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CHANGING PATTERNS OF LOCAL GOVERNANCEIN TWO AFGHAN BADAKHSHANI DISTRICTS:

THE IMPACT OF OPIUM AND HEROIN

MARC THEUSS (marc.theuss@gmail.com)

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RESEARCH LOCALES: BADAKHSHAN

Tajikistan

Pakistan

China

•3.5 years in Afghanistan•3 months research:

•Afghan (Badakhshan)•Tajikistan (GBAO)

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RESEARCH LOCALES: WAKHAN

TAJIKISTAN

PAKISTAN

CHINA

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RESEARCH LOCALES: SHUGHNAN

TAJIKISTAN

PAKISTAN

CHINA

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RESEARCH LOCALES: GBAO

•Allows for empirical triangulation

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BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH

•Multiple professional trips to Wakhan (1 to Shughnan)

•Wakhan/Shughnan similar: contextual/parametric variables

•Counter-intuitively anecdotal evidence of radical difference:

•Political outcomes

•Political processes

•Power relations

•Conflict processing

•A research enigma. Why?

•Tentative hypothesis: Cross-border heroin trade vs market of addiction

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RESOURCES

CATEGORIES:ACTORS STRATEGIESNETWORKS

POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES

ANALYTICAL MODEL

•Methodologically problematic to study OPE

•Did not want to pre-empt the importance of OPE

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PARAMETRIC SIMILARITIES/DIFFERENCES

•Geography•Agro-ecology•Religion•Ethnicity

SHUGHNAN WAKHAN

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GEOGRAPHY

•Mountainous

•Peripheral

•Remote

SHUGHNAN WAKHAN

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AGRO-ECOLOGY

SHUGHNAN WAKHAN

•Low land-holding

•High household sizes

•1 cropping season per year

•Previously: moderate land

•Radically reduced now

•1 cropping season

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RELIGION

SHUGHNAN WAKHAN

•Shia Ismailis

•Respect 49th Imam (Aga Khan)

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ETHNICITY

SHUGHNAN WAKHAN

•Shughnis (Pamiri)•Minority non-indigenous Sunis:

•Drug dealers•Government bureaucrats

•Wakhis (Pamiris)•Minority non-indigenous Sunis:

•Politico-military•Drug dealers•Government bureaucrats

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SHUGHNAN: HEROIN/POSITIONALITY

•Shughnan transit point between:

•Largest opiate producing nation in world

•Global heroin nexus

UNODC: 50% Afghanistan’s GDP opiate-related

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SHUGHNAN: ESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE

•2003

•Ministry of Defence made a drug swoop: Bashur bazaar

•MoD. Pashtun senior Generals and Tajik soldiers

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SHUGHNAN: ESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE

•400 KGs heroin seized

•50 KGs opium

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SHUGHNAN: ESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE

•Based on 4 week working stock

•Market price 2,000 USD/KG

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SHUGHNAN: ESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE

•Annual heroin trade 9.6 million USD

•2 week working stock: 19.2 million USD

•Probably much higher: stock located off shop-sites: 40 million USD

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OPIUM TRADE: MARKETS OF ADDICTIONESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE

•20% population addicted

•10,000 population = 2,000 addicts

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OPIUM TRADE: ESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE

•Annual consumption 1.2 –2.4 million USD opium

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DIFFERENCES –COMMODITY

SHUGHNAN WAKHAN

HEROIN OPIUM

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DIFFERENCES –GROSS REVENUE

40 USD MILLION 2.4 USD MILLION

SHUGHNANWAKHAN

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DIFFERENCES –EXCHANGE ‘USE’/PURPOSE

GLOBAL TRADE SERVICE LOCAL ADDICTION

SHUGHNAN WAKHAN

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NO. TRANSACTIONS/YEAR

100 KGS PER CROSSING:

•48•96•192

Addict buys once weekly (average)

•Based on 7 grams/day consumption

•2,000 addicts

•100,000 transactions

SHUGHNAN WAKHAN

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REVENUE PER TRANSACTION

SHUGHNAN:

200,000 USD

WAKHAN:

24 USD

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THE ARGUMENT

•The nature of the resource bases in respective districts influences:

•Kinds of actors involved in the economic system

•Way actors articulate themselves in networks vis-à-vis systems

•Sorts of strategies that are appropriate, to achieve objectives

•Proviso: find that this relationship is not deterministic

•Strategies can change, despite the same resource base

•Very different outcomes emerge rapidly

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WAKHAN

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ACTORS

•Tajik Suni Badakhshanis

•Incentivised by state-building –privileging Sunis (Zahir Shah)

•More recent mujaheds

Ex-security commander/opium trader Non-indigenous opium trader

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NETWORKS: ASSOCIATIONAL GLUE

•Ethnicity: Tajik

•Geography: Badakhshani

•Politico-military: Jamiat-e-Islami

•Religion: Suni

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100 household survey in 3 villages:

•Land taken against will: 28%

•Threats of force: 21%

•Force: 11%

•Slapping•Beating•Torture•Mock executions•Electrocutions

STRATEGIES: FORCE

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•2002

•Director of Education (Wakhan)

•Paid teachers in-kind in opium

•Made a profit on the side

STRATEGIES:INSTRUMENTALISATION OF ADDICTION

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STRATEGIES: DEBT MECHANISMS

•Wheat for opium

•Debt term: 1 to 6 months

•Interest rate = 90%

•Cash for opium

•Interest rate = 60%

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PUNITIVE DEBT FOR ‘ESSENTIALS’

1% 2% 4%

20%

35%

38%

Food

Opium

•Food and opium a necessity

•Food insecurity politicised

•Addiction promoted

•Addiction instrumentalised

•Power asymmetry

•Opium: a necessity

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OUTCOMES

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% Population with debt

75 85 95

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68

91

83

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

05

%

Peak during Jehadi-era

+37%

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LAND OWNERSHIP CROP TRENDS

0,00

1,00

2,00

3,00

4,00

5,00

6,00

7,00

8,00

9,00

10,00

1975 1985 1995 2005

LandWheatPatakPoppyOrchardsBarleyBaqulySugar Beat

-38%

-35%

Jeribs:1/5

hectare

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LAND TRANSFER: INSIDE OUTSIDE

60%

40%

Sold within communitySold to outsider

•40% sales: outsiders

•30% land owned Suni Badakhshanis

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VERTICALISATION OF LAND

•Minimum 15% land owned by 3:•Commanders•Drug dealers•Government bureaucrats•Hybrid mixture

•Latifundism

•Remote-control extraction: agents

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POWER RELATIONS

•Power-locked

•Radical asymmetry

•Rare example of enduring asymmetry

•Opium encourages avoidance

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SHUGHNAN

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ACTORS: PASHTUN DRUG-DEALER

•Most powerful drug dealer: Pashtun

•From Kabul/Pashtun belt east of Kabul

•Was Khalqi

•Fought in Afghan Airforce (Soviet-era)

•Personal friend of President Najibullah

•Sophisticated trader:•Gems•Commodities•Antiques

•Intelligent/knowledgeable

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PASHTUN/TAJIK STATE ACTORS

•Drugs swoop (2003)

•Pashtun Generals in Kunduz

•Presently high up in Government

•‘Stole’drugs

•From state and non-state actors

•Drugs not declared - stolen

•Suni

•State actors

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CRIMINAL STRONGMEN: INTERNATIONAL

•Senior drug dealers in Khorog

•Former UTO commanders

•Links to criminals: Tashkent/Moscow

•Ismaili

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DISTRICT INDIGENOUS ELITE

•Shughni

•Ismaili

•Cosmopolitan

•Educated

•Soviet-era apparatchiks

•Product of Soviet minority politics

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NETWORKS

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CROSS-BORDER HEROIN TRADE

•15 Afghans moved over to Khorog

•Pashtuns/Tajik Badakhshanis

•Network: Khorog/Bashur/Baharak

•Associational glue:

•politico-military

•Localist

•Family/kin

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‘BUSINESS-TRADING’: NETWORKS

•3 elite political-entrepreneurs:

•Chief of Police (Baharak)

•Drug dealer(s) in Khorog

•Pashtun commodity-dealer (Bashur)

•No associational glue:•Religious•Socio-professional•Ethnicity•Politico-military

•In works of Khorogi drug dealer:‘It is about heroin and money’

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TAJIK BADAKHSHANI/SHUGHNI ELITE

•Local Shughni elite coopted

•Into Tajik Badakhshani state apparatus

•Shughnis junior ‘partners’

•Second-tier positions are Shughnis

•Chief of Border Security, KhAD, Dep Woliswol

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STRATEGIES: CROSS-BORDER TRADE

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SHIFTING ELITE STRATEGIES.FROM: FACTIONALISM AND FLUID ALLIANCES

• 1990 -1999

• Factionalism

• Local elite fragmented

• PDPA factions

• Deployed patrons

• Badakhshanis fragmented

• Faizabad vs Baharak

• Alliances: fluid/capricious

• Extreme violence

• Rationale: control-border

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TO: STABLE POWER ASYMMETRY - AT ELITE-LEVELS

• 2001 - 2005

• Woliswoli

• Junior partners: Shughni

• Senior: Suni Tajik Badakhshanis

• Predictable asymmetry

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HOW/WHY?: COOPERATION BENEFICIAL

• Cooperative behavior: profitable

• Uncooperative behavior: not profitable

• Factionalism: 200 deaths

• Loss of drugs/money

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HOW/WHY?:REDUCTION IN INTER-JEHADI TENSIONS

• Inter-jehadi tensions: diminished

• Baharak disarmed

• Faizabad more powerful

• Therefore less rivalry

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EMBRYONIC LEGITIMACY/PATRONAGE

• Spring food insecurity

• Drug dealer supplies flour

• 40% reduction in price

• Flour war

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STRUCTURES OF FLOUR MARKET: SPRING/EARLY SUMMER

• WFP included

• 42% drug dealer

• 31% flour consortium

• Flour market politicised

• WFP not included

• 58% drug dealer

• Flour market dominated

• By 1 political entrepreneur

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EMBRYONIC LEGITIMACY/PATRONAGE

• Did not make loss on deal

• However, only made smallprofit

• Could have made: 50,000USD

• Actual profit: 4,000 USD

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WHY?

• Reduce de facto power of state• Reduce power indigenous elite actors• Physical security/protection

• First act of ‘charity’• Legitimacy• Long term power-asymmetries

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OVERWHELMING FORCE/LEVERAGING OF PATRONAGE

• Drug seizure

• Bashur

• 100 armed MoD forces

• Overwhelming force

• MoD forces threatened by Rabbani

• Deployed threats of patronage

• Americans as super-patron

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OUTCOMES

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CROSS-BORDER TRADE: PROFESIONALISED

• Centralised

• Professionalised

• Concentrated

• Verticalised

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SUMMARY: ECONOMICS OF RESOURCE BASE

DispersedConcentratedGeographical focusModerately profitableHighly profitableProfitHighLowTransactionsHighLowLogisitical difficultyLowHighRevenuePetty tradeGlobal nexusNature of tradeWakhanShughnanIndicator

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SUMMARY: ACTORS

InexperiencedExperienced

Experience (business;modern bureaucraticadministration)

ParochialCosmopolitanWorld-viewLowHighEducationProvinciallyInternationally, KabulPolitically connected?CrudeSophisticatedCharacter

•Provincial•District

•International•National•Regional•Provincial•DistrictPositionality

HomogeneousHeterogeneousDiversityWakhanShughnanVariable

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SUMMARY: NETWORKS

SimpleComplexAssociational glueProvincialCross-border/internationalGeographical scopeHomogeneousHeterogeneousCompositionFossilised

Fluid/capricious butstabilisingNature

One nexusMultipleNo. networksWakhanShughnanIndicator

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SUMMARY: STRATEGIES

UnimportantImportantPatronage for positionalityCoercion and brutalityOverwhelming forceForceUnimportantImportantCultivating legitimacyImportantUnimportantExploitative institutionsUnimportantImportantPower sharingImportantModerately importantInstrumentalise: addictionWakhanShughnanIndicator

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SUMMARY: OUTCOMES

Dispersed but verticalising

ProfessionalisingCentralisingVerticalConcentrated

Arrangement ofdrug economy

ExtremeModeratePower asymmetry

Power-lockedStabalisingPower-relationsUnequal gains

•Mutuallybeneficial•Mutuallyprofitable

Power-relations(Suni vs Ismailielites)

Latifundism/verticalisationUnchangedLand-concentrationMassive land lossMinor land-lossLandRadically increased (opium)Increased (heroin)AddictionViolentPeacefulConflict processingDisembeddedEmbeddedConflict processingWakhanShughnanIndicator

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AFGHAN CENTRAL STATE: FRAGMENTED STATE

• Shughnan: high revenues

• High levels of state interest

• Wakhan: petty trade

• Insignificant state penetration

• Conclusion. Wakhan:

• Left to district/provincial potentates

• Autonomous extraction

• Shughnan:

• Multiple interest groups (state/non-state)

• Violent competition

• Fragmented state (not failed state)

• Economic extraction primary driver of state centre-periphery relations