changes in equity risk perceptions: global consequences and policy responses warwick j mckibbin anu...
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Changes in Equity Risk Perceptions:Global Consequences and
Policy Responses
Warwick J McKibbinANU and Brookings Institution
And
David VinesOxford, ANU and CEPR
Presented at the Bank of Canada Workshop on “Global Models and the Transmission of Shocks, 22 May 2003
Background
Two broad views of the current global economic slowdown• The result of weak aggregate demand that can be offset
through appropriate adjustments to monetary policies• The results of a reduction in aggregate supply resulting
from A downward revision in productivity growth in the OECD The collapse of the “new economy” bubble An increase in risk since September 11 and the war on terrorism
Goals of the Paper
To understand the current world economic slowdown in terms of the contribution of supply versus demand shocks when an equity bubble bursts
To explore the transmission of equity risk shocks between countries
To explore the optimal response of monetary policy in response to a sharp equity price adjustment
To explore whether there are gains to policy coordination in response to equity price shocks
Attempt to Quantify the Key Issues using a global model
Use the MSG3 model version 50o
(2 sector version of G-Cubed)
New version based on GTAP I/O data
www.gcubed.com
The G-Cubed Model
Key features• Based on explicit intertemporal optimization by
households and firms in each economy in a dynamic setting
• Substantial sectoral dis-aggregation with macroeconomic structure
• Explicit treatment of financial assets with stickiness in physical capital differentiated from flexibility of financial capital
• Short run deviation from optimizing behavior due to stickiness in labor markets, myopia
• Short run “New Keynesian” Model with Neoclassical steady state
G-Cubed Model
12 sectors production in each economy• Plus a capital good producing sector• Plus a household durable production sector (I.e. housing)
Estimation of KLEM technology in production and consumption
Tracks flows of international trade at the sectoral level Tracks flows of international capital Distinguishes between relatively traded and non trade goods
(all goods are potentially tradeable)
: The Structure of the G-Cubed Use Table
A) Interindustry transactions.B) Industry sales to final demand sectors.C) Purchases of primary factors by industries.D) Purchases of primary factors by final demand sectors.
1
...
12
C
I
G
X M
1
...
A
B
12
R
K
C
Kc
D
L
Derivative Models
We aggregate the full G-Cubed model by sectors and countries to create models suitable for particular purposes:
G-Cubed (Asia Pacific)
G-Cubed (Agriculture)
G-Cubed (Environment)
MSG3 (macro)
Countries In G-Cubed (Asia Pacific)
United States Japan Australia New Zealand Rest of the OECD Korea Thailand Indonesia China Malaysia Singapore Taiwan Hong Kong Philippines India Oil Exporting Developing Countries Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union Other Developing Countries
Sectors in G-Cubed (Asia Pacific)
Energy Mining Agriculture Durable Manufacturing Non-Durable Manufacturing Services
Countries: Exchange rate Regime:United States floatJapan floatAustralia floatCanada floatUnited Kingdom floatGermany Euro (floating)Austria Euro (floating)France Euro (floating)Italy Euro (floating)Rest of Euro Zone Euro (floating)Rest of OECD floatChina peg to $USnon Oil Developing countries peg to $USEastern Europe and Russia floatOPEC peg to $US
The MSG3 Model
The Simulations
1) Baseline 2002 • Assumptions about
population growth by country Productivity growth by sector catching up by 2% per year to US leading
sector Given tax rates, monetary growth rates etc in all countries
• Solve for rational expectations equilibrium for the global economy
2) apply the change in equity risk premium• Permanent versus temporary• US versus OECD Wide
Capital Stock (non Energy)
-120-100-80-60-40-20
0204060
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
USA (P) China (P)
USA (T) China (T)
GDP
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
USA (P) China (P) USA (T) China (T)
Permanent Versus Temporary
Employment
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
USA (P) China (P) USA (T) China (T)
Real Interest Rates
-4.5-4
-3.5-3
-2.5-2
-1.5-1
-0.50
0.5
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
USA (P) China (P) USA (T) China (T)
Permanent Versus Temporary
Current Account
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
USA (P) China (P) USA (T) China (T)
Real Exchange Rates
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
USA (P) China (P) USA (T) China (T)
Permanent Versus Temporary
OECD – Wide versus US Only
GDP
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
USA (S) China (S)
USA (A) China (A)
Capital Stock (non Energy)
-16-14-12-10-8-6-4-2024
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
USA (S) China (S)
USA (A) China (A)
OECD – Wide versus US Only
Real Interest Rates
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
USA (S) China (S)
USA (A) China (A)
Employment
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
USA (S) China (S)
USA (A) China (A)
OECD – Wide versus US Only
Current Account
-1-0.8-0.6-0.4-0.2
00.20.40.60.8
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
USA (S) China (S)
USA (A) China (A)
Real Exchange Rates
-5-4-3-2-1012345
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
USA (S) China (S)
USA (A) China (A)
Key Points
Equity Risk shock in the US is a large negative supply shock reducing the desired capital stock
Domestic variables in the US not affected much by whether the shock is in the US or in the OECD but international trade and capital flows and exchange rates are affected
Developing countries absorb some of the capital released and help reduce the global demand effect of the shock but very quickly diminishing returns in capital accumulation
US details for OECD – Wide Temporary
National Acounts
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
GDP Consumption Investment
Exports Imports
Assets
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
Capital Wealth H Wealth
Bonds For'n Assets
Employment and Inflation
-3-2.5
-2-1.5
-1-0.5
00.5
1
1.52
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
Employment CPI Inf lation PPI Inf lation
Wages and Prices
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
Wage CPI PPI
US details for OECD – Wide Temporary
Asset Prices
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
Nominal r Real r
Tobin q (nonenergy) Tobin Q Housing
Exchange Rates
-5
-4-3
-2-1
0
12
34
5
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
Real Eff ER Nominal Eff ER
US details for OECD – Wide Temporary
Key Points
Investment falls Consumption rises
• Housing prices rise which dampen the negative impact on wealth and consumption
Net exports improve• Capital outflow depreciates the currency• External balance acts as stabilizer except when all countries have
the shock
Real wages need to fall Aggregate demand falls as does aggregate supply
Optimal Policy Response
itiitt
t
itW
'
0
Policy makers choose a vector of instrument Ui to minimize:
Where τ is a vector of targets (inflation and employment), δ is a discount rate(10%) and Ω is a matrix with the diagonal elements being a set of weights on each target
Policy optimization
Two cases• Countries have weight of 2 on inflation and 1 on
employment (infemp)• Countries have weight 2 on inflation and zero on
employment (inf)
Optimal US Response to OECD-Wide
Nominal Interest Rates
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
USA (infemp) USA (inf)
GDP
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
USA (infemp) USA (inf)
Optimal US Response to OECD-Wide
Employment
-3-2.5
-2-1.5
-1-0.5
00.5
11.5
2
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
USA (infemp) USA (inf)
Inflation
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
USA (infemp) USA (inf)
Optimal US Response to OECD-Wide
Consumption
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
USA (infemp) USA (inf)
Real Exchange Rate
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
USA (infemp) USA (inf)
Optimal French Response to US Shock
National Acounts
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
GDP Consumption Investment
Exports Imports
Assets
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
Capital Wealth H Wealth
Bonds For'n Assets
Optimal French Response to US Shock
Employment and Inflation
-0.1-0.08
-0.06-0.04-0.02
0
0.020.040.06
0.080.1
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
Employment CPI Inflation PPI Inflation
Wages and Prices
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
Wage CPI PPI
Optimal French Response to US Shock
Asset Prices
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
Nominal r Real r
Tobin q (nonenergy) Tobin Q Housing
Exchange Rates
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
Real Eff ER Nominal Eff ER
Key Points
Impact on France of OECD wide shock similar to the results for the US
Impacts on France of US shock very different • Positive French supply shock but negative external
demand shock
US Results for Cooperation
Employment
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
Non Coop Coop
Inflation
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
Non Coop Coop
Europe Results for Cooperation
Employment
-3-2.5
-2-1.5
-1-0.5
00.5
11.5
2
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
Non Coop Coop
Inflation
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
Non Coop Coop
Conclusion
Shocks to equity risk premia have significant effects on the real economy
Both aggregate demand and supply are affected. Monetary policy can help in the short to smooth the
adjustment but it can do little to offset the underlying shock
Conclusion
Transmission• Within countries an equity risk shock
lowers real interest rates, Lowers real wages causes a capital outflow, raises other asset prices like housing Lowers investment but raises consumption and net exports
• Across Countries lowers real interest rates, causes a capital inflow, raises all asset prices including equities and housing Raises investment and consumption Lowers net exports
Conclusion
Monetary Policy Response• Within countries experiencing an equity risk shock
Demand falls more than supply thus a loosening of monetary policy can dampen to employment losses in the short run
• In countries not experiencing an equity risk shock Demand rises more than supply Employment rises but inflation falls due to falling prices in affected
countries and an exchange rate appreciation Interest rates should fall because of a fall in the global real interest rate
Conclusion
Gains from Policy Coordination• Compared the the optimal non-cooperative policies there
is little gained from cooperation in the face of an OECD wide shock
• In reality the current policy stance of the G7 particularly Europe and Japan are very far from the optimal policies in this paper (real interest rates in Europe and Japan are too high). To the extent that real world cooperation might move these region towards more sensible policy, cooperation could achieve significant gains