cellular automata based authentication (caa ) monalisa mukherjee 1 niloy ganguly 2 p pal chaudhuri 1...

Cellular Automata Based Authentication (CAA )

Monalisa Mukherjee1 Niloy Ganguly 2

P Pal Chaudhuri 1

1 Department of Computer Science & Technology , Bengal Engineering College ( D . U ) , Howrah ,

West Bengal , India 711103

2Department of Business Administration , Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management , Calcutta ,

West Bengal , India 700073

CA Research Group (BECDU)

• Importance 1. Authentication & Verification of

data source 2. Protection of copyright &

detection of intrusion 3. Prevention of Cyber-Crime

• Wide Applications E-Commerce, Medical, Technology, Government , Law

Authentication


Message Digest Generation Function

Message Digest Generation FunctionsAccepts a message of arbitrary length as the inputTransforms a key of fixed length called “fingerprint”

or “message digest” as the output One-way hash function with the addition of a secret key forms the basis of this transformation

Authentication Compares fingerprint produced at source and destination end Important for the security protocols inMessage authentication , Data integrity and Digital signature


SOURCE

MessageDigest

Cellular Automata (CA) based Authentication (CAA)

MessageDigest

DESTINATION

Digest

HashPrivate key

Hash

Private key

Compare Same Not Hacked

Hacker


Importance of Proposed Method

Limitations of the conventional MD5 based message authentication -Not withstand the advanced cryptanalytic attacks

-The hash function used is weak In the above background, we propose an efficient message digest generation scheme.

The proposed scheme employs a special class of GF(2p) Cellular Automata (CA )

2p Predecessor Single Attractor Cellular Automata(SACA)


pp pp

1 i-1 i i+1 n

0/1

Input Input Input

OutputOutput Output Output

Input

Output0/1

An n Cell GF(2P) CA

W i

W i+1W i-1

Input

0 --- 2p - 1


Structure of a 3 Cell GF ( 2 2 ) CA

Cell 2 Cell 1 Cell 0

Clock

T =

3 2 0

3 1 2 0 3 2

S 1 = T S 0

0

3

2 3 31

2

2

0XORXORXOR


300 301 302 303 233200

010 013012 011 022020 021023

030 033032 031

130 131 132 133100333

002 001 003

000

STATE TRANSITION OF A 3 CELL GF ( 2 2 ) SACA

T =

3 2 0

3 1 2 0 3 2

Depth = 3 , Attractor - 0No. of predecessors = 2 p = 4No. of non reachable states = 48


Structure of a 3 Cell GF ( 2 2 ) CA

Clock

T =

3 2 0

3 1 2 0 3 2

S 1 = T S 0 + F

Cell 2 Cell 1 Cell 0

XNOR

0

3

2 3 31

2

2

0

XNOR XNOR

F = 111


T =

3 2 0

3 1 2 0 3 2

DUAL SACA

F = 111

103

010 011 012 013 233200

110112 111 101100 102

121 123122 120

310 311 312 313330003

133 132 131

130

113


SACA AND ITS DUAL300 301 302 303 233200

010 013012 011 022020 021023

030 033032 031

130 131 132 133100333

002 001 003

000

103

010 011 012 013 233200

110112 111 101100 102

121 123122 120

310 311 312 313330003

133 132 131

130

113

DUAL SACA

SACA


HASHING USING SACA AND ITS DUAL300 301 302 303 233200

010 013012 011 022020 021023

030 033032 031

130 131 132 133100333

002 001 003

000

103

010 011 012 013 233200

110112 111 101100 102

121 123122 120

310 311 312 313330003

133 132 131

130

113

SACA

DUAL SACA

Hashing 300 Hashed value 113


1 0 1 1 1 1 1 08 bits MessageHash Function – 2-cell

GF(22) SACAKey Size = 4

2 3

Message Authentication Through CAA

1 0 1 1 1 1 1 02 3 3 2

Matrix fromfirst token

2 11 3

3 2

Private Key 32

0 02 0


2 3 3 2

2 3Matrix fromfirst token


2 11 3

32

3 20 02 0

32

01

0 02 0

13

F =

1 3

SACA

DUAL SACA

Private Key


2 3 3 2

3 2Matrix fromfirst token


3 11 2

13

0 00 02 0

00

01

0 02 0

12

F =

1 2

Message Digest


Brute Force AttackKey Size can be increased with

minimum cost

Attack Changing key

Related Key Cryptanalysis

Differential Cryptanalysis

Security Analysis For CAA


Attack changing Message

File SizeFile Size

No of Ones in xored cyphertextNo of Ones in xored cyphertext

Key 128bitKey 128bit Key 256bitKey 256bit 128128

P=4P=4 P=8P=8 P=8P=8 P=16P=16 MD5MD5

32393239 3434 70 70 128128 122122 6969

6578065780 5555 7676 114114 138138 6464

259120259120 5151 6464 130130 136136 7070

P1 = 101010111111 C1 = 110101P2 = 101010111101 C2 = 011011

XORED = 101110No of 1’s = 4


Attack changing key

File SizeFile Size

No of Ones in xored cyphertextNo of Ones in xored cyphertext

Key 128bitKey 128bit Key 256bitKey 256bit 128128

P=4P=4 P=8P=8 P=8P=8 P=16P=16 MD5MD5

32393239 5454 6363 134134 130130 6464

6578065780 4545 6464 104104 134134 6868

259120259120 5555 6464 132132 128128 6666

K1 = 101010111111 C1 = 110101K2 = 101010111101 C2 = 011011

XORED = 101110No of 1’s = 4



No of 1’s = 5

P1 = 11001011 C1 = 00110101 P2 = 10011001 C2 = 10000110XORED=0101010 XORED=10110011

No of 1’s = 3

P1 = 11000011 C1 = 10110101 P2 = 00001001 C2 = 00100110XORED=0101010 XORED=10010011

No of 1’s = 3 No of 1’s = 4



No of 1’s = 5

P1 = 11001011 C1 = 00110101 P2 = 10011001 C2 = 10000110XORED=0101010 XORED=10110011

No of 1’s = 3

P1 = 11000011 C1 = 10110101 P2 = 00001001 C2 = 00100110XORED=0101010 XORED=10010011

No of 1’s = 3 No of 1’s = 4

P1 P2 = 3P1 P2 = 3

C1 C2 C1 C2 FreqFreq

11 nn11

22 nn22

33 nn33

44 nn44

55 nn55

66 nn66

77 nn77

88 nn88

Standard Deviation of distribution



Avg. Std. Devn. Of XOR Distribution (%) using CAA

P=16P=16P=8P=8P=8P=8P=4P=4Key 256bitKey 256bitKey 128bitKey 128bit

File SizeFile Size

4.9864.9865.0025.0025.0345.0346.6676.6676578065780

5.1225.1226.1236.1236.134 6.134 8.4588.4583586035860

4.0334.0336.1026.1027.9827.98210.21310.213259120259120


Time Needed for MD5 & CAA

File SizeFile Size

CPU Time in SecondsP=1P=1 P=2P=2 P=4P=4 P=8P=8

MD5MD5n=12n=1288

n=64n=64 n=32n=32 n=16n=16

16081608 0.0550.055 0.050.0500

0.040.04 0.040.04 0.550.55

142164142164 0.2050.205 0.160.1655

0.110.1188

0.080.0811

0.220.2200

852984852984 0.2930.293 0.250.2522

0.200.2055

0.200.2055

0.330.3300

Speed calculated in WindowsNT 4.00 -1381 , IBM


Watermarking – Its Importance

• Invisible Fragile Watermarking

- Image Authentication / Ownership

- Tamper Detection

- Verification of Image Integrity

•Application

- Legal matters

- News reporting, Medical


Watermarking

• Existing Tools

- MD5 based One-way Hash Function

•Advantages

- Easy Software implementation

- License free nature

•Disadvantages

- Non-keyed primitive

- Lacks sound & realistic cryptanalysis


Watermark Insertion / Extraction

Host ImageWatermark Image

Watermarked Image

Insertion Scheme

255 128108 11

1 01 1

11111110 1000000001101100 00001010

1 11 0

CA Based Hashing

0 1 0 1

11111110 1000000101101100 00001011

254 129108 11

11111111 1000000001101100 00001011


Watermark Insertion / Extraction

Host ImageWatermark Image

Watermarked Image

Insertion SchemeExtraction Scheme

Watermarked Image

Watermark Image


Proposed Scheme

Resists Holliman-Memon Attack

Vector Quantization Attack

Higher PSNR

Watermarking

Image Name

Data inBytes

PSNR Values in dB unit

P = 4 P = 8 MD5

Lena 1064071 53.463 53.788 51.243

Concord 1485604 54.020 54.527 51.318

Rabbit 964451 52.444 52.725 51.104


Current & Future Works on Watermarking

• Invisible Robust Watermarking

- Survives Image Cropping & Compression

• Audio & Video Watermarking

• Application

- Prevent Unauthorized Access & Forgery

- Copyright Protection & Authentication

Thank you

Niloy Ganguly

[email protected]

http://ppc.becs.ac.in

cellular automata based authentication (caa ) monalisa mukherjee 1 niloy ganguly 2 p pal chaudhuri 1...

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