1. IntroductionViolent conflicts of one type or another have plagued Africa and exacted a heavy toll on the continents societies, polities and economies, robbing them of their developmental potential and democratic possibilities. The causes of the conflicts are as complex as the challenges of resolving them are difficult. But their costs cannot be in doubt, nor the need, indeed the urgency, to resolve them, if the continent is to navigate the twenty-first century more successfully than it did the twentieth, a century that was marked by the depredations of colonialism and its debilitating legacies and destructive postcolonial disruptions.

African conflicts are rooted in the long-standing tendency to treat African social phenomena as peculiar and pathological, beyond the pale of humanity, let alone rational explanation. Yet, from a historical and global perspective, Africa has been no more prone to violent conflicts than other regions. Africas share of the more than 180 million people who died from conflicts and atrocities during the twentieth century is relatively modest, in the sheer scale of casualties there is no equivalent in African history to Europes First and Second World Wars, or even the civil wars and atrocities in revolutionary Russia and China.

African conflicts are inseparable from the conflicts of the twentieth century, the most violent century in world history; many postcolonial conflicts are rooted in colonial conflicts. There is hardly any zone of conflict in contemporary Africa that cannot trace its sordid violence to colonial history and even the late nineteenth century. For instance, to quote Heywood (2003:2), the region from the southern Sudan through northern Uganda to Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo now the scene of brutal civil wars and genocide and have a long history of colonial violence in the form of slave trading, slave labour, plantation labour, plantation terror and a violent gun culture which all have to be taken into account when explaining the contemporary situation. Thus, it cannot be overemphasized that African conflicts are remarkably unexceptional: they have complex histories; they exhibit multiple and multidimensional causes, consequences, similarities and differences.

1.2. Africas Civil WarsAfrica has been the site of some of the worlds most deadly conflicts in the last few decades, with those in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda each resulting in the deaths through battlefield casualties or war-induced famine and disease of 500,000 to 1,000,000 persons. Frey (1999: 237) notes that in 1995, there were five on-going wars, in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan, several countries that were candidates for state collapse or civil war Burundi, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Togo, and Zaire and a host of other countries where low-level ethnic and political conflict remained contained but unresolved (Frey, 1999: 237).In this section will focus on the impact of decolonization contributed to the political, economic, and cultural disparities that have given rise to African domestic conflict in Sudan, Rwanda and Uganda. The discussion will be centred on three countries, Sudan, Rwanda and Uganda. Following that, the research focuses on several causes and consequences of the conflicts.

2.1 SudanThe history of Sudan has been strongly influenced by the Arab world. In fact, in 651, Muslim Egyptians invaded Sudan, and signed a peace treaty with the Christian state of Makuria ruled by the Nubians, first inhabitants of the country. The treaty came to be known as Bakt. It was based on mutual respect of each others political and cultural integrity. Accordingly, Makuria had to provide the Egyptians with slaves in exchange for goods. This historical pattern is central, because the exploitation of marginalized regions is still an ongoing process in modern Sudan (Harbom, 2010: 68).

The ongoing Darfur crisis started in early 2003 with the peace talks between North and South. The two Darfurian rebel groups, the SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army) and the JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) started to conduct attacks against military installations in early 2003. The rebel groups major concern was that the peace agreement between North and South would have marginalized 2.even more, politically and economically the region of Darfur. Since 2003, the government started to bombard African villages, and state-sponsored Arab militia, known as the Janjaweed, has been involved in grave crimes against humanity, including ethnic cleansing, mass killings, and raping (Harbom, 2010: 69).

2.1.1. Causes: Religion and Ethnicity

While the worst conflicts in Arab Africa are religious, the worst conflicts in Black Africa are ethnic, Sudan seems to follow this model. The word ethnic in this case is used in the sense of the older word, tribal. By Arab Africa, we largely mean North Africa (Algeria, Libya and Egypt, for example, are Arab). Darfur is afflicted by arguably the worst conflict in Arab Africa. The conflict is between Islamicists and the military secularists, and religion, however politicized, is at its root. It is among the ugliest and most intractable armed conflicts in the world (Jackman, 2001: 55). Religion is also at the root of the conflict in Egypt (Kebschull, 2012: 69).

The first conflict in Darfur began in 1985, the same period when Sudan was suffering from a severe drought which brought suffering in the form of devastating famine. The government neglected the Khartoum in South, with the denial by sedentary communities to allow migration on their land of the pastoralists towards the South created an explosive anger and frustration in the Darfur region. The situation was further exacerbated by the massive movement of Chadian refugees fleeing the civil war that had begun in Chad, bringing with them more hardship. The civil conflict lasted for four years until a peace agreement was signed in 1989 by the warring faction (Dunne, 2009: 52).

This initial conflict created the mechanisms for future conflict. The 1989 Peace Accord lasted just for a decade and another conflict erupted in 2003 and is still goingon. The developments in Sudan over the years have led the present crisis to be at aglance an ethnic conflict, which sees mainly two sides: the Arab, government-sponsored militia, the Janjaweed, and the African ethnic groups - the Masalit, Fur and Zaghawa - of two rebel movements, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 3.and the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA). According to Human Rights Watch (2005: 95) between 2003 and 2005, the crisis has caused two million of internally displaced people (IDPs), 220,000 refugees to Chad, and 1.5 million still need food assistance.

2.1.2. Consequence: Internally Displaced People (IDP)

The consequences of the genocide in Darfur will be numerous and catastrophic. Short of a massive international effort, far greater than any that has been put forward to date, the 2.5 million refugees are unlikely to ever get their land back from the janjaweeds. This is termed "the new reality" in NGO-speak. In fact, since the land really isn't suitable for agriculture anymore, there is some question as to whether they could support themselves there, even if the Sudanese government decided to return it all with apologies (Knipe, 2008: 75).

Darfur refugees seek refuge in neighbouring countries like, Chad and the Central African Republic. According to the Human Rights Watch (2005: 82) Chad currently has at least 500,000 Darfuri refugees. However, those border regions already had adequate populations before the genocide broke out, and local people don't want to see the refugees staying on indefinitely. They will need to be resettled somewhere, but the borderlands, like Darfur itself, have been suffering from lack of rain and the region continues to experience draught.

According to the Human Rights Watch (2005: 102), many nearby countries have been arming and supplying different factions in the Darfur Conflict, and the fighting has spilled beyond Sudan's borders. Not only Chad, but also Libya, Egypt, and Eritrea all have meddled in the fighting. There is a very real possibility that this could explode into a regional conflict, if a solution isn't found very soon to the refugee issue.

2.2 Rwanda

In 1994, the world opened its eyes to the crisis in Rwanda. The genocide that 4.occurred there let many know that all has not been well in Rwanda following the Belgian colonization of the country. Many believed that the sole reason of the genocide was the division of power among the Hutu and Tutsi. One must look at the history of Rwanda to find the true reasons for the genocide and to understand the events that led to such heinous acts (Leedy and Ormrod, 2010: 31).

2.2.1 Causes: Cultural division and Belgian colonization

Although many believe that the cause of the genocide was solely due to the cultural division between the Hutu and the Tutsi, there were many other factors that contributed to the genocide. For instance, the spiralling economy was a large reason for the conflict among the population of Rwanda. Rwandas land and its resources were scarce. Since the Tutsi tended to be wealthier than the Hutu because of when they were in power during Belgian colonization, they controlled most of the land and its resources. Many Rwandans were motivated to kill their wealthier neighbours just so seize their land (The African Press News, Internet: 58).

The African Press News (Internet: 58), argues another issue regarding the economy of Rwanda was that it was a very poor nation. Its national debt is sours into the billions. The majority of the people living in Rwanda lived below the poverty line. This caused many to be frustrated and angered, especially the Hutu who many blamed their poverty on the colonization by the Belgians where Hutu were not allowed to secure good jobs or get a good education.

Another contributing factor had to do with the state in which Belgium left Rwanda when they gave Rwanda its independence. Belgium colonized neighbouring Burundi at the same time as Rwanda and gave Burundi its independence at the same time as Rwanda. Burundi had a similar history to Rwanda and since its independence has had a similar type of turmoil. The Belgians have a history of not preparing their colonies well for independence, as evident by the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi and even in the Congo (Political Instability Index, 2011: 74).

The Belgians during colonization creating many of the divisions that existed among5.

the people even at the time of the genocide, and because of the favouritism they showed towards the Tutsi and by making the Tutsi the elite class and superior to the Hutu, it cause great conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi.

2.2.2 Consequences: Attacks on Children

Countless thousands of children were slaughtered during the Rwandan genocide. This was evident throughout the country in the months after the killing. For instance, on a path winding up a hillside in Nyakizu in Butare province, a small red sweater lay discarded. Inside was the ribcage of an infant. When children went back to school at Kaduha in Gikongoro province, the bones of other children still lay strewn about the schoolyard in which they played. Of the bodies exhumed by Physicians for Human Rights at a mass grave in Kibuye province, some 44 percent were of children under the age of fifteen and 31 percent were under ten (Agenor and Montiel, 2011: 39).

Agenor and Montiel (2011: 32) argues most had been killed by machete; fewer than 1 percent, the more fortunate, had been killed by gunfire. Among the victims treated by physicians in Western Rwanda, some 30 percent were children and most had been injured by machete. Over time, the bones have disappeared but many living children throughout Rwanda bear evidence of the genocide in amputated limbs and scars from machete wounds, especially across the face, head, and neck. They and all of the others, even those with no mark on their bodies, bear invisible but nonetheless real scars from having experienced horrors beyond anything imaginable.

According to a Human Rights Watch (2005: 52), survey of three thousand children, 80 percent of children interviewed experienced a death in the family during the period of the genocide; 70 percent witnessed a killing or an injury; 35 percent saw other children killing or injuring other children; 88 percent saw dead bodies or body parts; 31 percent witnessed rape or sexual assault; 80 percent had to hide for protection; 61 percent were threatened that they would be killed; and 90 percent believed that they would die.6.According to a Human Rights Watch (2005: 88), children had been largely spared of death in previous armed conflicts in Rwanda. However in 1995 this had all changed with the genocide horror. The killing of Tutsi since the 1950s was different, as the killings were towards children the most, it killed babies on the back, children who were beginning to walk, pregnant women, old people. The elderly woman, a Hutu, had become a target when informers told the militia that she was hiding her Tutsi grandchildren. According to Straton Nsanzabaganwa, director of social planning and protection of vulnerable groups in the Ministry of Local Administration and Social Affairs (2008: 12), confirmed that children had seldom been targeted before even during the ethnic massacres of 1959 and 1973. With the 1994 genocide, he said, children lost their protected status.

2.3 Uganda

The roots of the war between the government of Uganda and the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in Acholiland are entwined with the history of conflicts in Uganda and the rise to power of the National Resistance Movement/National Resistance Army (NRM/A). The conflict has persisted because of fragmented and divisive national politics, strategies and tactics adopted by the armed protagonists, and regional and international interests. The harrowing war has claimed many innocent civilian lives, forcefully displaced over 400,000 people and destroyed schools and health centres. In addition, the war has been characterized by widespread and systematic violations of human rights, including rapes, abductions of men, women and children, torture, increased economic decay, and national and regional insecurity (Human Rights Watch 2005: 47).

2.3.1 Causes: Multitudes of factors

Ugandas post-colonial history of violent coups, numerous armed rebellions and lack of accountability for such violence provides the critical backdrop for understanding why the war broke out the way it did in Northern Uganda. Indeed, given this history of accessing power through violent means, the armed rebellion in the North against the NRM regime was seen as the normal course of political business. 7.The political system in Uganda has, since the first post-independence government, had a strong military character. Previous regimes, such as those of Idi Amin and Milton Obote I and II, have been characterised by civil unrest and gross human rights violations, manifested in torture, rape, extra-judicial execution and mass murders, disappearances and displacement (Collis & Hussey, 2003: 32).

The perpetrators of these crimes got away with impunity, and eventually created a trend for successive governments to hunt down and exact extra-judicial revenge on soldiers and civilian populations associated with the ousted regimes. This practice culminated in a cycle of fear, hate, anger, mistrust, and more violent vengeance, and served to entrench prejudices that had, since the colonial period, labelled and dichotomised Ugandans along regional and ethnic lines. The culture of impunity also made recourse to violence the easy and normal method of retaining or gaining access and control of state power (Collis & Hussey, 2003: 41).

As one religious leader in Gulu noted of Tito Okellos forces after the defeat by the NRA, states, they believed they could get power back because it is the norm: Amin did the same, Obote did the same, and Museveni did the same. So they also could use force and topple the government. Political mistakes carried out by undisciplined soldiers became only symptoms of a culture of revenge and exclusion entrenched by historical incidents under various regimes. For instance, FEDEMU, a mainly Baganda battalion with the NRA during its guerrilla struggle, did not enjoy the reputation for discipline and reportedly committed many atrocities in the North during 1985-1986 period (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2010: 203).

According to Leedy & Ormrod (2010: 54) argues that the absence of viable political structures allowing for the free entry and exit from the political process, as well as inadequate channels to express grievances or disaffection, further fuelled violent political change. The purging of previous army officers forced many into exile, while others were persuaded by their leaders to go into hiding or join other disgruntled groups, to fight either to restore their control of political power and related socio-economic advantages, or to push for popular support to overthrow the government. For numerous people in Gulu and Kitgum, the sense of betrayal by the NRM on the8.power-sharing provisions of the 1986 Nairobi Peace Accord was the immediate cause of the conflict. The rebels generally wanted Museveni to apologise for breaching the Nairobi peace talks. The Nairobi Peace Talks have given the rebels justification for fighting.

Another cause of conflicts in the colonial state was exacerbated by the partition of the country into economic zones. For instance, while a large portion of the territory South of Lake Kyoga was designated as cash crop growing and industrial zones, the territory North of Lake Kyoga was designated as a labour reserve. This partition, which was not dictated by development potentials, led to economic disparities between the South and the North. The fragmentation of the society was compounded by the economic-cum-administrative policy that left the civil service largely in the hands of Baganda and the army largely in the hands of the Acholi and other northern ethnic groups. These policies also widened the gulf between the socio-political South and the socio-political North. This was further sustained by the administrative policy that relied on the Baganda as colonial agents in other parts of the country. The policy of divide and rule, which rested on so-called indirect rule, led to widespread anti-Buganda sentiment (Heywood, 2003: 89).

2.3.2 Consequences: Political Marginalisation

While poverty in itself does not automatically lead to violence, and is not identified here as a root cause of the conflict, it is certainly a consequence of the war that, in turn, continues to feed peoples perception of marginalisation. In particular, notions of political marginalisation have been reinforced by the impact of displacement throughout the region. Widespread displacement is perhaps the most visible impact of the conflict and serves as a reminder of the consequences of war (Frey & Kreps, 1999: 63).

According to the Human Rights Watch (2005: 47), over 1.4 million people are currently displaced within the districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Lira, Apac, Soroti, Katakwi, Kaberamaido and Adjumani. While the conflict in general is seen to have been the cause of displacement, the majority of researchers on the ground did not 9.see the LRA attacks per se as the direct cause of flight.

Government policy of moving people into protected villages that were the most common explanation given for the widespread displacement. The justification by the government for doing this was to enable the UPDF to protect the civilians more effectively and to assist their military strategy by making rebels more visible. The camps are a military strategy of the UPDF designed to deny the rebels manpower and other resources. However, an ongoing attack on civilian population that has continued by rebels even in the camps perceives this as a weak explanation. The LRA is reported to have attacked 16 of the existing 35 Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader between June and September 2002 alone, and continues to attack IDP camps persistently (Human Rights Watch, 2005: 308).

3. Similarities and Differences

The international community has attempted to address conflict and war through a variety of means, of which peacekeeping efforts have become the most visible. This preferred means of conflict resolution has experienced setbacks in former Sudan, Rwanda and Uganda, but following a period of reflection and reappraisal peacekeeping operations regained their stature as an efficient and reliable way to promote peace. As a result, the number of these missions has proliferated in Africa, especially in Sudan, Rwanda and Uganda.

The establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) on the Uganda side of the common border, the focus would primarily be on transit or transport, by roads or tracks which could accommodate vehicles, of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border, as well as any other material which could be of military use.

The response by the United Nations was very weak. Many downplayed the violence that was occurring in Rwanda. The French and Belgians alike said that what was occurring in Rwanda was being blown out of proportion by the media. A Rwandan official affirmed these beliefs. Because of this, the United Nations didnt give a lot of support in Rwanda. UNAMIR, the United Nations peacekeeping for in Rwanda, wasnt strong enough to suppress the rebel forces or the militia. Even after repeatedly hearing of the genocide, the United Nations failed to bring in reinforcements.

Finally on May 17, 1994 the United Nations admitted that genocide was taking place in Rwanda. Immediately the United Nations gave their support to resolving the situation in Rwanda. Although the genocide only last a couple of months, in the end a total of 937,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus had lost their lives during the genocide. UNAMIR remained in Rwanda until 1996.