cases_law on violation against women and their childred

7/29/2019 Cases_law on Violation Against Women and Their Childred

1/31

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN G.R. No. 168852

Petitioner,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.,

Chairperson,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,NACHURA, and

REYES,JJ.

SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN

and JUANITA L. TAN, Promulgated:

Respondents.* September 30, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N


2/31

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

of Court assailing the Resolution1[1] dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court

(RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC

Resolution2[2] dated July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for

Reconsideration.

The factual background of the case:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven)

were married.

3

[3] Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle

4

[4]and Kristen Denise.5[5] On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner

filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) 6[6]

against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan

(respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents,

1

2

3

4

5

6


3/31

were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section

5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7[7] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,8[8]

otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice 9[9] granting petitioner's

prayer for a TPO.

On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the

Issuance of Permanent Protection OrderAd Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,10[10]

contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of

the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.

On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition11

[11] torespondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262

under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of

victims of violence.

7

8

9

10

11


4/31

On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution 12[12] dismissing the case as to

respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not

included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law

expressio unius est exclusio alterius.13[13]

On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration 14[14]

contending that the doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the broader

interests of substantial justice and due process.

On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for

Reconsideration15[15] arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the

provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the alleged

victim was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.

On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16[16] denying petitioner's

Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents

under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of

the law.

12

13

14

15

16


5/31

Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA,

PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FORTHE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-VIOLENCE

AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004.17[17]

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the

provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory

application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on

conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that

Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving

her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the

family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically;

that respondents should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete

resolution of the case.

On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262

since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim

only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on

the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this

Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or

necessary parties, since their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether

17


6/31

illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No.

9262.

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as

any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,

former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating

relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate

or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in

physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of

such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the

victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude

the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory

application of the RPC, thus:

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal

Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)

Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:


7/31

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are

or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of

this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should

specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a

supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in

which the special law is silent on a particular matter.

Thus, in People v. Moreno,18[18] the Court applied suppletorily the provision on

subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992,

otherwise known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noting that the special law did not

contain any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment

in case of insolvency.

InPeople v. Li Wai Cheung,19[19] the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the

service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was

found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous

Drugs Act of 1972, considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.

18

19


8/31

InPeople v. Chowdury,20[20] the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19

of the RPC to define the words principal, accomplices and accessories under R.A.

No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,

because said words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the same

terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment .

In Yu v. People,21[21] the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary

imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC toBatas Pambansa (B.P.)Blg. 22, otherwise

known as the Bouncing Checks Law, noting the absence of an express provision onsubsidiary imprisonment in said special law.

Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22[22] the Court applied suppletorily the

principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P.Blg. 22 in the absence of a

contrary provision therein.

With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC

may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section

47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC,

which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.

20

21

22


9/31

Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once

conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the

act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of

them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. 23[23]

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that

the acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender

through another, thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of

violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

x x x

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through

another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the

woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or herchild;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her

child against her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals

or pets of the woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

23


10/31

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing

further acts of violence against the woman or her child may include

individuals other than the offending husband, thus:

SEC. 8.Protection Orders. x x x The protection orders that may be issued under

this Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing,personally orthrough another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning,contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x

(Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the

protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasissupplied)

It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law 24[24] and that this intent must

be effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262

reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment

of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection andsafety of victims of violence against women and children.

24


11/31

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est

exclusio alterius finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is

only an ancillary rule of statutory construction. It is not of universal application. Neither

is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent

which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated

purpose of the legislature.25[25]

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the

attendance of circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven andrespondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However,

conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on

the merits and cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of

facts.26[26] It is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this

controversy is centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be included

in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best

passed upon after a trial on the merits.

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied

suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may

be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in

superfluity.

25

26


12/31

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions

dated March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon

City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET

ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition against respondents is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO


13/31

Associate Justice

Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultationbefore the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.


14/31

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons

Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the

Courts Division.


SUPREME COURT

Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

ABAD, J.:


15/31

This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a

former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.

The Indictment

The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional TrialCourt (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their

Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads:

That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully,unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short

Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud,

who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely nakedbody of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the

said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial emotional anguish,

psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.

1

The Facts and the Case

The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan

were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they

became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that

Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke upwith him.

Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope

with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected theproposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irishchanged her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text

messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301

and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.

In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS)

a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irishs face superimposed on the figure

(Exhibit A).2 The senders cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of

the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot hetook when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).3

After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it

would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread

the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in textmessaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring

send sa lahat ng chatter."4
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt1


16/31

Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under

police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the

picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy.Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked

towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and

seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was beingquestioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"

Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert

in information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one

to lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman inanother picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear that

the face and the body belonged to just one person.

Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the face

was not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was

fake and the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzalesexplained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like the

Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.

For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in October2003 and their relation lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after their relation

ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that his

girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.

Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort

as she needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers

approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and brought him to thepolice station.

Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify

a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the senders number and,

pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages

from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, whythe obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that

it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of

a woman whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5

Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustans wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures.Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that

contained them because she was jealous and angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish.

But, while the woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as inExhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish

denied that she was the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the

picture was fully dressed.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt5


17/31

After trial, the RTC found Irishs testimony completely credible, given in an honest and

spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience,

prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for theacts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim

during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of

human nature and experience."6

Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC foundRustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

On Rustans appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),7 the latter rendered a decision dated January

31, 2008,8 affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustans motion for reconsideration in a

resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.

The Issues Presented

The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message

the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological

distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

The subordinate issues are:

1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is

defined in R.A. 9262;

2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this

case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;

3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation

of his constitutional rights; and

4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented

in the case.

The Courts Rulings

Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of aperson against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts

committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against awoman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom

he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or

without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,

battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt8


18/31

x x x x

Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these

include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychologicaldistress to a woman. Thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. The crime of violence

against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

x x x x

h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another,that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her

child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

x x x x

5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence againstwomen through harassment are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of

harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan hada "dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a

situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during

the course of the relationship. Thus:

(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wifewithout the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis

during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between

two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring

supplied.)

Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the

offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act.

He cites Websters Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquialor informal meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make love to"

as in "He romanced her."


19/31

But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that

implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman.

Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couples relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9

R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series

of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had asexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a

dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f)defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in

the bearing of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore,

exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.

Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off"

variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a

continuing basis." But the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits,

from October to December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of

mutual trust and love.

An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their

taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken

up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained thatat times, when she could not reply to Rustans messages, he would get angry at her. That was all.

Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous.10

Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered aform of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very

dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that

constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translatesinto violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children.Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.

Rustan alleges that todays women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her

getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or

psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish suchthat she was already desensitized by them.

But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not

impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-

7). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show onthem.

Michelle, Rustans wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except

Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know thatExhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that

she did not have time to delete them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures

from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt11


20/31

would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card,

there was no reason for her to keep it for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous

to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence toher testimony.1avvphi1

Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustans lowregard for the alleged moral sensibilities of todays youth. What is obscene and injurious to an

offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case.Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irishs head and face,

was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman

like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she seesherself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the

picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.

Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him without

any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is

that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that thepolice officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items

to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony EricssonP900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial

conference.

Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irishs testimony that she

received the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the senders cellphone numbersbelonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that

the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to summon

him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did.12Consequently, the prosecution did not have to

present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.

Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish.13 His defense was

that he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish and

he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented thecellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the

same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was

most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify thesender.

Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an

electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as

provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A,for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the

admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be

deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.14
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt14


21/31

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic

Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative

proceedings.15

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the

crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate JusticeARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the

case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate JusticeChairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons

Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultationbefore the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt15


22/31

Oct

26

Digest 4: RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, G.R. No. 182835,

April 20, 2010, Abad, J.

Admissibility of Electronic Documents and Signatures

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUAvs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH

SAGUD,G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010, Abad, J.

Facts: Petitioner-accused Rustan Ang was charged of a violation against RA 9262

otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act, by

sending through SMS using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to Irish Sagud,

who was his former girlfriend whereby the face of the latter was attached to a

completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish

Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture.

Issue: Whether or not the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message

constitutes an electronic document

Ruling: Petition DENIED.

The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial

proceedings, and administrative proceedings.

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every

element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

Digest 4: RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

and IRISH SAGUD

G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.

Facts: The herein petitioner, Rustan Ang and the private respondent, Irish Sagud

were lovers during their college days in Wesleyan University in Maria Aurora

Province of Aurora. Eventually, Irish heard that Rustan has a live-in-partner whom
http://marksunga.blogspot.com/2012/10/digest-4-rustan-ang-y-pascuavsthe.htmlhttp://marksunga.blogspot.com/2012/10/digest-4-rustan-ang-y-pascuavsthe.htmlhttp://marksunga.blogspot.com/2012/10/digest-4-rustan-ang-y-pascuavsthe.htmlhttp://marksunga.blogspot.com/2012/10/digest-4-rustan-ang-y-pascuavsthe.htmlhttp://marksunga.blogspot.com/2012/10/digest-4-rustan-ang-y-pascuavsthe.htmlhttp://marksunga.blogspot.com/2012/10/digest-4-rustan-ang-y-pascuavsthe.htmlhttp://marksunga.blogspot.com/2012/10/digest-4-rustan-ang-y-pascuavsthe.htmlhttp://marksunga.blogspot.com/2012/10/digest-4-rustan-ang-y-pascuavsthe.htmlhttp://marksunga.blogspot.com/2012/10/digest-4-rustan-ang-y-pascuavsthe.htmlhttp://marksunga.blogspot.com/2012/10/digest-4-rustan-ang-y-pascuavsthe.html


23/31

Rustan got pregnant. Because of this, Irish decided to broke up with Rustan. The

latter asked Irish to elope with him, since he does not love the other girl, to which

Irish refused. To pressure Irish to get back with him he send multimedia messages

to Irish, bearing a picture of a naked woman, who spread her legs with a face of

Irish superimposed on it. Rustan even added in the text message that it is easy for

him to spread those pictures in the internet. Because of this scenario, Irish, askedhelp from the Vic-Mayor of the municipality, to which coordination with the local

police was made. Entrapment operation was conducted and arrested Rustan.

Issue: Whether or not Rustans contention that the multimedia messages should

not be made admissible for the basic reason that such was not properly

authenticated as provided by the Rules on Electronic Documents?

Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:

Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message

constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of

an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on

Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene

picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since

he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time

it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such

ground for objection.

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on

Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and

administrative proceedings.

Indeed the assertion of Rustan will not be given merit for the basic reason that suchcontention was only raised before this court to which the latter had a presumption

that Rustan has waived his right to question the authenticity of the pictures.

Moreover, the court avers that such assertion of Rustan cannot be made possible in

criminal case; such can only be made before, civil and administrative actions.

The high court denied the petition.


24/31

Family court judge dismissed

SC Dismisses Makati Family Court Judge

May 4, 2010

The Supreme Court has dismissed a Makati City Family Court Judge for gross

misconduct.

In a 75-page consolidated per curiam decision, the Court En Banc also ordered the

forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual disqualification from public office of Family

Court Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua, also Presiding Judge of the Makati City Regional

Trial Court, Branch 144.

The cases against Judge Arcaya-Chua have also been referred to the Office of the

Bar Confidant for her possible disbarment.

Her dismissal was spawned by judicial audit investigation on her sala conducted by

the SC. The Court found substantial evidence showing that Judge Arcaya-Chua did

not report in her Monthly Reports the actual number of marriages she had

solemnized and that the solemnization fees that were paid did not correspond to

the number of marriages that were solemnized by her. From November 2005 to

March 2007, her Monthly Reports indicated that she did not solemnize any

marriage, but 1,068 marriage certificates issued by her during the said period are in

the Courts custody.

Victoria C. Jamora, Court Stenographer of the Makati City RTC, Branch 144, wasfound guilty of grave misconduct and dismissed from service, with forfeiture of all

retirement benefits. The Court said that Jamora was a willing participant since she

knew that the figures stated in the Monthly Reports were incorrect but she had

condoned the wrongdoing by affixing her signature on them.

Immediately upon service on Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua and Victoria C. Jamora

of this decision, they are deemed to have vacated their respective office, and their

authority to act as Judge and Court Stenographer, respectively, are considered

automatically terminated, the Court said.

The Court also found Judge Arcaya-Chua guilty of gross ignorance of the law and

suspended for six months without pay for issuing a temporary protection order

(TPO) in favor of a male litigant in violation of RA 9292 (Anti-Violence Against

Women and Their Children Act of 2004), which provides that a TPO cannot be issued

a in favor of a man against his wife. Indeed, as a family court judge, Judge Arcaya-

Chua is expected to know the correct implementation of RA 9292, the Court said.


25/31

Likewise, the Court denied for lack of merit Judge Arcaya-Chuas motion for

reconsideration of the July 14, 2005 resolution of the Court, which had imposed a

six-month suspension for receiving money in exchange for a favorable decision.

(AM OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ, Ocampo v. Judge Arcaya-Chua; AM No. RTJ-

07-2049, OCA v. Judge Arcaya-Chua; AM No. RTJ-08-2141, OCA v. JudgeArcaya-Chua; AM No. RTJ-07-2093, Santos v. Judge Arcaya-Chua, April 23,

2010)


SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182367 December 15, 2010

CHERRYL B. DOLINA, Petitioner,

vs.

GLENN D. VALLECERA, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

ABAD, J.:

This case is about a mothers claim for temporary support of an unacknowledged child, which

she sought in an action for the issuance of a temporary protection order that she brought against

the supposed father.

The Facts and the Case

In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a

temporary protection order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional TrialCourt (RTC) of Tacloban City in P.O. 2008-02-071for alleged woman and child abuse under

Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.2 In filling out the blanks in thepro-forma complaint, Dolina added ahandwritten prayer for financial support3 from Vallecera for their supposed child. She based her

prayer on the latters Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera as the childs father. Thepetition also asked the RTC to order Philippine Airlines, Valleceras employer, to withhold from

his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate.

Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolinas petition was essentially one for

financial support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses; that he was not thechilds father; that the signature appearing on the childs Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that

the petition is a harassment suit intended to force him to acknowledge the child as his and give it

financial support; and that Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with Dolina, renderingunnecessary the issuance of a protection order against him.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt3


26/31

On March 13, 20084 the RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior judgment exists

establishing the filiation of Dolinas son and granting him the right to support as basis for an

order to compel the giving of such support. Dolina filed a motion for reconsideration but theRTC denied it in its April 4, 2008 Order,5 with an admonition that she first file a petition for

compulsory recognition of her child as a prerequisite for support. Unsatisfied, Dolina filed the

present petition for review directly with this Court.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolinas

action for temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child.

The Courts Ruling

Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262

under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are

victims of abuse or violence.

6

Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondentin the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both

are entitled to a protection order and to legal support.

Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her child.1avvphilBut it

became apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim,

neither she nor her child ever lived with Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her action

was to get financial support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is the father. Heof course vigorously denied this.

To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the

child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for herson is based on her claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to suchsupport if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. 7 The

childs remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory

recognition.8If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation.9 In short,illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly

proved.10

Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory

recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she maydirectly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated

and resolved.

11

It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed the entire case based

solely on the lack of any judicial declaration of filiation between Vallecera and Dolinas childsince the main issue remains to be the alleged violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina

and her child and whether they are entitled to protection. But of course, this matter is already

water under the bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on review. This omission lends
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt11


27/31

credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of the petition is to obtain support

from Vallecera.

While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity andfiliation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy

and peace of the putative fathers legitimate family.12

Vallecera disowns Dolinas child anddenies having a hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to be

resolved in an appropriate case.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Regional Trial Court of

Tacloban Citys Order dated March 13, 2008 that dismissed petitioner Cherryl B. Dolinas action

in P.O. 2008-02-07, and Order dated April 4, 2008, denying her motion for reconsideration datedMarch 28, 2008.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABADAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate JusticeDIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZAAssociate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the

case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate JusticeChairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons

Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultationbefore the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/dec2010/gr_182367_2010.html#fnt12


28/31

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice


29/31

DOLINA V. VALLECERA

GR No. 182367- [December 15, 2010]

DOCTRINE:


child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. If filiation is beyond question, support

follows as matter of obligation.

FACTS:

In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with aprayer for the issuance of a temporary protection

order against Glenn Vallecera before RTC for alleged woman and child abuse under RA 9262. In

the pro forma complaint cherryl added a prayer for support for their supposed child. She basedsuch prayer on the latters certificate of live birth which listed Vallecera s employer, to withhold

from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate.

Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolinas petition was essentially one for financial

support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses, that he was not the childsfather and that the signature in the birth certificate was not here. He also added that the petition is

a harassment suit intended to for him to acknowledge the child as his and therefore give financial

support.

RTC dismissed petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolinas action for temporary protection and denied

her application for temporary support for her child?

HELD:

Yes.

RATIO:

Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are

victims of abuse or violence. Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent

in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that bothare entitled to a protection order and to legal support. In this case neither her or her child lived

with Vallecera.


30/31


child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for her

son is based on her claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to suchsupport if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. The

childs remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory

recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short,illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly

proved.

Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory

recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she maydirectly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated

and resolved.


31/31