G.R. No. L-18125 May 31, 1963BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, PROVINCE OF LAGUNA,petitioner,vs.COURT OF TAX APPEALS and THE NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY (NAWASA),respondents.Gabriel V. Valero and Rodolfo F. de Gorostiza for petitioner.Manuel B. Roo for respondent National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority.CONCEPCION,J.:This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals reversing a resolution or decision of the Board of Assessment Appeals for the Province of Laguna.The question involved in this case is whether the water pipes, reservoir, intake and buildings used by herein respondent, National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority hereinafter referred to as NAWASA in the operation of its waterworks system in the municipalities of Cabuyao, Sta. Rosa and Bian, province of Laguna, are subject to real estate tax.Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.1wph1.tThe parties have submitted in the Court of Tax Appeals a stipulation of facts. The pertinent parts thereof are to the effect:1. That the petitioner National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NWSA) is a public corporation created by virtue of Republic Act No. 1383, and that it is owned by the Government of the Philippines as well as all property comprising waterworks and sewerage systems placed under it:.2. That, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1383, petitioner NWSA took over all the property of the former Metropolitan Water District and all the existing local government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems all over the Philippines, including the Cabuyao-Sta. Rosa-Bian Waterworks System owned by the Province of Laguna (Section 8, Republic Act No. 1283);3. That the functions and activities of petitioner NWSA, as enumerated in Republic Act No. 1383, more particularly Section 2 thereof, are the same and identical with the functions of the defunct Metropolitan Water District, particularly Section 2, Act 2832, is amended;4. That petitioner National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NWSA) has no capital stock divided into shares of stocks, no stockholders, and is not authorized by its Charter to distribute dividends; and, on the other hand, whatever surplus funds it has realized, may and will after meeting its yearly obligations, have been, are and may be, used for the construction, expansion and improvement of its waterworks and sewer services;5. That at the time that the Cabuyao-Sta. Rosa-Bian Waterworks System was taken over by petitioner NWSA in 1956, the former was self-supporting and revenue-producing, but that all its surplus income are not declared as profits as this surplus are or may be invested for the expansion thereof;6. That in the year 1956 the Provincial Assessor of Laguna assessed, for purposes of real estate taxes, the property comprising the Cabuyao-Sta. Rosa-Bian Waterworks System and described in Tax Declaration No. 5987 (Exh. "A-l") which, as stated in Paragraph 2 hereof, herein petitioner NWSA had taken over;7. That against the above-mentioned assessment made by the Provincial Assessor of Laguna, petitioner NWSA protested, claiming that the property described under Tax Declaration No. 5987 (Exh. "A-l") are exempted from the payment of real estate taxes in view of the nature and kind of said property and functions and activities of petitioner, as provided in Republic Act No. 1383;.8. That the said protest of petitioner NWSA was overruled on appeal before the herein respondent Board of Assessment Appeals, hence the present petition for review filed by petitioner;x x x x x x x x x "After appropriate proceedings, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered the aforementioned decision reversing the action taken by petitioner Board, which, accordingly, has brought the case to us for review, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1125, contending that the properties in question are subject to real estate tax because: (1) although said properties belong to the Republic of the Philippines, the same holds it, not in its governmental, political or sovereign capacity, but in a private, proprietary or patrimonial character, which, allegedly, is not covered by the exemption contained in section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 470; and 2) this exemption, even if applicable to patrimonial property, must yield to the provisions of section 1 of Republic Act No. 104, under which all corporations, agencies or instrumentalities owned or controlled by the Government are subject to taxation, according to petitioner appellant.Sections 2 and 3(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 470 provide:SEC. 2.Incidence of real property tax. Except in chartered cities, there shall be levied, assessed, and collected, an annual ad valorem tax on real property, including land, buildings, machinery, and other improvements not hereinafter specifically exempted.SEC. 3.Property exempt from tax. The exemptions shall be as follows:(a) Property owned by . . . the Republic of the Philippines, any province, city, municipality or municipal district. . . .It is conceded, in the stipulation of facts, that the property involved in this case "is owned by the Government of the Philippines". Hence, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines and falls squarely within the letter of the above provision. This notwithstanding, petitioner Board maintains that respondent NAWASA is not entitled to the benefits of the exemption established in said section 3(a), inasmuch as, in the case of the City of Cebu vs. NAWASA, G. R. No. L-12892, decided on April 30, 1960, we ruled that the assets of the water system of the City of Cebu, which the NAWASA had sought to take over, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1383 as it did in the case at bar, with respect to the Cabuyao-Sta. Rosa-Bian Waterworks System are patrimonial property of said city, which held it in a proprietary character, not in its governmental capacity.We did not declare, however, in the Cebu case that said assets were subject to taxation. In that case we merely reiterated the doctrine, laid down in the case of City of Baguio vs. NAWASA, G. R. No. L-12032, decided on August 31, 1959, that municipal corporations hold in their proprietary character, the assets of their respective waterworks, which, accordingly, cannot be taken or appropriated by the National Government and placed under the NAWASAwithout payment of just compensation. Neither the Cebu case nor that of Baguio sustains the theory that said assets are taxable.Upon the other hand, in exempting from taxation "property owned by the Republic of the Philippines, any province, city, municipality or municipal district . . .," said section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 470 makes no distinction between property held in a sovereign, governmental or political capacity and those possessed in a private, proprietary or patrimonial character. And where the law does not distinguish neither may we, unless there are facts and circumstances clearly showing that the lawmaker intended the contrary, but no such facts and circumstances have been brought to our attention. Indeed, the noun "property" and the verb "owned" used in said section 3(a) strongly suggest that the object of exemption is considered more from the view point of dominion, than from that of domain. Moreover, taxes are financial burdens imposed for the purpose of raising revenues with which to defray the cost of the operation of the Government, and a tax on property of the Government, whether national or local, would merely have the effect of taking money from one pocket to put it in another pocket (Cooley on Taxation, Sec. 621, 4th Edition.) Hence, it would not serve, in the final analysis, the main purpose of taxation. What is more, it would tend to defeat it, on account of the paper work, time and consequently, expenses it would entail. (The Law on Local Taxation, by Justiniano Y. Castillo, p. 13.)Section 1 of the Republic Act No. 101, upon which petitioner relies, reads:. . . All corporations, agencies, or instrumentalities owned or controlled by the government shall pay such duties, taxes, fees and other charges upon their transaction, business, industries, sale, or income as are imposed by law upon individuals, associations or corporations engaged in any taxable business, industry, or activity except on goods or commodities imported or purchased and sold or distributed for relief purposes as may be determined by the President of the Philippines.This provision is inapplicable to the case at bar for it refers only to duties, taxes, fees and other charges upon "transaction, business, industry, sale or income" and does not include taxes on property like real estate tax.WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-22814 August 28, 1968PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,plaintiff-appellant,vs.CITY OF BUTUAN, MEMBERS OF THE MUNICIPAL BOARD,THE CITY MAYOR and THE CITY TREASURER, all of the CITY OF BUTUAN,defendants-appellees.Sabido, Sabido and Associates for plaintiff-appellant.The City Attorney of Butuan City for defendants-appellees.CONCEPCION,C.J.:Direct appeal to this Court, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Agusan, dismissing plaintiff's complaint, with costs.Plaintiff, Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, is a domestic corporation with offices and principal place of business in Quezon City. The defendants are the City of Butuan, its City Mayor, the members of its municipal board and its City Treasurer. Plaintiff seeks to recover the sums paid by it to the City of Butuan hereinafter referred to as the City and collected by the latter, pursuant to its Municipal Ordinance No. 110, as amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 122, both series of 1960, which plaintiff assails as null and void, and to prevent the enforcement thereof. Both parties submitted the case for decision in the lower court upon a stipulation to the effect:1. That plaintiff's warehouse in the City of Butuan serves as a storage for its products the "Pepsi-Cola" soft drinks for sale to customers in the City of Butuan and all the municipalities in the Province of Agusan. These "Pepsi-Cola Cola" soft drinks are bottled in Cebu City and shipped to the Butuan City warehouse of plaintiff for distribution and sale in the City of Butuan and all municipalities of Agusan. .2. That on August 16, 1960, the City of Butuan enacted Ordinance No. 110 which was subsequently amended by Ordinance No. 122 and effective November 28, 1960. A copy of Ordinance No. 110, Series of 1960 and Ordinance No. 122 are incorporated herein as Exhibits "A" and "B", respectively.3. That Ordinance No. 110 as amended, imposes a tax on any person, association, etc., of P0.10 per case of 24 bottles of Pepsi-Cola and the plaintiff paid under protest the amount of P4,926.63 from August 16 to December 31, 1960 and the amount of P9,250.40 from January 1 to July 30, 1961.4. That the plaintiff filed the foregoing complaint for the recovery of the total amount of P14,177.03 paid under protest and those that if may later on pay until the termination of this case on the ground that Ordinance No. 110 as amended of the City of Butuan is illegal, that the tax imposed is excessive and that it is unconstitutional.5. That pursuant to Ordinance No. 110 as amended, the City Treasurer of Butuan City, has prepared a form to be accomplished by the plaintiff for the computation of the tax. A copy of the form is enclosed herewith as Exhibit "C".6. That the Profit and Loss Statement of the plaintiff for the period from January 1, 1961 to July 30, 1961 of its warehouse in Butuan City is incorporated herein as Exhibits "D" to "D-1" to "D-5". In this Profit and Loss Statement, the defendants claim that the plaintiff is not entitled to a depreciation of P3,052.63 but only P1,202.55 in which case the profit of plaintiff will be increased from P1,254.44 to P3,104.52. The plaintiff differs only on the claim of depreciation which the company claims to be P3,052.62. This is in accordance with the findings of the representative of the undersigned City Attorney who verified the records of the plaintiff.7. That beginning November 21, 1960, the price of Pepsi-Cola per case of 24 bottles was increased to P1.92 which price is uniform throughout the Philippines. Said increase was made due to the increase in the production cost of its manufacture.8. That the parties reserve the right to submit arguments on the constitutionality and illegality of Ordinance No. 110, as amended of the City of Butuan in their respective memoranda.x x x x x x x x x1wph1.tSection 1 of said Ordinance No. 110, as amended, states what products are "liquors", within the purview thereof. Section 2 provides for the payment by "any agent and/or consignee" of any dealer "engaged in selling liquors, imported or local, in the City," of taxes at specified rates. Section 3 prescribes a tax of P0.10 per case of 24 bottles of the soft drinks and carbonated beverages therein named, and "all other soft drinks or carbonated drinks." Section 3-A, defines the meaning of the term "consignee or agent" for purposes of the ordinance. Section 4 provides that said taxes "shall be paid at the end of every calendar month." Pursuant to Section 5, the taxes "shall be based and computed from the cargo manifest or bill of lading or any other record showing the number of cases of soft drinks, liquors or all other soft drinks or carbonated drinks received within the month." Sections 6, 7 and 8 specify the surcharge to be added for failure to pay the taxes within the period prescribed and the penalties imposable for "deliberate and willful refusal to pay the tax mentioned in Sections 2 and 3" or for failure "to furnish the office of the City Treasurer a copy of the bill of lading or cargo manifest or record of soft drinks, liquors or carbonated drinks for sale in the City." Section 9 makes the ordinance applicable to soft drinks, liquors or carbonated drinks "received outside" but "sold within" the City. Section 10 of the ordinance provides that the revenue derived therefrom "shall be alloted as follows: 40% for Roads and Bridges Fund; 40% for the General Fund and 20% for the School Fund."Plaintiff maintains that the disputed ordinance is null and void because: (1) it partakes of the nature of an import tax; (2) it amounts to double taxation; (3) it is excessive, oppressive and confiscatory; (4) it is highly unjust and discriminatory; and (5) section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, upon the authority of which it was enacted, is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers.The second and last objections are manifestly devoid of merit. Indeed independently of whether or not the tax in question, when considered in relation to the sales tax prescribed by Acts of Congress, amounts to double taxation, on which we need not and do not express any opinion - double taxation, in general, is not forbidden by our fundamental law. We have not adopted, as part thereof, the injunction against double taxation found in the Constitution of the United States and of some States of the Union.1Then, again, the general principle against delegation of legislative powers, in consequence of the theory of separation of powers2is subject to one well-established exception, namely: legislative powers may be delegated to local governments to which said theory does not apply3 in respect of matters of local concern.The third objection is, likewise, untenable. The tax of"P0.10 per case of 24 bottles,"of soft drinks or carbonated drinks in the production and sale of which plaintiff is engaged or less than P0.0042 per bottle, is manifestly too small to be excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory.The first and the fourth objections merit, however, serious consideration. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the tax prescribed in section 3 of Ordinance No. 110, as originally approved, was imposed upon dealers "engaged in selling" soft drinks or carbonated drinks. Thus, it would seem that the intent was then to levy a tax upon the sale of said merchandise. As amended by Ordinance No. 122, the tax is, however, imposed only upon "any agent and/or consignee of any person, association, partnership, company or corporation engaged in selling ... soft drinks or carbonated drinks." And, pursuant to section 3-A, which was inserted by said Ordinance No. 122:... Definition of the Term Consignee or Agent. For purposes of this Ordinance, a consignee of agent shall mean any person, association, partnership, company or corporation who acts in the place of another by authority from him or one entrusted with the business of another or to whom is consigned or shipped no less than 1,000 cases of hard liquors or soft drinks every month forresale, either retail or wholesale.As a consequence, merchants engaged in the sale of soft drink or carbonated drinks, are not subject to the tax,unless they are agents and/or consignees of another dealer,who, in the very nature of things, must be one engaged in businessoutsidethe City. Besides, the tax would not be applicable to such agent and/or consignee, if less than 1,000 cases of soft drinks are consigned or shipped to him every month. When we consider, also, that the tax "shall be based and computed from thecargo manifestorbill of lading... showing the number of cases" not sold but "received" by the taxpayer, the intention to limit the application of the ordinance to soft drinks and carbonated drinks brought into the City from outside thereof becomes apparent. Viewed from this angle, the tax partakes of the nature of an import duty, which is beyond defendant's authority to impose by express provision of law.4Even however, if the burden in question were regarded as a tax on the sale of said beverages, it would still be invalid, as discriminatory, and hence, violative of the uniformity required by the Constitution and the law therefor, since only sales by "agents or consignees" ofoutsidedealers would be subject to the tax. Sales by local dealers, not acting for or on behalf of other merchants,regardless of the volumeof their sales, and even if the same exceeded those made by said agents or consignees of producers or merchants established outside the City of Butuan, would beexemptfrom the disputed tax.It is true that the uniformity essential to the valid exercise of the power of taxation does not require identity or equality under all circumstances, or negate the authority to classify the objects of taxation.5The classification made in the exercise of this authority, to be valid, must, however, be reasonable6and this requirement is not deemed satisfied unless: (1) it is based upon substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the legislation or ordinance; (3) the classification applies, not only to present conditions, but, also, to future conditions substantially identical to those of the present; and (4) the classification applies equally all those who belong to the same class.7These conditions are not fully met by the ordinance in question.8Indeed, if its purpose were merely to levy a burden upon the sale of soft drinks or carbonated beverages, there is no reason why sales thereof by sealers other than agents or consignees of producers or merchants established outside the City of Butuan should be exempt from the tax.WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered annulling Ordinance No. 110, as amended by Ordinance No. 122, and sentencing the City of Butuan to refund to plaintiff herein the amounts collected from and paid under protest by the latter, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the promulgation of this decision, in addition to the costs, and defendants herein are, accordingly, restrained and prohibited permanently from enforcing said Ordinance, as amended. It is so ordered.Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.1wph1.tFootnotes1De Villata v. Stanley, 32 Phil. 541; City of Manila v. Inter-Island Gas Service, 99 Phil. 847, 854; Syjuco v. Municipality of Paraaque, L-11265, Nov. 27, 1959; City of Bacolod v. Gruet, L-18290, Jan. 31, 1963.2U.S. v. Bull, 15 Phil. 7, 27; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377.3State v. City of Mankato, 136 N.W. 264; People v. Provinces, 34 Cal. 520; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick 129 U.S. 141, 32 L. ed. 637.4Section 2(i), Republic Act No. 2264; Panaligan v. City of Tacloban, L- 9319, Sept. 27, 1957, 102 Phil. 1162-1163; East Asiatic Co. v. City of Davao, L-16253, August 21, 1962. .5Tan Tim Kee v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-18080, April 22, 1963; Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas, L-20125, July 20, 1965. .6Felwa v. Salas, L-26511, October 29, 1966; Aleja v. GSIS, L-18529, February 26, 1965; People v. Solon, L-14864, November 23, 1960; People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56; Laurel v. Misa, 42 O.G. 2847.7Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Botelho Shipping Corp., L-21633-34, June 29, 1967; Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Ass'n. v. City Mayor, L-24693, October 23, 1967; Rafael v. Embroidery & Apparel Control & Inspection Board, L-19978, September 29, 1967; Meralco v. Public Utilities Employee Ass'n., 79 Phil. 409. .8Viray v. City of Caloocan, L-23118, July 26, 1967; PHILCONSA v. Gimenez, L-23326, December 18, 1965; Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, L-23794, February 17, 1968.

G.R. No. L-31156 February 27, 1976PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,plaintiff-appellant,vs.MUNICIPALITY OF TANAUAN, LEYTE, THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR, ET AL.,defendant appellees.Sabido, Sabido & Associates for appellant.Provincial Fiscal Zoila M. Redona & Assistant Provincial Fiscal Bonifacio R Matol and Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco & Solicitor Enrique M. Reyes for appellees.MARTIN,J.:This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in its Civil Case No. 3294, which was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on October 6, 1969, as involving only pure questions of law, challenging the power of taxation delegated to municipalities under the Local Autonomy Act (Republic Act No. 2264, as amended, June 19, 1959).On February 14, 1963, the plaintiff-appellant, Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc., commenced a complaint with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Leyte for that court to declare Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264.1otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, unconstitutional as an undue delegation of taxing authority as well as to declare Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27, series of 1962, of the municipality of Tanauan, Leyte, null and void.On July 23, 1963, the parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts, the material portions of which state that,first, both Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 embrace or cover the same subject matter and the production tax rates imposed therein are practically the same, and second, that on January 17, 1963, the acting Municipal Treasurer of Tanauan, Leyte, as per his letter addressed to the Manager of the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Plant in said municipality, sought to enforce compliance by the latter of the provisions of said Ordinance No. 27, series of 1962.Municipal Ordinance No. 23, of Tanauan, Leyte, which was approved on September 25, 1962, levies and collects "from soft drinks producers and manufacturers a tai of one-sixteenth (1/16) of a centavo for every bottle of soft drink corked."2For the purpose of computing the taxes due, the person, firm, company or corporation producing soft drinks shall submit to the Municipal Treasurer a monthly report, of the total number of bottles produced and corked during the month.3On the other hand, Municipal Ordinance No. 27, which was approved on October 28, 1962, levies and collects "on soft drinks produced or manufactured within the territorial jurisdiction of this municipality a tax of ONE CENTAVO (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity."4For the purpose of computing the taxes due, the person, fun company, partnership, corporation or plant producing soft drinks shall submit to the Municipal Treasurer a monthly report of the total number of gallons produced or manufactured during the month.5The tax imposed in both Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 is denominated as "municipal production tax.'On October 7, 1963, the Court of First Instance of Leyte rendered judgment "dismissing the complaint and upholding the constitutionality of [Section 2, Republic Act No. 2264] declaring Ordinance Nos. 23 and 27 legal and constitutional; ordering the plaintiff to pay the taxes due under the oft the said Ordinances; and to pay the costs."From this judgment, the plaintiff Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, in turn, elevated the case to Us pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.There are three capital questions raised in this appeal:1. Is Section 2, Republic Act No. 2264 an undue delegation of power, confiscatory and oppressive?2. Do Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 constitute double taxation and impose percentage or specific taxes?3. Are Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 unjust and unfair?1. The power of taxation is an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty, belonging as a matter of right to every independent government, without being expressly conferred by the people.6It is a power that is purely legislative and which the central legislative body cannot delegate either to the executive or judicial department of the government without infringing upon the theory of separation of powers. The exception, however, lies in the case of municipal corporations, to which, said theory does not apply. Legislative powers may be delegated to local governments in respect of matters of local concern.7This is sanctioned by immemorial practice.8By necessary implication, the legislative power to create political corporations for purposes of local self-government carries with it the power to confer on such local governmental agencies the power to tax.9Under the New Constitution, local governments are granted the autonomous authority to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes. Section 5, Article XI provides: "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Withal, it cannot be said that Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 emanated from beyond the sphere of the legislative power to enact and vest in local governments the power of local taxation.The plenary nature of the taxing power thus delegated, contrary to plaintiff-appellant's pretense, would not suffice to invalidate the said law as confiscatory and oppressive. In delegating the authority, the State is not limited 6 the exact measure of that which is exercised by itself. When it is said that the taxing power may be delegated to municipalities and the like, it is meant that there may be delegated such measure of power to impose and collect taxes as the legislature may deem expedient. Thus, municipalities may be permitted to tax subjects which for reasons of public policy the State has not deemed wise to tax for more general purposes.10This is not to say though that the constitutional injunction against deprivation of property without due process of law may be passed over under the guise of the taxing power, except when the taking of the property is in the lawful exercise of the taxing power, as when (1) the tax is for a public purpose; (2) the rule on uniformity of taxation is observed; (3) either the person or property taxed is within the jurisdiction of the government levying the tax; and (4) in the assessment and collection of certain kinds of taxes notice and opportunity for hearing are provided.11Due process is usually violated where the tax imposed is for a private as distinguished from a public purpose; a tax is imposed on property outside the State, i.e., extraterritorial taxation; and arbitrary or oppressive methods are used in assessing and collecting taxes. But, a tax does not violate the due process clause, as applied to a particular taxpayer, although the purpose of the tax will result in an injury rather than a benefit to such taxpayer. Due process does not require that the property subject to the tax or the amount of tax to be raised should be determined by judicial inquiry, and a notice and hearing as to the amount of the tax and the manner in which it shall be apportioned are generally not necessary to due process of law.12There is no validity to the assertion that the delegated authority can be declared unconstitutional on the theory of double taxation. It must be observed that the delegating authority specifies the limitations and enumerates the taxes over which local taxation may not be exercised.13The reason is that the State has exclusively reserved the same for its own prerogative. Moreover, double taxation, in general, is not forbidden by our fundamental law, since We have not adopted as part thereof the injunction against double taxation found in the Constitution of the United States and some states of the Union.14Double taxation becomes obnoxious only where the taxpayer is taxed twice for the benefit of the same governmental entity15or by the same jurisdiction for the same purpose,16but not in a case where one tax is imposed by the State and the other by the city or municipality.172. The plaintiff-appellant submits that Ordinance No. 23 and 27 constitute double taxation, because these two ordinances cover the same subject matter and impose practically the same tax rate. The thesis proceeds from its assumption that both ordinances are valid and legally enforceable. This is not so. As earlier quoted, Ordinance No. 23, which was approved on September 25, 1962, levies or collects from soft drinks producers or manufacturers a tax of one-sixteen (1/16) of a centavo for .every bottle corked, irrespective of the volume contents of the bottle used. When it was discovered that the producer or manufacturer could increase the volume contents of the bottle and still pay the same tax rate, the Municipality of Tanauan enacted Ordinance No. 27, approved on October 28, 1962, imposing a tax of one centavo (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity. The difference between the two ordinances clearly lies in the tax rate of the soft drinks produced: in Ordinance No. 23, it was 1/16 of a centavo for every bottle corked; in Ordinance No. 27, it is one centavo (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity. The intention of the Municipal Council of Tanauan in enacting Ordinance No. 27 is thus clear: it was intended as a plain substitute for the prior Ordinance No. 23, and operates as a repeal of the latter, even without words to that effect.18Plaintiff-appellant in its brief admitted that defendants-appellees are only seeking to enforce Ordinance No. 27, series of 1962. Even the stipulation of facts confirms the fact that the Acting Municipal Treasurer of Tanauan, Leyte sought t6 compel compliance by the plaintiff-appellant of the provisions of said Ordinance No. 27, series of 1962. The aforementioned admission shows that only Ordinance No. 27, series of 1962 is being enforced by defendants-appellees. Even the Provincial Fiscal, counsel for defendants-appellees admits in his brief "that Section 7 of Ordinance No. 27, series of 1962 clearly repeals Ordinance No. 23 as the provisions of the latter are inconsistent with the provisions of the former."That brings Us to the question of whether the remaining Ordinance No. 27 imposes a percentage or a specific tax. Undoubtedly, the taxing authority conferred on local governments under Section 2, Republic Act No. 2264, is broad enough as to extend to almost "everything, accepting those which are mentioned therein." As long as the text levied under the authority of a city or municipal ordinance is not within the exceptions and limitations in the law, the same comes within the ambit of the general rule, pursuant to the rules ofexclucion attehusandexceptio firmat regulum in cabisus non excepti19The limitation applies, particularly, to the prohibition against municipalities and municipal districts to impose "any percentage tax or other taxes in any formbased thereonnor impose taxes on articles subject tospecific taxexcept gasoline, under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code." For purposes of this particular limitation, a municipal ordinance which prescribes a set ratio between the amount of the tax and the volume of sale of the taxpayer imposes a sales tax and is null and void for being outside the power of the municipality to enact.20But, the imposition of "a tax of one centavo (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity" on all soft drinks produced or manufactured under Ordinance No. 27 does not partake of the nature of a percentage tax on sales, or other taxes in any form based thereon. The tax is levied on the produce (whether sold or not) and not on the sales. The volume capacity of the taxpayer's production of soft drinks is considered solely for purposes of determining the tax rate on the products, but there is not set ratio between the volume of sales and the amount of the tax.21Nor can the tax levied be treated as a specific tax. Specific taxes are those imposed on specified articles, such as distilled spirits, wines, fermented liquors, products of tobacco other than cigars and cigarettes, matches firecrackers, manufactured oils and other fuels, coal, bunker fuel oil, diesel fuel oil, cinematographic films, playing cards, saccharine, opium and other habit-forming drugs.22Soft drink is not one of those specified.3. The tax of one (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity on all softdrinks, produced or manufactured, or an equivalent of 1- centavos per case,23cannot be considered unjust and unfair. 24 an increase in the tax alone would not support the claim that the tax is oppressive, unjust and confiscatory. Municipal corporations are allowed much discretion in determining the reates of imposable taxes. 25 This is in line with the constutional policy of according the widest possible autonomy to local governments in matters of local taxation, an aspect that is given expression in the Local Tax Code (PD No. 231, July 1, 1973). 26 Unless the amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive, courts will go slow in writing off an ordinance as unreasonable. 27 Reluctance should not deter compliance with an ordinance such as Ordinance No. 27 if the purpose of the law to further strengthen local autonomy were to be realized. 28Finally, the municipal license tax of P1,000.00 per corking machine with five but not more than ten crowners or P2,000.00 with ten but not more than twenty crowners imposed on manufacturers, producers, importers and dealers of soft drinks and/or mineral waters under Ordinance No. 54, series of 1964, as amended by Ordinance No. 41, series of 1968, of defendant Municipality,29appears not to affect the resolution of the validity of Ordinance No. 27. Municipalities are empowered to impose, not only municipal license taxes upon persons engaged in any business or occupation but also to levy for public purposes, just and uniform taxes. The ordinance in question (Ordinance No. 27) comes within the second power of a municipality.ACCORDINGLY, the constitutionality of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, as amended, is hereby upheld and Municipal Ordinance No. 27 of the Municipality of Tanauan, Leyte, series of 1962, re-pealing Municipal Ordinance No. 23, same series, is hereby declared of valid and legal effect. Costs against petitioner-appellant.SO ORDERED.Castro, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz Palma, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.Separate OpinionsFERNANDO,J.,concurring:The opinion of the Court penned by Justice Martin is impressed with a scholarly and comprehensive character. Insofar as it shows adherence to tried and tested concepts of the law of municipal taxation, I am only in agreement. If I limit myself to concurrence in the result, it is primarily because with the article on Local Autonomy found in the present Constitution, I feel a sense of reluctance in restating doctrines that arose from a different basic premise as to the scope of such power in accordance with the 1935 Charter. Nonetheless it is well-nigh unavoidable that I do so as I am unable to share fully what for me are the nuances and implications that could arise from the approach taken by my brethren. Likewise as to the constitutional aspect of the thorny question of double taxation, I would limit myself to what has been set forth inCity of Baguio v. De Leon.11. The present Constitution is quite explicit as to the power of taxation vested in local and municipal corporations. It is therein specifically provided: "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.2That was not the case under the 1935 Charter. The only limitation then on the authority, plenary in character of the national government, was that while the President of the Philippines was vested with the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus, or offices, he could only . It exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law ...3As far as legislative power over local government was concerned, no restriction whatsoever was placed on the Congress of the Philippines. It would appear therefore that the extent of the taxing power was solely for the legislative body to decide. It is true that in 1939, there was a statute that enlarged the scope of the municipal taxing power.4Thereafter, in 1959 such competence was further expanded in the Local Autonomy Act.5Nevertheless, as late as December of 1964, five years after its enactment of the Local Autonomy Act, this Court, through Justice Dizon, inGolden Ribbon Lumber Co. v. City of Butuan,6reaffirmed the traditional concept in these words: "The rule is well-settled that municipal corporations, unlike sovereign states, after clothed with no power of taxation; that its charter or a statute must clearly show an intent to confer that power or the municipal corporation cannot assume and exercise it, and that any such power granted must be construed strictly, any doubt or ambiguity arising from the terms of the grant to be resolved against the municipality."7Taxation, according to Justice Parades in the earlier case ofTan v. Municipality of Pagbilao,8"is an attribute of sovereignty which municipal corporations do not enjoy."9That case left no doubt either as to weakness of a claim "based merely by inferences, implications and deductions, [as they have no place in the interpretation of the power to tax of a municipal corporation."10As the conclusion reached by the Court finds support in such grant of the municipal taxing power, I concur in the result. 2. As to any possible infirmity based on an alleged double taxation, I would prefer to rely on the doctrine announced by this Court in City ofBaguio v. De Leon.11Thus: "As to why double taxation is not violative of due process, Justice Holmes made clear in this language: 'The objection to the taxation as double may be laid down on one side. ... The 14th Amendment [the due process clause) no more forbids double taxation than it does doubling the amount of a tax, short of (confiscation or proceedings unconstitutional on other grouse With that decision rendered at a time when American sovereignty in the Philippines was recognized, it possesses more than just a persuasive effect. To some, it delivered the coup justice to the bogey of double taxation as a constitutional bar to the exercise of the taxing power. It would seem though that in the United States, as with us, its ghost, as noted by an eminent critic, still stalks the juridical stage. 'In a 1947 decision, however, we quoted with approval this excerpt from a leading American decision: 'Where, as here, Congress has clearly expressed its intention, the statute must be sustained even though double taxation results.12So I would view the issues in this suit and accordingly concur in the result.Separate OpinionsFERNANDO,J.,concurring:The opinion of the Court penned by Justice Martin is impressed with a scholarly and comprehensive character. Insofar as it shows adherence to tried and tested concepts of the law of municipal taxation, I am only in agreement. If I limit myself to concurrence in the result, it is primarily because with the article on Local Autonomy found in the present Constitution, I feel a sense of reluctance in restating doctrines that arose from a different basic premise as to the scope of such power in accordance with the 1935 Charter. Nonetheless it is well-nigh unavoidable that I do so as I am unable to share fully what for me are the nuances and implications that could arise from the approach taken by my brethren. Likewise as to the constitutional aspect of the thorny question of double taxation, I would limit myself to what has been set forth in City ofBaguio v. De Leon.11. The present Constitution is quite explicit as to the power of taxation vested in local and municipal corporations. It is therein specifically provided: "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.2That was not the case under the 1935 Charter. The only limitation then on the authority, plenary in character of the national government, was that while the President of the Philippines was vested with the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus, or offices, he could only . It exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law ...3As far as legislative power over local government was concerned, no restriction whatsoever was placed on the Congress of the Philippines. It would appear therefore that the extent of the taxing power was solely for the legislative body to decide. It is true that in 1939, there was a statute that enlarged the scope of the municipal taxing power.4Thereafter, in 1959 such competence was further expanded in the Local Autonomy Act.5Nevertheless, as late as December of 1964, five years after its enactment of the Local Autonomy Act, this Court, through Justice Dizon, inGolden Ribbon Lumber Co. v. City of Butuan,6reaffirmed the traditional concept in these words: "The rule is well-settled that municipal corporations, unlike sovereign states, after clothed with no power of taxation; that its charter or a statute must clearly show an intent to confer that power or the municipal corporation cannot assume and exercise it, and that any such power granted must be construed strictly, any doubt or ambiguity arising from the terms of the grant to be resolved against the municipality."7Taxation, according to Justice Parades in the earlier case ofTan v. Municipality of Pagbilao,8"is an attribute of sovereignty which municipal corporations do not enjoy."9That case left no doubt either as to weakness of a claim "based merely by inferences, implications and deductions, [as they have no place in the interpretation of the power to tax of a municipal corporation."10As the conclusion reached by the Court finds support in such grant of the municipal taxing power, I concur in the result. 2. As to any possible infirmity based on an alleged double taxation, I would prefer to rely on the doctrine announced by this Court in City ofBaguio v. De Leon.11Thus: "As to why double taxation is not violative of due process, Justice Holmes made clear in this language: 'The objection to the taxation as double may be laid down on one side. ... The 14th Amendment [the due process clause) no more forbids double taxation than it does doubling the amount of a tax, short of (confiscation or proceedings unconstitutional on other grouse With that decision rendered at a time when American sovereignty in the Philippines was recognized, it possesses more than just a persuasive effect. To some, it delivered the coup justice to the bogey of double taxation as a constitutional bar to the exercise of the taxing power. It would seem though that in the United States, as with us, its ghost, as noted by an eminent critic, still stalks the juridical stage. 'In a 1947 decision, however, we quoted with approval this excerpt from a leading American decision: 'Where, as here, Congress has clearly expressed its intention, the statute must be sustained even though double taxation results.12So I would view the issues in this suit and accordingly concur in the result.Footnotes1 "Sec. 2. Taxation. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts shall have authority to impose municipal license taxes or fees upon persons engaged in any occupation or business, or exercising private in chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts by requiring them to secure licenses at rates fixed by the municipal board or city council of the city, the municipal council of the municipality, or the municipal district council of the municipal district to collect fees and charges for service rendered by the city, municipality or municipal district; to regulate and impose reasonable for services rendered in connection with any business, profession occupation being conducted within the city, municipality or municipal district and otherwise to levy for public purposes, just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees: Provided, That municipalities and municipal districts shall, in no case, impose any percentage tax on sales or other taxes in any form based thereon nor impose taxes on articles subject to specific tax, except gasoline, under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code: Provided, however, That no city, municipality or municipal district may levy or impose any of the following:(a) Residence tax;(b) Documentary stamp tax;(c) Taxes on the business of any newspaper engaged in the printing and publication of any newspaper, magazine, review or bulletin appearing at regular interval and having fixed prices for subscription and sale, and which is not published primarily for the purpose of publishing advertisements;(d) Taxes on persons operating waterworks, irrigation and other public utilities except electric light, heat and power;(e) Taxes on forest products and forest concessions;(f) Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa(g) Taxes on income of any kind whatsoever;(h) Taxes or fees for the registration of motor vehicles and for the issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving thereof;(i) Customs duties registration, wharfage on wharves owned by the national government, tonnage and all other kinds of customs fees, charges and dues;(j) Taxes of any kind on banks, insurance companies, and persons paying franchise tax:(k) Taxes on premiums paid by owners of property who obtain insurance directly with foreign insurance companies; and(i) Taxes, fees or levies, of any kind, which in effect impose a burden on exports of Philippine finished, manufactured or processed products and products of Philippine cottage industries.2 Section 2.3 Section 3.4 Section 2.5 Section 3.6 Cooley, The Law of Taxation, Vol. 1, Fourth Edition, 149-150.7 Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Phil., Inc. vs. City of Butuan, L-22814, August 28, 1968, 24 SCRA 793-96.8 Rubi v. Prov. Brd. of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 702 (1919).9 Cooley, ante at 190.10 Idem at 198-200.11 Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, 513-14.12 Cooley ante at 334.13 See footnote 1.14 Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Phil. Inc. vs. City of Butuan, 1, 2S 1 4, August 28, 1968, 24 SCRA 793-96. See Sec. 22, Art. VI, 1935Constitution and Sec. 17 (1), Art. VIII, 1973 Constitution.15 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lednicky L- 18169, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 609.16 SMB, Inc. v. City of Cebu, L-20312, February 26, 1972, 43 SCRA 280.17 Punzalan v. Mun. Bd of City of Manila, 50 O.G. 2485; manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Meer, 89 Phil. 351 (1951).18 McQuillin. Municipal Corporations, 3rd. Ed., Vol. 6, at 206.-210.19 Villanueva v. City of Iloilo, L-26521, December 28, 1968, 26 SCRA 585-86; Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Mun. of Roxas, Palawan, L-20125, July 20, 1965, 14 SCRA 663-64.20 Arabay, Inc. v. CFI of Zamboanga del Norte, et al., L-27684, September 10, 1975.21 SMB, Inc. v. City of Cebu, ante, Footnote 16.22 Shell Co. of P.I. Ltd. v. Vao, 94 Phil. 394-95 (1954); Sections 123-148, NIRC; RA No. 953, Narcotic Drugs Law, June 20, 1953.23 Brief, defendants-appellees, at 14. A regular bottle of Pepsi-Cola soft drinks contains 8 oz., or 192 oz. per case of 24 bottles; a family-size contains 26 oz., or 312 oz. per case of 12 bottles.24 SeePepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Phil., Inc. v. City of Butuan,ante,Footnote 14, where the tax rate is P.10 per case of 24 bottles; City of Bacolod v. Gruet, L-18290, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 168-69, where the tax is P.03 on every case of bottled Coca-Coal.25 Northern Philippines Tobacco Corp. v. Mun. of Agoo, La Union, L-26447, January 30, 1971, 31 SCRA 308.26 William Lines, Inc. v. City of Ozamis, L-350048, April 23, 1974, 56 SCRA 593, Second Division, per Fernando,J.27 Victorias Milling Co. v. Mun. of Victorias, L-21183, September 27, 1968, 25 SCRa 205.28 Procter & Gamble Trading Co. v. Mun. of Medina, Misamis Oriental, L-29125, January 31, 1973, 43 SCRA 133-34.29 Subject of plaintiff-appellant's Motion for Admission and consideration of Essential Newly Dissevered Evidence, dated April 30, 1969.FERNANDO, J.1 L-24756, October 31, 1968, 25 SCRA 938.2 Article XI, Section 5 of the present Constitution.3 Article VII, Section 10 of the 1935 Constitution.4 Commonwealth Act 472 entitled: "An Act Revising the General Authority of Municipal Councils and Municipal District Councils to Levy Taxes, Subject to Certain Limitations."5 Republic Act No. 2264.6 L-18534, December 24,1964,12 SCRA 611.7 Ibid, 619. Cf. Cuunjieng v. Potspone, 42 Phil. 818 (1922); De Linan v. Municipal Council of Daet, 44 Phil. 792 (1923); Arquiza Luta v. Municipality of Zamboanga, 50 Phil. 748 (1927; Hercules Lumber Co. v. Zamboanga, 55 Phil. 653 (1931); Yeo Loby v. Zamboanga, 55 Phil. 656 (1931); People v. Carreon, 65 Phil. 588 (1939); Yap Tak Wing v. Municipal Board, 68 Phil. 511 (1939); Eastern Theatrical Co. v. Alfonso 83 Phil. 852 (1949); De la Rosa v. City of Baguio, 91 Phil. 720 (I!)52); Medina v. City of Baguio, 91 Phil. 854 (1952); Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Antigua, 96 Phil. 909 (1955); Municipal Government of Pagsanjan v. Reyes, 98 Phil. 654 (1956), We Wa Yu v. City of Lipa, Phil. 975 (1956); Municipality of Cotabato v. Santos, 105 Phil. 963 (1959).8 L-14264, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 887.9 Ibid, 892.10 Ibid.11 L-24756, October 31, 1968, 25 SCRA 938.12Ibid,943-944.

G.R. No. 99886 March 31, 1993JOHN H. OSMEA,petitioner,vs.OSCAR ORBOS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; JESUS ESTANISLAO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; WENCESLAO DELA PAZ, in his capacity as Head of the Office of Energy Affairs; REX V. TANTIONGCO, and the ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD,respondents.Nachura & Sarmiento for petitioner.The Solicitor General for public respondents.NARVASA,C.J.:The petitioner seeks the corrective,1prohibitive and coercive remedies provided by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,2upon the following posited grounds,viz.:31) the invalidity of the "TRUST ACCOUNT" in the books of account of the Ministry of Energy (now, the Office of Energy Affairs), created pursuant to 8, paragraph 1, of P.D. No. 1956, as amended, "said creation of a trust fund being contrary to Section 29 (3), Article VI of the . . Constitution;42) the unconstitutionality of 8, paragraph 1 (c) of P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137, for "being an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power . .to the Energy Regulatory Board;"53) the illegality of the reimbursements to oil companies, paid out of the Oil Price Stabilization Fund,6because it contravenes 8, paragraph 2 (2) ofP. D. 1956, as amended; and4) the consequent nullity of the Order dated December 10, 1990 and the necessity of a rollback of the pump prices and petroleum products to the levels prevailing prior to the said Order.It will be recalled that on October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil.Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O. 1024,7and ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy. The same Executive Order also authorized the investment of the fund in government securities, with the earnings from such placements accruing to the fund.President Corazon C. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137 on February 27, 1987, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possiblecost underrecoveryincurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of the underrecovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance.Now, the petition alleges that the status of the OPSF as of March 31, 1991 showed a "Terminal Fund Balance deficit" of some P12.877 billion;8that to abate the worsening deficit, "the Energy Regulatory Board . .issued an Order on December 10, 1990, approving the increase in pump prices of petroleum products," and at the rate of recoupment, the OPSF deficit should have been fully covered in a span of six (6) months, but this notwithstanding, the respondents Oscar Orbos, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; Jesus Estanislao, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; Wenceslao de la Paz, in his capacity as Head of the Office of Energy Affairs; Chairman Rex V. Tantiongco and the Energy Regulatory Board "are poised to accept, process and pay claims not authorized under P.D. 1956."9The petition further avers that the creation of the trust fund violates 29(3), Article VI of the Constitution, reading as follows:(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purposes only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government objective."10Petitioner further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State,such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created."11He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to the ERB violates 28 (2). Article VI of the Constitution,viz.:(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix, within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government;and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the power of taxation, "the limits, limitations and restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must not only specify how to tax, who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also impose a specific limit on how much to tax."12The petitioner does not suggest that a "trust account" is illegalper se, but maintains that the monies collected, which form part of the OPSF, should be maintained in aspecial accountof the general fund for the reason that the Constitution so provides, and because they are, supposedly,taxes levied for a special purpose. He assumes that the Fund is formed from a tax undoubtedly because a portion thereof is taken from collections ofad valoremtaxes and the increases thereon.It thus appears that the challenge posed by the petitioner is premised primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State. The Solicitor General observes that the "argument rests on the assumption that the OPSF is a form of revenue measure drawing from a special tax to be expended for a special purpose."13The petitioner's perceptions are, in the Court's view, not quite correct.To address this critical misgiving in the position of the petitioner on these issues, the Court recalls its holding inValmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al.14The foregoing arguments suggest the presence of misconceptions about the nature and functions of the OPSF. The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established "for the purpose of minimizing the frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustment and/or changes in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products."15Under P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 dated 27 February 1987, this Trust Account may be funded from any of the following sources:a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on petroleum productssubject to tax under this Decreearising from exchange rate adjustment, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy;b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of government corporations, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy:c) Any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum productsto augment the resources of the Fund through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board of Energy requiring payment of persons or companies engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products;d) Any resulting peso cost differentialsin case the actual peso costs paid by oil companies in the importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed using the reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of Energy.xxx xxx xxxThe fact that the world market prices of oil, measured by the spot market in Rotterdam, vary from day to day is of judicial notice. Freight rates for hauling crude oil and petroleum products from sources of supply to the Philippines may also vary from time to time. The exchange rate of the pesovis-a-visthe U.S. dollar and other convertible foreign currencies also changes from day to day. These fluctuations in world market prices and in tanker rates and foreign exchange rates would in a completely free market translate into corresponding adjustments in domestic prices of oil and petroleum products with sympathetic frequency. But domestic prices which vary from day to day or even only from week to week would result in a chaotic market with unpredictable effects upon the country's economy in general.The OPSF was established precisely to protect local consumers from the adverse consequences that such frequent oil price adjustments may have upon the economy.Thus, the OPSF serves as a pocket, as it were, into which a portion of the purchase price of oil and petroleum products paid by consumers as well as some tax revenues are inputted and from which amounts are drawn from time to time to reimburse oil companies, when appropriate situations arise, for increases in, as well as underrecovery of, costs of crude importation.The OPSF is thus a buffer mechanism through which the domestic consumer prices of oil and petroleum products are stabilized, instead of fluctuating every so often, and oil companies are allowed to recover those portions of their costs which they would not otherwise recover given the level of domestic prices existing at any given time.To the extent that some tax revenues are also put into it, the OPSF is in effect a device through which the domestic prices of petroleum products are subsidized in part.It appears to the Court that the establishment and maintenance of the OPSF is well within that pervasive and non-waivable power and responsibility of the government to secure the physical and economic survival and well-being of the community, that comprehensive sovereign authority we designate as the police power of the State. The stabilization, and subsidy of domestic prices of petroleum products and fuel oil clearly critical in importance considering, among other things, the continuing high level of dependence of the country on imported crude oil are appropriately regarded as public purposes.Also of relevance is this Court's ruling in relation to the sugar stabilization fund the nature of which is not far different from the OPSF. InGaston v. Republic Planters Bank,16this Court upheld the legality of the sugar stabilization fees and explained their nature and character,viz.:The stabilization fees collected are in the nature of a tax, which is within the power of the State to impose for the promotion of the sugar industry (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148). . . .The tax collected is not in a pure exercise of the taxing power.It is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide a means for the stabilization of the sugar industry. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State (Lutz v. Araneta,supra).xxx xxx xxxThe stabilization fees in question are levied by the State upon sugar millers, planters and producers for a special purpose that of "financing the growth and development of the sugar industry and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market including the foreign market." The fact that the State has taken possession of moneys pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute them state funds, even though they are held for a special purpose (Lawrence v. American Surety Co. 263 Mich. 586, 249 ALR 535, cited in 42 Am Jur Sec. 2, p. 718). Having been levied for a special purpose, the revenues collected are to be treated as a special fund, to be, in the language of the statute, "administered in trust" for the purpose intended. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance if any, is to be transferred to the general funds of the Government. That is the essence of the trust intended (SEE 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29(3), lifted from the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(1).17The character of the Stabilization Fund as a special kind of fund is emphasized by the fact that the funds are deposited in the Philippine National Bank and not in the Philippine Treasury, moneys from which may be paid out only in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (1987) Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29 (3), lifted from the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(1). (Emphasis supplied).Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without precedent.With regard to the allegedundue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, 8(c) of P.D. 195618expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amountsto augment the resources of the Fund.What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or "a specific limit on how much to tax."19The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the premise that what is involved here is the power of taxation; but as already discussed, this is not the case. What is here involved is not so much the power of taxation as police power. Although the provision authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power of taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the delegate to act with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced by the police power of the State.The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the determination of the price of oil and petroleum products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment or exhaust the Fund, do not conveniently permit the setting of fixed or rigid parameters in the law as proposed by the petitioner. To do so would render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as to mitigate or avoid the undesirable consequences of such fluidity. As such, the standard as it is expressed, suffices to guide the delegate in the exercise of the delegated power, taking account of the circumstances under which it is to be exercised.For a valid delegation of power, it is essential that the law delegating the power must be (1) complete in itself, that is it must set forth the policy to be executed by the delegate and (2) it must fix a standard limits of whichare sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform.20. . . As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which the legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may either be express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.21It would seem that from the above-quoted ruling, the petition for prohibition should fail.The standard, as the Court has already stated, may even be implied. In that light, there can be no ground upon which to sustain the petition, inasmuch as the challenged law sets forth a determinable standard which guides the exercise of the power granted to the ERB. By the same token, the proper exercise of the delegated power may be tested with ease. It seems obvious that what the law intended was to permit the additional imposts for as long as there exists a need to protect the general public and the petroleum industry from the adverse consequences of pump rate fluctuations. "Where the standards set up for the guidance of an administrative officer and the action taken are in fact recorded in the orders of such officer, so that Congress, the courts and the public are assured that the orders in the judgment of such officer conform to the legislative standard, there is no failure in the performance of the legislative functions."22This Court thus finds no serious impediment to sustaining the validity of the legislation; the express purpose for which the imposts are permitted and the general objectives and purposes of the fund are readily discernible, and they constitute a sufficient standard upon which the delegation of power may be justified.In relation to the third question respecting the illegality of the reimbursements to oil companies, paid out of the Oil Price Stabilization Fund, because allegedly in contravention of 8, paragraph 2 (2) of P.D. 1956, amended23 the Court finds for the petitioner.The petition assails the payment of certain items or accounts in favor of the petroleum companies (i.e., inventory losses, financing charges, fuel oil sales to the National Power Corporation, etc.) because not authorized by law. Petitioner contends that "these claims are not embraced in the enumeration in 8 of P.D. 1956 . . since none of them was incurred'as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products,'"24and since these items are reimbursements for which the OPSF should not have responded, the amount of the P12.877 billion deficit "should be reduced by P5,277.2 million."25It is argued "that under the principle ofejusdem generis. . . the term 'other factors' (as used in 8 of P.D. 1956) . . can only include such 'other factors' which necessarily result in the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products."26The Solicitor General, for his part, contends that "(t)o place said (term) within the restrictive confines of the rule ofejusdem generiswould reduce (E.O. 137) to a meaningless provision."This Court, inCaltex Philippines, Inc. v. The Honorable Commissioner on Audit, et al.,27passed upon the application ofejusdem generisto paragraph 2 of 8 of P.D. 1956,viz.:The rule ofejusdem generisstates that "[w]here words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are held to be as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned."28A reading of subparagraphs (i) and (ii) easily discloses that they do not have a common characteristic. The first relates to price reduction as directed by the Board of Energy while the second refers to reduction in internalad valoremtaxes. Therefore, subparagraph (iii) cannot be limited by the enumeration in these subparagraphs. What should be considered for purposes of determining the "other factors" in subparagraph (iii) is the first sentence of paragraph (2) of the Section which explicitly allows the cost underrecovery only if such were incurred as aresult of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products.The Court thus holds, that the reimbursement of financing charges is not authorized by paragraph 2 of 8 of P.D. 1956, for the reason that they were not incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products. Under the same provision, however, the payment of inventory losses is upheld as valid, being clearly a result of domestic price reduction, when oil companies incur a cost underrecovery for yet unsold stocks of oil in inventory acquired at a higher price.Reimbursement for cost underrecovery from the sales of oil to the National Power Corporation is equally permissible, not as coming within the provisions of P.D. 1956, but in virtue of other laws and regulations as held inCaltex29and which have been pointed to by the Solicitor General. At any rate, doubts about the propriety of such reimbursements have been dispelled by the enactment of R.A. 6952, establishing the Petroleum Price Standby Fund, 2 of which specifically authorizes the reimbursement of "cost underrecovery incurred as a result of fuel oil sales to the National Power Corporation."Anent the overpayment refunds mentioned by the petitioner, no substantive discussion has been presented to show how this is prohibited by P.D. 1956. Nor has the Solicitor General taken any effort to defend the propriety of this refund. In fine, neither of the parties, beyond the mere mention of overpayment refunds, has at all bothered to discuss the arguments for or against the legality of the so-called overpayment refunds. To be sure, the absence of any argument for or against the validity of the refund cannot result in its disallowance by the Court. Unless the impropriety or illegality of the overpayment refund has been clearly and specifically shown, there can be no basis upon which to nullify the same.Finally, the Court finds no necessity to rule on the remaining issue, the same having been rendered moot and academic. As of date hereof, the pump rates of gasoline have been reduced to levels below even those prayed for in the petition.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED insofar as it prays for the nullification of the reimbursement of financing charges, paid pursuant to E.O. 137, and DISMISSED in all other respects.SO ORDERED.Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Campos, Jr., and Quiason, JJ., concur.Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.#Footnotes1 The writ ofcertiorariis, of course, available only as against tribunals, boards or officers exercisingjudicialorquasi-judicial functions.2 The petition alleges separate causes or grounds for each extraordinary writ sought.3 Rollo, pp. 1 to 4.4 Rollo, p. 2.5 Id.6 When this petition was filed, the amount involved was P5,277.4 million.7 Issued on 9 May 1985.8 Rollo, pp. 8-9.9 Rollo, p. 11; emphasis supplied.10 Id., pp. 13-4.11 Id., p. 15.12 Rollo, p. 17.13 Comment of the Respondents;Rollo, p. 63.14 G.R. Nos. L-79501-03 [23 June 1988] 162 SCRA 521; Decided jointly with Citizen's Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board et al., G.R. Nos. L-78888-90, and Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al., G.R. Nos. L-79590-92; emphasis supplied.15 CitingE.O. No. 137, Sec. 1 (amending 8 of P.D. 1956).16 158 SCRA 626, emphasis supplied.17 "(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the government." (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 28[3]).18 Supra;seefootnote 14 and related text.19 Rollo, p. 17.20 SEEVigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission, G.R. No.L-19850, 30 January 1964 and Pelaez v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825, 24 December 1965;see alsoGonzales, N. Administrative Law A Text, (1979) at 29.21 De La Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294,citingEdu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481:Cf.Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195.22 Hirabayashi v. U.S., 390 U.S. 99.23 When this petition was filed, the amount involved was P5,277.4 million.24 Rollo, p. 20.25 Id., p. 21.26 Id., p. 20.27 Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. The Honorable Commissioner on Audit, et al., G.R. No. 92585, 8 May 1992,En Banc. N.B. The Solicitor General seems to have taken a different position in this case, with respect to the application ofejusdem generis.28 Smith Bell and Co., Ltd. v. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53 [1954],citingBLACK on Interpretation of Law, 2nd ed. at 203:see alsoRepublic v. Migrio 189 SCRA 289 [1990].29 Supraat note 25;SEE alsoMaceda v. Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 88291, 197 SCRA 771 (1991).G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS,petitioner,vs.HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA,respondents.Angel C. Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C. Chaves & Jose Laureta for petitioner.Sotero H. Laurel for respondents.FERNANDEZ,J.:This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge Francisco Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 72797, the dispositive portion of winch reads.Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents, declaring Ordinance No. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and void. The preliminary injunction is made permanent. No pronouncement as to cost.SO ORDERED.Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.(SGD.) FRANCISCO ARCAJudge1The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968.2City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.3Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 65374prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six (6) months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction.5On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void.6In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for wanting the ordinance declared null and void:1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation;2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers:3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.7On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968 rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction.8Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the present petition on March 27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by respondent Judge in the latter's decision of September 17,1968:9ITHE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE OF UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION.IIRESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.IIIRESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION.Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature.The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executiveOrdinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activityper selawful.10InChinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board,11where a law granted a government agency power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the Supreme Court ruled against the interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a policy, rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled.It was also held inPrimicias vs. Fugoso12that the authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits of all classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law.Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.13The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.Barredo, Makasiar, Muoz Palma, Santos and Guerrero, JJ., concur.Castro, C.J., Antonio and Aquino, Fernando, JJ., concur in the result.Concepcion, Jr., J., took no part.Separate OpinionsTEEHANKEE,J.,concurring:I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fernandez which affirms the lower court's judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void for the reason that the employment of aliens within the country is a matter of national policy and regulation, which properly pertain to the national government officials and agencies concerned and not to local governments, such as the City of Manila, which after all are mere creations of the national government.The national policy on the matter has been determined in the statutes enacted by the legislature,viz, the various Philippine nationalization laws which on the whole recognize the right of aliens to obtain gainful employment in the country with the exception of certain specific fields and areas. Such national policies may not be interfered with, thwarted or in any manner negated by any local government or its officials since they are not separate from and independent of the national government.As stated by the Court in the early case ofPhil. Coop. Livestock Ass'n. vs. Earnshaw, 59 Phil. 129: "The City of Manila is a subordinate body to the Insular (National Government ...). When the Insular (National) Government adopts a policy, a municipality is without legal authority to nullify and set at naught the action of the superior authority." Indeed, "not only must all municipal powers be exercised within the limits of the organic laws, but they must be consistent with the general law and public policy of the particular state ..." (I McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd sec. 367, P. 1011).With more reason are such national policies binding on local governments when they involve our foreign relations with other countries and their nationals who have been lawfully admitted here, since in such matters the views and decisions of the Chief of State and of the legislature must prevail over those of subordinate and local governments and officials who have no authority whatever to take official acts to the contrary.Separate OpinionsTEEHANKEE,J.,concurring:I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fernandez which affirms the lower court's judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void for the reason that the employment of aliens within the country is a matter of national policy and regulation, which properly pertain to the national government officials and agencies concerned and not to local governments, such as the City of Manila, which after all are mere creations of the national government.The national policy on the matter has been determined in the statutes enacted by the legislature,viz, the various Philippine nationalization laws which on the whole recognize the right of aliens to obtain gainful employment in the country with the exception of certain specific fields and areas. Such national policies may not be interfered with, thwarted or in any manner negated by any local government or its officials since they are not separate from and independent of the national government.As stated by the Court in the early case ofPhil. Coop. Livestock Ass'n. vs. Earnshaw, 59 Phil. 129: "The City of Manila is a subordinate body to the Insular (National Government ...). When the Insular (National) Government adopts a policy, a municipality is without legal authority to nullify and set at naught the action of the superior authority." Indeed, "not only must all municipal powers be exercised within the limits of the organic laws, but they must be consistent with the general law and public policy of the particular state ..." (I McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd sec. 367, P. 1011).With more reason are such national policies binding on local governments when they involve our foreign relations with other countries and their nationals who have been lawfully admitted here, since in such matters the views and decisions of the Chief of State and of the legislature must prevail over those of subordinate and local governments and officials who have no authority whatever to take official acts to the contrary.Footnotes1 Annex "F", Petition, Rollo, p. 64.2 Petition, Rollo, p. 28.3 Annex "A", of Petition, Rollo, p. 37-38.4 Section 1. It shall he unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any kind of position or occupation or allowed directly or indirectly to participate in the functions, administration or management in any office, corporation, store, restaurant, factory, business firm, or any other place of employment either as consultant, adviser, clerk, employee, technician, teacher, actor, actress, acrobat, singer or other theatrical performer, laborer, cook, etc., whether temporary, casual, permanent or otherwise and irrespective of the source or origin of his compensation or number of hours spent in said office, store, restaurant, factory, corporation or any other place of employment, or to engage in any kind of business and trade within the City of Manila, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Man