challenges to human security in complex situations: the case of conflict in the southern philippines

8/3/2019 Challenges to Human Security in Complex Situations: The Case of Conflict in the Southern Philippines

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Edit ors

Merlie B. MendozaVictor M. Taylor

CHALLENGES

to HUMAN SECURITYin COMPLEX SITUATIONS

THE CASE OF CONFLICT IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINESTHE CASE OF CONFLICT IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES


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Editors

Merlie B. Mendoza

Victor M. Taylor

A PUBLICATION OF THE ASIAN DISASTER REDUCTION AND RESPONSE NETWORK

Challenges to Human Security

in Complex SituationsThe Case of ConfliCT in The souThern PhiliPPines


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Copyright 2009 Merlie B. Mendoza and Victor M. Taylor

This publication is issued by the Asian Disaster Reduction and Response

Network (ADRRN) for general distribution. All rights are reserved.Reproduction is authorized, except for commercial purposes, providedADRRN is acknowledged.

First of the ADRRN Publication Series.Made possible with funding support from AusAID.

Editors:Merlie B. Mendoza and Victor M. Taylor

Contributors:Abhoud Syed M. LinggaMerlie B. MendozaRudy B. RodilVictor M. Taylor

Wilfredo M. Torres III


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This book is sincerely dedicated to all humanitarians andpeace workers around the world who relentlessly and

quietly persevere in upholding the respect for humandignity and, together with the communities in conict,pursue just and lasting peace despite the odds.


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Table of Contents

Foreword Datuk Dr. Jemilah Mahmood 7

Introduction Merlie B. Mendoza and Victor M. Taylor 9

List of Maps 11

List of Tables 11

PART I Elements of the Conict Situation in the Philippines

Chapter I. Mindanao : A Historical Overview 15Rudy B. Rodil

Chapter II. State Domain vs. Ancestral Domain in MindanaoSulu 21Rudy B. Rodil

Chapter III. The Bangsamoro under the Philippine Rule 28Abhoud Syed M. Lingga

Chapter IV. Ideology-Based Conicts 38Victor M. Taylor

Chapter V. Letting a Thousand Flowers Bloom: Clan Conicts and their Management 46Wilfredo M. Torres III

Chapter VI. Criminality : Focus on Kidnappings 59Victor M. Taylor

PART II Synthesis

Chapter I. Tying the Strands 70Victor M. Taylor

PART III Conclusion

Chapter I. Humanitarianism in Complex Areas 78Merlie B. Mendoza

Bibliography 91

About the Editors 95

About the Writers 96


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ForewordDR. JEMILAH MAHMOOD

Former Chair of ADRRN and

Former President of Mercy Malaysia Chief, Humanitarian Response Branch,United Nations Population Fund

More and more, humanitarian workerstoday have had to undertake their tasks ofhelping others not just in the face of natural

disasters but in the context of violence andstrife. Increasingly, this violence has personallyaffected humanitarian workers themselves.

While humanitarian workers havetraditionally been accorded protection andrespect for their seless commitment to saveand protect lives, the last two decades haveseen an increase in attacks directed againsthumanitarian workers. One estimate, forexample, cited a 92% increase (practicallya doubling!) of violent attacks against aidworkers over the eight-year period from 1997-2005. Based on a report by the Center forInternational Cooperation and the OverseasDevelopment Institute, for last year alone anestimated 122 aid workers were killed whilein the eld serving others. Around the world,humanitarian workers are being targeted asnever before.

This fact came home painfully to us inthe Asian Disaster Reduction and ResponseNetwork (ADRRN) in September 2008 whentwo of our partners were kidnapped on theisland province of Basilan in the southernPhilippines. Merlie Milet B. Mendoza, afounding and current member of the ADRRNExecutive Committee, along with EsperancitaEspie Hupida of the Nagdilaab Foundation,an ADRRN member, were on their way homefrom meeting with displaced communities in

the interior of Basilan when they were waylaidand abducted by heavily armed men along thehighway (to be identied later as members of

the Abu Sayyaf Group). While they were heldcaptive separately (Espie for 45 days and Miletfor 61 days), each and every one of us, fellow

humanitarian workers across Asia and thePacic, waited in anguish and attempted allmeans to nd a way to secure their safe release.When Espie and Milet were later released ondifferent periods, we all breathed a sigh ofrelief only to learn that kidnappings of otheraid workers ensued.

My colleague Takako Izumi, Coordinatorof ADRRN, and I traveled to Manila shortlyafter Espie and Milets release to meet them.It was a reunion lled with tears and comfort,for both sides. As the stories of their captivitywere related to us painfully, through thenights and days we spent together, it becamevery clear that the time was right to addressthe issues surrounding the chronic conictand humanitarian crisis in the SouthernPhilippines. There were lessons to be learnt andshared with other humanitarian workers in theregion in particular, but also those working in

other complex crises globally.

As the reality of narrowing humanitarianspace confronts each and every humanitarianworker today, this book hopes to address someof the issues surrounding how we should doour work in order to provide support andassistance to the affected communities whilstattempting to protect those working on the

eld. How do we nd that delicate balance?

What is clear is the need to fully understandthe context, which is no less than complex, the

challenges, perceptions and realities, and the


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need to engage in a way that is unique to thecommunities at risk.

The ADRRN is proud to share this therst of a number of publications, which we

feel is essential for the region, with voices fromthe people who come from Asia, work amongcommunities in Asia and understand Asianculture and values. And more importantly,as Milet and Espie show us, to attempt totransform one horric experience to somethingthat would benet other humanitarian andpeace workers in the conceptualization andimplementation of their programs in themidst of the increasing complexities they areconfronted with. There is much to learn from

local expertise and knowledge and while thereis a perception that international organisationsand agencies know better how to providehumanitarian assistance and implement post-conict recovery and reconstruction programs,it is hoped that this misguided notion bepondered upon more seriously and thatsensitivity to and respect for local capacitiesand knowledge is increased. It is our hope

that this book will be an important referenceand guide to those working in the SouthernPhilippines and similar complex situationsglobally.

ADRRN in its strategic objectives for 2008-2011 plans to publish a series of knowledgeresource books in subjects related tohumanitarian response, recovery and disasterrisk reduction. It is our hope that the experienceand expertise among our members in thisvulnerable region be shared with the aim ofincreasing our preparedness and resilience toface the challenges to the region, from naturalhazards or conict.

I would like to express my sincerest thanksto Milet and Victor for their untiring effortsand passion in producing this important book,and to our ADRRN partner, Caritas Manila,for providing support. This publication wouldnot have been likewise possible without thesupport from AusAID to the network, and weoffer our utmost gratitude for this.

8 Dr. Jemilah Mahmood


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Introduction

MERLIE B. MENDOZA AND VICTOR M. TAYLOR

Many countries particularly in Asia are notonly beleaguered with natural hazards but alsohuman-induced disasters arising from complexsituations of conict. The Philippines is amongthem.

This rst publication of the Asian Disaster

Reduction and Response Network (ADRRN)focuses on the challenges to human security incomplex situations, considering the situationin the Southern Philippines as a case study.It is hoped that other countries will betterunderstand the complexities of the situationhere, may nd some parallels with their ownexperiences and will learn some lessons fromwhat is happening in the Philippines.

This book discusses the various complex

elements in areas of conict and submitsan analysis of the interplay of these factors.Part I denes the various aspects of the conictsituations. What are the different factors thathave given rise to conict in the SouthernPhilippines?

The book brings together various issueexperts who touch on different conictsituations in the South. The topics beginwith a historical background to the situationin Mindanao showing the major historicalmovements from the dominance of indigenoustribes to the arrival and spread of Islam, theentry of Spanish colonialism, the takeoverof American colonialism and nally theestablishment of the Philippine Republic. Thishistorical overview, written by Rudy Rodil,retired professor of history from the MindanaoState University, describes how the indigenouspeoples, many of whom subsequently became

Muslims, eventually became minorities in whatthey consider to be their homeland with theinux starting in the 20th century of Christian

settlers from the northern and central parts ofthe Philippines.

This historical overview is followed bya description of a major element which hasresulted in the minoritization of Lumads(indigenous tribes) and Muslims in the South,

which is the conict over land and territory.This chapter explains how this conict hasleft the Lumads and the Moro people dejectedand desirous of regaining their territories andin the process preserve all other elements oftheir culture that were lost or vitiated whentheir ancestral domains were taken away fromthem.

A discussion of the growth of resistanceand secessionist movements in the Southern

Philippines follows, with a chapter written byAbhoud Syed Lingga, Executive Director of theInstitute of Bangsamoro Studies in CotabatoCity, showing that, given the history ofMindanao and the Philippines, the secessioniststruggle appears to be a logical outcome.

The discussion of the resistance andsecessionist movements is followed by achapter, written by Victor Taylor, which showsthat the struggle for self-determination hasan ideological element to it which furthercomplicates what is in itself already a verydifcult situation.

Wilfredo Torres III, Program Ofcer of TheAsia Foundation, writes about clan conicts,showing examples of clan feuds and howthese have aggravated the local conict on theground. His chapter shows how these havebeen managed in some communities.

Victor Taylor contributes a chapter onthe kidnapping phenomenon in the South, as


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one example of criminal activities which arerampant in the area.

What these chapters try to show is, rst,that human-made conicts are innitely more

complex than the impact of natural disasters.When natural disaster strikes, as in the caseof the Tsunami of 2004, one nds people of allraces, religions, political beliefs and afliations, joining hands to save lives, bring relief tosurvivors and help rebuild communities andlives notwithstanding the unprecedentedchallenges and tremendous coordinationrequirements resulting from such majordisasters. Human-made disasters, on the otherhand, breed enmity and drive people apart

even where they may have been living in peacein the past.

Second, and of critical importance to thehumanitarian worker involving himself orherself in helping address a natural or human-made disaster, is the need to understand thatthere are many aspects to a conict situation,that a struggle for self-determination, forexample, may be underlain by religiousdifferences, conicts over land, competitionsfor supremacy in the political arena and evenefforts by unscrupulous individuals to takeadvantage of disasters for personal gain. Hence,the need to carefully assess a situation and tryto understand the various strands of conictthat may lie just below the surface. The abilityto evaluate these various aspects could spell thedifference between an intervention that helps acommunity get back on its feet and one whichmay not last or, even worse, simply complicates

what was already a difcult situation to beginwith.

We continue to witness developmentprograms that have taken off from a lack of

in depth analysis of the complexities involvedand the ensuing mismatch in the frameworkof action in addressing the threats to humansecurity. The situation remains very complex. Itdemands a focused, sensitive deliberation and

constant re-examination of the unique featuresof the area in which interventions are beingintroduced. It necessitates a multi-disciplinaryapproach that is nurtured by intuition. Indeed,a very delicate balance of art and science.

Fundamentally, this can take off froma culture-sensitive understanding andappreciation of all contending elements presentin the areas of conict, and to put as manycritical stakeholders, including those that may

refuse or oppose change, to task.

The pursuit of a just, comprehensive andlasting peace is rooted in the fundamentalfreedoms. It begins with having the rightinformation, and deliberate and comprehensivepublic information, education andcommunications plan towards an appreciationof the historical context and of all the elementsthat are at play. This demands standing back,holding our respective biases and prejudicesin check and sincerely beginning to listenand aspire for peace. A strong political will isdemanded from government, and for everyoneelse to exercise constant peace vigil.

Finally, any development interventionin conict areas, including humanitarianresponse, must be seen as no less than as anact of peacebuilding. More creative ways ofengagement, anchored on clear principles of

engagement and adherence to a code of conduct,need to be explored hand in hand and carefullycoordinated with genuine allies for peacefuland democratic change.

10 Merlie B. Mendoza and Victor M. Taylor


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LIST OF MAPS

1. Map of Mindanao

2. Mindanao 1890

3. Map of combined Sulu-Maguindanao Sultanates

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Public Land Law and Resettlement

Table 2. Demographic Change in Mindanao-Sulu, 1948 to 1970 Censuses

Table 3. Kidnapping Incidents in SuluTable 4. Kidnapping Incidents in Basilan


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Pt o

Elements of the Conict Situationin the Philippines


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Cpt i

Mindanao:

A Historical OverviewRudy B. Rodil

Introduction

Any humanitarian intervention in anarea, to be truly effective, must begin withan understanding of the historical context ofthe place. Without such an understanding,any programs introduced may result inshort-term benefits for the people in theregion, but these benefits may not last if theprograms do not take into consideration themain historical trends which have shapedthe region and which continue to influence

developments there. This chapter brieflydescribes the key historical influences thathave shaped the Southern Philippines orwhat can be referred to as Mindanao and theSulu Archipelago.

The Peoples of Mindanao and Sulu

It has become common in the past twentyyears or so to speak of the inhabitants ofMindanao as the tri-peoples of the region.

These are the indigenous peoples, consistingof the various Lumad tribes and the IslamizedMoros, on the one hand, and those who camerecently, mostly the settlers of the twentiethcentury, from Luzon and the Visayas andtheir descendants. Based on the 2000 censusthe Lumad communities, some 35 tribes andsub-tribes in all, constitute 8.9 percent of theregions total population; the Moros, thirteenethnolinguistic groups altogether, make

up 18.5 percent and the settlers and theirdescendants, for lack of a better name, 72.5

percent.

No Largescale Population Movement

into Mindanao-Sulu till 1890In an ethnographic map made in 1890

by Ferdinand Blumentritt (the Austrianethnographer who pioneered in Philippineethnography in the late nineteenth century andbecame a close friend of Dr. Jose Rizal, nowthe Philippine national hero), which he basedon the data put together by Jesuit missionaries,the Mindanao-Sulu geo-ethnic setting clearlyindicates that as of that period, most of

Mindanao mainland was inhabited by Lumadtribal communities, followed by the Islamizedgroups. Only small strips of the coastal areaswere occupied by Christians most of whomwere converts from local inhabitants during theSpanish colonial period. Catholic missionarystatistics reveal that from a low of 21,300baptisms in northern and eastern Mindanaoin the third decade of the seventeenth centurythe gures grew to a high of 191,493 in the

same general area to as far as the Zamboangapeninsula in the west. This clearly indicates thatno largescale movement of population from thenorth took place during the three centuries ofSpanish colonial presence.

The Name: Mindanao-Sulu

In todays common usage, Mindanao hascome to include the Sulu archipelago. But thisis a recent phenomenon, perhaps from the early

1970s, thanks in part to the efforts of the MoroNational Liberation Front (MNLF) to unify theMoros into the Bangsamoro or Moro nation. The


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16 Rudy B. Rodil

region has always been known as Mindanaoand Sulu even in Spanish documents, obviouslyin reference to the sultanates of Sulu which hadexisted from 1450 and Maguindanao whichwas formalized by Sultan Kudarat in 1619. The

name Mindanao evolved from Maguindanao.This paper will use the term Mindanao-Sulu torefer to the region.

Major Events inuence History

The ow of Mindanao-Sulu history waspunctuated and substantially inuenced bymajor events, namely, (a) the settling in ofIslam, (b) the arrival of Spanish colonialism inthe Philippine archipelago, mainly in Luzon

and the Visayas and in northeastern Mindanao,(c) the intrusion of American imperialism,and (d) the unication of the entire Philippinearchipelago into one Republic of the Philippinesin 1946. Each of these major events had its ownmajor sub-plots but these will be touched uponas the story moves along.

The Islamic Factor

It can be assumed that prior to the coming ofIslam in 1380 or earlier in the Sulu archipelagoand around 1515 or earlier in central Mindanao,all communities in the Mindanao-Sulu regionwere indigenous. Social structures werepresumably simple, akin to what the Spanishmissionaries had noted about the barangaysof old. Ethnolinguistic groups were not reallytribes but small clan communities living moreor less independently of one another, althoughgroups belonging to the same linguistic

identities tended to generally inhabit contiguousterritories. There were intermarriages and otherforms of alliances to dene inter-clan and inter-community relationships.

It sounds more correct to say that Islamsettled into the region, brought in by Arabtraders from Johore, who by the very natureof travel by sea crafts propelled by the wind,would tarry for long periods in one place, theirtrading camps, as it were, waiting for tradegoods to come from neighboring communitiesand the monsoon winds for their sailboats. Thiswas how these traders married into the local

population, converted their new relations, andrevolutionized their social structures; a newummah or Islamic community was formed; thesultan became the vice regent of Allah withinthe realm. Islam had found a new home.

Islam revolutionized the indigenouscommunities. It brought with it not onlymonotheism or systematized belief in one Godcalled Allah, enshrined in the Holy Quran, butalso the idea of centralized leadership, the newsocial structure of the state, which was whata Sultanate was all about. In due time theseSultanates built up their respective armies, onland and at sea, had their internal economicsystem, and were engaged in interisland

trade or what may correspond to what isknown today as international trade, as far asthe Celebes, Southeast Asia and China. TheseSultanates also signed treaties. At the arrival ofthe forces of Spanish colonialism, at least twostates were already in place to oppose them, theSulu Sultanate and the Maguindanao Sultanate.The same may be said to a certain extent withrespect to the Pat a Pongampong ko Ranaw, thefour principalities of Lanao whose maturation

into a sultanate was unfortunately truncated bythe arrival of the newcomers.

The Spanish Impact

Spain came to colonize and to Christianizewith the use of both sword and cross. TheSpanish king enjoyed the relationship of

patronato real with the Pope whereby hebecame responsible for and supported theevangelization of the inhabitants of his new-

found lands, terra nullius, they called them, landthat belonged to no one, thus justifying theiracquisition and denying the possessory and

territorial rights of the indigenous inhabitants.

After demolishing Muslim opposition inMindoro and Manila and conquering almostall of the Visayas and Luzon, except for thepeoples of the Cordillera in the northernportion of Luzon, the Spanish colonial powerattempted to bring the Sultanates of Brunei,Sulu and Maguindanao to their knees, butwithout success. The establishment of nativeChristian communities in the northern and


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Mindanao: A Historical Overview 17

eastern parts of Mindanao, as well as theZamboanga peninsula in western Mindanao,was part of this war effort to subjugatethe Moros. But the Moros fought back. TheMoro wars, lasted from 1565 to 1898, during

which period the Spaniards employedthousands of Filipino ghters, and in returnthe Moros regularly retaliated by hitting theChristianized communities in Luzon, theVisayas and the northern and eastern partsof Mindanao. Thousands of captives on bothsides ended up in slavery. Mutual bad bloodand mutual distrust characterized the feelingsof Moros and Filipino Christians for eachother. This accumulated negative energy eldremains very much alive today, coexistingside by side ironically with many instancesof excellent tri-people relations built up overmany years of living together in the 20thcentury.

US Denies Reality of Nations

Couching their own imperialistic ambitionswith the alleged mission to civilize, theAmerican imperialists of the late 19th and early

20th centuries claimed that when they arrivedin the Philippines, there were no nations there,only different tribes ghting one another, thusnegating the very legitimate existence of theSulu Sultanate, the Maguindanao Sultanate andthe newly established state of Pilipinas. Theirwar with Spain was an excuse to occupy thePhilippines. The Treaty of Paris of December1898, became a transaction whereby Spainceded for twenty million dollars the Philippinesto the Americans, ignoring the fact that the

Philippines had already won its independencefrom Spain six months earlier, and theSultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao and thePat a Pongampong ko Ranaw had all this timeremained uncolonized by the Spaniards untilthen. Any question on this spurious transactionin Paris was however rendered moot andacademic when the Americans subsequentlyconquered the Filipinos and the Moros by forceof arms.

Logic of Colonialism Wins

By the logic of indigenous patriotism, the

United States should have recognized andrestored the independence of at least threeindependent states in July 1946: the Republicof the Philippines, the Sultanate of Sulu andthe Sultanate of Maguindanao. The logic of

colonialism won out on the premise that therewere no nations there, only different tribesghting one another, the grant of independencewas solely for the Republic of the Philippines;the Moro political entities were unilaterallyintegrated into it.

American Institutions

The American government introduceda number of vital institutions that had taken

deep roots and have remained to this day: theAmerican brand of representative government;the torrens land titling system; compulsorypublic education; and capitalism.

Very early into their rule the Americansconducted a census of the Islands andpromptly classied the population into twoneat categories, Christians and non-Christians,also described as civilized and uncivilizedrespectively, the latter being made up of theMoros and so-called wild tribes.

Regular political units, provinces andtowns were created for Christians; specialprovinces and tribal wards were establishedfor non-Christians for ten years, both as arecognition of their distinct identities but alsoand especially to form transition mechanismsthat would facilitate their integration intothe mainstream Filipino community. Studies

were made on non-Christian cultures butthese were found inadequate to serve as abasis for a civilized government and werepromptly dismissed to give way to westerninstitutions.

The Torrens System

As new alleged owners of the PhilippineIslands, the American government reservedthe right to classify the lands and distribute

the same to the inhabitants. Public land lawswere passed institutionalizing the torrenssystem. The rst of these laws, enacted by the


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18 Rudy B. Rodil

American-dominated Philippine Commissionin 1903, declared as null and void all land grantsmade by traditional leaders if done withoutgovernment consent, thus getting nativelandholding and land use institutions neatly out

of the way. The public land laws then went intoforce, settlement areas were opened in Luzonand Mindanao after these had been declaredas public lands, which settlement areas wereopened to settlers who were variously knownas homesteaders, homeseekers, colonos, as wellas to corporations.

Public Land Laws, Resettlement andMarginalization

The public land law, in its original andamended forms, specied not only how landmay be acquired but also how many hectaresmay be acquired by whom.

Table 1. Public Land Laws andResettlement

YearHECTARAGE ALLOWED

Homesteader Non-Christian Corporation

1903 16 . n pv 1024 .

1919 24 . 10 . 1024 .

1931 15 . 4 . 1024 .

Largescale movement of settlers startedin 1913 with the opening of the agriculturalcolonies of Pikit-Pagalungan in the CotabatoValley for the rst 100 colonos from Cebu.These colonies were followed with ofcially-declared resettlement areas, supported by atleast three government resettlement projectsduring the American colonial period, twoduring the Commonwealth, and no less thanve during the Republic. Taking their cuefrom these government initiatives, thousandsof other settlers were presumed to have comeon their own. By 1970, less than sixty yearslater, the newcomers outnumbered the locals,the latter severely marginalized in their ownlands. The story of resettlement of migrants

from Luzon and the Visayas to Mindanaois also the story of the marginalization ofthe indigenous inhabitants. The census dataprovide incontrovertible evidence. In the 1903

census, the estimated number of migrantsis 36.97 percent of the total Mindanao-Sulupopulation, while the combined populationof the Moros and Lumad is 63.03 percent. Thegures go up to 47.02 percent in 1918 for the

migrants and tumble down to 52.98 percentfor the locals. Population data became betterorganized from the 1948 census. From here,the migrant population steadily shoots up 69.17percent in 1948 to 76 percent in 1970, whilethe Lumad population slips to 4.52 percent in1948, and that of the Moro Muslims to 19.98percent for a combined total of 24 percent. Seenin terms of towns, only eight municipalitiesremained with Lumad majority by 1970; onlyve provinces and fteen towns outside theseve were with Muslim majority.

Table 2. Demographic Changesin Mindanao-Sulu, 1948 to 1970

Censuses(in percentages)

YEAR SETTLERS MOROMUSLIM

LUMAD

1948 69.17 26.31 4.52

1960 72.9 24.63 2.47

1970 76.00 19.98 4.02

Marginalization extended beyondpopulation to politics, to economic life, toculture, to control over land and resources.To marginalization may be traced one of thebasic causes of the Moro rebellion. Its outbreakin 1972 was precipitated by a series of violentevents like the Jabidah massacre, widespreadviolence among the civilian population incentral Mindanao, mainly Cotabato and Lanaodel Norte, punctuated by the Manili massacrein Manili, Carmen, Cotabato and Tacub,Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, all perceived byMoro Muslims as concrete evidence of a trend toexterminate them. The uprising was an assertionof Moro self-determination, characterized bythe conscious effort of Muslims to identifythemselves as belonging to a Bangsamoro or

Moro nation, the desire to establish their ownBangsamoro republic. Fourteen years later,the Lumad leaders would themselves declaretheir own struggle, though unarmed, for self-


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Mindanao: A Historical Overview 19

determination. Stressing that they are distinctfrom the Bangsamoro, the Lumads haveexpressed their right to govern themselveswithin their own ancestral domains.

Corporate ActivitiesComing side by side with settlers were

corporate entities although not in the samecontinuous ow as the former. These weremostly agri-corporations during the earlypart of the twentieth century, owned mostlyby Americans, Japanese, and Spaniards. It wasthe Japanese entrepreneurs and their Japaneseworkers, for example, who transformed Davaointo the abaca capital of the Philippines.

Several armed uprisings broke out against the Japanese expansion but these were promptlysuppressed. It was the American investors,more specically the American Chamberof Commerce and the rubber interest whoattempted thrice to retain Mindanao as anAmerican territory rather than incorporateit into a Philippine Commonwealth andeventually Philippine Republic. But most ofthese investors left for one reason or another.

Very few stayed on until after the second worldwar, like Del Monte Pineapple in Bukidnon,Findlay Millar in Lanao and Weyerheueser inBasilan and Cotabato.

Economic Boom

Timber extraction and processing did notproliferate until the early 1960s when a smallnumber of 157 timber corporate-concessionairescornered nearly all of Mindanaos commercial

forests, more than ve million hectares of them.No doubt these had contributed substantiallyto the rapid decline of Mindanaos forest cover.In the 1950s, 59% of Mindanao was forested, 54percent of which being primary forest and vepercent secondary. Fifteen years later, primaryforest was down to 17 percent and secondaryup to 29 percent. Pasture leases also dottedthe landscape especially in the provinces ofBukidnon and the undivided Cotabato. Postwar

corporate plantations like banana, thoughconned mostly in Davao and South Cotabato,projected a dominant presence since the late1960s. Pineapple production was held tightly

by two giants, both American multinationals,Del Monte in Bukidnon and Dole in SouthCotabato.

Irony: Poverty and Conict in

Abundance

At this point in time Mindanao-Sulucan boast of various major manufacturingactivities, like sh canning in General Santos,cement in Davao and Iligan, coconut oil andpellets in Davao del Sur, Davao City andIligan, and many more. There is no need tofear an energy shortage because it has bothhydro and geothermal resources, enough toenergize Mindanao-Sulu. There are guardedclaims of oil and gas deposits in centralMindanao and in the Sulu sea. There are justied claims that Mindanao-Sulu, theregion once advertised in the 20th century asthe land of promise (read: full of promise dueto its abundant natural resources) can easilyfeed the whole nation.

While so much can be said of Mindanao-Sulus natural resources, there is no denying

that it is the only region in the country wherethree major political conicts exist side by side:the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)/Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)-ledBangsamoro struggle for self-determinationthat dates back to 1968; the Lumad (IndigenousPeoples) assertion of their own right to self-determination that goes back to 1986, and theght for national democracy with a socialistperspective pursued by the Communist Party ofthe Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA)

that also broke out in 1968. It is the only regionwhere fourteen of the 20 poorest provinces ofthe country are found.

And so one should ask: can we speak ofhuman security in this land of abundancewhere so many are poor and feel the need torebel against the status quo?

Political settlements needed

The MNLF war, stretching from 1970 to1996, had cost the government Php 73 billion(approximately US$1.5 billion) in combat


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20 Rudy B. Rodil

expenses alone, and had left in its wake some120,000 dead, several thousands more maimedand wounded, and untold damage to propertyand to Philippine societys moral ber. Anagreement had been signed, the Tripoli

Agreement in 1976 granting autonomy to theMuslims within the integrity of the Republic ofthe Philippines. After the plebiscite the listedterritory of the autonomy was reduced from 13to ve provinces. It took twenty years to cometo terms on how it should be implemented;nally in 1996, the nal agreement on theimplementation of the Tripoli Agreementwas signed. To this day, however, the MNLFhas complained that several provisions of theAgreement have yet to nd realization.

MILF Resumes Bangsamoro Struggle

Having split earlier from the MNLF,the leaders of the splinter group formedthemselves into the Moro Islamic LiberationFront (MILF) in 1984, rejected the terms ofthe 1996 Agreement signed by the MNLF andresumed the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination. This organization entered

into its own peace negotiations with thegovernment since January 1997 and was aboutto sign a Memorandum of Agreement on

Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), an importantstep to pave the way for the formulation ofa comprehensive compact within one year.Opposition politicians raised their objectionto the MOA-AD to the Supreme Court,

applied and got a temporary restraining ordereffectively preventing the signing of thisAgreement; the Supreme Court subsequentlyruled that the MOA-AD is unconstitutional.

Uncertainties in the Peace Process

The government peace negotiating panelwas dissolved by the Ofce of the President;a new paradigm for the peace process wasdened by the government: DDR (disarmament,

demobilization and reintegration) and authenticcommunity dialogue, and a new panel wasformed. The peace process continues to be onan uncertain track, expected to be switching onand off for its resumption.

In broad brushstrokes, these are thehistorical elements that have broughtMindanao-Sulu to the point at which it is nowas well as the major challenges facing the regiontoday. Any humanitarian interventions must beaware of these elements and see how, in theirown way, they can contribute to addressing thechallenges which still exist.


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Cpt i i

State Domain vs.

Ancestral Domainin Mindanao-Sulu

Rudy B. Rodil

Introduction

The conict over land and territory isclearly the product of a series of events thatinuenced the internal developments ofMindanao-Sulu and the Philippines. It is not just land, it is domain. It was the domains ofthe Moros and the Lumad that was taken over.The Moros and the Lumad want these backand secured, by agreement and by law.

Spanish colonial ambition led Spainto conquer not only central and northernPhilippines but also certain parts of Mindanao.The colonization and Christianizationof northern and eastern Mindanao andZamboanga was part of her strategy tosubjugate Moroland.

American success at armed conquestand colonization of the entire Philippine

archipelago including the areas of the Suluand Maguindanao sultanates and the Pat aPongampong ko Ranaw has left very deep andlasting impact on the Mindanao-Sulu region.The entire area was placed under one uniedpolitical structure and governance, althoughthere were distinguishing features betweenthe Special Moro Province, the special Agusanprovince (combined areas of Agusan andBukidnon) and the two regular provinces of

Misamis and Surigao. Landholding practiceswere transformed into the Torrens systemunder the umbrella of the state-adoptedregalian doctrine, and within this framework

and in total disregard of indigenous systems,the region was laid open to government-sponsored resettlement programs.

This combination of events consequentlyled to the marginalization of the Moro andLumad communities in practically all majoraspects of their lives in less than sixty years:in their own lands and domain, in the sphereof governance, in economic life, in education,

in culture. The policy of government wasamalgamation of the non-Christians into themainstream Filipino community.

The marginalization process generateda corresponding accumulation of resentmentand dissatisfaction, and reached its explosivepoint in the MIM1 -MNLF-MILF uprising in1968, and the Lumad assertion of their ownright to self-determination in 1986.

At this point we become witness toMoro and Lumad articulations of politicalaspirations, both against and within theframework of the Philippine state, coveringpolitical identity and right to self-governance,claim to territory and all resources therein.

But this is also the point in time when thestate apparatus, the migrant population itself,the economic system and the cultural milieustand in the way of these claims. Bangsamoro

claims to self-determination and ancestralterritory express the need to break away fromthe state apparatus itself, or at least create a

1 Muslim Independence Movement


23/98

22 Rudy B. Rodil

secure niche within this apparatus; it mustalso reckon with other claimants, the Lumadespecially, who will contest said claims withtheir own counter-claims in areas whichoverlap their own.

This is a very complicated situation indeed.How do all stakeholders come to a satisfactoryarrangement? We need to step back into historyfor a while.

Geoethnic Situation

Today Mindanao-Sulu has 25 provinces.The names of these provinces will be used topinpoint traditional domains of the Moros and

the Lumad in Mindanao.

The 1890 ethnographic map of Mindanao-Sulu by Austrian ethnographer FerdinandBlumentritt was rendered recently into digitalform by Dr. Sabino Padilla, an anthropologistof the University of the Philippines, ManilaCampus. The peoples of the region wereclassied into three: Cristianos, Moros andIneles (indels). The Cristianos consistingof nearly 200,000 people were stretched out

in thin strips of territory, a small area in whatis now Davao City, a long stretch from DavaoOriental to Surigao del Norte to Agusan delNorte, to Misamis Oriental to Iligan to MisamisOccidental to Dipolog-Dapitan to Sindangan

bay and Zamboanga City. From there onemust take a leap to nd a small community ofCristianos, also known today as chavacanos orZamboangueos in what is now ZamboangaCity. [See 1890 Map]

Heavy concentrations of Morocommunities were found in what is nowMaguindanao and Lanao del Sur, Basilan andthe Sulu Archipelago. There were also stripsof Moro communities along the coast from the

left side of the mouth of the Pulangi, facingthe sea, to Sultan Kudarat to General SantosCity to Sarangani Islands, and then pocketsof communities around Davao gulf, in DavaoCity, Davao del Norte and Davao Oriental.From the right side of the mouth of Pulangi,there is a narrow strip of Moro communities,presumably Iranun, all the way to Pagadian,Zamboanga del Sur. And a few more inZamboanga del Sur and Zamboanga Sibugay

Digital copy by Dr. Sabino G. Padilla, Jr.

Map a Ethnograficodel Archipelago Filipino

F. Blum entritt1890

Grupo

40 0 40 80 120 Kilometers123 125

CristianosInfieles

Moros

Teritorio de los Infieles

Teritorio de los Moros

Teritorio de los Cristianos

121

N

S

W E

6

8

10

121 123 125

10

8

6

MINDANAO 1890


24/98

State Domain vs. Ancestral Domainin Mindanao-Sulu 23

and the west end of Zamboanga del Norte.

The Lumad communities inhabited thegreater part of Mindanao mainland. Theymay have been thinly spread out but what is

important is that this was a time when theyalone lived in the areas. They were not visiblein Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan andthe Sulu archipelago.

It is good to know that those areas markedas Moros and ineles nd conrmationin early Spanish documents as traditionalterritories of these same peoples, leading usto the conclusion that these indeed are theirtraditional domain.

Sultanate Dominance

At their peak, the sultanates domainsencompassed areas way beyond their tribalboundaries. The same may be said of the Pat aPongampong ko Ranaw. [See map of combinedSulu-Maguindanao Sultanates]

Sulu Sultanate included Basilan, Sulu,Tawi-Tawi, southern Palawan and northBorneo. Also, Zamboanga City, if the sultanwas more powerful than that of Maguindanao.The Islamized tribes in the territory were

the Tausug in Sulu; Sama and Badjao (onlythose who had settled on land) in Tawi-Tawi; Jama Mapun in Cagayan de Sulu andsouthern Palawan; Palawani and Molbog (orMelebugnon) in Southern Palawan; Yakan inBasilan, and the Kalibugan in Zamboanga.Non-Islamized tribes included the Batakand Tagbanua of southern Palawan and theSubanen of the Zamboanga peninsula. Noother tribe has been known to have occupiedsaid territories before them. There is no clear-cut historical evidence that northern Palawanever fell within the territory of the Sulusultanate; Muslim settlements seem to haveexisted for a while already only in the southernportion extending from Aborlan southward toBalabac.

The Maguindanao sultanate covered

Historical Accounts:Dominions of theSultanates ofMaguindanao,Sulu and Pat aPongampong ko Ranao

MaguindanaoSultanate

Sultanate of Maguindanao (1645)

Sultanate of Maguindanao

Sultanate of Maguindanao (1618-1671) Majul


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24 Rudy B. Rodil

the present provinces of Maguindanao,Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato, Sarangani,Davao del Sur, Davao City, Davao del Norte,Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental; alsothe provinces of Zamboanga del Norte

almost in its entirety, Zamboanga del Sur,Zamboanga Sibugay and Zamboanga City.Zamboanga City would also belong to Suluwhen its Sultan was more powerful than thatof Maguindanao. Islamized tribes that maybe categorized as subject of the Maguindanaosultanate included the Maguindanao, Iranunand Sangil. Also the Kalagans of the DavaoGulf area who reportedly became Muslimsonly in the 19th Century. The non-Muslimtribes were the Subanen in Zamboanga; theTeduray, Ubo, Tboli, Bla-an, Manobo in theCotabato area; the Bagobo, Bla-an again,Tagakaolo, Ata, Mangguangan, Mandayaand Mansaka, and Manobo in the Davaoregion, and the Bukidnon and Higaunon inthe Bukidnon border, as well as in Iligan Cityin Lanao del Norte. It is extremely difcultto determine from historical sources to whatextent and under what terms the latter groupof people (the non-Muslims) were subjects

of the sultanates. Also, in the specic caseof Zamboanga peninsula, no study hasyet been made specifying where the Sulusultanates suzerainty ended and where theMaguindanaos inuence begun.

Pat a Pongampong ko Ranaw had bothLanao del Norte, Iligan City and Lanao del Sur.In Maranao tradition, Pongampong a Balo-i was supposed to extend as far as Tagoloanin Misamis Oriental but this is contested by

the Higaunons who admit that they and theMaranaos share a common ancestry but anaccord had been entered into in the past calledtampuda hu balagun, a peace pact in whichthey agreed on certain territorial bordersbetween them.

When the American colonizers came, theycombined the Sulu, Maguindanao and Ranawterritories together, minus Palawan, andformed the special Moro Province, ofciallycomposed of the ve provincial districts ofDavao, Cotabato, Lanao, Zamboanga and Sulu.With the institutionalization of the resettlement

program, settlers from Luzon and the Visayascame in droves, all of whom operated withinthe framework and protection of state laws.In todays political structure, the MoroProvince encompassed the 17 provinces of

Davao Oriental, Compostela Valley, Davao delNorte, Davao del Sur; Cotabato, Maguindanao,Sarangani, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat;Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur; Zamboangadel Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, ZamboangaSibugay; Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi.

After its lifespan of ten years, the Moroprovince was abolished, its ve provincialdistricts graduated to regular status minuspopular election of ofcials. The same thing

happened to Agusan, its components turninginto the regular provinces of Agusan andBukidnon. New administrative structureswere born: Department of Mindanao and Sulu,Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, Commissionon National Integration (CNI), and so on. Bothmainstreaming and marginalization werehappening at the same time, acculturation anddeculturation, expanding operationalizationof the modern form of governance and the

defanging of traditional customary laws. BothMoro and Lumad were severely hit by this.

Lumad Assertion

Lumad articulation of their right to self-determination was initially made throughthe founding congress of Lumad Mindanawin June 1986. Bisaya being their lingua franca,representatives from 15 tribes agreed to adoptLumad, a Visayan word meaning native,

as their common name. Then they declaredtheir right to self-governance within theirrespective ancestral domains. In 2001 theystarted to view themselves as rst nationsafter the fashion of indigenous tribes inCanada and other indigenous communitiesof the world; they also started to explore theconcept of one day having their own Lumadautonomous region in Mindanao. These self-determination-related concepts found their

way into the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act(IPRA) which allows indigenous communitiesamong others to le for and obtain titles totheir ancestral domains. This is the rst time


26/98


since the Philippine Commission Act of 1903that a law was passed recognizing ancestraldomain and allowing it to be titled on the basisof native title. Native title means that the landin question has never been public domain, or

public land.

Their articulation increased in volume andacquired new dimensions in reaction to theGRP-MILF peace negotiations where, amongothers, even their titled ancestral domains wereincluded in the MILF ancestral domain claim.Having learned their lessons from the GRP-MNLF peace talks, 1975 to 1996, where theyhad absolutely no participation yet found theirtraditional domains included in the territory of

the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao(ARMM), this time they insisted on theirparticipation during the GRP-MILF talks. True,they had one Lumad member in the Governmentof the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Paneland three in the GRP Technical Working Group,and another one in the MILF Panels TechnicalWorking Group. But they were not content withthis for the MILF took the position that theLumad are part of the Bangsamoro, so is their

territory, although they conceded free choiceto them on whether they wished or not to bepart of Bangsamoro. This triggered a stronglyworded position paper from Lumad leaders.

More than 200 Lumad leader-participants,declared in their August 2008 meeting inCagayan de Oro that while they recognizeand respect the Bangsamoro identity andright to self-determination, they, too, havetheir own distinct identity and right to self-

determination. Calling them Bangsamoro andincluding their domains in the Bangsamoroancestral domain is a violation of traditionalpeace pacts variously named pakang, sapa,dyandi, tampuda hu balagun, or khandugoentered into by their ancestors in the past;these have not expired and are still verymuch in effect today. On the other hand, theTedurays, Lambangian and Dulangan Manobotribes, already inhabitants in Maguindanao,within ARMM, do not oppose their inclusionin the Bangsamoro ancestral domain but askthat the Bangsamoro respect their right to self-determination, traditional governance and

tribal justice system, their right to ancestraldomain and to the natural resources within,and their right to their own distinct identityand culture. They felt this as necessary becausein the present ARMM, the Regional Legislative

Assembly has yet to enact an ancestral domainlaw since its inception in 1989 to protect theinterest of the indigenous peoples within theAutonomy. The Indigenous Peoples RightsAct (IPRA) which is designed to enable theindigenous people to pursue and protect theirinterests is not operative within the ARMM.Without an ancestral domain law within theARMM, there is no way that the indigenouscommunities will feel secure under the law.

Native Title vs Torrens Title

There is no denying that there exists aninherent contradiction between native titleand torrens title. Both are deemed privatethough one is communal and the otherindividual. Although the 1987 Constitutionrecognizes the ancestral domain rights ofindigenous communities there is as well theinherent contradiction between state domain

and ancestral domain; which is why at thesame time that there is IPRA, there is also themining law and other laws which allow orenable corporations to intrude into indigenousancestral domains. Though, the negotiationwith the MILF leaves the ground wide openfor claims and counter-claims.

Ancestral domain is one of three agendaitems in the GRP-MILF peace talks in 2001,the rst time it became a major agenda item.

If under IPRA, claim to ancestral domainis anchored on occupancy and possessionsince time immemorial, in the GRP-MILFnegotiation, the MILF denition of ancestraldomain is rooted on two fundamental factors:tribal land and territorial domain of thesultanates. Both do not form part of publicdomain. The claim therefore is not tenurialbut political. The MILF is not just after apiece of land, they plainly want recovery of

a political territory. The Lumad have reasonto be uncomfortable; they had cited in theirstatements some negative experiences withMoro abuses in the past.


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26 Rudy B. Rodil

The government resettlement programin the whole country proceeded on thefundamental assumption that the state ownsthe entire territory, that the state reservesthe right to classify and dispose of the land

according to law, that lands classied as publicdomain are alienable and disposable. Thesewere the very same lands declared open forresettlement or homesteading.

Now, we are not only confronted with theBangsamoro ancestral domain claim amidstor alongside with private lands covered bytorrens titles, they must also reckon with apolitical twist born out of the formation of theRepublic of the Philippines.

The Political Twists and UnsettledIssues

There is no single community today,indigenous or otherwise that does not fallwithin the jurisdiction of a local political unit.The inhabitants are viewed therein as citizens,not as belonging to this or that tribe or this orthat family but as individual citizens. When

the constitution says sovereignty resides inthe people, the reference is to the individualcitizens, not to their tribal or family afliation.Now, there is a prescription in the constitutionand the local government code that in theevent that a political unit, whether province,municipality or barangay is created, modied,merged with another, or abolished, the peopleof the affected units will have to express theirdecisions, to agree or not to agree, in a plebiscitecalled for the purpose.

The establishment of the ARMM wentprecisely through this process. Should therearise a new GRP-MILF peace agreement callingfor adjustments in the ARMM territory, thereis so far no way to get around this prescriptionexcept by a constitutional amendment. Nowthe question has been askedwhich has neverbeen asked in earlier peace negotiations: whatif the territory in question is ancestral domain,a territory that is presumed to have never beenpublic, a territory that is covered not only by anative title but was also part of state territoriesthat were taken and integrated into a colonial

territory without the plebiscitary consent ofits people? Can the vote of non-traditionalresidents invalidate the ancestral domainclaim? This question has yet to be answered.It is important at this point to realize that this

is a fundamental question that requires ananswer in the resolution of the Bangsamoroconict. No less than thirteen provinces willbe affected, and if we bring the Lumad intothe picture, the issue of ancestral domain andright to self-determination will encompasspractically all of Mindanao-Sulu.

CADT-CALT among the Lumad

The IPRA is perhaps one of the most

historic pieces of legislation in Philippinepolitical history. There was reference earlierto the Philippine Commission Act of 1903declaring as null and void all land grantsmade by traditional leaders without theconsent of government. IPRA abolished andreversed this Act, after nearly one century inoperation, and after the Lumad and the Moroshad been reduced to approximately a quarterof the Mindanao-Sulu population. IPRA does

not only recognize ancestral domain, it alsoallows their titling.

After slightly more than ten years ofimplementation of IPRA, what, if one mayask, is the status of Lumad claims to ancestraldomain, whether at the level of the Certicateof Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) or theCerticate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT)? Thequestion must be asked because IPRA in thelast one hundred years is the most promising

legislation by Congress for the IndigenousPeoples. Is the government delivering?

As of May 1, 2008 the National Commissionon Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) reports thatfrom 2002 to 2008, titles to 71 ancestral domainstotaling 1,635,972 hectares have been awardednationwide, beneting 333,848 individuals;while titles have been issued to 180 ancestrallands totaling 5,628 hectares and beneting2,947 individuals. In terms of hectarage,

Mindanaos total CADT is 829,424 hectares or50.69 per cent of total national. Lumad leadersin Mindanao do not seem impressed with


28/98


this record. Among their demands in theirCagayan de Oro manifesto last August 2008was for NCIP to fast track the delineation andapproval of ancestral domain titles.

Tentative ConclusionIn the nal analysis, it would seem that

plenty of hard work lies ahead.

For the Moro Muslims, there is already anARMM but the ongoing GRP-MILF war andthe stalled peace negotiation between the twoparties, already stretched to more than tenyears, are more than eloquent testimonies thatthe Bangsamoro conict will denitely spill over

into the next political administration. This alsomeans that those segments of the population,the Lumad and the settlers, who are threatenedby Bangsamoro claims, will continue to remainguarded and or apprehensive.

For the Lumad, their articulation for self-determination is progressing to more rened

political concepts, from self-governancewithin their respective ancestral domains torst nations to the establishment of their ownautonomous region, but it is not yet clear howthese concepts can be translated into more

concrete forms - more so because their numberis disturbingly small and very dispersed. In themeanwhile settlers continue to penetrate theirterritories while the indigenous communitieswait for their CADTs.

The settler population has the advantageof number on all counts. They are the principalbeneciaries of the government resettlementprogram. They are dominant in all fronts:trade and commerce, culture, education, and

so on. Government must take it upon itselfto appeal to their fraternal spirit; to createmechanisms that will enable the majority toextend a helping hand to the disadvantagedminorities.


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Cpt i i i

The Bangsamoro

under the Philippine RuleAbhoud Syed M. Lingga

Minority Communities

Nowadays we nd minority communitieswithin the borders of many countries includingthe Philippines. These minority communitiescan be classied broadly into three majorcategories.2

The minority migrant populations are onecategory. During the colonial period, workerswere recruited from other colonies to workin plantations, mining and other industries.

In recent years, migration of peoples whoare induced by pull factors like economicopportunities and liberal policies of countriesof destination and the push factors in theirown countries like violent conicts, lackof economic opportunities and repressivegovernment policies are observable. Themigrant populations have no attachment toany portion of the territory of the host country.Their concerns are the acceptability by andequal rights with the dominant majority, and

equal access to social services and economicopportunities.

Another category is the indigenous peopleswho became minority in their homelands as theresult of colonial settlements. There are around300 million of them in more than seventycountries. These peoples have retained theirsocial, cultural, economic and political wayof life but face the threat of being assimilatedwith the majority populations. The aspirations

of the indigenous peoples are to exercisecontrol over their own institutions, ways of lifeand economic development and to maintainand develop their identities, languages andreligions, within the framework of the Statesin which they live.3

People who were incorporated into thenew nation-states after the departure ofthe colonial powers are one more category.Before colonization these peoples had theirpolitical institutions, administrative system,

and trade and international relations withother countries. Colonial intrusions in theirterritories were not welcomed and often metwith resistance. When the colonial powersgranted independence to their colonies thehomeland of these peoples were incorporatedinto the new nation-states. In some cases,their territories became parts of more thanone country. With their history of politicalindependence and distinct way of life, thesepeoples claim they belong to different nations

from the majority. Their identities are alwayslinked to their traditional homeland. Theyfeel uncomfortable living within the bordersof the new nation-states, which they perceivedas successor-in-interest of the colonial powers,and relish the memory of their long historyof political independence that they want torevive in order to establish a system of lifein accordance with their world view, culture,religion and social norms.

2 W.K. Che Man,Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern of Southern Thailand.(Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1990), p. 1.3 International Labor Organization, Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in IndependentCountries, adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation at its seventy-sixth session, 1989.


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The Bangsamoro under Philippine Rule 29

The Bangsamoro

The Muslims who traditionally inhabitedMindanao, the islands of Basilan and Palawan,and the Sulu and Tawi-Tawi archipelago in

the south of the Philippines belong to thethird category. They are collectively calledBangsamoro. The name Moro was given bythe Spanish colonizers to the Muslims inMindanao whom they found to have the samereligion and way of life with the Muslims ofNorth Africa who ruled the Iberian Peninsulafor centuries. The Malay word bangsa, whichmeans nation, was prexed to suggest distinctnationhood. The name Bangsamoro has foundplace in ofcial documents of the Organization

of Islamic Conference (OIC)4 and agreementsbetween the Government of the Republic of thePhilippines (GRP) and the MILF.5

The Bangsamoro people consist of thirteenMuslim ethno-linguistic groups: Iranun,Magindanaon, Maranao, Tao-Sug, Sama,Yakan, Jama Mapun, Kaagan, Kalibugan,Sangil, Molbog, Palawani and Badjao. Theindigenous peoples of Mindanao who were

once protectorate groups of the sultanates arealso considered Bangsamoro, though adoptionof this identity on their part is a matter of freechoice.

The traditional homeland of the Bangsamoropeople consisted of the territories under the jurisdiction of their governments before theformation of the Philippine state. At the heightof its power, the Sulu Sultanate exercisedsovereignty over the present day provinces

of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Palawan, Basilan and theMalaysian state of Sabah (North Borneo). Theterritory of the Magindanaw Sultanate includedparts of Maguindanao province, the coastal

areas of the provinces of Sultan Kudarat, SouthCotabato, Sarangani, parts of Lanao provinces,Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental, and theeastern part of Zamboanga del Sur. The DatuDakula who ruled Sibugay, an autonomous

region under the Magindanaw Sultanate,exercised jurisdiction over Zamboanga delNorte, Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga Cityand some parts of Zamboanga del Sur. TheRajah of Buayan ruled North Cotabato, theupper valley of Maguindanao and the interiorareas of Sultan Kudarat and South Cotabato andsome parts of Bukidnon. The Pat a Pangampongko Ranao (confederation of the four lake-basedemirates) ruled the interior parts of Lanao delSur, Lanao del Norte, and parts of Bukidnon,Agusan, and eastern and western Misamisprovinces. The small sultanate of Kabuntalanseparated the domains of Magindanaw andBuayan.

As the result of the colonial policies andprograms of the Philippine government thatencouraged Filipino settlers from the north tosettle in the Bangsamoro traditional homeland,the Bangsamoro are now conned in the

provinces of Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Lanao delSur and Maguindanao, and some municipalitiesof Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Sibugay,Zamboanga del Norte, Lanao del Norte, NorthCotabato, Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato,Sarangani, Davao Oriental, Davao del Sur,Davao del Norte, Compostela Valley andPalawan.

The historical experience of the Bangsamoropeople in statehood and governance started

as early as the middle of the 15th centurywhen Sultan Shariff ul-Hashim establishedthe Sulu Sultanate. This was followed by theestablishment of the Magindanaw Sultanate

4 Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Resolution No. 58/28-P, Twenty-Eight Session of the Islamic Conference ofForeign Ministers (ICFM), 2001.5 The Agreement on Peace between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic LiberationFront, otherwise known as the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001, signed on June 22, 2001 in Tripoli, Libya, unambigu-ously recognizes that identity. Examples are these provisions of the agreement:Recognizing that peace negotiations between the GRP and the MILF is for the advancement of the general interest of the

Bangsamoro peopleOn the aspect of ancestral domain, the Parties, in order to address the humanitarian and economic needs of theBangsamoro people and preserve their social and cultural heritage and inherent right over their ancestral domain, The observance of international humanitarian law and respect for internationally recognized human rights instrumentsand the protection of evacuees and displaced persons in the conduct of their relations reinforce the Bangsamoro peoplesfundamental right to determine their own future and political status.


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30 Abhoud Syed M. Lingga

in the early part of the 16th century by ShariffMuhammad Kabungsuwan. The Sultanate ofBuayan and the Pat a Pangampong ko Ranao(confederation of the four lake-based emirates)and other political subdivisions were organized

later.

By the time the Spanish colonialists arrivedin the Philippines the Muslims of Mindanao,Sulu and Tawi-Tawi archipelago and theislands of Basilan and Palawan had alreadyestablished their own states and governmentswith diplomatic and trade relations with othercountries including China. Administrativeand political systems based on realities ofthe time existed in those states. In fact it was

because of the existence of the well-organizedadministrative and political systems that theBangsamoro people managed to survive themilitary campaign against them by Westerncolonial powers for several centuries andpreserve their identity as a political and socialorganization.

For centuries the Spanish colonialgovernment attempted to conquer the Muslimstates to add their territories to the Spanishcolonies in the Philippine Islands but historytells us that it never succeeded. The Bangsamorosultanates with their organized maritimeforces and armies succeeded in defending theBangsamoro territories, thus preserving theirindependence.

The Bangsamoro resistance continued evenwhen American forces occupied some areas inMindanao and Sulu. Though the resistance was

not as erce as during the Moro-Spanish wars,guerrilla attacks against American forces andinstallations reinforced what remained of thesultanates military power. Even Bangsamoroindividuals showed deance against Americanoccupation of their homeland by attackingAmerican forces in operations called prangsabil (martyrdom operation).

When the United States governmentpromised to grant independence to the

Philippine Islands, the Bangsamoro leaders

registered their strong objection to be part ofthe Philippine Republic. In a petition to thePresident of the United States dated June 9,1921, the people of the Sulu archipelago saidthat they would prefer being part of the United

States rather than be included in an independentPhilippine nation.6

In the Declaration of Rights andPurposes, the Bangsamoro leaders meetingin Zamboanga on February 1, 1924, proposedthat the Islands of Mindanao and Sulu,and the Island of Palawan be made anunorganized territory of the United Statesof America7 In Lanao, the leaders who weregathered in Dansalan (now Marawi City) on

March 18, 1935 appealed to the United Statesgovernment and the American people not toinclude Mindanao and Sulu in the grant ofindependence to the Filipinos.

Under the Philippine Republic

Despite their objections, in 1946, theBangsamoro became part of the new politicalentity called the Republic of the Philippines.Their incorporation in the new state was notwelcomed for they continuously considerthemselves a separate nation. The Bangsamoroclaim that they belong to a separate nation byvirtue of their distinct identity is articulatedby Muhammad al-Hasan in these words:

We [Moros and Filipinos] are two different peoples adhering to different ideologies, havingdifferent cultures, and nurtured by different historicalexperiences.

We have contradistinct conceptions ofsovereignty. The Filipinos believe that sovereigntyresides in them, but we believe that sovereigntybelongs to God alone. The political, social, economicand judicial institutions they inherited from thecolonizers, organized on the basis of the separation ofspiritual and mundane aspects of life, are incongruouswith ours which are established on the postulates thatlife is a unity, God is the Sovereign and man is Hisvicegerent.

6 See Petition to the President of the United States of America from the People of the Sulu Archipelago in Salah Jubair,Bangsamoro: A Nation Under Endless Tyranny. (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: IQ Marin SDN BHD, 1999), 293-297.7 See A Declaration of Rights and Purposes Addressed to the Congress of the United States of America in Jubair, pp. 298-303.


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Our culture, imbued with Islamic beliefs, tenetsand principles, is diametrically in contrast withwhat is known today as Filipino culture which isthe amalgamation of the residues of the colonizerscultures. Our art, architecture, literature and music

have retained their Asian character [which] is nottrue [of] theirs.8

Under the Republic of the Philippines,the Bangsamoro complain that they sufferdiscrimination and oppression. Some of thesecomplaints are:

1. The Christian majority are biasedagainst Muslims as shown by studies.9

These prejudices lead to exclusion of the

Bangsamoro from jobs, education, housingand business opportunities. These areevident in the personal experiences ofMuslims on how they were shut out of jobs,housing and study opportunities recountedin the Philippine Human DevelopmentReport (PHDR 2005).

The PHDR 2005 survey revealed that aconsiderable percentage (33 per cent to39 per cent) of Filipinos is biased against

Muslims. Exclusion from job opportunitiesis very high given that 46 per cent of theChristian population would choose aChristian male worker and 40 percenta Christian female domestic helper.Only 4 per cent would choose a Muslimmale worker and 7 percent Muslimfemale domestic helper. Majority of theChristians cannot even accept Muslimsas neighbors, as the survey showed

that in Metro Manila 57 per cent opt forresidence with higher rent but far from aMuslim community.

The earlier study of Filipinas Foundation(1975) showed that Muslim-Filipinos werethe least likeable group, and 54% of thosewho responded to the question describingMuslims had unfavorable comments.

Muslim-Filipinos were described astreacherous, killers.

In the study among youth in Mindanao,majority (91%) of the Christians showedstronger biases and prejudices againstthe Muslims than the Muslims had forChristians. In terms of acceptance, thestudy reveals that: More than 90 percent of the Muslim youth respondentswere more willing to accept Christians as

associates or to work, live together, whilemajority (87%) of the Christians are not.10

2. Due to government policies and programsthe Bangsamoro lost big portions of theirlands and became a minority in their ownhomeland.11

The Philippine government openedthe whole of Mindanao to resettlementand corporate investments. In 1903, the

Philippine Commission declared asnull and void all land grants made bytraditional leaders like sultans, datus, andtribal leaders if done without governmentconsent. Through the years the governmentimplemented public land laws which werediscriminatory to the Bangsamoro andother indigenous people of Mindanao,and favorable to Filipino settlers andcorporations.12 The introduction of public

land laws, which were based on the Regaliandoctrine, became an opportunity for thecolonized north-Filipino elites to own orlease substantial landholdings as well

8 Quoted by Peter G. Gowing, Of Different Minds: Christian and Muslim Ways of Looking at Their Relations in thePhilippines, International Review of Missions 265 (1978), p. 78.9 Christian prejudices against Muslims were revealing in the study conducted by Filipinas Foundation, Philippine Majority-Minority Relations and Ethnic Attitudes (Makati, Rizal, 1975) and in the Philippine Development Network, Philippine HumanDevelopment Report 2005 (PHDR 2005).10 Danny M. Alfaras, In the Minds of the Generation X: A Look at the Psycho-Cultural Dimension of the Mindanao

Conict. Paper presented at the SEACSN Conference 2004: Issues and Challenges for Peace and Conict Resolution inSoutheast Asia, Penang, Malaysia, 2004.11 On the minoritization of the Bangsamoro people, see B. R. Rodil, The Minoritization of the Indigenous Communities ofMindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.(Davao City: Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao, Inc. 1994)12 See Rudy B. Rodil, Philippine Government Policies on the Indigenous Peoples, paper presented during the Workshopon Multi-Ethnic Asia: Peace and Sustainable Development, Ho Chi Minh City, 16-20 April 2007.


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as a chance for the legal or systematiclandgrabbing of traditional lands13 of theMuslims.

The discrimination against Muslims and

indigenous peoples in land ownershipis evident in a number of laws passedduring the American colonial period thatlimited the hectarage that non-Christianscould own compared to Christians andcorporate entities.14

In 1954 the National Resettlement andRehabilitation Administration (NARRA)was established. Under this program,from 1954 through 1958 close to 23,400

Christian Filipino families were resettledin Cotabato.15

The consequence of the state policies onland ownership and encouragement ofChristian settlers to settle in Mindanaois the minoritization of the Bangsamoroin their traditional homeland. The landsthat remain to the Bangsamoro are thoselocated in the Autonomous Region inMuslim Mindanao (ARMM) and small

areas in other provinces.

3. Government failed to deliver basicservices and needed development toBangsamoro communities. In the ARMM,which comprises provinces where theBangsamoro constitute the majorityof the population, poverty incidencewas the highest in the country. Povertyincidence in ARMM was 60% in 2000,52.8% in 2003, and 61.8% in 2006, while thenational gures were 33%, 30% and 32.9%,respectively.16

Functional literacy rate in the region was62.9 (2003) while the national average was84.1.17 Out-of-school children and youth

are also highest in the ARMM (23.1%)while the national average is 14.7%.18

ARMMs under-ve and child mortalityrates are very high at 45 and 12 deaths

per thousand live births, respectively,compared to the countrys UFMR andCMR at 32 and 8 deaths per thousand livebirths in 2006, respectively.19

4. The Government has also failed toprotect the persons and properties of theBangsamoro people. There were reportedmassacres of Muslims and destructionof their properties but the governmentfailed not only to give them protection

but also to give them justice. No seriousinvestigations were conducted and noone was held responsible in many of theseincidents of human rights violations.Killings of Muslims and wholesaleburning of villages dating back to the1960s and 1970s remain unsolved tothis day with no effort on the part ofthe Philippine Government to eveninvestigate them.

Continuing Assertion forIndependence

The Bangsamoro consider the annexationof their homeland as illegal and immoral sinceit was done without their plebiscitary consent.On this basis and with their sad state of affairsunder the Philippines, the Bangsamoro peoplecontinue to assert their right to independence.Their assertions manifest in many forms.

The armed resistance of Kamlon, Jikiriand Tawan-Tawan were protests against theusurpation of their sovereign right as a people.Some Muslims who joined the Philippinegovernment used the new political system to

13 Myrthena L. Fianza, Contesting Land and Identity In The Periphery: The Moro Indigenous People of Southern Philip-pines. Working paper prepared for the 10th Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Com-mon Property held at Oaxaca, Mexico on August 9-13, 2004, p. 5.14

Rodil, Philippine Government Policies on the Indigenous Peoples.15 Michael O. Mastura,Muslim Filipino Experience. (Manila: Ministry of Muslim Affairs, 1984), p. 245.16 http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2006_05mar08/table_2.asp17 http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/2003/03tabE.htm18 http://www.census.gov.ph/data/pressrelease/2003/pr0375tx.html19 First ARMM Progress Report on the Millennium Development Goals


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pursue the vision of regaining independence.Congressman Ombra Amilbangsa from theProvince of Sulu, for example, led HouseBill No. 5682 during the fourth session ofthe Fourth Philippine Congress seeking the

granting and recognition of the independenceof Sulu. As expected, the bill found its way intothe archives of Congress since there were fewMuslim members of Congress. Then on May 1,1968, the then provincial governor of Cotabato,Datu Udtog Matalam, made a dramatic movewhen he issued the Mindanao IndependenceMovement (MIM) manifesto calling for theindependence of Mindanao and Sulu to beknown and referred to as the Republic of

Mindanao and Sulu.

The peaceful movement for independencewas deected when the Ilaga, which weregovernment-backed Christian militias, attackedMuslim communities in the early 1970s, burningmosques and houses, and massacring hundredsof people, including women and children. TheMuslims were left with no other alternative butto ght back to defend themselves and theircommunities.

Independence Movements

Thus it was inevitable that broad-basedorganized movements to break free from whatwas viewed as the oppression of the PhilippineGovernment would eventually arise. Nolonger was resistance going to be sporadic,undertaken by individuals in isolated areas ofMindanao, but it had now acquired a broad-based sustained character, nding sympathynot only among Muslims in the Philippines butin the Muslim world.

Thus rose the Moro National LiberationFront (MNLF) leading the struggle not onlyto defend the Muslim communities but alsoto regain their lost independence. The MNLFstruggle lasted for more than twenty years, fromearly 1970s when widespread ghting broke outthroughout Mindanao and Sulu until the Final

Peace Agreement was signed by the MNLF and

the Philippine Government in September 1996.

When the MNLF accepted autonomywithin the framework of Philippinesovereignty a faction of the MNLF separated

and formed the Moro Islamic LiberationFront (MILF) to continue the struggle forindependence which the leaders of the MILFbelieved had been abandoned by the MNLFleadership. The break between the MNLF andthe MILF came with the signing of the TripoliAgreement in 1976 between the MNLF and thePhilippine Government. Since that time theMILF steadily grew in strength until todaywhen it is recognized as the main resistancemovement for self-determination of the

Bangsamoro people.

Even though the MNLF signed a series ofagreements with the Philippine Government,culminating in what is referred to as the FinalPeace Agreement in 1996, and the MILF in turnhas been engaged in talks with the PhilippineGovernment since 1997 to try to nd a formulato put an end to the war, the struggle continuesto this day. One continues to read of ghtingoccurring in different areas of Mindanao, withhundreds of thousands of innocent civiliansbeing displaced and deaths of combatants andnon-combatants being practically a daily affair.

The end of the struggle of the Bangsamoropeople for self-determination is still far fromover.

Government Responses

The Government position in respondingto the struggle of the Bangsamoro peoplehas always been on the premise that they areFilipino citizens, including those ghting thegovernment,20 and that any solution to resolvethe conict has to be within the sovereigntyand territorial integrity of the Philippines.

To reinforce these policies governmenttakes on three elemental approaches to itsconict with the Bangsamoro people.

20 Reective of this policy is President Ferdinand E. Marcos statement during the Special Session of the Batasang Bayan,May 3, 1977. See The Presidents Report on Southern Philippines, Batasang Bayan, May 3, 1977.


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1. To deect the underlying political issuesof the conict, government admittedneglect. The government is insistent thatthe problem is the absence of economicdevelopment. That is why within the span

of the administration of ve presidents,government efforts are always focused ondevelopment of Mindanao.

Earlier, the Philippine governmentpursued vigorously its national integrationprogram. The Commission on NationalIntegration (CNI) was established chargedwith carrying out within ten years a broadrange of programs designed to attend tothe economic and educational phase of

cultural minority problems.21 In June1955 Congress passed a law establishingthe Mindanao State University to promotethe government program of education toaccelerate the integration of the Muslimsinto the body politic. In 1961, the MindanaoDevelopment Authority (MDA) wasalso established to hasten the economicdevelopment of Mindanao.

After the conict ared up into armedconfrontation between governmentand MNLF forces in the early 1970s,the government created a PresidentialTask Force for the Reconstruction andDevelopment the purpose of which wasto pool all government resources from itseconomic development, nancial, welfare,and health agencies as well as militaryunits22 in order to assess the damagecaused by the conict, to prepare an

integrated plan for full reconstruction andrehabilitation of Mindanao, and restorepeace and order.

To appeal to the religious sense of theMuslims, the Code of Muslim PersonalLaws of the Philippines was decreed intolaw in 1977. These laws were extractedfrom Islamic jurisprudence on person and

family. Shariah courts were subsequentlyorganized in Muslim communitiesand Shariah judges were appointed toadjudicate cases involving marriage andinheritance. The Philippine Amanah Bank,

with a mandate to operate in accordancewith Islamic banking principles, was alsoestablished.

2. The government, invoking its sovereignright to maintain its territorial integrity,unleashed its military might against theBangsamoro. The military campaign hasbeen very costly. Based on the revelationsof former Congressman Eduardo Ermita,MindaNews reported the following:

In a privilege speech in July 1996, then Rep.Eduardo Ermita, who became Presidential

Adviser on the Peace Process citing data fromthe Armed Forces of the Philippines, showed howover a period of 26 years since 1970, more than100,000 persons had been killed in the conictin Mindanao, 30 per cent of that governmentcasualties, 50 per cent rebels and 20 percentcivilians.

Ermita said 55,000 persons were injured, notcounting those from the rebel side. From 1970 to1976 alone, he said, an average of 18 people wereslain everyday.

All in all, Ermita said, the AFP spent P73billion in the 26-year period, or an average of 40

per cent of its annual budget.23

A government think tank reported thatThe toll on human lives and property

was heavy on both sides. Independentestimates came out with these numbers:50,000 deaths, 2 million refugees, 200,000houses burned, 535 mosques and 200schools demolished, and 35 cities andtowns destroyed.24

The World Bank assessment of directeconomic costs of the conict is $23

21

Mastura, pp. 245-246.22 Quoted by Mastura, p 248.23 Carolyn O. Arguillas, The Cost of War. Part 1: Economic cost of never ending conict is P30-M dailyMindaNews,posted March 26, 2003. http://www.mindanews.com/2003/03/26pep-cost1.html24 Carolina Hernandez, The AFPs institutional responses to armed conict: a continuing quest for the right approach,Philippine Institute for Development Studies Policy Notes, No. 2006-02 (March 2006), p. 3.


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billion, and the human and social toll sincethe 1970s has been heavy. The World Bankreport shows an estimate of 120,000 deaths,and uncounted numbers of woundedand disabled; and more than two million

people displaced.25

In the year 2000 whengovernment troops attacked the MILFcamps, around 932,000 civilians weredisplaced from their homes. The WorldBank report shows that Majority of peoplewho were displaced as a result of theconict in Mindanao that erupted in 2000were Muslims.26 Around 390,000 peoplewere again displaced when governmenttroops attacked MILF enclaves in Pikitand Pagalungan in February 2003. Whenarmed clashes between government andMILF forces resumed after the signingof the MOA-AD was aborted, more thanhalf a million people were displaced.As to casualties, 170 were reported deadand 123 injured; and 2,356 houses weredestroyed.27

3. Negotiation is another approach adopted bythe Philippine government. Negotiations

with the MNLF started in 1975 and ended in1996. The signicant agreements betweenthe GRP and MNLF were the TripoliAgreement of 1976 and the 1996 FinalPeace Agreement. The Tripoli Agreementprovided for the establishment of autonomyfor Muslims in Southern Philippines,within the realm of the s

challenges to human security in complex situations: the case of conflict in the southern philippines

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