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India Review, vol. 9, no. 3, July–September, 2010, pp. 385–395Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN 1473-6489 print; 1557-3036 onlineDOI:10.1080/14736489.2010.506356

FIND1473-64891557-3036India Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, Jul 2010: pp. 0–0India ReviewREVIEW ESSAY

Causes and Consequences of Nuclear South Asia: The Debate Continues . . . Causes and Consequences of Nuclear South AsiaIndia ReviewHARSH V. PANT

Inside Nuclear South Asia. Edited by Scott D. Sagan. Stanford, CA:Stanford University Press, 2009. 296 Pages. Paperback, $27.95.

Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences ofthe Kargil Conflict. Edited by Peter R. Lavoy. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2009. 407 Pages. Hardcover, $55.00.

These are strange times indeed. The US President, Barack Obama,seems to be leading an effort towards strengthening the nuclear armscontrol regime. Under his tutelage the United Nations Security Councilpassed a unanimous resolution that stands on three pillars: a reaffirma-tion of the goal of nuclear abolition, strengthening the non-proliferationregime centered in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), andminimizing the risks associated with the increased use of nuclear energyaround the world amid mounting concerns regarding global warming.Obama also went to Moscow to sign an agreement with Russia thatwould reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads in each coun-try to between 1,500 and 1,675, down from the previous ceiling of2,200, even as he cancelled a plan of his predecessor to put defensesagainst intercontinental ballistic missiles in Eastern Europe.

On the other hand, there is little evidence to suggest that Iran andNorth Korea have halted their efforts toward nuclear weaponization.The negotiations with Iran drag on while North Koreans are gradu-ally expanding their nuclear arsenal. The Russian military is conduct-ing war games in which it is simulating nuclear attacks on a

Harsh V. Pant teaches in the Department of Defence Studies at King’s College London.

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neighboring country. The Chinese are rethinking their credible mini-mum deterrence nuclear posture. Pakistan is expanding its nucleararsenal to counter a rising India while India’s eyes are on Chinesenuclear modernization. The prospect of the emergence of “new”nuclear nations and the interest in weapons of mass destructionevinced by radical terrorist organizations has prompted many to ques-tion if nuclear deterrence can survive in the coming years and if recentdevelopments pose a threat to an over 60-year-old taboo on the use ofnuclear weapons.

The last few years have been particularly difficult for the globalnon-proliferation and arms control regime. From Iran to NorthKorea, from the nuclear black market of A.Q. Khan to Brazil, newchallenges are emerging virtually every other day that threaten toundermine the global arms control architecture. Forced by India’sopen challenge to the global arms control and disarmament frame-work in May 1998, major powers in the international system havebeen re-evaluating their orientation towards global arms control andnon-proliferation. The Indian nuclear tests in 1998 were the first openchallenge to the system, especially by a “responsible,” opposed to a“rogue,” member of the international community. Some might arguethat surreptitious Chinese weapons proliferation and clandestinenuclear programs undercut the arms control regime long before theIndian nuclear tests. Nonetheless, India’s nuclear tests significantlyaltered the contours of the existing security architecture already understress in the post Cold War era. India’s open defiance marked the realbeginning of the end of the non-proliferation regime as the world hadknown it until then, forcing the international community to look atnuclear proliferation through a different lens.

For a long time, the West has viewed nuclear weapons in SouthAsia with dread because of the possibility that conventional warfarebetween India and Pakistan might escalate into a nuclear war. Indianand Pakistani officials, on the other hand, have continued to arguethat, just as the threat of Mutual Assured Destruction resulted in “hotpeace” between the US and the former Soviet Union during the ColdWar, nuclear weapons in South Asia will also have a stabilizingimpact. Since September 11, 2001, however, the nature of the problemfor the region and the world at large has changed, insofar as the threatnow appears to be Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal being used by radicalIslamists if they can manage to wrest control of it. There is little hope

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Causes and Consequences of Nuclear South Asia 387

that the rational actor model on which classical nuclear deterrencetheory is based would apply as much to Islamist terrorist groups asit would to the Pakistani government. In the immediate aftermath of9/11, there were suggestions that the US had explicitly sought guaran-tees from the Musharraf government that its nuclear arsenal was safe.The present turmoil in Pakistan continues to raise concerns about thesafety, security, and command of its nuclear stockpile. Though Pakistan’sgovernment is always quick to dismiss reports that its nuclear weap-ons are in danger of falling into the wrong hands as “inspired” andstresses that Pakistan provides the highest level of institutionalizedprotection to its strategic assets, the credibility of such claims remainsopen to question.

Debating Nuclear ProliferationEver since the advent of nuclear weapons in global politics in 1945,theorists and practitioners alike have focused on the causes and conse-quences of nuclear weapons proliferation. The first generation ofnuclear strategists that included Bernard Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter,and Thomas Schelling among others, tried to grapple with the centraldilemma that confronted global politics with the advent of nuclearweapons. On the one hand, the presence of survivable and deliverablestrategic weapons made it imperative for nuclear powers to try to limitwar. On the other hand, nuclear powers also viewed nuclear weaponsas political instruments, whereby the threat of nuclear war could beused to attain political ends.1 This dilemma has continued to define thework of later scholars, including the “optimist-pessimist debate” onthe proliferation of nuclear weapons.2 Kenneth Waltz, the leadingproponent of the optimist school, has long argued that the gradualspread of nuclear weapons is inevitable but not a cause for worry.3

Waltz has contended that “whatever the number of nuclear states, anuclear world is tolerable if these states are able to send a convincingdeterrent message: It is useless to attempt to conquer because you willbe severely punished.”4 In fact, he argues that proliferation should bewelcomed since nuclear weapons, being defense oriented, make warsless likely. According to him, proliferation of nuclear weapons willlead to neither domestic nor regional instability as “uncertainty aboutthe course that a nuclear war might follow, along with the certaintythat destruction can be immense, strongly inhibits the first use ofnuclear weapons.”5

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While there were several dissenting voices against Waltz’s provoca-tive argument, the most powerful critique of this proliferation-optimism school came from Scott Sagan.6 Sagan argued that civiliancontrol of the military in emerging nuclear states seems to be weak or,in many cases, these states have military-run governments. In suchstates, the biases and parochial interests of the military mightdetermine state behavior, thereby leading to deterrence failures as“professional military organizations, if left on their own, are unlikelyto fulfill the operational requirements for rational nuclear deter-rence.”7 Sagan used his argument to bring the issue of civil-militaryrelations in emerging nuclear states to the center of the debate on theimplications of nuclear proliferation.

The scholarly debate on the causes and consequence of nuclearweapons acquisition has long been dominated by the realists whoargue that states will acquire nuclear weapons only if they find itnecessary to counter a threat to their vital security interests from otherstates. As for the consequences of such an action, realists suggest thatnuclear weapons induce stability in inter-state relations by producingstable deterrence. Realists make these predictions by treating states asrational unitary actors. The two books under review here examine thenuclear predicament in South Asia afresh, moving the debate on thecauses and consequences significantly forward. While Lavoy’s volumeis focused on the consequences of a nuclearized South Asia, Sagan’sexamines both the causes and consequence of nuclear proliferation inSouth Asia, even as it takes direct aim at the standard realist argumentson proliferation and its consequences.

Opening Up the Black BoxOffering a strong critique of narrow realist views of nuclear prolifera-tion, Inside Nuclear South Asia examines the domestic politics andorganizational interests behind specific nuclear policy choices in SouthAsia. The authors in this volume demonstrate that realist predictionsdo not hold in the context of South Asia, and in order to gain athorough understanding of the spread of nuclear weapons in the sub-continent, it is important to understand the domestic political dynam-ics- political interests, power relations, and bureaucratic processes.

The first part of the book examines the causes of proliferation in SouthAsia and has three interesting, though at times contradictory, chapters.Kanti Bajpai makes a strong case that had the Hindu-nationalist

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Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) not come to power in India, India wouldnot have tested nuclear weapons in 1998. According to Bajpai, thestructural incentives facing the Indian government in 1998 had notchanged compared to the ones its predecessors faced. It was the ideo-logical inclination of the BJP and the need for the then Indian PrimeMinister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to consolidate his power in the coali-tion government that pushed India towards nuclear acquisition. “TheBJP played politics with the bomb”, suggests Bajpai, and the nucleartests consolidated Vajpayee’s “hold on his party and the coalition.”

This chapter is followed by a quantitative analysis that attempts totest the theories of proliferation in the South Asian context. Sasikumarand Way include three variables in their model: technological,security, and domestic political. They conclude that in the absence of a“nuclear umbrella” from nuclear weapon states, “states facing achallenging security environment are much more likely to pursuenuclear weapons.” Their assessment supports the standard realistargument about nuclear weapons acquisition. As for the importanceof domestic political variables, they argue that regime type—democraticor otherwise—does not seem to matter. What is important is the“influence of parochial actors who gain enough influence to promotetheir agenda.”

The third chapter is about the impact of discourse on state behav-ior wherein the author focuses on a broader issue of why statesdevelop nuclear programs, as opposed to examining the reasonsbehind nuclear weapons acquisition. Itty Abraham suggests that thefocus of most scholarship on nuclear weapons proliferation is indetermining when and why states decide to pursue a nuclear weaponsprogram which he terms as “the discourse of control.” In such a con-text, non-proliferation policy paradoxically becomes a reason forstates to become nuclear powers. Nuclear power for India became asymbol of Indian independence. Indian leaders had always viewedtheir nation as a major global power, and nuclear power was a symbolof India’s technological sophistication. Abraham argues that “India’satomic energy program represented the zenith of Indian developmen-talism, technologically and symbolically,” and therefore the questionof giving up the nuclear project did not even arise, as it would be“equivalent to giving up the project of a sovereign Indian state.”

The second part of the volume focuses on the consequences ofnuclear proliferation in South Asia. Vipin Narang takes an innovative

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approach to examining the strategic behavior of India and Pakistan bypresenting a new database of strategic missile tests conducted by thetwo states between 1998 and 2008 under a range of systemic anddomestic conditions. This timeframe gives him numerous data pointsto work with, allowing him to examine a greater number of plausibleexplanations than an examination of the single case of the 1998 nucleartests would allow. His analysis suggests that while Pakistan is largelyresponding to the security concerns emanating from India when itdecides to test nuclear-capable missiles, India’s decisions regardingstrategic weapons are derivative of domestic political ideology and thepriorities of the two main political parties—the Congress and theBJP—relative to each other. This leads him to conclude that “the SouthAsian arms race and the general risk of the regional escalation are criti-cally tied to the domestic political configuration in New Delhi.”

S. Paul Kapur examines the stability/instability paradox in theSouth Asian context and takes aim at the widely held scholarlyconsensus that it is the paradox that explains continuing conflict in anuclear South Asia. Whereas the stability/instability paradox isexpected to impede escalation of conflict between two nuclear powers,in the South Asian case, the nuclear shield has actually madePakistan’s leadership more adventurous as they believe that fear ofnuclear escalation would prevent India from using its conventionalsuperiority against Pakistan and lead the international community tointervene before conflict could escalate. South Asian violence, accord-ing to Kapur, “has resulted from a strategic environment in whichnuclear escalation is a serious possibility in the event that a limitedIndo-Pakistani confrontation spirals into a full scale conventionalconflict.”

The last chapter by Scott Sagan is an examination of Indian andPakistani nuclear doctrines. Sagan argues that the two states havedifferent approaches in the development of their doctrines and neithergovernment is strictly following a “minimum deterrent” nuclearposture that they publicly proclaim. The Pakistani military’s role iscentral in the development of their nation’s doctrine, and commonmilitary biases are evident in Pakistan’s doctrinal preferences andattitudes. Sagan suggests that Indian doctrine has also, over the years,moved away from its traditional “no-first-use” declaratory posture ofthe 1990s, influenced by global developments and military adventur-ism from Pakistan. Sagan concludes that the evolution of Indian

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nuclear doctrine has been “influenced by debates and diverse interestsof domestic and bureaucratic actors inside India.”

Inside Nuclear South Asia is largely pessimistic about the stabilityof nuclear deterrence in South Asia as well as about the prospects ofnuclear proliferation elsewhere in the world. As Sagan emphasizes,“the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan and their mutualpossessions of nuclear arsenals are a dangerous mix.” Theoretically,the volume is an interesting undertaking insofar as it highlights thedomestic, political, and organizational context of nuclear decision-making in South Asia. The conclusions of the volume, however, are attimes difficult to reconcile with the empirical realities on the ground.

First, the section on the causes of nuclear proliferation in SouthAsia remains internally inconsistent when the first chapter talks aboutthe ideological proclivities of the BJP as the key driver of nucleariza-tion; the second chapter’s conclusions suggest that in the absence of anuclear umbrella states facing a difficult security environment aremuch more likely to pursue nuclear weapons; and the third chapterfinds the roots of Indian nuclear weapons acquisition in Indian civil-ian nuclear program itself. All three arguments have some validity buttogether they weaken the broader theoretical underpinnings of theproject. Bajpai’s argument that the interests of the BJP propelled Indiatowards testing in 1998 ignores the fact that in December 1995 thethen Congress Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, came very closeto testing and backed away because the US discovered the prepara-tions. It was Indira Gandhi who made India a nuclear power in 1974and all successive governments, irrespective of party affiliations, con-tinued to work towards enhancing India’s nuclear prowess. Sasikumarand Way’s conclusion seems to support India’s nuclear weapons tra-jectory as India sought a nuclear umbrella from the West before goingdown the path of nuclearization.8 Abraham’s chapter, too, ends upcomplicating Bajpai’s focus on the BJP. Abraham’s argument that theIndian nuclear program from the very beginning was a symbol ofIndian independence suggests that all political parties were equallyculpable in this endeavor. And in this context, Congress should beviewed as the main culprit given its dominance of the Indian politysince independence. Successive Congress governments used the Indiannuclear program and their nation’s opposition to the global nuclearregime as a means to burnish their nationalistic credentials. The BJPmerely followed in the Congress footsteps when it got a chance.

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The section dealing with the consequences of nuclear proliferationin South Asia is more interesting. Sagan’s chapter on Indian andPakistani nuclear doctrines is important as so little scholarly work hasbeen done on this subject. The Indian nuclear doctrine still remains awork in progress. If one agrees with Sagan that there has been a subtleevolution of the Indian doctrine away from its strict “no first use” andminimum deterrent posture, then this only strengthens the realistargument that the doctrines of major powers would converge. AsIndia rises in the global inter-state hierarchy, it is merely followingother major powers who have given nuclear weapons much greaterprominence in their military doctrines.

The Kargil Conflict: South Asia’s First Limited War Under the Nuclear ShadowA crude nuclear stability has emerged in South Asia as India’scalibrated responses to the three crises since the two sides openlycrossed the nuclear Rubicon in 1998 demonstrate. Indeed, a state ofrecessed/nonweaponized deterrence had existed since the time of theBofors crisis in early 1987 that led to the 1988 India-Pakistan agree-ment not to strike each others’ nuclear installations. Nuclear weaponshave contributed to regional strategic stability by reducing the risk offull-scale war in the region. Despite repeated provocations byPakistan in 1999, 2001–02, and 2008, and a resentful Indian public thatwanted its government to retaliate, Indian policymakers have demon-strated an extraordinary measure of restraint in the aftermath of allthree crises, refusing to launch even small–scale limited attacks againstPakistan. The Indian government forbade the military to cross theLine of Control despite Indian military officials clearly wanting topursue such a posture. It is in this context that Peter Lavoy’s volumemakes an important contribution by meticulously examining the firstlimited war to occur in the Indian subcontinent under the shadow ofnuclear weaponry.

Peter Lavoy’s Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia examines thecauses and consequences of the Kargil conflict between India andPakistan in 1999, which was the first military clash between twonuclear-armed powers since the 1969 Sino-Soviet war. It providesempirical evidence to test the claims made for the nuclear optimistsand pessimists about the effects of nuclear proliferation on statebehavior. Though a number of accounts of this conflict have appeared

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in recent times, this volume is “the first rigorous, comprehensive andobjective case study of the causes, conduct and consequences of theKargil conflict.” Consequently, the volume is able to shatter a numberof myths surrounding the conflict. It clearly demonstrates that despitePakistan’s continuing protestations to the country, it was Pakistan’sNorthern Light Infantry that conducted the cross-Line of Control(LoC) intrusion, precipitating the crisis. Pakistan continues to claimthat the mujahideen played a significant role in these intrusions, aclaim that has not only dented Pakistan’s global credibility but alsochanged the larger narrative of Kashmir insurgency in India’s favor.

The volume clarifies a number of issues regarding the role ofnuclear weapons in Kargil. Nuclear weapons did not play as major arole in this conflict as many have argued. In fact, while the rest of theworld saw Kargil as the first nuclear crisis of the subcontinent, Indiaand Pakistan saw it as just another one of their conflicts. It was not acalculation that the threat of nuclear escalation would prevent Indiafrom counterattacking but the domestic civil military relations andassumptions about changing military balance in Kashmir that drovePakistan toward a decision to advance across the LoC. Not only didIndia and Pakistan not raise the risk of nuclear escalation, but theyalso did not ready their nuclear arms for employment. It was, rather,the international community that went on overdrive fearing a nuclearcatastrophe to resolve the crisis at its earliest.

The most significant aspect of this volume, especially in the contextof the earlier discussion of Sagan’s book, is its examination of thetheory of nuclear deterrence on the basis of empirical evidencegleaned from the Kargil conflict. The propositions of nuclear deter-rence theory are derived from the assumption regarding states asrational, unitary actors. Given that deterrence theory does end upexplaining much of Indian and Pakistani strategic behavior during andafter the Kargil conflict, it further complicates the argumentspresented in Inside Nuclear South Asia. As Lavoy argues, the Kargilcase “is consistent with a looser perspective on nuclear deterrence,which recognizes that the armed forces of nuclear powers can fighteach other, but only where their vital interests are not at stake.” Whilethis goes against the strict version of the nuclear deterrence theory,which suggests that wars will not arise between nuclear armed states,it is accepted by deterrence theorists that limited wars are possiblebetween nuclear powers. After all, two nuclear powers, China and the

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former Soviet Union, had already clashed in 1969 without escalatingthe conflict to the nuclear level.

Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia also suggests that during theKargil crisis, neither side seriously threatened nuclear use. There weresome emotive statements from both sides but they were off-the-cuffremarks, not part of a serious governmental strategy, confirminganother expectation of nuclear deterrence theory that nuclear threatswould not be used to change the territorial status quo. Though a crisisbetween a nuclear India and a nuclear Pakistan did occur, it remaineda limited one and India refrained from escalating the crisis, therebyturning Kargil “into a bilateral exercise in mutual restraint.” Despitetrying its best to prevent the crisis from escalating, New Delhi paid ahigh price to preserve the territorial status quo again in conformitywith the expectation of nuclear deterrence theory. A failure to do thiswould have sent a signal to Pakistan that India lacked the resolve tofollow through on its deterrent threats. Finally, nuclear deterrencetheory suggests that the balance of conventional military power willbecome largely irrelevant in determining political outcomes in anuclearized environment. This volume suggests that while the militarybalance did not matter, the prospect of nuclear war too did not havemuch impact on Pakistan’s strategic calculations in 1999. Only oneexpectation of the nuclear deterrence theory has not been met in theSouth Asia nuclear landscape. India and Pakistan are yet to pursueserious arms control to stabilize their strategic competition thoughthey have made some limited attempts such as the 1988 CBMs onnon-attack on nuclear facilities and declaration of lists of such facili-ties and the 1999 Lahore declaration annexures containing agreementto give notice of missile tests.

Though the volume presents a detailed account of the cause,conduct, and consequences of the Kargil conflict, its real value lies inpresenting an analytical account of how the two nuclear armed statesin South Asia interacted during a military crisis that presented a realrisk of nuclear escalation. For a long time, the accounts of this crisiswere dominated by nuclear pessimists who argued that this crisissupported their claims about the perils of nuclear proliferation. But, asthe contributors to this volume demonstrate, such an understandingcontributes “to a selective reading of the initiation and termination ofthe Kargil conflict, which exaggerates harming signs and generallyignores evidence of caution and restrain.”

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The underlying reality in South Asia is that despite a number ofcrises post-1998, nuclear deterrence remains robust insofar as state-to-state ties are concerned. The real problem now is that of the non-stateactors who may try to sabotage this stability. The jihadi groups thathave been nurtured by the Pakistani State to further its agenda inKashmir and elsewhere have now turned against their sponsors. Thisnew problem complicates the old nuclear deterrence model in theSouth Asian context. And, it is this issue that should be the focus offuture studies of the consequences of nuclearization in South Asia.

NOTES

1. A detailed historical analysis on the evolution of strategic thinking on the role of nuclearweapons in the US can be found at Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 3–46.

2. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate(New York: Norton, 1995).

3. For the first detailed explication of Waltz’s provocative analysis, see Kenneth N. Waltz,“The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better,” Adelphi Paper No. 171(London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).

4. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 7.5. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 108.6. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 47–92.7. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 49.8. On India’s attempts to obtain a nuclear guarantee, see A. G. Noorani, “India’s Quest for

a Nuclear Guarantee,” Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 7 (July 1967), pp. 490–502.

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