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dvocating a Liberal WorldOrder: A Strategy for Aligninghe World's Like-Minded and

Capable Democraciesaker: Ash Jain, Nonresident Fellow, German Marshall Fund, and Consultant, Eurasia Groupsider: Stewart M. Patrick, Senior Fellow and Director of the International Institutions and Global Governance

gram

uary 17, 2013

ncil on Foreign Relations

STEWART PATRICK: OK, folks. I think we might -- we might

go ahead and get started. I assume this is on.

I met most of you. For those of you who I haven't, my name's

Stewart Patrick. I'm a senior fellow here and direct the program

on international institutions and global governance under whose

auspices Ash Jain has written his paper.

It's a great pleasure to welcome you all here. This meeting,

unlike most council events, with the agreement of our co-

presenters, is -- or presenter and discussant, is going to be on

record. So just for your full warning, this isn't -- is not being held under normal council

es.

ould just want to do some brief introductions. You have their bios. Ash Jain is a

nresident fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States and a consultant

h the Eurasia Group. In the past he's been affiliated as a fellow, visiting fellow at the

ashington Institute for Near East Policy. And before that he was in government service as

member of the State Department's policy planning staff, where some of the ideas that

s going to be discussing were germinated.

vid Gordon, as you all know, is head of research and director of global macro analysis at

Eurasia Group. He has served in a number of senior capacities in the U.S. government,

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st recently as director of policy planning under Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at

tail -- actually, not quite tail end of the -- of the George W. Bush administration. And

ore that he served in a number of capacities in the National Intelligence Council, where

rst had the pleasure of getting to know him.

hat I've asked Ash to do is to speak for about 15 minutes or so, presenting some of the

in lines of argument in his paper, not necessarily going through it exhaustively, and

n perhaps David can offer 10 minutes of reflection or so.

just start with a few items of reflection of my own. I did do a blog on this -- on Ash's

per, which we had commissioned because I felt it was an important contribution to the

going debate over what is the role of, in a sense, regime type in determining or shaping

S. policies -- U.S. foreign policy, to what degree should the United States seek to build

mmonality, solidarity and common purpose with democracies.

w, there's obviously a rich tradition of this. At the tail end of the Clinton administration,

course, Madeleine Albright presided over the formation of the Community of

mocracies, which I think, in retrospect -- while not being a useless organization, in

rospect, suffered some from flaws, not least of which is the fact that it really didn't have

rticularly stringent criteria as to what constituted a democracy and so arguably allowed a

w more spoilers and troublemakers into the room than would have been desirable.

been interesting in this -- this periodic interest in an alliance or a concert of a league of

mocracies is something that one finds on both sides of the political spectrum. It was a

jor theme in the Princeton Project on National Security that Anne-Marie Slaughter and

hn Ikenberry spearheaded. It was probably the most controversial aspect, in some ways,

that -- of that project. But it's -- it also featured in much of the campaign rhetoric of

nator John McCain in the 2008 presidential election and has been associated or -- with

blic policy intellectuals like Robert Kagan as well as those of a more centrist or even to

left persuasion, like Jim Lindsay, our director of studies here, who's probably -- would

ntify himself as a centrist, I think, and Ivo Daalder, who's obviously played a significant

e in this administration.

w all of those -- these schemes have been criticized on a number of different grounds. Is

re enough commonality amongst democracies, particularly democracies that aren't

cessarily all advanced OECD countries? Is -- are there problems of defining democracy,

o gets to actually make the club ? Or do you risk having a "West versus the rest"

namic, et cetera? A lot of -- particularly critiques from the realist side.

fact one of the invitees to this gathering responded quite -- with some acid to me -- a

mer colleague of mine -- basically saying, enough of this Kantian claptrap. This is all just

stalgia for a Western order that is quickly going by the wayside. You know, please, this is

angerous trend that you're going down, since I'd -- I had last month hosted a meeting

h John Ikenberry and Dan Deudney, had presented something that at least is somewhat

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erminous with this, although a little bit ideologically different.

that as it may, this is an important part of U.S. political culture. It's also true that there

certain things that democracies care about and nondemocracies don't. And what's

eresting about Ash's paper is how, I think, he tries to avoid some of the shortfalls and

ortcomings of previous efforts to try to advocate for something like this, partly because

a more limited objective and it's also incremental, builds on some things that have

eady been tried.

with those preliminaries, let me turn things over to Ash, then David will make his

mments, and then we'll open the floor up to all of you. Thank you very much.

H JAIN: OK. Well, thank you all for coming. And I want to express my gratitude to

art Patrick and the Council on Foreign Relations for organizing this event and for

mmissioning the paper that we're going to discuss today. It's a pleasure to be here.

m going to talk for a few minutes about global cooperation and a proposal for a new

nue that I'm calling the Democracies 10, or the D10. So when President Obama heads to

Petersburg for the G-20 summit later this year, he'll have a full plate of issues to

ntend with, but we can bet that what will not likely be on the agenda are some of the

st critical and vexing security challenges facing the United States -- whether to

ervene in Syria, how to strengthen sanctions against Iran, what we can do to advance

mocratic reform in places around the world -- Burma, China and others. The G-20, as

all know, is not the venue to discuss political and security issues, and nor would such a

ergent group of countries be likely to produce a useful outcome.

hat about when the president heads to the G-8 in Northern Ireland this summer? Is that

ere we can expect to gain some traction on these big challenges? Well, not likely. If the

st is any indication, the G-8 is likely to end up with a bland and largely meaningless

tement of concern, but no consensus on a strategy for moving forward.

could the president deploy Susan Rice at the U.N. Security Council to come up with a

n of action? Well, here too we've seen that given Russia and China's positions, they're

t likely to play ball at the U.N. Security Council and we're not likely to gain any traction

re either.

this illustrates the dilemma that we face. The U.S. has been at the forefront of setting up

umber of international venues to facilitate multilateral cooperation. But where do we

n when we want to build strategic consensus on the wide range of issues, political and

urity threats, that we face today? Well, I hope after today's discussion we'll have at least

e possible answer to consider.

I'd like to begin with some observations about the future of great power cooperation,

n to the value of -- I see in working with like-minded allies and then outline this D10


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ncept, who would be in it and why, and then finally a little bit on the feasibility of

nging this concept to reality.

in recent years, the United States has invested a great deal in enhancing cooperation

h major world powers, reaching out to emerging powers, bringing them into the halls of

wer. And I'd like to suggest three observations about what we can expect in the future.

st, in the economic realm, this effort at engaging major powers and giving them a stake

the international system may, in fact, end up paying dividends. While both Russia and

ina maintain a heavy-handed state role, they, along with Brazil, India, other emerging

wers have essentially embraced capitalist economies that accept a wide range of norms

d practices, such as trade liberalization, that have been the hallmarks of an open liberal

der. Establishing the G-20, therefore, as an inclusive forum for economic cooperation

ds some promise.

cond point is, however, that when it comes to political and security cooperation, the

uation, I would contend, is qualitatively different. Russia and China remain

ndamentally opposed to the expansion of many of the liberal norms and principles long

ampioned by the West, particularly when they involve involvement in the internal affairs

other states.

ese diverging perspectives are evident in at least four major policy areas: one, the

pansion of democracy; two, the prevention of violence against civilians; three, the

atment of rogue regimes; and four, the establishment of privileged spheres of influence.

e track record on this is pretty clear. Over the years Russia and China have voted or

pressed their positions against democracy promotion by vetoing successive resolutions at

Security Council. We've seen this, obviously, with -- most recently with Syria.

eviously they voted against resolutions relating to democracy promotion in Zimbabwe

d Burma. They have sought to reverse -- particularly Russia has -- to reverse the Color

volutions in places like Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Both China and Russia, while

y have supported efforts to persuade Iran and North Korea to abandon their nuclear

ograms, they've continually sought to water down these sanctions and have maintained

d in some cases even strengthened trade and economic ties. And finally, China and

ssia diverge from the Western powers in claiming what Dmitri Medvedev has called so-

led privileged spheres of influence in regions close to their borders.

at's not to say that cooperation with China and Russia is impossible. In fact, the two

untries have collaborated with the West -- with Western powers to address various

eats to international security. But those have primarily been limited to threats

anating from nonstate actors, including terrorism and al- Qaida, piracy, drugs and

anized crime.

e third observation I would make is that as much as we would like to believe that they


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with us, we're not going to be able to rely on rising democracies, including India, Brazil,

uth Africa and Turkey and the like, for support on these big international issues, at least

t in the short run.

hile they do share common values and objectives, these rising democracies have been

bivalent about supporting Western-led actions to advance these objectives, particularly

en it requires coercive diplomacy, economic sanctions and especially the use of force.

democracy promotion, for example, these countries have resisted efforts to isolate or

ssure autocratic regimes. They've struggled on the issue of protecting civilians against

lent atrocities. For example, they criticized NATO's actions to bring down Gadhafi and

ve maintained their strident opposition to intervention in Syria. And on Iran, they have

en hesitant to support economic isolation and are firmly against any kind of military

ervention to deal with its nuclear program.

given the diverging views of major world powers, consensus at the U.N. and inclusive

titutions on political and security challenges will be difficult. Instead, the United States

going to have to turn to its like-minded partners if it wants to establish greater

operation on these issues.

me turn now to talk a little bit about these like-minded democracies. The United States

d Europe have embraced a common worldview over the years that's been built on shared

ncepts of universal human rights, the rule of law, market economies and value -- and a

ues-based international order. I think it's fair to say that the basic strategic preferences

countries like the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the like are aligned largely

h those of the United States. This shared worldview is not limited to Europe. Several

untries in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Japan, Australia and South Korea, have

pressed a similar commitment to preserving a liberal international order.

is legacy of cooperation has been tested at times, with Iraq serving as probably the most

gnant example in recent years. But major policy disagreements between the United

tes and its like- minded allies like that are relatively rare and tend to be narrower in

pe than is -- than is with -- the case with others.

addition to shared values, the U.S. and the West have maintained a preponderance of

wer in the international system that continues to provide a tremendous source oferage. With all the focus on China and the rise of emerging powers, one might overlook

fact that the United States continues to remain the world's leading economic power and

expected to be in that position for another two decades. In the security realm, Western

wer is even more pronounced with the U.S. and its closest allies spending six times or

re on defense than Russia and China combined.

t what they're missing is a crucial element for success, and that is a collective vehicle for

ategic coordination. During the Cold War, the U.S. and its allies organized themselves to


6/32

dress important challenges facing the liberal order. Through NATO, they worked to

ify position -- military capabilities to contain the Soviet Union, and then later the G-7

ovided a venue for joint consultation on political issues among advanced industrial

mocracies. Both provided valuable platforms for like-minded coordination that

imately helped defeat communism.

t today's threats are much more diffuse. They include outlier regimes seeking to acquire

clear weapons, Islamic extremism, dictators trampling on human rights committing

lent atrocities and great power autocracies seeking to extend spheres of influence. And

ective multilateral cooperation remains essential to these challenges. But the like-minded

k any collective entity through which they can collaborate.

ll, what about NATO? NATO has served for a long while to promote cooperation among

e-minded allies, and its new strategic concept has recently expanded in scope. But the

oblem with NATO is that its mandate remains limited to defense and security

operation, whereas today's threats and challenges often require a much wider set of

eign policy actions, such as those related to sanctions, foreign assistance and public

lomacy. Other important political objectives as well, such as democracy promotion,

man rights and transnational justice remain largely outside of NATO's purview.

hat about the G-8? Well, as mentioned, the G-8 has sought to remain relevant as a forum

consultation among most like-minded states. But the presence of Russia has rendered it

apable and ineffective on the most critical foreign policy challenges, such as Iran, Syria,

rth Korea and, of course, on issues relating to Russia itself.

with few other options, the U.S. has relied increasingly on ad hoc coalitions and contact

ups. The Friends of Syria, the working group on Iran sanctions, for example, the

oliferation Security Initiative and others provide mechanisms to facilitate cooperation

ong like-minded countries. But though they offer flexibility, these ad hoc coalitions tend

encourage tactical cooperation on isolated issues rather than strategic assessment and

ordination across a range of policy challenges. They also require a greater effort to

tain.

fill this void, I would contend we need a new strategic framework. And that brings us to

notion of the D10. So what is it, who would be in it, and what would it do? Well, the

0, as termed here in this paper, the Democracies 10, would be a new entity aimed atomoting multilateral cooperation.

ho would be in it? Two criteria would guide participation. The first is strategic like-

ndedness. That is, states that share a common worldview, not only in terms of how they

rceive current threats and challenges, but also in their commitment to shared values,

mocracy, human rights and the rule of law, and to preserving and advancing a liberal

rld order.


7/32

d the second is the demonstrated capacity to act on an international scale. So this would

us on states that have the economic and military assets, soft power resources and

lomatic influence that provide them with the capability to act in addressing threats to

bal security and promoting international norms.

if you apply these criteria to countries around the world, the forum here would

compass America's closest strategies partners. From Europe, it would include the United

ngdom, France, Germany, Italy. From the Asia-Pacific region, it would encompass Japan,

stralia and South Korea. And then from North America, Canada and, of course, the

ited States.

th the addition of the EU, the resulting D-10 would bring together a powerful and

mpelling group of like-minded states that account for more than 60 percent of local GDP

d more than three- fourths of the world's military expenditures. There is a chart in front

you that also sort of depicts these states and how they rank, just to get a sense of the

d of power and influence these states have, both in terms of military and economic

pacities.

w, there may be other states, in Europe particularly, that might arguably meet these

teria, and other countries, depending on how large one wanted to make it, could be seen

like-minded and capable. However, I would suggests that the group, at least to begin

h, would need to be -- start out as narrowly constituted in order to maximize its

ectiveness. The larger the group, the more formal its proceedings tend to be, and the

re difficult and time-consuming it is to forge consensus.

what would the D10 do? To succeed, such a framework must have a clearly defined

rpose. To advance the norms and values of a liberal international order, the D10 would

ve three primary functions: one, strategic consultation; two, policy coordination; and

ee, crisis response.

- so in terms of strategic consultation, the D10 would offer a standing framework for

nsultation at the strategic level, allowing the like-minded to collaborate on global

allenges and defining strategies for a rule-based international order, promoting

mocracy, preventing violence against civilians, countering terrorism, defending the global

mmons and the like. The D10 could focus on producing a joint strategy that outlines

orities and sets forth ways that the like-minded could better align resources and addressps in capabilities beforehand.

cond, the D10 could serve as a facilitator of policy coordination on specific challenges

ong the participating countries. Participants could share relevant intelligence and

nsitive information, discuss the merits of various policy options and coordinate

lomatic actions. It could also serve as a core group for broader coalitions of like-minded

tes and a platform to align positions at other international venues such as the U.N., for

ample, or the six-party talks on Korea -- North Korea, et cetera.


8/32

d finally, the D10 could provide a venue to formulate collective responses to future

itical and security crises. In the wake of a new North Korean provocation in East Asia or

Iranian escalation in the Gulf for example, like -- the like-minded could come up

ether through this venue to forge a rapid and unified response.

d when the use of force may be required, the D10 could be of particular value. The U.S.

d its allies, for example, find it necessary to intervene in a future conflict such as Syria

t are unable to obtain Security Council authorization. It could work through the D10 as

alternative venue for joint action. Though certainly wouldn't carry the same legal or

itical weight as the Security Council, a decision by a multilateral venue composed of

mocracies, established democracies, would provide at least some sense of greater

rceived legitimacy.

y decision could -- to use force could then be implemented through NATO or separately

med coalitions of the willing.

nally, let me turn now to sort of the feasibility of bringing this concept into reality. And I

l -- want to point to a diplomatic initiative at -- that the State Department initiated a

w years ago. In 2008 policy planning directors from a group of nine like-minded

mocratic states gathered in Toronto to launch a unique series of official dialogues on

bal security challenges. Not coincidentally, the nine participating states included those

oposed for the D10, minus the EU. Subsequent meetings of this policy planning dialogue

k place annually in Washington and Seoul.

e establishment of this dialogue and its continuity from the Bush into the Obama

ministrations suggests that it is feasible, even with today's emphasis on cooperation

ong emerging powers, to launch a mechanism for coordination among traditional allies.

t it also suggests two other considerations. First, to serve as an effective venue for

ategic collaboration, such a framework must be reinforced at more senior levels and has

be integrated across policymaking channels. And secondly, the ability to sustain this

mework and produce successful outcomes will require and will depend upon U.S.

dership. Allies who are -- continue to look to the United States to assume a coordinating

e and to provide overall strategic direction.

how would we go about establishing a D10? Well, with the policy planning dialogue as andation, the simplest way forward would be to convene a meeting of the D10 at the

eign ministers level to endorse the purposes and mission of this new construct.

ch a meeting could take place without a lot of fanfare, perhaps on the margins of a future

ATO gathering -- NATO foreign ministers' gathering or at the opening session of the

neral Assembly at the U.N. The D10 doesn't require a secretariat, wouldn't need a

rmanent staff or an actual physical location. Instead, like the G-8 and the G-20, states

uld rotate hosting meetings. Leaders' summit meetings would not be essential to the


9/32

ccess of this framework. Instead the goal would be to avoid an emphasis on high-

blicity summits and joint communiques, focusing instead on facilitating behind-the-

nes strategic and policy coordination across diplomatic channels, with foreign ministers

oviding overall guidance and direction.

me conclude with three brief points. First, in launching the D10, we would need to be

eful to guard against, as Stewart mentioned, perceptions of "the West versus the rest."

t there are ways, I think, to ensure that Russia, China and other emerging powers would

t perceive this as an effort to marginalize them in any way.

cond, the D10 is not, certainly, a panacea. The like-minded are not always going to agree.

d as I mentioned, its success will depend on leadership, particularly by the United

tes. But a venue like this would at least serve to encourage greater collaboration than we

ve today on these big strategic issues.

d finally, the D10 would not replace, necessarily, any existing venue. Instead the U.S.

uld continue to cooperate with major powers to expand economic coordination at the G-

It would look to engage China and Russia at the U.N. Security Council and other

nues. It would try to strengthen ties with rising democracies and try to encourage their

entation towards the West, but it would add to this mix a new framework aimed at

epening strategic collaboration with the like-minded.

sum, it may be anachronistic to focus -- it may seem anachronistic to focus on a new

um for engagement with traditional allies. But I think it's an approach that's grounded

the reality of today's world, a world that may be converging around a set of global

nomic norms but one that remains stridently divided on political and security issues

t are at the core of a democratic world order. By providing a platform for strategic

nsultation, policy coordination and joint crisis response, the D10 could provide a

werful complement to the G-20, allowing the U.S. and its like-minded allies to best

anize for the challenges of today's world.

anks.

TRICK: Ash, thank you very much for that very eloquent summary of your -- of your

ument and giving us tons of food for thought. I'm sure many of us are -- have questions

t we're ready to ask.

t first we're going to allow Ash's former boss David Gordon to have his say.

VID GORDON: Well, thank you very much, Stewart.

his on?

TRICK: I believe that they're all on. Yeah, you can pull it a little closer to you.


10/32

RDON: And I want to thank Ash for doing this paper. I think it's a really good paper.

d I'm a big fan of Stewart's program here, and I thank you for hosting us today.

I want to take some of these themes, talk about them, but also raise them up a little bit

terms of how do we think about the world now, and where does this fit with some other

ngs we're doing. And I agree with Ash, you know, sort of 90 (percent) to 95 percent on

h scope and purpose here. But I want to highlight a couple of points.

the first is that in -- this effort that we began at the end of the -- of the last

ministration, I think, was a really significant one.

saw its importance as a matrix mechanism between sort of allies in the trans-Atlantic

na and allies in the trans-Pacific arena where it hadn't always been easy to get those

ether. We used the phrase -- at the time, sort of three phrases here -- Ash has cut it

wn to two -- but we used "the like-minded," "the capable" and "the willing," because you

uld be like-minded and even relatively capable but not willing. And I think this -- Ash

s sort of conjoined those, and I think for the purpose of a title that's fine.

t I worked on two interesting sort of structural architecture issues near the end of the --

he Bush administration. One was this, and one was the G-20. And both of these were in

l senses responses to a much more differentiated world, to a world of rising powers and

a world where the existing mechanisms of collaboration weren't maximizing where we

re going. And I think we've had some interesting experiences coming out of each.

m actually a little bit more critical of the G-20 and what it's achieved. The G-20 did great

ts first year, year and a half, no question, but the G-20 was, I think, thought about in a

y similar to how we were thinking about the major economies meetings that were set up

deal with climate issues.

ese were made -- these were intended to be coalitions of the like -- of the nonlike-

nded, capable and potentially willing. All right? Nonlike-minded, capable, potentially

ling. And I think that in a crisis, as we were in in 2008, we were able to take that

nlike- mindedness and that potentially willing and get something out of it on the G-20. I

nk in the period since 2009, we've seen a lot of atrophy in the G-20. So I don't think

t this notion that we're heading to convergence on the economic side but you have theseproblems on the security side is quite right.

fact, in my view the biggest potential here for a regime- changing coalition of the willing

s in the trade front, and that is the simultaneous opportunities to move forward towards

mpletion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the parallel construction of a U.S.- EU or a

rth America-EU, again, trade agreement that also has regulatory implications for what

es on behind borders. And this is a -- this is big regime-changing coalition of the willing.


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mean, Arvind Subramadian wrote a piece about this earlier this week. He hates it. The

oretical trade economists all hate this because they have this model of universalism here

t, frankly, we can't get to with -- the WTO framework is fundamentally broken, and our

and nobody's going to change it in the way Arvind would like to change it.

hates it, but the -- the theoretical trade economists all hate this because they have this

del of sort of universalism here that, frankly, we can't get to with -- the WTO framework

undamentally broken, and our -- and nobody's going to change it in the way Arvind

uld like to change it.

have now an alternative mechanism, can bring together this giant, essentially, coalition

the willing that has a regime- changing way in a way that really deepens U.S. rules and

rms and can serve, I believe, as a very powerful body that has some of the "this is a club

ant to join" element that the EU had at the end of the Cold War.

t I think the world we're in -- all of this stresses the world we're in now is one in which

t of universalist multilateralism is really a very, very tough row to hoe. And a lot of this

s to do with the rise of what -- Ian Bremmer and I wrote an op-ed piece back in the

ing -- is all these books, articles on the rise of the rest -- we said, no, no, it's not the rise

the rest; it's the rise of the different. And I think the point that Ash was making about

n our -- the democratic developing countries -- they aren't willing to engage in these big

ltilateral efforts, make commitments to them, bind themselves to them. And it's not just

er World War II, we were -- we were restoring and reconstructing allies who were pretty

ch like us.

-- over a very long time, over a very long time, I think a lot of the developing countries

going to -- are going to get there, but in the meantime, I think we -- we're deluding

rselves a little bit in thinking that a lot of the big developing countries, even those that

very democratic, have the level of like-mindedness and willingness to act that make

m viable partners.

d so I think it's in that context that I think the D10 construct, I believe, is a very, very

eful construct.

w I think the key to it, though -- and here's where, if I have a slight disagreement with

h, I -- I'm very wary about the -- using the D10, giving it any legitimating authority. Ink once you start imbibing legitimating authority to this, then it raises all of these red

gs for everybody else in the world.

I think part of the key -- part of the key for the success of the D10 is that it is basically a

an alliance of the most like- minded, the most capable, the most willing, and it's a way to

sure strategic coherence and maximize the synergies and the weight behind those states

a world in which there are all sorts of issues and all sorts of potentially alternative

ances. It -- but it shouldn't -- it's not going to replace other coalitions of the willing.


12/32

the case of Iranian sanctions, we built this incredibly broad coalition of the willing,

luding a lot of countries that we never thought we would be able to get in because we

ectively used financial leverage that we had against them.

are in this -- in this trade world that we're going into, a lot of other countries are going

get into that trade world. So we don't want to set this up as a huge, exclusive club here,

d I don't think you want to push the boundaries of legitimating action. But I think having

completely agree that there's no other venue that enables -- there's no other venue that

ables this strategic collaboration and coherence than something including these states.

w, where's the boundary -- where's the appropriate boundary? Here's a really hard

estion. I mean, you know -- and I remember every time when I was policy planning

ector, you know, that every group you constructed, the group that lies one beyond it is

ways upset, all right? So, you know, the Dutch were unhappy in anything that the

lians were included in; the Italians were unhappy in anything that the Germans are

luded in. The Argentinians absolutely wouldn't abide Brazil having a seat in the Security

mean, this is the nature of this.

d so -- I mean, when we -- when we got to the G-20, the main reason we were able to

to G-20 was because it was a pre-existing organization, right? There was a pre-existing

ance ministers group made up of the G-20.

hat we decided to do was elevate that to a head of state level, right?

I think there is -- and again, it's an argument for more informality -- more informality.

t I think the notion of having a set of countries there with whom the -- and having it

h Atlantic and Pacific and having it -- a set of countries who effectively involve the

jor like-minded allies of the United States as a way to lever and synergize U.S. influence

d responses to actual events is a really, really important case moving forward.

w, I think -- part of where I think we have to go, particularly if we go here -- I have a

ferent pathway in mind for the G-20. I actually think that -- given the impossibility of

curity Council reform that I think the G-20 should actually take on a broader set of

ues. Right now it's totally run by finance ministers. Finance ministers know that if they

broader, their role goes down, and the Treasury Department here -- you know, theyuld hang me by the tree right out in front of their building if they were in here listening.

t I actually believe that you -- that you do desperately need a broader institution that can

ve at least a dialogue of the non-like- minded but potentially capable and potentially

ling.

ain, I don't think the G-20 should be a legitimating authority, but I do think that if you -

you reinforced or expanded the role of the G-20, that would be part of where


13/32

veloping countries and nonlike-minded countries are engaged. I think that would

nimize the kind of blowback around creating the D10 as a concept.

with that, we'll open up the floor to a broader discussion. Again, Ash, thank you very

ch. Ash did a great job in developing this paper, but he did an even better job in putting

ether, with our Canadian colleagues, the first meeting here. And it was really an

ormously, enormously successful event. And thank you so much.

TRICK: Great. I have a number of questions myself, but I'm going to hold off and might

de them in edgewise at different times. Let's start with Henry Nau and then Herman

hen. Let's go -- take them by twos, if we can.

UESTIONER: Thank you. First of all, I find this paper to be very, very useful and very

reshing. Some 10 years or so ago I wrote a book in which I devoted a chapter to the

velopment of a more like-minded, democratic, smaller democratic country sort of

ering group, and I think it's well overdue. I always regretted the downgrading of the G- 7

en it was morphed into a G-8. I understood the reasons for that, to try to include Russia,

t we haven't been terribly successful in that cause. So it's a much more practical way of

nking about leadership in the international system from the standpoint of the United

tes, and it is -- you know, in the end it's inspirational.

we -- if we aren't about building a somewhat stronger and more expansive liberal world

der, I don't know what we're about in our -- other than just simply protecting ourselves,

ich means we would have more a limited hemispheric policy only.

ke the fact, too, that you keep it informal. No secretariat. It should not be -- it should be

invisible as possible, maybe building from the bottom up, as you suggest, with now

ybe foreign ministers meeting on the basis of a policy planning group; that's very, very

eful way to think about it.

might wonder -- I wonder why you hadn't included NATO, maybe a representative from

ATO. You have a representative from the European Union. And the fault, in my mind,

s, OK, you don't want to work through NATO, it's a pretty cumbersome institution now,

t what about a representative that would also then reflect some of the views of the other

mocracies, the smaller democracies?

d the last point I would make is, I'm also very sympathetic to your desire not to

ntralize this thing, that is, not to play it immediately under some sort of a development of

- of a -- of a centralized international institution. I mean, one of our tasks now, it seems

me, is to try to bring conservatives and liberals together on a new consensus on

ernationalism. And you're going to lose the conservatives if you go -- if you go universal

multilateral, and you're going to lose the liberals if you unilateral with the most extreme

t of conservative position. So you got to bring them together, and I think this has a

ance to do that as the basis for American leadership.


14/32

e last point, maybe you ought to think about -- this group obviously should not be

lusive. There should be some sense that it's, in fact, open and eventually bridging to

er countries. And there are a group of -- a group of countries -- maybe even the G-20 is

other organization that you could think about bridging, too -- not immediately, because

not like-minded, but other countries like India, Mexico, Turkey, South Africa -- I mean,

ybe keep in mind the idea that, to the extent that this group could encourage that group

come to this group for consultation and for -- to put questions about, for example, India

the case of sorting of deal with the strategic concerns -- and the Indian Ocean is one --

more open the group -- you would want the group to be to those so-called bridging

untries.

TRICK: Let's go with Herman, and then -- (inaudible) -- and then get back to Ash, and

vid, if he'd have -- like to have some comments too.

UESTIONER: Despite the fact that you -- opposed to have the D10 as virtually invisible

d very low-key, I can't think of anything that would more solidify and expand the

ranoia of Russia and China. And this -- and we need Russia and China for a lot of issues.

r example, international salafism. They're right on track with us on that. There's no

agreement. Secondly, nuclear proliferation, we need both of them on that. Thirdly, we

ed regional stability -- for example, Central Asia and Southeast Asia, (and that ?)

operation on regional stability is really important. So I frankly disagree with the creation

a D10.

condly, even within the D10, we talk about capacity to act on an international scale.

ere's only one country can do that, right? USA. And it's -- and that's -- it'll tell France

d others, well, another bid for hegemony by the U.S. Look at the Gaullists in France.

hat would they say about this stuff? I'm kind of dubious. Thank you.

TRICK: Great. Ash.

IN: Well, thanks, both of you, for your comments and questions. Let's see. Let me first

ct to the small question about NATO.

s. In fact, thinking about who should be at the table, I think it would be very effective to

ve a NATO representative be in the room. I didn't think it would be worth profiling that.mean, it tends to send a signal that this is a military, you know, institution. I don't think

t's the right sort of way of thinking about this construct. But certainly, at times and

ybe as a general matter, you would want to have a NATO representative in the room,

t as you would the EU; you just wouldn't call attention to it.

cond, with regard to opening this up to others, yeah, I would agree with your point that

s shouldn't be seen as a closed group. In fact, the message should be that as countries

come capable and like-minded and willing, this group could be expanded in the future.


15/32

potentially a way of encouraging countries like India and Brazil to step up and play a

re responsible role and become more like- minded over time.

d with regard to the points you raised about will this push away the Russians and

inese, you know, is this the wrong thing to do? Well, I guess my reaction to that -- and I

ve a section in the paper where obviously, you know, this is a discussion and a very

portant consideration because the last thing we want to do is push the Chinese or the

ssians away at a time when we do need their cooperation on a number of important

ues.

t my thought on that is that I don't think that -- well, first of all, I think there's a way to

sent what this is without it being perceived by the Russians and Chinese as some kind of

ort to isolate them or marginalize them. This is one of many institutions through which

U.S. would continue to engage. We have the G-20, and I think whether or not the G-20

ffective, you know, in this realm, it's -- the fact that it's actually -- it's there as the high

le where all of the major countries come together. And we have the U.N. Security

uncil where obviously, the Russians and Chinese are major players. We would need to

ntinue to emphasize their importance and make clear that we're not in any way pulling

ck from our efforts to engage these -- you know, Russia, China and others in these

titutions.

hink that would go a long way, along with just bilateral diplomacy, to give them a sense

comfort that this isn't -- this isn't something that's aimed at them.

condly, I think that the Russians and Chinese are probably -- we may be fearing too

ch about how they would perceive this. They know that we already coordinate with our

es in a number of other ways. You know, we have the P-3 at the U.N. that meets all the

me with -- which excludes the Russians and Chinese -- you know, to come up with policy

ues and coordinate. We meet through NATO, obviously, which, you know, doesn't have

ssia and Chinese as members. We have all kinds of other venues and summits and

cussions, multilateral and bilateral, where we try to coordinate policy with our friends

d allies.

d again, I don't see the Russians on Chinese -- you know, other than perhaps some

tements of regret or whatever, I don't see them reacting in a way that might jeopardize

operation in other places. The Russians and Chinese -- they have an interest inoperating on some of the issues I mentioned, counterterrorism and al-Qaida, certainly on

ost of economic issues. And I think it's unlikely that they would suspend or cut back or

l away from engagement with the U.S. and the West simply because we've now added

other place to go to coordinate with -- you know, with our closest allies.

TRICK: Let me move on now to Kurt Volker and Dan Marklaigon (ph).

UESTIONER: Thank you. A little closer. No, thanks very much. And I want to


16/32

ngratulate Ash for forcing everybody to think, which is good. (Chuckles.) What I thought

out in hearing your presentation and thinking about the structure of it -- I'm very much

out like- mindedness. I'm very much about coordinating with like-minded to tackle

oblems.

t some of my experience just sort of sits in my gut and I think, you know, I'm not so

e about this. One of them is even working with NATO, where we are working on

ional issues with European allies that they have an inherent reason to care about, we

l can't get them to do things that we want to do. (Laughter.) So the idea that we're going

then triangulate that to, you know, some third problem in Asia or the other way around,

re going to get the South Koreans to do something with us in some third part of the --

m just not so sure it's going to work that way.

d I guess my gut feeling is that as a loose -- I'm kind of with David -- with a loose

ordinating mechanism where you can talk to people, it's probably a very healthy thing to

but I would not necessarily look to it as a -- as a group that would take coordinated

ion together, because it's really going to be -- depend much more upon the country's

ional interests and perspectives of what they're willing to invest in and what not, as we

with a lot of our European allies already who are already there.

o other brief comments. One of them -- it's really something to think about leaving

azil and India out off the top of the list from the beginning. You made the point about

couraging them. And it may be that, you know, if you're -- if you did something like this,

u'd want to start by inclusiveness to encourage them rather than by having them feel

y're on the outside. But when you look at the numbers, they really belong in the top

up.

d to take Henry's (sp) point and flip it, rather than add NATO, I'd probably delete the

. (Laughter.) I guess I don't need to explain that. (Laughter.)

RDON: The ambassador -- (inaudible) -- to NATO. (Laughter.)

UESTIONER: Well, I'd be interested some time in the course of the discussion to hear

m Ash and David about how far away they think both India and Turkey are on the

pability, like-mindedness and willingness scale, because I think in both cases, there

uld be good -- great advantages of them being inside the tent.

my main question is, back when there was all the dialogue that Jim Lindsay and Ivo

alder and Bob Kagan raised about a so-called League of Democracies, which was a larger

uping but smaller than the Community of Democracies, the problem being described, as

vid alludes to, was legitimizing. When the Security Council can't do something -- you

ow, bomb Syria to deal with ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and there have been some cases

not being able to do something recently, including on Syria -- so this is not to do that.

u seem to agree. Do we need to find some multilateral locus that is an alternative for


17/32

itimizing use of force if the Security Council falls down?

TRICK: If you could also address from your own experience, is there demand for this

angement among -- when you were doing this, I mean, was there demand to elevate this

ove, you know, periodic -- because we used to have quad meetings or whatever, the

nt, or whatever, begin and then --

R. : Policy planning --

TRICK: Policy planning meetings -- above the policy planning level. Is there demand for

But go ahead.

IN: OK, good. Some very good questions and comments. So -- and I guess the question

wart is asking is maybe similar to both Kurt and Herman's question about our allies,

uld they want to play in a context, would they be interested in such a venue. It's hard

ough, as Kurt said, to get some more allies on board to take actions, you know, in places

ere we think it is. And in fact, the French might thing the other way around.

been hard for them to get us to play effectively on issues like Mali and Syria and Libya,

atever it is.

is there enough potential that this could be actually something value-added? Well, I

nk we could -- one reaction to that is we would -- we should go into, if we decide -- if we

d up pursuing a D10, having realistic expectations about what this is and can be. It's not

solution to producing consensus on all of these major issues. There -- the differences

d different views that allies have will continue to be there. It's just another mechanism

coordination.

t I think what you do, what -- you have a greater hope -- I mean, Mali is an example, I

nk, where it's just the wrong process, it's the wrong way to go about entering a crisis like

s. Wouldn't it have been better to have a venue where you're talking about Mali in the

ntext of the broader effort against al-Qaida as a set of allies that care about this

ategically and then addressing -- you may end up in the same place; maybe France still

es the lead, but you have a way of doing this in a little bit more coordinated and

ategic way, rather than tactically saying: France is going in; who's helping?

I think that's its value.

's see. The question about India and Turkey and then the question about legitimacy --

ll, I think it's pretty clear that given the record of India's, you know, positions on various

ues, that they're nowhere -- well, they're not prepared to step up and take an active role

managing global security and political issues. They for a variety of reasons would rather

e-ride, I think, on other efforts. They still have this nonaligned view and a strong sense

noninterference, and they're very hesitant -- any time there's some, you know, effort at


18/32

ercive diplomacy, they don't feel like they want to get involved.

ey don't have an answer for how to address these kinds of crises.

mean, Libya is a good example. They did -- they did, you know, abstain on the Security

uncil vote but then partially criticized American actions and NATO actions when we

ded up going in to bring down Gadhafi. And I think on issue after issue, you see a lot of

sitation, both India -- I mean, Turkey may be a little bit more willing to play a role on

ues, particularly in their neighborhood. I'm not -- well, I guess you could see a pathway

a country like Turkey or maybe even Indonesia at a more -- you know, they may be a

le bit more like-minded. Certainly they're NATO members. And so, you know, it's

ssible to think about maybe bringing them in earlier in the future.

t I think my point on that would be it's important to start small with what you -- if you

nt this to be an effective mechanism, it needs to be as like-minded as possible at the

tset because the last thing you want to do is make it difficult to get consensus right off

bat, in which case everybody questions its utility from the beginning. I'd rather see it,

u know, just as NATO, you know, started, or even the G-6, G-7, is that you start off with

mall number of countries that can demonstrate that they can act effectively through this

ordinating mechanism, and then perhaps over time that precedent allows you to bring in

ers.

d then -- question about the -- how difficult was -- what were allies interested -- I'll let

vid take a crack at this. My own sense was that there wasn't -- and there were mixed

ws about what this is, what it could be. I think there was a lot of skepticism going into

s as to whether we could even pull this off. Would countries participate in what looks

e a minileague of democracies? Would they come to the table? Could you actually have a

icy -- even a policy planning dialogue?

d I think that experience proved that, in fact, we could, that there -- certainly if the U.S.

cides to play a leadership role in pulling this together and has a strong partner -- in this

e, the Canadians were instrumental when they decided to host the meeting, and they

ntinued to support it along the way -- others didn't want to be left out.

they would -- I think you'd likely to see -- and I -- from the Asia-Pacific side, I think

re was a lot more enthusiasm, because for them to be at the table where discussing bigbal issues, it's very much value-added. And so again, I think it's this -- you'd have some

pticism, but I think you would also probably have some success if it's were -- if it were

en as a serious initiative by the United States.

RDON: Let me -- let me pick up on Ash's final point, because I think when we were

nking about this and creating this, a lot of what drove this was the notion that this

wer shift to the Asia-Pacific and the challenge of rising China and the notion of both

ting our -- getting our European allies into a discussion about China, which is something


19/32

rally at the time, five years ago -- I mean, the European discussion of this was

mpletely immature, Kurt (sp), as you well remember -- and also wanting our Asian allies

think of themselves as not just regional players but as global players -- still a big issue

the United States as we try to play the pivot, because in playing the pivot with our

an allies, we don't want to completely accept their worldview of us as a hedge against

Chinese, because there are larger global issues. And at the end of the day, we need good

ationships both with the Asian allies and we have to have a good relationship with

ina.

t again, I think these are reasons why, to our mind, this made a lot of sense.

t I think all -- a lot of the questions raised -- I think that Hank Cullen's (sp) question on

Russians and the Chinese -- this is one reason -- I mean, the Russians and the Chinese

n't going to like the G-20 going beyond economics because they're permanent members

the Security Council. But I think you get -- you get legitimacy for a D10 by expanding

the G-20 concept. To my mind, those two things are linked.

m -- on this question of legitimacy that Mark (sp) raised, I think that -- I think the

ministration is right in looking to regional organizations as -- and in particular, when

u have very, very strong consensus in regional organizations. I have -- I have a problem

en it comes -- I mean, I think we have to always have the ability, as the United States, to

independently. But I'm very skeptical about a -- having any kind of real legitimacy

forced by, essentially, these kinds of coalitions. I think it's a big problem to go there.

IN: Could I jump in on that? Because I didn't address that, and I think it's important. I

ess I think I have a slightly different view on that because I -- as I mentioned in the talk,

o think there's a place, a role for the D10 in crisis response.

d if there's lack of consensus at the Security Council and you have this group in place

t's ready and willing to step in, I guess I don't see why it wouldn't be prudent to have

ordination on a potential intervention that doesn't have Security Council approval stem

m some kind of legitimating action by the D10. I wouldn't put it at the top of the list of

ngs that it should be doing, and, in fact, it probably would evolve towards that anyways

ce it was in place if we could make a choice as to how we would want to publicize that

nction. But I guess I would be more open to having the D10 play that role.

TRICK: Can I just pick up on that really quickly, on the question of the G-20 adopting a

ater -- a more expansive agenda that conceivably could even get into some of the

itical and security aspects of things? I very much agree with David's analysis. I think it's

ually inevitable that that's going to happen over time just as it happened with the other

.

e one -- the thing that I would suggest is somewhat cautionary note, though, about the

a of the D10 being sort of quite complementary, in a sense, with an expanded agenda of


20/32

G-20 is just this question of whether or not it's good or bad to conceive of having

ucuses within the G-20, because that, of course, is what the creation of a D10 would do.

d, you know, people have already had some concerns about having a really sort of very

vious G-7 caucus within the G-20 and what's the response, then, of course? Is there a

ICS caucus or what have you? Are there particular regional -- I mean, obviously to some

gree you can't help these sorts of things. They -- some of them will develop organically,

t the question is just how obvious and overt you want to have them be.

n we go now to -- is it Tom Williams (sp)? Is that right?

UESTIONER: Yeah.

TRICK: And then Irving Williamson (sp).

UESTIONER: Thanks. Just for Ash, just wanted to tease out the relationship you see

ween capacity and willingness.

mean, you could argue that some of the lessons we learned over the last 10 years

ecifically are towards capacity. We spent a lot of time trying to build capacity, but as you

k at the list of countries here in the D10, capacity's going down, very much tied to

nomic malaise and challenges. So do you see that willingness is tied to capacity?

d then also challenging the idea -- you spoke to the feasibility -- really, the sustainability

hat goes back to the idea of capacity. I mean, how do we sustain this? I mean, that's

at we've learned. Sometimes these actions are 10, 12, 15 years, and as the -- as the

ure of these policies change, how do you sustain some of these ideas that are very

portant?

you know, could you speak to me that -- really the idea of capacity, willingness -- as we

cline in capacity, how will we stay will (sic)?

TRICK: A great question.

. Williamson.

UESTIONER: Thank you. Sorry.

ually, I want to pick up on the point that Tom Williams (sp) made about -- in thinking

out this, I see one of our policy goals should be to expand the number of countries that

, you know, capable -- have strong, functioning democracies, pursue open economic

icies. And I'm not sure -- and what concerns me is this idea -- we're creating an

clusive club here, and all the folks that we really need to be working on to get them to

ve these basic policies are going to be turned off by it.


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mean, so I can see having -- if there are areas where we aren't sufficiently coordinating,

n't have the mechanisms to coordinating on -- in broader groups -- I mean, we have the

CD; we have, you know, a range of different like-minded coordinating bodies now and -

ou know, usually made up of the experts in the field. But I think in -- when I'm thinking

out trying to expand, particularly -- not so much the military intervention and things,

panding, you know, as I said, democracy, economics and all that, I -- I'm concerned

out this approach.

e first thing -- when you first started talking, the first thing I thought about was, when I

st started working at the GATT, one of the things that -- or working with the GATT, one

the things I really liked -- this is a body of sinners.

erybody recognizes that they're sinners, and their goal is to try to work together, criticize

ch other so they all become better.

d to the extent that we want to get a club where some folks are going to say, oh, the

ite man's burden, you know, all that colonial stuff -- that's what -- that's what worries

about, say -- particularly taking this form all too publicly.

d in terms -- to Mr. Gordon's point about the Trans-Pacific Partnership, partnership

h the EU, I still think the ultimate goal and the biggest payoff is going to come -- we

ve forward and get, you know, new trade rules, strengthen trade rules, experiment in

w you do things in regulatory coordination, stuff like that. But the ultimate benefit is

t we are able to take it to a multilateral body, that we bring in those countries where we

ed to strengthen those rules. So those are my comments on it.

UESTIONER: Stewart, could I have a two-finger --

TRICK: Sure, of course, George.

UESTIONER: -- because I just -- (inaudible) -- just echoes that because that was the

ncern that I have all along here is that, you know, the goal when we set out to do this was

how do we expand that community of liberal democracies, like-mindedness, and

refore translate that into the larger multilateral organizations so that we shift the

namics of those organizations and thereby create a body of like- minded countries that is

re likely to legitimate the kinds of actions that we want to take in the world. And I don'thow this initiative advances that goal.

TRICK: Great. Please, respond.

IN: Yeah. Good, well, let me jump right in on that one because I think it goes to the

art of what this is about. In fact, this is all about expanding the democratic, liberal world

der, and I can't see how bringing in countries to a discussion where you're essentially

oling them to join you in various initiatives worldwide is going to lead to a more


22/32

mocratic world order or a larger group of capable democracies.

fact, this is the way to pursue that goal. You have -- if you have a set of strong and

pable powers that agree in the goal of getting more countries around the world to

come democratic and to have more capable and stable democratic systems, you have to

ve a place where you can talk about how to achieve that goal. And I guess I can't see -- I

an, we have today already, as we've mentioned -- we have clubs of inclusive institutions

t look diverse and have all of the major players and makes us feel good that everybody's

ing around the table, but effectiveness is simply -- you know, these institutions have not

monstrated that they can be effective in advancing the very kinds of goals that you just

ked about. So that's where I think it's -- I think that's where the benefit of a venue like

s is.

th regard to your question on willingness -- well, yeah, certainly I agree with David and

point about willingness being a criteria. I think it almost is implicit that you're not

ng to have unwilling partners join a construct like this. It's part of being -- you know,

ited and interested in a venue like this is that you would need to be willing. But I guess

t could be made explicit. And I think willingness and capacity are certainly related. A

aller country without the capability to act is probably not going to be as willing to

gage globally and is not going to want to expend resources to do that. So, certainly I

nk they're connected.

RDON: Can I just make a very brief comment here, because I'm -- I'm not

sympathetic at all to the issues that you raise, Mr. Williamson, and Ambassador Moose,

d I think that's why to my mind, I think having this informality and not trying to imbue

s with any legitimating function is important.

t I think having a -- having a place where you can have a real strategic dialogue among

es at a -- at a global level, which is something that we still really don't have in NATO

d we don't have in the Pacific, that -- that's the aim here.

d I agree with Ash that it's obviously that the United States, if we were in a circumstance

being in a situation where we felt there was an overwhelming argument for intervention

a context where you -- for various reasons you couldn't get the Security Council to go

ng, these are certainly the countries that we would call on to work with us. But that's

ferent from saying that we would use the existence of the group to legitimate that and toand that's where I -- I mean, I think once you start talking about that legitimation, the

malism that comes with that, that's what's going to get the Russians and the Chinese

lly upset, right?

I think that there's a fine line. And it's the balance between legitimacy and efficiency,

re. There's a trade-off between legitimacy and efficiency. And this is a construct that

re really utilizing to maximize efficiencies, in many ways, among our most like- minded

es.


23/32

have to do so in a way that minimizes loss of legitimacy. And so that's the trick in

ting the balance right on this.

TRICK: OK, we've got a number of cards that just (got off ?), so I'm going to have to --

h your indulgence, so I'm going to take four in a row here, and then I'm going to take

last four.

's start -- we'll go with Michael, then with Fred, then Amitai (ph) and Dan.

UESTIONER: I want to -- I want to expand on a throwaway line that Kurt (sp) provided

at the very end of his comments, and that has to do with the EU, because I'm skeptical

out the EU's being in this group at all and wonder whether it shouldn't be a D9 rather

n a D10. And I come to this from actually the same place that Irving (sp) raised and

me from -- with my own interest in international trade that David seems to be pushing

positively toward as being skeptical about whether the EU would maintain the same

d of interest that we would like to see, because the EU, in my experience, pushes for

versalism, is concerned about India and Brazil beyond what they ought to be. And I

nder whether they don't -- and they also are not much of a military factor at all. My own

ncern is that the EU is the wrong group to include in the D10.

TRICK: Thank you.

ed, I believe you were next.

UESTIONER: Yeah, thanks. I also think this is a great service because it puts up for

ument an idea that's even worse than Ivo Lederer's "Axis of Ivo" -- (laughter) -- because,

mean, part of it depends on what you think the big agenda is for multilateral

laboration.

d to me, in a world where the big problems are going to be around natural assault,

berassaults, robotic assaults, this group -- you know, pulling together this sort of

rthern Alliance of geriatric democracies -- (scattered laughter) -- with the idea that

y're going to somehow facilitate better multilateral collaboration around these problems

mean, this -- it reminds me of Bicker at Princeton, where, you know, everybody tried to

t of get with the people they felt most comfortable with and most alike at a universityere you're supposed to be learning about people who aren't like you and working

ectively with people who aren't like you.

e instinct was let's be like-minded; let's gather together.

d I think there's a diplomatic analogy there: The United States is a lazy multilateral

yer. And we can't afford to be anymore, as we've lost our dominance in lots of other

tors. We've got to be more effective in negotiation and compromise.


24/32

u know, we won't find like-mindedness on every problem, and that's the whole point.

d so if you start creating a structure of multilateralism that creates clubs that make other

ople think they've got to create their own clubs so they feel better about themselves, it

t doesn't seem to have the right set of dynamics for addressing the problems we've got.

TRICK: Thank you. Amitai (ph).

UESTIONER: One-line observation, then my question. Herman Cohen (sp) mentioned

lier that only one of these nations was globally capable, so I understand that during the

yan operation, the French general called our head of the Air Force and said, you know,

m very embarrassed, but a few weeks into the operation we ran out of bombs; can you

e me 300 bombs? And the Air Force general picked up his phone and said, Jimmy (sp),

e him 3,000 bombs. (Laughter.) And then just after this Gates said the Europeans verge

irrelevance. And these are the most capable people of it.

-- but my question is, you referred to privileged spheres of influence.

d it wasn't clear if you're for or against them. Are you for us having them and the

inese not having them?

TRICK: (Chuckles.) OK. I believe Henry Stimson called that our little area over here that

body else has ever bothered about, right?

K, last, in this round, Dan Nelson.

UESTIONER: Thank you very much. Ash, I, like many people around the table, what to

ngratulate you for -- who said this? -- making us think. You know, this is a big idea, and

ideas are always important. I just have two problems: like-minded and highly capable.

aughter.)

u know, I think back to Suez. I'm old enough to remember that, OK. And gosh, there

sn't much like-mindedness then; there wasn't much like-mindedness in Iraq either; and

ou talk to some of the Germans, not too much like-mindedness about Afghanistan

her. And, you know, this comes very close, Ash, to saying, you know, democracy means

e-mindedness. And I just don't think that. I mean, that's the Kantian notion. And I knowu were already -- that comment has already been made, but -- and the democratic peace

tion and so on that was an industry in political science for about 25 years.

t as far as capability -- this was already mentioned, I think, in David's comment about

lingness. You know, it's not just capability in terms of military or economic resources;

also the political and economic -- political and social consensus that has to be available

order to fashion action. So I'm sure that as you develop this paper you'll take care of all

that. And I have not -- outside of the quick summary by Stewart, I haven't really read the


25/32

per in its initial form.

t I do think that both of those concepts need to be refined and need to be made more

pirically verifiable. So I'll leave it at that. Thanks.

TRICK: If you could limit your responses to reasonably concise statements, that would

great.

IN: Sure. OK, let me pick up on the last one quickly. Democracy, you said, means like-

ndedness. I think, in fact, this is sort of pushing back against the notion that just because

u're democratic means you're like-minded. That was the league of democracies notion.

is is not that. This is a very small set of countries that -- a specific criteria is strategic

e-mindedness, countries who share a set of values and interests and are capable and

ve demonstrated that they're willing and interested in taking on global challenges. So I

nk that's what differentiates it from some of these other proposals.

garding Mr. Tipson's (sp) comment about is this the right way to engage in today's

rld, well, I don't think this is -- and again, I've tried to make the theme of the paper, it's

t exclusive. We would continue to maintain outreach and engagement with all of the

wers that we've been engaging with to address the threats like cybersecurity or terrorism,

ere the Russians are somewhat more supportive. Whatever the various issues are, if

re's a venue -- if we can work through inclusive venues, we should.

t I think where this is intended to fill the gap is those issues where it is not -- simply not

ssible and not going to be possible. No matter how much you beg and plead with the

ssians to help on Syria, you know, it's just -- there's a different worldview that's

tivating a lot of their actions. We can continue to try it, and we can, but I don't think

t should stop us from looking to have a place where we can coordinate more effectively

h our allies.

d on that note, we're doing it anyways in smaller ways. We're reaching out from time to

me to the French and the Brits and smaller groups here and there sort of on an ad hoc

sis where -- when we can't get consensus, you know, at the Security Council and

ewhere. All we're doing here is providing a more strategic venue to accomplish those

me goals and bringing in our other trans-Pacific partners who are very often just simply

luded from the discussion.

d then with regard to the question on privileged spheres of influence, I think Stewart

sed this a little earlier in one of my drafts. No, I think there's a different -- I mean, I

ess what I am getting at is when the Russians and Chinese talk about privileged spheres

nfluence, they mean they're going to essentially have a relationship with these

vernments where it's their people in charge, it's not -- these aren't countries that are --

se aren't democratically elected governments that are choosing what relationships they

nt to have with Russia and China. It's their -- you know, it's their privilege. The West


26/32

d no one else has a -- has the right to speak about what kind of government and what

d of policy these countries should adopt. I don't -- I don't think that's the way we see our

e, even in Latin America or elsewhere.

d finally, with regard to the EU, well, you know, I think there's a question about what

e could the EU play. I was thinking of it more as the role they play in the G-20 where an

rep is essentially there to participate. It's important to have since you can't bring in a

of these small, like-minded European countries because it would be too big but you do

nt them on board for sanctions issues and other actions at the front end if you can't. So I

nk having the EU be part of the discussion at the beginning just provides a way to bring

m in without having a great deal of expectation about, you know, what role they would

ually play.

TRICK: Great. Hans (sp) and then Mr. Olivant (sp) and then Edith (sp), Steve (sp), and

ctually now see -- Dick Solomon (sp) has raised his placard as well.

we're going to go with five here -- (chuckles) -- and then we'll close it out after the

mments here.

UESTIONER: Thank you, Stewart. Ash, thank you for creating a very stimulating

cussion here. I just fear, however, that the more that I listen to this, the more concerns

raised in my mind about the idea, because I don't think it does address the problems

t we face in the world today. I agree with Fred, and I'd just amplify on those a bit. And I

o think it creates new problems with existing structures.

me, in addition to the cyber and other issues that Fred talked about, our problems today

in the greater Middle East and South Asia. And given the nature of those problems, the

utions do not lie in imposition from the outside. They lie in dealing with those regions

mselves and finding partners in those regions that can help us solve those problems.

herwise, it looks like imposing from the outside.

d the second cluster of problems we have deal with China and, to a lesser degree,

ssia. And I don't think we are properly structured to deal with the emerging concerns

d challenges that China presents to us, but this is not the answer to that. I don't think

u rely on Germany, for example, to lead in dealing with a growing set of challenges from

ina. We probably need a new security architecture in Asia to deal with that. But this ist that.

that's on the problem side -- on the not solving the kinds of problems that we face side.

t on the other side, I am concerned that this would undermine NATO. You talk about

ATO being sort of the executing body, potentially, for not decisions but conclusions --

audible) -- by this group.

t think about NATO. It's a consensus organization. It wants to be in on the ground floor.


27/32

wants to be part of the decision-making process. I just fear that you would have an

dermining effect within NATO itself, and that's currently our best instrument to deal

h a lot of these problems.

d then to Hank's point, not only would I think it would drive China and Russia away, it

uld drive them together, and that's not what we want.

TRICK: Thanks, Hans (sp).

UESTIONER: I like this concept, but I think we need to just accept up front this is going

be uncharitably described as old Europe plus English-speaking peoples, plus the

merly occupied.

to counter that characterization, I think it would be -- I think it would strengthen the

per if you were to think about other countries in maybe concentric circles around the

0. As David said, the next circle is going to be those who didn't make the cut. And

y're going to come in different flavors. You know, the Dutch didn't make the cut kind of

cause of you did an arbitrary cut line. Personally, I'd trade -- I'd swap the Dutch for the

lians, but that's just me. (Laughter.) You know, the Romanians don't make the cut

cause, you know, they're like-minded and they're very, very, very willing; they're just not

pable. (Laughter.) So you know, you're going to have to manage that group and figure

what they want and don't want.

ould share Mr. Cohen's (sp) concerns about, you know, the two countries on the outer

ncentric circle, the Russian, the Chinese, although they clearly know where they stand

h us. This is not going to be news to them.

UESTIONER: Right.

UESTIONER: My concern would be the bodies in between. What is -- is there a

ssibility that this is going to re-energize some type of new nonaligned movement that the

azilians, the Indians --

R. : Turks.

UESTIONER: -- the Turks will see a -- you know, they realize they're probably -- they'rever going to get into this club.

ey really don't want to be in this club. Is this going to bind them together and then

tentially push them closer to the outer ring?

TRICK: Thanks. Edith (ph).

UESTIONER: This is set in the context of democracy and justice and the rule of law, but I


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ven't heard the word law used here -- (chuckles) -- so I'm going to ask about what you

as the implications for international law, and particularly with the legitimating function

bypass the U.N. Security Council for intervention in times of crisis. Mali, France was

ited in. In Libya, it was the Arab League, U.N. Security Council. In Kosovo, no, but there

s a legitimating Security Council resolution, arguably, afterwards. So my question to you

what has been your analysis on the assumptions on what it does for international law?

d tied in with that is a second question. If I take 10 years, 20 years down the pike, is this

recedent that we could see others picking

cfr pushing a liberal world order

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