cause case digests

7/23/2019 Cause Case Digests

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DOROMAL V. CAFACTS: A parcel of land in Iloilo were co-owned by 7 siblings all surnamed Horilleno.5 of the siblings gave a SA to their niece !ary "imene#$ who succeeded her fatheras a co-owner$ for the sale of the land to father and son %oromal. &ne of the co-owner$ herein petitioner$ 'ilomena "avellana however did not gave her consent to

the sale even though her siblings e(ecuted a SA for her signature. )he co-ownerswent on with the sale of *+7 part of the land and a new title for the %oromals wereissued.

,espondent oered to repurchase the land for /0 as stated in the deed of sale butpetitioners declined invoing lapse in time for the right of repurchase. etitioneralso contend that the /0 price was only placed in the deed of sale to minimi#epayment of fees and ta(es and as such$ respondent should pay the real price paidwhich was 115$ 25/.

ISSUE: 3&4 the period to repurchase of petitioner has already lapsed.

HELD: eriod of repurchase has not yet lapsed because the respondent was notnotied of the sale. )he /-day period for the right of repurchase starts only afteractual notice not only of a perfected sale but of actual e(ecution and delivery of thedeed of sale.

)he letter sent to the respondent by the other co-owners cannot be considered asactual notice because the letter was only to inform her of the intention to sell theproperty but not its actual sale. As such$ the /-day period has not yet commencedand the respondent can still e(ercise his right to repurchase.

)he respondent should also pay only the /0 stipulated in the deed of sale becausea redemptioner6s right is to be subrogated by the same terms and conditions

stipulated in the contract.

GOLDENROD V CA G.R. NO. 126812

Facts:arretto owned parcels of land which were mortgaged to 89. arretto failed to

pay: the properties were foreclosed. ;oldenrod made an oer to arretto that it

would buy the properties and pay o the remaining balance of arretto6s loan with

89. It paid arretto 1 million pesos as part of the purchase price. )he remaining

balance would be paid once arretto had consolidated the titles. &n the date that

;oldenrod was supposed to pay$ ;oldenrod ased for an e(tension. 89 agreed.

3hen the e(tension date arrived$ ;oldenrod ased for another e(tension. 89refused. arretto successfully consolidated the titles. ;oldenrod informed arretto

that it would not be able to push through with their agreement. It ased arretto to

return the 1 million pesos. arretto did not give in to ;oldenrod6s

rescission. Instead$ it sold the property that was part of their agreement to

Asiaworld.

Issue: Should ;oldenrod be paid bac the 1 million pesos


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He!:=es. ,escission creates the obligation to return the things which were the

ob>ect of the contract together with the fruits and interest. arretto is obliged to pay

;oldenrod bac because 1? ;oldenrod decided to rescind the sale: 2? the

transaction was called o and: ? the property was sold to a third person. y virtue

of the e(tra>udicial rescission of the contract to sell by ;oldenrod$ without

opposition from arretto$ who in turn sold it to a third person$ arretto had the

obligation to return the 1 million pesos plus legal interest from the date it received

the notice of rescission.

EDRADA " RAMOS,amos @respondents? are the owners of two @2? shing vessels$ the Bady Balaineand the Bady )heresa. &n 1 April 1CC*$ respondents and petitioners e(ecuted anuntitled handwritten document which lies a tthe center of the present controversy.full te(t is reproduced belowD

1st April 1CC*)his is to acnowledge that 'ishing Eessels FBady BalaineF and FBady)heresaF owned by Gduardo &. ,amos are now in my possession and received ingood running and serviceable order. As such$ the vessels are now my responsibility.%ocuments pertaining to the sale and agreement of payments between me and theowner of the vessel to follow. )he agreed price for the vessel is 4ine Hundred

)housand &nly @C//$///.//?.@S;%.?@S;%.?G%8A,%& &. ,A!&SAB',G%& ,.G%,A%A@Seller?@urchaser?9&4'&,!GD9&4'&,!GD@S;%.?@S;%.?9A,!G49I)A,A!&S,&SIG G4%,A%Aetitioners delivered to respondents four @? postdated 'G)9 checs payable tocash drawn by petitioner ,osella Gdrada$ in various amounts totaling &ne Hundred'orty )housand esos @1/$///.//?. )he rst three @? checs were honored uponpresentment to the drawee ban while the fourth chec for &ne Hundred )housandesos @1//$///.//? was dishonored because of a stop payment order.&n "une 1CC*$ respondents led an action against petitioners for specicperformance with damages before the ,)9$ praying that petitioners be obliged toe(ecute the necessary deed of sale of the two shing vessels and to pay thebalance of the purchase price @as evidenced by the agreement cited above?.However$ despite delivery of said vessels and repeated oral demands$ petitionersfailed to pay the balance. )hey averred that that the document sued upon merelyembodies an agreement brought about by the loans they e(tended to respondents.According to petitioners$ respondents allowed them to manage or administer theshing vessels as a business on the understanding that should they nd thebusiness protable$ the vessels would be sold to them for 4ine Hundred )housandesos @C//$///.//?.ut petitioners decided to call it uits after spending a heftysum for the repair and maintenance of the vessels which were already in dilapidatedcondition.


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,)9 in favour of Sps. ,amos and ordered Sps. Gdrada to pay J*/. )his courttreated the action as one for collection of a sum of money and for damages andconsidered the document as a perfected contract of sale. !, led after but wasdenied. 9A aKrmed.

ISS8GD 3&4 the document is a perfected contract of sale

HGB%D S9 disagree with the ,)9 and the 9ourt of Appeals that the document is aperfected contract of sale.

a. A contract of sale is dened as an agreement whereby one of the contractingparties obligates himself totransfer the ownership of and to deliver adeterminate thing$ and the other to pay therefore a pricecertain in money orits euivalent.

It must evince the consent on the part of the seller to transfer anddeliver and on thepart of the buyer to pay.

b. )he agreement may conrm the receipt by respondents of the two vesselsand their purchase price.However$ there is no euivocal agreement totransfer ownership of the vessel$ but a mere commitmentthat documentspertaining to the sale and agreement of payments . . . LareM to follow.Gvidently$ thedocument or documents which would formali#e the transfer ofownership and contain the terms of payment of the purchase price$ or theperiod when such would become due and demandable$ have yet tobee(ecuted. ut no such document was e(ecuted and no such terms werestipulated upon.

#$%%&&%'es F(ee #(ess) I'c. "s. C*u(t *+ A&&eas,-/ SCRA 6/0

'A9)SD etitioner$ thru )eodoro Bocsin$ Sr.$ led a case of Annulment of Sale of itsbuilding$ lot and printing machineries during the regime of !artial Baw to privaterespondent then represented by late +;en. !en#i on 'ebruary 2*$ 1CJ7. etitionercontends that there was vitiated consent and gross inadeuacy of purchase priceduring its sale on &ctober 2$ 1C7. )he trial court dismissed petitioner6s complaintand granted private respondent6s counterclaim. It was elevated to the 9ourt ofAppeals but was also dismissed for lac of merit.

ISS8GD 3hether or not the action for annulment has already prescribed.

,8BI4;D =GS. Article C1 of the 9ivil 9ode pertinently reads N)he action forannulment shall be brought within four years. )his period shall beginD In cases ofintimidation$ violence or undue inOuence$ from the time the defect of consentceases ( ( (P.

L)he Supreme 9ourtM can not accept the petitioners6 contention that the periodduring which authoritarian rule was in force had interrupted prescription and that


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the same began to run only on 'ebruary 25$ 1CJ*$ when the Auino governmenttoo power. It is true that under Article 115 Lof the 9ivil 9odeM ((( fortuitousevents have the eect of tolling the period of prescription. However$ Lthe Supreme9ourtM can not say$ as a universal rule$ that the period from September 21$ 1C72through 'ebruary 25$ 1CJ* involves a force ma>eure. lainly$ Lthe Supreme 9ourtMcan not bo( in the NdictatorialP period within the term without distinction$ and

without$ by necessity$ suspending all liabilities$ however demandable$ incurredduring that period$ including perhaps those ordered by this 9ourt to be paid.

C(u " Fe('a'!*

In 1CJ$ 9ru# e(ecuted aKasunduanwith the ;loriosos for the consideration of the

rear portion of a 22 s m lot. )he Kasunduan provides that the lot will be sold at a

/ per s m. )hat the portion of the lot to be sold is the rear portion of it. )hat

upon selling$ the 9ru# will transfer their house from the front portion to the rear

portion of the land once it is bought. )hat they will have a right of way from the

front portion going to the bac end of the lot. )he 9ru# never gave anything to the;loriosos for there was an alleged failure to have the land surveyed. %ue to non

payment$ the ;loriosos instead sold the whole lot @bac and rear portion? to the

'ernandos.

In 1CC$ after repeated demands$ the 'ernandos led a case in court for accion

publiciana demanding the 9ru# to vacate the lot and to pay a rental of 5//.//. )he

,)9 ruled in favor of the 'ernandos. )he 9A aKrmed the ,)9 ruling.

ISSUE:3hether or not what transpired between the 9ru#es and the ;loriosos was a

contract of sale.

HELD:4o. )he absence of a specic manner of payment in the terms andconditions of the contract maes it a contract to sell. &wnership was never

transferred to the 9ru#es. )his is because the manner of payment of the purchase

price is an essential element before a valid and binding contract of sale can e(ist.

Although the 9ivil 9ode does not e(pressly state that the minds of the parties must

also meet on the terms or manner of payment of the price$ the same is needed$

otherwise there is no sale. Also$ the 9ru#es never transferred their house from the

front portion to the rear portion of the lot. It was evident in the contract that they

will transfer the house to the rear portion once they were able to buy it.)he S9 also ruled that the 'ernandos were not buyers in bad faith. )here was no

consummated sale between the 9ru#es and the ;loriosos. In a contract to sell$ there

being no previous sale of the property$ a third person buying such property despite

the fulllment of the suspensive condition such as the full payment of the purchase

price$ for instance$ cannot be deemed a buyer in bad faith and the prospective

buyer cannot see the relief of reconveyance of the property. )here is no double

sale in such case. )itle to the property will transfer to the buyer after registration

because there is no defect in the owner-seller6s title per se$ but the latter$ of course$

may be sued for damages by the intending buyer.


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3alang morales devt co vs 9A

La&e(a "s. R*3e(s

,oberto Baperal sold his property to the "apanese !ilitary 9ontrolled ,epublic of the

hilippines for the sum of .5//$/// in "apanese !ilitary 3ar notes. 3hen "apaneseoccupation was over$ Baperal led an action for recovery of hisproperty with thealien property custodian alleging that the sale too place during the "apaneseregime amd was madeunder duress and the consideration was grossly inadeuate.

)he trial court ruled in favor of Baperal.

Baperal6s contentionD)he main allegations of the complaint were that appellee e(ecuted the deed of saleof April 12$ 1C in favor of theoccupation ,epublic of the hilippines under duressand due to the threats employed by the representatives of the"apanese !ilitaryAdministration$ and that the consideration of 5//$///.// in "apanese !ilitary noteswasgrossly inadeuate.

,espondent6s contentionD)he hilippine Alien roperty Administrator denied$ for lac of nowledge andinformation$ plainti6s allegationsconcerning the circumstances under which thesale of the property was allegedly made. )he ,egister of %eeds of !anila wasdeclared in default due to his failure to answer the complaint within thereglementary period.

IssueD 3as the deed of sale e(ecuted under duress that the contract can benulliedudgment debtor will not be granted preliminary in>unction toen>oin e(ecution of a nal >udgment or implementation of an already e(ecuted

>udgment simply because of the ling by the >udgment debtor of a new action forannulment of the e(ecuted >udgment on bare allegations of fraud$ because thepresumption is that such >udgment was legally and validly rendered.

&n %ecember 2J$ 1C7/$ this 9ourt rendered its >oint decision in 9ases B-/J71 1and B-1*/ 2 involving the same protagonists at bar$ wherein the decisive issue of

conOict of >urisdiction between two branches of the 9aloocan 9ity court of rstinstance was stated thusD

)he 9ourt sustained the e(clusive >urisdiction of "udge 9ru#6s court$ holding thatN@I?t is patent that such e(clusive >urisdiction was vested in "udge 9ru#6 court.

)his 9ourt thus upheld the validity of the e(ecution sale held on 'ebruary 1$ 1C*7of respondent ernabe6s two real properties @registered under ).9.). 4os. CCJ5 andCCJ* of 9aloocan 9ity? wherein petitioner Aurora de Beon @sister of the >udgmentcreditor Gnriue de Beon? was the highest bidder and of "udge 9ru#6 orders ofSeptember 5$ 1C*C and "anuary 5$ 1C7/ in the rst case @4o. 9-1JC? consolidatingownership of the properties in petitioner de Beon with the e(piration of the

redemption period and ordering respondent to surrender his owner6s duplicatecerticates of title to the properties thus sold to petitioner Nsince said orders werewithin the e(clusive competence and >urisdiction of "udge 9ru#6 court.P

y the same toen$ this 9ourt held that "udge Salvador had no >urisdiction to taecogni#ance of respondent ernabe6s second action @9ase 4o. 9-1217? against his

>udgment creditor Gnriue de Beon and herein petitioner Aurora . de Beon as


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purchaser to set aside or annul the e(ecution on 'ebruary 1$ 1C*7 Nfor beinganomalous and irregularP and to order the holding of a new auction sale.

ursuant to this 9ourt6s said decision$ petitioner assumed control of the propertiesand collection of the rentals therefrom$ while under the 9ourt6s resolution of !arch15$ 1C71$ ernabe6s motion for the return of the redemption amount of $J17.2J

accepted by the sheri under "udge Salvador6s order of !ay 2/$ 1C*C which this9ourt set aside and declared null and void$ was granted as a matter of euity.

It now turns out that respondent ernabe led under the same date of !arch 15$1C71 still another action against petitioner Aurora . de Beon$ et al. @doceted as9ase 4o. 9-2/J? for annulment or declaration of nullity of the >udgment renderedagainst him in the rst case @4o. 9-1JC? at the e(ecution sale of which petitioner deBeon had acuired his properties in uestion on the ground that Nthe >udgmentrendered in 9ivil 9ase 4o. 9-1JC which led to the e(ecution and sale of hisproperties$ was null and void because the same was secured by Gnriue de Beon$ "r.$petitioner6s brother and the plainti named in 9ivil 9ase 4o. 9-1JC$ through fraud$deceit and misrepresentation in that his @Gnriue de Beon$ "r.6? signatures appearing

in the document @lease contract? on which his complaint in 9ivil 9ase 4o. 9-1JC wasfounded$ and in the verication of said complaint$ were both falsied by his father$Gnriue de Beon$ "r. is not entitled to the >udgment he obtained in 9ivil 9ase 4o. 9-1JC because the complaint which gave rise to it was not instituted by him but by hisfather$ Gnriue de Beon$ Sr. the person who signed the verication thereofdeclaring that he is the plainti named therein.P

3hen petitioner ased respondent >udge to nally enforce his previous orders ofSeptember 5$ 1C*C and "anuary 5$ 1C7/ for the surrender and cancellation ofrespondent ernabe6s certicates of title and the issuance of new certicates inpetitioner6s favor @as upheld by this 9ourt6s previous decision above referred to?$respondent >udge denied petitioner6s motions to this eect per his orders of "une 11$

1C71 and September J$ 1C71 on the ground of pendency of respondents6 new actionfor annulment of >udgment @9ase 4o.9-2/J?.

Hence$ the present petition for certiorari$ prohibition and mandamus. 12 )he 9ourt$in giving due course$ issued on "anuary 15$ 1C72 its writ of preliminary in>unctionen>oining respondents from further restraining this 9ourt6s nal decision in 9ases B-/J71 and B-1*/ above referred to and respondent >udge from further taingcogni#ance of and proceeding with the annulment case @4o. 9-2/J?.

IssueD )he crucial issue thus presented at bar is whether respondent >udge actedwith grave abuse of discretion amounting to e(cess of >urisdiction in issuing hischallenged orders restraining in eect implementation of this 9ourt6s nal decisionof %ecember 2J$ 1C7/ which sustained his own orders of September 5$ 1C*C and

"anuary 5$ 1C7/ in the original case @4o. 9-1JC? Nconrming Aurora6s acuisition oftitle to the properties by virtue of the e(ecution sale and ordering ernabe totransfer possession to herP 1 simply from the bare fact that respondent ernabehas led on !arch 15$ 1C71 a second action for annulment of the e(ecuted

>udgment for alleged fraud @9ase 4o. 9-2/J? after his rst action for annulment ofthe e(ecution sale in favor of petitioner Aurora @9ase 4o. 9-1217? had failed and this


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9ourt had sustained by nal >udgment the very orders implementing the e(ecutionsale which respondent >udge would now en>oinudge did so act with grave abuse of discretion. In

the absence of overriding considerations and none has been shown here theimplementation of e(ecution proceedings already performed in satisfaction of a

>udgment and sustained by nal >udgment of this 9ourt @for consolidation of title ofthe properties acuired in the e(ecution sale by petitioner Aurora and her e(erciseof the rights of ownership and possession the same? will not be en>oined$ simplybecause of the ling by the >udgment debtor of a new action for annulment of thee(ecuted >udgment on the ground of fraud$ because the presumption is that such

>udgment was legally and validly rendered. )his is doubly true where as in this caserespondent >udgment debtor has already failed in a previous action to annul thee(ecution sale and this 9ourt sustained the validity of such sale in a nal >udgmentrendered over three years ago on %ecember 2J$ 1C7/.

Gually pertinent is the established doctrine that where there is no uestion aboutthe >urisdiction of the court over the parties and sub>ect matter and the proceedingswere free from e(trinsic fraud$ the >udgment cannot be declared null and void evenif it were assumed that the court committed an error of >udgment or reached anerroneous conclusion in deciding the case$ since such errors of >udgment not of

>urisdiction are correctible and reviewable only by appeal and Nif no appeal is taen$the decision$ erroneous or not$ becomes nal and e(ecutory$ and is valid andbinding between the parties.P 1*

)hus$ when respondent >udge in obedience to this 9ourt6s preliminary in>unctionsubseuently ordered respondent ernabe to surrender his titles under pain ofcancellation and authori#ed petitioner Aurora Nto resume collecting rentals from the

propertiesP per his orders of April 7$ 1C72$ "uly 1$ 1C72 and September 11$ 1C72 andernabe sought to impugn such orders in a petition for certiorari led with this9ourt on September 2J$ 1C72 @doceted as 9ase B-555C 17? the 9ourt dismissedthe petition for lac of merit per its resolutions of &ctober 1$ 1C72 and 4ovember2J$ 1C72.

Here$ respondent ernabe admittedly had his day in 9ourt in the original case @4o.9-1JC? where >udgment was obtained and e(ecuted against him$ his appeal fromthe >udgment failed$ and his special civil action for certiorari again "udge 9ru#6orders conrming petitioner Aurora6s acuisition of title to the properties by virtueof the e(ecution sale was decided adversely against him in this 9ourt6s decision of%ecember 2J$ 1C7/.

He now alleges fraud in his new complaint only in the >udgment creditor6s father@Gnriue de Beon$ Sr.? allegedly falsied his @the son6s? signatures in the leasecontract and in the complaint supra. 1J In respondent ernabe6s belatedsupplementary memorandum of !ay 1C$ 1C7$ however$ reali#ing perhaps that hisbare allegations as to the father having falsied the signatures of his son$ the

>udgment creditor$ in the lease contract and the complaint do not mae out a caseof e(trinsic fraud since he was no way deprived of his day in court$ he now maes


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for the rst time allegations not made below of a Nsecond fraudP alleged collusionbetween his lawyer in the rst case @9-1JC? and the de Beons and indicates that hewould correspondingly see an Namendment of pleading if necessary to serve theends of >ustice.P

)he best-case view for respondent then is that while he could le such action or

amended action for annulment of the e(ecuted >udgment @on the assumption thathis rst action to annul the e(ecution sale in 9ase 4o. 1217 is not res >udicata? suchling per se does not invalidate the >udgment nor entitle him to a preliminaryin>unction suspending eects and conseuences of the e(ecuted >udgment topre>udice of petitioner Aurora$ whose rights as purchaser of the properties at thee(ecution sale have been recogni#ed by this 9ourt6s nal >udgment of %ecember 2J$1C7/$ until and unless he shall have obtained a nal >udgment for annulment.

)he worst-case view for respondent is that respondent >udge may tae a secondloo at petitioner6s motion to dismiss for lac of cause of action on the ground thatthe fraud alleged in respondent6s new complaint does not constitute e(trinsic fraud which alone warrants annulment of a >udgment and then resolve after hearing

the parties that indeed no e(trinsic fraud is alleged in respondent6s secondcomplaint for annulment or such amendments thereof as shall have been permittedand that the same should therefore be dismissed without need of trial for failure tostate a cause of action.

)he uestion of e(trinsic fraud has been e(tensively discussed in the 9ourt6s ample>urisprudence on the matter. In the latest case of 9ru# vs. 4avarro$ 1C !r. "ustice9astro succinctly dened fraud as Ne(trinsic when it is employed to deprive a partyof his day in court$ thereby preventing him from asserting his right to the property.P

A99&,%I4;B=$ the writ of certiorari is granted and respondent >udge6s uestionedorders of "une 11$ 1C71 and September J$ 1C71 in 9ase 4o. 9-1JC denying

implementation of his previous orders conrming petitioner6s acuisition of title tothe properties @as set aside by respondent >udge in his subseuent orders of April 7$

"uly 1$ and September 11$ 1C72? are hereby set aside and annulled. )he preliminaryin>unction heretofore issued on "anuary 15$ 1C72 by the 9ourt is set aside insofar asit en>oined respondent >udge from further taing cogni#ance of and proceeding withthe annulment case @4o. 9-2/J? with instructions to dispose of the same$particularly as to the unresolved uestion raised in petitioner6s pending motion todismiss of whether the allegations of respondent6s complaint therein mae out acase of e(trinsic fraud so as to state a cause of action$ in consonance with thecontrolling principles and >urisprudence thereon as set forth in the 9ourt6s opinion.4o pronouncement as to costs.

Veasc* ". CA

'actsD A suit for specic performance led by Boren#o Eelasco against the!agdalena Gstate @9ivil 9ase77*1? on the allegation that on 2C 4ovember 1C*2$ Eelasco and the !agdalenaGstate had entered into a contract of sale by virtue of which !agdalena Gstateoered to sell Eelasco$ to which the latter agreed to buy$ a parcel of land with anarea of 2$/5C s.ms. @Bot 15$ loc 7$ sd-*12C$? located at 4o. C corner *th Street


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and acic Avenue$ 4ew !anila$ Tue#on 9ity$ for the total purchase price of1//$///.//. Eelasco alleged that he was to give a down payment of 1/$///.// tobe followed by 2/$///.// and the balance of 7/$///.// would be paid ininstallments$ the eual monthly amorti#ation of which was to be determined as soonas the /$///.// down payment had been completed.

He further alleged that he paid the downpayment on 2C 4ovember 1C*2 @,eceipt2/7JJ? and that when on J "anuary 1C* he tendered to the payment of theadditional 2/$///.// to complete the /$///.//$ !agdalena Gstate refused toaccept and that eventually it liewise refused to e(ecute a formal deed of saleobviously agreed upon. Eelasco demanded 25$///.// e(emplary damages$2$///.// actual damages and 7$///.// attorney6s fees. !agdalena Gstate deniedthat it has had any direct-dealings$ much less$ contractual relations with the Boren#oEelasco regarding the property in uestion$ and contends

that the alleged contract described in the document attached to the complaint isentirely unenforceable under the Statute of 'rauds:

that the truth of the matter is that a portion of the property in uestion was beingleased by a certain Socorro Eelasco who$ on 2C 4ovember 1C*2$ went to the oKceof !agdalena Gstate indicated her desire to purchase the lot:

that the latter indicated its willingness to sell the property to her at the price of1//$///.// under the condition that a down payment of /$///.// be made$2/$///.// of which was to be paid on 1 4ovember 1C*2$ and that the balance of7/$///.// including interest at CU per annum was to be paid on installments for aperiod of 1/ years at the rate of 5$J1.2 on "une / and %ecember of every yearuntil the same shall have been fully paid:

that on 2C 4ovember 1C*2$ Socorro Eelasco oered to pay 1/$///.// as initial

payment instead of the agreed 2/$///.// but because the amount was short ofthe alleged 2/$///.// the same was accepted merely as deposit and upon reuestof Socorro Eelasco the receipt was made in the name of her brother-in-law $Boren#oEelasco:

that Socorro Eelasco failed to complete the down payment of /$///.// andneither has she paid any installments on the balance of 7/$///.// up to thepresent time:

that it was only on J "anuary 1C* that Socorro Eelasco tendered payment of2/$///.//$ which oer !agdalena Gstate refused to accept because it hadconsidered the oer to sell rescinded on account of her failure to complete the downpayment on or before 1 %ecember 1C*2.

&n 4ovember 1C*J$ the 9'I Tue#on 9ity rendered a decision$ dismissing thecomplaint led by Boren#o and Socorro Eelasco against the !agdalena Gstate$ Inc.for the purpose of compelling specic performance by !agdalena Gstate of analleged deed of sale of a parcel of residential land in favor of the Eelascos. )he basisfor the dismissal of the complaint was that the alleged purchase and saleagreement Nwas not perfected.P


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&n 1J 4ovember 1C*J$ after the perfection of their appeal to the 9ourt of Appeals$the Eelascos received a notice from the said court reuiring them to le theirprinted record on appeal within */ days from receipt of said notice. )his */-dayterm was to e(pire on 17 "anuary 1C*C. Allegedly on 15 "anuary 1C*C$ the Eelascosallegedly sent to the 9A and to counsel for !agdalena Gstate$ by registered mail

allegedly deposited personally by its mailing cler$ one "uanito %. Tuiachon$ at the!aati ost &Kce$ a N!otion 'or G(tension of )ime )o 'ile rinted ,ecord onAppeal.P )he e(tension of time was sought on the ground Nof mechanical failures ofthe printing machines$ and the voluminous printing >ob now pending with the Eerarinting ress.P

&n 1/ 'ebruary 1C*C$ the Eelascos led their printed record on appeal in the 9A.)hereafter$ the Eelascos received from !agdalena Gstate a motion led on J'ebruary 1C*C praying for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that theEelascos had failed to le their printed record on appeal on time. )he 9A$ on 25'ebruary 1C*C$ denied the !agdalena Gstate6s motion to dismiss$ granted theEelasco6s motion for /-day e(tension from 15 "anuary 1C*C$ and admitted the

latter6s printed record on appeal. &n 11 !arch 1C*C$ !agdalena Gstate prayed for areconsideration of said resolution. )he Eelascos opposed the motion forreconsideration and submitted to the 9A the registry receipts @/215 and /21*?$ bothstamped 15 "anuary 1C*C$ which were issued by the receiving cler of the registrysection of the !aati ost &Kce covering the mails for the disputed motion fore(tension of time to le their printed record on appeal and the aKdavit of itsmailing cler.

After several other pleadings and manifestations relative to the motion forreconsideration and on 2J

"une 1C*C$ the 9A promulgated a resolution granting the motion for reconsiderationand ordered Atty.

atrocinio 9orpu# @Eelasco6s counsel? to show cause within 1/ days from notice whyhe should not be suspended from the practice of his profession for deceit$ falsehoodand violation of his sworn duty to the 9ourt$ and directed the rovincial 'iscal of,i#al to conduct the necessary investigation against "uanito %. Tuiachon of theSalonga$ &rdoVe#$ =ap$ Sicat W Associates Baw &Kce and 'laviano &. !alindog$ aletter carrier at the !aati ost &Kce$ and to le the appropriate criminal actionagainst them @it appears that !alindog postmar the letters 15 "anuary 1C*C on 7'ebruary 1C*C at the reuest of Tuiachon?. X

&n 5 September 1C*C$ the 9A promulgated another resolution$ denying the motionfor reconsideration of the Eelascos but$ at the same time$ accepting as satisfactorythe e(planation of Atty. 9orpu# why he should not be suspended from the practiceof the legal profession.

&n 2/ September 1C*C$ the 'irst Assistant 'iscal of ,i#al notied the 9ourt ofAppeals that he had found a prima facie case against !alindog and would le thecorresponding information for falsication of public documents against him$ butdismissed the complaint against Tuiachon for lac of suKcient evidence. A petitionfor certiorari and mandamus was led by the Eelascos against the resolution of the9ourt of Appeals dated 2J "une 1C*C in 9A-;, 27*$ which ordered the dismissal


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of the appeal interposed by them from a decision of the 9'I Tue#on 9ity on theground that they had failed seasonably to le their printed record on appeal.

)he Supreme 9ourt denied the instant petition: without pronouncement as to costs.1. Issues raised by Eelascos: Some issues are sub>ect of appeal on certiorari under,ule 5 rather

than that of certiorari under ,ule *5 )he Eelascos contend that the 9ourt of Appealsacted without or in e(cess of >urisdiction$ or with such whimsical and grave abuse ofdiscretion as to amount to lac of >urisdiction$ because

@a? it declared that the motion for e(tension of time to le the printed record onappeal was not mailed on 15 "anuary 1C*C$ when$ in fact$ it was mailed on the saiddate as evidenced by the registry receipts and the post oKce stamp of the !aatiost &Kce:

@b? it declared that the record on appeal was led only on 1/ 'ebruary 1C*C$ beyondthe time authori#ed by the appellate court$ when the truth is that the said date ofling was within the /-day

e(tension granted by it:

@c? the adverse conclusions of the appellate court were not supported by therecords of the case$ because the said court ignored the aKdavit of the mailing clerof the petitioners6 counsel$ theregistry receipts and postmared envelopes and$ instead$ chose to rely upon theaKdavit of the mail carrier !alindog$ which aKdavit was prepared by counsel for!agdalena Gstate at the aKant himself so declared at the preliminary investigationat the 'iscal6s oKce which absolved the Eelascos6 counsel mailing cler Tuiachonfrom any criminal liability:

@d? section 1$ ,ule 5/ of the ,ules of 9ourt$ which enumerates the grounds upon

which the 9ourt of Appeals may dismiss an appeal$ does not include as a ground thefailure to le a printed record on appeal:

@e? the said section does not state either that the mismailing of a motion to e(tendthe time to le the printed record on appeal$ assuming this to be the case$ may be abasis for the dismissal of the appeal:

@f? the 9ourt of Appeals has no >urisdiction to revoe the e(tension of time to le theprinted record on appeal it had granted to the petitioners based on a ground notspecied in section 1$ ,ule 5/of the ,ules of 9ourt: and

@g? the ob>ection to an appeal may be waived as when the appellee has allowed therecord on appeal to be printed and approved. Some of the ob>ections raised by theEelascos to the uestioned resolution of the 9ourt of Appeals are obviously mattersinvolving the correct construction of our rules of procedure and$ conseuently$ areproper sub>ects of an appeal by way of certiorari under ,ule 5 of the ,ulesof 9ourt$ rather than a special civil action for certiorari under ,ule *5. )hepetitioners$ however$ have


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correctly appreciated the nature of its ob>ections and have ased this 9ourt to treatthe instant petition as an appeal by way of certiorari under ,ule 5 Nin the eventthat the Supreme 9ourt should deem that an appeal is an adeuate remedyP )henature of the present case permits a disuisition of both types of assignments.

2. %ate stamped on receipts and envelopes: Henning and 9alte( cases do not apply

3hile it is true that stamped on the registry receipts /215 and /21* as well as onthe envelopes covering the mails in uestion is the date 15 "anuary 1C*C$ this$ byitself$ does not establish an unrebuttable presumption of the fact or date of mailing.

)he Henning and 9alte( cases are not in point because the specicad>ective issue resolved in those cases was whether or not the date of mailing apleading is to be considered asthe date of its ling$ )he issue in the present case is whether or not the motion ofthe petitioners for e(tensionof time to le the printed record on appeal was$ in point of fact$ mailed @and$therefore$ led? on 15 "anuary1C*C.. 9ertication of postmasters and !alindog6s sworn declaration believable:

!alindog induced toissue false registry receipts for the Eelasco6s counsel

)he certications issued by the two postmasters of !aati$ ,i#al and the sworndeclaration of themail carrier !alindog describing how the said registry receipts came to be issued$are worthy of belief. It willbe observed that the said certications e(plain clearly and in detail how it wasimprobable that the registryreceipts in uestion could have been issued to Eelascos6 counsel in the ordinarycourse of oKcial business$while !alindog6s sworn statement$ which constitutes avery grave admission against his own interest$provides ample basis for a nding that where oKcial duty was not performed it was

at the behest of a personinterested in the Eelascos6 side of the action below. )hat at the preliminaryinvestigation at the 'iscal6s oKce$!alindog failed to identify Tuiachon as the person who induced him to issuefalsied receipts$ contrary towhat he declared in his aKdavit$ is of no moment since the ndings of the inuestscal as reOected in theinformation for falsication led against !alindog indicate that someone did induce!alindog to mae andissue false registry receipts to the counsel for the Eelascos.. ,ight to appeal a statutory privilege and not a natural right nor a part of dueprocessIn ello vs. 'ernando$ it was held that the right to appeal is not a natural right nor apart of dueprocess: it is merely a statutory privilege. and may he e(ercised only in the mannerprovided by law.5. %uty of appellant to le printed record on appeal with 9A within */ days fromreceipt of notice

)he ,ules of 9ourt e(pressly maes it the duty of an appellant to le a printedrecord on appeal with


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the 9ourt of Appeals within */ days from receipt of notice from the cler of thatcourt that the record onappeal approved by the trial court has already been received by the said court.Section 5 of ,ule * @%uty ofappellant upon receipt of notice? states that NIt shall be the duty of the appellantwithin 15 days from the date

of the notice referred to in the preceding section$ to pay the cler of the 9ourt ofAppeals the fee for thedoceting of the appeal$ and within */ days from such notice to submit to the court/ printed copies of therecord on appeal$ together with proof of service of 15 printed copies thereof uponthe appellee.P*. Appellate court did not abuse its discretionAfter a careful study and appraisal of the pleadings$ admissions and denialsrespectively adduced andmade by the parties$ it is clear that the 9ourt of Appeals did not gravely abuse itsdiscretion and did not actwithout or in e(cess of its >urisdiction. As the Eelascos failed to comply with the duty

to le the printed recordon appeal within */ days from receipt of notice which the ,ules of 9ourt en>oins$and considering that therewas a deliberate eort on their part to mislead the said 9ourt in granting them ane(tension of time withinwhich to le their printed record on appeal$ it stands to reason that the appellatecourt cannot be said to haveabused its discretion or to have acted without or in e(cess of its >urisdiction inordering the dismissal of theirappeal.7. "urisprudence replete with cases where 9ourt dismissed appeal on grounds notmentioned

specically in ,ule 5/$ Section 1"urisprudence is replete with cases in which this 9ourt dismissed an appeal ongrounds not mentionedspecically in Section 1$ ,ule 5/ of the ,ules of 9ourt. @See$ for e(ample$ %e la 9ru#vs. lanco$ 7 hil.5C* @1C2?: ;overnment of the hilippines vs. 9ourt of Appeals. 1/J hil. J* @1C*/?:'erinion vs. Sta.,omana$ B-25521$ 'ebruary 2J$ **$ 1* S9,A 7/$ 75?.J. !otion for e(tension of period must be made before the e(piration of the periodto be e(tendedInasmuch as the motion for e(tension of the period to le the printed record onappeal was belatedlyled$ then$ it is as though the same were non-e(istent. In auiran vs. 9ourt ofAppeals$ it was stated thatNthe motion for e(tension of the period for ling pleadings and papers in court mustbe made before thee(piration of the period to be e(tended.P )he soundness of this dictum in matters ofprocedure is self-evident.'or$ were the doctrine otherwise$ the uncertainties that would follow when litigantsare left to determine and


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redetermine for themselves whether to see further redress in court forthwith ortae their own sweet timewill result in litigations becoming more unbearable than the very grievances theyare intended to redress.C. &b>ection to appeal not waived!agdalena Gstate did le a motion in the 9ourt of Appeals on J 'ebruary 1C*C

praying for thedismissal of the appeal on the ground that up to the said date the Eelascos had notyet led their record onappeal and$ therefore$ must be considered to have abandoned their appeal. )heob>ection to an appeal was thus not waived$ contrary to Eelasco6s argument that itwas waived when the appellee allows the record on appealto be printed and approved+1/. 4o contract of sale perfected because the minds of the parties did not meet inregard to themanner of payment4o contract of sale was perfected because the minds of the parties did not meet Ninregard to the

manner of payment.P )he material averments contained in Eelasco6s complaintthemselves disclose a lac ofcomplete Nagreement in regard to the manner of paymentP of the lot in uestion.

)he complaint statespertinently Nthat plainti and defendant further agreed that the total down paymentshall be /$///.//$including the 1/$///.// partial payment mentioned in paragraph hereof$ andthat upon completion of thesaid down payment of /$///.//$ the balance of 7/$///.// shall be paid by theplainti to the defendant in1/ years from 4ovember 2C$ 1C*2: and that the time within which the full downpayment of the /$///.//

was to be completed was not specied by the parties but the defendant was dulycompensated during the saidtime prior to completion of the down payment of /$///.// by way of lease rentalson the house e(istingthereon which was earlier leased by defendant to the plainti6s sister-in-law$ Socorro

". Eelasco$ and whichwere duly paid to the defendant by checs drawn by plainti.P )he Eelascosthemselves admit that they and!agdalena Gstate still had to meet and agree on how and when the down paymentand the installmentpayments were to be paid. Such being the situation$ it cannot be said that a deniteand rm sales agreementbetween the parties had been perfected over the lot in uestion.11. %enite agreement on the matter of payment of purchase price an essentialelement to formbinding and enforceable contract of saleA denite agreement on the manner of payment of the purchase price is anessential element in theformation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. In the present case$ theEelascos delivered to


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!agdalena Gstate the sum of 1/$/// as part of the downpayment that they had topay cannot be consideredas suKcient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale agreement betweenthe parties under article 1J2of the new 9ivil 9ode$ as the Eelascos themselves admit that some essential matter@the terms of payment?

still had to be mutually covenanted.

cause case digests

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