions involved to its resident manager that the stri+ing employees would lifttheir pic+et line and start returning to wor+ on 'ugust 3!, 4>3. Then, too, 6inister &ple denied a partial

motion for reconsideration insofar as the return"to"wor+ aspect is concerned which reads :8e find no merit

in the said 6otion for 0econsideration. The Labor code, as amended, specifically 'rticle 32< g5, mandates

that whenever a labor dispute is certified by the 6inister of Labor and #mployment to the 1ational Labor

0elations Commission for compulsory arbitration and a stri+e has already ta+en place at the time of

certification, 9all stri+ing employees shall immediately return to wor+ and the employees shall immediately

resume operations and readmit all wor+ers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the

stri+e.9 : 9 331o valid distinction can be made between the e7ercise of compulsory arbitration vested in the

6inistry of Labor and the jurisdiction of a labor arbiter to pass over claims for damages in the light of the

e7press provision of the Labor Code as set forth in 'rticle 3;. *n both cases, it is the 6inistry, not a court

of justice, that is vested by law with competence to act on the matter.

3 is hereby made permanent.

G.R. No. L-25316 F*0ruary 2, 1979

;A"ISANAN NG !GA !ANGGAGA:A SA !ANILA RAILROA& O!"AN4 RE&IT %NION,

IN., petitioner"appellant,

vs.

!ANILA RAILROA& O!"AN4, respondent appellee.

Gre+orio . Fa@ardo for appellant.

Gre+orio "aro1ue for appellee.


25/35

FERNAN&O,J.:

*n this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court, petitioner"appellant would see+ a reversal of such

decision relying on what it considered to be a right granted by Section 23 of the 0epublic 'ct 1o. 3!3),

more specifically the first two paragraphs thereof 9... 5 ' member of a cooperative may, notwithstanding

the provisions of e7isting laws, e7ecute an agreement in favor of the co"operative authori-ing his employer

to deduct from the salary or wages payable to him by the employer such amount as may be specified in theagreement and to pay the amount so deducted to the co"operative in satisfaction of any debt or other

demand owing from the member to the co"operative. 35 =pon the e7emption of such agreement the

employer shall if so re$uired by the co"operative by a re$uest in writing and so long as such debt or other

demand or any part of it remains unpaid, ma+e the claimant and remit forth with the amount so deducted

to the co"operative.91

To show that such is futile, the appealed decision, as $uoted in the brief for petitioner"appellant, stated the

following 9Then petitioner contends that under the above provisions of 0ep. 'ct 3!3), the loans granted

by credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll collection from the respondent:s employees

wages and salaries. 's can be clearly seen, there is nothing in the provision of 0ep. 'ct 3!3) hereinabove

$uoted which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy firstpriority in the deduction from the employees: wages and salaries. )'e onl2 effect of Rep. Act BBD is to

compel t'e emplo2er to deduct from t'e salaries or (a+es pa2able to members of t'e emplo2eesE

cooperative credit unions t'e emplo2eesE debts to t'e union and to pa2 t'e same to t'e credit union.*n

other words, if 0ep. 'ct 3!3) had been enacted, the employer could not be compelled to act as the

collecting agent of the employees: credit union for the employees: debt to his credit union but to contend

that the debt of a member of the employees cooperative credit union as having first priority in the matter

of deduction, is to write something into the law which does not appear. *n ot'er (ords, t'e mandator2

c'aracter of Rep. Act BBD is onl2 to compel the employer to ma+e the deduction of the employees: debt

from the latter:s salary and turn this over to the employees: credit union but this mandatory character does

not convert the credit union:s credit into a first priority credit. *f the legislative intent in enacting pars.

and 3 of Sec. 23 of 0ep. 'ct 3!3) were to give first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations ofemployees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so e7pressly declared. Thus, the

e7press provisions of the 1ew Civil Code, 'rts. 33


26/35

une$uivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do e7cept to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the

scope of its operation, must be obeyed. &ur decisions have consistently born to that effect. 5.

3. Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Petitioner"appellant was unable to show a clear legal right. The

very law on which he would base his action fails to supply any basis for this petition. ' more rigorous

analysis would have prevented him from instituting a a suit of this character. *nJ.R.!. "usiness Corporation

v. Montesa, 6this Court held. 96an"damus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect

on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act, which specifically the law enjoins as a duty or an

unlawful e7clusion of a party from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled. 7The opinioncontinued in this wise9'ccording to former Chief ?ustice 6oran,9 only specific legal rights may be enforced

by mandamus if they are clear and certain. *f the legal rights are of the petitioner are not well defined,

clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed. *n support of the above view, 3iuda e Hi@os de Crispulo

=amora v. >ri+'t was cited. 's was there categorically stated 9This court has held that it is fundamental

that the duties to be enforced by mandamus must be those which are clear and enjoined by law or by

reason of official station, and that petitioner must have a clear, legal right to the thing and that it must be

the legal duty of the defendant to perform the re$uired act.: 's e7pressed by the then ?ustice 0ecto in a

subse$uent opinion 9*t is well establish that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that

the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that the writ not issue in cases where the

right is doubtful.9 To the same effect is the formulation of such doctrine by former ?ustice Barrera 9Stated

otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases. *t neither confers powers nor imposes duties. *t is simplya command to e7ercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.9 So it has

been since then. 9The latest reported case,Province. of Pan+asinan v. Reparations Commission, 1this

court spea+ing through ?ustice Concepcion ?r., reiterated such a well"settled doctrine 9*t has also been

held that it is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal

right to the thing demanded, and it must be the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act

re$uired. *t never issues in doubtful cases. 11

8(#0#%&0#, the appealed decision is affirmed. 1o pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-6729 !ay 29, 197

RA&IO O!!%NIATIONS OF THE "HILI""INES, IN., petitioner,

vs.

NATIONAL TELEO!!%NIATIONS O!!ISSION an# ;A4%!ANGGI RA&IO NET:OR;

INOR"ORATE&,respondents.

G%TIERRE=, JR,J.:

This petition see+s the reversal of the decision of the 1ational Telecommunications Commission 1TC5

which ordered petitioner 0adio Communications of the Philippines, *ncorporated 0CP*5 to desist from

operating its radio telephone services in Catarman, 1orthern Samar@ San ?ose, &ccidental 6indoro@ and

Sorsogon, Sorsogon.

Petitioner has been operating a radio communications system since 4A; under its legislative franchise

granted by 0epublic 'ct 1o. 3!)2 which was enacted on ?une 3), 4A;.


27/35

*n 42>, the petitioner established a radio telegraph service in Sorsogon, Sorsogon. *n 4;, another radio

telegraph service was put up in San ?ose, 6indoro followed by another in Catarman, Samar in 4;2. The

installation of radio telephone services started in 4; in San ?ose, 6indoro@ then in Sorsogon, Sorsogon

and Catarman, Samar in 4>).

*n a decision dated ?une 3! in 1TC Case 1o. >!"!>, private respondent ayumanggi 0adio 1etwor+

*ncorporated was authori-ed by the public respondent to operate radio communications systems in

Catarman, Samar and in San ?ose, 6indoro.

&n ecember ), the private respondent filed a complaint with the 1TC alleging that the petitioner

was operating in Catarman, Samar and in San ?ose, 6indoro without a certificate of public covenience and

necessity. The petitioner, on the other hand, counter"alleged that its telephone services in the places

subject of the complaint are covered by the legislative franchise recogni-ed by both the public respondent

and its predecessor, the Public Service Commission. *n its supplemental reply, the petitioner further stated

that it has been in operation in the $uestioned places long before private respondent ayumanggi filed its

application to operate in the same places.

'fter conducting a hearing, 1TC, in its decision dated 'ugust 33, 4>< ordered petitioner 0CP* to

immediately cease or desist from the operation of its radio telephone services in Catarman 1orthern

Samar@ San ?ose, &ccidental 6indoro@ and Sorsogon, Sorsogon stating that under #7ecutive &rder 1o.A


28/35

Section A. 8ith the e7ception of those enumerated in the preceding section, no public

service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate

from the Public Service Commission, +nown as 9certificate of public convenience,9 or

9certificate of convenience and public necessity,9 as the case may be, to the effect that the

operation of said service and the authori-ation to do business will promote the public

interests in a proper and suitable manner. ...

8e find no merit in the petitioner:s contention.

Pursuant to Presidential ecree 1o. dated September 3),4;3, reorgani-ing the e7ecutive branch of the

1ational /overnment, the Public Service Commission was abolished and its functions were transferred to

three speciali-ed regulatory boards, as follows the Board of Transportation, the Board of Communications

and the Board of Power and 8aterwor+s. The functions so transferred were still subject to the limitations

provided in sections < and A of the Public Service Law, as amended. 8ith the enactment of #7ecutive

&rder 1o. A


29/35

h. Supervise and inspect the operation of radio stations and telecommunications facilities@

i. =nderta+e the e7amination and licensing of radio operators@

j. =nderta+e, whenever necessary, the registration of radio transmitters and transceivers@

and

+. Perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law.

*t is clear from the afore$uoted provision that the e7emption enjoyed by radio companies from the

jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission and the Board of Communications no longer e7ists because of

the changes effected by the 0eorgani-ation Law and implementing e7ecutive orders. The petitioner:s claim

that its franchise cannot be affected by #7ecutive &rder 1o. A


30/35

t'e +rantee t'e fre1uencies and (ave len+t's to be used, and issued to t'e +rantee a license

for suc' case. #mphasis supplied5

Thus, in the words of 0.'. 1o. 3!)2 itself, approval of the then Secretary of Public 8or+s and

Communications was a precondition before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas where it

desires to operate. *t has been repeated time and again that where the statutory norm spea+s

une$uivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do e7cept to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the

scope of its operation, must be obeyed. /on-aga v. Court of 'ppeals, A SC0' )>5.

The records of the case do not show any grant of authority from the then Secretary of Public 8or+s and

Communications before the petitioner installed the $uestioned radio telephone services in San ?ose,

6indoro in 4;. The same is true as regards the radio telephone services opened in Sorsogon, Sorsogon

and Catarman, Samar in 4>). 1o certificate of public convenience and necessity appears to have been

secured by the petitioner from the public respondent when such certificate,was re$uired by the applicable

public utility regulations See e7ecutive &rder 1o. A;.5

*t was well within the powers of the public respondent to authori-e the installation by the private

respondent networ+ of radio communications systems in Catarman, Samar and San ?ose, 6indoro. =nderthe circumstances of this case, the mere fact that the petitioner possesses a franchise to put up and

operate a radio communications system in certain areas is not an insuperable obstacle to the public

respondent:s issuing the proper certificate to an applicant desiring to e7tend the same services to those

areas. The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be e7clusive in nature nor can a franchise be

granted e7cept that it must be subject to amendment, alteration, or even repeal by the legislature when

the common good so re$uires. 'rt. M**, sec. of the 4>2 Constitution5. There is an e7press provision in

the petitioner:s franchise which provides compliance with the above mandate 0.'. 3!)2, sec. A5.

*n view of the foregoing, we find no reason to disturb the public respondent:s findings of fact, and

conclusions of law insofar as the private respondent was authori-ed to operate in Catarman, Samar and

San ?ose, 6indoro. 's a rule, the Commission:s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, areconclusive upon this Court. 8e may modify or ignore them only when it clearly appears that there is no

evidence to support reasonabl2such a conclusion. (alili v. aplas, < SC0'

ALA !O&E GAR!ENTS, IN.,petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS O!!ISSION, ?F'r(

&'''on@ L%REIA V. GABA an# ELSA I. !ELAR"ES, respondents.

& E I S I O N

HER!OSISI!A, JR.,J.


31/35

Before us is a petition for certiorarisee+ing to annul and set aside the 0esolutionsIJof the 1ational Labor

0elations Commission 1L0C.5 dated 1ovember 3


32/35

1otwithstanding the submission by private respondents of their e7planation letters, they were not allowed

to resume their wor+. Petitioner alleged that it advised private respondents to await the decision of

management, pending a company investigation as to whether or not the real reason for their absence was

an intent to sabotage the operations of petitioner.

Significantly, however, petitioner never denied that the other line leaders who were also absent on 6ay A

and 2, 44), had been immediately allowed to resume their wor+ despite their two"day absence.

&n 6ay ;, 44), private respondents filed with the 1L0C separate complaints for, among others, illegal

dismissal.

'fter submission of position papers, replies and rejoinders, the Labor 'rbiter rendered a ecision dated

'pril 3A, 44< finding that private respondents were illegally dismissed from service on the mere suspicion

that their two"day absence was actually a boycott to derail the operations of petitioner. The Labor 'rbiter

held that such suspicion was utterly unsupported by any evidence. The Labor 'rbiter also found that

private respondents: right to due process was violated in the absence of compliance by petitioner with the

twin re$uirements of notice and hearing. The Labor 'rbiter ruled, thus

98ell"settled is the rule that in termination cases, the employer has the burden of proof to show that the

dismissal was for cause. %ailure in this regard, renders the dismissal unjustified and therefore, illegal

/esulgon vs. 1L0C, 34 SC0' A25. *n the case at bar, e7cept for respondent:s bare allegation thatcomplainants sabotageIdJ its business operations which resulted in huge losses, no evidence was adduced

to support its contention. 1either did respondent submitted IsicJ proof that the company indeed incurred

losses as a result of complainants: concerted action. ecisions could not be based on mere conjectures or

surmises but must be supported by evidence.

%urthermore, records are bereft of any showing that complainants were indeed afforded the due process

re$uirement of the law. 8hat complainants submitted were letters"e7planations regarding their absence

but not with respect to the charge of sabotage as alleged by respondent.s

6oreover, granting ar+uendo, that complainants violated the company rules and regulations for having

been absent without prior approval by the management, still the penalty of dismissal is too severe a

penalty, considering that this is the first offenseNinfraction committed by them during their three )5 years

of service with the company.

'll told, complainants were indeed dismissed from the service without cause and due process. 's such,

they should be reinstated to their former positions without loss of seniority rights with bac+wages not

e7ceeding three )5 years 7 7 79I)J

=nderstandably, petitioner appealed the aforecited decision of the Labor 'rbiter to respondent 1L0C. Such

appeal, however, was dismissed on 1ovember 3


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Petitioner raises the following as grounds justifying the nullification of the herein assailed resolutions of

respondent 1L0C

'. T(# 1L0C /0'#LF 'B=S# *TS *SC0#T*&1 8(#1 *T 0=L# T('T P0*'T# 0#SP&1#1TS 8#0#

*S6*SS# BF P#T*T*&1#0 8(#1 T(# #*#1C# &1 0#C&0 S(&8S T('T P0*'T# 0#SP&1#1TS

8#0# S*6PLF *1ST0=CT# T& '8'*T 6'1'/#6#1T:S #C*S*&1 0#/'0*1/ T(# P#1*1/

'6*1*ST0'T*# *1#ST*/'T*&1.

B. P#T*T*&1#0 (' 0#'S&1'BL# /0&=1 T& C&1CL=# T('T P0*'T# 0#SP&1#1TS: %'*L=0# T&

0#P&0T %&0 8&0 8'S ' %&06 &% C&1C#0T# 'CT*&1 #S*/1# T& S'B&T'/# *TS &P#0'T*&1S.

T(# 1L0C /0'#LF 'B=S# *TS *SC0#T*&1 8(#1 *T 0=L# &T(#08*S#.

C. T(# 1L0C /0'#LF 'B=S# *TS *SC0#T*&1 8(#1 *T C&1CL=# T('T *S6*SS'L 8'S T&&

S##0# ' P#1'LTF %&0 P0*'T# 0#SP&1#1TS: *1%0'CT*&1S. P0*'T# 0#SP&1#1TS 8#0# /=*LTF &%

S'B&T'/*1/ T(# &P#0'T*&1S &% P#T*T*&1#0. (#1C#, T(# P#1'LTF &% *S6*SS'L *S C&66#1S=0'T#

T& T(# *1%0'CT*&1S C&66*TT# BF P0*'T# 0#SP&1#1TS.

. T(# 1L0C /0'#LF 'B=S# *TS *SC0#T*&1 *1 C&1CL=*1/ T('T P#T*T*&1#0 %'*L# T&

&BS#0# T(# 0#H=*0#6#1TS &% =# P0&C#SS.

#. T(# 1L0C /0'#LF 'B=S# *TS *SC0#T*&1 *1 (&L*1/ P#T*T*&1#0 L*'BL# %&0 B'C8'/#S.(&L*'F P'F, S#0*C# *1C#1T*# L#'# P'F, '1 'TT&01#F:S %##S 8(#1 *TS %*1*1/ &% *LL#/'L

*S6*SS'L *S 1&T ##1 S=BST'1T*'T# BF #*#1C#.

The petition fails to convince us that respondent 1L0C is guilty of grave abuse of discretion.

The cru7 of petitioner:s argument is that it cannot be held guilty of illegal dismissal because there was no

dismissal effected in the first place. This claim is belied by the fact, undisputed by the petitioner, that

private respondents were barred from entering the wor+ premises while the other line leaders supposedly

part of the boycott were allowed to return to wor+. The failure of the petitioner to accept the private

respondents bac+ after their absences constitutes constructive discharge or dismissal. ' constructive

discharge or dismissal is defined as a 9$uitting because continued employment is rendered impossible,

unreasonable or unli+ely@ as an offer involving a demotion in ran+ and a diminution in pay.9 Privaterespondents herein found it well nigh impossible to continue their employment, having been denied access

into their wor+place. The case of 3aliant Mac'iner2 and Metal Corp. vs. $RC,IAJwherein this Court found

the employer guilty of illegal dismissal when it did not allow its wor+ers to enter the company premises

finds application to the situation at hand. 's held therein

9The Court finds substantial evidence in support of the ruling of the 1L0C that the private respondents

were indeed dismissed without cause. 8hile there was no outright or open termination of the services of

the employees, there is reason to believe the company barred them from wor+ because they were absent

practically for one wee+ when they were badly needed in the factory.9

%inding that there was, indeed, a dismissal, 8e hold that the same was made without compliance with there$uirements laid down by law and jurisprudence. *n order to constitute a valid dismissal, two re$uisites

must concur a5 the dismissal must be for any of the causes e7pressed in 'rt. 3>3 of the Labor Code, and

b5 the employee must be accorded due process, basic of which are the opportunity to be heard and to

defend himself.I2J(erein, the Labor 'rbiter found that records are bereft of any showing that private

respondents were indeed afforded the due process re$uirement of the law. 8hat private respondents

submitted were letters"e7planations regarding their absences but not with respect to the charge of

sabotage as alleged by petitioner.I;J

Petitioner claims that the private respondents were only made to wait for the decision of the management

pending investigation of the alleged 9sabotage9 or boycott. *t will be noted, however, that the private
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/122165.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/122165.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/122165.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/122165.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/122165.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/122165.htm#_edn7


34/35

respondents were already barred from entering the company as early as 6ay ;, 44). They filed their

complaint on 6ay ; of the same year. Ten days had lapsed before the said complaints were filed. 8ithin

those ten days the private respondents were not allowed to wor+ in the company and their status remained

unclear. 's aptly noted by the Solicitor /eneral

9#ven assuming e4 +ratiaar+umentithat there was a company investigation being then conducted, still

petitioner should not have ordered private respondents to await its decision on the matter but instead

imposed on the latter preventive suspension in conformity with Sections ) and < of 0ule M* of Boo+ of

the *mplementing 0ules of the Labor Code, considering that private respondents were accused of havingsabotaged petitioner:s operations which resulted in business losses, a clear e7ample of a serious and

imminent, if not actual, threats to petitioner:s property. (ence, having been placed in suspended

animation, so to spea+, by petitioner, private respondents had every reason to believe that they were

dismissed by the former, as they actually were, thereby warranting the filing of the complaints for illegal

dismissal.9I>J

The private respondents were never summoned by the management to air their side regarding the

accusations of sabotage, but were only re$uired to give e7planations regarding their absences. Thus, even

if, as petitioner claims, that the dismissal was due to the role played by the respondents in the alleged

sabotage, the said dismissal is still invalid, as no notice was given and no hearing was conducted. To

reiterate, the twin re$uirements of notice and hearing constitute essential elements of due process in the

dismissal of employees.I4J

6oreover, the petitioner is inconsistent in its arguments. 8hile contending that private respondents were

not dismissed, it goes on to state that dismissal in this instance is valid as petitioner had 9reasonable

ground to suspect that the absences were a form of concerted action.9I!J*t also insists that private

respondent *nocencio:s absence due to abdominal pains, accompanied by loose bowel movement and

vomiting, to be flimsy at best, despite the fact that said private respondent submitted a medical certificate

to substantiate her claim.IJ

&n the contrary, as noted by the Solicitor /eneral, the Labor 'rbiter gave credence and weight to the

justification given by private respondents for their two"day absence as consistent with the truth, against

petitioner:s mere conjecture that the absences were a form of sabotage. 8ell entrenched is the rule thatwhen the conclusions of the labor arbiter are sufficiently corroborated by the evidence on record, the same

should be respected by appellate tribunals since he is in a better position to assess and evaluate the

credibility of the contending parties.I3J*f ever there is anything that may be considered flimsy in this case,

it should be the petitioner:s lame justification for the dismissal of the private respondents. 's succinctly put

by the 1L0C

9'bsent any proof that complainants private respondents in this case5 actually initiated what it termed a

concerted action of its line leaders to sabotage its business operations by absenting themselves all at the

same time on 6ay A and 2, 44), the respondent herein petitioner5 cannot just invo+e sabotage that does

not e7ist. Besides, what ma+es it difficult for respondent to charge complainants of illegal stri+e, if such

e7istedG That it miserably failed to show that there were other line leaders aside from complainants5 whowere li+ewise absent on said dates, we cannot but consign this defense to the :dustbin: of afterthoughts9I)J

8e come now to the petitioner:s claim that the 1L0C gravely abused its discretion in holding it liable for

bac+wages, holiday pay, service *ncentive leave pay, and attorney:s fees. &ther than the award for

bac+wages, this Court finds no reason why the petitioner should not be made so liable. 's noted by the

Labor 'rbiter, and affirmed by respondent 1L0C, petitioner failed to show proof that the holiday pay and

service incentive leave pay had been paid. (aving been also compelled to litigate, the award of attorney:s

fees e$uivalent to five percent AK5 of the total judgment award is also proper.I


35/35

'nent the issue of bac+wages, 8e find that the Labor 'rbiter erred in limiting the award of bac+ wages for

only a period not e7ceeding three )5 years. Prior to the effectivity of 0epublic 'ct 1o. 2;A, the rule was

that an employee, who was illegally dismissed, was entitled to an award of bac+wages e$uivalent to three

years where his case is not terminated sooner5.IAJ0epublic 'ct 1o. 2;A, which amended 'rt. 3;4 of the

Labor Code too+ effect on 6arch 3, 4>4. *t states in part

9'0T. 3;4. Security of Tenure. D . . . 'n employee who is unjustly dismissed from wor+ shall be entitled to

reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to'is full bac6(a+es inclusive of

allo(ances and to 'is ot'er benefits or t'eir monetar2 e1uivalent computed from t'e time 'iscompensation is (it''eld from 'im up to t'e time of 'is actual reinstatement.9 emphasis ours5

Private respondents: cause of action against the petitioner arose on 6ay ;, 44), their complaint for illegal

dismissal was filed on 6ay ;, 44). Since the dismissal too+ place after the passage of such law, and

following the doctrine laid down in the case of Calte4 Refiner2 mplo2ees Association CRA vs. ational

$abor Relations Commission )'ird 5ivision,I2J8e hold that the private respondents are entitled to

reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, as well as to other privileges and their full bac+wages

inclusive of allowances, and to their other benefits or their monetary e$uivalent computed from the time

their compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. 6oreover, no

deduction shall be allowed in accordance with the doctrine enunciated in the recent case of Bustamante vs.

1ational Labor 0elations Commission and #vergreen %arms, *nc.I;Jwherein this Court too+ the opportunity

to clarify how 0epublic 'ct 1o. 2;A is to be interpreted

9The Court deems it appropriate, however, to reconsider such earlier ruling on the computation of

bac+wages as enunciated in said Pines City #ducational Center case, by now holding that conformably with

the evident legislative intent as e7pressed in 0ep. 'ct 1o. 2;A, 7 7 7 bac+wages to be awarded to an

illegally dismissed employee, should not, as a general rule, be diminished or reduced by the earnings

derived by him during the period of his illegal dismissal. The underlying reason for this ruling is that the

employee, while litigating the legality IorJ illegality5 of his dismissal, must still earn a living to support

himself and family, while full bac+wages have to be paid by the employer as part of the price or penalty he

has to pay for illegally dismissing his employee. The clear legislative intent of the amendment in 0ep. 'ct

1o. 2;A is to give more benefits to wor+ers than was previously given them under the 6ercury rug rule

or the :deduction of earnings elsewhere: rule. Thus, a closer adherence to the legislative policy behind 0ep.

'ct 1o. 2;A points to :full bac+wages: as meaning e7actly that, i.e., without deducting from bac+wages

the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal. *n

other words, the provision calling for :full bac+wages: to illegally dismissed employees is clear, plain and

free from ambiguity, and, therefore, must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation. *nde4

animi sermo est.9

Should reinstatement no longer be feasible due to strained relations, the award of separation pay

e$uivalent to one 5 month salary for every year of service, a fraction of si7 25 months to be considered

as one 5 year.

:HEREFORE,the, Petition is hereby *S6*SS#, and the 0esolution of the 1ational Labor 0elationsCommission dated 1ovember 3

cases on judicial authority and duty

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