Chapter-11

Human Rights, Human Needs And

Participation In The Context of Development

Introduction

Within the modem liberal theory, there are good reasons for linking

material conditions for development to the question of liberty. Each of us not

only require liberty to develop his individuality but the satisfaction of social

interest and growth of communitarian sentiments necessitate that others be

likewise free to cultivate their nature. Human welfare rights do not arise

directly from a right that basic needs to be satisfied, but rather from a right

to fair treatment. Right to freedom and right to well - being both ensure

condition without which rational autonomy is impossible. The pursuit of

human well-being need not then be demoted to instrumental status in

relations to autonomy. This chapter further discuses human development as

a process of enlarging the range of people's choices which includes

community participation.

This chapter is divided into three sub-chapters.

1. Rights and Well-being

2. Right to Development

3. Participation as a Human Rights.

Rights and Well-being

Eighteenth century right theory had limited conception of equality and

gave preference to liberty, but nineteenth century socialism exalted equality

and set it high above liberty. The twentieth century adopted equality and

liberty as basic rights and expanded and deepened the eighteenth century

37

connotation of equality. In the rhetoric of eighteenth century, equality meant

primarily political equality (not necessarily universal suffi"age ). The:

twentieth century has deepened that equal protection by holding government

responsible for some official discriminations. It has also extended that

concept of equality from equality of opportunity to include (some) equality

of distribution. In addition to the substantial degree of equality now implied

in the welfare conception in the obligation to accord to every human being

an equal minimum and economic rights, we have moved to greater

distributive justice by other programs for equalization for narrowing the

differences in benefit enjoyed.1

The modem liberal theory of man, however provides the following

basic arguments for a social minimum or basic needs. Each of us not only

requires liberty to develop his individuality but the growth of communitarian

sentiments necessitate that others be likewise free to cultivate their natures.

Green's notion of positive liberty implies that guaranteeing other equal

negative liberty is not sufficient to promote their development. Certain

material conditions are necessary for development to proceed. After all, the

issue is what a person needs to develop, not what he needs in order to have

(negative) liberty. 2

Within the modem liberal theory there are good reason for linking

these material pre-condition for development to question of liberty. It is

important to distinguish following three notions of liberties. Those are

Louis Henkin, 'TheRightsofMan Today'Westviewpress, Colorado, (c) 1978.

2 Gerald F. Gaus. 'The Modem Liberal Theory of Man' CroomHelm, London (c) 1983.

J

38

formal liberty, effective liberty and worth of liberty. Where as formal

liberties are simply the legal guarantee of certain rights and liberties,

effective liberties require that one has sufficient resources to take advantage

to these legal assurances. 3 All should be guaranteed an effective liberty does

not necessarily to claim that the worth of liberty should be same for all. The

former only requires that each have sufficient resources so that the exercise

of liberties yield significant developmental benefits where as the lat(~r point

to something like equal developmental benefits. This latter notion is

problematic, since natural differentiation coupled with individual choice

would seem to inevitably entail differential worth of specific liberties.

Indeed, differences in natural talent may well result in inevitable variance in

the worth of the entire system of liberties. 4

Liberal egalitarians wants to say that freedom of choice is not very

meaningful without a right to those goods necessary to life itself. 5 If it is

meaningful to say the there right to nourishment creates the conditions for

freedom --- and thereby increases individual freedom to follow one's own

will, then freedom of human beings from starvation is a form of freedom--­

freedom to choose or to follow one's life plan- and not simply a verbal

disguise for another value.6 Liberty does not entail a strictly equal

distribution of goods, not does it entails a more equal distribution unless that

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. pp.245, 246.

s Amy Gutman, 'Liberal Equality'. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (c) 1980 p-8.

J

39

distribution is a pre-condition for expanding individual freedom of choice

within a given social context. 7

Gutman takes the foundation of contemporary egalitarianism back to

classical liberalism. The primary aim of distributive justice for new

egalitarianism is equality of result; for old egalitarianism, it is equality of

opportunity. She goes beyond welfare rights and economic redistribution

based on a new awareness of the material pre-requisites for equalising

opportunities among individuals and expands liberal egalitarianism to

explicitly include further equalisation of opportunities for political

participation as well. 8

Macpherson's work has been especially important in bringing to our

attention the fundamental difference between pre-and post ---Millian

liberalism. In Macpherson's interpretation liberal theory from Hobbes to

Bentham conceived of man 'as essentially a consumer of utilities, an infinite

desirer and infinite appropriator'. Starting with J.S. Mill and Green, a

different understanding of human nature is introduced into liberalism which

depicts man as a self- developer and maximiser ofhuman power.9

Natural rights are natural in the sense that they are part of our divinely

ordained human nature. It has become popular to argue that human :right are

based on human needs. This theory has considerable plausibility, since

6

7. 8

9

lbidp-9. lbid.p.9. Amy Gutman, 'Liberal Equality~Cambridge University Press, Cambridge_,© 1980.

Gerald F.Gaus 'The Modern Liberal Theory of Man'. CroomHelm, London (c)l983. 40 J

human needs are an important part of human nature. In the view of Jack

Donnelly, the source of human rights is individual moral nature, which is

only loosely linked to the 'human nature' ofbasic human needs.10

In saying that needs or capacities can give rise to rights, one has to be

careful where to draw line. Maurice Cranston includes all manners of

aspiration within the category of rights. According to him a need comes to

be called a right only when it is generally universally recognised to be of

paramount importance (as need for basic subsistence is ) and when the

meeting of it is practicable. He insists on adding the test of practicability and

paramount importance to universality. 11

Hegel describes the interaction of freedom as a process of recitprocal

recognition. He further observes that such freedom is itself a relation of

justice on two accounts. Not only it is self - grounded, defining its own

autonomy through its activity, but the complementary self-determination

comprising it proceeds in a conjunction of right and duty.12 Discarding all

natural and monological definition of civil need, Hegel understands that

what does characterise it, is its direction upon means of satisfaction that can

only be obtained from correlatively needy individuals. In the line with the

freedom of interest, the particular content of such need is a matter of

personal preferences and hence may well coincide with some physical or

10

II

12

Jack Donnelly 'The Concept of Human Rights', CroomHelm, London (c) 1985. p··31 _,

D.D.Raphael 'Rights of Man and Right of Citizen' in 'Political Theory and Rights of Man'

edited by D.D.Raphael_, Indiana University Press, Londo~(c) 1967.

Richard Dien Winfield. The Just Economy' Chapman and Hall Inc. (c) 1988. p-91.

41

psychological wants. However, what gives a need the normative status, an

object of civil rights is that its satisfaction is sought in reciprocal needs of

others. Only this social dimension mandate what figure as a rightful nef~d

within the normative relation of civil freedom. 13

A humanist approach to human rights must begin by making two

distinctions between more basic and less basic needs and between the

concept of need and the concept of want. 'Human need' refers to any and all

requirement for a person's survival, health and essential freedoms; that is,

freedoms essential not only to survival and health, but to self - expression

and individual growth as well. 'Human want' on the other hand shall refer to

any perceived or alleged need. A given want may or may not, then

correspond to a real need. Whenever we can be sure that some people are in

dire need, these needs must take precedence over other people's more wants

or interests. In principle, from any humanist human rights perspective, the

basic needs must take precedence over mere wants, and that survival needs

must come first, followed by the need for protection of health, followed by

freedom needs which includes both social solidarity and self-development. 14

Neil stammers argues from a position which holds that individual as

autonomous subjects but not in the abstracted way purported by

deontological liberalism, They stand as subjects I individuals in concrete

social relations which develop by process. There is, in other words a

13

14

Ibid. p-97.

Christian Bay. 'Peace and Critical Political lfnowledge as Human Rights'. Political Theory, vo1.8 No.3, August 1980. pp.293-318.

42

continual interaction between the individual and rest of society (the subject

and object) but instead of being dissolved within this interaction, the

autonomous subject is perpetually reconstituted through social practices.

This is what be refers to as a 'social constructionist' perspective.1s

In liberal theory, private realm of individuals took precedence over

the public domain of the state. Public power was only legitimate in so far it

served the private realm. The emphasis in natural rights was on the rights of

private individuals against the state, although it should be noted these rights

were also said to bold against other individuals. In terms of intellectual

development the idea that there is a private realm which is separated from

and superior to the public realm remains at the heart of liberal theory. In the

view of Stammers, in order to maintain the public/private dichotomy,

modem liberal rights thinkers continue their search for a timeless, abstract,

universality through which to ground their concept of rights. 16

It is crucial to realize that philosophical justification of natural rights

was a complete fiction which bore no relation to history and social reality.

More importantly, historically there was no private realm which could be

shown to precede or be superior to the public realm. 17

The early liberal thinkers recognized the danger of state power. In the

view of Stammers, advocates of natural rights and the rights of man were not

working in a vaccum and that their ideas were part of the intellectual side of

15 Neil Stammers·: 'Human Rights and Power', Political Studie& Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 01995.

16 • Ibid.

43

a sweeping and revolutionary social tradition. In the view of Jack DonneJly,

the original bourgeois proponents of natural rights gradually moved out of

political opposition and into control. As a result, natural rights claims came

increasingly from the political context and arguments based on natural

rights, especially the right to property, came to be used to impede further

change, not as an instrument of political change.18

Just as the advocates of natural right posed a revolutionary challenge

to existing power relations in an earlier era, so socialist theories and working

class activists posed a revolutionary challenge to the prevailing power

relationships in the nineteenth century. They identified the ownership and

control of capital as a key source of power in society and began to df~mand

rights which, it was hoped, would control and transform it. In part, these

demands were demands for rights in the political sphere, but many other

demands were economic and social, intended to limit the exerc~ise of

economic power directly. In day-to-day practice, Marxists have often been at

the forefront of struggle for the extension of rights, particularly ec:onomic

and social rights. 19

Thinkers from Plato to Rawls argued that justice is the highest value,

that first virtue and the most fundamental human need. Of course, justice is

more likely to obtain where life, health and peace are protected. But because

justice is not equivalent to the protection of life, health and peace, its

17. Ibid. 18 . Jack Donnelly, 'Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice', New York, Com•;.lll

University Press~© 1989. Ch.S 19 • Neil Stammers: 'Human Rights and Power', Political Studies. Blackwell Publishers,

Oxford, 1993 44

demands of the latter. Bay shows that the latter ought to take preceden1~e in

all such conflicts. 20

In the view of Amy Gutman, distributive justice in Rawls's theory is

divided into two egalitarian spheres.21 First, a distribution of basic human

services in which some version of equal treatment of needs operates and

second, a distribution of residual goods (presumably in the form of money)

in which a principal of equal shares to individual (modified in the interests

of the poorest sector operates).

Needs have given way to interest. Non-personal axiotima have needs

but no interests. 22 Human welfare rights arise not directly from a rights that

one's basic needs be satisfied, but rather from a right to fair treatment along

with those of every other beneficiary in the social distribution of goods. If

there are to be institutions allocating resources which can take account of

needs in the distributive process, then no one's needs for the less basic goods

should be satisfied before everyone's need for most basic?3 But in the view

of Stanley I.Benn, since some people do work intrinsically more valuable

than others, a claim to equal consideration of the interests of human beings

will fail. Accordingly, while the equal consideration of the basic interests of

persons as chooser has lexical priority over considerations of value in

respect of the needs of human being as axiotima, differential attention to

20

21

22.

Richard E.Flathman 'Rights, Needs and Liberalism: A t!vmment on Bay'. Political Theory_,vol8, No3, Aug.1980 p.319-330.

Amy Gutman. 'Liberal Equality~ Cambridge University Press, Cambridg~(c) 1980 p.127.

Stanleyi.Benn ~A TheoryofFreedom,. CambridgeUniversityPress, Cambridge,. (c) 1988 Ibid.

45

their further needs in the light of the value of the person and his projects

becomes justifiable. 24

In the view of Hart, if there was one natural right, it was the right of

all people to be free. A more general argument is provided by Gewirth. In

addition to the right to freedom, Gewirth establishes a right to well-being.

Both types of rights have same end, that is to ensure the conditions without

which rational autonomy is impossible. 25

An autonomous person is one who is some sense rule himself or one

who determines the course of his own life. Kantian conception of autonomy

conduct was something of which human being were capable rather than

something which was necessarily manifested in everything they did. Kant's

conception of autonomy was narrow in that it held that individual acts

autonomously in so far as they followed the dictates of reason which is same

for everyone. Liberal theoristshave taken a much more generous view of

what should be regarded as autonomous conduct. They have widened the

concept so that it encompasses people's general ability to make choices, to

formulate plans and projects and to be the authors of their own aims and

aspirations. Contrasted with conceptions of autonomy in the Kantian

traditions, are conception which value autonomy as an essential constituent

of human well-being. In this approach, the normative significance of

autonomy resides not in its being the central feature of personhood, but it is

being an essential element of living well. Attending to art individuals

24 Ibid. pp.250,251.

2.5 Michael Freeden, 'Rights' Open University Press, Buckinghan:?_, (c) 1991 pp.44,45.

46

autonomy is less a matter of doing what is right than promoting what is

good.26

Conditions of enactment of the principle of autonomy as requiring

ultimately, on the one hand, the restructuring of civil society. This involves

recognizing the indispensability of a process of double democratisations.

This transformation is elaborated what David Held calls democratic

autonomy. In the interconnected world, the condition of enactment of

principle of autonomy have to be thought in relation to the international

networks of states and organizations and international networks of c.ivil

societies. The problem of democracy is to specify how the principles of

autonomy can be enshrined and secured in a series of interconnected power

and authority centres27

While John Rawls lists of primary goods include libertie:s and

opportunities, resources (income and wealth) and social bases of self­

respect, David Johnston list of basic means include mental and physical

powers, liberties and opportunities, resources (income, wealth, status and

recognition). 28 Amartya Sen is a principal advocate of the view that mental

and physical powers, or capabilities should be considered centrally in

assessing alternative social arrangements. His focus on basic c,apabilities

should be seen as a natural extension of the notion of primary goods. He

argued that we should count at least the basic capabilities that constitute

26. Peter Jones 'Rights' MacMillan Press, London, (c) 1994 27. David Held 'Democracy, The Nation states and The Global system in David Held (ed)

Political Theory Today, Polity Press, Cambridge (c) 1991 28 . David Johnston 'The Idea of A Liberal Theory: A Critique and Reconstruction', Princeton:

Princeton University Press© 1994.p-161 47

well-being separately from other means that enable us to pursue our values

and projects. Sen distinguishes four different types of things that he claims

should count from an evaluative point of view: First, well-being, Second,

well-being freedom (i.e. the freedom individuals have to obtain the things

necessary for their well-being), Third, agency freedom (i.e. the free:dom

people have to pursue whatever projects or values they may conc;eive,

fourth, agency achievements. According to Sen, the important thing to

recognise is that the well-being aspect and the agency aspect of persons have

dissimilar roles in moral accounting. 29

Rawls too, assesses in his hypothetical model, in which rights are

somewhat peripheral that they pertain to the primary goods, mainJy civil

liberties that rational/moral individuals would regard as necessary to the

function of a just constitutional framework. 30 Three assumptions are

implicated in these arguments. First, the core of human nature is purposive

action, self-control and self-development. Second, agency and autonomy are

the pinnacle of human existence and other human attributes and function are

secondary to them. Third, all individuals are equal in their potential

rationality and in the right to action emanating from it. The conjunction of

the first two assumptions will make the task of welfare theorist more

difficult. While they have no rational grounds for denying that the identified

components of human nature are indeed central, these may not be sufficient.

They may wish to add other core of human capacities, such as capacity to

enjoy friendship and music. The pursuit of human well-being need not then

29.

30

Amartya Sen. 'Well-being, Agency and Freedom ', The Dewey Lectures. 1984, Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985) Ibid. p.45.

48

be demoted to instrumental states in relation to autonomy. The third

assumption may be challenged on the grounds that the ends perceived by

one individual as good may not be similarly perceived by others, and

therefore the right to act can not endorse that right to any action.31 In the

view of Benn, human beings have a capacity to development and one can

assign value to them not only as biological objects but as beings achi~~ving

various degrees of excellence and admirable in proportion to their

achievements. 32 Then the argument for human rights to basic needs can

develop into a right to the conditions for the attaining of whatever degree

and kind of excellence of which a person is capable. The right to such

conditions would personably include the universal declaration to edm~ation,

to leisure and to participate in cultural life of the community, interests

common to all autarchic person. Section 2 of article 26 of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights announces that education shall be directed to

the full development of personality and to the strengthening of respect for

human rights and fundamental freedoms, 33

A new dimension to the theory of human rights is added by

introducing the notion of the full development of the human personality as

part of the reason for attributing right to human beings, a reason over and

beyond their merely being able to pursue what ever enterprises worthy or

unworthy they happen to have. This provides as we shall see, a bridge from

31

32

33

p.45.

Stanley I. Benn. :4 Theory of Freedom' Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (c) 1988. pp.251-252.

Ibid. pp.251,252.

49

the individualist theory of human rights into what is referred as the species

theory. 34

A person can decide not to be rational and autonomous-and choose

not to exercise its rights. Here the choice of right-bearer is balanced against

an interest that may not coincide with choice. 35 Here it may be useful to

distinguish between

(1) A right that it is not wrong for someone to realise.

(2) A right that is necessary for human flourishing.

This bifurcation appears at first, close to Golding's differentiation

between option - rights concerning freedom and choice - and welfare rights

concerning entitlement to some good necessary to well-being . Although a

particular option - right may be waived, it is still necessary to human

flourishing that human beings have the rights to freedom and choic~e and be

able to exercise them over an acceptable range. The reasonable, if not

absolute control over one's life that rights afford is a core constituent of

individual well-being. Although liberty - rights may seem optional their

existence belongs to Golding's welfare rights category. 36

The reasons for acceptance of responsibility by society for enhancing

well-being of members can be enumerated below. First, if they were not to

do so, their members would ultimately being incapable of full d(~velopment

34

35

36

Ibid pp.257,258.

Michale Freeden 'Rights' Open University Press, Buckingham_,( c) 1991 p.46.

Ibid. p.47

so

on their own and incapable of co-operation with others in order to draw out

their social capacities. Individuals may therefore claim the right to such

social activity as a condition for their own humanity. Second, many

constraints operating on individual action and development are the product

of social malorganization error or incompetence. Third, The protection of

individual rights serve specifically social interests such as national viability

or the health and quality of working power available to society. From this

perspective a right constitute a claim that directly or indirectly enhances the

quality oflife in a community and of a community.37

In the view of Freeden, we can conceive of two types of legitimate

social intervention in individual lives. The first would apply when crucial

social interest are at stake. The second would apply when crucial individual

interests are at stake, but the individuals concerned do not or cannot take the

required steps to safeguard those interest. The prevention of individual

dehumanizing is then both a dire, humanist gesture and indirectly one of

social utility grounded on the communist interest. 38

What explains the apparent contradiction is that economist do not

regard the identification of well - being with the satisfaction of preferences

as a controversial ethical judgement. It is just part of the standard view of

rationality. And once one accepts this identification, one need only add on

uncontroversial principle of minimal benevolence to get strong policy

37• Ibid p. 72.

38 Ibid. p.74,76.

51

recommendations via following argument. 39 Suppose that one identifies

individual well-being with satisfaction of preferences and that one accepts

the moral principle of minimal benevolence. In the view of Hausman, other

things being equal, it is morally good thing if people are better off. Most

economist would be surprised at the charge that welfare economics is non­

liberal. They regard their view as distinctively liberal, for they take the

identification of well-beings with the satisfaction of preferences as itself a

crucial liberal premise.40

One might object that basing neutrality on theory of good as the

satisfaction of preferences does precisely what Rawls and Dworkin seek to

avoid. It makes political neutrality the doctrine of a particular ethical sect.

The neutrality that results from taking well - being to be the satisfaction of

preferences would be a means for pursuing collectively a particular view of

well-being.41 Liberal supports political neutrality not because it tenables

people to get what ever they prefer, not because it helps people to live

autonomously, but mainly because it is required by their view of equal

respect. An opposite view is taken by Joseph Raj by emphasising autonomy

and underemphasizing equality. Liberals favour political neutrality over state

politics to promote autonomy because of their commitment to equality. 42

39

40

41

42

Daniel M. Hausman, 'Liberalism, Welfare Economics and Freedom' Social Philosophy and Policy, vol.lO, No.2, 1993.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

52

A difficulty is that no government can avoid either non-rationally

shaping its citizen's preferences or providing them with incentives. Even if

governments do not try to produce these effects, they are bound to o<~cur an

unintended consequences of many political arrangement including

importantly, many arrangements that are adopted for quite different reasons.

We can acknowledge that all political arrangements will have such effects

without concluding that it is impossible to be neutralist. But the same

considerations that tell for this interpretation now suggest that it government

knows which way of living are (potentially) best, it can definitely increase

overall value through the judicious use of conditioning and incentives. The

reason is that if all political arrangements do not rationally shape preferences

and provide incentives, a government will further diminish autonomy simply

by producing these effects intentionally. Thus, if a government makes no

effort to promote value by conditioning preferences and providing

incentives, the result will be no gain in autonomy, but only a lessening in the

number of citizens who live in the ways that the government consider

(potentially) valuable. The ultimate effect of neutralism will be to prevent at

least some citizens from living valuable lives. 43

Right to Development

Before, development economists regarded concept of human rights as

irrelevant and disruptive to their attempt to make development policies non­

political. But new development policies are being advocated with stress on

43 'George Sher, 'Liberal Neutrality and The Value of Autonomy', Social Philosophy and Policy, vol.12, No.1, 1995.

53

basic needs, human rights including right to participation. It is useful to

distinguish four types of definition of development. 44

First, to define development in term of economic growth measured by

Gross National Product.

Second, to define development as to overcome dependency (to be self

-reliant).

Third, development is defined as directed to meet basic needs and

enhancing the quality of life.

Fourth, development is defined as a global concept covering all

human rights such as economic, social, cultural, civil and political.

The discussion on the relationship between human rights and

individual and collective aspect of development has centred around the right

to development which has been characterised as the realisation of the

potentialities of the human person in harmony with the community. It has

also been understand as a process designated to create condition in which

every person can enjoy and exercise all his or her human rights including

economic, social, cultural and civil and political rights. Thus there is a clear

implication that everyone has the right to participate in and benefit from

development to improve the quality of his or her life.45

4S

Jose Zalaquette The Relation between Development and Human Rights' in 'Food as a Human Right, &lited by Asbjom Eide, Wenche Barth Eide, Susantha Ci<x>natilake, Joan Gussow and Omawale, UNU (c) 1984.

Ibid.

54

There are fundamental differences between basic needs approach to

development and human rights as basis of development. Basic needs

approach stress highly specific, limited and targeted outcomes such as the

fulfilment of objectively defined norms. Although participation is considered

equal importance with basic needs, this has tended to be undermined in

practice. This results in the inclusion of people as a need objects of research

and planning. A more serious consequence of the above, is that basic needs

approach risk the suspension of some other rights or trade-off betw~:en rights

in order to achieve measurable programme in fulfilling basic needs. 46

The conventional wisdom of the 1960s and early 1970s held that rapid

development and human right are competing concern except in the very long

run. It has been argued that the exercise of many human rights both

economic, social and cultural, civil and political interfere with rate of

economic growth and development. So in the interest of both human rights

must be temporarily suspended. Those are the need trade-off, the equality

trade-off and liberty trade off. 47

It has been argued that need deprivation are necessary in order to

maximise investment which will lead to development. A strong need trade­

off would attempt to reduce freeze or otherwise control com:umption in

order to capture the largest possible share of resources for investment. A

strong equality trade-off would view inequality as a contributor to rather

46

47

Ibid.

t-'Jack Donnelly:-- Human Rights and Development; Complemental')!, and Competing Concern' in the Book 'Human Rights and Third World Developmeni',Edited by George W. Shepherd Jr. and Ved P.Nanda, Greenwood Press_, Londo~( c) 1985 ..

55

than an mtavoidable consequences of development. Since investment is the

key to rapid growth inequality actually is in the long fW1 best interests of the

poor. The liberty trade-off implies civil and political rights disrupt or

threaten to destroy development plan and therefore must be temporarily

suspended. But such arguments have proved to be tragically misguided. 48

One of the greatest danger in development policy lies in the tendency

to give the more material aspects of growth an overriding emphasis. The end

may be forgotten in pre-occupation of the means. Human rights may be

submerged and human beings seem only as instruments of production rather

than free entities for whose welfare and cultural advance the production is

intended. The recognition of this issue has a profomtd bearing upon the

formulation of the objectives of economic development and methods

employed in obtaining them.49

On 26, November 1957, the General Assembly in its resolution

1161 (XII), expressed the view that a balanced and integrated economic and

social development would contribute towards the promotion and

maintenance of peace and security, social progress and better standard of

living and the observance of and respect for rights and freedom. 50 The theme

was elaborated upon by the International Conference on Human Rights, held

at Tehran in 1968. In its resolution, the conference expressed its belief that

48. 49

Ibid Ved. P.Nanda 'Development and Human Righ~~The Role of International Law and Organization' in the book 'Human Rights and Third World Devf:lopment' edited by George W.Shepherd Jr. and Ved P. Nanda, Green Wood Press_, London!J(c) 1985.

'United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights' United Nations (c) 1994. , 56

the enjoyment of economic and social rights are inherently linked with any

meaningful enjoyment of civil and political rights and that there is a

profound connection between the realisation of human rights and economic

development. 51

The Declaration on Social Progress and Development prepared by

commission for Social Development and adopted by the General Assembly

(United Nations) in its resolution 2542(XXIV) of 11 December 1969, states

that social progress and development shall aim at the continuous rising of

the material and spiritual standards of living of all members of society with

respect for and in compliance with human rights and fundamental freedoms.

This Declaration also called for the adoption of measures to ensure the

effective participation of all elements of society in the preparation and

execution of national plans and programmes of social and economic

development. 52

The International Development strategy for the Third United Nations

Developments Decade, annexed to General Assembly resolution 35/36 of 5

December 1980, declared that the ultimate aim of development is the

constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population on the basis

of its full participation in the process of development and a fair distribution

of the benefits therefrom. 53

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53• Ibid.

57

In its resolution 4(XXXIIT) of 21 February 1977, the Commission on

Human Rights (UN) decided to pay special attention to consideration of the

obstacles hindering the full realisation of economic, social and cultural

rights, particularly in the developing countries, as well as of the actions

taken at the national and international levels to secure the enjoyment of there

rights. It recommended to the Economic and Social Council that it should

invite the Secretary General, in co-operation with UNESCO and other

competent specialised agencies to undertake a study on the subject.

Commission on Human Rights in its resolution 36 (XXXVIII) of 1.1 March

1981 decided to establish on working group which held nine sessions

between 1981 to 1984. It adopted a report which the Commission

transmitted to the General Assembly, through the Economic and Social

Council, enable the Assembly to adopt the Declaration on the Right to

Development in its resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986.54

Article 1 (1) of the Declaration on Right to Development says that the

right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every

human person and all people are entitled to participate in, contribute to and

enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all

human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realised. Article 8(1)

proclaims that states should undertakes at the national level, all necessary

measures for the realisation of the right to development and shall ensure

equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education,

54 Ibid.

58

health services, food, employment and the fair distribution of income. 55

Article 2(2) of the Declaration of Right to Development provides that all

human being have a responsibility for development, indivildually or

collectively taking into account the need for full respect for their human

rights and fundamental freedoms as well as their duties to the community,

which alone can ensure the free and complete fulfilment of hurnan being,

and they should therefore promote and protect an appropriate political, social

and economic order for development. 56 Development of defined as global

realization of human rights, is part of a process of developing a. normative

order which is substantially independent of states system in an

interdependent world. This an expression of international civil community.

The post-cold war era has so far brought an incremental deepening of

the global human rights regime. The international tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia and Rwanda created in 1991 and 1994 have revived the

Nuremberg precedent. The General Assembly of United nations' decision at

the end of 1995 to create an international criminal tribunal suggest a deeper

normative transformation. In recent years, however, the link between human

rights and international peace and security which has been a central part of

United Nations doctrine has finally become a part of UN prac1ice. United

Nations operation in Somalia, Northern Iraq and Rwanda hadl primarily

human rights mandate. A broader normative deepening was evidenced at

the Vienna World Conference on Hunan Rights (1993) which proclaims that

all human rights are ,~niversal, indivisible and interdepc~ndent and

ss

S6

'Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments'. United. Nations; vol.l, partl, (c) 1994. P 403-408.

Ibid.

59

interrelated. While the significance of national and regional particularities

and various historical cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in

mind, it is the duty of states regardless of their political, e'~onomic and

cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental

freedoms. 57

But it has been argued that there is growing contradic~tion between

multilateral human rights initiatives and the activities of international

financial institutions. Externally imposed structural adjustment programmes

that requires reduction in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural

rights. Economic interdependence does not seem to be spawning a plausible

alternative provider of internationally recognized economic, social and

cultural rights.

In recent year, economists themselves and most especially

development economists have rested ethical concern to a central place in the

study of their descipline. Although many planners still equate development

with economic growth, other repudiate this reductionist vie:w and plan for

multi-dimensional advance of society in all realms economic, social,

political, cultural, environmental and spiritual. Goulet main quest is to find a

conceptual schemes in which demand of three distinct ethical values --­

justice, freedom and solidarity are relativized. No single one of these value

can be taken to have absolute worth and each must be defined and delimited

in its proper boundaries only in relation to other two. 58

57. Jack Donnelly: 'The Social Construction of International Human Rights' in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (ed.) 'Human Rights in Global Politics',. Printed in UK at University Press, cambridge. (c) 1999

ss. Denis Goulet, 'Tnternational Ethics and Human Right', Alternatives 17, 1992. 60

Due to the present unjust international order, the third world are

unable to fulfil the right to an adequate standard of living of their pe:ople. It

is in that context that we must look at some third generation of human rights

such as right to development, the right to peace, the right of people: to self­

determination, and the right of people to have permanent sovereignty over

natural resources. Richard Falk is of the opinion that the whole third

generation of solidarity rights are part of developing normative order

substantially independent of state system. He describes this as an expression

of developing international community.59 James Crawford in his book the

'Rights of Peoples' discusses mainly about three types of people's rights.

These are, self-determination, right of people to existence and right of

people to permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Both individual and

peoples right are concurrent but not competing. All can be taken as

important components of right to development. 60

While discussing about cosmopolitan morality, Vincent says it is to

highten the sensitivity of people in one place to wrong done in another, in

the interest of the achievement of global justice. There should be emergence

of a new value orientation that reflects both worth of the individual and the

solidarity of humanity. It is not reasonable to allow this valwe to be diluted

by the mere boundaries which constructed against each other. Vve should

59. Richard Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty, Holmes, and Meier, London © 1981.

61

reach out with those community for a conception of basic human rights

which is natural with respect to the main political and economic division in

the world. 61

In the view of G.B. Mathur, the term development has to relate in

some way to the possibility of directional as well as directed social change.

Society does change in specifiable ways which cannot only be cognised but

are generally understood, since social changes are also in a certain sense

law-governed. Some of these changes are not merely in the nature of a

measurable quantitative growth but also mark a general improvement in the

quality of life which can be assessed, if not always measured, in terms of

certain indicators

development. 62

of economic growth as well as non-economic

Both capitalism and socialism are products of the western type

rationality and shared in its excellence as well as defects. One could not

have served as an alternative to other. They were two competing variants of

the same civilizational paradigm which sought to subject the entire social

process to a bourgeoning techno--- bureaucratic structure devised to ensure

continuous economic and military growth. This was inescapable because

both models, in an ultimate analysis, equated development with economic

development and power in the society with the power of the statle. No doubt

socialism has shown much greater regard for humanitarian value: through its

emphasis on equality, support for movements of national liberation and

61 . R.J. Vincent : 'Human Right.f and International Relations', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, © 1986.

62 . G.B. Mathur, 'The Current Impasse in Development Thinking: the Metaphysic of Power, Alternatives, No.4, October 1989.

62

world peace. But socialism did never address seriously to the issues of the

ends - means relationship, or the type of social reasons that need to be

evolved for absorbing the state within the civil society. The western society

has all along been guided by science, technique and a distinctive 'production

- consumption-organization' system based thereon. In such a society the

main operative reason is not the mind's deeper accord with a global truth

concerning the humanity at large and the meaning of human existence. This

type of rationality has tended to exclude different and broader type of reason

form gaining acceptance at all points to which its own domain extends. In

the view of Johan Galtung, west is not even aware of alternative forms of

rationality because of its success in destroying other culture.63

There are two obvious lines of action which are not mutually

exclusive. The first is to explore and find out the epistemological potential

of other types and level of knowledge. The second is to open up the existing

mould of scientific rationality itself to make it accessible to other forms of

reason. 64

Participation as a Human Right

The focus of the participation is the fundamental choices among social

institutions and social policies that control security and subsistence where

63 . Ibid. In the word of Samir Ghabbour, there is no such things as western reason. There is only one reason that is human reason. Foci of development (or progress) move about the globe and settle down where the climate is favorable.

64. Ibid. 63

the person is directly affected by the operation of institutions and

implementation of policy. It is often argued that many people in fact are not

interested in participation in fundamental choices about social institutions

and social policies, even in the fulfilment of their own rights affected. But in

the opinion of Henry Shue, something being a universal rights does not

necessary implies that it should be universally believe to be right. 65 A despot

may provide security and subsistence to its own people but there is no right

to security and subsistence unless there is right to participation. Sec:urity and

subsistence are basic rights because enjoyment of them is essential to the

enjoyment of all rights. Enjoyment of all rights to liberties depend upon the

enjoyment of security and subsistence but the enjoyment of right to security

and right to subsistence is depend upon the enjoyment of only some liberties

like right to participation and right to freedom of movement. 66

Market plays a vital role in the world dominated by liberal democracy.

In the view of Lindblom, Market is a method of social coordination and

method of readjustment of conflicting claims. Market's popular control aims

largely at result or outcomes. While democratic popular controls aim largely

at process. As aftluence rises many people begin to care about process no

less than end product. In his view market and democracy are complementary

method of popular control. 67

65

66

67.

Hemy Shue, 'Basic Rights: Subsistence, AjJluence and U.S. Foreign Policy'. Princeton University Pres~( c) 1980.

Ibid.

Charles E. Lindblom : 'Market and Democracy -abliquely ', Political Science and Politics' American Political Science Association December, 1995.

64 ,

In the view of Benjamin constant in the ancient time, freedom was

constituted by active and constant participation in commonwt!alth. 68 William

Draper is of the opinion that human development is a proc~~ss of enlarging

the range of people's choices which include community participation. 69

Locke coupled the right to participation in government with economic

and social rights. 70 Maurice cranston, while writing about economic and

social rights as a new and different kind, include the right to take part in the

government of one's country within it. In the view of Cranston, while article

1 to 20 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights legitimately begin with

the world 'Everyone', he goes on to say that article 22 to 29 need to be

qualified in this respect. He omitted mention of article 21 of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights. Cranston is not quite sure whether to say (in

accordance with liberalism of classical natural rights theorist) that the

democratic rights of participation in government should be demanded for

everyone or alternatively. In the opinion of Raphael, no fixed line can be

drawn on this spectrum and what the line that are drawn from time to time

depend on historical circumstances. The right to participate in government

which is today, a right of citizen according to Raphael, or a local right

according to Cranston, may become a right of man in the future (or at least a

right of citizen of the world) if there will be an world government. It is still

,s, ._

69

70

D.D. Raphael 'Rights of Man and Rights of Citizen, 'Political Theory and Rights of Man' Edited by D.D. Raphael, Indiana University Press_, London (c) 1967. Russel a:wrence Barsh 'Measuring Human Rights: Problem and Methodology and Purpose~ Human Rights Quarterly, The John Hopl1iniUniversity Press_, 15, 1993,

D.D Raphael, 'Human Rights, Old and New', in 'Political Theory and Right of Man', by D.D.Raphae!, Indiana University Press, London (c) 1967 ,.

65

open to debate whether a right become a right of man which today can only

be a right of national citizen. 71 Article 2(1) of the Declaration on Right to

Development provides that the human person is the central subject of

development and should be active participant and beneficiary of the right to

development. 72

The Global consultation on the Right to Development as a Human

Rights took place at Geneva from 8 to 12 January 1990. The consultation

reaffirmed that the right of individuals groups and peoples to take decision

collectively, to choose their own representative organisation and to have

freedom of democratic action, free from interference, is fundamental to

democratic participation. The concept of participation is of central

importance in the realisation of the right to development. 73

In the opinion of Habermas, advanced moral codes are committed to

granting every human being an equal right to participate to open dialogue

about the configuration of society and politics. The crucial consequence that

stems from this claim is that there are no valid ground for excluding any

human being from dialogue in advance. No system of exclusion passes this

moral test unless it constitutive principles can command the consent of all, in

particular those to be excluded from the social arrangement in question. 74

71

72

73

74

D.D.Raphael, 'Right of Man and Right of Citizen' in 'Political Theory and Right ofMan' Edited by D.D.Raphae!, Indiana University Press, Londo~( c) 1967.

'Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instrument'. Unitc!d Nations. vol.l, Part 1(c) 1994. p-405.

'United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights'. United Nations (c) 1994. P.268-272. J

Kimberly Hutchings 'Kant, Critique and Politics' Routledge, London,( c) 1996, p-156. 66

In the view of Amy Gutmann, classical liberal equality turned on one

of two 'equality assumption'. Man were held to have either 'equal passion'

or 'equal rationalty' and it was on these sorts of equalities that equal political

status was based on our modem liberals. Bosanquent provides clear instance

of this sort of argument. That 'all men are equal' and so by nature, he tells

which does not mean that all are equally good and equally capable, but 'that

all rational beings are equal in having within them a principle of self­

government. 75

In the 'positive' sense, the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the

part of the individual to be his own master. The Liberals of the first half of

the nineteenth century correctly foresaw that liberty in this (positive) sense

could easily destroy many of the (negative) liberties that they hdd sacred.

Perhaps the chief value for liberals of political 'positive' rights, of

participating in the government, is as a means for protecting what they hold

to an ultimate value, namely individual- 'negative liberty' 76

Conclusion:

Human beings have a capacity to development and one can assign

value to them not only as biological objects but as beings achieving various

degrees of excellence and admirable in protection to their achievements.

?S

76

Gerald F. Gaus. 'The Modern Liberal Theory ofMan~CroomHelm. London_,(c) 1983.

Isaiah Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty' in 'Liberalism and its Critics' Edited by Michael Sandel, Basil Blackwell,(c) 1984.

67

Then the argument for human right to basic needs can develop into a right to

the conditions for the attaining of whatever degree and kind of excellence of

which a person is capable. The right to such conditions would presumably

include universal declaration of education, to leisure and to participate in

cultural life of the community. The notion of the full development of the

human personality adds a new dimension to theory of human rights. This

provides a bridge from the individualist theory of human rights to species

theory. Right constitutes a claim that directly or indirectly enhances the

quality of life in a community and of a community.

68