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CHALLENGER DISASTER 1 Roger Boisjoly-The Challenger Disaster Abdul Muqtadir Ansari [1559940] Fairleigh Dickinson University

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CHALLENGER DISASTER 1

Roger Boisjoly-The Challenger Disaster

Abdul Muqtadir Ansari [1559940]

Fairleigh Dickinson University

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Table of Contents

1. Abstract

2. Thesis Statement

3. Introduction

4. Whistle Blowing [ Methods and dissents]

5. Results of Whistle Blowing

6. Justification of the dissents

7. Conclusion

8. References

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Abstract

This case study mainly focuses on the Roger Boisjoly's attempt to prevent the launch of

the Challenger and subsequent quest to follow Boisjoly's experiences before and after the

Challenger disaster raise numerous ethical issues that are integral to any explanation of the

disaster and applicable to other management situations. Underlying all these issues, Boisjoly was

targeted and was blamed for not whistle blowing before the launch of the challenger Shuttle. So

in this analysis, I will explain the reality and will answer the critics who were against Roger

Boijoly. “In analyzing this fundamental issue, this paper has two objectives: first, to demonstrate

the extent to which the ethical ambiguity that permeates the relationship between individual and

organizational responsibility contributed to the Challenger disaster; second, to reclaim the

meaning and importance of individual responsibility within the diluting context of large

organizations.” (Browning, Larry D. 1988, p. 211-227)

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Roger Boisjoly-The Challenger Disaster

After reading and analyzing in depth about the Challenger Disaster case, I agree with

the action taken by Roger Boisjoly case of the Challenger Disaster. At every step, he tried to

whistle blow whenever it was possible for him to do it. He also protested at the later stages

of launching of the shuttle. The main reason I support him is because, during the earlier

stages of development of the shuttle, at every point, where ever he felt, he cautioned his

senior authorities about the risks and dangers associated with the mechanism of the shuttle

and he didn’t stop and continued his protest at all stages in the development of the shuttle.

This is because of his ethical values and having a fear of loss of life of crew members, he just

tried to save humanity, he risked his career and livelihood only to prevent any fatal accident

and hence this proves that whatever Roger Boisjoly did was ethically right and in turn his

whistle blowing changed the future towards the safe side for the future generations to be

associated with it for a better tomorrow.

Roger Boisjoly didn’t loose his ethical values. Boisjoly did everything he was

ethically obligated to do, by speaking out at every possible level and from time to time

expressing his strong concerns and, at the end, his strong feelings against the launch. His

ethical values urged him to protest and caution NASA about the safety concerns associated

with the launch of the shuttle, even during Discovering Leaks in the Primary Seal, O- ring

problem or the unfavorable weather condition during the launch of the shuttle.

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Introduction

Definition of whistle-blower

“Whistle-blowers are seen as people who "sound an alarm from within the very

organization in which the work, because of a threat to public interest". The article "Whistle-

blowing and Trust: Some Lessons from the ADM Scandal " focuses on the question of

personal, corporate, and public trust.” [NC State University]

On 28 January, 1986 the Challenger space shuttle blew up 73 seconds after launch. 7

lives and three billion dollars worth of equipment were lost. The Challenger accident was the

result of a faulty sealing system which allowed exhaust flames from the Solid-Fuel Rocket

Boosters (SRB) to vent directly to the external tank, rupturing the tank and causing the

explosion. NASA identified the failure due to the improper sealing of the O-rings, the giant

black rubber loops that help seal the segments of the SRBs. The O-ring is made of a

fluoroelastomer, which seals the joint between two solid rocket booster sections. An

elastomer is a material that can be deformed dramatically and recover its shape completely.

A rubber band is an example of an elastomer.

Concerns were being voiced by Roger Boisjoly of Thiokol, the SRB manufacturing

company from time to time, as to whether the fatal launch should have taken place. The cold

weather, some of the coldest in Florida history, provided uncharted waters for the operation

of the SRBs. So in this case, we will try to get a clear picture about the role played by Roger

Boisjoly and to what extend he was responsible for the disaster and indeed whether he was

late in whistle blowing or not. All of these things will be discussed in our case.

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Whistle Blowing [Methods of disagreement and dissent]:

“Three things are required for whistle-blowing to occur in organizations:

wrongdoer(s) who commit the alleged wrongdoing; whistle-blower(s) who observe the

wrongdoing, define it as such and report it; and recipient(s) of the report of wrongdoing. In

other words, whistle-blowing is a dynamic process involving at least three social actors, each

of whom takes actions in response to the others. Whistle-blowing is in fact a series of steps,

as we saw in the case of Mr. Whitacre, where each player takes actions, possibly over a

number of years (Dozier & Miceli, 1985). At any point, then, decisions are made and

tradeoffs considered that causes variation in the process. As a result, no whistle-blowing case

can be described as typical.

“Elsewhere we have defined whistle-blowing as: "the disclosure by organization

members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of

their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action." (Near &

Miceli, 1985, p. 4). Although this definition has been widely used, by ourselves (Miceli &

Near, 1992) and others (e.g., Brewer & Selden, 1995; Perry, 1992), there are several

elements of it that are controversial (Near & Miceli, 1987), each of which we consider.

Further, we attempt here to determine the extent to which the definition can be improved

through consideration of other disciplines' perspectives.” [Near, Janet P., Miceli, Marcia, 96]

To start off with, in the early stages of the development of the shuttle, Roger Boisjoly

found out certain defects and errors in the hardware of the shuttle. It is evident from his

statement published by himself in a seminar 20 years after the disaster of the Challenger

shuttle. “The significance of starting with January, 1985, results from my observations made

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during the post flight inspection of hardware from Flight 51C which was launched on

January 14, 1985. I found that hot combustion gases had blown by the primary seals on two

field joints and had produced large arc lengths of blackened grease between the primary and

secondary seals. Subsequent to reporting my findings, I was ordered to MSFC to present a

preliminary report prior to formal FRR meetings.

I participated in the formal FRR's for flight 51E which was scheduled for an April

launch. The presentations were given at MSFC in February at three successively higher level

review boards with exclusions and refinements in content made at each board level. I spoke

about my belief that the low ambient temperature prior to launch was responsible for such a

large witness of hot gas (approximately 5500 °F [3040 °C]) blow-by but NASA Program

Management insisted on that position being softened for higher and final review board

presentations. The ambient temperature was 18 to 22 °F (-8 to -6 °C) several days prior to

launch and in the 60 - 65 °F (16 to 18 °C) range at launch time and resulted in a seal

temperature of 53 °F ( 12 °C) -which was calculated after the damage was found.” ( Boisjoly,

May’06).

This was during the early 1985 where he cautioned the management about the

problem with the hardware, there was another scenario where Boisjoly wrote in the form a

letter complaining about the O-Ring problem, it is quite evident from the following: “Again,

my concern about the joints increased due to the lack of attention being given to this problem

by MTI. My notebook entry on August 15,1985 reads as follows: "An attempt to form the

team (I was referring to the SIRM Seal Erosion Task Team) was made on 19 July 1985. This

attempt virtually failed and resulted in my writing memo 2870:FY86:073. This memo finally

got some response and a team was formed officially. The first meeting was held on August

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15, 1985 at 2:30 p.m." The memo I referred to is the one I wrote to the Vice President of

Engineering at MTI on July 31, 1985. The memo was stamped COMPANY PRIVATE by

my boss and had a very limited distribution until I read it to the Presidential Commission on

February 25, 1986. The memo reads as follows:

"Subject: SRM O-Ring Erosion/Potential Failure Criticality. This letter is written to

ensure that management is fully aware of the seriousness of the current O-ring erosion

problem in the SRM joints from an engineering standpoint. The mistakenly accepted a

position on the joint problem was to fly without fear of failure and to run a series of design

evaluations which would ultimately lead to a solution or at least a significant reduction of the

erosion problem. This position is now drastically changed as a result of the SRM 16A nozzle

joint erosion which eroded a secondary O-ring with the primary O-ring never sealing."

"If the same scenario should occur in a field joint (and it could), then it is a jump ball

as to the success or failure of the joint because the secondary O-ring cannot respond to the

clevis opening rate and may not be capable of pressurization. The result would be a

catastrophe of the highest order--loss of human life." ”. ( Boisjoly, May’05).

So from the above two statements made by Roger Boisjoly, we can conclude that

indeed he was worried about the life of people associated with the shuttle and thus proves

that ethically he was right and he showed his dissent in this way.

Let us now consider the ways Roger Boisjoly showed his dissent, both before ad after the

disaster of the Challenger Shuttle .Firstly, “ Thompson has identified and discussed four

distinct types of dissents. They are as follows:

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1) Protesting “within the organization”, while still doing one’s job

2) Expressing disagreement “outside the organization”, while continuing to do one’s job

3) The “open obstruction of policy”

4) “Covert obstruction” (e.g. Leaks).”[Thompson, p. 557-559 ].

From this, we can understand that, in Roger Biosjoly’s case, the first and second one

will be, i.e protesting within the organization while still doing one’s job during the

development process of the shuttle and the second one will be after the aftermath of the

shuttle, partially while he was still in the organization and after being outside the

organization.

In the beginning, it is quite evident that when it was discovered about the leaks in the

primary seal, Roger Boisjoly reported this to his supervisors and he was told to ignore the

problem. This type of dissent can be classified in the first form of dissent mentioned by

Thompson, i.e protesting within the organization while still doing one’s job. In the later

cases, i.e. when he met Arnie Thompson to discuss the blow-by scenario and the effect of

cold temperature on O-ring resiliency, again in this case too he was asked to soften and

ignore it.

As we can see from time to time, Roger Boisjoly along with his team were showing

concern, not for name or fame, but to protect the lives of the people involved with it. He even

wrote memos and gave presentations on the same, explaining them in detail, but to no avail.

The only reason I think he didn’t whistle blew the situation can be due to the fact that, he was

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not having solid full proof evidence for the same. Even during the time of the launch of the

shuttle, Roger and his team again recommended not to launch the shuttle and that too in the

bad weather which was again overlooked and finally the disaster which could have avoided,

occurred and thus took the lives of the crew members and thus reducing the value of life

which is unethical. If you look at this article, you will be more convinced about the efforts

and the dissent showed by Mr. Roger “Mr. Boisjoly worked for 27 years in the aerospace

industry. But it was one night and one moment that stood out. On the night of Jan. 27, 1986,

Mr. Boisjoly and four other Thiokol engineers used a teleconference with NASA to press the

case for delaying the next day’s launching because of the cold. At one point, Mr. Boisjoly

said, he slapped down photos showing the damage cold temperatures had caused to an earlier

shuttle. It had lifted off on a cold day, but not this cold.

“How the hell can you ignore this?” he demanded. At first this seemed persuasive,

according to commission testimony. Makers of critical components had the power to

postpone flights.

Four Thiokol vice presidents, all engineers themselves, went offline to huddle. They

later said that they had worried they lacked conclusive data to stop a launching that had

already been postponed twice. They thought the naysayers might be operating on gut

reaction, not science.

Jerry Mason, Thiokol’s general manager, told his fellow executives to take off their

engineering hats and put on management hats. They told NASA it was a go.”[Martin,

February, 2012]

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All these cases and examples can be classified in the first form of dissent classified

by Thompson.

“ The public servant is morally bound, just as are other persons, to tell the truth, to

keep promises, to respect the person and property of others, and to abide by the requirements

of the law.” [Wilibern, Y. (1984).] After the disaster of the Challenger Shuttle, this time

around, Roger Boisjoly went public for the first time openly accusing both his company and

NASA responsible for it. And he has to pay the consequences for it by resigning from the job

after President Ronald Reagan ordered a presidential commission to review completely about

the disaster, in which Boisjoly was one of the witnesses called. He gave explanations about

why he felt the O-rings had failed. After the commission gave its findings, Boisjoly found

himself shunned by colleagues and also by the managers and thus he resigned from the

company. So these are the two types of dissents present in the case and in the coming part of

it, I will talk about the results of those dissents.

Results/Consequences of the dissent shown:

In the case of Roger Boisjoly, there were certain bad effects for both Roger Boisjoly

and for NASA and the companies associated with it in the making of challenger shuttle. Both

whistle-blowers and people accused of wrongdoing suffer whether the allegations are

ultimately sustained or not. Though in our case study, we will throw more light on our main

character, i.e. Roger Boisjoly.

When Roger Boisjoly went public for the first time after the disaster, Mr. Boisjoly

gave the presidential commission who were investigating the disaster internal corporate

documents. The disclosure of the internal memo, which he had written six months before the

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disaster, was a bombshell which exploded on the NASA and the booster manufacturing company

he was associated with. As a result of it, he had to resign from his post and was left jobless and it

affected his livelihood. It was quite evident from the article published below:

“ Thiokol cut him off from space work, and he was shunned by colleagues and managers.

A former friend warned him, “If you wreck this company, I’m going to put my kids on your

doorstep,” Mr. Boisjoly told The Los Angeles Times in 1987.

He had headaches, double-vision and depression, he said. He yelled at his dog and his

daughters and skipped church to avoid people. He filed two suits against Thiokol; both were

dismissed.

He later said he was sustained by a single gesture of support. Sally Ride, the first

American woman in space, hugged him after his appearance before the commission.

“She was the only one,” he said in a whisper to a Newsday reporter in 1988. “The only

one.”” [Martin, February, 2012]

But his sacrifices and sincerity paid off and he lived up to his ethics. Because he was

right, much appreciated his efforts and as a result of it he got many recognitions and awards.

“Mr. Boisjoly was awarded the Prize for Scientific Freedom and Responsibility by the American

Association for the Advancement of Science, and spoke to more than 300 universities and civic

groups about corporate ethics. He became sought after as an expert in forensic engineering.”

[Martin, February, 2012]

There was also one more positive result on the whole and it was on the bright side for the

future, an act called “Whistle blower Protection Act of 1989 (Enrolled Bill [Final as Passed Both

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House and Senate]” came into effect and we can say that Roger Boisjoly’s case played a

significant effect for that to happen.

So on the whole, if you look at the brighter side of the world, it played an important role

in everyone’s life in a safe, secure and free tomorrow.

Justification of the dissents:

Different people have different kind of thinking and upbringing. Code of ethics differs

from person to person and from culture to culture. So based on my view, I would appreciate his

actions and the efforts he has put into trying to stop from something bad to happen. Some people

disagree with him that he should have whistled blew earlier before the shuttle was launched, but I

would defend his action by saying that, he maintained a certain code of ethics, followed the rules

and regulations to an extend that it didn’t clash with his own personal values and standards which

he has set for himself. The main important ethical values and moral principles that were at

stake in this case were of not protesting against anything which can cause danger to humanity

in any form. An employee who is working in a company, should follow the standards

maintained by the company, but he should not go against the moral values which are present

in them. The various obligations or responsibilities of Roger Boisjoly were as follows:

1. To fulfill his duties and responsibilities of an engineer by making sure that the job

assigned to him of running the booster was implemented successfully. Ethically

speaking, if we see that what Mr. Roger did was not against the company, but it was

for the betterment of the company, because he was following the safety guidelines

which everyone should follow.

2. He has to obey the orders of the company and listen to them in any situation, but I

would like to defend his actions by saying that he wasn’t rude, he did it in a good

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way, he presented memo, consulted with his senior professionals and cautioned them

in a good way about the worst consequences that could happen if the shuttle was

launched. We can get to know more about it from the following statements:

“ His former employer does not share a Boisjoly's eagerness to discuss his actions and their

meaning. A spokesman for Morton Thiokol declined to comment on any matter relating to

Boisjoly, saying that the subject is closed. But colleagues applaud Boisjoly's efforts to raise

the issue of professional ethics and to stress its importance.

"He's one of a very small group of people who have had the courage of their

convictions," says William Middleton, chairman of the ethics committee for the Institute of

Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). "He took the matter into his own hands and dealt

with it by going public on a whistle-blowing campaign. And now he's sort of blacklisted. For

those of us who do work in the ethics area, he's a hero."

He has turned that experience into a campaign for stronger professional ethics and for the

need to speak out against risk. He visits college campuses about twice a month, where his

message is well-received. "The students see him as a role model," says William Middleton,

chairman of the ethics committee for IEEE USA. "I think he will do a great deal to change the

ethical perspective [of future engineers]."

Regardless of how Boisjoly is ultimately labeled, those like IEEE's William Middleton and

General Motors Corp. Consultant Ron Westrum (see accompanying story), who follow

professional ethics issues, says that society needs these so-called Chicken Littles. "I would

encourage people to be courageous, even if the penalty is stiff," says Westrum.”

[Pennisi, January, 1990]

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So from all the above points mentioned along with the references given, I can

conclude that Roger Boisjoly was a good nature person who had many good qualities and

was obliged to many ethical values and hence he should be given respect according to the

work and sacrifices he has done to abide by good ethical values.

I don’t think so that Roger Boisjoly should have acted differently as because during

the time of protest, he was not having a solid proof which could have made them understand

It. I would defend him by mentioning the fact that NASA and his company were just busy to

make the shuttle ready for the launch and ignored many of his warnings and also told him to

keep quiet in that case. I can justify his point with the following statements: “According to

the hierarchical model, responsibility for political outcomes falls on the person who stands

highest in the chain of authority.”[ Thompson, Page 906, Dec, 1980]. That is why in my eyes

Roger Boisjoly was a hero because of his never dying attitude towards the right thing.

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Conclusion

To conclude, I would like to salute Roger Boisjoly for his sincere efforts he put in to

save humanity while being at work and also after resigning from the company, he played a

very important role in spreading awareness about workplace ethics and how one should act in

any kind of situation and live a life with the head always towards the sky. He is a role model

to many people and brought awareness among people to protest against the wrong. To finish

my essay, I would like to share few points mentioned about him below:

Professor Liam Donaldson, the chief medical officer for England’s National Health

System, wrote,

We should “applaud heroes, and hope they are among us, but to base our hope of

remedy in ordinary systems on the existence of extraordinary courage is insufficient.”

I pretty much scoured the literature, and no one addresses whistle-blowing, ostracism

and suicide.  No one addresses the life ruination, the total and complete losses, and the

resultant world goes on while leaving the whistle-blower (and surviving family, if any) in

literal limbo.

And really, it’s the perfect crime.  Because it’s like a Holmes’ dog that didn’t bark. 

No one notices the absence of whistle-blowers.  No one sees them missing in group photos,

nor misses their names in employee recognition events, nor has any notion at all about their

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well-being. Much better than Jimmy Hoffa’s demise with that pesky media and all keeping

his name alive and the issues addressed.

Whistle-blowers are disappearing much more cleanly and completely than any CIA

black site prison. The torture leaves no mark.” [Berkes, 1987]

References

1. “Interpreting the Challenger Disaster: Communication under Conditions of Risk and

Liability.” Published by Browning, Larry D. 1988. Organization Environment 2 (3):

211227.

2. "Pre-Disaster Background (Ethical Decisions - Morton Thiokol and the Challenger

Disaster)" Online Ethics Center for Engineering, 5/15/2006. 

3. “The Possibility of Administrative Ethics,” Public Administration Review, published

by Dennis Thompson on September/October 1985, 45 (5), 555-561.

4. “ Whistle-blowing: Myth and Reality.” Published by: Near, Janet P., Miceli, Marcia

P., Journal of Management, 01492063, 1996 Special Issue, Vol. 22, Issue 3

5. “ Roger Boisjoly, 73, Dies; Warned of Shuttle Danger” published by Douglas Martin

Published on February 3, 2012. Retrieved from :

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/us/roger-boisjoly-73-dies-warned-of-shuttle-

danger.html?_r=0

6. “Challenger's Whistle-Blower: Hero And Outcast” published by Elizabeth Pennisi on

January 20, 1990 retrieved from :

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http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/10849/title/Challenger-s-

Whistle-Blower--Hero-And-Outcast/

7. “Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands” published

by Dennis F. Thompson, Page 905 of 905-916 retrieved from

http://www.jstor.org.libaccess.fdu.edu/stable/1954312

8. Wilibern, Y. (1984). Types and Levels of Public Morality. Public Administration

Review, 44 (2), 102-108.

9. “Whistle-blowing” by NC State University retrieved from :

http://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu/basics/whistle/study.php

10. “The only one” published by Howard Berkes in 1987 retrieved from

: http://incompatiblewithlife.wordpress.com/2012/02/04/the-only-one/