change in military organization

Change in Military OrganizationAuthor(s): David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler SegalSource: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 9 (1983), pp. 151-170Published by: Annual ReviewsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2946061 .

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Ann. Rev. Sociol. 1983. 9:151-70 Copyright ? 1983 by Annual Reviews Inc. All rights reserved

CHANGE IN MILITARY ORGANIZATION 1

David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal

Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742, and Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Washing- ton DC 20012

Abstract Recent literature in military sociology is reviewed in the context of theories regarding increasing rationality on the part of societies, organizations, and individuals. Models that emphasize individualistic orientations to military service are compared with models that assume a more collectivistic orientation. Attention is paid to the shift from a mobilization-based armed force to a force in being, and to the convergence between military and civilian organizations. Several consequences of the rationalization of the military are considered, including potential changes in willingness to fight, military unionization, changes in professionalism, the substitution of management for leadership, increased utilization of women, and dependence on research, including social science research.

INTRODUCTION

One of the major themes of classical sociological theory is reflected in contemporary conceptualizations in the sociology of economic life: the theme of increasing rationality. In classical theory, the theme is manifested in distinc- tions such as mechanical vs. organic solidarity (see below). In the sociology of economic life it appears as the "modernization model" that has dominated the field in the post-World War II years (Makler et al 1982).

'The opinions or assertions contained herein are the private views of the authors and are not to be construed as official or as reflecting the views of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.

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The rationalization theme proposes changes at the social system, organizational, and individual levels that are consequential for military organization and its relationship to civilian society. At the social system level, the model emphasizes the emergence of characteristics such as adoption of scientific technology, urbanization, secularization, commercialization, decline of infor- mal customs, and the rise of legal systems. With regard to organizations and occupations, the model portends greater levels of bureaucratization and professionalism. At the individual level, it anticipates behavior based increasingly on calculative self-interest.

Military organizations tend to be microcosms of the societies that host them, and thus the rationalization of society and its civilian institutions should be reflected in the military as well. In some ways, however, the military is an anachronism in modem society, and it is empirically questionable whether the primordial functions of an armed force can be rationalized. It is certainly questionable whether economic rationality is an appropriate or effective motivation for serving in the military. Should fighting wars be left to those who need the work? This essay attempts to summarize the ways in which the literature of military sociology and of related disciplines has attempted to address these issues in recent years.

Because one of the aspects of societal rationalization is an increasing dependence on science, and because our discipline and its siblings claim the mantle of science, we pay special attention to the role the social sciences have played in the development of military organizational, personnel, and manpower policy. While our empirical focus is primarily on the United States and its ground combat forces, reflecting the literature that we seek to summarize, we believe that the patterns we discuss below are common, at least among the industrial democracies of the Western world.

THE SOCIETAL CONTEXT: CHANGE IN MODERN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION The Rationalization of Societies One of the major themes of classical sociological theory concerns changes in the organization of social relationships that can be inferred to be correlated with modernity. Toennies's (1957) notion of Gemeinschaft, for example, refers to pre-industrial societies in which social relationships are seen as ends rather than means, and people are seen as sharing a common fate. Under conditions of industrialized Gesellschaft, by contrast, people view each other as means in their rational pursuit of individual self-interest. Similarly, for Durkheim (1949), societies characterized by low population density and little division of labor are held together by the moral consensus of mechanical solidarity, while increased societal complexity, population growth, and division of labor lead to



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increased individualism and a need to replace the moral consensus with more organic forms of solidarity.

These typologies, and others like them, are based upon differences in rationality at the system level (Weber 1947) and are manifested in differences in the degree to which social values and social structures grant primacy to and reward individual as against collective goals. These differences are important to military sociologists, particularly to those concerned with modern industrial societies, because, at least for land warfare, strong affective ties in military units have been shown to be essential for effectiveness. Thus the interpersonal relationships required within small military units for effective operation may be at variance with the value systems and institutions of pre-service socialization that shape the perspectives of their personnel. Indeed, formal military organization itself may interfere with the development of small-unit cohesion.

That the United States manifests the characteristics of a rationalized society is a theme appearing repeatedly in sociological analyses of American life. Riesman (1950), for example, while noting the trend toward increasing "other- directedness," does not see this as a quest for fulfillment of collective goals, but rather for recognition of individual achievement as measured against consensual standards. Stein (1960) documents the change in the nature of social relationships within communities as well, extending in particular to the military, where the bureaucratic aspects of organization and the caste-like aspects of the rank structure preclude the development of a collective sense of community. Indeed, in Stein's view, even the interpersonal attachments among groups of buddies that military sociology made much of at the end of World War II, and that we discuss at greater length below, were seen as relatively unimportant (see also Vidich & Stein 1960).

This is not to argue that American life has become wholly individualistic. Indeed, as Lipset (1963) notes, the themes of individualism and achievement coexisted with that of equality at the birth of the republic. While analysts like Riesman (1950) or Whyte (1956) see the traditional achievement orientation being replaced with "other direction" or the development of a "social ethic," Lipset sees a continuing interplay between the values of individualism and equality.

From a more psychological perspective, the direction of social change can be interpreted in terms of the motivational theories of Thomas (1923:4) and of Maslow (1954). The individualism that characterized the first 150 years of America's national existence can be seen as a striving to achieve basic goals: safety (Maslow) or security (Thomas). As we entered the age of affluence in the mid-20th century, it might be argued, we moved beyond the basic subsistence needs and emphasized instead a quest for love, affection, belongingness, and esteem (Maslow), recognition and response (Thomas). This might explain



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the "other-directedness" and "social ethic" identified at mid-century. It also anticipates further changes, as belongingness goals are fulfilled and replaced by higher order goals: Thomas's need for new experiences and Maslow's self- actualization.

In a Gemeinschaft society, belongingness is pervasive. Primary group relationships predominate; individuals bear stong allegiances to their groups; and the groups exert strong social control over members, often limiting individual freedom and achievement. Social changes toward Gesellschaft provide individuals with greater opportunities for self-actualization, but they also make belongingness more problematic. Indeed, in the highly segmented, pluralistic America of the 1980s, we see various responses among our youth to unfulfilled needs for strong group ties and consensual values, including devotion to religious cults.

This formulation is relevant to the analysis of military organization. The United States Army in the 1980s has been emphasizing "belongingness" goals, manifested through programs to improve group performance by enhancing unit cohesion. At the same time, looking toward the high technology battlefield of the future, it is seeking ways to elicit high performance from individual soldiers. "Be all that you can be," a major recruiting slogan, is explicitly tied to Maslow's notion of self-actualization. The question that remains is whether self-actualization in military organization will in fact produce the army of the year 2000, or whether it will more closely resemble Southern California, circa 1970, which may be our most dramatic empirical example to date of a system based on self-actualization. As we move beyond belongingness, the interplay between equality and individualism that Lipset identifies as pervasive themes in American society may shift toward the latter.

The Rationalization of Organizations Weber's analysis of the rationalization of Western societies was accompanied by a vision of the rationalization of organizations within those societies. This included military organizations. Like rationalized society, the rational-legal bureaucratic organization was seen as characterized by a division of labor based upon laws and regulations, a clear hierarchy, management based upon written documents, specialization based on training, the full involvement of the official, and acceptance of general rules. Weber (1968:981) saw the military becoming bureaucratized as the obligation and right to serve in the military were transferred from the "shoulders of the propertied to those of the property- less." Weber also, of course, saw emerging military technologies as necessitat- ing the growth of military bureaucracy.

Weber's ideal typical bureaucracy notwithstanding, the extreme rationalization of organizations, manifested by Taylor's (1911) approach to "scientific management" early in the 20th century, did produce problems of alienation,




disaffection, and low productivity. By mid-century, it was being replaced by a more "human relations" oriented approach to personnel management (e.g. Roethlisberger & Dickson 1939). In turn, this moved organizational models beyond the rigid Weberian bureaucracy and toward more adaptive forms (e.g. Bennis & Slater 1968). This has been manifested in a general concern for the quality of work life (e.g. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1973) and the introduction of a range of organizational development strategies aimed at improving organizational functioning (e.g. Bowers 1973). Most recently and specifically, there have been attempts to adapt "Quality Circles," a worker involvement strategy developed in America but used most widely in the Japanese context, for use in American organizations, including the military (Blair & Hurwitz 1982).

As we shall see below, these changing philosophies of management have had an effect on the nature of military organization. As we shall further see, they reflect a central problem in the sociology of rationality. The general theoretical approach assumes increasing rationality at societal, organizational, and individual levels. Classical theories of organizational rationality, however, assume that individuals respond on the basis of organizational goals rather than self- interest (Ritzer 1982). Organizational strains can be seen in part as a result of incompatibilities between rationality at the macro-organizational and individual levels.

The Rationalization of Individuals Concern in the social sciences with rationality at the individual level has been manifested most strongly in utilitarian economics, psychology, and behavioral- ly oriented sociology-most notably exchange theory (Segal 1982). Most analyses of rationality have in fact failed to distinguish the individual from the collective level (Parsons 1976), perhaps because utilitarians assume that individuals acting in their own self-interest will, in the aggregate, serve the collective good. This assumption, however, has not been supported by the weight of evidence and argument. Olson (1965:2), for example, addresses the question of whether it is rational for individuals to help achieve the collective good. He finds that, while the utilitarian assumption holds in small groups, rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve the common interests of large-scale collectivities, in most cases, in the absence of coercion or other special considerations. Similarly, Janowitz (1978:29) notes that "the individualistic pursuit of economic self-interest can account for neither collective social behavior nor the existence of a social order...

Rational organizations are designed to minimize the discretionary behavior of individuals and in the extreme to replace labor with capital to make organizational processes more routine and predictable. Increasing the opportunity of individuals to make calculated choices among alternatives is not quite consis-



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tent with the goal of organizational rationality, particularly since the processes of rational individual choice are constrained by lack of information, uncertain- ty, complexity, and other factors (Arrow 1951). Yet in a culture that values rationality at the societal and organizational levels, that same value is likely to be manifested at the individual level as well, and the seeming incompatibility between rationality at organizational and individual levels is likely to be consequential at both levels. This is a problem that military organization, as well as other organizations in modern industrial society, must address.

TRADITIONAL MODEL OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION Roots in Military History and Military Sociology Two models dominate contemporary debate on military manpower and military organization, one emphasizing traditional mechanical forms of social solidarity, and the other emphasizing more organic forms. The two models are rooted in different scholarly disciplines. Their influence on the policy process has been affected not only by their inherent worth, but also, and perhaps more important, by the relationships existing between their parent disciplines and the world of public policy (Segal 1983a).

The traditional model, emphasizing mechanical solidarity, appeared in military history, and was affirmed by military sociology. Prior to World War I, the French military analyst Ardant du Picq (1958) recognized that the rational analysis of military organization and military formations tended to be wrong, because it neglected intangible factors, such as morale, that are difficult to determine objectively, but that are nonetheless imperative to effective military operation. In the American forces in World War II, S.L.A. Marshall (1947) rediscovered the principle that morale, rooted in a feeling of unity, gives soldiers the courage to fight. Marshall's findings, based on after-action combat interviews, were confirmed by the surveys of Stouffer and his team of researchers in the War Department (Stouffer et al 1949). The importance of the affective relationships noted in the American Army was also found for the Wehrmacht by Shils & Janowitz (1948).

As Moskos (1976a) notes, in the period since World War II, military sociologists have observed a decline in the primary group as the basis for social cohesion and combat performance. Little (1964) sees the primary group as being replaced by buddy relationships in the Korean War; Moskos (1970:134- 56) sees the American soldier in Vietnam as fighting a "privatized" war. The cause of the decline in the cohesion of the fighting unit is attributed to the military rotation system.

Moskos's (1976a) view is that the importance of the primary group for combat soldiers in World War II has been overstated. We think the importance




of primary relationships has not declined as much as has been thought. This can be seen in empirical evidence of strong affective ties in combat units and in the implementation of military policies designed to foster group cohesion. While the individual rotation policies of the Korean period did disrupt primary group relations in the Army, such relations persisted as networks of interpersonal linkages (Faris 1977). Moreover, recognizing the importance of the primary group, the Army experimented with unit rotation during Korea (Chesler et al 1955) and on at least four additional occasions between Korea and Vietnam (Segal 1982). While an individual rotation policy was followed during Viet- nam, primary groups did develop among soldiers. Since this occurred despite, rather than as a consequence of, rotation policies, primary groups crystallized around counter-organizational, rather than organizational, norms (Helmer 1974).

After Vietnam, a new and ongoing series of initiatives were begun in the Army to create an organization that generates and nurtures cohesion. The Army's Chief of Staff has put into place programs to build unit cohesion through stabilization of personnel, develop symbolic identification with units through the implementation of a regimental system, and develop linkages between military units and their host civilian communities through a program of home-basing. He has publicly attributed many of these initiatives to the influence of Morris Janowitz (Binder 1982).

It may well be that in a large, rational organization like the military it is not possible to create strongly cohesive primary groups. Primary affective ties are more likely to be characterized as social networks of interpersonal bonds. The more densely structured and interconnected the networks, the more cohesive the units. There may also be performance strength in "weak ties" (Granovetter 1973) because the group can remain intact and functioning despite the loss of individual members.

Affectivity, Solidarity, and Symbols The emphasis placed on primary groups by studies in military sociology in World War II has been interpreted largely in terms of a deterministic model, denying the effects of other factors such as attachment to secondary symbols (e.g. Savage & Gabriel 1976). Actually, Shils & Janowitz (1948), while noting the apolitical attitudes of German soldiers, noted as well their personal devotion to national leaders. Similarly, in the case of the US forces, Shils (1950) noted that the "tacit patriotism" of the American soldier contributed to combat motivation. Moskos (1970) discussed the importance of "latent ideology" for American troops in Vietnam. Indeed, Moskos (1976a) viewed ideology as more important than group cohesion for the combat motivaton of American soldiers in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. In the Soviet Union, the



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importance of ideology in the motivation of soldiers has been manifested in active programs of political socializaton both in support of, and within, the military (Jones & Grupp 1982).

Through the last two decades of debate on the draft and the all-volunteer force, sociologists have argued for the citizenship component in military service (Janowitz 1967). However, with the advent of the concept of the "welfare state" in sociology, and a concern with the benefits that society provides, or should provide, to the citizenry, the notion that citizenship involves obligations as well as rights got displaced. The concurrent emergence of the welfare state and the military force-in-being after World War II produced the competition for economic resources between "guns and butter" and helped redefine the relationship between the citizen and the state in terms of economic support (see Harries-Jenkins 1981). Only recently has there been a return to the inclusion of obligations in the conceptualization of citizenship (Janowitz 1980), and a recognition that the concepts of citizenship and patriotism have consequences for military organization (Janowitz 1979, 1982a). Empirical support for the principle that the population will support the military establishment when there is a clear sense of national purpose and need comes from survey data that show growing support for registration and for a military draft, as well as a willingness among a plurality of young American males to volunteer for service in the event of a necessary war (Segal 1981 a). One of the emerging issues in military sociology is how citizenship education and military service are to be articulated in a welfare state context in which citizenship itself is increasingly defined in economic rather than political terms (Janowitz 1983; Segal 1983b).

MODERN MODEL OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION Roots of the Model in Econometrics and Industrial Psychology The mechanical model of military solidarity has been developed by learned disciplines whose practitioners have, except for periods of wartime mobilization, been based primarily in universities. The model was therefore more popular outside the policy arena than within it. The organic model, by contrast, has been advocated by disciplines whose practitioners have long felt it legitimate to leave the groves of academe and involve themselves in the policy process: economics and psychology. The blueprint for an all-volunteer military force in the United States was drawn during the debate on military manpower during the Vietnam War, largely by economists like Friedman (1967) and Oi (1967). While the blueprint was produced largely by economists with academic appointments, the subsequent use of economists within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as under contract to that office, incorporated the individualistic utilitarian perspective into the policy process. President Nixon's




Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Gates et al 1970) defined the military personnel issue largely in terms of economic concerns and concluded that in terms of wage and labor elasticities, an all-volunteer force was feasible. The military manpower problem was seen as the problem of the rational economic actor. Was there an affordable wage that would attract sufficient numbers of individuals to military service to meet America's national security needs? The answer the Commission arrived at was affirmative.

The individualistic orientation brought to Defense by the economists was compatible with the behavioral science research programs within the military services. Since World War I, when psychologists began to develop selection and classification tests for the War Department, behavioral science within the services has been conceived primarily in individualistic psychological terms and has been devoted primarily to psychometric test development, human factors engineering, and the development of training technologies (Segal 1983c). With the advent of the all-volunteer military force in 1973, the emphasis placed on individual incentives by the economists in the Defense secretariat, and an assumption of increasing similarities between military and civilian organizations (discussed below), led the psychologists in the services to consult the work their colleagues were doing in industrial settings. They thus set out to measure, and to improve, the quality of work life in the military. While the psychologists shared with the economists an emphasis on the individual, they did not believe that motivations to serve in the military were purely economic. Thus the human relations approach to management has become manifested in military forces. This trend toward research and policy focussing on the quality of work life in the military has appeared across services and in several industrialized nations (Holz & Gitter 1974; Manley et al 1975; Borup- Nielsen et al 1974; Stenton 1980; Payne 1974).

Individualism and Utilitarianism Since the advent of the all-volunteer force in America, the nature of the American military institution has come under widespread criticism from policy-makers, journalists, and sociologists, among others (e.g. Janowitz & Mos- kos, 1979). Much of the sociological critique has concerned recruiting short- falls, the quality of personnel recruited, the sociodemographic unrepresenta- tiveness of the force, and the alteration in the definition of citizenship obligations that accompanied the all-volunteer force. Responses by Department of Defense economists to these charges have not directly addressed the issues of representativeness and citizenship but have focussed on variables most relevant to them and most manipulable at the individual level: personnel quantity and quality. Economic analyses have repeatedly demonstrated either that the all- volunteer force was not doing as badly as its detractors claimed (e.g. Cooper 1982), or that if it had problems, they were due to not meeting the economic



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requirements assumed by the Gates Commission (e.g. McNown et al 1980; Hunter & Nelson 1982). The issue of whether simply bringing greater numbers of personnel into the armed forces produced an effective military organization was in the main not raised by scholars working from this perspective.

The approach of industrial psychologists has confronted more directly the issues of quality of work life, both by direct interventions aimed at improving the climate of the work environment and by more general attempts to improve the quality of organizational life, broadly defined to include problems of the military family and the military community (see below). Interventions in the work environment have met with limited success. Studies have repeatedly shown greater discrepancies between employee preferences and employee experiences in military than in civilian work environments (Segal 1978). Correcting these discrepancies through the use of organizational development strategies devised in the civilian sector assumes similarity between military and civilian organizations. As we argue below, there are limits to these similarities. Moreover, many of the sources of dissatisfaction of military personnel are matters of national policy, beyond the control of the military services themselves-e.g. compensation levels and fringe benefits. Among the organizational dimensions that are manipulable, some intervention programs have produced modest improvements. A recent review of the US Army's organizational effectiveness program, for example, notes that most such operations have been considered successful but that most of the data supporting this conclusion came from people within the program or supporters of it (US Army Research Institute 1980).

THE CONVERGENCE OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION Convergence and the Emergence of a Force in Being Prior to World War II, there were important differences between civilian and military organizations, between the military and civilian work forces, and between military service and civilian employment. There were crucial tech- nological differences between the two spheres, rooted in the fact that military and civilian personnel spent their time doing different things. Warfare was primarily a land-based activity; infantry and, increasingly, armor (which had only recently replaced the mounted cavalry) were the core of the army. The military world was overwhelmingly male, predominantly young, and predominantly unmarried. The military work force was elastic, expanding rapidly in times of war, largely through conscription, and demobilizing rapidly thereaf- ter, with most personnel returning to civilian life. For those who were mobil- ized, military service was seen as a short-term obligation to the state, rather than as a career.




With the increased use of air power between the two world wars, and with the advent of nuclear technology in World War II, warfare became more capital- intensive in the middle part of the 20th century. Military organization began to require personnel with skills that were also needed in the civilian economy. Moreover, as technology deprived nations of the lead time required to mobilize for war from a small base, and as it became obvious that in a confrontation between major powers victory would be Pyrrhic, the military mission came to be defined in terms of deterrent and peace-keeping operations (Janowitz 1960: 418-41; Janowitz 1974; Moskos 1975; Moskos 1976b). The distinction between peacetime and wartime became less relevant for military organization. The need to maintain a large standing force became obvious, as the deterrence concept, and the need to respond rapidly should deterrence fail, assumed primacy (Segal & Segal 1983). The mass force, based on the mobilization model, declined after World War II. With the emergence of a "new long term trend . . . toward smaller, fully professional, and more fully alerted and self-contained military forces, the direction was away from a mobilization force to a military force 'in being' " (Janowitz 1975:121). Thus the military began to require a large full-time work force. By the 1950s and 1960s, military sociology was stressing the increased similarity of military and civilian sectors of American society (Janowitz 1965:17).

Scholars quickly recognized, however, that common technologies, leading to common organizational forms, could not eliminate the fundamental difference between the military and civilian spheres, (Janowitz 1971), a difference rooted in the unique mission of the military: the management of large-scale, organized, legitimate violence on behalf of the state. Moskos (1970:70) took an extreme position, which he has since rejected, that the trend toward convergence of civilian and military organizations had been reversed.

The position Moskos subsequently adopted became the basis for a more refined model of civil-military convergence. Moskos (1973) argued that some elements of the armed forces would be organizationally divergent and traditionally military, particularly the ground combat forces, while others would be organizationally convergent and civilianized, particularly clerical, technical, and administrative areas. This theme of organizational differentiation has been further developed by other analysts (Hauser 1973; Bradford & Brown 1973).

Institutional and Occupational Models These changes in military organization have led to a variety of concepts dealing with the issue of rationalization. The concept that has had the most impact is that of Moskos (1977), who argues that military service is changing from a calling or vocation, legitimized by institutional values, to an occupation, legitimized by the labor market. From this perspective, a member of the armed services comes to see his/her service in much the same terms as does an



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employee in a civilian organization. Instead of being motivated by a desire to serve the common good, he/she is concerned with pay, benefits, and the quality of working life (Levitan & Alderman 1977).

Although it has been subject to some criticism (Janowitz 1977), Moskos's model has influenced the research agenda of military sociology. It has been tested empirically in the United States in both the Army (Segal et al 1983) and the Air Force (Stahl et al 1978, 1980, 1981), and in several foreign countries, including Canada (Cotton 1981). The major finding of these studies is that the modal modern soldier seems to be motivated by considerations that are in part institutional or normative and in part occupational or rationalistic. In addition, there may be a trend in the occupational direction. Equally interesting from a sociology of knowledge perspective is the fact that all of the United States military services have recently designed programs that explicitly attempt to reduce the occupational orientation and reaffirm the institutional nature of military service (Moskos 1982).

CONSEQUENCES OF RATIONALIZATION

Willingness to Fight One of the major questions raised by the assumption of a job-oriented military force is whether soldiers, sailors, and airmen motivated by labor force considerations will in fact be any more willing to go to war, should the need arise, than would the assembly-line workers in an automobile plant. In fact, in a series of extensive interviews with enlisted personnel, Gottlieb (1980:77) found that "few seemed to have given any serious thought as to how they would feel or behave given the need to enter a combat situation."

In a survey of 358 soldiers, Brown & Moskos (1976) found that 79% of their respondents would volunteer for combat, or go into combat if ordered, while 21 % would try to avoid combat or would refuse to go. Personnel in elite units (airborne and ranger) were significantly more willing to go into combat than those in more conventional ground maneuver units (infantry and armor). Other studies of paratroopers (Cockerham & Cohen 1981; Segal, Harris & Rothberg 1984) and Marines (Burrelli & Segal 1982) confirm the greater willingness of elite combat troops to go to war.

Military Unionization The redefinition of military service as a job rather than as a citizenship obligation raised the possibility that efforts might be made to unionize the armed forces. The armed forces of six of the NATO nations are, to varying degrees, unionized, and in 1975 the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), the federal civil service union, announced that it was considering opening its membership to military personnel. Concern over this




possibility resulted in the passage of a law and the issuance of a Department of Defense directive prohibiting military unionization. A flurry of social science research also ensued. In 1976 and 1977, three anthologies (Krendel & Samoff 1977; Sabrosky 1977; Taylor et al 1977) and a special issue of a scholarly journal (Armed Forces and Society, 1976) were published on the topic. This literature described the European military organizations that were unionized, as well as the special case of the Air National Guard's civilian technicians, who are unionized civilian employees during the week but don uniforms to do the same jobs as weekend warriors. Empirical research on American military personnel revealed a general concern over a perceived erosion of fringe benefits, a feeling that unionization might improve the economic lot of the soldier, and a fear that unionization might impair the effectiveness and professionalism of the military. A significant minority of military personnel (roughly one third in a series of surveys) reported they would join a military union. Support for unionization was highest among junior personnel, those who were not career-oriented, and those in noncombat specialties.

The Nature of Military Professionalism The professionalization of occupations is one characteristic of societal rationalization, and the issue of military professionalism has been the subject of extensive social science analysis. Two of the earliest influential works in military sociology (Janowitz 1960; Huntington 1957) sought to define the role of the military professional vis-a-vis society. However, only in the wake of the Vietnam War did analysts begin to recognize that despite their common functionalist orientation, there were important differences between the Jano- witz and Huntington perspectives. An alternate, more critical orientation developed.

Recent analyses have focussed on the military professional operating in a bureaucratic environment, in contrast to the individual activity of the "classical" professions, law and medicine. A second theme has been the subservience of the military profession to civilian political power, again in contrast to the presumed autonomy of the classical professions (Segal & Schwartz 1981). Finally, there has been a widespread concern with the behavior of American military personnel in Vietnam, in terms of both how this reflected on military professionalism and how it reduced public confidence in the military, again in presumed contrast to widespread trust and public acceptance of other professions (Huntington 1978; Peters & Clotfelter 1978; Sarkesian 1975, 1978, 1981). Only gradually have investigators recognized that these factors reflect more the similarities than the differences between the military and the classical professions: Doctors and lawyers work increasingly in bureaucratic contexts rather than as sole practitioners; their autonomy has been challenged, the esteem in which they are held by the public tarnished (Segal & Lengermann 1980).



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Leadership and Management The traditional image of the military commander is that of the warrior. A departure from this image in the United States can be dated to the early 20th century. During the greatest popularity of Taylor's scientific management, Secretary of War Elihu Root reviewed the experiences of the Spanish- American War and decided that most of the mistakes the Army had made in that conflict were caused by basic organizational problems. He brought rational organization and management to the defense establishment (Segal & Lenger- mann 1980:172; Bickel et al 1982). In the subsequent decades, and particularly since the institutionalization of operations research and systems analysis in the Pentagon by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the 1960s, the Defense Department has focussed increasingly on dispassionate rationalistic management. Operations researchers have omitted from their calculations any consid- eration of leadership as an affective relationship between commanders and their soldiers, a relationship that contributes to morale, esprit de corps, and other crucial intangibles as difficult to measure as leadership itself (Segal 1981b; Moskos 1981). This has occurred despite the trend in the armed forces toward the human relations orientation to management and away from the more crudely rationalistic scientific management approach. The same general trend has been observed in other Western nations as well (Martin 1981). In the United States, there has been a growing recognition that the rational management required by a large, high-technology military organization must be balanced by traditional leadership relationships if the military is to function effectively (Korb 1981).

Utilization of Women The process of rationalization in society entails increasing emphasis on individual achievement and a deemphasis on ascriptive characteristics. Such development also involves the granting of citizenship rights to previously disen- franchized groups. One of the consequences of these trends is the movement towards equality of treatment of males and females in societal institutions.

The position of American women has undergone change in many institutions in the past twenty years. Most notable has been the "subtle revolution" of women's increasing labor force participation (Smith 1979). Though the occupational world is still largely sex segregated (Smith 1979; US Department of Labor 1980; Waite 1981), more women have been participating in previously male-dominated domains, including the military. Indeed, during the decade of the 1970s, the number of military women and the variety of jobs they perform increased dramatically, and women were admitted to the service academies for the first time (Binkin & Bach 1977; DeFleur et al 1978; Department of Defense 1981; Hoiberg 1978; Johnson et al 1977; Priest et al 1978b; Safilios-Rothschild 1978; Segal & Blair 1978; M. Segal 1978; Stiehm 1981; US Army Research




Institute 1977). However, the force of traditional cultural values continues to oppose trends toward rationalization in decisions about women's military role (Segal & Segal 1983).

The military has traditionally been an exclusive male province characterized by prototypic masculine norms, with military service functioning as a rite of passage to manhood. As with other predominantly male occupations, research shows that military men in newly gender-integrated settings have negative attitudes toward the presence and performance of women (DeFleur & Gillman 1978; Durning 1978; Larwood et al 1980; Priest et al 1978a; Stiehm 1981). The influence of traditional values can also be seen in the legal prohibition against women in combat in the Navy and Air Force and in recent policy changes in the Army. These policies include a return to gender-segregated basic training, a reduction in the planned expansion in the number of women, and the exclusion of women from some jobs previously held by them. This slowing of gender integration in the Army also reflects the attempt to enhance unit cohesion. The belief that the presence of women interferes with group cohesion and "male bonding" has not been the subject of empirical research (M. Segal 1982, 1983).

Military Families and Communities The increasing rationality of American society has brought with it a -separation of work and family spheres. The military community is at an earlier stage in this process than other work settings. The relationship between the military organization and military families is currently being transformed by many factors, including changes in the structure of pay and benefits (Bachman et al 1977:20- 23), an increased proportion of married junior enlisted personnel, increased labor force participation of military wives, and the increased number of military women, dual service couples, and sole parents (Croan et al 1980; Grossman 1981; Hunter 1977; Hunter et al 1980; Hunter et al 1978; Hunter & Shaylor 1979; McCubbin & Marsden 1978; Orthner 1980; Orthner & Bowen 1982; Orthner & Nelson 1980).

While many of the trends in military families resemble those in civilian families, certain unique characteristics of the military organization and lifestyle may lead to different adaptations. Demands are placed on families by military requirements (e.g. geographic mobility, overseas tours, and absence of the military family member), and military families are making demands on the military organization for recognition and services. The military is struggling to define the boundaries of its responsibilities to families.

Utilization of Scientific Research Reflecting on his experience as an Army researcher during World War II, Stouffer (1962: 291-92) noted resistance to research on personnel issues. Rationalization, however, assumes increased use of science, and the expendi- ture for behavioral and social science research by defense establishments has



166 SEGAL & SEGAL

indeed been increasing (Segal 1983a). While psychology and economics dominate the social science research effort in the United States, the research program of the German Bundeswehr has made great progress in articulating the sociopolical context in which a modem military establishment operates (e.g. Zoll 1979; Lippert & Wachtler 1982). Even the relatively small personnel research program of the Canadian forces has shown increasing awareness of social-structural, as opposed to individual, variables (e.g. Cotton 1981; Pinch 1982).

Studies of the effects of social science research on military manpower policy yield mixed results. Segal (1983a) and Boene (1983) argue that sociology has had less effect than other social sciences. Focussing on policy research on the all-volunteer force, Snyder & Davis (1981), find the research has been relevant and timely. Janowitz (1982b), evaluating several specific cases of applied social science, concludes that the military is a somewhat better institution than it might have been had the research not been done. While the most positive of these evaluations are guarded at best, we find it notable that they were conducted at all. Their one common finding, that social science research has been used in the policy making process, reflects increasing rationalization.

CONCLUSION

Trends toward rationality in modem society have been reflected in the Amer- ican armed forces in bureaucratization and in increasing concerns with professionalism, management, and the cash nexus that links the serviceperson to the military. These trends are common in the corporate world as well. Thus in one sense the military can be seen not as a unique institution but rather as a laboratory in which widespread social processes can be observed. Perhaps the most general observation is the apparent incompatibility between individual and collective levels of rationality (see Barry & Hardin 1982).

Every institution, however, is unique. The combat function of the military, coupled with a conservative institutional culture, have led to vacillation in policies affecting the maintenance of the military as a "company town," the responsibility of the institution for the families of its members, the role of women, and the association between military service and citizenship (see Sherraden & Eberly 1982). Here too, however, the underlying factor seems to be the military's desire to maintain social solidarity in an increasingly individualistic social environment.

Particularly interesting for sociology as a discipline, as it moves out of the university and into applied settings, is the degree to which the rationalization of the military has been reflected in the utilizaion of social science research. Indeed, the military may be the arena in which sociological concepts have had their greatest policy impact.




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