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G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,

vs.

ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL,

SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL,

JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES

PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-

FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE

HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig,

Metro Manila, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a)

the decision of the Court of Appeals1

dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista,

Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual,

Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed

the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying

petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural

children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the

decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue,

legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived

by the following:

(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;

(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased,

to wit:

Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista

Manuel C. Pascual

Jose C. Pascual

Susana C. Pascual-Bautista

Erlinda C. PascualWenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.

(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:

Avelino Pascual

Isoceles Pascual

Loida Pascual-Martinez

Virginia Pascual-Ner

Nona Pascual-Fernando

Octavio Pascual

Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;

(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the

deceased, to wit:

Olivia S. Pascual

Hermes S. Pascual

(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and

represented by the following:

Dominga M. Pascual

Mamerta P. Fugoso

Abraham S. Sarmiento, III

Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay

Eleuterio P. Sarmiento

Domiga P. San Diego

Nelia P. Marquez

Silvestre M. Pascual

Eleuterio M. Pascual

(Rollo, pp. 46-47)



Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual,

filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special

Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late

husband (Rollo, p. 47).

On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to

the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia

Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual ( Rollo, pp.

99-101).

On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to

the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood

brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by

the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don

Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).

On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE

AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S.

Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such compromise

agreement provides, to wit:

This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the

above-entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by

another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes

Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)

The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the

Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual,

manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual,

their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).

On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary

Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate

Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).

On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S.

Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to

Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual

(Rollo, p. 136).

On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp.

515-526). and such motion was denied.

Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No.

14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).

On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the

decision the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14,

1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for

reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari .

After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.

The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the

Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural

children from the inheritance of the deceased.

Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992

of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized and of

the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being

acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a

prior marriage when such children were under conception ( Rollo, p. 418).

Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992

must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).



On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within

the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v.

IAC is applicable to them.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children

and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in

the same manner from the illegitimate child.

The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra,

where this Court ruled that:

Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits

absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the

legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.

They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the

purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there

is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate

child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn

hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the

former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees

in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a

blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding

further grounds of resentment.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.

Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in

holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the

succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full

blood brother of their father.

In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles

902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio

Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.

On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further

elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers

the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.

The Court held:

Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate

children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The

descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of

representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should

not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves

illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of

representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in

the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by

petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to

represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the

grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such

a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate

child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at

naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case

because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the

illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It

may not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the

exception.

The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shallinherit by right of representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate

children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether

legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to

the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the

legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion

by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate

Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).

Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane

but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words andphrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be



determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean

exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may

not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words

(Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of

interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if thelaw may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even

granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be

strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly

warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather

than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court

will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145

SCRA 654 [1986]).

Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.

Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally

placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or

not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative.

It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed

decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152658. July 29, 2005

LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO, BEN MAURICIO P. BRAVO,1 ROLAND P.

BRAVO, JR., OFELIA BRAVO-QUIESTAS, HEIRS OF CORPUSINIA BRAVO-NIOR

namely: GERSON U. NIOR, MARK GERRY B. NIOR, CLIFF RICHARD B. NIOR, BRYAN

B. NIOR, WIDMARK B. NIOR, SHERRY ANNE B. NIOR, represented by LILY

ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO as their attorney-in-fact, and HONORABLE

FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 139,

Makati City, Petitioners,

vs.

EDWARD P. BRAVO, represented by his attorney-in-fact FATIMA C. BRAVO,

respondent , and DAVID B. DIAZ, JR., intervenor -respondent .

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J .:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review2 assailing the Decision

3 of 21 December

2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67794. The Court of Appeals

reversed the Decision4 of 11 May 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch

No. 139, in Civil Case No. 97-1379 denying respondents’ prayer to partition the

subject properties.

Antecedent Facts

Spouses Mauricio Bravo ("Mauricio") and Simona5 Andaya Bravo ("Simona") owned

two parcels of land ("Properties") measuring 287 and 291 square meters and

located along Evangelista Street, Makati City, Metro Manila. The Properties are

registered under TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal

on 23 May 1958. The Properties contain a large residential dwelling, a smaller

house and other improvements.

Mauricio and Simona had three children - Roland, Cesar and Lily, all surnamed

Bravo. Cesar died without issue. Lily Bravo married David Diaz, and had a son, David

B. Diaz, Jr. ("David Jr."). Roland had six children, namely, Lily Elizabeth Bravo-Guerrero ("Elizabeth"), Edward Bravo ("Edward"), Roland Bravo, Jr. ("Roland Jr."),

Senia Bravo, Benjamin Mauricio Bravo, and their half-sister, Ofelia Bravo ("Ofelia").

Simona executed a General Power of Attorney ("GPA") on 17 June 1966 appointing

Mauricio as her attorney-in-fact. In the GPA, Simona authorized Mauricio to

"mortgage or otherwise hypothecate, sell, assign and dispose of any and all of my

property, real, personal or mixed, of any kind whatsoever and wheresoever

situated, or any interest therein xxx."6 Mauricio subsequently mortgaged the

Properties to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Development Bank of the

Philippines (DBP) for P10,000 and P5,000, respectively.7

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On 25 October 1970, Mauricio executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Real

Estate Mortgage ("Deed of Sale") conveying the Properties to "Roland A. Bravo,

Ofelia A. Bravo and Elizabeth Bravo"8 ("vendees"). The sale was conditioned on the

payment of P1,000 and on the assumption by the vendees of the PNB and DBP

mortgages over the Properties.

As certified by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, the Deed of

Sale was notarized by Atty. Victorio Q. Guzman on 28 October 1970 and entered in

his Notarial Register.9 However, the Deed of Sale was not annotated on TCT Nos.

58999 and 59000. Neither was it presented to PNB and DBP. The mortage loans and

the receipts for loan payments issued by PNB and DBP continued to be in Mauricio’s

name even after his death on 20 November 1973. Simona died in 1977.

On 23 June 1997, Edward, represented by his wife, Fatima Bravo, filed an action for

the judicial partition of the Properties. Edward claimed that he and the other

grandchildren of Mauricio and Simona are co-owners of the Properties by

succession. Despite this, petitioners refused to share with him the possession and

rental income of the Properties. Edward later amended his complaint to include a

prayer to annul the Deed of Sale, which he claimed was merely simulated to

prejudice the other heirs.

In 1999, David Jr., whose parents died in 1944 and who was subsequently raised by

Simona, moved to intervene in the case. David Jr. filed a complaint-in-intervention

impugning the validity of the Deed of Sale and praying for the partition of the

Properties among the surviving heirs of Mauricio and Simona. The trial court

allowed the intervention in its Order dated 5 May 1999.10

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court upheld Mauricio’s sale of the Properties to the vendees. The trial

court ruled that the sale did not prejudice the compulsory heirs, as the Properties

were conveyed for valuable consideration. The trial court also noted that the Deed

of Sale was duly notarized and was in existence for many years without question

about its validity.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision of 11 May 2000 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby DENIES the JUDICIAL

PARTITION of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000 registered with

the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.

SO ORDERED.11

Dissatisfied, Edward and David Jr. ("respondents") filed a joint appeal to the Court

of Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Citing Article 166 of the Civil Code ("Article 166"), the Court of Appeals declared the

Deed of Sale void for lack of Simona’s consent. The appel late court held that the

GPA executed by Simona in 1966 was not sufficient to authorize Mauricio to sell the

Properties because Article 1878 of the Civil Code ("Article 1878") requires a special

power of attorney for such transactions. The appellate court reasoned that the GPA

was executed merely to enable Mauricio to mortgage the Properties, not to sell

them.

The Court of Appeals also found that there was insufficient proof that the vendees

made the mortgage payments on the Properties, since the PNB and DBP receipts

were issued in Mauricio’s name. The appellate court opined that the rental income

of the Properties, which the vendees never shared with respondents, was sufficient

to cover the mortgage payments to PNB and DBP.

The Court of Appeals declared the Deed of Sale void and ordered the partition of

the Properties in its Decision of 21 December 2001 ("CA Decision"), as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Metro-Manila,

Branch 13[9] dated 11 May 2000[,] review of which is sought in these proceedings[,]

is REVERSED.

1. The Deed of Sale with Assumption of Real Estate Mortgage (Exh. 4) dated 28

October 1970 is hereby declared null and void;

2. Judicial Partition on the questioned properties is hereby GRANTED in the

following manner:



















A. In representation of his deceased mother, LILY BRAVO-DIAZ, intervenor DAVID

DIAZ, JR., is entitled to one-half (1/2) interest of the subject properties;

B. Plaintiff-appellant EDWARD BRAVO and the rest of the five siblings, namely: LILY

ELIZABETH, EDWARD, ROLAND, JR., SENIA, BENJAMIN and OFELIA are entitled to

one-sixth (1/6) representing the other half portion of the subject properties;

C. Plaintiff-appellant Edward Bravo, intervenor DAVID DIAZ, JR., SENIA and

BENJAMIN shall reimburse the defendant-appellees LILY ELIZABETH, OFELIA and

ROLAND the sum of One Thousand (P1,000.00) PESOS representing the

consideration paid on the questioned deed of sale with assumption of mortgage

with interest of six (6) percent per annum effective 28 October 1970 until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.12

The Issues

Petitioners seek a reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, raising these

issues:

1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY

AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEED OF SALE WITH ASSUMPTION OF MORTGAGE.

2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PARTITION OF THE

PROPERTY IN QUESTION.13

At the least, petitioners argue that the subject sale is valid as to Mauricio’s share in

the Properties.

On the other hand, respondents maintain that they are co-owners of the Properties

by succession. Respondents argue that the sale of the conjugal Properties is void

because: (1) Mauricio executed the Deed of Sale without Simona’s consent; and (2)

the sale was merely simulated, as shown by the grossly inadequate consideration

Mauricio received for the Properties.

While this case was pending, Leonida Andaya Lolong ("Leonida"), David Jr.’s aunt,

and Atty. Cendaña, respondents’ counsel, informed the Court that David Jr. died on

14 September 2004. Afterwards, Leonida and Elizabeth wrote separate letters

asking for the resolution of this case. Atty. Cendaña later filed an urgent motion to

annotate attorney’s lien on TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000. In its Resolution dated 10

November 2004,14

the Court noted the notice of David Jr.’s death, the letters

written by Leonida and Elizabeth, and granted the motion to annotate attorney’s

lien on TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

The questions of whether Simona consented to the Deed of Sale and whether the

subject sale was simulated are factual in nature. The rule is factual findings of the

Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. However, there are exceptions, such as

when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are

contradictory, or when the evidence on record does not support the factual

findings.15

Because these exceptions obtain in the present case, the Court willconsider these issues.

On the Requirement of the Wife’s Consent

We hold that the Court of Appeals erred when it declared the Deed of Sale void

based on Article 166, which states:

Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift,

or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot

alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the

wife’s consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may

compel her to grant the same.

This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnerships before

the effective date of this Code.

Article 166 expressly applies only to properties acquired by the conjugal partnership

after the effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines ("Civil Code"). The Civil Code

came into force on 30 August 1950.16

Although there is no dispute that the

Properties were conjugal properties of Mauricio and Simona, the records do not

show, and the parties did not stipulate, when the Properties were acquired.17

Under



























Article 1413 of the old Spanish Civil Code, the husband could alienate conjugal

partnership property for valuable consideration without the wife’s consent.18

Even under the present Civil Code, however, the Deed of Sale is not void. It is well-

settled that contracts alienating conjugal real property without the wife’s consent

are merely voidable under the Civil Code – that is, binding on the parties unless

annulled by a competent court – and not void ab initio.19

Article 166 must be read in conjunction with Article 173 of the Civil Code ("Article

173"). The latter prescribes certain conditions before a sale of conjugal property can

be annulled for lack of the wife’s consent, as follows:

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the

transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the

husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any

act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest inthe conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this r ight, she or

her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property

fraudulently alienated by the husband. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Code, only the wife can ask to annul a contract that disposes of

conjugal real property without her consent. The wife must file the action for

annulment during the marriage and within ten years from the questioned

transaction. Article 173 is explicit on the remedies available if the wife fails to

exercise this right within the specified period. In such case, the wife or her heirs can

only demand the value of the property provided they prove that the husbandfraudulently alienated the property. Fraud is never presumed, but must be

established by clear and convincing evidence.20

Respondents’ action to annul the Deed of Sale based on Article 166 must fail for

having been filed out of time. The marriage of Mauricio and Simona was dissolved

when Mauricio died in 1973. More than ten years have passed since the execution

of the Deed of Sale.

Further, respondents, who are Simona’s heirs, are not the parties who can invoke

Article 166. Article 173 reserves that remedy to the wife alone. Only Simona had

the right to have the sale of the Properties annulled on the ground that Mauricio

sold the Properties without her consent.

Simona, however, did not assail the Deed of Sale during her marriage or even after

Mauricio’s death. The records are bereft of any indication that Simona questioned

the sale of the Properties at any time. Simona did not even attempt to take

possession of or reside on the Properties after Mauricio’s death. David Jr., who was

raised by Simona, testified that he and Simona continued to live in Pasay City after

Mauricio’s death, while her children and other grandchildren resided on the

Properties.21

We also agree with the trial court that Simona authorized Mauricio to dispose of

the Properties when she executed the GPA. True, Article 1878 requires a special

power of attorney for an agent to execute a contract that transfers the ownership

of an immovable. However, the Court has clarified that Article 1878 refers to the

nature of the authorization, not to its form.22 Even if a document is titled as a

general power of attorney, the requirement of a special power of attorney is met if

there is a clear mandate from the principal specifically authorizing the performance

of the act.23

In Veloso v. Court of Appeals,24

the Court explained that a general power of

attorney could contain a special power to sell that satisfies the requirement of

Article 1878, thus:

An examination of the records showed that the assailed power of attorney was

valid and regular on its face. It was notarized and as such, it carries the evidentiaryweight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. While it is true that it

was denominated as a general power of attorney, a perusal thereof revealed that it

stated an authority to sell, to wit:

"2. To buy or sell, hire or lease, mortgage or otherwise hypothecate lands,

tenements and hereditaments or other forms of real property, more specifically TCT

No. 49138, upon such terms and conditions and under such covenants as my said

attorney shall deem fit and proper."

Thus, there was no need to execute a separate and special power of attorney since

the general power of attorney had expressly authorized the agent or attorney in



















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fact the power to sell the subject property. The special power of attorney can be

included in the general power when it is specified therein the act or transaction

for which the special power is required. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, Simona expressly authorized Mauricio in the GPA to " sell, assign and

dispose of any and all of my property , real, personal or mixed, of any kind

whatsoever and wheresoever situated, or any interest therein xxx" as well as to "act

as my general representative and agent, with full authority to buy, sell, negotiate

and contract for me and in my behalf."25

Taken together, these provisions

constitute a clear and specific mandate to Mauricio to sell the Properties. Even if it

is called a "general power of attorney," the specific provisions in the GPA are

sufficient for the purposes of Article 1878. These provisions in the GPA likewise

indicate that Simona consented to the sale of the Properties.

Whether the Sale of the Properties was Simulated

or is Void for Gross Inadequa cy of Price

We point out that the law on legitime does not bar the disposition of property for

valuable consideration to descendants or compulsory heirs. In a sale, cash of

equivalent value replaces the property taken from the estate.26

There is no

diminution of the estate but merely a substitution in values. Donations and other

dispositions by gratuitous title, on the other hand, must be included in the

computation of legitimes.27

Respondents, however, contend that the sale of the Properties was merely

simulated. As proof, respondents point to the consideration of P1,000 in the Deed

of Sale, which respondents claim is grossly inadequate compared to the actual value

of the Properties.

Simulation of contract and gross inadequacy of price are distinct legal concepts,

with different effects. When the parties to an alleged contract do not really intend

to be bound by it, the contract is simulated and void .28

A simulated or fictitious

contract has no legal effect whatsoever29

because there is no real agreement

between the parties.

In contrast, a contract with inadequate consideration may nevertheless embody atrue agreement between the parties. A contract of sale is a consensual contract,

which becomes valid and binding upon the meeting of minds of the parties on the

price and the object of the sale.30

The concept of a simulated sale is thus

incompatible with inadequacy of price. When the parties agree on a price as the

actual consideration, the sale is not simulated despite the inadequacy of the price.31

Gross inadequacy of price by itself will not result in a void contract. Gross

inadequacy of price does not even affect the validity of a contract of sale, unless it

signifies a defect in the consent or that the parties actually intended a donation or

some other contract.32

Inadequacy of cause will not invalidate a contract unless

there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence.33

In this case, respondents have

not proved any of the instances that would invalidate the Deed of Sale.

Respondents even failed to establish that the consideration paid by the vendees for

the Properties was grossly inadequate. As the trial court pointed out, the Deed of

Sale stipulates that, in addition to the payment of P1,000, the vendees should

assume the mortgage loans from PNB and DBP. The consideration for the sale of

the Properties was thus P1,000 in cash and the assumption of the P15,000

mortgage.

Respondents argue that P16,000 is still far below the actual value of the Properties.

To bolster their claim, respondents presented the following: (1) Tax Declarations

No. A-001-0090534

and A-001-0090635

for the year 1979, which placed the assessed

value of the Properties at P70,020 and their approximate market value at P244,290;

and (2) a certified copy of the Department of Finance’s Department Order No. 62 -

9736

dated 6 June 1997 and attached guidelines37

which established the zonal value

of the properties along Evangelista Street at P15,000 per square meter.

The subject Deed of Sale, however, was executed in 1970. The valuation of the

Properties in 1979 or 1997 is of little relevance to the issue of whether P16,000 was

a grossly inadequate price to pay for the Properties in 1970. Certainly, there is

nothing surprising in the sharp increase in the value of the Properties nine or

twenty-seven years after the sale, particularly when we consider that the Properties

are located in the City of Makati.

More pertinent are Tax Declarations No. 1581238

and No. 15813,39

both issued in

1967, presented by petitioners. These tax declarations placed the assessed value of

both Properties at P16,160. Compared to this, the price of P16,000 cannot be






























































considered grossly inadequate, much less so shocking to the conscience40

as to

justify the setting aside of the Deed of Sale.

Respondents next contend that the vendees did not make the mortgage payments

on the Properties. Respondents allege that the rents paid by the tenants leasing

portions of the Properties were sufficient to cover the mortgage payments to DBP

and PNB.

Again, this argument does not help respondents’ cause. Assuming that the vendees

failed to pay the full price stated in the Deed of Sale, such partial failure would not

render the sale void. In Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals,41

the Court held:

xxx If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of

sale is valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner of

payment. xxx

It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of

sale. Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract.

Payment of the price goes into the performance of the contract. Failure to pay the

consideration is different from lack of consideration. The former results in a right to

demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid

contract while the latter prevents the existence of a valid contract. (Emphasis

supplied.)

Neither was it shown that the rentals from tenants were sufficient to cover the

mortgage payments. The parties to this case stipulated to only one tenant, a certain

Federico M. Puno, who supposedly leased a room on the Properties for P300 per

month from 1992 to 1994.42

This is hardly significant, when we consider that the

mortgage was fully paid by 1974. Indeed, the fact that the Properties were

mortgaged to DBP and PNB indicates that the conjugal partnership, or at least

Mauricio, was short of funds.

Petitioners point out that they were duly employed and had the financial capacity

to buy the Properties in 1970. Respondents did not refute this. Petitioners

presented 72 receipts43

showing the mortgage payments made to PNB and DBP,

and the Release of the Real Estate Mortgage44

("Mortgage Release") dated 5 April

1974. True, these documents all bear Mauricio’s name. However, this tends to

support, rather than detract from, petitioner-vendees’ explanation that they

initially gave the mortgage payments directly to Mauricio, and then later directly to

the banks, without formally advising the bank of the sale. The last 3 mortgage

receipts and the Mortgage Release were all issued in Mauricio’s name even after his

death in 1970. Obviously, Mauricio could not have secured the Mortgage Release

and made these last payments.

Presumption of Regularity and Burden of Proof

The Deed of Sale was notarized and, as certified by the Regional Trial Court of

Manila, entered in the notarial books submitted to that court. As a document

acknowledged before a notary public, the Deed of Sale enjoys the presumption of

regularity45

and due execution.46

Absent evidence that is clear, convincing and more

than merely preponderant, the presumption must be upheld.47

Respondents’ evidence in this case is not even preponderant. Respondents’allegations, testimony and bare denials cannot prevail over the documentary

evidence presented by petitioners. These documents – the Deed of Sale and the

GPA which are both notarized, the receipts, the Mortgage Release and the 1967 tax

declarations over the Properties – support petitioners’ account of the sale.

As the parties challenging the regularity of the Deed of Sale and alleging its

simulation, respondents had the burden of proving these charges.48

Respondents

failed to discharge this burden. Consequentially, the Deed of Sale stands.

On the Partition of the Property

Nevertheless, this Court finds it proper to grant the partition of the Properties,

subject to modification.

Petitioners have consistently claimed that their father is one of the vendees who

bought the Properties. Vendees Elizabeth and Ofelia both testified that the "Roland

A. Bravo" in the Deed of Sale is their father ,49

although their brother, Roland Bravo,

Jr., made some of the mortgage payments. Petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Paggao, made

the same clarification before the trial court.50

As Roland Bravo, Sr. is also the father of respondent Edward Bravo, Edward is thus a

compulsory heir of Roland Bravo, and entitled to a share, along with his brothers













































and sisters, in his father’s portion of the Properties . In short, Edward and

petitioners are co-owners of the Properties.

As such, Edward can rightfully ask for the partition of the Properties. Any co-owner

may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner

has repudiated the co-ownership.51 This action for partition does not prescribe and

is not subject to laches.52

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Decision of 21 December 2001 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67794. We REINSTATE the Decision of 11 May 2000 of

the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch No. 139, in Civil Case No. 97-137,

declaring VALID the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage dated 28 October

1970, with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. We GRANT judicial partition of the subject Properties in the following manner:

a. Petitioner LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO is entitled to one-third (1/3) of the

Properties;

b. Petitioner OFELIA BRAVO-QUIESTAS is entitled to one-third (1/3) of the

Properties; and

c. The remaining one-third (1/3) portion of the Properties should be divided equally

between the children of ROLAND BRAVO.

2. The other heirs of ROLAND BRAVO must reimburse ROLAND BRAVO, JR. for

whatever expenses the latter incurred in paying for and securing the release of themortgage on the Properties.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995

BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL,

MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA

MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL, petitioners,vs.

HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37,

Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL,

respondents.

VITUG, J.:

The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left

by an illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or

ascendant.

Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling,

initiated this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital

affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born.

Several years passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his mistress

Ursula finally crossed the bar on, respectively, 06 August 1960, 05 February 1981

and 04 November 1976.

Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In

consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land,

with an area of 2,700 square meters, covered by Original Certificate of Title ("OCT")

No. P-20594 was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two

other parcels of land, covered by OCT P-19902 and Transfer Certificate of Title

("TCT") No. 41134, were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The

couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled

the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold

and so raised her as their own "daughter".

On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of

Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2)

portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21

February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also

passed away.

On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an

Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land coveredby OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the name of Juan











Manuel). Following the registration of the document of adjudication with the Office

of the Register of Deeds, the three titles

(OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name of Juan Manuel were

canceled and new titles, TCT No. 184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No. 184225,

were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. On 19 October 1992,

Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of

Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land

(now covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under

the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did

not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of

Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the

aforesaid instruments.

The case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was submitted to the court a

quo for summary judgment.

The trial court, in its now assailed 15th August 1994 decision, dismissed the

complaint holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate

brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit.

Petitioners were also ordered to jointly and severally (solidarily) pay

(a) respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages,

P5,000.00 for exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for

litigation expenses and (b) Estanislaoa Manuel the sum of P5,000.00 for moral

damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages and P500.00 for attorney's fees.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court.

The petition before us raises the following contentions: That —

1. THE LOWER COURT (HAS) FAILED TO CONSIDER THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF

ARTICLE 994 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, AS THE CONTROLLING LAW APPLICABLE BY

VIRTUE OF THE ADMITTED FACTS, AND NOT ARTICLE 992 OF THE SAME CODE.

2. THE LOWER COURT, IN NOT ANNULLING ALL THE ACTS OF, AND VOIDING ALL

DOCUMENTS EXECUTED BY, RESPONDENT MODESTA BALTAZAR, WHO ARROGATED

UNTO HERSELF THE RIGHTS OF AN HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN

MANUEL, (HAS) VIRTUALLY GRANTED SAID RESPONDENT THE STATUS OF AN HEIR

MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND PUBLIC POLICY.

3. TO ENFORCE ONE'S RIGHT WHEN THEY ARE VIOLATED IS NEVER A LEGAL

WRONG.1

Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate

estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the

provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing thusly:

Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded

by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate.

If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and

nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half.

(Emphasis supplied)

Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with

Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate

children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative

inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child . (Emphasis supplied)

Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the

rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate

family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato inthe collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate

relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the

direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has

no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.

This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in

intestacy is explained by a noted civilist.2 His thesis:

What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and

nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that

under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate



family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this

barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether

legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the

illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks of "brothers and sisters,

nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate

brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of

such brothers and sisters. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain", firstly, in the early

case of Grey v . Fabie3 and, then, in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v .

Intermediate Appellate Court 4 and De la Puerta v . Court of Appeals.

5 In Diaz, we

have said:

Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato

between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father

or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this isnot recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate

family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening

antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down

upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the

illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and

the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the

illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish

broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further

grounds of resentment.

The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other

cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had

half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's

inheritance;6 that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed

from her illegitimate child;7 that a natural child cannot represent his natural father

in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent;8 that the natural

daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate

brother of her natural father;9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit

ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father.10

Indeed, the

law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should

be rendered inoperative11

by, but must always be construed in relation to, any

other part as to produce a harmonious whole.12

In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference

and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through

Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:

Order of Preference Order of Concurrence

(a) Legitimate Children and (a) Legitimate Children and

Descendants Descendants, Illegitimate

Children and Descendants,

and Surviving Spouse

(b) Legitimate Parents and (b) Legitimate Parents and

Ascendants Ascendants Illegitimate

Children and Descendants,

and Surviving Spouse

(c) Illegitimate Children and (c) Illegitimate Children and

Descendants (in the absence Descendants and Surviving

of ICDs and LPAs, the Spouse

Illegitimate Parents)

(d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse and

Illegitimate Parents



(e) Brothers and Sisters/ (e) Brothers and Sisters/

Nephews and Nephews and Nieces

Nieces and Surviving Spouse

(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone

(within the fifth civil degree)

(g) State (g) Alone

In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not

an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward ( ampon), without the benefit

of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir.13

We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of

the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to

her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa

Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real

"parties-in-interest"14

in the case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action

to initiate the complaint.

The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for

moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An adverse

result of a suit in law does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful asto justify an assessment of damages against the actor.

15

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan

(Branch 37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary

damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in favor of private

respondents, which portion is hereby DELETED. No special pronouncement on

costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977

IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners,

vs.

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and SUSANA

DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of

Consolacion de la Torre, respondents.

Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.

Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.

MARTIN, J.:

Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed thecomplaint of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A, entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al.

vs. Susana de la Torre, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la

Torre"

It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy

Quio he sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed

Frias Chua. When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second

marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of

Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any issue. Then in 1929,

Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his sonJuanito Frias Chua of the second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo

Frias Chua of his first marriage. In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court

issued an order dated January 15, 19311 adjudicating, among others, the one-half

(1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's

widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito

Frias Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze Frias chua;

and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of the first marriage. By virtue

of said adjudication, Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483)2

dated April 28,

1932 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre

and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.



On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate

without any issue. After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to

his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time or on March 6, 1952,

Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor

the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which Transfer Certificate of

Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name. Then on

March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in

the descending or ascending line except her brother and sisters.

In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-

A, the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and dominador

and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias

Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaint a quo3 (subseqently segregated

as a distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on May 11, 1966 before the

respondent Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying that the

one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but

which passed to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declaredas a

reservable property for the reason that the lot in questionn was subject to reserval

troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code, Private respondent as

administratrix of the estate of individually the complaint of petitioners4

On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the

complaint of petitioner. Hence this instant.

The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:

ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any property which the

latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendat, or a brother or

sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of

law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the

line from which said property came.

Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with

a reservable character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the

property was acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or from a brother or

sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the

property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there

are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property

came.5

In the case before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as

borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate

in 1952; he died withour leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No.

399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre died, Juannnito Frias Chua

who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio

Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate

children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.

The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit of reserva

troncal — whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua

from his father Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the

respondent Court said:

It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the property in question was

not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously but fora consideration, namely, that the legatees were to pay the interest and cost and

other fees resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court. As such it is undeniable

that the lot in question is not subject tot a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the

New Civil Code, and as such the plaintiff's complaint must fail.

We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in

question is not subject to a reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code. It

is, As explained by Manresa which this Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v.

Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when

the recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the propertytransmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the

transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person

making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the

person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an

eminent Filipino commentator,6 "the essential thing is that the person who

transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the

transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the

property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of

his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore



gratuitous. It is true that there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate Court in

Intestate Proceeding No. 4816 which estates in express terms;

2. — Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de Consolacion de la Torre, viuda, mayor

de edad, y de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua, menor de edad, todos residente de San

Enrique, Negros Occidental, I.F.,como herederos del finado Jose Frias Chua Choo,

estas propiadades:

14483

La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399 del Catsatro de la Carlota, Negros

Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadddrados y cubierto por el Certificado de Titulo

No. 11759, en partes equales pro-indiviso; por con la obligscion de pagar a las

Standard Oil Co. of New York la deuda de P3971.20, sus intereses, costas y demas

gastos resultantes del asunto civil No. 5300de este jusgado

But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of

P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not

personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by an

order of the court in the Testate Proceeding No.4816 dated January 15, 1931. As

long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition

imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity,

itg is gratuitous. it does not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs, in this

case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standare oil co. of New York the amount of

P3,971.20. This does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the

property to him. This being the case the lot in question is subject to reserva troncal

under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.

It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua to

the respondent heirs or legatees was agreed upon by the heirs in their project of

partition based on the last will and testament of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners

claim that the supposed Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua was never

probated . The fact that the will was not probated was admitted in paragraph 6 of

the respondents' answer.7 There is nothing mentioned in the decision of the trial

court in Civil Case No. 7839 A which is the subject of the present appeal nor in the

order of January 15, 1931 of the trial court in the Testate Estate Proceeding No.

4816 nor in the private respondent's brief, that the Last Will and Testament of Jose

Frias Chua has ever been probated . With the foregoing, it is easy to deduce that if

the Last Will and Testament has in fact been probated there would have been no

need for the testamentary heirs to prepare a project of partition among

themselves. The very will itself could be made the basis for the adjudication of the

estate as in fact they did in their project of partition with Juanito Frias Chua getting

one-half of Lot 399 by inheritance as a sone of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the

latter's second marriage.

According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without any

issue. After his death his mother Consolation de la Torre succeeded to his one-half

pro-indiviso share of Lot 399. This was, however, subject to the condition that the

property was reservable in character under Art. 891 of the Civil Code in favor of

relatives within the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the property came.

These relatives are the petitioner herein.

It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot399 which originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has already prescribed when it

was filed on May 11, 1966. We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the

petitioners herein are claiming as reservees did not arise until the time the

reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died in March 1966. When the petitioners

therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they

were very much in time to do so.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The

petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are declared

owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of NegrosOccidental is hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796

covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name of Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a

new Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided

portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and

Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot. Without pronouncement as to

costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñ;oz Palma, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ.,

concur.



G.R. No. L-10701 January 16, 1959

MARIA CANO, applicant-appellee,

vs.DIRECTOR OF LANDS, EUSTAQUIA GUERRERO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.

JOSE FERNANDEZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.

Ramon C. Fernandez for appellants.

Jose B. Dealca for appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J .:

In an amended decision dated October 9, 1951, issued in Land Registration Case No.

12, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2835, the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon decreed the

registration of Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Juban (Sorsogon) Cadastre, under the

following terms and conditions:

In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the notices have been duly published

and posted as required by law, and that the title of the applicant to the above-

mentioned two parcels of land is registrable in law, it is hereby adjudged and

decreed, and with reaffirmation of the order of general default, that the two

parcels of land described in plan SWO-24152, known as Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of

the Cadastral Survey of Juban, with their improvements, be registered in the name

of Maria Cano, Filipina, 71 years of age, widow and resident of Juban, province of

Sorsogon, with the understanding that Lot No. 1799 shall be subject to the right of reservation in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article 891 of the Civil code.

After this decision shall have become final for lack of appeal therefrom within the

30-day period from its promulgation, let the corresponding decree issue.

So ordered. (Rec. App. pp. 18-19)

The decision having become final, the decree and the Certificate of Title (No. 0-20)

were issued in the name of Maria Cano, subject to reserva troncal in favor of

Eustaquia Guerrero. In October 1955, counsel for the reserve ( reservatorio)

Guerrero filed a motion with the Cadastral Court, alleging the death of the original

registered owner and reservista, Maria Cano, on September 8, 1955, and praying

that the original Certificate of Title be ordered cancelled and a new one issued in

favor of movant Eustaquia Guerrero; and that the Sheriff be ordered to place her in

possession of the property. The motion was opposed by Jose and Teotimo

Fernandez, sons of the reservista Maria Cano, who contended that the application

and operation of the reserva troncal should be ventilated in an ordinary contentious

proceeding, and that the Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the

motion.

In view of the recorded reserva in favor of the appellee, as expressly noted in the

final decree of registration, the lower court granted the petition for the issuance of

a new certificate, for the reason that the death of the reservista vested the

ownership of the property in the petitioner as the sole reservatorio troncal .

The oppositors, heirs of the reservista Maria Cano, duly appealed from the order,

insisting that the ownership of the reservatorio can not be decreed in a mere

proceeding under sec. 112 of Act 496, but requires a judicial administrationproceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as the reservatorio entitled to the

reservable property, are to be declared. In this connection, appellants argue that

the reversion in favor of the reservatorio requires the declaration of the existence

of the following facts:

(1) The property was received by a descendant by gratuitous title from an

ascendant or from a brother or sister;

(2) Said descendant dies without issue;

(3) The property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and

(4) The existence of relatives within the third degree belonging the line from which

said property came. (Appellants' Brief, p. 8)

We find the appeal untenable. The requisites enumerated by appellants have

already been declared to exist by the decree of registration wherein the rights of

the appellee as reservatario troncal were expressly recognized:

From the above-quoted agreed stipulation of facts, it is evident that Lot No. 1799

was acquired by the Appellant Maria Cano by inheritance from her deceased

daughter, Lourdes Guerrero who, in turn, inherited the same from her father



Evaristo Guerrero and, hence, falls squarely under the provisions of Article 891 of

the Civil Code; and that each and everyone of the private oppositors are within the

third degree of consaguinity of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, and who belonging

to the same line from which the property came.

It appears however, from the agreed stipulation of facts that with the exception of

Eustaquia Guerrero, who is the only living daughter of the decedent Evaristo

Guerrero, by his former marriage, all the other oppositors are grandchildren of the

said Evaristo Guerrero by his former marriages. Eustaquia Guerrero, being the

nearest of kin, excludes all the other private oppositors, whose decree of

relationship to the decedent is remoter (Article 962, Civil Code; Director of Lands vs.

Aguas, 62 Phil., 279). (Rec. App. pp. 16-17)

This decree having become final, all persons (appellees included) are bared thereby

from contesting the existence of the constituent elements of the reserva. The only

requisites for the passing of the title from the reservista to the appellee are: (1) thedeath of the reservista; and (2) the fact that the reservatario has survived the

reservista. Both facts are admitted, and their existence is nowhere questioned.

The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the

assumption that the reservatario will succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property

from the reservista. This is not true. The reservatario is not the reservista's

successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of the reservista's estate;

the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (

prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had

temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authoritiesare all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter

must be deemed to have enjoined no more than a life interest in the reservable

property.

It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the

reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes,

automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. As

already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does not

even answer for the debts of the latter. Hence, its acquisition by the reservatario

may be entered in the property records without necessity of estate proceedings,

since the basic requisites therefor appear of record. It is equally well settled that

the reservable property can not be transmitted by a reservista to her or his own

successors mortis causa,(like appellants herein) so long as a reservatario within the

third degree from the prepositus and belonging to the line whence the property

came, is in existence when the reservista dies.

Of course, where the registration decree merely specifies the reservable character

of the property, without determining the identity of the reservatario (as in the case

of Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil., 279) or where several reservatarios dispute

the property among themselves, further proceedings would be unavoidable. But

this is not the case. The rights of the reservataria Eustaquia Guerrero have been

expressly recognized, and it is nowhere claimed that there are other reservatarios

of equal or nearer degree. It is thus apparent that the heirs of the reservista are

merely endeavoring to prolong their enjoyment of the reservable property to the

detriment of the party lawfully entitled thereto.

We find no error in the order appealed from and therefore, the same is affirmedwith costs against appellants in both instances. So ordered.

G.R. No. 14904 September 19, 1921

FRANCISCO D. LUNSOD, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.

SINFOROSO ORTEGA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Pascual and Bernardo etc. Cecilio for appellants.Benito Gimenez Zoboli for appellees.

ARAULLO, J.:

On June 3, 1915, Rufina Medel, widow, resident of the municipality of San Pablo,

Province of Laguna, in a public document executed and acknowledged on the same

day before Felix Esconde, notary public for and in said municipality, sold to

Francisco Lunsod, husband of Gabina Peyamonte, for the sum of P2,000 and with

the right to repurchase for two years, three parcel of land planted with coconut

trees, situated in the barrio of Sta. Catalina of said municipality, described in said

document and in the complaint to which reference is hereafter made, it being a



condition of the sale that the vendor could not exercise the right to repurchase until

after the expiration of said two years from the date of the document and that two-

thirds of the fruits produced by said land would belong to the purchaser and one-

third to the vendor, as compensation for the work of cleaning and taking care of the

parcels of land during said period.

On September 19, 1916, Francisco Lunsod filed in the justice of the peace court of

San Pablo a complaint against Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga, the case being

docketed there as civil case No. 861. In said complaint the description of the parcels

in question was given and the plaintiff alleged that he was the owner of the three

parcels of land mentioned in the aforementioned document and that on or about

June 4, 1916, he was illegally, and by means of strategy and stealth, turned out of

the possession thereof by Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga, who have been

collecting the fruits, thereby injuring him in the sum of P150. The plaintiff,

therefore, prayed that judgment be rendered against the defendants, ordering

them to deliver the possession to the plaintiff, and compelling them to pay to the

plaintiff the sum of P150, the value of the coconuts taken and the damages

occasioned to the latter, and further, that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued

enjoining the defendants from continuing to perform acts of possession upon the

land and from gathering the fruits.

The defendants having answered the complaint, judgment was rendered on

October 26, 1916, by the justice of the peace court in favor of the plaintiff,

sentencing Sinforoso Ortega to restore the possession of the property in question

to the plaintiff and to pay the sum of P150, as damages sustained by the latter, with

the costs. The case was dismissed as to the defendant Cariaga. From this judgment

an appeal was taken to the Court of First Instance by the defendant Ortega. In the

Court of First Instance an incidental question was raised by the plaintiff concerning

the irregularity and insufficiency of the bond filed by the defendant for the purpose

of the appeal and it was asked that the appeal be declared improperly taken and

dismissed. This motion was overruled in said court and due exception was taken by

the plaintiff, who thereupon reproduced his complaint in said court against the

defendant Sinforoso Ortega only, but without the allegation that he was the owner

of said parcels, it being only alleged that prior to the month of June, 1916, he was in

the quiet and peaceful possession and enjoyment thereof, and, in addition to what

was alleged in his complaint in the justice of the peace court, that the defendant

Sinforoso Ortega has used force and intimidation in turning him out of said

possession and that until said day, March 9, 1917, said defendant illegally detained

said parcels. The plaintiff prayed that the injunction mentioned in his previous

complaint be issued against the defendant, that he be sentenced to restore the

possession of said three parcels to the plaintiff, and to pay the sum of P150 as

damages and whatever other damages may have been suffered by him from the

month of September, 1916, the date of the filing of the complaint, until the final

disposition of the case, and the costs.

In answer to said complaint, the defendant Ortega denied generally and specifically

each and every allegation thereof, and alleged, as a special defense, that he was in

possession of said parcels because he was, together with his sister Francisca Ortega,

a pro indiviso owner thereof, and that his possession was not obtained illegally, nor

by the means mentioned in the complaint. The defendant, therefore, prayed that

he be absolved from the complaint and the injunction denied.

To this answer the plaintiff filed a reply, denying generally and specifically all the

facts alleged therein, and further stating that said three parcels were his exclusive

property, having acquired them by purchase from Rufina Medel, deceased, the sole

and absolute owner thereof.

Said Rufina Medel having died on April 10, 1916, intestate proceedings, docketed as

case No. 2218, were instituted in the same Court of First Instance of Laguna by

Cipriano Medel, brother of said deceased, for the appointment of an administrator

of the property left by her, and Cipriano Medel himself was appointed

administrator. An inventory of the property of said deceased having beensubmitted on October 31, 1916, in which the three parcels of land in question were

included, with the statement that they had been sold to Francisco Lunsod with the

right to repurchase for the sum of P2,000, Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega

appeared in said proceedings and filed a motion asking that said parcels be

excluded from the inventory on the ground that said parcels were their exclusive

property and were then in their exclusive possession, having inherited the same

from their first cousin, Anacleta Ortega, who died in the municipality of San Pablo

on or about June 8, 1903. This petition was opposed by said administrator and

denied by the court on November 25, 1916, reserving to Sinforoso Ortega and

Francisca Ortega the right to institute the proper action against the administrator of



the property, on the ground that the question as to the ownership of those parcels

could not be raised in said proceedings.

By virtue of said resolution, Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega filed, on the

same day that the order was issued, a complaint in the Court of First Instance,

which was afterwards amended and docketed as case No. 2286, against said

administrator of the estate of Rufina Medel, deceased, and Francisco Lunsod, the

plaintiff in the case for unlawful entry and detainer. It was there alleged that

through inheritance from their deceased father Mariano Ortega and their niece

Anacleta Ortega, deceased, they, Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega, were the

absolute owners thereof, and had been in possession of said parcels in question;

that the defendants, by common accord, without any legal right, in an attempt to

dispossess them of said parcels, had decided to molest and interrupt them in the

possession and enjoyment thereof. In support of this claim it was alleged that

Francisco Lunsod had presented a criminal complaint against them for theft of

coconuts in the justice of the peace court of San Pablo, which was dismissed, as

appeared from the certained copy attached to the complaint as a part thereof, and

Cipriano Medel had included said parcels of land in the inventory submitted by him,

as administrator of the estate of said deceased in the intestate proceeding No.

2218, and both had filed numberless charges against them for theft of coconuts —

all this in addition to the other acts performed by said defendants which restricted

the rights of the plaintiffs as owners of said property from the death of Rufina

Medel on April 10, 1916, who, during her lifetime, had only the usufruct of said

parcels. The plaintiffs pray: (1) That said parcels be excluded by said administrator

of the estate from the inventory; (2) that they, the plaintiffs, be declared the sole

owners of said parcels and the improvements thereon; (3) that a preliminary

injunction be issued and that it be made absolute, enjoining the defendants, their

agents or representatives from disturbing the plaintiffs in their possession and the

exercise of their rights as owners, which they had been exercising upon said parcels,

and from intervening in the gathering of the fruits thereof.

The prayer for the preliminary injunction was denied on the ground that the

question whether or not the death of Rufina Medel gave an end to the usufruct and

possession of said parcels, which apparently were in the possession of the intestate

estate, as they were included in said inventory, would have to be finally determined

in the very case initiated by said complaint; and a demurrer to the complaint having

been presented by the defendants and overruled by the court, the defendants

answered the complaint, denying generally and specifically all the facts alleged

therein, and alleging as special defense, besides those stated as grounds of the

demurer, that one of them, Cipriano Medel, and his sister, Jacoba Medel, acquired

said three parcels of land by inheritance from their deceased sister Rufina Medel,

the same being a property belonging to the intestate estate of said deceased, the

record of which was made an integral part of the answer; that therefore it was

against the law and improper to sue the administrator of said estate before the

debts were paid and the liquidation and adjudication affected by the court; that

said deceased was at any event the sole heir in the direct line of her deceased

daughter Anacleta Ortega, the latter having died before her mother while still

young and long after her father Estanislao Ortega; that there was no will, and as

Rufina Medel left neither legitimate descendants nor ascendants, nor

acknowledged or legitimated children, her brother and sister who survived her, the

defendant Cipriano Medel and the latter's sister Jacoba, succeeded her directly, in

all her obligations, rights and choses in action affecting said three parcels of land,

according to said intestate proceeding No. 2218, and that Rufina Medel, together

with her predecessors and heirs, had been exercising the absolute right of

ownership over said parcels and had been possessing them as owners quietly and

peacefully, without any interruption, for many years until July 4, 1916, when they

were usurped by the plaintiffs. As a counterclaim the defendants also alleged that

Rufina Medel in her lifetime, to wit, on June 3, 1915, sold said three parcels and

others with right of repurchase to one of them the defendant Francisco Lunsod, for

the sum of P2,000, as appears in a public instrument, also made a part of the

answer, and that on the same date said Francisco Lunsod took possession thereof,having been in the quiet and peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same until

the plaintiffs by means of force, strategy and fraud, illegally deprived them of said

possession, said plaintiffs having been since then gathering the fruits of the lands,

notwithstanding the protest and demands made by said Lunsod, who by reason of

said detention had suffered damages in the sum of P1,140, the value of the

coconuts gathered. Said defendants therefore prayed that they be absolved from

the complaint and that the deceased Rufina Medel be declared to be the sole

owner of said three parcels of land, as the sole intestate heirs of her deceased

daughter Anacleta Ortega and successor of the latter in all her rights and

obligations and that Cipriano Medel and his sister Jacoba were equally intestateheirs with respect to the properties left by the deceased Rufina and that the acts



and contracts executed by the latter should be considered subsisting; and, finally,

that the plaintiffs be sentenced to return said three parcels to the defendant

Francisco Lunsod and to pay P1,440, ad damages caused said defendant, plus the

sum of P90, as the value of the crop for every two months until said restitution is

effected, and that, if the plaintiffs should not pay said sum to the defendant

Lunsod, they be ordered, pending the trial and until final judgment, to deposit said

crop as the average product for every two succeeding months.

In answer to said counterclaim, the plaintiffs denied all the allegation thereof,

setting up as a special defense that the sale of the lands in question with the right

to repurchase, made by Rufina Medel in favor of Francisco Lunsod, was absolutely

null and void because the vendor was not the true and exclusive owner of said

parcels of land at the time of said sale, for which reason it did not have any effect,

and the plaintiffs asked that they be absolved from the counterclaim.

After the institution of intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of thedeceased Rufina Medel, to wit, on November 6, 1916, which was one and one-half

month after the filing by Francisco Lunsod of the complaint for unlawful detainer

and six days after the inventory of the properties left by said deceased had been

made and submitted, the administrator of the estate, Cipriano Medel, and his sister

Jacoba presented in the same Court of First Instance of Laguna an application,

which was later amended, for the registration in their name, in accordance with the

Land Registration Act, of said three parcels with the improvements thereon,

described in the plans attached thereto. In said application it was alleged that they

acquired the absolute title thereof through inheritance from their deceased sister

Rufina Medel, and that said parcels were occupied since the year 1915 by FranciscoLunsod to whom they had been sold with the right to repurchase by their sister

Rufina. The applicants finally invoked the benefits of chapter 6 of Act No. 926, on

the ground that they had been in continuous, open and peaceful possession of the

land for more than 21 years including that of their predecessors in interest.

The application, which was docketed as case No. 219, was opposed on the one hand

by Francisco Lunsod, and on the other, by Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega.

The first named person alleged that, the period for the repurchase of said parcels,

stipulated in the document of June 3, 1915, having already expired, without any of

those believing themselves entitled thereto having made use of the right of

redemption, he was the sole and exclusive owner thereof. The last two named

persons, in turn, claimed that they were the absolute owners and were in

possession thereof, having acquired them by inheritance from their deceased father

Mariano Ortega and their deceased niece Anacleta Ortega.

The three civil suits respectively mentioned, to wit, case No. 2322, for unlawful

entry and detainer, case No. 2286, for the recovery of title, and exclusion of the

land from the inventory of the intestate estate of the deceased Rufina Medel and

the issuance of a preliminary injunction against the defendants, and finally case No.

219, that is to say, the proceedings instituted by Cipriano Medel and his sister

Jacoba Medel for the registration of said three parcels, were jointly tried, by

common consent of the parties; and it was agreed between the parties that the

evidence introduced in case No. 2286, should be considered as evidence in the

other two cases. After said trial the Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered

judgment as follows: In case No. 219, which is the land registration case, it was

declared that Cipriano and Jacoba Medel had no right to a decree of registration

and the application was therefore dismissed, with costs. In the other tow civil cases,

Nos. 2286 and 2322, it was held that the three parcels of land in question belonged

to Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega, and it was therefore ordered that the

defeated party should pay the costs and that said three parcels should be excluded

from the inventory submitted by Cipriano Medel, administrator of the estate of the

deceased Rufina Medel in civil case No. 2218, the intestate proceeding. To this

judgment the plaintiff Francisco Lunsod and the administrator of the intestate

estate, Cipriano Medel, and his sister Jacoba Medel excepted, and filed a motion for

new trial, which was denied with their exception, and took an appeal by the proper

bill of exceptions, which was transmitted to this court.

In their brief the appellants assign various errors to the judgment of the trial court.

Some of these errors refer to the allowance of the appeal from the judgment

rendered by the justice of the peace court, notwithstanding the alleged irregularity

of the bond filed; to the consequent lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance

to take cognizance of the case on account thereof and for the reason that an

original complaint asking for the issuance of a preliminary injunction as to said

three parcels had been filed, although said complaint had no connection with any

other case pending before said court; and lastly, to the overruling by said court of



the demurrer to said complaint presented by the defendants-appellants. The other

errors relate to the merits of the case.

The defendant Ortega was not sentenced by the justice of the peace in the case for

unlawful entry and detainer to pay any sum as rent in arrears of the land or as the

reasonable value of the use and occupation of the same, for the judgment did not

fix any amount, and the bond filed by him was in the sum of P500, (not P150, for

this was merely the amount which the defendant was sentenced to pay as

damages, and which was, by order of the court dated September 27, 1917,

substituted by P500), to answer to damages and costs, not with only one surety, as

claimed by the appellants, but with two sureties. Therefore said bond was in

accordance with the provisions of section 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as

amended by Acts Nos. 1776 and 2588; and the defendant is not obliged, in order to

secure a stay of the execution of said judgment, to make any monthly payment, as

required by Act No. 2588, for the reason that there was in the judgment no order

for the payment of rent in arrears nor for any amount for the use and occupation of

said parcels. The result is that the appeal interposed by the defendant against said

judgment was properly admitted and the Court of First Instance acquired

jurisdiction to take cognizance of said case.

It is not true that the complaint filed by Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega against

Francisco Lunsod and Cipriano Medel, administrator of the intestate estate of the

deceased Rufina Medel, docketed in the Court of First Instance as case No. 2286,

had for its sole object the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against said

defendants, prohibiting them from performing acts of ownership and possession

upon said parcels. Neither is it true that said complaint is not related to any otheroriginal action instituted in said court, fro in the same complaint, as already stated,

allegations were made relative to the title of the plaintiffs to said parcels and to the

acts performed by the defendants violative of plaintiffs' right over said parcels and

of their possession, use and enjoyment thereof; and by virtue of these allegations, it

was prayed not only that the plaintiffs be declared the only owners of said parcels

with the improvements thereon, as though the proper action to recover the title

were instituted, but also that said parcels be excluded and stricken out from the

inventory presented in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of

said deceased, and, lastly, that said writ of preliminary injunction be issued. It is,

therefore, evident that there is no force in the arguments advanced by the

appellants to show that the trial court committed errors Nos. 4 and 5, assigned in

their brief, in taking cognizance of said action in spite of its lack of jurisdiction, and

in overruling the demurrer to the complaint on the ground that the facts therein

stated did not constitute a cause of action.

Neither does the claim or allegation, made by the appellants, of another action

pending, justify the filing of said demurrer for two reasons: First, in case No. 2322,

instituted by Francisco Lunsod against Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga in the

justice of the peace court, the only question in issue was as to the actual possession

of said three parcels of land, and, although in said case for unlawful entry and

detainer judgment was rendered by said court in favor of the plaintiff, from which

appeal was taken by the defendant Ortega, said judgment, according to the positive

provisions of section 87 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the repeated doctrines

of this Court, construing said section, is no obstacle to the institution by the same

parties in the Court of First Instance of another action respecting the title to said

real property, nor is it conclusive evidence, in another case between the same

parties, of the facts established therein. Second, with respect to the petition of the

plaintiffs Ortega in case No. 2286, for the recovery of title, and exclusion of said

parcels from the inventory of the intestate estate of the deceased Rufina Medel, on

the ground that the same belong to them in fee simple and they are entitled to the

possession thereof, since the court held in said intestate proceedings that the

question of title to said property was a matter of another action, for it was not

proper to raise it in said proceedings, and the administrator of the intestate did not

appeal from said decision, said ruling became final. Besides, in said motion the

defendant Francisco Lunsod and Jacoba Medel were not parties in said petition

while they were parties defendant, together with Cipriano Medel, in the case for

recovery of title No. 2286. Furthermore, it is an established doctrine of this court

that the mere fact that one of the parties is the executor or administrator of the

estate of a deceased person does not confer upon the probate court, in which the

proceedings for the distribution and settlement of said estate are pending,

exclusive jurisdiction to decide all questions that may arise between said executor

or administrator and third persons as to the title to a specific property (Bauermann

vs. Casas. 10 Phil., 386), which doctrine the trial court undoubtedly had in mind in

reserving to the plaintiffs in said proceedings the right to institute the proper action

against the administrator of the intestate estate with respect to the ownership of

said property.



Lastly, neither could the demurrer be sustained on the ground that the plaintiffs

had no capacity to bring such action docketed as case No. 2286, for the recovery of

title, because a plaintiffs lacks capacity to sue in two cases, to wit, when he does

not have the necessary qualifications to appear at the trial, or when he does not

have the character or representation he claims; and, in the present case, it does not

appear from the complaint that the plaintiffs were not in the full exercise of their

civil rights, nor was it necessary that they should first have proved their character as

heirs of their deceased father Mariano Ortega and their deceased niece Anacleta

Ortega, for, it having been alleged that they were absolute owners of the parcels in

question by inheritance from them, this should be, as in fact it was, a matter to be

proved at the trial. If it should be accepted that for this reason the plaintiffs had no

capacity to institute the action, it necessarily follows that the defendants Cipriano

Medel and Jacoba Medel would also lack the capacity to exercise, as they did in

their answer to said complaint, their rights as owners of said parcels by inheritance

from the deceased sister Rufina Medel, or the right to ask for the registration of

said parcels in the registry of property in their name because of their character as

such heirs, as they did in the application docketed as case No. 219, which was

presented when the proceedings relating to the administration of the intestate

estate of the same deceased were not yet terminated, the inventory of the

respective properties was not yet approved, and no declaration had as yet been

made in favor of said defendants.

The questions raised by the parties in the three cases aforesaid by their respective

allegations reduced themselves to one the resolution of which will determine the

appeal interposes by the defendants. This question relates to the title to the three

parcels which were sold with the rights to repurchase by Rufina Medel to Francisco

Lunsod in the documents of June 3, 1915.

Considering the documents in connection with the testimony of the appellees

Ortega, Prudencio Baldovino and Aguedo Reyes, it appears from the evidence

beyond question: (1) That upon the death of Mariano Ortega, resident of the

municipality of San Pablo, Province of Laguna, which took place about 27 years ago,

he left three children, named Sinforoso, Francisca and Estanislao Ortega; (2) that

Estanislao Ortega was married on May 8, 1895, to Rufina Medel and died on

September 26, 1902, leaving a daughter born of said marriage, named Anacleta

Ortega, who also died on June 17, 1903, at the age of six years, she and Estanislao

Ortega having been survived by said Rufina Medel, who died on April 10, 1916.

The plaintiff Sinforoso Ortega presented two witnesses, Prudencio Baldovino and

Aguedo Reyes, who are residents of the same municipality of San Pablo, 65 years

old, and well informed about the three parcels of land in question, situated in the

barrio of Sta. Catalina of said municipality, because the first, for about forty years or

more, and the second, since he could remember, had possessed lands in the same

place besides the latter being an adjoining owner of the third parcel. From their

testimony it also appears that the person whom they first saw in possession of said

three parcels, cleaning and sowing and planting palay and coconut trees upon them

was, according to one of them, Mariano Ortega, father of Sinforoso Ortega,

Francisca Ortega and Estanislao Ortega, said possession having been quiet and

peaceful; that upon the death of Mariano Ortega, he was succeeded in the

possession of said parcels by the three brothers, children of said deceased, named

Sinforoso, Francisca and Estanislao Ortega, who used to help their father in the

cultivation of the land and continued to cultivate it, as was seen by the same

witnesses; that upon the death of Estanislao Ortega, husband of Rufina Medel, the

latter and her brother and sister-in-law Sinforoso and Francisca, respectively, that is

to say, the appellees in this case, continued in possession, aiding one another,

according to Sinforoso Ortega, in the cultivation of the land, and dividing the fruits

collected therefrom between them; that upon the death of Rufina Medel on April

10, 1916, said Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, and no other, took, or continued in,

possession, according to the second of said witnesses, Aguedo Reyes, one of the

appellees, Sinforoso Ortega being at present, that is to say, at the time the witness

was testifying, in possession of the land, although in the month of October, 1916,

Rufina Medel being already dead, Catalino Alaguilan Segundo collected the

coconuts by order, according to them, of Francisco Lunsod, that is, the plaintiff in

the case for unlawful entry and detainer, No. 2322, but after that event Sinforoso

Ortega continued in possession. The same witnesses Baldovino and Reyes described

the different parcels in their declarations, the first having described the boundaries

of each of the three parcels and stated the number of trees planted on them, and

the second having given the boundaries of the second parcel about which he was

examined, and also stated the number of coconut trees planted thereon, as well as

the fact that Mariano Ortega had a house on said parcel, which was between the

other two parcels; and, finally, the first, who had been cabeza de barangay and



lieutenant of the barrio of Sta. Catalina, as well as the second who, as aforesaid,

possessed lands in that barrio, testified that they did not know that the Medel

family had any land in the same barrio, the last named witness stating that the

lands of the Medel family were in the barrio of San Lorenzo, near that of Sta.

Catalina.

Lastly, the attorney for the plaintiffs and appellees Ortega having stated that he still

had two witnesses, named Basilia Balcita, adjoining owner of the third parcel on the

west, and Pantaleon Esconde on the north, and another witness Cirilo Escaba,

adjoining owner of the first parcel on the west, who testify to the same effect as the

witness Aguedo Reyes, the attorney for the appellants accepted their testimony

without objection.

On the other hand, from the evidence offered by the defendants it appears,

according to Francisco Lunsod, that he was in possession of said three parcels since

June, 1915, the date of the deed of sale executed by Rufina Medel in his favor, twowhich reference was made in the beginning of this decision, as shown by his having

ordered the collection of the fruits every two months by his overseer, who was

Cipriano Medel; that his watchman on said lands was Catalino Alaguilan Segundo;

that he held said possession until June, 1916, when the land was taken by Sinforoso

Ortega who prohibited his overseer (Lunsod's) from collecting the fruits on the

ground that the property belonged to him (Ortega): that by reason thereof he filed

a complaint in the justice of the peace court for theft, which was dismissed, and

another for forcible entry and detainer; that he collected fruits six times a year,

sometimes personally and sometimes through his overseer, although he could not

exactly say how many times he had been on the land; that he also placed RufinaMedel herself in charge of that work in her lifetime, she having been succeeded in

the possession by her brother Cipriano; that he knew Rufina Medel to be the true

owner of said parcels, because in the real estate tax declarations, Exhibits 2, 3, and

4, presented by her in the municipality of San Pablo for the purposes of the

payment of the taxes, and introduced at the trial, he saw the name of said Rufina

Medel, the witness identifying the receipt Exhibit 5, also presented by said

defendants, dated May 31, 1917, issued in favor of the same Rufina Medel and

evidencing the payment of the land taxes of 5 parcels of land, two of which,

according to the same document, are situated in said barrio of Sta. Catalina.

Cipriano Medel, testifying as witnesses, declared that he knew that Francisco

Lunsod had property in the barrio of Sta. Catalina because he (Lunsod) had

purchased such property in the year 1915 from his sister Rufina Medel, who before

that year was in possession thereof; that the parcel in the sitio of Ma-ancel in said

barrio was bought by his parents (the witness') from Mariano Ortega, but he did not

then remember the boundaries thereof nor could be say how many coconut trees

there were on the land because he had not seen them; that the other parcel in the

sitio of Duhat was bought by Rufina Medel from one Julio Bajalaldia, deceased, but

the witness does not remember when because Rufina Medel told him only that she

had bought that land; that the other parcel in the sitio of Lacdawen had not been

bought by Rufina Medel from anybody; that the sitio of Ma-ancel is in the barrio of

Sta. Catalina and that the other parcel is in the sitio of Catmon; that since 1915,

when said lands were conveyed to Francisco Lunsod by Rufina Medel the former

took possession thereof, but in the year 1916, Sinforoso Ortega seized (so says the

witness) the possession thereof from the former, prohibiting Lunsod from collecting

the coconuts on the land and from interfering in any way with them on the ground

that he, Ortega, was its owner.

Francisco Baldonado, another witness for the defendants, 28 years old and laborer

by occupation, also stated that he knew that Lunsod had a coconut grove in the

barrio of Sta. Catalina, because he had been several times upon said land since 1915

and had bought coconuts from the overseer, named Cipriano Medel, about four

times, and thrice from Lunsod himself, although it is true that the third time, which

took place in the first days of June, 1916, the purchase was not carried into effect

because Sinforoso Ortega suspended the collection of the fruits, telling them that if

they should not do so they would settle the matter by force. The witness also

declared that he did not remember the boundaries of the land on which the

gathering of the fruits was suspended, nor the number of coconut trees or fruits

that were in the land, and that when the event occurred Francisco Lunsod was not

present.

The parties stipulated that Mateo Ticson would declare in the same terms as the

preceding witness.

Catalino Alaguilan Segundo, a laborer 50 years old, also testifying for the

defendants, stated that he knew that Francisco Lunsod had three parcels of land in



said barrio of Sta. Catalina, municipality of San Pablo, one in the sitio of Lacdawen,

another in Ma-ancel, and the third in Catmon, of which parcels he was the owner

and possessor since 1915 by acquisition from Rufina Medel, who in turn acquired

the land in the sitio of Lacdawen from her father-in-law Mariano Ortega as dowry

when she married, that in the sitio of Ma-ancel by inheritance from her mother

(that of Rufina Medel), and that in the sitio of Catmon, the boundaries of which

were mentioned but not the respective cardinal points, by purchase from Julio

Bajalaldia about twenty years ago, said Medel being then newly married, this fact

being also known to the witness because he had been working with them and

Medel had requested him to gather the coconuts in order to pay to Bajalaldia the

price of the said parcel, and he himself, who was then a laborer working for Rufina

Medel, personally delivered the price of the vendor, the first delivery being for P20

and the second for P15, without any receipt having been given by Bajalaldia for he

stated that he did not know how to write; that from the time of the possession of

Rufina Medel he himself took care of said land and gathered the coconuts thereon,

and since 1915 Francisco Lunsod put him in charge thereof ordering him to gather

the fruits which he had done six times; that the parcel in Lacdawen was, during the

lifetime of Mariano Ortega, in the latter's possession and they gathered the fruits

thereon; that from the very first time that he knew the parcel in Ma-ancel he saw

Rufina Medel and her husband in possession thereof, the witness also naming the

boundaries but not the respective cardinal points; that the owner of the parcel in

Lacdawen was the father of Sinforoso Ortega and the person taking care of the

three parcels on the date on which he testified was the same Sinforoso Ortega since

June, 1916, when he seized the lands from Francisco Lunsod; and finally that he, the

witness, as the overseer or watchman of Lunsod, had a share of one-fifth in the

fruits gathered on said parcels and was interested in securing the possession of the

land for Lunsod.

The evidence adduced by both parties being considered, we arrive at the conclusion

that there is no reason why we should not give credit to the testimony of the

witnesses for the plaintiffs, relative to the statements in the documents presented

by them, with respect to the relationship between said plaintiffs Sinforoso Ortega

and Francisca Ortega and the deceased Mariano Ortega, Estanislao Ortega and his

daughter, Anacleta Ortega, born of the marriage with Rufina Medel, who also died

at a tender age, one year after her father Estanislao, as well as with respect to the

quiet, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession which they enjoyed since about

thirty years ago of the three parcels in question, first, through Mariano Ortega and

later, upon his death, through his children Sinforoso, Francisca and Estanislao, and

upon the latter's death through Rufina Medel, mother of Anacleta Ortega, together

with her brother and sister-in-law Sinforoso and Francisca, respectively, which

possession was, upon the death of Anacleta, held by said three persons until June 3,

1915, when the mother of the latter, Rufina Medel, sold said three parcels to

Francisco Lunsod with the right to repurchase. Said witnesses, two of whom are 65

years of age and adjoining owners with respect to said lands, had shown complete

knowledge of those facts and explained the reasons why they respectively knew

what they had testified to.

On the other hand, while it is true that from the testimony given by the witnesses

for the defendants it appears that they had attempted to prove the sole and

exclusive title of Rufina Medel to said three parcels and her possession thereof as

owner when she sold them on said date, June 3, 1915, to Francisco Lunsod, said

witnesses tracing said possession to an original different from that claimed by the

plaintiffs, yet the following facts must be observed in analyzing said declarations:

(1) Francisco Lunsod himself did not know from whom Rufina Medel acquired said

parcels. He knew that she owned them only from the real estate tax declaration

presented by her in the municipality of San Pablo for the purposes of taxation and

by the real estate tax receipts issued to her on May 31, 1917, on which date she

was already dead, and in which receipt the two parcels situated in the barrio of Sta.

Catalina, municipality of San Pablo, are only vaguely and generally mentioned.

These documents, as may be seen, are not and cannot be considered as evidence of

title, as has repeatedly been held by this court in similar cases. Besides, it must alsobe remembered that in 1915 said lands had been placed in the assessment list in

her own name by Rufina Medel after the death of her daughter Anacleta Ortega,

who was the owner thereof, as heir of her deceased father Estanislao Ortega, when,

according to the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, she and the plaintiffs,

her brother and sister-in-law, were in joint possession of said real property. This

fact also explains why Rufina Medel in June of said year was able to effect the sale

of those three parcels, with the right to repurchase, in favor of Francisco Lunsod as

if she were the lawful and exclusive owner thereof, although with the condition

inserted in the corresponding documents that she, the vendor, would take care and

clean said parcels in consideration of a third party of the coconuts that might be



gathered during the term of the repurchase, a circumstance which may have caused

the Ortega brother, who participated with her in the possession thereof, not to

note that she had conveyed said parcels with pacto de retro to said Lunsod.

(2) Rufina Medel being in charge of the cleaning and watching of said parcels at said

compensation it is strange that Cipriano Medel should also be the overseer of

Lunsod, as stated by the latter, and this is particularly so, because said Cipriano

Medel in his testimony was not asked by the attorney for the defendants on this

point and did not make any statement whatever about it; on the other hand it is not

strange that Catalino Alaguilan Segundo should have declared that he was the

watchman of Lunsod and furthermore, that he participated to the extent of one-

fifth of the fruits collected on said parcels, for the reason that said person,

according to his testimony, had been working for Rufina Medel and had taken care

of said parcels and gathered the fruits thereon since the time of Rufina Medel; the

result, therefore, is that, although it may be true that Rufina Medel on June 3, 1915,

had sold the lands with pacto de retro to Francisco Lunsod, as appears from the

document already mentioned, the testimony of said Alaguilan Segundo does not

prove that the plaintiffs were not, jointly with Rufina Medel, in possession of said

parcels on the date when according to Francisco Lunsod, he was turned out of said

possession by Sinforoso Ortega and this is the more so when it is considered that,

according to Lunsod himself, the person who gathered the coconuts on said parcels

was his representative, Cipriano Medel, and his watchman Alaguilan Segundo, he

(Lunsod) having gone to the land only a few times, which he could not exactly

determine, and that he also left that work to Rufina Medel during her lifetime. It is

thus seen quite clearly why the plaintiffs Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega were

completely ignorant of the fact that Rufina Medel had sold said parcels to Francisco

Lunsod, and were unable to know that said Lunsod claimed to be in possession of

said lands.

(3) Cipriano Medel did not remember the boundaries of the parcel in Ma-ancel and

could not state how many coconut trees there were on it, because he had not seen

it although he stated that parcel was purchased from Mariano Ortega by his parents

and sisters Jacoba and Rufina Medel; and as he must have known everything

relative to the three parcels for, according to him and his sister Jacoba, they

inherited them from their other sister, now deceased, Rufina Medel, he mentioned

a parcel in the sitio of Duhat as the parcel by her from Julio Bajalaldia, about which

parcel nothing was said by the other witness Catalino Alaguilan Segundo or appears

in the record, said Alaguilan Segundo having, in turn, stated that what was

purchased by Rufina Medel from Julio Bajalaldia was the parcel in the sitio of

Catmon. The result s that as these two witnesses contradict themselves upon this

point nothing certain is proved as to the acquisition of said parcels; and said

Alaguilan Segundo being, according to his own statement, the overseer of said

parcel of Rufina Medel since the latter was married and prior to the year 1915, he

having succeeded Francisco Lunsod, and having about twenty years ago, as laborer

of Rufina Medel, taken to Julio Bajalaldia the payment of the price of the parcel in

Catmon and having, furthermore, as overseer and watchman of Lunsod with a right

to a share of one-fifth of the fruits, collected six times, as stated by him, the fruit of

the coconut trees planted thereon, it is at the same time strange that he was the

owner of the lands adjoining the parcels in Catmon and Lacdawen about which he

has been examined, not having been asked with respect to the boundaries and

owners of the properties adjoining the land at Ma-ancel.

(4) The same parcel in the sitio of Ma-ancel was, according to Alaguilan Segundo,

acquired by Rufina Medel from her mother through inheritance, which is contrary

to the testimony of Cipriano Medel, who testified, as already stated, that said parcel

was purchased by her parents from Mariano Ortega; and said Alaguilan Segundo

has also said that Rufina Medel acquired the parcel in Lacdawen from her father-in-

law Mariano Ortega as dowry when she married, while Cipriano Medel only stated

that parcel was not purchased by Rufina Medel from anybody but did not state how

she acquired it, notwithstanding that he and his sister Jacoba claimed that they

acquired the ownership thereof by inheritance from their deceased sister Rufina.

(5) Francisco Baldonado being a laborer, as stated by him, it is likewise strange that

he had four times purchased coconuts, gathered on said parcels, from the overseer

Cipriano Medel, and twice from Lunsod himself, that is, six times in all, as if he were

a merchant or business man. It is also doubtful that said witness was present when

Sinforoso Ortega suspended the operation of the collection of the fruits on the first

days of June, 1916, threatening to wound those who were engaged in that work,

because he did not remember the boundaries of the land as to which said

suspension was ordered or the number or coconuts gathered or that of the coconut

trees planted upon the land, and, on the other hand, Cipriano Medel himself in his

testimony did not state anything about his having sold at any time the coconut



gathered on said lands, as overseer of Francisco Lunsod, nor about Sinforoso Ortega

having threatened to injure those who were engaged in the gathering of the fruits;

said witness only stated that in 1916 Ortega seized said parcels from Lunsod,

prohibited the latter from gathering the coconuts on the land or from interfering

with them on the ground that he (Ortega) was their owner, which statement

indicates that Lunsod was present when said prohibition was made, and this is aside

from the fact that what has been stated by Alaguilan Segundo clearly leads to the

inference that he, and not Cipriano Medel, was the person who, as overseer and

watchman of the land of Lunsod, for he was entitled to a share of one-fifth of the

fruits, gathered the coconuts by order of Lunsod himself, an operation which

according to him, was effected about six times, which must be the same occasions

refereed to by the witness Baldonado when, according to him, he bought coconuts

from Cipriano Medel, for according to Lunsod himself he had gathered fruits six

times a year and that year was from June, 1915, when he bought the parcels from

Rufina Medel, to June, 1916, when according to the complaint, he was distributed

in the possession thereof. Alaguilan Segundo also did not state that when Sinforoso

Ortega seized said parcels in June , 1916, from Lunsod, he threatened to attack with

his bolo those who were gathering the fruits, nor did he testify that they were then

engaged in that task.

What has been said constitutes sufficient ground for not giving any credence to the

allegation of the defendants and appellants and the testimony of their witnesses

that said defendants owned and possessed the parcels in question. Upon the same

ground it can also be held that the trial court did not err in finding that the weight

of the evidence markedly preponderates in favor of the theory that the lands in

question passed, through inheritance, upon the death of Mariano Ortega, father of

Sinforoso, Francisca and Estanislao Ortega, to the last named person who, with his

wife Rufina Medel, took possession thereof, and that, therefore said couple having

had a daughter named Anacleta Ortega, who inherited said three parcels upon the

death of her father; upon the death of said daughter on June 17, 1903, said three

parcels of land passed by inheritance to her mother Rufina Medel. To this it must

also be added that it is likewise proven that Rufina Medel continued in possession

of said parcels jointly with the brother and sister of her deceased husband, who are

uncle and aunt, respectively, of her deceased daughter Anacleta, and who are the

appellees Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega, and that she was in such joint

possession on June 3, 1915, when she sold said parcels with pacto de retro to

Francisco Lunsod who, notwithstanding said sale, was not in possession thereof in

June, 1916, the date when, according to him he was turned out of said possession

by Sinforoso Ortega, by reason of which facts we cannot hold that the acts

indicative of that possession and testified to by Lunsod himself and his witnesses

and the witnesses of the other plaintiffs and appellees were duly proven.

Now, according to article 811 of the Civil Code an ascendant who inherits from a

descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other

ascendant, or from a brother or sister is obliged to reserve such property as he may

have acquired by operation of law in favor of the relatives within the third degree

belonging to the line from which such property came. In the decision rendered in

the case of Edroso vs. Sablan and Sablan (25 Phil., 295), in which the former, as heir

of her son, asked for the registration of certain property classified as reservable, the

application having been opposed by two legitimate uncles in their capacity as heirs

of their nephew entitled to the reservable property, and in which it was at the same

time asked that, in case the application be granted, the reservable character of the

property in their favor be noted, this court, speaking through the illustrious Chief

Justice, Cayetano S. Arellano, now deceased, laid down the following:

ESTATE; DUTY OF ASCENDANT, WHO INHERITS THROUGH A DESCENDANT, TO

RESERVE THE PROPERTY IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW; ARTICLE 811, CIVIL CODE. —

Property which an ascendant inherits by operation of law from his descendant and

which was inherited by the latter from another ascendant of his, must be reserved

by the ascendant heir in favor of uncles of the descendant from whom the

inheritance proceeded, who are his father's brother, because they are relatives

within the third degree, if they belong to the line whence the property proceededaccording to the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.

In the case at bar, Rufina Medel inherited by operation of law from her daughter

Anacleta Ortega, who died at the age of six years, the three parcels of land in

question situated in the barrio of Sta. Catalina in the municipality of San Pablo

Province of Laguna, which parcels had been acquired by said Anacleta Ortega

gratuitously, that is to say, also by inheritance from an ascendant, who was her

father Estanislao Ortega, and said three parcels having come from Mariano Ortega,

father of the deceased Estanislao Ortega and the appellees Sinforoso and Francisco

Ortega, who are therefore relatives within the third degree of the child Anacleta



Ortega, daughter of Estanislao Ortega, then according to the provisions of said

article 811, these pieces of land constitute reservable property in favor of said

Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, uncle and aunt of the descendant's predecessor in

interest with respect to the property.

With respect to the rights and obligations of the person obliged to reserve inconnection with the reservable property mentioned in the same article, the

discussion made by this court in the same decision in quite clear and explicit, to wit:

It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy,

dispose of, and recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the

absolute or complete ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the

rights to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of

disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or contract is

granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights of using and enjoying, and then

he is said not to have the fee simple — that is, the rights of disposal and recovery,which pertain to another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full

ownership.

The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:

"What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the

reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?"

There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate

title belonging to the persons in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were

so, the person holding the property could not apply for registration of title, but the

person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion

does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by decisions of

the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil

Code, and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.

Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points — the usufruct

and the fee simple; the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived,

but become obscured in the presence of that deceptive emphasis which only brings

out two things: that the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must

keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)

In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be

maintained — that is, that the surviving spouse (the person obligated by article 968

to make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the

descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in

the Code." (Ibid ., 238.)

The ascendant who inherits from a descendant, whether by the latter's wish or by

operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring

absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him

exclusively — use, enjoyment, disposal, and recovery. This absolute ownership,

which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no

relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they

die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the

property. If there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line

whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership

would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with

exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The

opinion which makes this limitation consists in reducing the ascendant heir to the

condition of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal and

recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as it does not have,

according to the opinion that has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the

father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference between the

case where a man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary

and the other as owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811

or of the father or mother in article 968. In the first case, there is not the slightest

doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the hereditary owner and

only he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform

any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the

right of usufruct in accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code),

or any act of recovery thereof except the limited one in the form prescribed in

article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the

ascendant who holds the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the

father or mother required by article 968 to reserve the right, can dispose of the

property they inherit itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his

or her child in first marriage, and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it,



while the persons in whose favor the right if required to be reserved in either case

cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.

Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 968 to

reserve the right may dispose of the property itself:

"Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by

the surviving spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his

or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive,

without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law."

It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but

under a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children

or descendants of the first marriage survive."

If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his

alienation thereof would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to

do so and without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that

the alienation subsists (to subsist is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the

provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:

"The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending

may mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of the

parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the

registration."

In such case, the child or legitimate descendant of the first marriage in whose favorthe rights is reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the

condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must

reserve the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person who must

reserve the right should outlive all the persons in whose favor the right is reserved

and then there would be no reasons for the condition subsequent that they survive

him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be

reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in

every way absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right

required by law to be reserved to the children is respected; while the effects of the

alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not become definite, it

will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what the

law establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968, wherein the

legislator expressly directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second

marriage shall reserve to the children or descendants of the first marriage

ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendant must make the

reservation.

Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading,

"Rights and obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be

reserved," in these words:

"During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right

required by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the

third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to them has been

assured , have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even have the

capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.

"The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the

things according to their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in

commenting upon the articles of the Code referring to use and usufruct.

"But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally,

the owner in fee simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided

in article 974 to 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the

Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that

articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer to property

reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this

subject, and the relatives within the third degree ought not to be more privileged in

the right reserved in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article

975, chiefly for the reason that the right required to be reserved carries with it a

condition subsequent, and the property subject to those conditions can validly be

alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such alienation to

continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)

Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:



"The ascendant acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether

or not there exist at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the

descendant from whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If

such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the death of the

ascendant. If they do not exist, the ascendant can freely dispose thereof. If this is

true, since the possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent can alienate

and encumber it, the ascendant may alienate the property required by law to be

reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more because no one can

give that does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore receive a limited

and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn have an

expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot

be transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the

person who is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may

rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved and they will

acquire it and all the rest that has the same character in complete ownership, in fee

simple, because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the death

of the usufructuary." (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservables, 304, 305.)

The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has,

beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the

reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition

subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to

dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of his to alienation, although

under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who

possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable

one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside

in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been

assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.

On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is

reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is in no way, either

actually, constructively, or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because

they have no title of ownership or of fee simple which they can transmit to another,

on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die

before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they

take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives

within the third degree, that is to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate

succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the

persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their rights has been

assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of

the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely

decided in the decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to

determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he

exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right required by

law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear

by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as it may even become

absolute should that person die."

Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act to disposal

inter vivos of the person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by

him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the

rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition

that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know that

he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to

us that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives

within the third degree of the descendant from whom he got the property to be

reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the

law: "To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident

of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of

December 30, 1897.)

Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the rightto the condition of a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be

reserved cannot attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property

the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that which the applicant has

made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the

conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the

usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use

and enjoyment of the property required by law to be reserved are all that the

person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienation the usufruct all

the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible manner.

The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic,



sine re, for it is not real, actual and positive, as is the case of the institution of two

heirs, one a usufructuary and the other the owner, by the express wish of the

predecessor in interest.

If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the rights has all the rights

inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, inaddition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it,

although under a condition. . . .

It is, therefore, indisputable, in view of the preceding discussion made in the

decision of this court just cited, that the person obliged to reserve, that is, Rufina

Medel, heir of her daughter Anacleta Ortega, was not only a usufructuary but also

the owner in fee simple of the three parcels of land in question, notwithstanding

the fact that they have the character of reservable property in favor of Sinforoso

and Francisca Ortega, relatives within the third degree of said Anacleta Ortega and

belonging to the line from which such property came, and, in her capacity as such,she could have, as she did, sold with the right to repurchase on June 3, 1915, said

three parcels to Francisco Lunsod; but it is also indisputable that Rufina Medel

acquired these parcels subject to a resolutory condition, that is to say, her

ownership of said property was subject to said condition, to wit, that there should

or should not exist at the time of her death relatives of Anacleta Ortega from whom

she inherited said property, included within the third degree and belonging to the

line from which said property came, by virtue of which condition said property was

impressed with the reservable character, according to the provision of article 811 of

the Civil Code, and therefore she could not have effected said sale without saving

the rights of the persons entitled to have the property reserved to them, bysecuring to the latter the value thereof, according to the provision of article 974

and 975 of the Civil Code in connection with article 109 of the Mortgage Law and in

the manner established in this article, the provisions of the first two articles being

applicable by analogy to reservable property mentioned in article 811 of the Civil

Code to which reference has already been made.

Rufina Medel not having complied with the provisions of said article in effecting the

sale of said parcels in favor of Francisco Lunsod, inasmuch as the document

executed for the purpose was not recorded in the registry of property, and she

could not, therefore, have made in the corresponding record the express

reservation of the right of Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega over said property, and

said Rufina Medel not having even mentioned in said document the fact that said

property was reservable, said alienation is void and can have no effect as against

the persons entitled to have such property reserved, who are Sinforoso and

Francisca Ortega. And Rufina Medel having died on April 10, 1916, leaving as her

survivors the persons already mentioned and entitled to have the property reserved

in their favor, and the condition attached to the title to said parcels having thus

been resolved, said parcels became the absolute and exclusive property of the

same persons entitled to have said property reserved as relatives within the third

degree of Anacleta Ortega and belonging to the line from which said property

came.

Rufina Medel not having acquired said parcels before her death in fee simple and

without the limitation which characterizes them as reservable property, for the

reason that Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, who were entitled to have such parcels

reserved, survived her, it is obvious that the brother and sister of the former,

Cipriano and Jacoba Medel did not, as they claim acquire said parcels by inheritance

from said deceased, and, consequently, they have no right to have said property

registered in the registry of deeds in their name and the opposition to said

registration presented by Francisco Lunsod in said case No. 219 is, therefore,

groundless.

The three parcels referred to not being, therefore property of the conjugal

partnership of the deceased Estanislao Ortega and Rufina Medel, but the separate

and exclusive property of the former, since he acquired them gratuitously from his

father Mariano Ortega, the title thereof passing afterwards to their daughterAnacleta Ortega, and, upon the latter's death, to Rufina Medel by inheritance from

Anacleta, with the character of reservable property in favor of Sinforoso and

Francisca Ortega, who acquired the absolute title thereto by virtue of said

character, the exclusion, ordered by the court, of said property from the inventory

presented by the administrator Cipriano Medel in the intestate proceedings for the

settlement of the estate of Rufina Medel, case No. 2218, was proper.

With respect to the possession of said parcels claimed by Francisco Lunsod of

which, he alleges, he was deprived by Sinforoso Ortega in June or July, 1916, these

facts were nor proved at the trial, as already stated, but, on the contrary, it was



proven that Rufina Medel continued in said possession in which, in some way or

another, her brother and sister-in-law, Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, the persons

entitled to have the property reserved in their favor, participated, although Rufina

Medel, according to the document of June 3, 1915, had already sold said parcels to

Lunsod with the right to repurchase, and therefore the remedy prayed for by the

latter in his complaint in the Court of First Instance, which is a reproduction of the

one previously filed in the court of the justice of the peace of San Pablo, and

docketed there as case No. 2322, is improper and groundless.

What has been said knows that the trial court did not commit errors Nos. 6, 8, and 9

assigned by the appellants in their brief; neither did the court below commit the 7th

error, for the judgment appealed from, there are set forth the conclusions arrived

at by the trial judge with respect to the points in issue and which his Honor

considered proved, it being there stated, at the same time, that the preponderance

of the evidence is notably in favor of the theory maintained by the appellees

Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the addition

that Sinforoso Ortega is absolved from the complaint filed against him by Francisco

Lunsod on May 9, 1917, and docketed as case No. 2322, for unlawful entry and

detainer; and the opposition of said Lunsod to the application of Cipriano and

Jacoba Medel for registry of deeds is dismissed, and the opposition entered by

Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega to said registration is sustained, with the costs of

first instance as ordered in the judgment appealed from, and the costs of this

instance against the appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-25039 March 2, 1926

VICENTE TUAZON, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

HERMOGENES REYES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, and

ROBERTO SIOCHI, respondents.

Santos & Benitez for petitioner.

The respondent judge in his own behalf.

Juan Bernales for the other respondent.

OSTRAND, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari upon the following facts: In an action bought

by Roberto Siochi against Petronilo David et al. for the partition of a track of land.

this court in a decision promulgated January 8, 1919, ordered the partition in equal

shares between the plaintiff and the defendant Petronilo David of some 15 hectares

of the land an d the case was ordered returned to the Court of First Instance for

further proceedings in accordance with sections 184 et seq. of the Code of Civil

Procedure.1

Commissioners of partition were thereupon appointed but for reasons which do not

clearly appear, they did not take immediate action in the matter and in the

meantime, Petronilo David obtained Torrens certificates of title for the land in

cadastral case No. 10 of the Province of Pampanga and, on July 30, 1921, sold the

land to the petitioner herein, Vicente Tuazon, the deed containing a recital to the

effect that of the land so sold as area of 7 hectares and 50 ares was in dispute

between the vendor and Roberto Siochi and that the purchaser Vicente Tuazon was

merely subrogated to the rights and obligations of the vendor in relation to said

disputed portion and that said vendor did warrant the title to the same. Thereafter

transfer certificates of title were issued in favor of Vicente Tuazon on March 8,

1923, but through the negligence of the register of deeds the reservation made in

regard to the land in dispute with Siochi was not entered upon the certificate of

title.

Thereafter, on December 26, 1923, Tuazon presented to the Court of First Instance

of Pampanga, a written protest against the partition of the ground that he held

Torrens certificates of title to all the land and by reason of said protest the

Honorable Guillermo Guevara, Judge of that court, after requiring the production in

court of the petitioner's transfer certificates of title, set aside the order of partition

and revoked the appointment of the commissioners in an order dated February 4,

1924. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Siochi and on July 7, 1924, the

herein respondent the Honorable Hermogenes Reyes, then Judge of the Court of



First Instance of Pampanga, revoked the order of his predecessor and ordered the

commissioners to execute the partition of the land.

In compliance with the order of Judge Reyes, the commissioners presented their

report adjudicating to Siochi his share of the land in dispute which report was duly

approved by said judge. Tuazon refused to deliver possession to Siochi of the landawarded the latter and, on April 1, 1925, the respondent judge issued an order

directing that Siochi be placed in possession of the land adjudicated to him.

This action was thereupon brought the petitioner maintaining that not being a party

to the original action his title was not affected by the partition proceedings and that

therefore the order of April 1, 1925, directing that Siochi be placed in possession of

the portion adjudicated to him in said proceeding was beyond the jurisdiction of the

court.

A purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith

holds an indefeasible title to the land and is such was the case here the petitioner's

contention would be perfectly valid. But there the element of good faith is lacking.

The defendant acquired his title while the partition proceedings were pending and

his title is therefore subject to the incidents and results of the pending litigation and

is no better than that of the vendor in whose shoes he now stands. In these

circumstances, the petitioner's transfer certificates of title can afford him no special

protection. The deed under which the title was acquired expressly recites that the

land was in dispute and that as to the disputed portion only the interest of the

vendor was conveyed. In ordering the execution of the judgment of partition the

respondent judge did therefore not exceed his jurisdiction and a writ of certiorari

will not lie.

During the pendency of this action, the respondent Siochi appears to have executed

a deed for the land in question in favor of Rafael and Felipe David who have now

filed a petition for intervention is unnecessary and the petition therefor is denied,

but upon cancellation and the transfer of certificates of title Nos. 617 and 618 now

held by the petitioner Vicente Tuazon and upon presentation to the register of

deeds for the deed executed by Siochi in favor of Rafael and Felipe David, together

with a technical description of the segregated portion of the land approved by the

General Land Registration Office, transfer certificate of the title may be issued

direct to said Rafael and Felipe David in accordance with the deed without previous

issuance of such certificate to Roberto Siochi in the partition proceedings embraces

portions of two cadastral lots, Nos. 4166 and 4173, it will be necessary to subdivide

said lots in conformity with the provisions of section 6 of Act No. 2259.

For the reasons stated the petition for a writ of certiorari is hereby denied with the

costs against the petitioner. The preliminary injunction hereinbefore issued isdissolved without prejudice to the respondent Siochi's claim for damages suffered

by virtue of the issuance of said injunction. Let transfer certificates of title Nos. 617

and 618 of the registry of deeds of the Province of Pampanga be detached for

cancellation and issuance of new certificates with properly approved technical

description in accordance with the result of the partition proceedings. So ordered.

G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913

MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.

PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.

Francisco Dominguez for appellant.

Crispin Oben for appellees.

ARELLANO, C.J.:

The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as

required by law to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and

issuance of title to two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan,

Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1

hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed, one for each parcel,

but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.

Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September

22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1,

1881, and who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died

on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels

of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the



hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her

ownership.

Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan — that is, two uncles german of Pedro

Sablan — appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two

things: Either that the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the rightreserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel."

(B. of E., 11, 12.)

The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed

through a bill of exceptions.

Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in

question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that

in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the

mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.

The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of

error), and denies that the land which are the subject matter of the application are

required by law to be reserved — a contention we regard as indefensible.

Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by

inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano

Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by

inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they

having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had between

him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.

A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a

valuable consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article 968 of

the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what

he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german are

within the third degree of blood relationship.

The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired

without a valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or

sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for

the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the

property proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)

Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels

of land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration — that is, by

inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them byoperation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to

the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded.

The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to

be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.

But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in

question have been acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired

without a valuable consideration, which is by operation of law, is required by law to

reserved.

The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first

instance, but only herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that

"Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in 1882, before the enforcement

of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right required by law to be reserved,

of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of action; and finally,

opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they had

it" (p. 49).

However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that

the applicant inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died

"unmarried and without issue." The trial court so held as a conclusion of fact,

without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan

died without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her son's

legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:

In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his

ascendants shall from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.

The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of

these lands had passed into her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the

case presents no testamentary provision that demonstrate any transfer of property



from the son to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's wish. The

legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was abintestate or

by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act

No. 190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have

therefore been fully complied with.

If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his

property, all he left at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only

what he would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.

The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the

hereditary estate of the children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly

dispose of the other half, with the exception of what is established in article 836.

(Civil Code, art. 809.)

In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to

be reserved, because it is what by operation of law could full to the mother from

her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved.

This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.

No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the

subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved, because the

interested party has not proved that either of them became her inheritance

through the free disposal of her son.

Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be

admitted that a half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother byoperation of law. The law provides that the other half is also presumed to be

acquired by operation of law — that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise, proof to

offset this presumption must be presented by the interested party, that is, that the

other half was acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of law.

Nor is the third assignments of error admissible — that the trial court failed to

sustain the renunciation of the right required by law to be reserved, which the

applicant attributes to the opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the

case. The appellant deduces it from the fact that the appellees did not contradict

the following statement of hers at the trial:

The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablandies and was buried, his brother came

to my house and said that those rice lands were mine, because we had already

talked about making delivery of them. (p. 91).

The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact

that Basilio Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and must bedelivered to her it cannot be deduced that he renounced the right required by law

to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil

Code, for they really belong to her and must be delivered to her.

The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of

action. The appellant alleges prescription of the opponent's right of action for

requiring fulfillment of the obligation they attribute to her recording in the property

registry the right required by law to be reserved, in accordance with the provisions

of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created by law, it prescribed in the

time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of the right alleged to the reserved by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)

The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law

are. Nor did she do so in first instance, where she says only the following, which is

quoted from the record: "I do not refer to the prescription of the right required by

law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of the right of action

of those who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking that guaranty, for

those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for

recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for

seeking entry in the registry; but as they have not exercised that right of action,

such right of action for seeking here that it be recorded has prescribed. The right of

action for requiring that the property be reserved has not prescribed, but the right

of action for guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is required by

law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).

The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring

the applicant to constitute the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for

guaranteeing the effectiveness of the required by law to be reserved; but because

that right of action has prescribed, that property has not been divested of its

character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has such character by

virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippine in



December, 1889, and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into

effect in the country by law of July 14, 1893; that from December, 1889, to July,

1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code acquired the character of

property reserved by operation of law was such independently of the Mortgage

Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that

although the Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it

has in no way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to

reinforce the same merely by granting the right of action to the persons in whose

favor the right is reserved by operation of law to require of the person holding the

property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in

due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to lose

the right itself; that the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage

the accessory obligation, and loss of the accessory does not mean loss of the

principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)

The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of landin question being indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right of action

which the Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final enforcement of such right has

prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this appeal is the question raised in

the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can and ought to

be registered, not in the property registry newly established by the Mortgage Law,

but in the registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the

allegations quoted some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate

subject as this of the rights required to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief

disgression on the most essential points may not be out of place here.

The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended

one of the colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and consequently in the

Philippines. The preamble of said amended Mortgage Law states:

The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the

modifications necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the

Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation

of the law on real property, and consequently of agrarian credit.

The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the

eight day.

Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil

Code, as set forth in article 968 thereof, where it says:

Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a

seconds marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of

the first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may have requiredfrom the deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer

without a valuable consideration."

The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines

on December 1, 189, do not contain any provision that can be applied to the right

reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil

Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the

effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first marriage when their

father or mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the

supreme court of Spain, for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been reiterated:

That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to

secure the right required to be reserved in the property refer especially to the

spouses who contract second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be

applicable to the right establishes in article 811, because, aside from the legal

reason, which is the same in both cases, such must be the construction from the

important and conclusive circumstance that said provisions are set forth in the

chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either testate or intestate, and

because article 968, which heads the section that deals in general with property

required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811;

and it would consequently be contradictory to the principle of the law and of the

common nature of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.

Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the

supreme court has already declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in article

977 and 978 for the rights required by law to the reserved to which said articles

refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811, because the same

principle exists and because of the general nature of the provisions of the chapter

in which they are found."



From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to

July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the

persons entitled to such right would have been able to institute, against the

ascendant who must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and

guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first marriage against

their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance,

under article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved,

annotation in the property registry of such right reserved in the real property and

appraisal of the personal property; and the guaranty, under article 978, is the

assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is validly

alienated.

But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in

the Philippines this is not only a principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for

the applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance

and guaranty provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is a positiveprovision of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain, to wit, article

199, which read thus:

The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil

Code can only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be

reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be require by the person who should

legally represent them. In either case the right of the persons in whose favor the

property must be reserved will be secured by the same requisites as set forth in the

preceding article (relative to the right reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code),

applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect tothe father .

In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with

article 199 quoted, so that said article 168 reads as thus:

Legal mortgage is established:

1. . . .

2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the

property required to be reserved, upon the property of the person obliged to

reserve it.

This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that

the period of ninety days fixed for the right of action to the guaranty, that is, torequire the mortgage that guarantees the effectiveness of the right required by law

to be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a principle in this matter.

Now it should by noted that such action has not prescribed, because the period of

ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action

of the persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation

of the person who must make the reservation.

Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in

court the proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves

may demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to theperson obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."

Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the

case of article 199 of the law the proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will

be instituted within the ninety days succeeding the date of the date of the

acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to reserve the property;

after this period has elapsed , the interested parties may require the institution of

such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their legal

representatives."

Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by

prescription of the period for the right must be reserved, but really the

commencement thereof, enables them to exercise it at any time, since no limits is

set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in

the two parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of the

Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end,

and an allegation of prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot

be sustained.

Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of

action for requiring that the property be reserved , for she explicitly so stated at the



trial, and as the case presents no necessity for the proceedings that should be

instituted in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription

of the right of action cannot take place, because such right of action does not exist

with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No.

496 of the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as

was done in the present case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the

claim set up by the two opponents for recording therein the right reserved in either

parcel of land.

Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration

because of this finding set forth in its decision:

Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and

the two uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made

except in the name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)

It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy,

dispose of, and recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the

absolute or complete ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the

right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of

disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or contract is

granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an enjoying, and then

he is said not to have the fee simple — that is, the rights of disposal and recovery,

which pertain to another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full

ownership.

The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:

What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the

reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?

There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate

title belonging to the person in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so,

the person holding the property could not apply for registration of title, but the

person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion

does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by decisions of

the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil

Code, and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.

Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points — the usufruct

and the fee simple; the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived,

but become obscure in the presence of that deceptive emphasis which only bringsout two things: that the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must

keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)

In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be

maintained — that is, that the surviving spouse (the person obliged by article 968 to

make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants

immediately as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the Code."

(Ibid ., 238.)

The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by

operation of law, requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring

absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him

exclusively — use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership,

which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no

relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they

die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the

property. If there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line

whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership

would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with

exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The

opinion which makes this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the

condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal and

recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as it does not have,

according to the opinion that he has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the

father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference between the

case where a man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary

and the other as owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811

or of the father or mother in article 968. In the first case, there is not the slightest

doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the hereditary owner and

he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform any



act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right

of usufruct in accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any

act of recovery thereof except the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486

of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendants who

holds the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father of mother

required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they might

itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first

marriage, and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons

in whose favor the right is required to be reserved in either case cannot perform

any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.

Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to

reserve the right may dispose of the property itself:

Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by

the surviving spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at hisor her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive,

without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage of Law.

It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but

under a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children

or descendants of the first marriage survive."

If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his

alienation thereof would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to

do so and without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that

the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the

provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:

The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending

may mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of the

parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the

registration.

In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose

favor the right is reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as

the condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who

must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person who

must reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose favor the right is

reserved and then there would be no reason for the condition subsequent that they

survive him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be

reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in

very way absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right

required by law to be reserved to the children is respected; while the effects of the

alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not become definite, it

will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what the

law establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968, wherein the

legislator expressly directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second

marriage shall reserve to the children or descendants of the first marriage

ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendants must make the

reservation.

Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading,"Rights and obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be

reserved," in these words:

During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right

required by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the

third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to them has been

assured , have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even have the

capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.

The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the

things according to their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in

commenting upon the article of the Code referring to use and usufruct.

But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the

owner in fee simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in

article 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the

Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that

articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer to property

reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this

subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privileged in

the right reserved in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article



975, chiefly for the reason that the right required to be reserved carries with it a

condition subsequent, and the property subject to those conditions can validly be

alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such alienation to

continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)

Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:

The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether

or not there exists at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the

descendants from whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If

such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the death of the

ascendants. If they do not exist, the ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is

true, since the possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent can alienate

and encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the property required by law to be

reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more because no one can

give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn have an

expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot

be transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the

person who is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may

rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved and they will

complete ownership, in fee simple, because the condition and the usufruct have

been terminated by the death of the usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes

reservable, 304, 305.)

The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has,

beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the

reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition

subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to

dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a

condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or

should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a

word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him

while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he

can do anything that a genuine owner can do.

On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right

is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually,

constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have

no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on

the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die

before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they

take their place in the succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives

within the third degree, that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate

succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the

persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their rights has been

assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of

the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely

decided in the decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to

determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he

exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right required by

law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear

by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even become

absolute should that person die."

Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal

inter vivos of the person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by

him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the

rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition

that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know that

he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to

us that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives

within the third degree of the descendants from whom he got the property to be

reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the

law: "To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident

of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of

December 30, 1897.)

Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right

to the condition of a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be

reserved cannot attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property

the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that which the appellant has



made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the

conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the

usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use

and enjoyment of the property required by law to be reserved are all that the

person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct all

the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible manner.

The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic,

sine re, for it is not real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs,

one a usufructuary and the other the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor

in interest.

If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights

inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in

addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it,

although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to the following terms:

Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a

condition subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the

ownership of the property he has inherited, when the persons in whose favor the

reservation must be made degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them

in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?

It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of

the vendor:

The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art.

1511.)

If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after

he has once acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has

a condition subsequent annexed — that the alienation the purchaser may make will

be terminated, if the vendor should exercise the right granted him by article 1507,

which says:

Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the

right to recover the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and

whatever more may have been agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold

by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding

this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may

register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged — that is to

say, the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of

the vendor. He may alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well

from the title entered in the registry that he acquires a title revocable after a fixed

period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than the purely contingent

expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day

what another has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not

applying to the person who must make the reservation the provision therein

relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto, since the argument in his favor is

the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositivo.

Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and

declare that the applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of

land which are the subject matter of the applicants, recording in the registration theright required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents,

Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special findings as

to costs.

G.R. No. L-23770 February 18, 1926

MAGIN RIOSA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

PABLO ROCHA, MARCELINA CASAS, MARIA CORRAL and CONSOLACION R. DE

CALLEJA, defendants-appellees.

Domingo Imperial for appellant

Mariano Locsin for appellees.

AVANCEÑA, C.J.:

Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her

first and only marriage and during which time she bore him three children named

Santiago, Jose and Severina. The latter died during infancy and the other two

survived their father, Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa, no deceased, married

Francisca Villanueva, who bore him two children named Magin and Consolacion



Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased, married Marcelina Casas and they had one child

who died before the father, the latter therefore leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left

a will dividing his property between his two children, Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving

the latter the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint. Upon the death of

Jose Riosa he left a will in which he named his wife, Marcelina Casas, as his only

heir.

On May 16, 1917, the will of Jose Riosa was filed for probate. Notwithstanding the

fact that Marcelina Casas was the only heir named in the will, on account of the

preterition of Maria Corral who, being the mother of Jose Riosa, was his legitimate

heir, I Marcelina Casas and Maria Corral, on the same date of the filing of the will

for probate, entered into a contract by which they divided between themselves the

property left by Jose Riosa, the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint

being assigned to Maria Corral.

On October 26, 1920, Maria Corral sold parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10 and 11 toMarcelina Casas for the sum of P20,000 in a public instrument which was recorded

in the registry of deeds on November 6, 1920. On November 3, 1920, Marcelina

Casas sold these eight parcels of land to Pablo Rocha for the sum of P60,000 in a

public document which was recorded in the registry of deeds on November 6, 1920.

On September 24, 1921, Pablo Rocha returned parcels No. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 to Maria

Corral stating in the deed executed for the purpose that these parcels of land had

been erroneously included in the sale made by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas.

The Court of first Instance denied the probate of the will of Jose Riosa, but on

appeal this court reversed the decision of the lower court and allowed the will to

probate.1

The legal proceedings for the probate of the will and the settlement of

the testate estate of Jose Riosa were followed; and, at the time of the partition,

Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas submitted to the court the contract of

extrajudicial partition which they had entered into on May 16, 1917, and which was

approved by the court, by order of November 12, 1920, as though it had been made

within the said testamentary proceedings.

From the foregoing is appears that the eleven parcels of land described in the

complaint were acquired by Jose Riosa, by lucrative title, from his father Mariano

Riosa and that after the death of Jose Riosa, by operation of law, they passed to his

mother Maria Corral. By virtue of article 811 of the Civil Code these eleven parcels

of land are reservable property. It results, furthermore, that parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,

7, 8 and 9 still belong in fee simple to Maria Corral, and that parcels 10 and 11 were

successively sold by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to Pablo

Rocha. Lastly, it appears that Magin and Consolacion Riosa are the nearest relatives

within the third degree of the line from which this property came.

This action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the property should have been

reserved, against Maria Corral, whose duty it was to reserve it, and against

Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha as purchasers of parcels 10 and 11. Consolacion

Riosa de Calleja who was also bound to make the reservation was included as a

defendant as she refused to join as plaintiff.

The complaint prays that the property therein described be declared reservable

property and that the plaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reservees;

that this reservation be noted in the registry of deeds; that the sale of parcels 10

and 11 to Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be declared valid only in so far as itsaves the right of reservation in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and of the

defendant Consolacion Riosa, and that this right of reservation be also noted on the

deeds of sale executed in favor of Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha; that Maria

Corral, Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha give a bond of P50,000, with good and

sufficient sureties, in favor of the reservees as surety for the conservation and

maintenance of the improvements existing on the said reservable property. The

dispositive part of the court's decision reads as follows:

For the foregoing reasons it is held:

1. That the eleven parcels of land described in paragraph 6 of the complaint have

the character of reservable property; 2. That the defendant Maria Corral, being

compelled to make the reservation, must reserve them in favor of the plaintiff

Magin Riosa and the defendant Consolacion Riosa de Calleja in case that either of

these should survive her; 3. That Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja have

the right, in case that Maria Corral should die before them, to receive the said

parcels or their equivalent.

In virtue whereof, the defendant Maria Corral is ordered: 1. To acknowledge the

right of Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja to the reservation of the said

parcels of lands described in the complaint, which she shall expressly record in the



registration of said lands in the office of the register of deeds of this province; 2. To

insure the delivery of said parcels of lands, or their equivalent, to Magin Riosa and

Consolacion Riosa de Calleja, should either of them survive her, either by a

mortgage thereon or by a bond in the amount of P30,000, without express

pronouncement as to costs.

The other defendants are absolved from the complaint.

Inasmuch as the reservation from its inception imposes obligations upon the

reservor (reservista) and creates rights in favor of the reservation (reservatarios) it

is of the utmost importance to determine the time when the land acquired the

character of reservable property.

It will be remembered that on May 16, 1917, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas

entered into a contract of extrajudicial partition of the property left by Jose Riosa,

in which they assigned to Maria Corral, as her legitime, the parcels of land here in

question, and at the same time petitioned for the probate of the will of Jose Riosa

and instituted the testamentary proceeding. In support of the legality of the

extrajudicial partition between Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas the provision of

section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure is invoked, which authorizes the heirs of

a person dying without a will to make a partition without the intervention of the

courts whenever the heirs are all of age and the deceased has left no debts. But this

legal provisions refers expressly to intestate estates and, of course, excludes testate

estates like the one now before us.

When the deceased has left a will the partition of his property must be made in

accordance therewith. According to section 625 of the same Code no will can pass

property until it is probated. And even after being probated it cannot pass any

property if its provisions impair the legitime fixed by law in favor of certain heirs.

Therefore, the probate of the will and the validity of the testamentary provisions

must be passed upon by the court.

For the reasons stated, and without making any express finding as to the efficacy of

the extrajudicial partition made by Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas, we hold that

for the purposes of the reservation and the rights and obligations arising

thereunder in connection with the favored relatives, the property cannot be

considered as having passed to Maria Corral but from the date when the said

partition was approved by the court, that is, on November 12, 1920. In the case of

Pavia vs. De la Rosa (8 Phil., 70), this court laid down the same doctrine in the

following language:

The provisions of Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) have annulled the provisions

of article 1003 and others of the Civil Code with regard to the pure or simpleacceptance of the inheritance of a deceased person or that made with benefit of

inventory and the consequences thereof.

x x x x x x x x x

The heir legally succeeds the deceased from whom he derives his right and title, but

only after the liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of same, and the

adjudication of the residue of the estate of the deceased, and in the meantime the

only person in charge by law to attend to all claims against the estate of the

deceased debtor is the executor or administrator appointed by a competent court.

As has been indicated, parcels 10 and 11 described in the complaint were first sold

by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas who later sold them to Pablo Rocha. In this

appeal it is urged that Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, who were absolved by the

court below, be ordered to acknowledge the reservation as to parcels 10 and 11,

acquired by them, and to have the said reservation noted on their titles. This

argument, of course, is useless as to Marcelina Casas for the reason that she

transferred all her rights to Pablo Rocha.

It has been held by jurisprudence that the provisions of the law referred to in article

868 tending to assure the efficacy of the reservation by the surviving spouse areapplicable to the reservation known as "reserva troncal," referred to in article 811,

which is the reservation now under consideration.

In accordance with article 977, Maria Corral, reservor, is obliged to have the

reservation noted in the registry of deeds in accordance with the provisions of the

Mortgage Law which fixes the period of ninety days for accomplishing it (article

199, in relation with article 191, of the Mortgage Law). According to article 203 of

the General Regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law, this time must be

computed from the acceptance of the inheritance. But as this portion of the Civil

Code, regarding the acceptance of the inheritance, has been repealed, the time, as



has been indicated, must be computed from the adjudication of the property by the

court to the heirs, in line with the decision of this court hereinabove quoted. After

the expiration of this period the reservees may demand compliance with this

obligation.

If Maria Corral had not transferred parcels 10 and 11 to another there would be nodoubt that she could be compelled to cause the reservable character of this

property to be noted in the registry of deeds. This land having been sold to

Marcelina Casas who, in turn, sold it to Pablo Rocha the question arises whether the

latter can be compelled to have this reservation noted on his title. This acquisition

by Pablo Rocha took place when it was the duty of Maria Corral to make the

notation of the reservation in the registry and at the time when the reservees had

no right to compel Maria Corral to make such notation, because this acquisition was

made before the expiration of the period of ninety days from November 12, 1920,

the date of the adjudication by the court, after which the right of the reservees to

commence an action for the fulfillment of the obligation arose. But the land firstpassed to Marcelina Casas and later to Pablo Rocha together with the obligation

that the law imposes upon Maria Corral. They could not have acquired a better title

than that held by Maria Corral and if the latter's title was limited by the reservation

and the obligation to note it in the registry of deeds, this same limitation is attached

to the right acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha.

In the transmission of reservable property the law imposes the reservation as a

resolutory condition for the benefit of the reservees (article 975, Civil Code). The

fact that the resolvable character of the property was not recorded in the registry

of deed at the time that it was acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha cannotaffect the right of the reservees, for the reason that the transfers were made at the

time when it was the obligation of the reservor to note only such reservation and

the reservees did not them have any right to compel her to fulfill such an obligation.

Marcelina Casas, as well as Pablo Rocha, Knew of the reservable character of the

property when they bought it. They had knowledge of the provisions of the last will

and testament of Mariano Riosa by virtue of which these parcels were transferred

to Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was one of the legatees in the will. Marcelina Casas was

the one who entered into the contract of partition with Maria Corral, whereby

these parcels were adjudicated to the latter, as a legitimate heir of Jose Riosa. Pablo

Rocha was the very person who drafted the contracts of sale of these parcels of

land by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to himself. These facts,

together with the relationship existing between Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas

and Pablo Rocha, the former a daughter-in-law and the latter a nephew of Maria

Corral, amply support the conclusion that both of them knew that these parcels of

land had been inherited by Maria Corral, as her legitime from her son Jose Riosa

who had inherited them, by will, from his father Mariano Riosa, and were

reservable property. Wherefore, the duty of Maria Corral of recording the

reservable character of lots 10 and 11 has been transferred to Pablo Rocha and the

reservees have an action against him to compel him to comply with this obligation.

The appellant also claims that the obligation imposed upon Maria Corral of insuring

the return of these parcels of land, or their value, to the reservees by means of a

mortgage or a bond in the amount of P30,000, also applies to Pablo Rocha. The law

does not require that the reservor give this security, the recording of the

reservation in the registry of deeds being sufficient (art. 977 of the Civil Code).There is no ground for this requirement inasmuch as, the notation once is made,

the property will answer for the efficacy of the reservation. This security for the

value of the property is required by law (art. 978, paragraph 4, of the Civil Code) in

the case of a reservation by the surviving spouse when the property has been sold

before acquiring the reservable character (art 968 of the Civil Code), but is not

applicable to reservation known as reserva troncal (art 811 of the Civil Code). In the

case of Dizon and Dizon vs. Galang (page 601, ante), this court held that:

* * * As already intimated, the provisions of the law tending to give efficacy to a

reservation by the widowed spouse mentioned in article 968 are applicable to thereserva troncal provided for in article 811. But as these two reservations vary in

some respects, these rules may be applied to the reserva troncal only in so far as

the latter is similar to a reservation by the widowed spouse. In the reserva troncal

the property goes to the reservor as reservable property and it remains so until the

reservation takes place or is extinguished. In a reservation by the widowed spouse

there are two distinct stages, one when the property goes to the widower without

being reservable, and the other when the widower contracts a second marriage,

whereupon the property, which theretofore has been in his possession free of any

encumbrance, becomes reservable. These two stages also affect differently the

transfer that may be made of the property. If the property is sold during the first



stage, before becoming reservable, it is absolutely free and is transferred to the

purchaser unencumbered. But if the sale is made during the second stage, that is,

when the duty to reserve has arisen, the property goes to the purchaser subject to

the reservation, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law. This is

the reason why the law provides that should the property be sold before it

becomes reservable, or before the widower contracts another marriage, he will be

compelled to secure the value of the property by a mortgage upon contracting a

new marriage, so that the reservation may not lose its efficacy and that the rights of

those for whom the reservation is made may be assured. This mortgage is not

required by law when the sale is made after the reservation will follow the

property, without prejudice to the contrary provisions of the Mortgage Law and the

rights of innocent purchasers, there being no need to secure the value of the

property since it is liable for the efficacy of the reservation by a widowed spouse to

secure the value of the property sold by the widower, before becoming reservable

are not applicable to the reserva troncal where the property goes to the ascendant

already reservable in character. A sale in the case of reserva troncal might be

analogous to a sale made by the widower after contacting a second marriage in the

case of a reservation by the widowed spouse.

Since Maria Corral did not appeal, we cannot modify the appealed judgment in so

far as it is unfavorable to her. As she has been ordered to record in the registry the

reservable character of the other parcels of land, the subject of this action, the

questions raised by the appellant as to her are decided.

The judgment appealed from is modified and Pablo Rocha is ordered to record in

the registry of deeds the reservable character of parcels 10 11, the subject of thiscomplaint, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Street Malcolm, Villamor, Strand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA,

ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA,

BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA

LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO

LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y

LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,

ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA.ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA

Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,

TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA,

respondents.

AQUINO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët

Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance

of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and

damages and holding, as not subject to reserve troncal , the properties which her

mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No.

73335). The facts are as follows:

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on

June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven

children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three

sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.

On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason werepartitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the

heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by

Benito F. Legarda.

Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her

sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.

Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to

herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena

Legarda. The said properties consist of the following: 1äwphï1.ñët



(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of

P3,699.63.

(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in

certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine

Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila Times.

(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles),

80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.

1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205,

48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;

1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal,

now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of

deeds of Baguio;

1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the

Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael

describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;

1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds

(Streets);

l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila

registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):

2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of T0ayabas.

These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of

adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda

as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.

Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents

wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in

favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren

in all). The document reads: 1äwphï1.ñët

A mis hijos :

Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes

que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria

La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values Legarda.

De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he

0donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit

La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta

construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races. 1äwphï1.ñët

(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA

6 Marzo 1953

During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six

surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the

estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of

their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.

Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a

holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of

Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de

Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs.

Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix,filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's

estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena,

on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be

inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the

children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was

opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20,

1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and

her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said



properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her

holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and

her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).

As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this

appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of errorthat the lower court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable

properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.

On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error

contend that the lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the

estate of her daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and

hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not

holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable properties and that

her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.

The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs.

Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of

December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to

the petition for review.

In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under

undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved

only the issue of whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal

that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.

The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involvingfactual matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass

upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.

The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under

article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda.

de Legarda could dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the

exclusion of her six children.

Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her

daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the

reservees in the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the

reservees in the second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?

As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first

impression. lt was resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before

discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in the Florentino case andother pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on the nature of

reserve troncal, also called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.

Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in

descanting on the nature of reserve troncal which together with the reserva viudal

and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the

decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership

caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the

reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a

certain family for generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy,

and is incompatible with the socialization of ownership.

The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which

fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they penalize

legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and inequitable.

However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission,

restored the reserve troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and

Castan Tobenas has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.

Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article891, which reads: 1äwphï1.ñët

ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese

adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla

obligado a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de

los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la linea de donde

los bienes proceden

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the

latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or




law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to

the line from which said property came.

In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property

from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by

another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the saiddescendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the

benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant

( prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came.

So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title

(inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased

descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession

or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of

another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the

reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of

the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees ( reservatarios) or the relatives

within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the

first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas

Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).

If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia

Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the

death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of

his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the

meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).

The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister

from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous

title, (2) the descendant or prepositus ( prepositus) who received the property, (3)

the reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the

( prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within

the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the ( line o tronco) from

which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the

reservor.

The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil.

1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31,

1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor,

72 Phil. 392).

The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidossecularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extrañas

por el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la

vide personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran

quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203;

Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that

case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father Victorians. Pedro

died in 1902, single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited

from him the two parcels of land.

It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The

reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro

Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system

in her name but the fact that the land was reservable property in favor of her two

brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.

In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half

share of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Mañalac.

When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her

father, Anacleto Mañalac who owned the other one-half portion.

Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt

was held that the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of

Anacleto Mañalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and

Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Mañalac, who

belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs. Mañalac

114 Phil. 964).

Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil.

480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and



Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang,

48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo

Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina

vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.

The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or theone at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the

property last revolved by descent. He is called the prepositus (Cabardo vs.

Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).

In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother,

Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo

Abordo. ln his hands, the property was reservable property. Upon the death of

Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of

Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.

First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They

cannot even represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives

within the third degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).

Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to

the rule of representation. But the representative should be within the third degree

from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and

relationship by affinity are excluded.

Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient

gives nothing in return such as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44

Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p . 360).

The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the

ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of

relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property

came

(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject

to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor

predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable

property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the

revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are

revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor

but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs.

Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46

Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.

279.)

The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de

retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional .

The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory

condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees,

the transferee of the property should deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no

reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the transferee's title would become

absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono vs.

Nequia 93 Phil. 120).

On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent

right. His expectant right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt would

become absolute should the reservor predecease the reserves.

The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can

require that the reservable character of the property be recognized by the

purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3;

Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).

There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable

property is illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo

Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).

And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate

and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer



ownership to the vendee only if and when the reserves survives the reservor

(Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1äwphï1.ñët

The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant

( prepositus) said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had

temporarily and accidentally stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authoritiesare all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter

must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable

property. ( J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)

Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate

acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from

doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose,

they can compel the annotation of their right in the registry of property even while

the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs.

Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).

This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural

heirs of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of

the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as

there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).

The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant

(prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the

condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p.

286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in

Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus

becomes, "automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable

property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)

In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable

properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The

reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or

relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or

they survived Mrs. Legarda.

So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could

convey the reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the

third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the

second degree, her three daughters and three sons. As indicated at the outset, that

issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.

We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen

grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter

Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate

(Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition

mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the

reservor.

As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the

reservable properties from the prepositus, not from the reservor.

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all

the nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case

are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the

reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share

therein.

To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the

reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and,

consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring

violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.

We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs.

Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was ruled: 1äwphï1.ñët

Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant

(reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants

as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime,

for the reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving

the same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its

delivery to the relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest



( prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the

property, if he has at the same time the right of a reservatario (reserves).

ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife

Severina Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two

inherited properties from their father. Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, hisproperties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she

instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including those

coming from her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.

The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de

Leon and the descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued

Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their share in the reservable properties,

which Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had

inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter

Mercedes.

Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be

disposed of in Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained

by this Court.

It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of

Severina's estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes

alone.

As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-

seventh of the properties. The other six sevenths portions were adjudicated to theother six reservees.

Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this

case the doctrine of the Florentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during

the reservor's lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third

degree of the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common

descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the

property retains its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest

reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom

the reservable property should be awarded.

The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the

only relatives within the third degree are the common descendants of the

predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is

irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.

It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are notreservable properties because only relatives within the third degree from the

paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties

to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda

and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been

satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special

accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein".

That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor

willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus

and ignored the other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.

In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property

bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's

estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or

nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.

This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only

one reserves it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise

true that the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no

reason founded upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of

their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).

Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of

in her will the properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the

relatives within the third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by

operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within

the second degree from Filomena Legarda.

It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from

the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis



causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor (Padura vs.

Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due

to the non-existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of

the death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "exceptthird-degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.

That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by

the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of

her death, there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third

degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable character. The

disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with article 891 or

the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic

will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs.

Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby

adjudged that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her

daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are

reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro

and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L.

Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should

pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920

SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.

MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants-appellees.

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellants.

Felipe Agoncillo for appellees.

JOHNSON, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the

Province of Tayabas, absolving the defendants from all liability under the plaintiff's

complaint, without any finding as to costs.

Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva,

married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born.

Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo

Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, the parcels of land described in

Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.

Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon

the two parcels of land above-mentioned passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo,by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein

defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other

defendant herein.

Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son,

the defendants herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under the

claim that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the

same, ab intestate, from his deceased father.

On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged

natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the

purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in question,

particularly described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint, invoking the

provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.

The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff

was an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the

property here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no

right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.



The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is an

acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva. It appears from the

record that the said Juliana Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on

March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as her natural daughter , of

unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal certificate); that the said Juliana Nieva

nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived withher said mother until the latter was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said

mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter.

(See testimony of Antero Gala, pp. 5-6; Prudencio de la Cuesta, pp. 16-17; and

Mamerto Palabrica, pp. 26-27, sten. notes.)

The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the facts in

the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil., 697, 699). Under the decision of this

court in that case we are of the opinion and so decide, without rediscussing here

the law and legal principles involved, that the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva is an

acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva. (See also In re estate of Enriquezand Reyes, 29 Phil., 167.)

The other and more important question presented by this appeal is, whether

or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva

troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code. That article reads as follows:

Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the

latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is

obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of

law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from

which such property came.

The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco

Deocampo from his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had inherited it, in the same

manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff. The

plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo, and she belongs to the same line

from which the property in question came. Was Francisco Deocampo obliged by law

to reserve said property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an illegitimate relative

within the third degree of Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then, upon his death, the

plaintiff, and not his son the defendant Jose Deocampo, was entitled to the said

property; if he was not, the plaintiff's action must fail.1awph!l.net

There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of the Civil

Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to the property in question if she were a

legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil., 295.) But in said

article 811 the legislator uses the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and

"relatives," without specifying whether or not they have to be legitimate. Does the

legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives? Counsel forthe appellant, in a lengthy and carefully prepared brief, attempts to maintain the

affirmative.

This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before

by any court or tribunal. However, eminent commentators on the Spanish Civil

Code, who have devoted their lives to the study and solution of the intricate and

difficult problems that may arise under the provisions of that Code, have dealt with

the very question now before us, and are unanimous in the opinion that the

provision of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only to legitimate relative. One of

such commentators, undoubtedly the best known of them all, is Manresa. Webelieve we can do no better than to adopt his reasons and conclusions, in deciding

the question before us. In determining the persons who are obliged to reserve

under article 811, he says:

Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the

natural father or grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or

other natural ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the

ascendant, without attaching the qualification of legitimate, and, on the other

hand, the same reason that exists for applying the provision to the natural family

exists for applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in referring tothe ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the obligation to

reserve only upon the legitimate ascendant.

Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the Code recognizes or

does not recognize the existence of the natural family, or whether it admits only the

bond established by acknowledgement between the father or mother who

acknowledges and the acknowledged children. However it may be, it may be stated

as an indisputable truth, that in said Code, the legitimate relationship forms the

general rule and the natural relationship the exception; which is the reason why, as

may be easily seen, the law in many articles speaks only of children or parents, of



ascendants or descendants, and in them reference is of course made of those who

are legitimate; and when it desires to make a provision applicable only to natural

relationship, it does not say father or mother, but natural father or natural mother;

it does not say child, but natural child; it does not speak of ascendants, brothers or

parents in the abstract, but of natural ascendants, natural brothers or natural

parents. (See, for example, articles 294, 302, 809, 810, 846, 935, to 938, 944 and945 and 946 to 955.)

Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way

be maintained that they refer to legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They

evidently establish the legitime of the legitimate ascendants included as forced

heirs in number 2 of article 807. And article 811, — and as we will see also article

812, — continues to treat of this same legitime. The right of the natural parents and

children in the testamentary succession in wholly included in the eighth section and

is limited to the parents, other ascendants of such class being excluded in articles

807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the place which article 811 occupies in the Code of proof that it refers on ly to legitimate ascendants. And if there were any doubt, it

disappears upon considering the text of article 938, which states that the provisions

of article 811 applies to intestate succession, which is just established in favor of

the legitimate direct ascending line, the text of articles 939 to 945, which treat of

intestate succession of natural parents, as well as that of articles 840 to 847,

treating of their testamentary succession, which do not allude directly or indirectly

to that provision.

Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811 creates in

the right to succeed neither admits of any other interpretation. Whether the

provision is due to the desire that the properties should not pass, by reason of new

marriage, out of the family to which they belonged, or is directly derived from the

system of the so-called "reserva troncal," and whether the idea of reservation or

that of lineal rights (troncalidad ) predominate the patrimony which is intended to

be preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to legitimate ascendants and

descendants do article 968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from the

danger of second or subsequent marriage; only to legitimate parents do the special

laws of Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya and Cataluña concede the right to succeed with

respect to lineal properties (bienes troncales); only to the legitimate ascendants

does article 811 impose the duty to reserve.

The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural parents and ascendants

may be raised just as the question whether it would be preferable to suppress it

altogether may be raised; but in the realm of the statute law there is no remedy but

to admit that article 811, the interpretation of which should on the other hand be

strict was drafted by the legislator with respect only to legitimate ascendants.

(Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 6, 3d ed., pp. 249-250.)

The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is

established, says:

Persons in whose favor the reservation is established . — This is one of the

most delicate points in the interpretation of article 811. According to this article,

the reservation is established in favor of the parents who are within the third

degree and belong to the line from which the properties came.

It treats of blood , relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession,

according to articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by

affinity is established between each spouse and the family of the other, by

marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission of the properties of

the family of one spouse to that of the other, which is just what this article intends

to prevent.

It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a

legitimate ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds

from the same legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question,

because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line of that family

and only in favor of that line is the reservation established. Furthermore, we have

already said, the object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family,

following the precedents of the foral law. And it could not be otherwise. Article 943

denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child and viceversa,

from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither have the right to

inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited established a barrier

between the two families; properties of the legitimate family shall never pass by

operation of law to the natural family. (Ibid . pp. 251-252.)

Scævola, after a very extended discussion of this same subject, arrives at the

same conclusion as Manresa. "La reserva del articulo 811 es privilegio de la familia



legitima. (The reservation in article 811 is a privilege of the legitimate family.)" ( See

Scævola, Codigo Civil, Vol. 14, pp. 211-224, 3401-305.)

Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:

A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the

legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it;

nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.

To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural

brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the

express provision of the foregoing article (943).

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby

affirmed, without any finding as to costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-14856 November 15, 1919

ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.

MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Ramon Querubin, Simeon Ramos and Orense and Vera for appellants.

Vicente Foz, Jose Singsong Tongson and Angel Encarnacion for appellees.

TORRES, J.:

On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her husband

Simeon Serrano), Gabriel, Magdalena, Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, and Antonino of

the surname Florentino; for Miguel Florentino, guardian ad litem of the minor

Rosario Florentino; for Eugenio Singson, the father and guardian ad litem of Emilia,

Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores of the surname Singson y Florentino; and for

Eugenio Singson, guardian of the minors Jose and Asuncion Florentino, filed a

complaint in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, against Mercedes Florentino

and her husband, alleging as follows:

That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon;

that during the marriage he begot nine children called, Jose, Juan, Maria,

Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro, and Magdalena of the surname

Florentino y de Leon; that on becoming a widower he married the second time

Severina Faz de Leon with whom he had two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III of

the surname Florentino y de Leon; that Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died onFebruary 13, 1890; that he was survived by his second wife Severina Faz de Leon

and the ten children first above mentioned; that his eleventh son, Apolonio III, was

born on the following 4th of March 1890.

That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven children,

Juan, Maria and Isabel died single, without leaving any ascendants or descendants;

that Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, Antonio, and Rosario are the legitimate children of

the deceased Jose Florentino who was one of the children of the deceased Apolonio

Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children

of Espirita Florentino, now deceased, and her husband Eugenio Singson; that Joseand Asuncion are the children of Pedro Florentino, another son of the deceased

Apolonio Isabelo Florentino.

That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino

executed a will before the notary public of Ilocos Sur, instituting as his universal

heirs his aforementioned ten children, the posthumos Apolonio III and his widow

Severina Faz de Leon; that he declared, in one of the paragraphs of said will, all his

property should be divided among all of his children of both marriages.

That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to Apolonio

Florentino III, his posthumos son, the property marked with the letters A, B, C, D, E,

and F in the complaint, a gold rosary, pieces of gold, of silver and of table service,

livestock, palay, some personal property and other objects mentioned in the

complaint.

That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died

in 1891; that his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his property

described in the complaint; that the widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on

November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her only living

daughter, Mercedes Florentino; that, as such heir, said daughter took possession of

all the property left at the death of her mother, Severina Faz de Leon; that among



same is included the property, described in the complaint, which the said Severina

Faz de Leon inherited from her deceased son, the posthumos Apolonio, as

reservable property; that, as a reservist, the heir of the said Mercedes Florentino

deceased had been gathering for herself alone the fruits of lands described in the

complaint; that each and every one of the parties mentioned in said complaint is

entitled to one-seventh of the fruits of the reservable property described therein,either by direct participation or by representation, in the manner mentioned in

paragraph 9 of the complaint.

That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked the

defendants to deliver their corresponding part of the reservable property; that

without any justifiable motive the defendants have refused and do refuse to deliver

said property or to pay for its value; that for nine years Mercedes Florentino has

been receiving, as rent for the lands mentioned, 360 bundles of palay at fifty pesos

per bundle and 90 bundles of corn at four pesos per bundle; that thereby the

plaintiffs have suffered damages in the sum of fifteen thousand four hundred andtwenty-eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos, in addition to three hundred and eight

pesos and fifty-eight centavos for the value of the fruits not gathered, of one

thousand pesos (P1,000) for the unjustifiable retention of the aforementioned

reservable property and for the expenses of this suit. Wherefore they pray it be

declared that all the foregoing property is reservable property; that the plaintiffs

had and do have a right to the same, in the quantity and proportion mentioned in

the aforementioned paragraph 9 of the complaint; that the defendants Mercedes

Florentino and her husband be ordered to deliver to the plaintiffs their share of the

property in question, of the palay and of the corn above mentioned, or their value;

and that they be condemned to pay the plaintiffs the sum of one thousand pesos(P1,000) together with the costs of this instance.

To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging

that the cause of action is based on the obligation of the widow Severina Faz de

Leon to reserve the property she inherited from her deceased son Apolonio

Florentino y de Leon who, in turn, inherited same from his father Apolonio Isabelo

Florentino; that, there being no allegation to the contrary, it is to be presumed that

the widow Severina Faz de Leon did not remarry after the death of this husband nor

have any natural child; that the right claimed by the plaintiffs is not that mentioned

in article 968 and the following articles, but that established in article 811 of the

Civil Code; that the object of the provisions of the aforementioned articles is to

avoid the transfer of said reservable property to those extraneous to the family of

the owner thereof; that if the property inherited by the widow Severina Faz de Leon

from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon (property which

originated from his father and her husband) has all passed into the hands of the

defendant, Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion, a daughter of the commonancestor's second marriage (said Apolonio Isabelo Florentino with the deceased

Severina Faz de Leon) it is evident that the property left at the death of the

posthumos son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon did not pass after the death of his

mother Severina, his legitimate heirs as an ascendant, into the hands of strangers;

that said property having been inherited by Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion

from her mother (Severina), article 811 of the Civil Code is absolutely inapplicable

to the present case because, when the defendant Mercedes, by operation law,

entered into and succeeded to, the possession, of the property lawfully inherited

from her mother Severina Faz de Leon, said property had, while in the possession of

her mother, lost the character of reservable property — there being a legitimate

daughter of Severina Faz de Leon with the right to succeed her in all her rights,

property and actions; that the restraints of the law whereby said property may not

passed into the possession of strangers are void, inasmuch as the said widow had

no obligation to reserve same, as Mercedes Florentino is a forced heiress of her

mother Severina Faz de Leon; that, in the present case, there is no property

reserved for the plaintiffs since there is a forced heiress, entitled to the property

left by the death of the widow Severina Faz de Leon who never remarried; that the

obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty of respecting the legitime; that in the

instant case, the widow Severina Faz de Leon was in duty bound to respect the

legitime of her daughter Mercedes the defendant; that her obligation to reserve the

property could not be fulfilled to the prejudice of the legitime which belongs to her

forced heiress, citing in support of these statements the decision of the supreme

court of Spain of January 4, 1911; that, finally, the application of article 811 of the

Civil Code in favor of the plaintiffs would presuppose the exclusion of the defendant

from here right to succeed exclusively to all the property, rights and actions left by

her legitimate mother, although the said defendant has a better right than the

plaintiffs; and that there would be injustice if the property claimed be adjudicated

to the plaintiffs, as well as violation of section 5 of the Jones Law which invalidates

any law depriving any person of an equal protection. Wherefore they prayed that

the demurrer be sustained, with costs against the plaintiffs.



After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge absolved the

defendants from the complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to pay the costs.

Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to

grant them a new trial; said motion was overruled; the plaintiffs expected thereto

and filed the corresponding bill of exceptions which was allowed, certified andforwarded to the clerk of this court.

On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the

complaint of the plaintiffs, but, instead of ordering the latter to amend their

complaint within the period prescribed by the rules — undoubtedly believing that

the plaintiffs could not alter nor change the facts constituting the cause of action,

and that, as both parties were agreed as to the facts alleged in the complaint as

well as in the demurrer, every question reduced itself to one of the law, already

submitted to the decision of the court — the said judge, disregarding the ordinary

procedure established by law, decided the case by absolving the defendants from

the complaint and by condemning the plaintiffs to pay the costs of the instance.

There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants, instead of

answering the complaint of the plaintiffs, confined themselves to filing a demurrer

based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a

cause of action. However, the judge preferred to absolve the defendants, thereby

making an end to the cause, instead of dismissing the same, because undoubtedly

he believed, in view of the controversy between the parties, that the arguments

adduced to support the demurrer would be the same which the defendants would

allege in their answer — those dealing with a mere question of law which the courts

would have to decide — and that, the demurrer having been sustained, if the

plaintiffs should insist — they could do no less — upon alleging the same facts as

those set out in their complaint and if another demurrer were afterwards set up, he

would be obliged to dismiss said complaint with costs against the plaintiffs — in

spite of being undoubtedly convinced in the instant case that the plaintiffs

absolutely lack the right to bring the action stated in their complaint.

Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not

necessary — as in this case what has been done does not prejudice the parties —

the appellate court will now proceed to decide the suit according to its merits, as

found in the record and to the legal provisions applicable to the question of law in

controversy so that unnecessary delay and greater expense may be avoided,

inasmuch as, even if all the ordinary proceedings be followed, the suit would be

subsequently decided in the manner and terms that it is now decided in the opinion

thoughtfully and conscientiously formed for its determination.

In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invoke, intheir favor, the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, and whether the same

article is applicable to the question of law presented in this suit, it is necessary to

determine whether the property enumerated in paragraph 5 of the complaint is of

the nature of reservable property; and if so, whether in accordance with the

provision of the Civil Code in article 811, Severina Faz de Leon (the widow of the

deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino) who inherited said property from her son

Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of his father Apolonio Isabelo) had the

obligation to preserve and reserve same for the relatives, within the third degree,

of her aforementioned deceased son Apolonio III.

The above mentioned article reads:

Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the

latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is

obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of

law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from

which such property came.

During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Severina Faz de Leon

two children were born, namely the defendant Mercedes Florentino and Apolonio

Florentino III (born after the death of his father). At the death of Apolonio IsabeloFlorentino under a will, his eleven children succeeded to the inheritance he left, one

of whom, the posthumos son Apolonio III, was given, as his share, the

aforementioned property enumerated in the complaint. In 1891 the said

posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III died and was succeeded by his legitimate

mother Severina Faz de Leon, who inherited the property he left and who on dying,

November 18, 1908, instituted by will as her sole heiress her surviving daughter,

Mercedes Florentino, the defendant herein, who took possession of all property left

by her father, same constituting the inheritance. Included in said inheritance is the

property, specified in by the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III from his father

Apolonio Isabelo Florentino, and which, at the death of the said posthumos son,



had in turn been inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon. Even if Severina left

in her will said property, together with her own, to her only daughter and forced

heiress, Mercedes Florentino, nevertheless this property had not lost its reservable

nature inasmuch as it originated from the common ancestor of the litigants,

Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited by his son Apolonio III; was transmitted by same (by

operation of law) to his legitimate mother and ascendant, Severina Faz de Leon.

The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property, now

claimed by his brothers, by a lucrative title or by inheritance from his

aforementioned legitimate father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. Although said

property was inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, nevertheless, she was

in duty bound, according to article 811 of the Civil Code, to reserve the property

thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives, within the third degree, of the line

from which such property came.

According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the reservable

property, but its enjoyment, use or trust, merely for the reason that said law

imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve same for certain designated persons

who, on the death of the said ascendants reservists, (taking into consideration the

nature of the line from which such property came) acquire the ownership of said

property in fact and by operation of law in the same manner as forced heirs

(because they are also such) — said property reverts to said line as long as the

aforementioned persons who, from the death of the ascendant-reservists, acquire

in fact the right of reservatarios (person for whom property is reserved), and are

relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant from whom the reservable

property came.

Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are

living, within the third degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life

usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. He is, however, the

legitimate owner of his own property which is not reservable property and which

constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the Civil Code. But if, afterwards,

all of the relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant (from whom came

the reservable property) die or disappear, the said property becomes free property,

by operation of law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant

heir who can transmit it at his death to his legitimate successors or testamentary

heirs. This property has now lost its nature of reservable property, pertaining

thereto at the death of the relatives, called reservatarios, who belonged within the

third degree to the line from which such property came.lawphil.net

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there

are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearestrelative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding

it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more

remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same

as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the

third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the

right granted by the Civil Code in article 811 is in the highest degree personal and

for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are the relatives, within the

third degree, of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore,

relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as

reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the

part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of

relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of

reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of

nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. These

reservatarios have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers)

who are the brothers of the said deceased person and relatives within the third

degree in accordance with article 811 of the Civil Code.

In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs

Encarnacion, Gabriel and Magdalena are the legitimate children of the first

marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that Ramon, Miguel,

Ceferino, Antonio, and Rosario are both grandchildren of Apolonio Isabelo

Florentino II, and children of his deceased son, Jose Florentino; that the same have

the right to represent their aforementioned father, Jose Florentino; that Emilia,

Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children of the deceased

Espirita Florentino, one of the daughters of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo

Florentino II, and represent the right of their aforementioned mother; and that the

other plaintiffs, Jose and Asuncion, have also the right to represent their legitimate



father Pedro Florentino one of the sons of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo

Florentino II. It is a fact, admitted by both parties, that the other children of the first

marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died without issue so that

this decision does not deal with them.

There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservableproperty left at the death of Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the aforementioned

Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three children of his first marriage — Encarnacion,

Gabriel, Magdalena; his three children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who are

represented by their own twelve children respectively; and Mercedes Florentino,

his daughter by a second marriage. All of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the

deceased posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, within the third degree (four of

whom being his half-brothers and the remaining twelve being his nephews as they

are the children of his three half-brothers). As the first four are his relatives within

the third degree in their own right and the other twelve are such by representation,

all of them are indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the property which camefrom the common ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio Florentino III by

inheritance during his life-time, and in turn by inheritance to his legitimate mother,

Severina Faz de Leon, widow of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.

In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code already cited, the trial

judge refused to accept the theory of the plaintiffs and, accepting that of the

defendants, absolved the latter from the complaint on the ground that said article

is absolutely inapplicable to the instant case, inasmuch as the defendant Mercedes

Florentino survived her brother, Apolonio III, from whom the reservable property

came and her mother, Severina Faz de Leon, the widow of her father, Apolonio

Isabelo Florentino II; that the defendant Mercedes, being the only daughter of

Severina Faz de Leon, is likewise her forced heiress; that when she inherited the

property left at the death of her mother, together with that which came from her

deceased brother Apolonio III, the fundamental object of article 811 of the Code

was thereby complied with, inasmuch as the danger that the property coming from

the same line might fall into the hands of strangers had been avoided; and that the

hope or expectation on the part of the plaintiffs of the right to acquire the property

of the deceased Apolonio III never did come into existence because there is a forced

heiress who is entitled to such property.

The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that article 811 of

the Civil Code does not destroy the system of legitimate succession and that the

pretension of the plaintiffs to apply said article in the instant case would be

permitting the reservable right to reduce and impair the forced legitimate which

exclusively belongs to the defendant Mercedes Florentino, in violation of the

precept of article 813 of the same Code which provides that the testator cannotdeprive his heirs of their legitime, except in the cases expressly determined by law.

Neither can he impose upon it any burden, condition, or substitution of any kind

whatsoever, saving the provisions concerning the usufruct of the surviving spouse,

citing the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of January 4, 1911.

The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists mainly in

determining whether they property left at the death of Apolonio III, the posthumos

son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was not invested with the character of reservable

property when it was received by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon.

The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their complaint

came, without any doubt whatsoever, from the common ancestor Apolonio Isabelo

II, and when, on the death of Apolonio III without issue the same passed by

operation of law into the hands of his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it

became reservable property, in accordance with the provision of article 811 of the

Code, with the object that the same should not fall into the possession of persons

other than those comprehended within the order of person other than those

comprehended within the order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio

Isabelo II, the source of said property. If this property was in fact clothed with the

character and condition of reservable property when Severina Faz de Leon inherited

same from her son Apolonio III, she did not thereby acquire the dominion or right of

ownership but only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary with the necessary

obligation to preserve and to deliver or return it as such reservable property to her

deceased son's relatives within the third degree, among whom is her daughter,

Mercedes Florentino.

Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of

the ascendant who inherits and receives same from his descendant, therefore it

does not form part of his own property nor become the legitimate of his forced

heirs. It becomes his own property only in case that all the relatives of his



descendant shall have died (reservista) in which case said reservable property

losses such character.

With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her

own property in favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino, as forced

heiress. But whatever provision there is in her will concerning the reservableproperty received from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will

reduce the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews of her

daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as said property is not her

own and she has only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation to

preserve and to deliver same to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own

daughter, Mercedes Florentino.

It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express provision of law,

that by operation of law all of the reservable property, received during lifetime by

Severina Faz de Leon from her son, Apolonio III, constitutes or forms parts of the

legitime pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said property did not come to be the

legitimate and exclusive property of Severina Faz de Leon, her only legitimate and

forced heiress, the defendant Mercedes, could not inherit all by operation of law

and in accordance with the order of legitimate succession, because the other

relatives of the deceased Apolonio III, within the third degree, as well as herself are

entitled to such reservable property.

For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of Mercedes

Florentino, coming from the inheritance of her mother Severina Faz de Leon, has

been reduced and impaired; and the application of article 811 of the Code to the

instant case in no way prejudices the rights of the defendant Mercedes Florentino,

inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the reservable property, there being no

lawful or just reason which serves as real foundation to disregard the right to

Apolonio III's other relatives, within the third degree, to participate in the

reservable property in question. As these relatives are at present living, claiming for

it with an indisputable right, we cannot find any reasonable and lawful motive why

their rights should not be upheld and why they should not be granted equal

participation with the defendant in the litigated property.

The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress, her daughter

Mercedes, the property received from the deceased son Apolonio III lost the

character, previously held, of reservable property; and that the mother, the said

Severina, therefore, had no further obligation to reserve same for the relatives

within the third degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is evidently erroneous for the

reason that, as has been already stated, the reservable property, left in a will by the

aforementioned Severina to her only daughter Mercedes, does not form part of the

inheritance left by her death nor of the legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Justbecause she has a forced heiress, with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve

Severina of her obligation to reserve the property which she received from her

deceased son, nor did same lose the character of reservable property, held before

the reservatarios received same.

It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the reservista

Severina, took possession of the property in question, same did not pass into the

hands of strangers. But it is likewise true that the said Mercedes is not the only

reservataria. And there is no reason founded upon law and upon the principle of

justice why the other reservatarios, the other brothers and nephews, relativeswithin the third degree in accordance with the precept of article 811 of the Civil

Code, should be deprived of portions of the property which, as reservable property,

pertain to them.

From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced by the

Supreme Court of Spain on January 4, 1911, for the violation of articles 811, 968

and consequently of the Civil Code is not applicable in the instant case.

Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of Spain held that

the legitime of the forced heirs cannot be reduced or impaired and said article is

expressly respected in this decision.

However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their supposed

rights, it has not been shown, upon any legal foundation, that the reservable

property belonged to, and was under the absolute dominion of, the reservista,

there being relatives within the third degree of the person from whom same came;

that said property, upon passing into the hands of the forced heiress of the

deceased reservista, formed part of the legitime of the former; and that the said

forced heiress, in addition to being a reservataria, had an exclusive right to receive

all of said property and to deprive the other reservatarios, her relatives within the

third degree of certain portions thereof.



Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity for damages

and the delivery of the fruits collected, it is not proper to grant the first for there is

no evidence of any damage which can give rise to the obligation of refunding same.

As to the second, the delivery of the fruits produced by the land forming the

principal part of the reservable property, the defendants are undoubtedly in duty

bound to deliver to the plaintiffs six-sevenths of the fruits or rents of the portions of land claimed in the complaint, in the quantity expressed in paragraph 11 of the

same, from January 17, 1918, the date the complaint was filed; and the remaining

seventh part should go to the defendant Mercedes.

For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the order of

decision appealed from we should declare, as we hereby do, that the

aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased Severina Faz de Leon from her

son Apolonio Florentino III, is reservable property; that the plaintiffs, being relatives

of the deceased Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to six-sevenths of

said reservable property; that the defendant Mercedes is entitled to the remainingseventh part thereof; that the latter, together with her husband Angel Encarnacion,

shall deliver to the plaintiffs, jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from

said portion of the land and of the quantity claimed, from January 17, 1918, until

fully delivered; and that the indemnity for one thousand pesos (P1,000) prayed for

in the complaint is denied, without special findings as to the costs of both instances.

So ordered.

G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986

FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO

PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.

DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO,

defendants-appellants.

NARVASA, J.:

This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva

troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the

following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":

1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs,

Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives,plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.

2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a

common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana

Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant. The family

relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex 'A' and

made an integral part of this stipulation.

3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four

(4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which

parcels of land are presently covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165,

64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached

to this stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.

4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband,

Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon

(mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-

mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in

equal pro-indiviso shares.

5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by hislegitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate

grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three

(3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and

16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached hereto as

Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco,

but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of

land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon

in equal pro-indiviso shares.



6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without

issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land

above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who

received the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently

annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.

7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights

and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by her only

legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary

right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.

8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his

only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.

9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half

(1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from

her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.

10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other

half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva

troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on

intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim

because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said

parcel of land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon,

or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third

degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.

11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the

legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the

whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third

degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant)

of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon

from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-

indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore,

to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by defendant

Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the

expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.

12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted upon

legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to restore and preserve

harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive all their claims against each

other for damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which

this Honorable Court may deem proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of

litigation which shall be borne by the respective parties. 1

On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco,

Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho,

entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in

equal proportions, rendering judgment as follows:

... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the court

holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled to

three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or three-eights (3/8) of the

seven (7) parcels of land involved in this action. Consequently, they are, likewise,

entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by the

defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho from the tenants of the said parcels of land,

minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the

rentals.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly waived all their

claims against each other for damages including attorney's fees and expenses of

litigation other than the legal interests on plaintiffs' share in the rentals, the court

renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the seven

(7) parcels of land described in Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166,

T-64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The defendant

Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of all rents

received by her on the properties involved in this action for the purpose of

determining the legal interests which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their shares

in the rentals of the property in question.

SO ORDERED. 2

Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.



The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by

the lower Court, all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the

appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the

death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which

reads:

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the

latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or


law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to

the line from which said property came. (811),

or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject

to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.

That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino,3 where the

reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the

line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also

made that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This

Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the principles of intestacy

to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each

entitled to a share double that of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in

accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said the Court:

The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva troncal,

where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and belonging to

the fine of origin, are nephews of the descendant ( prepositus), but some arenephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood, should

the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally , or should the

nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of

the half blood?

xxx xxx xxx

The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on

the subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded that the position of the

appellants is correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to

assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging

to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated

into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).

xxx xxx xxx

The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved

to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no

further occasion for its application. In the relations between one reservatario and

another of the same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer;

wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be

governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit the

jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of

the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the

reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant

( prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs.

Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20

March 1905). And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant

( prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino

vs. Florentino, supra).

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there are

relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative,

called reservatarios over the property which the reservista (person holding it

subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote.

The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a

reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third

degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right

granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the

exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the

person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth

and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law

does not recognize them as such.

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of

one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of

relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of



reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of

nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. ... .

(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) See also Nieva

and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary

intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are

entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in

determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the

right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for

immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives

reservatarios to whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the

individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of

ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This

conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an

exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to

accomplish the purpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries

(Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):

... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe ampliarse, sino

mas bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto, manteniendo la excepcion mientras

fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las

reglas generales y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de sucesi6n, en aquehos

extremes no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera

de accion de la reserva que se crea.

The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil Code's

hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression

of the reserva viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-

980).

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate

succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because,

as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are

excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they

are related to him within the same degree as the latter. To this effect is Abellana vs.

Ferraris4

where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and

applied:

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy

nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles,

first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from Articles 1001,

1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provide as follows:

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or

widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers

and sisters or their children to the other half.

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they

shall inherit in equal shares.

Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieceswho are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the

former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.

Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers and

sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces

of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.)

being called to the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the

Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force

(R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:

Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces, children of

the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse, if not

separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the entire estate of the

deceased.

Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or

sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the

estate of deceased.



The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by

reason of the whole blood.

It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews

and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other

collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of

the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and

brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of

the latter vis a vis the other collaterals.

xxx xxx xxx

We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's

uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of

the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. ...

This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that asto the reservable property, the reservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but

from the descendant praepositus:

... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the

reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as there are reservatarios

existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from

the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are

the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the

reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol.

6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .

To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands5, where it was ruled that intestacy

proceedings to determine the right of a reservatario are not necessary where the

final decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of the reservista

over property subject to reserva troncal Identifies the reservatario and there are no

other claimants to the latter's rights as such:

The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the

assumption that the reservatario win succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property

from the reservista. This is not true. The reservatario is not the reservista's

successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of the reservista's estate;

the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant

( prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had

temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities

are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the matter

must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable

property.

It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the

reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes,

automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. As

already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does not

even answer for the debts of the latter. ... .

Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no

doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-

appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different

result should obtain simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed

by the interregnum of the reserva;"6 i.e., the property took a "detour" through an

ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its transmission to the

reservatario.

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-

appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary

property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside

and the complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.

SO ORDERED.



Note: SCRA gikan ang Padura vs. Baldovino case (mao ra jud niy nakasuwat about

sa case)

Padura vs. Baldovino

104 Phil 1065

Appeal from an order of the CFI of Laguna in Special Proceedings No.4551, declaring

all the reserves (without distinction) co-owners, pro indiviso in equal shares of the

parcels of land subject matter of the suit.

Appealed order reversed and set aside and the reservatorios who are nephews of

the full blood are declared entitled to a share twice as large as that of the nephews

of the half-blood. Records are remanded to the court below for further

proceedings.

Supposedly ang next assigned case kay Frias vs. CFI of Negros, but same case rani

sa Chua(Chua Frias) vs. CFI of Negros na case

G.R. No. L-36059 March 31, 1933

In re Intestate Estate of the deceased Concepcion Gerona.

IGNACIO ARROYO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.

JACOBA GERONA, ET AL., claimants-appellees.

DeWitt, Perkins and Brady, Claro M. Recto, Greenbaum and Opisso and A.P. Seva for

appellant.

Zulueta and Zulueta for appellees.

STREET, J.:

On June 16, 1927, Concepcion Gerona died in Iloilo, leaving neither ascendants nor

descendants. She had suffered from mental alienation from birth, and was at the

time of her death under the guardianship of her uncle, Ignacio Arroyo, her only

relative on her mother's side. On her paternal side her surviving relatives were her

aunts Clara, Ciriaca, Jacoba, and Patricia, sisters of her deceased father, Blas

Gerona, together with Maria G. and Blas G., children of Victor Gerona, a deceased

brother of the aforesaid aunts. Shortly after the death of Concepcion Gerona her

uncle Ignacio secured an order closing the guardianship, and on September 5, 1928,

he instituted intestate proceedings to wind up the estate. On October 8, 1928, hewas declared the owner of all her property and the proceedings were closed.

On July 9, 1929, Jacoba, Patricia, Ciriaca, and Clara Gerona filed a petition in the

cause, asking that two documents, Exhibits A and D, dated respectively June 13,

1913, and September 27, 1928, be annulled, that the order of October 8, 1928,

adjudicating the estate to Ignacio Arroyo, be set aside, and that a judicial

administrator be appointed to administer the estate. The Court of First Instance of

Iloilo, believing that the relief sought could only be obtained in an ordinary civil

action, ruled that it was without jurisdiction over the matter, and dismissed the

petition. From this order the petitioners appealed, and the order dismissing thepetition was here reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

(Arroyo vs. Gerona, 54 Phil., 909.) Upon the return of the record to the lower court

the petitioners filed an amended petition which differed from the original petition

only in the addition of a description of the property. The documents referred to

above, Exhibits A and D, are, first, a contract for the distribution of the properties

left by the parents of Concepcion Gerona, and, secondly, a ratification of the same

contract executed after the death of Concepcion. The effect of said contracts, as

they stand, is to deprive the plaintiffs of further participation in the estate of the

decedent mentioned. Although the issue which lies at the basis of this controversy

is presented in a somewhat anomalous way, the whole question resolves itself in itsessence into a contention over the validity of these agreements.

Concepcion Gerona was the daughter of Blas Gerona and Manuela Arroyo, who

died in 1895 and 1893, respectively. Concepcion had one brother named Salvador,

who died in childhood in 1907, leaving no descendant. Blas Gerona and Manuela

Arroyo left a conjugal estate consisting of various parcels of real property, which are

the principal object of this controversy. Manuela Arroyo also left paraphernal

property, which, however, is not involved in this lawsuit. Blas Gerona left no

separate property. When Salvador Gerona died in 1907, his property vested by law



in his maternal grandmother, Apolonia Lacson, she being then his only living

ascendant.

After death of Blas Gerona in 1895, his two orphaned children, Salvador and

Concepcion, passed into the care of their grandmother, Apolonia Lacson; but this

old lady leaned heavily of course upon her son Ignacio, who naturally acquired and

exercised the principal authority in the care of the two minors and of their property.

Indeed, he acted during many of the years succeeding the death of their father as a

guardian appointed by the family council. Later has legal guardian of Concepcion.

Apolonia Lacson apparently had no other property than such as she had acquired by

inheritance from her grandson Salvador; and when she died on December 25, 1921,

the ordinary rules of transmission by descent would have given one-half of this

property to Ignacio Arroyo and one-half to Concepcion Gerona. But before Apolonia

died she had executed a will, which was duly admitted to probate on February 1,

1913, in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. By this will the testatrix gave to

Concepcion Gerona only a one-sixth part of the property derived from Salvador.

The remainder she left to her son Ignacio.

Meanwhile the Gerona kin, captained by Victor Gerona, had become alert to the

fact that they would ultimately have an interest in the property that had pertained

to their deceased brother Blas. The title to that property was now mainly vested in

the demented girl, Concepcion, but it was obvious that she could never personally

enjoy more than so much of the income as was necessary to maintain her in an

asylum, leaving a residue which, in view of her incapacity, could only accumulate for

distant heirs. Now that her grandmother was dead it seemed to the Geronas an

opportune time to urge upon Ignacio Arroyo the taking of some step that would

enable them to enter to some extent into the enjoyment of their part of the estate.

Perhaps the degree, they were joint reservees with Concepcion Gerona, though

they were not so near as she to the source from which the property had come. It is

not necessary for us here to make pronouncement upon that point. Suffice it to say

that these heirs, brother and sisters of Blas Gerona now began to press the

desirability of adjusting the claims of the Gerona heirs. Ignacio Arroyo assented to

the proposition, and on June 13, 1913, about six months after the death of Apolonia

Lacson, a contract of partition, known to the record as Exhibit A, was executed

between Ignacio Arroyo on the one part, and Victor, Jacoba, Clara, Patricia, and

Ciriaca Gerona, on the other. In the execution of this agreement Victor Gerona

acted for himself, but his four sisters were severally represented by their respective

attorneys-in-fact. Thus Jacoba Gerona was represented by her son, Miguel

Gemarino, justice of the peace of Guimbal; Patricia Gerona was represented by

Pablo Gemarino, a notary public; Ciriaca Gerona, by her husband Pedro Gayatao;

and Clara Gerona, by her husband Benito Garingalao.

The purpose of this agreement, as recited therein, was to enable the parties to

arrive at a compromise and amicable settlement regarding the estate left by the

spouses Blas Gerona and Manuela Arroyo and in paragraph 4 it is agreed that

certain parcels of land, thirteen in number, situated in Binalbagan, Isabela, and

Guimbal, and particularly described in an adjoined list, shall appertain to the five

Geronas in common. In paragraph 5 Ignacio Arroyo promises to pay to each of the

Geronas the sum of five hundred pesos, as soon as a certain fund should be paid to

him by the municipality of Iloilo. These sums were duly paid in proper course to

each of them. In addition to the aforesaid obligations Ignacio Arroyo condoned adebt owing by Victor Gerona, as lessee of the Hacienda Manolita, and any debt or

debts owing by the same individual to Ignacio Arroyo in any character. Ignacio

Arroyo furthermore obligated himself to support and care for Concepcion Gerona

with the full dignity of her station and rank. In paragraph 8 of the contract it is

stated that the remainder of the estate pertaining to the spouses Blas Gerona and

Manuela Arroyo, not specified in the inventory attached to the deed, shall belong to

Ignacio Arroyo; "and, therefore, any property, right or interest that the

incapacitated Concepcion Gerona may or might have in and to the estate of said

spouses shall also belong to Ignacio Arroyo after her death, in virtue and in

consideration of these presents and of the obligations by him assumed hereby."Finally, the parties agreed to renounce any claim that they might severally have

against each other, with reference to the estate which was the subject of division.

Intrinsically considered, the division thus effected had the merit of being exactly

what both the parties desired. This applies even more particularly to the Geronas

than to Ignacio Arroyo. Time, and the changes to be brought about by time, were

destined to give a different complexion to the situation, more especially in the

feature of the contract now to be mentioned. Among the properties which were

assigned to Ignacio Arroyo under this partition were four parcels of farm land

amounting to about 1,350 hectares, located in the barrios of Soledad and Camang-



camang, in the municipality of Binalbagan, Occidental Negros. This land really

compromised three or four different parcels, but they were all commonly thought

of as comprising a part of the Hacienda Manolita. This farm had been leased for

many years to Victor Gerona, who had gotten along with indifferent success and in

the course of the time succeeded in piling up an accumulated indebtedness for rent

which remained unpaid in the amount of something like ten thousand pesos whenthe contract now under consideration was made. In the course of his experience as

an unsuccessful farmer Victor Gerona had formed the belief that this land was

bewitched, — a naive opinion in which Ignacio Arroyo, apparently shared.

Accordingly in the negotiations leading up to the making of this partition, Victor

Gerona insisted that this farm should be assigned to Ignacio Arroyo. Perhaps the

latter may have had a little more discerning eye for possibilities of the future. At

any rate Ignacio yielded to the insistence of the Geronas; and in the course of a few

years, great things occurred in this region, resulting from the fact that the

Binalbagan Sugar Central was built in that municipality, and the resulting

development of sugar lands, including the Manolita property, raised the value of the farm into the hundreds of thousands of pesos. Nevertheless eighteen years

passed without the Geronas evincing any dissatisfaction with the partition. In the

meanwhile, soon after the contract had been made, the Geronas proceeded to

partition among themselves the property which had thus been assigned to them in

common under the contract; and both the Geronas and Ignacio Arroyo in time

procured Torrens titles to the portions respectively assigned to them.

Considered from a legal point of view the contract Exhibit A exhibits the vital defect

that it was an agreement for the partition of the estate of a living person, made

between those who, in case of death, would be in a position to inherit the estate. Itwas not a partition planned by the owner for the purpose of dividing his estate

properly among his living heirs. It was therefore void under the second paragraph of

article 1271 of the Civil Code. In addition to this have the further fact that the living

owner of the estate thus partitioned was a demented woman, to whom at least one

of the contracting parties stood in a fiduciary relation.

There was therefore ample basis for the uneasiness which Ignacio Arroyo began to

manifest in time with respect to the security of the rights assured to him under this

contract. In this connection we find significant an incident that occurred in 1919 in

winding up to the estate of his mother Apolonia Lacson. Arroyo was the

administrator of this estate, but the proceedings had moved along slowly. In 1919

he submitted an inventory of the decedent's estate, and in this inventory the

property that had belonged to Blas Gerona and Manuela Arroyo figured as the

property of said decedent. In this inventory there was assigned to Concepcion

Gerona only that portion of this property which had been bequeathed to her in the

will of Apolonia Lacson, namely, a one-sixth interest. But it will be remembered thatin will of Apolonia Lacson she disposed only of the property which she had acquired

from her grandson Salvador Gerona. In other words the valuable interest which

Concepcion Gerona had inherited from her parents was conducted into the estate

of Apolonia Lacson. By this device half of the property left by Blas Gerona and

Manuela Arroyo was made to disappear apparently from the thought of man.

Then, in order to get the court to approve the settlement based upon the aforesaid

inventory, Arroyo procured one Mauro Ditching to be appointed guardian ad litem

for Concepcion Gerona. Ditching, as such guardian, formally receipted for the share

pertaining to this demented ward, and immediately resigned. Ignacio Arroyo thenqualified as her legal guardian and he continued to discharge this office until her

death. It will be noted that none of the Geronas were parties to the consummation

of this device, and of course they were not bound by the decree. Furthermore, the

trick was in law ineffectual as against Concepcion Gerona because of the

confidential relations that existed between her and her uncle.

As already stated, Concepcion Gerona died on June 16, 1927, a circumstance which

served to precipitate the controversy which has resulted. To Arroyo the problem

presented was to obtain a ratification or confirmation of the contract Exhibit A. This

matter was accordingly taken up, and on September 27, 1928 the contract (Exhibit

D) was entered into between Arroyo and the Gerona sisters. Victor Gerona being

now dead, his interest in the estate had descended to his two children, Blas G. and

Maria Gerona. This interest, it is important to note, is not involved in the present

lawsuit, as the two heirs mentioned have been content, upon the payment of an

independent consideration, to acquiesce in the contract of June 13, 1913 (Exhibit

A). We are therefore concerned in the situation solely as it affects the Gerona

sisters.

When the suggestion for the ratification of the original agreement was first raised

by Ignacio Arroyo the Geronas showed no enthusiasm about the matter; and that



reason was that they feared that Ignacio Arroyo was setting afoot some scheme to

disturb them in the benefits that they had received under the contract Exhibit A.

They were far from being dissatisfied with that contract and were determined to

hold to what they had gotten. Nevertheless, when it was explained to them that

Arroyo was not intending to disturb them in their previously acquired rights, the

agreement Exhibit D was executed.

In this document the Geronas declared that, in their capacity as heirs and next of

kin of the deceased Concepcion Gerona, they ratified in all its part the deed of

compromise and waiver of June 13, 1913 (Exhibit A), and waived in favor Ignacio

Arroyo any right, interest or participation that they had or might had in and to the

estate left by said Concepcion Gerona (par. 4); that to give effect to this waiver they

authorized Attorney Jose Evangelista to state to the court of their name that they

waived, as such heirs of Concepcion Gerona, in favor of Ignacio Arroyo, any right

they might have in the estate of Concepcion Gerona, in conformity with the

renunciation contained in the document Exhibit A, whereby all of the estate of Concepcion Gerona, not apportioned to the Gerona brothers, had been transferred

to Ignacio Arroyo, whom they likewise authorized to obtain from the court a

pronouncement as to his right to appropriate to himself the said estate of

Concepcion Gerona (par. 5); and that they expressly and specifically waived in favor

of Ignacio Arroyo any right, title or interest which they had or might have in any

other property standing in the name of Concepcion Gerona (par. 6).

Directing our attention to the conditions under which the contract Exhibit D was

executed, we observe that, for appellees, it is contended that this ratification or

confirmation of the original contract Exhibit A was procured by fraudulent

representations; and in this connection it is claimed that the appellant and his

attorney falsely represented to the plaintiffs that the estate of Concepcion Gerona,

which was the subject of that contract, had a value of only eighteen thousand

pesos. We are of the opinion that some such misrepresentation as this was made.

Indeed, in view of the process to which Arroyo had subjected Concepcion's share in

the estate of her parents, namely, of passing it through the testate proceedings of

the estate of Apolonia Lacson, with the apparent result of giving to Concepcion

Gerona only a one-sixth part thereof, it was but natural that the appellant should

have represented that the interest really pertaining to her was of a trivial value. But

whether the Geronas in fact seriously misled by any such misrepresentation is more

questionable. The circumstance that really entitles the Geronas to relief is that

Arroyo had been in confidential relations with Concepcion Gerona, as her uncle and

guardian, and the Geronas were dealing with him in that light, ands as one in whom

they had confidence. It is a well established rule of equity that all dealings with

expectant heirs are presumptively invalid (2 Pom. Eq., 4 ed., sec. 953); also that, if a

person who is placed in a fiduciary relation towards another intentionally conceals amaterial fact with the purpose of inducing the other to enter into an agreement,

such concealment is an actual fraud, and the agreement is void without the aid of

any presumption. (2 Pom. Eq., Jur., 4 ed., sec 956.) The Geronas were in no sense

implicated in the fraudulent device by which the property inherited by Concepcion

Gerona from her parents was passed through the estate of Apolonia Lacson. That

device was a fraud perpetrated by Ignacio Arroyo upon his own ward and upon all

who might derive an interest by inheritance from her. The original contract Exhibit

A, as already suggested, was a mere nullity, and the circumstance that in 1919

Ignacio Arroyo dealt with the estate of his niece in the testacy of Apolonia Lacson in

the manner already stated, shows clearly that he placed little reliance that contract.

It insisted for the appellee that, inasmuch as the contract Exhibit A was void, the

ratification of said contract contained in Exhibit D was also a nullity. But this

contention overlooks of fact that, before the deed of ratification was executed,

death had removed Concepcion Gerona from the scene of life. This circumstance

removed the cause of nullity. A null contract cannot of course be ratified as long as

the cause of nullity continues to exist, but when the cause removed the parties are

free to contract as they please. Whether the contract Exhibit D be viewed as a

ratification, confirmation, or as a new contract, the result is the same, namely, that

the Geronas are bound by said contract unless it was vitiated by fraud, actual orconstructive.

Under the circumstances we have no hesitancy in declaring that the appellees are

entitled to relief from said contract, but the extent of the relief which they should

receive presents a question of some difficulty; for we are confronted with a

situation in which, in eager haste to correct one wrong, we might commit another

equally obnoxious to equity and the sense of justice.

The proper key to the solution of the case is found in the circumstance that the

appellees have appealed to us as a court of equity, to be relieved from a contract



which is prima facie binding against them. Under such circumstances the court has

full power to grant relief to the extent necessary to correct the wrong that has been

suffered by the appellees, without permitting them inflict unnecessary damage

upon others. Fortunately the case supplies the proper clue for what we consider the

correct solution of the case.

In considering the significance of the acts done in this case, as affecting the rights of

the respective parties, it is important to bear in mind that we are concerned with

two interests which have different histories, although the threads have at no time

been disentangled from each other. We refer to the different hereditary shares of

the two heirs, Salvador and Concepcion Gerona, in the estates of their deceased

parents. Each of these shares consisted of two elements, one inherited from the

mother Manuela Arroyo, upon her death in 1893, and the other inherited from Blas

Gerona, upon his death in 1895. The property thus inherited by Salvador and

Concepcion was never partitioned, and when Salvador died in 1907 his share was

inherited, as we have already seen, by his grandmother Apolonia Lacson. In the

hands of the latter their property was reservable under article 811 of the Civil Code,

and the interest thus inherited by Apolonia Lacson from Salvador should have been

reserved for Concepcion Gerona. But, as we have already seen, Apolonia Lacson

made a will, and, ignoring the reservable character of the property, devised only an

undivided one-sixth interest therein to Concepcion. This was an infraction of the

rules of descent prejudicial to Concepcion, and it is manifest that the devise was

invalid in so far as it conveyed to Ignacio Arroyo an interest which should have been

inherited by Concepcion. Now, it was shortly after the death of Apolonia Lacson

that the contract Exhibit A, bearing date of June 13, 1913, was executed. In the

execution of this document the contracting parties of course had principally in mindthe facts then affecting their rights, namely, the death of Salvador Gerona and

Apolonia Lacson.

On the other hand, the one-half interest which Concepcion Gerona had inherited

from her parents, Blas Gerona and Manuela Arroyo. remained in her until her

death, unaffected by the death of Salvador Gerona and Apolonia Lacson. Therefore,

bearing in mind it all times that the contract Exhibit A, of June 13, 1913, was a

nullity, it becomes manifest that the appellee stand in a much better position with

respect to the interest which Concepcion acquired by inheritance from her own

parents that they do in respect to the interest which they seek to derive from

Salvador through Apolonia Lacson and Concepcion Gerona. The situation is

undoubtedly somewhat confused because the parties attempted to deal with both

interests in the same contract, and without advertence to the character of the

different rights involved therein; but the difference, when attention is once drawn

to the matter, is quite apparent.

The result is, and so is our opinion, that the appellees can not be permitted to

recover any of the property formerly vested in Salvador Gerona. Good reason for

refusing to permit this recovery is found in the fact that the appellees were active

and efficient agents in the making of the contract by which the estate of the living

Concepcion Gerona was apparently stripped of that property. They were therefore,

as to this interest, equally in wrong with the individual whom they now seek to

despoil of the larger portion of his gain. As to this interest we think that the deed of

ratification or confirmation, Exhibit D, should be held effective.

As to the half interest directly inherited by Concepcion Gerona from the estate of

her deceased parents, the appellees are in a different position. They had no part in

the act of Ignacio Arroyo which he attempted to despoil his demented ward of five-

sixths of this interest, that is, by conducting it through the channel of the testate

proceedings of his mother into himself. The non-participation of the appellees in

that act and their evident ignorance of its effects upon their hereditary rights,

clearly entitle them to relief as to this part of the property involved.

In the course of these proceedings the fact has come to light that Ignacio Arroyo in

life transferred a large part of the property which involved in this lawsuit, and as to

which he had acquired Torrens titles, to his son Jose Maria Arroyo. The act by which

any such transfer was made constitutes no obstacle to this proceedings, although

when the administration is under way proper steps will have to be taken to hold the

estate of Ignacio Arroyo liable, if the property itself cannot be reached, for any

responsibility which may be properly fixed upon him or his successors, in

conformity with this decision.

The appealed decision of June 30, 1931, will therefore be affirmed in appointing an

administrator over the estate of Concepcion Gerona, thereby abrogating the

resolution of October 8, 1928 , authorizing the summary distribution of her

property. The amendatory order of July 2, 1931, is also affirmed in so far as it makes

a declaration of nullity concerning the contract Exhibit A, of June 13, 1913. But the



declaration with respect to the document Exhibit D, of the date of September 27,

1928, must be modified to the extent that the appellees are bound thereby, in so

far as relates to the interest formerly vested in Salvador Gerona. In other respects

the declaration of nullity made by the trial court concerning said contract is correct;

and, as thus modified, the appealed judgment is affirmed. So ordered, without

costs.

Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Vickers, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

Justice Hull participated in this case, but on account of his absence on leave at the

time of the promulgation of the decision, no statement of his conclusions appears

appended to the opinion of the court, but he authorized the undersigned to certify

that he voted to reverse the judgment and dismiss the complaint on the ground

that the contract of September 27, 1928, is valid and should be enforced. —

STREET, J.

G.R. No. L-22066 December 2, 1924

FRANCISCA MAGHIRANG and SERGIA GUTIERREZ, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.

ATILANO BALCITA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

---------------------------------

G.R. No. L-22067 December 2, 1924

GREGORIO EMPALMADO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.

SERGIA GUTIERREZ, opponent-appellant.

Francisco & Lualhati for appellants.

Ramon Diokno for appellees.

STREET, J.:

By the appeal in civil cause No. 2643 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Sergia

Gutierrez seeks to reverse a decision of said court, whereby two parcels of land

were declared to be the exclusive property of Gregorio Empalmado and of Esteban

Reyes, respectively, free from the claim of Sergia Gutierrez that said lots are held by

said defendants subject to a contingent reservable interest in her favor. Connected

with the action above mentioned is the proceeding in the second appeal, wherein

the trial court declared that the first of the two lots in controversy should be

registered in the name of Gregorio Empalmado, free from the same claim. Becauseof the intimate relation between the action instituted in behalf of the appellant,

Sergia Gutierrez, as reservee, and the registration proceeding in which she is

opponent, the two causes were heard together in the trial court and will be here

disposed of in a single opinion.

The basis of the claim put forth by the plaintiff Gutierrez is the same as to both

parcels, but the facts constituting the respective defenses of the two defendants

are different. It will therefore be convenient to state first the points pertaining to

the two parcels in common and then such as pertain especially to the controversy

over each.

It appears that the original owner of both parcels was one Bonifacio Gutierrez, who

died about the year 1902, after having been thrice married. The first wife left no

children, but the second wife left a daughter, Zoila Gutierrez, who intermarried with

Atilano Balcita, one of the defendants herein. To this pair was born a daughter,

Gertrudis Balcita. Zoila Gutierrez predeceased her father; and upon the death of the

latter, the two parcels of land with which we are concerned passed by inheritance

directly from Bonifacio to his granddaughter Gertrudis, then a mere child. Gertrudis

Balcita herself died on December 9, 1912, at the age of 16, leaving no heir except

her father, Atilano Balcita. The plaintiff, Sergia Gutierrez, is a daughter of Bonifacio

Gutierrez by his third wife, one Francisca Maghirang. Sergia was therefore the aunt

of Gertrudis Balcita, on her mother's side, and as reservee under article 811 of the

Civil Code she should succeed to the title of the two parcels which Atilano Balcita

inherited, or should have inherited, from Gertrudis, provided all the conditions

necessary to the assertion of the reservation right are fulfilled.

GUTIERREZ VS. EMPALMADO

Parcel A. — In the year 1905 Atilano Balcita sold the parcel A to one Vicente

Almario. As the land belonged to Gertrudis, a lawsuit was instituted in her behalf in

1912 with a view to recovering it. The litigation was compromised by the



reconveyance of the land by Almario to Gertrudis and the payment to him of

P1,200, which was the amount that he had paid for the property. The money

necessary to effect this compromise had to be borrowed by Gertrudis, or those

representing her; and although the point is subject to discussion, the

preponderance of the testimony is to the effect that the money was obtained from

Gregorio Empalmado under an agreement by which Gertrudis Balcita undertook toconvey the land to him for the sum of P2,100. The document, Exhibit B, constituting

the evidence of this agreement is dated November 28, 1912. In addition to the

signature of Gertrudis Balcita, which is questioned, it bears the signature of Atilano

Balcita and two subscribing witnesses. Gertrudis Balcita died of dysentery on

December 9, 1912, and on December 12 thereafter her father, Atilano Balcita,

executed the document Exhibit C, whereby he conveyed, or purported to convey,

the same parcel to Gregorio Empalmado, it being recited that he had inherited the

land from his daughter Gertrudis. Gregorio Empalmado immediately entered into

possession, and he has subsequently maintained possession under claim of

ownership.

For the plaintiff, Gutierrez, it is insisted that the document, Exhibit b, is not

authentic and that the name of Gertrudis Balcita subscribed thereto is a forgery.

The trial judge was of the opinion that the due execution of this instrument had

been proved by a preponderance of the evidence; and although the question is

debatable, and the point not altogether free from doubt, we are of the opinion that

the trial court's conclusion on this point should be affirmed. The two subscribing

witnesses both say that they saw the girl sign the document upon the date stated

therein, and this is corroborated not only by the testimony of Gregorio Empalmado,

who was present at the execution of the instrument, but also by Atilano Balcitahimself. The only testimony to the contrary is that of Sergia Gutierrez, who says

that the girl was too sick for some time prior to her death to admit the possibility of

her having signed the instrument. It is true that the questioned signature appears

somewhat suspicious, but we have not sufficient data upon which to pronounce it a

forgery, considered as a mere question of penmanship. Certainly, the instrument

expresses the agreement that would naturally have been drawn upon under the

proven circumstances which gave rise to the transaction.

Upon the foregoing state of facts the trial judge found as a matter of law that the

title to parcel A passed out of Gertrudis Balcita and became vested in Gregorio

Empalmado before her death; and although Gertrudis was then a minor, the

conveyance was only voidable and not void. Moreover, as his Honor pointed out,

the contract was evidently advantageous to the minor because she thereby

obtained the money necessary to get the property back from Vicente Almario, with

the consequent saving of P900.

These conclusions of the trial court seem to us well founded, and the result is that,

as to this parcel, the inchoate reservable right asserted by Sergia Gutierrez never

came into existence. In this view the conveyance executed by Atilano Balcita a few

days after the death of his daughter Gertrudis operated as a mere quit-claim from

him, as title had already vested in Empalmado under the prior agreement with her.

No error was therefore committed by the trial judge in dismissing the complaint in

case No. 2643 in so far as it affects parcel A and the right of the defendant

Empalmado thereto; nor did his Honor err in ordering the registration of the same

parcel in the name of Empalmado and his wife Felipa Brion, regardless of the

opposition of the plaintiff Gutierrez.

GUTIERREZ VS. REYES

Parcel B. — As already stated, this parcel comes from the same source as the parcel

A, that is, from the estate of Bonifacio Gutierrez. With respect to this parcel it

appears that on May 28, 1906, Atilano Balcita, being then in possession and

asserting a claim of ownership, sold the same by a contract of sale with pacto de

retro for the sum of P200 to the defendant Esteban Reyes. In the document

constituting the evidence of this sale Atilano Balcita falsely declared that he was

owner by virtud of having inherited the property from his parents and that he hadbeen in quiet and pacific possession for fifteen years. Esteban Reyes was a

purchaser for value and bought in belief that the land really belonged to his vendor.

The period for repurchase under this contract was ten years, which passed in 1916

without redemption having been effected. It is not clear whether the purchaser

under this contract entered into possession during the time stipulated for

redemption or not; but it is agreed that, with this exception, the defendant Reyes

had, until the institution of this action on May 10, 1918, exercised actual and

adverse possession, to the exclusion of all other persons.lawphi1.net



Upon the facts above stated the trial judge gave Reyes the benefit of prescription

under the ten years statute (sec. 41, Code of Civ. Proc.) and held that the right of

Sergia Gutierrez, as reservee, had been thereby destroyed.

We are of the opinion that the conclusion thus reached is erroneous. We may

accept the legal proposition that occupancy by Esteban Reyes, pursuant to the

contract of sale with pacto de retro by which he acquired the property, and prior to

the expiration of the period for redemption, may be considered an adverse

possession as against everybody having a prescriptible interest, notwithstanding the

existence of the stipulation for repurchase. As was said by this court in Santos vs.

Heirs of Crisostomo and Tiongson (41 Phil., 342, 352), the insertion of a stipulation

for repurchase by the vendor in a contract of sale does not necessarily create a right

inconsistent with the right of ownership in the purchaser. Such a stipulation is in the

nature of an option, and the possible exercise of its rests upon contingency. It

creates no subsisting right whatever in the property, and so far from being

inconsistent with the idea of full ownership in the purchaser, it really rests upon the

assumption of ownership in him.

But it must be borne in mind that the true owner of this property was Gertrudis

Balcita, a minor, and the period of limitation did not begin to run against her or any

person claiming in her right until the date of her death, which was December 9,

1912. It must furthermore be remembered that the plaintiff does not claim in the

character of an ordinary successor to the rights of Gertrudis Balcita; her claim is

based upon a positive provision of law, which could no operate in any wise until the

death of Gertrudis Balcita, when the reservable character first attached to the

property in question. From this it is obvious that the right of the plaintiff — which

even yet is of a purely contingent nature — could not be affected by anything that

had occurred prior to the death of Gertrudis Balcita; and as this action was begun in

May, 1918, the ten-year period necessary to confer a complete prescriptive title

had not then elapsed.

What has been said makes it unnecessary to express any opinion upon he more

recondite question whether Sergia Gutierrez really has a prescriptive interest in the

parcel B, but we may observe that the position of the reservee under the Spanish

law is very much like that of the ordinary remainderman at common law, who is

entitled to take after the termination of a particular life estate; and it is generally

accepted doctrine in common law jurisdictions that if the life tenant loses his life

estate by adverse possession the interest of the remainderman is not thereby

destroyed. (17 R. C. L., 982; 21 C. J., 972, 975, 1013.) The reason for the rule is said

to be that, during the existence of the life estate, the remainderman has no right to

possession and consequently cannot bring an action to recover it. (21 C. J., 974.) As

was said by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Webster vs. Pittsburg, etc., Railroad Co.(15 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1154), "No possession can be deemed adverse to a party who has

not at the time the right of entry and possession."

From what has been said it is apparent that the judgment must be affirmed in so far

as concerns the registration of parcel A in expediente No. 409, G. L. R. O., record No.

14769, and in so far as relates to the dismissal of the complaint against Gregorio

Empalmado in case No. 2643; but the judgment in the same case must be reversed

in so far as relates to parcel B, now in the possession of Esteban Reyes, and it is

hereby declared that said parcel is reservable property and upon the death of

Atilano Balcita will pass to Sergia Gutierrez, if she be then living. Let a certified copy

of this pronouncement be filed with the register of deeds of the Province of Laguna

for record pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 2837 of the Philippine Legislature.

So ordered, without special pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-22601 October 28, 1966

PRIMA G. CARRILLO and LORENZO LICUP, plaintiffs and appellants,

vs.

FRANCISCA SALAK DE PAZ and ERNESTO BAUTISTA, defendants and appellees.

Filemon Cajator for plaintiffs and appellants.Tomas Besa for defendants and appellees.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac dismissing a

suit to recover ownership and possession of 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 of the

Cadastral Survey of Tarlac.

Severino Salak and Petra Garcia were the owners of Lot No. 221 of the Cadastral

Survey of Tarlac, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 41543, with an area of

1,334 square meters. Petra Garcia died on September 21, 1941. On August 16,



1943, Severino Salak sold to Honoria Salak for P812.00 his ½ portion of said lot. A

year later, on December 5, 1944, Severino Salak died.

Sometime in January 1945, Honoria Salak and other members of her family died —

massacred by the Japanese.

As a result, two settlement proceedings were instituted in the Court of First

Instance of Tarlac: (1) Special Proceeding No. 3, to settle the estates of Severino

Salak and Petra Garcia and (2) Special Proceeding No. 23, to settle the estates of the

Salak family (parents Simeon Salak and Isabel Carrillo; and children Adolfo, Honoria,

Consuelo and Ligaya).

On September 4, 1946, a Project of Partition was submitted in Special Proceeding

No. 3, which the court approved on November 19, 1946. Said project adjudicated

inter alia Lot No. 221, which was given thereunder to Francisca Salak de Paz (1/4 of

it in her capacity as heir, and the other 3/4 by purchase and/or exchange with her

co-heirs, Rita Sahagun, Aurea Sahagun and Ernesto Bautista). From 1946 up to thepresent Francisca Salak has possessed all of Lot No. 221.

On the other hand, in Special Proceeding No. 23, on February 26, 1948, the court a

quo held that the heirs entitled to the estates of the Salak family were Agustina de

Guzman Vda. de Carillo (3/4 share) and Ernesto Bautista (1/4 share), applying the

survivorship presumption [Rule 123, Sec. 69(ii), now Rule 131, Sec. 5(jj) of the Rules

of Court], thus: (1) Simeon Salak died first — his properties went to the children

Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya (1/4 each); (2) Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya

died next — Honoria's and Consuelo's properties went to their mother, Isabel;

those of Ligaya went to her son, Ernesto Bautista;

1

(3) Isabel died next — herproperties went to her son Adolfo; and (4) Adolfo died last — his properties went to

his maternal grandmother, Agustina. Agustina thereby succeeded to the properties

that came by intes-state succession from Honoria Salak and Isabel Carrillo, including

½ of Lot No. 221.

On November 9, 1948, Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo filed an action in the

Court of First Instance of Tarlac (docketed therein as Case No. 351) against the heirs

in Special Proceeding No. 3 to recover ½ of Lot No. 221 which as aforementioned

has been possessed by Francisca Salak de Paz.

On April 24, 1950, Agustina died.

On June 8, 1950 the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of First

Instance of Tarlac in Special Proceeding No. 23, and further decreed that the

properties inherited by Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo were subject to reserva

troncal .

On November 6, 1950, Ernesto Bautista filed a petition in Special Proceeding No. 23

for the execution of the judgment therein. Said petition was heard on November

10, 1959, after a copy was served on the lawyer of Prima Carrillo, the latter being a

party thereto as administratix of the estate of her deceased mother Agustina.

Acting on said petition, the lower court issued its order of November 14, 1950,

which reads in part:

. . . the Court, in view of the death of the reservista, Doña Agustina de Guzman Vda.

de Carrillo, declares all the interest of the said reservista Doña Agustina de Guzman

Vda. de Carrillo as well as that of her heirs in the three-fourths share adjudged tothe reservista, definitely terminated, and that the reservee, the minor Ernesto

Bautista, is entitled to the immediate delivery to him of the said three-fourths share

declared reserved to him in the decision of the Court of Appeals of June 8, 1950. . . .

(Record on Appeals, pp. 213-214)

On December 20, 1960, the lower court dismissed Civil Case No. 351. The order of

dismissal reads in part:

By virtue of the existence of third-degree relatives of Adolfo Salak, the portion of

Lot No. 221, inherited by Agustina de Guzman was never released from the reserva,

so as to convert the ownership of Agustina de Guzman into an absolute one. Upon

her death on April 24, 1950, therefore, the property did not pass by inheritance to

her legal heirs, but rather reverted to the family trunk of the Isabel-Adolfo line.

Such being the case, the estate of Agustina de Guzman, the Present plaintiff in this

case, has no cause of action against the defendants.

In resume, the adjudication in Special Proceeding No. 23, Intestate Estate of the late

Simeon Salak and Isabel Carrillo, which included Lot No. 221, has become res

judicata which cannot be disturbed in this case. (Record on Appeal, p. 209)



On April 22, 1963, Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup filed the present suit for

recovery of 2/3 of 1/2 of No. 221 against Francisca Salak de Paz and Ernesto

Bautista.2

On June 20, 1963, defendants Francisco Salak de Paz and Ernesto Bautita filed a

motion to dismiss upon the grounds that the cause of action is barred by prior

judgement and by the statute of limitations.

On November 19, 1963, the court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground of

res judicata, finding the suit barred by the order of delivery dated November 14,

1950 in Special Proceeding No. 23.

Plaintiffs Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup thereupon appealed to Us upon

questions of law.

Several grounds were advanced to support the motion to dismiss: that the cause of

action is barred by prior judgment and by the statute of limitations. Although theaction was dismissed by the lower court expressly upon the ground of res judicata,

it did not totally disregard the defense of prescription. Thus, said court pointed out

that:

Prima Carrillo being then the administratrix of the estate of her mother, she is also

deemed to have been notified of the petition for execution of judgment in Special

Proceeding No. 23, and of the order of November 14, 1950. As of then, therefore,

Prima Carrillo (even though as administratrix) personally knew that Ernesto Bautista

claimed to be the sole reservee of all the properties inherited by Da. Agustina from

the Salak Family, among which was Lot No. 221 in question, but she did not file any

opposition thereto. It was her opportunity to assert her right as reservee by

opposing the petition or, failing in this, to contest or to ask to be relieved from the

order of November 14, 1950. Instead, she allowed about thirteen (13) years before

she commenced the present action. (Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 214-215;

emphasis supplied)

At any rate, this Court can resolve this appeal on the issue of prescription. As ruled

in the cases of Garcia Valdez vs. Soterana Tuazon, 40 Phil. 943 and Relativo v.

Castro, 76 Phil. 563, when the trial judge decides a case in favor of a party on a

certain ground, the appellate court may uphold the decision below upon some

other point which was ignored or erroneously decided in favor of the appellant by

the trial court.

Reserva troncal in this jurisdiction is treated in Article 891 of the new Civil Code and

Article 811 of the old Civil Code, which states:

The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may

have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is

obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for

the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line

from which said property came.

The reserva troncal arose — as had been finally decided by the Court of Appeals in

Special Proceeding No. 23 — when Agustina acquired by operation of law all the

properties of her descendant Adolfo (grandson), who acquired them by gratuitous

title from another ascendant, Isabel (Adolfo's mother).

According to Manresa, the reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservista,

as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who

can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right, if not exercised

within the time for recovering real properties, can be lost by prescription:

Pero extinguida la reserva por la muerte del reservista, cambian por completo las

relaciones y condiciones juridicas de las personas y de las cosas, como ya se ha

indicado. La obligacion de reservar se convierte en la de entregar los bienes a quien

correspondan, obligacion que pasa a la herencia del reservista fallecido y deben

complir sus herederos. Y el derecho a la reserva se convierte en el derecho al

dominio pleno de esos bienes. Si a la muerte del reservista se comple la condicion

resolutoria de existir parientes dentro del tercer grado que pertenezcan a la linea

de donde los bienes proceden, a estos parientes pasa desde aquel momento por

ministerio de la ley el dominio absoluto de aquellos bienes, y, por consiguiente, el

derecho para reclamarlos, pudiendo disponer libremente de aquellos o de este, y

transmitirlos a sus herederos, puesto que la ley no lo prohibe. Y si no sobrevive al

reservista ninguno de dichos parientes, queda extinguida la obligacion de reservar,

por no haberse complido aquella condicion resolutoria impuesta por la ley, y en su

virtud vuelven los bienes al pleno dominio del ascendiente, y pertenecen a su

herencia conforme al art. 651. Y como nada ordena la ley en sentido contrario,



tenemos por indudable que no tiene el caracter de personalisimo ninguno de esos

derechos, que nacen con la extincion de la reserva, pertenecen a la herencia y se

transmiten a los herederos, aunque el causante no los hubiere ejercitado por si

mismo, salvo cases de renuncia, incapacidad o prescripcion.

xxx xxx xxx

C) Extincion de la reserva.—Las mismas condiciones exigidas para el nacimiento de

la reserva son necesarias para su existencia. Al faltar una de ellas, la reserva

muerte. Tres son, por tanto, las principales causas de extincion:

1.a. Muerte del ascendiente.—Sea el que quiera el destino definitivo de los bienes,

en virtud de la naturaleza condicional de los derechos que crea el art. 811, es lo

cierto que la reserva, como tal, una vez necida a compaña al ascendiente obligado a

ella hasta su muerte. Muerto el ascendiente, cesa toda obligacion de reservar; falta

el sujeto pasivo de la reserva.

xxx xxx xxx

Ademas de las tres causas expresadas, pueden señalarse otras que expondremos a

continuacion.

xxx xxx xxx

Y 5.a La prescripcion, si se disfrutan como libres los bienes por los herederos del

ascendiente durante el tiempo y con las condiciones marcadas por la ley. (Manresa,

Comentarios Al Codigo Civil Español , Vol. 6, 1911 Ed., pp. 288-289, 316-318).

Scaevola also states the view that prescription can apply against the reservatarios

to cut off their right to the reservable property:

f) Prescipcion.—Este modo extintivo de los derechos tiene solo applicacion a los

parientes del tercer grado del descendiente, porque no habiendo reserva si no

acepta el ascendiente, no hay que hablar de prescripcion extintiva respecto de el.

Tocante a los parientes con derecho a la reserva, es aplicable la doctrina, porque

pueden no ejercer su derecho por ignorar la muerte del descendiente opor otra

causa.

Dada esta posibilidad, entendemos que, tratandose de un derecho real sobre

bienes inmuebles, prescribira a los treinta años (art. 1.693) (1), contados desde la

aceptacion de la herencia por el ascendiente, momento determinante del derecho

al ejercicio de la reserva (art. 1.969) ; transcurridos, pues, treinta años desde la

aceptacion sin que los parientes favorecidos por la ley hayan solicitado la

constitucion de la reserva, se extenguira esta, y el ascendiente o sus derecho-habientes adquiriran el pleno dominio de los bienes reservables por su naturaleza,

pero que no fueron objeto de reserva. (Scaevola, Codigo Civil Comentado, Vol. 14,

1944 Ed., p. 360).

Plaintiffs-appellants herein, as reservatarios, had the right to claim the property 2/3

of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 — from Francisca Salak de Paz, who has been possessing it in

the concept of an owner, from April 24, 1950 when Agustina died. And the Court of

Appeals' decision affirming the existence of reserva troncal , promulgated on June 8,

1950, rendered it all the more doubtless that such right had accrued in their favor

from the time Agustina died. It is clear, therefore, that the right or cause of action

accrued in favor of the plaintiffs-reservatarios herein on April 24, 1950.

Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure fixes 10 years as the period of prescription

for actions to recover real property, counted from the time the cause of action

accrued. This is the applicable law because Article 1116 of the New Civil Code

provides that "Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code

[August 30, 1950] shall be governed by laws previously in force."

Plaintiffs-appellants' suit herein, having been filed only on April 22, 1963, or more

than ten (10) years from April 24, 1950, has prescribed.

And having reached such conclusion, We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the

question of whether the suit is also barred on the ground of res judicata.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed on the

ground of prescription, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-10915 March 30, 1960



SOLEDAD BACALZO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.

MARTINA PACADA, respondent.

Leoncio P. Abarquez for petitioners.

Antonio T. Bacaltos for respondent.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J .:

This is a petition to review on certiorari a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The pertinent facts of the case are not disputed and are stated in the decision of the

appellate court as follows:

On March 9, 1917, Carmiano Bacalzo, who was then married to petitioner's mother

Carmelina Padillo, entered into a contract (Contract No. 7009) with the Government

of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, for the purchase by him of

Lot No. 1790 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Estate, originally forming part of the Friar

Lands, for the stipulated price of P200.00, payable on installments. The sale

certificate stated the area of Lot No. 1790 as 22 acres and 70 centares, or 2270

square meters. The certificate of sale also stipulated that upon complete payment

of the stipulated price, the Director of Lands would issue a final deed of sale to the

purchaser, Carmiano Bacalzo. (Exhibit A for petitioner, Exhibit 2 for respondents;

and testimony of Friar Lands Agent Jose V. Sison.) Carmelina Padillo died sometime

in 1922, survived by her husband, Carmiano Bacalzo, and her children with the

latter, the herein petitioners. In 1924, Carmiano Bacalzo contracted a second

marriage with the respondent Martina Pacada. Carmiano Bacalzo died on

November 5, 1948 (Petitioners' Exhibit C).

Carmiano Bacalzo made payments on account of Lot No. 1790 during his union with

Carmelina Padillo and the respondent, although the main bulk of such payments

was made during his union with the latter (Petitioners' Exhibit B; Respondent's

Exhibits 4, 5, 5-a, 5-b, 5-d, and 5-e). According to Mr. Sison, Lot No. 1790 was fully

paid for on June 17, 1947, although a payment for shortage of interest was also

made on August 12, 1948 (Petitioners' Exhibit B).

Mr. Sison also testified that upon full payment of the lot, he recommended to the

Director of Lands that the final deed of conveyance be executed to Carmiano

Bacalzo, deceased, married to Martina Pacada, subject to the claim of heirs, and

that petitioners as well as respondent had filed claims to the lot in question

(Petitioners' Exhibits D and E). Although Mr. Sison stated on direct examination that

Lot No. 1790 was fully paid for on June 17, 1947, he, however, admitted on cross-

examination that on February 16, 1953 he required respondent to pay the

additional amount of P0.45 representing an increase of five square meters in thearea of Lot No. 1790 after it had been found upon resurvey by the Bureau of Lands

that the true and correct area of said Lot No. 1790 is 2,275 square meters and not

2,270 square meters as originally stated in Sale Certificate No. 7009 (Respondent's

Exhibit 6). Said amount of P0.45 was paid by respondent on March 4, 1953.

(Respondent's Exhibit 1).

On October 29, 1953, the Director of Lands forwarded to the Register of Deeds for

the City and Province of Cebu the final deed of sale for the issuance of the

necessary transfer certificate of title to 'the legal heirs of Carmiano Bacalzo,

represented by Martina Pacada.(Respondent's Exhibits 6-a and 6-b). Pursuant to the

Director's communication, Exhibit 6-b, the Register of Deeds for the City and

Province of Cebu, on November 11, 1953, issued Transfer Certificate of Title No.

2898 for Lot No. 1790 in the name of 'THE LEGAL HEIRS OF CARMIANO BACALZO,

represented by Martina Pacada of Tabunoc, Talisay, Cebu, as owners thereof in fee

simple, subject to such of the incumbrances mentioned in Article 39 of said Act as

may be subsisting and other provisions of Section 19 of Act 1120 as amended,

subject to the rights of any legal heirs other than Martina Pacada should there be

any within two years from November 11, 1953. . . ." Upon payment by respondent

of the corresponding legal fees (Respondent's Exhibit 7), the transfer certificate of

title was delivered to her by the Register of Deeds. By motion of herein petitionersfiled on January 7, 1954, in G. L. R. O. Record No. 3732, the Honorable Edmundo S.

Piccio, on February 15, 1954, required respondent herein to deposit with the Clerk

of this Court (CFI of Cebu) the said transfer certificate of title until such time as the

declaration of the legal heirs of the deceased Carmiano Bacalzo shall have been

determined by this Court.

On February 24, 1954, herein petitioners, Soledad, Ildefonso and Felicidad, all

surnamed Bacalzo, the children of the deceased Carmiano Bacalzo by his first

marriage with Carmelina Padillo, filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu a special

action for declaratory relief for a determination of their rights to the lot in question



as against Martina Pacada, surviving widow of their deceased father. The action,

however, was treated by the parties in their pleadings as one for positive relief.

Treating the case in the same manner, the trial court on July 30, 1954, after hearing,

rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring respondent to be the legal and

absolute owner of Lot No. 1790 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Estate; ordering the Clerk

of Court to deliver Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2898 to the said respondent; and

ordering the Register of Deeds for the Province and City of Cebu to cancel the said

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2898 and to issue in lieu thereof another transfer

certificate of title in the name of the herein respondent, with the parties bearing

their own costs.

The above decision was predicated on the theory that the deceased Carmiano

Bacalzo, prior to and until his death was a mere holder of a certificate which is only

an agreement to sell, and that the purchase price of the lot was not fully paid until

March 4, 1953, when respondent Martina Pacada paid the amount of 45 centavos

(P0.45) for the additional 5 square meters discovered upon resurvey of the lot.

According to the court, respondent Martina Pacada, under section 16 of the Friar

Lands Act (Act No. 1120), succeeded in the right of her deceased husband. On

appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court affirmed the decision; hence, the present

petition for review.

Petitioners' contention is that their deceased father Carmiano Bacalzo became the

actual owner of the lot in question upon full payment during his lifetime of the

purchase price thereof, and as his legal heirs, they succeeded him in the ownership

of said lot. We find merit in the contention. It is not disputed that the originalpurchase price of P200.00 for the lot in question was fully paid on June 17, 1947,

with a payment of shortage of interest on August 12, 1948, or before the death of

the purchaser Carmiano Bacalzo on November 5, 1948. All the requirements of the

law for the purchase of the lot having been complied with by said Carmiano Bacalzo

on August 12, 1948, the Government on that date was legally bound to issue to him

"the proper instrument of conveyance" by reason of section 12 of the Friar Lands

Act, providing that —

. . . Upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued interest the

Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held by him

by proper instrument of conveyance in the manner provided in section 122 of the

Land Registration Act. . . .

The fact that the Government failed to do so cannot, in our opinion, preclude the

now deceased purchaser from acquiring during his lifetime ownership over the lot

in question. It is not the issuance of the deed of conveyance that vests ownership in

the purchaser under the Friar Lands Act. Thus, in the case of Director of Lands, et al.

vs. Rizal, et al. 87 Phil., 806, this Court speaking through Justice Montemayor, said

that "in the sale of friar lands under Act No. 1120, the purchaser, even before the

payment of the full price and before the execution of the final deed of conveyance,

is considered by law as the actual owner of the lot purchased under the obligation

to pay in full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government being that

of a mere lien holder or mortgagee."

Of course, under section 16 of the same Act No. 1120, in the event of the death of

the purchaser or holder of certificate, the widow shall be entitled to receive the

deed of the land upon showing that she has complied with the requirements of the

law for the purchase of the same, that is to say, she succeeds in the parcels of land

to be sold by the Government. The section referred to, however, cannot be applied

to the present case. That section contemplates a situation where the purchaser-

applicant dies before completing payment of the purchase price.

In the case at bar, it is true that herein respondent, upon demand made by the Friar

Lands Agent, paid 45 centavos (P0.45) after discovering, upon a resurvey of the lot

in question, that the actual area thereof is 5 square meters more than that stated in

the sale certificate. We do not, however, think that respondent, by virtue of such

payment, is entitled to receive the deed of the land in question, specially since saidpayment was made more than 4 years after the original purchase price had been

paid in full. The friar lands — as was said by this Court in the case of Director of

Lands et al. vs. Rizal, et al. supra — "are surveyed before they are sold. The

purchaser buys a definite parcel with fixed boundaries, at an agreed price, not a

parcel yet to be surveyed when he pays the final installment and whose price is to

be ascertained and fixed according to the area then found by the survey. In other

words, the purchaser buys the land as it was at the time he applied for the

purchase, with definite boundaries and a fixed price." Since the lots are not sold at

the rate of specified price for each unit measure, but rather on lump sum basis with



definite boundaries, there can be no increase or decrease of the price although

there be a greater or less area than that stated in the contract. (See Art. 1471, old

Civil Code; article 1542 of the new.) The purchaser, therefore, under the Friar Lands

Act, has the right to insist that all the area inside the fixed boundaries as stated in

the sale certificate be considered included in the sale.

It being clear that the deceased purchaser Carmiano Bacalzo was the legal owner of

the lot in controversy and there being no dispute that he is survived only by the

children of his first marriage, herein petitioners, and his second wife, herein

respondent, the question that arises is, who between them should have the right to

succeed him as owner thereof. As provided in section 16 of the Friar Lands Act, the

interest of the purchaser who dies before the giving of the deed of the land, "shall

descend and deed shall issue to the persons who under the laws of the Philippine

Islands would have taken had the title been perfected before the death of the

holder of the certificate. . . ." Under Article 834 of the old Civil Code — which is the

law applicable — the surviving spouse received a share in usufruct equal to the

share of a legitimate child. It was only upon the enactment of the new Civil Code

that the legitimate of the surviving spouse has been changed from usufruct to full

ownership. (See Art. 892, new Civil Code; Civil Code by Tolentino, Vol. III, 1955 ed.,

p. 275; Report of the Code Commission, p. 23.) Applying the law, the deed of

conveyance and title to the controverted lot in the present case must be issued to

and in the name of herein petitioners, without prejudice to the right of the

respondent to the portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of

legitime to each of the three petitioners. (Article 834, old Civil Code.)

In view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is

reversed. The petitioners are hereby declared to be the legal and absolute owners

of the lot in controversy, and the Register of Deeds for the Province and City of

Cebu is ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2898 covering the lot in

question and to issue in lieu thereof another transfer certificate of title in the name

of herein petitioners, subject to right of respondent Martina Pacada to the portion

in usufruct equal to that which pertains as legitime each of the three petitioners.

Without costs.

G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990

JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO and VICTORIA RONDA

NACARIO, respondents.

Domingo Lucenario for petitioners.

Ernesto A. Atienza for private respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrary to existing

relevant laws and applicable jurisprudence the decision1

of the Court of Appeals

dated December 11, 1987 which reversed and set aside that of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch XXXII, at Pili, Camarines Sur.2

The challenged decision adjudged the

petitioners liable to the private respondents in the total amount of P20,505.00 and

for costs.

The facts are as follows:

In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido

Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines

Sur, figured in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor

and owned and operated by petitioner Jose Baritua.3

As a result of that accident

Bienvenido and his passenger died4

and the tricycle was damaged.5 No criminal

case arising from the incident was ever instituted.6

Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlementof the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer — Philippine First

Insurance Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity) — Bienvenido Nacario's

widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, received P18,500.00. In consideration of

the amount she received, Alicia executed on March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in

favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them from all

actions, claims, and demands arising from the accident which resulted in her

husband's death and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then

driving. Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in which she formally

manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case, either civil or criminal, against

the petitioners.7



On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of the

accident on November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of

Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners with the

then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur.8

In their complaint, the private

respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners

through their representatives promised them (the private respondents) that asextra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for

the funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage for the

tricycle the purchase price of which they (the private respondents) only loaned to

the victim. The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead

negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late

son. The Nacario spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be

ordered to indemnify them in the amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son

Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and

exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and for moral damages.9

After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by

the defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and her child, who are the

preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased Bienvenido to the

exclusion of his parents, the plaintiffs (herein private respondents), extinguished

any claim against the defendants (petitioners).10

The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the

trial court. The appellate court ruled that the release executed by Alicia Baracena

Vda. de Nacario did not discharge the liability of the petitioners because the case

was instituted by the private respondents in their own capacity and not as "heirs,

representatives, successors, and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not have validly

waived the damages being prayed for (by the private respondents) since she was

not the one who suffered these damages arising from the death of their son.

Furthermore, the appellate court said that the petitioners "failed to rebut the

testimony of the appellants (private respondents) that they were the ones who

bought the tricycle that was damaged in the incident. Appellants had the burden of

proof of such fact, and they did establish such fact in their testimony . . .11

Anent

the funeral expenses, "(T)he expenses for the funeral were likewise shouldered by

the appellants (the private respondents). This was never contradicted by the

appellees (petitioners). . . . Payment (for these) were made by the appellants,

therefore, the reimbursement must accrue in their favor.12

Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay the

private respondents P10,000.00 for the damage of the tricycle, P5,000.00 for

"complete" funeral services, P450.00 for cemetery lot, P55.00 for oracion adulto,

and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees. 13 The petitioners moved for

a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision14

but their motion was denied.15

Hence, this petition.

The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in holding

that the petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents the aggregate

amount of P20,505.00 despite the agreement of extrajudicial settlement between

the petitioners and the victim's compulsory heirs.

The petition is meritorious.

Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by payment.

Article 1231 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:

(1) By payment or performance;

(2) By the loss of the thing due;

(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;

(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;

(5) By compensation;

(6) By novation.

(Emphasis ours.)

There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition arising

from the accident that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question now is



whether or not Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the petitioners'

payment, is entitled to it.

Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to whom

payment to extinguish an obligation should be made.

Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has

been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it.

Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the

successors in interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive

payment. The Civil Code states:

Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and

ascendants;

2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants with respect to

their legitimate children and decendants;

3. The widow or widower;

4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;

5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1

and 2. Neither do they exclude one another. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his

parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral

relatives.

(Emphasis ours.)

It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter

dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse

concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was

married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private respondents are not

successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners

therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of

Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia

had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for

the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.

Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek

relief and compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private

respondents loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and

shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are

but money claims against the estate of their deceased son.16

These money claims

are not the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by

the agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena

Vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of their

child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of

the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby

REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-10732 May 23, 1959

VICTORIANO GAMIS, petitioner,

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.

Fernando Gerona and Florencio C. Diño for petitioner.

Jose C. Concepcion for respondent Gerarda Gamis.

PADILLA, J .:



Appeal by certiorari Rule 46 of the Rules from a judgment rendered by the Court of

Appeals which modified that of the court of First Instance of Sorsogon in a partition

suit (civil No. 120).

On September 1946 in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon Gerarda Gamis and

her husband Sebastian Imperial commenced suit against her father Victoriano

Gamis and brother Macario Gamis for partition of several parcels of land (A to C)

claimed to be paraphernal of the late Ciriaca Giro, mother of the plaintiff Gerarda

Gamis and those numbered 1 to 19, in the second complaint dated 4 September

1950, to be conjugal of the spouses Victoriano Gamis and Ciriaca Giro.

After hearing, on 30 September 1954 the court rendered judgment the dispositive

part of which is as follows:

POR TANTO, el Juzgado declara las parcelas A y B la porcion equivalente a 2 2/3

partes de la Pacela C como bienes parafernales de la finada Ciriaca Giro que deben

ser divididas en partes iguales entre la demandante Gerarda Gamis y el demandadoMacario Gamis. En cuanto a las Parcelas 1 al 19, se declaran bienes de Ciriaca Giro y

Victoriano Gamis las Parcelas 1 y 2, las porciones cubiertas por las hojas

declaratorias Exhibits K-2 y K-3 de la Parcela 5, la Parcela 9, la porcion cubierta por

la hoja declaratoria Exhibit I-4 de la Parcela 10, y las Parcelas 11 y 19, y se ordena

que las mismas sean adjudicadas y divididas en la forma siguente: una mitad a favor

del demandado Victoriano Gamis y la otra mitad a iguales entre la demandante

Gerarda Gamis y el demandado Macario Gamis. Se condena al demandado

Victoriano Gamis a pagar a la demandante la suma de P2,000.00 en concepto de

daños y prejuicios. SE SOBRESEE la demanda en cuanto a las Parcelas 3, 4, 6, 7, 12,

13, 14, 15,16, 17 y 18. SE CONCEDE a las partes una plazo de treinta (30) dias paraque presenten el Juzgado un proyecto de particion de conformidad con esta

decision en la inteligencia de que no hacerlo dentro de dicho plazo, el Juzgado

nombrara, a peticion de cualquiera de las partes, tres comisionados que

verificaranla particion ordenada en la presente decision.

No se hace ningun pronunciamiento especial en cunato a las costas. (pp. 85, 104-

105, Rec. on App.)

Victoriano Gamis appealed to the Court of Appeals and there assigned as

committed by the trial court the following errors:

1. The trial court erred in holding that parcels A, B and C, as described in the

complaint, are paraphernal property of Ciriaca Giro,

2. The trial court erred in finding parcels 1, 2, 9, 11 and 19 as conjugal property of

the spouses Victoriano Gamis and Ciriaca Giro.

3. The trial court erred in condemning appellant to pay plaintiff Gerarda Gamis two

thousand pesos as damages.

4. The trial court erred in not declaring appellant forced heir of Ciriaca Giro,

assuming that parcels A, B and C are her paraphernal property.

On 11 April 1956 the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court

with a slight modification as to the remaining one-third undivided share of parcel of

land lettered C, described in paragraph 3 of the second amended complaint, which

was declared to belong to Gerarda Gamis and Macario Gamis share and share alike,

said one-third undivided share having been inherited by them from their deceased

uncle Anastacio Giro. In the judgment of the Court of Appeals the following

pronouncement is made.

Finally counsel for appellant contends that the lower court failed to declare

appellant forced heir of Ciriaca Giro according to Article 834 of the Civil Code which

provides that a widower or widow who, on the death of his or her spouses is not

divorced, or should be so by the fault of the deceased, shall be entitled to a portion

in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate

children or descendants who have not receive any betterment. This is the first time

this question is raised by appellant. He failed altogether to call the attention of the

lower court to this question and hence it should be understood to have been

waived according to a long line of decisions of our Supreme Court. Moreover, the

lower court must have taken this fact into consideration when it awarded a nominal

damage in the sum of P2,000 to the plaintiffs. (p. 13, Annex A.)

A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing pronouncement was denied. Hence

this appeal by certiorari .

In his brief the petitioner Victoriano Gamis assigns only the one error as committed

by the Court of Appeals, to wit:



The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the Court of First

Instance of Sorsogon in Civil Case No. 120, in so far as it held that parcels A, B and C

should be divided equally between Gerarda Gamis and Macario Gamis.

And after making a short statement of facts under the heading "Discussion"

contends that —

. . . the Court of Appeals violated Article 834 of the Old Civil Code when it decided

to partition equally between Gerarda Gamis and Macario Gamis Parcels A, B and C,

ignoring altogether the usufructuary rights of petitioner Victoriano Gamis as

surviving spouse of his deceased wife, Ciriaca Giro.

In support of the contention he invokes article 834 of the old Civil Code, the law

applicable because the deceased spouse died on 17 January 1909, which provides:

A widower or widow who, on the death of his or her spouse, is not divorced, or

should be so by the fault of the deceased, shall be entitled to a portion in usufruct

equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children or

descendants who have not received any betterment.

Under articles 807 and 834 of the old Civil Code the surviving spouse is a forced heir

and entitled to a share in usufruct in the estate of the deceased spouse equal to

that which by way of legitime corresponds or belongs to each of the legitimate

children or descendants who have not been battered or have not received any

share in the one-third share destined for betterment. The right of the surviving

spouse to have share in usufruct in the estate of the deceased spouse is provided

by law of which such spouse cannot be deprived and which cannot be ignored. Of

course, the spouse may waive it but the waiver must be express.

True, in his answer filed in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon the petitioner did

not claim that he was a forced heir as surviving spouse and as such entitled to a

share in usufruct in the estate of his deceased wife, but the assertion of his

usufructuary right as surviving spouse in the estate of his deceased wife would have

been inconsistent with his claim that the parcels of land sought to be partitioned

were not paraphernal, the main controversy being whether the parcels of land

sought to be partitioned were paraphernal of the deceased first spouse, conjugal,

after the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon had rendered its judgment that the

first (A), second (B) and 2/3 of the third (C) parcels of land were paraphernal he lost

no time in asserting his usufructuary right as surviving spouse in the estate of his

deceased first wife and praying that he be so held and declared in his brief

submitted to the Court of Appeals, without waiving his right to claim and contend

that the parcels of land just referred to were not paraphernal of his deceased firstwife but otherwise. Under these circumstances the petitioner can not be held to

have waived his usufructuary right or share in usufruct as surviving spouse in the

estate of his deceased wife Ciriaca Giro.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals under the review is modified in the sense

that under articles 807 and 834 of the old Civil Code the petitioner is entitled to a

share in usufruct in the estate of the late Ciriaca Giro, without pronouncement as to

costs.

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