chapter 13 july 1917: stalin emerges as a leadergrh2/contra/docs/1_3_6.pdf · february revolution....

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CHAPTER 13

JULY 1917: STALIN EMERGES AS A LEADER

Though upwards of 400 people were killed on the streets of Petrograd during the

July Days, the demonstration and its aftermath settled nothing. Russia remained

unstable. The Soviet leaders—fearing to take power themselves and fearing the

Bolsheviks—chose the support offered by "loyal" regiments over that of the masses and

thus effectively transferred power to the government and, in particular, to the non-

socialists in the government. The subsequent disarming of workers and crushing of

radicals in the military confirmed this shift of power by robbing the Soviets of the basis of

their former strength—the potential to command the power of the armed masses.

Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries could no longer exercise any meaningful

influence over government policies; at most they could occasionally express displeasure

at the government's actions. The Provisional Government emerged from the July Days

seemingly strengthened, but it remained weak and lacking in support. It had survived

only because it had managed for the moment to convince soldiers that there was a

German-Bolshevik plot to undermine the war effort, because the Bolsheviks had

vacillated, and because the Soviets had declined to take power. Without strong popular

backing, it relied increasingly on the military for support. The government's dependence,

together with the defeat of the far left, emboldened the right to press for undoing the

February Revolution. Business magnates, landlords, professionals and the military elite

clamored for smashing the Soviets and curtailing democratic freedoms, aggressively

prosecuting the war, and taking forceful measures to "restore order" in factories, the

armed forces and the countryside. By August these extreme demands, which went

beyond the considerable steps the government wanted to take, would provoke a serious

clash between the government and the far right. But in the meantime, the nonetheless

repressive actions of the Provisional Government aggravated the masses' antagonism


2

toward it. The regime's continuing inability to end the war and solve the country's

worsening economic and social problems further fueled the threat from below.

The Bolsheviks, of course, were also losers in the July Days. Their organizations

were disrupted, their leaders jailed or driven into hiding, their standing with many

soldiers and even some workers discredited. But defeat was not wholly without rewards.

As a result of the July debacle, some Bolsheviks recognized a need for greater discipline

within the Party and greater control over their followers. The Party could not afford to be

provoked again into rash action by insubordination within its ranks or by the responses

of the common people to the ebb and flow of daily events. Many Bolsheviks also realized

that the Party needed to develop a more sensible tactic than that followed since April.

Lenin had recognized the need for a tactical change as early as mid June, and the

July defeat gave him the political cover to scrap his April tactic. Characteristically, he

needed to place blame for his failure on someone other than himself. As in April, his

scapegoat was the Party militants. In "On Slogans," a pamphlet written several days after

he escaped from Petrograd, Lenin explained why "All Power to the Soviets!" had to be

withdrawn. He remarked that

To all appearances, not all supporters of the slogan … gave adequatethought to the fact that it was a slogan for the peaceful progress of therevolution. Peaceful not only in the sense that nobody, no class, no forceof any importance could at that time (from February 27 to July 4) havebeen able to … prevent the transfer of power to the Soviets. But this isnot all. Peaceful development would then have been possible even in thesense that the struggle of classes and parties within the Soviets couldhave gone on most peacefully and most painlessly, provided full statepower had passed to the Soviets in good time.1

Lenin conveniently ignored the fact that he had sought to pressure the Soviets through

demonstrations that threatened violence. He ignored the fact that the Soviets had

successfully resisted all of the Bolsheviks' efforts to intimidate them. He forgot that often

he had demanded the transfer of power immediately, not "in good time." And he forgot

that, although he had revised Party policy in April to preclude transferring power until the

Soviets were willing to take it, he had nevertheless continued to call for transferring all

power to the Soviets. Lenin's analysis characteristically misrepresented his policy and


3

distorted events in order to deflect responsibility for failure from himself on to those who

allegedly had failed to grasp the peaceful, sensible nature of his approach.2 But Lenin's

policy had failed because of its own contradictions, not because underlings failed to

understand it.

Ironically, the tactic Lenin turned to was the one favored by the very militants he

blamed: armed action, an insurrection. As early as the evening of July 6 he broached this

idea in a brief meeting with Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin, and the Military Organization's

Podvoisky. Podvoisky, who had heard Lenin advocate insurrection nearly a month

before, recalled Lenin saying on July 6 that the counter-revolution now held all power and

that the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks had joined with it. The choice before

the Party, he argued, was simple: an insurrection to seize power—or death. Blithely

asserting that the proletariat must shed its illusion that power could be transferred

peacefully, he declared that the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" was obsolete and

suggested replacing it with another, such as transferring power to soviets of

revolutionary workers or to "the working class with their revolutionary party of Bolshevik-

Communists in the vanguard."3

In another conversation shortly after the July defeat, Lenin told Ordzhonikidze

that "Now it is possible to take power only by means of armed uprising." He expected

this to be accomplished by September or October and workers' factory committees to be

"the organs of uprising," but not the Soviets.4

Lenin gave voice to his new hard line, albeit sotto voce, in "Three Crises," written

on July 7 and intended for publication. After defending Bolshevik conduct during the

April, June and July demonstrations—the three crises of his title—he predicted that more

clashes between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie were inevitable. "In the future," he

said, "the forms of crises may, of course, change." Using peasant demand for land as an

example, he anticipated a "sharp class struggle." He added, "great reforms can never be

realized without the most decisive revolutionary measures against the bourgeoisie,

measures that can only be taken when the poor peasants join the proletariat, only when


4

the banks and syndicates are nationalized."5 Though Lenin had to be evasive to escape

censorship, he nonetheless conveyed the idea that future proletarian action would be

"sharp" and go beyond mere demonstrations, and that it should result in "the most

decisive measures" being taken against the bourgeoisie and the landowners. But he said

nothing about the Soviets.

In "The Political Situation," written on July 10 for consideration at the upcoming

Sixth Party Congress, Lenin presented his new views with what one scholar calls “clarity

and determination."6 As in early April, he labeled the components of his argument

theses. His original subtitle indicated that he had four theses in mind, but he numbered

only one of these (the fourth).7 In a long initial paragraph he characterized the state as

totally counter-revolutionary, a military dictatorship that was preparing to disband the

Soviets. Though he thought the counter-revolution's seizure of all state power was "so

obvious and fundamental a fact," he believed it "is still obscured by a number of

institutions that are revolutionary in words but powerless in deeds." He was alluding to

the Soviets. In his second and third paragraphs, Lenin asserted that the leaders of the

Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries had "completely betrayed the cause of the

revolution," thus "turning themselves, their parties and the Soviets into mere fig leaves of

the counter-revolution." By their "complete and final bankruptcy" the majority parties

"have deprived themselves of all real power" and become "the most loudmouthed ranters

who help the reaction to 'divert' the people's attention until it is finally ready to disband

the soviets." Lenin's fourth paragraph conveyed his belief that "All hopes for a peaceful

development of the Russian revolution have vanished for good." Hence, the "objective

situation" dictated only two choices: "either complete victory for the military dictatorship,

or victory for the workers' armed uprising." In his fifth paragraph, he argued that the

slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" was "no longer correct" and stressed that there could

be "no constitutional or republican illusions of any kind, no more illusions about a

peaceful path." Bolsheviks had to "resolutely prepare for the armed uprising, if the

course of the crisis permits it, on a really mass, national scale." A sixth paragraph


5

specified that "The aim of the insurrection can only be to transfer power to the proletariat,

supported by the poor peasants, with a view to putting our Party program into effect."

Finally, in the only numbered (fourth) thesis, expressed in three short paragraphs, Lenin

called on the Party to "Reorganize immediately, consistently, resolutely, all along the

line," forming "illegal organizations or cells everywhere," and combining illegal work with

legal activities, the importance of which should not be overvalued. "Act," he advised, "as

we did in 1912-14, when we could speak about overthrowing tsarism by a revolution and

an armed uprising" while not foregoing legal opportunities to organize and agitate.

In the weeks ahead Lenin would tinker with this line and even temporarily

abandon it, but he would consistently return to it. It had become and would henceforth

remain the core of his thinking about how to make the revolution: necessarily by an

armed insurrection, by the Bolsheviks in opposition to all other parties, and not

dependent on the Soviets. It was a tactic aimed at achieving power unfettered by the

constraints imposed by coalitions, institutions or electorates. It sought to achieve a

complete break with bourgeois values and lay the foundation for a new, “socialist”

society. Violence was essential to this process; compromise, by its very nature, could

not achieve the complete break Lenin thought was needed.

The Bolshevik Central Committee, augmented by representatives of the Military

Organization, the Petersburg Committee and three Muscovite Party organizations, took

up Lenin's theses at a meeting on July 13-14. Debate was apparently vigorous, but the

meeting, by a vote of 10-5, rejected Lenin's proposals. A resolution adopted by the

Central Committee indicates that the majority saw the new political situation as more fluid

than did Lenin, strongly disagreed with him on the question of the Soviets, and preferred

greater tactical flexibility than he did.8 This resolution would provide the basis of

Bolshevik policy in the months to come, and the conflict between it and Lenin’s core

position would be the key issue confronting the Party.

In the view of the Central Committee, the bourgeoisie, landowning nobility and

military had mobilized and were "heading toward an imperialist counter-revolution." The


6

Provisional Government, described as a dictatorship under Kerensky, represented both

the counter-revolutionary forces and "the peasant petty bourgeoisie and a part of the

workers which has not yet become disillusioned with the petty bourgeois democrats." It

"is incapable of accomplishing a single one of the fundamental tasks of the revolution."

The Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, "which hold the majority in the Soviet,"

had "used all their authority against the Petrograd workers and soldiers" and "unmuzzled

counter-revolutionary elements with the aim of crushing the internationalist wing of the

proletariat." Through "their cowardliness, their betrayal of revolutionary principles, and

their open treachery to the revolutionary proletariat," these two parties were "steadily

strengthening the position of classes which are hostile to the revolution." The

Provisional Government was likewise "helping the counter-revolution." Having "become

more brazen thanks to the connivance of the Mensheviks and the Socialist

Revolutionaries," the counter-revolution was, in the Committee's assessment, "already

moving from attacks on the Bolsheviks to attacks on the Soviets and on the parties of the

Soviet majority."

In these circumstances "The proletarian party has the task," resolved the Central

Committee, "of unmasking any counter-revolutionary measures, of criticizing relentlessly

the reactionary policy of the petty bourgeois leaders, [and] of strengthening the positions

of the revolutionary proletariat and its party." It also should prepare "its forces for the

decisive struggle to implement the party program—if the course of the crisis permits—on

a genuinely national scale. This period of preparation and building up forces requires

that the party use all of its organizational opportunities." "In the process of the further

development of the revolutionary proletarian movement," the Committee concluded, "the

Russian proletariat will be increasingly confronted with purely socialist tasks, and the

revolutionary struggle of the Russian workers will be very closely tied with the

developing revolution in western Europe."

With most of these statements of tasks and with the concluding forecast Lenin

would have agreed. But the Central Committee declined to explicitly endorse his call for


7

an armed uprising. Instead of recommending an armed revolt, the Central Committee

called for a "decisive struggle to implement the Party program"—umbrella language

which did not rule out insurrectionary tactics but allowed other forms of "decisive

struggle" as well.

Years later, in 1924, Stalin testified that the Central Committee disagreed with

Lenin's notion that the Soviets "had become useless" and instead thought that there

might be a "possibility that the Soviets would revive."9 This point was central to the

Central Committee’s disagreement with Lenin. Though recognizing that "the role of the

Soviets is declining," the Central Committee majority did not see them as dead or

hopelessly counter-revolutionary, but rather as victims of the very counter-revolution that

their current leaders had abetted. Soviets could still play a central role in the proletarian

revolution. After declaring that "Only a state authority” supported by the proletariat and

the poorest peasants “will be viable” and only if it "resolutely and firmly implements the

program of the workers," the Committee resolved that the basis of this authority had to

be "the concentration of all power in the hands of the revolutionary proletarian and

peasant Soviets." The Central Committee majority recognized that the political

complexion of Soviet institutions might change. It also apparently realized the great and

indelible significance that the Soviets had for the common people—and for most

Bolsheviks as well—as the foundation of revolutionary democracy. (Ironically, Lenin had

been preaching since April that the Soviets were the only possible form of revolutionary

government.) For these reasons the Central Committee majority did not reject the

Soviets as revolutionary institutions. But neither did it embrace the current Soviets.

Declining to take a position on Lenin's call to withdraw "All Power to the Soviets!" as the

Party's slogan, the Central Committee looked forward to the prospect of revolutionary

Soviets holding all power.

The Central Committee’s commitment to the Soviets was related to its interest in

cooperation with other left socialists. The leader of the Menshevik-Internationalists,

Martov—for whose support at the Central Executive Committee session on July 5 Stalin


8

had expressed appreciation—had called on July 9 for all revolutionary forces to stop

feuding and to come together in a revolutionary Soviet government to fight the counter-

revolution.10 The Central Committee showed its interest in exploring this possibility by

inviting representatives of both the Menshevik-Internationalists and the left-

internationalist wing of the Socialist Revolutionaries to attend the upcoming Bolshevik

Party congress.11 Recognition that the way to a united front of Internationalists against

the counter-revolution lay through the Soviets was another reason for the Central

Committee not to reject the Soviets.

Probably on July 14 or 15, apparently in quick reaction to the Central Committee's

resolutions, Lenin penned another manuscript, "On Slogans."12 In this he reiterated most

of what he had said in his four theses. Because the peaceful period of the revolution had

ended with the July Days, Lenin said that "the slogan calling for the transfer of state

power to the Soviets would now sound quixotic or mocking." "It has patently ceased to

be correct now." Lenin savaged Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary leaders as

"butchers' aides" and for "the butcher's role they are playing." The real butchers,

however, were "the military gang, who are shooting insubordinate soldiers at the front

and smashing the Bolsheviks in Petrograd." The only force that "can overthrow the

bourgeois counter-revolutionaries," Lenin argued, is "the revolutionary proletariat. Now,

after the experience of July 1917, it is the revolutionary proletariat that must

independently take over state power … supported by the poor peasants or semi-

proletarians." In this manuscript meant for publication, Lenin could not overtly call for an

armed uprising, but the idea can readily be inferred between his lines. This much of "On

Slogans" echoes his theses of July 7.

But, apparently in response to the Central Committee's stand, Lenin shifted his

position on the Soviets. 13 Like the Central Committee, he now expressed the view that

the Soviets—as institutions— were victims of the counter-revolution. "At the moment,"

he said, "these Soviets are like sheep brought to the slaughterhouse and bleating pitifully

under the knife. The Soviets at present are powerless and helpless against the


9

triumphant and triumphing counter-revolution." How apt that he labeled the leaders of

the majority parties as "butcher's aides."14

Looking ahead to the proletariat's overthrow of the bourgeoisie, Lenin then

pointed out that

Soviets may appear in this new revolution, and indeed are bound to, butnot the present Soviets, not organs collaborating with the bourgeoisie, butorgans of revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie. It is true thateven then we shall be in favor of building the whole state on the model ofthe Soviets. It is not a question of Soviets in general, but of combating thepresent counter-revolution and the treachery of the present Soviets.15

Lenin was acknowledging that new and different Soviets might develop and play a role

during and after the proletarian revolution. But for the present and the foreseeable

future, he continued to rule out Bolshevik involvement in the existing Soviets. How the

Soviets might become different without Bolshevik involvement he did not explain.

A recollection by Stalin in 1924 of the situation after the July Days suggests that

the Central Committee was not impressed by Lenin's modified position. "After the July

defeat," he said,

disagreement did indeed arise between the Central Committee and Leninon the question of the future of the Soviets. It is known that Lenin,wishing to concentrate the Party's attention on the task of preparing theuprising outside the Soviets, warned against any infatuation with thelatter, for he was of the opinion that, having been defiled by thedefencists, they had become useless. The Central Committee and theSixth Party Congress took a more cautious line and decided that therewere no grounds for excluding the possibility that the Soviets wouldrevive. The Kornilov revolt [in late August] showed that this decision wascorrect … Later, Lenin admitted that the line taken by the Sixth Congresshad been correct.16

This account, which we shall have occasion to revisit, indicates that the disagreement

between Stalin and the Central Committee majority, on one hand, and Lenin, on the other,

was not ended by Lenin’s “On Slogans” but continued at least into August. It is also

significant that Stalin portrays Lenin in a negative light: he was both wrong and

incautious in seeking "an uprising outside the Soviets," and he did not "admit" his error

until sometime "later" than the Kornilov revolt. This is hardly a sketch of a respected

leader.


10

But as of July 14, the final day of the Central Committee meeting, Stalin himself

may not have fully made up his own mind about the necessity of an armed uprising and

whether the Soviets had revolutionary potential. An article he published the next day

suggests points of both agreement and conflict with Lenin, though it does not deal

explicitly with these key issues. The majority parties, "blinded by factional fanaticism,"

had "perfidiously" struck "at the revolutionary workers and soldiers," Stalin said, and

thus they had raised the hopes of counter-revolutionaries. The result was "a riot of

counter-revolution and a military dictatorship." Now, "scared by the military

dictatorship," "the ruling Socialist Revolutionary and Menshevik parties … light-

heartedly betray the leaders of the proletarian parties to the enemies of the revolution."

As the "counter-revolutionaries grow more brazen and provocative from hour to hour," he

said, they moved from assaulting the Bolsheviks to attacking "all the Soviet parties and

the Soviets themselves." A trade union office and some Menshevik district

organizations in the Petrograd area had been "smashed," he reported (with a concern

Lenin certainly would not have shared), and the Petrograd Soviet itself had been

"invaded" by police. "New political crises," Stalin forecast, were "inevitable." To

prepare for the "impending battles," the ex-seminarian called on his readers to obey two

"commandments." First, "arm yourselves with restraint and self-control," resist all

provocations and premature actions. Second, close ranks around "our Party," "keep the

banner flying, encourage the weak, rally the stragglers and enlighten the unawakened."

"No compromise with the counter-revolutionaries!" he insisted, "No unity with the

'socialist' jailers!" "Our watchword" must be "an alliance of the revolutionary elements

against the counter-revolution and those who shield it."17 Stalin’s remarks neither

endorsed nor ruled out insurrection, but it was “restraint and self-control” with which he

urged workers to arm themselves, not rifles.

The next day, in addressing the Petrograd Bolsheviks' Second City Conference,

Stalin clarified his thinking.18 He saw the social and political situation as fluid. The

"outstanding feature of the present situation is a crisis of power," Stalin said, a crisis that


11

is "due to the shakiness of the government … its orders are greeted with either ridicule or

indifference … Ministers are falling like ninepins," and "government instability has

reached its apex."19 The peasants, too, were divided and conflicted.20 "A new period has

begun, a period of sharp conflicts, clashes and collisions. Times will be turbulent, crisis

will follow crisis. The soldiers and the workers will not remain silent." Indeed, Stalin

claimed that the proletariat "is now rising to power" and that soon "a favorable moment

will arrive when we shall be able to give decisive battle to the bourgeoisie."21

On the important question whether the Bolsheviks could "continue to adhere to

the old slogan 'All Power to the Soviets!'" Stalin answered, "Of course, not. To transfer

power to Soviets that in fact are tacitly working hand in glove with the bourgeoisie would

mean helping the enemy." Then, responding to comments, he offered a fuller

explanation. "Our slogan of power to the Soviets," he pointed out,

was adapted to the peaceful period of development of the revolution,which has now passed. … When we advanced the slogan about theSoviets, power was actually in the hands of the Soviets. By bringingpressure to bear upon the Soviets we could influence changes in thegovernment. Now power is in the hands of the Provisional Government.We can no longer count on securing the peaceful transfer of power to theworking class by bringing pressure to bear on the Soviets. As Marxistswe must say: it is not a matter of institutions, but of which class's policythe given institution is carrying out. Unquestionably we are in favor ofSoviets in which we have the majority. And we shall strive to create suchSoviets. But we cannot transfer power to Soviets that have entered intoan alliance with the counter-revolutionaries.

What I have said may be summed up as follows: the peaceful pathof development of the movement has come to an end, because themovement has entered the path of socialist revolution. … Therefore, at thepresent stage the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" has becomeobsolete.22

Stalin was agreeing with Lenin on the important but limited issue of the utility of "All

Power to the Soviets!" in the present circumstances. Indeed, his language in several

places is borrowed from Lenin's theses and "On Slogans." Having been laughed at by

the Soviet leaders when he proposed they should seize power, Stalin had even better

reason than Lenin to regard them as counter-revolutionaries.

But Stalin clearly did not agree with Lenin about the revolutionary potential of the

Soviets in the longer run. Stalin's argument that "it is not a matter of institutions, but of


12

which class's policy the given institution is carrying out," showed greater political insight

than Lenin's petulant dismissal of the Soviets, and it allowed greater tactical flexibility

than Lenin's insistence on working outside the Soviets. Stalin affirmed the Soviets as

potential revolutionary vehicles and endorsed working within Soviet institutions to

advance the revolution. Indeed, he announced that the Bolsheviks would continue to

participate in the Central Executive Committee itself, even though he said it was

"concluding a shameful alliance with the counter-revolutionaries and complying with

their demands." Moreover, the Bolshevik members of the Central Executive Committee

would "refrain from opposing" its decisions, although they would reserve the right of

independent political action.23

As for "talk about unity with the [mainstream] Mensheviks and Socialist

Revolutionaries," Stalin was firmly opposed, characterizing such notions as extending "a

hand to counter-revolutionaries." Noting that there were "efforts being made here and

there in the factories to arrange an alliance" of the majority parties with the Bolsheviks,

Stalin branded this "a camouflaged form of fighting the revolution, for alliance with the

defencists may bring about the doom of the revolution." "We cannot regard the Socialist

Revolutionaries and Mensheviks as Socialists," Stalin declared, adding "To talk about

unity with the social-jailers … would be criminal." He pointed out, however, that "There

are elements among the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries who are prepared

to fight the counter-revolutionaries (the followers of Kamkov among the Socialist

Revolutionaries and of Martov among the Mensheviks), and with these we are ready to

join in a united revolutionary front." Stalin went so far as to propose that "We must put

forward another slogan: Unity with their Left wing, with the Internationalists, who still

retain a modicum of revolutionary integrity and who are prepared to fight the counter-

revolution."24 He also attempted to establish procedures to facilitate discussions toward

cooperation with the other Internationalists, but failed.25 Stalin's vision of a broader and

united Social Democracy had suffered greatly during 1917, but he still preserved a narrow

hope.


13

On the important issue of an armed uprising, Stalin acknowledged (in response to

a question) that "It is to be presumed that there will be armed actions, and we must be

prepared for all contingencies." Stalin was signaling his basic agreement with Lenin on

the need to prepare for armed struggle. Then he added—with apparent reference to

Lenin's having backed down from the June and July demonstrations—that ”future

conflicts will be sharper and the Party must not wash its hands of them."26 These words

express both Stalin's conviction that a party that urged workers and soldiers to go to the

barricades was morally obligated to fight alongside them and his doubts about Lenin's

leadership.27

Later in the meeting, Stalin added an important qualification to his views on

insurrection. "We must not forget," he said, "that one of the conditions for the transfer

of power now is victory over the counter-revolution by means of an uprising."28 Lenin,

who according to Stalin favored "an uprising outside the Soviets," might have asked what

other condition there was? Stalin's answer would have been that the insurrection had to

be made by or through the Soviets. This conjecture is supported by Stalin's 1924 sketch

of events in 1917, to which reference has previously been made. Stalin pointed out that a

"major fact" preceding the October Revolution was that "the Moscow and Petrograd

Soviets [went] over to the side of the Bolsheviks." Then he observed that "the

revolution's attack" was

carried out under the slogan of protecting Petrograd from possible attack…carried out under the slogan of organizing Soviet control over theHeadquarters of the Military District … under the slogan of protecting thePetrograd Soviet from possible action by the counter-revolution. Therevolution, as it were, masked its actions in attack under the cloak ofdefense in order more easily to draw the irresolute, vacillating elementsinto its orbit. This, no doubt, explains the outwardly defensive characterof the speeches, articles and slogans of that period, the inner content ofwhich, nonetheless, was of a profoundly attacking nature.29

For Stalin, then, the Soviets were an integral and essential component of the

insurrection, not—as Lenin saw them—hindrances or irrelevancies. Though Stalin

agreed that the government's use of force against the Bolsheviks made armed action to


14

take power likely, he did not agree with Lenin that violence was unavoidable, nor did he

agree with Lenin about whether the Soviets had a role to play in taking power.

Given the considerable gap between Stalin's thinking and Lenin's, it is to be

expected that Stalin would not have been eager to spread Lenin's views within the Party.

He gave striking evidence of this at the Second City Conference when, despite requests

for copies of Lenin's theses, he did not produce them. He did, however, offer a

“summary” of Lenin’s view. According to the conference protocol, Stalin said that

Lenin's theses "boil down roughly to three positions: (1) the counter-revolution has

triumphed; (2) [not made out by the recording secretary]; and (3) the slogan 'All Power to

the Soviets' is quixotic in the present situation, that power must be transferred to classes,

not to institutions."30 Even allowing that Lenin had not specified exactly what each of the

four theses was, what a remarkable performance: four theses boiled down to three points

and then to two! As Robert Slusser points out, "This was at best a highly oversimplified

summary … completely missing [Lenin's] call for preparations for an armed uprising in

place of reliance on the soviets."31 Indeed, Stalin had left Lenin's theses on the fire so

long that they almost all boiled away.

A worthwhile question is why the secretary could not make out the second part of

what Stalin said. Stalin had a heavy Georgian accent and, according to numerous

observers, spoke in a low, muffled voice, which often made it hard to understand him.32

Because the recording secretary evidently had little problem understanding the rest of

Stalin's remarks, it would appear that he spoke in exceptionally muffled tones when he

reached the second of Lenin's theses. This suggests that he was so reluctant to

communicate this point that he deliberately mumbled.

But what was the indecipherable "second" thesis? Slusser and Soviet historian

A. M. Sovokin speculate it was: the Soviet majority parties had betrayed the revolution.33

Stalin, however, did not disagree with this point (hardly controversial in any event), a fact

that militates against the conclusion. It seems more probable that Stalin garbled Lenin's

call for an armed uprising, a conclusion reinforced by Stalin's total omission of Lenin's


15

closely related fourth thesis calling on the Party to reorganize for insurrection and other

illegal activity.34

Stalin's intent to conceal a central part of Lenin's theses is also suggested by his

handling of their publication, which came in the Kronstadt Soviet's newspaper,

Proletarskoe Delo. Notations on Lenin's manuscript establish that Stalin edited the

article.35 Though it was in Stalin's hands on or before July 13, it did not appear until seven

days later. This considerable delay in publishing the short piece indicates Stalin's

reluctance to air Lenin's work. By contrast, Stalin brooked no delay in publishing in the

same paper on July 15 a piece of his own, virtually equal in length to Lenin's, which

reflected some conclusions reached by the Central Committee on July 13-14.36 When

Lenin's manuscript finally saw the light of day, his call for "an armed uprising" had been

changed to "a determined struggle of the workers," thus muting his differences with the

Central Committee, and his final three sentences, concerning reorganization to prepare

for the uprising, had been deleted. Because some alterations probably were necessary to

avoid government censorship, these changes may seem relatively unremarkable. But "a

determined struggle" did not clearly signal an "armed uprising," and the changes that

Stalin made suggest that he misrepresented Lenin's theses at the Second City

Conference.

Perhaps even more revealing are the steps Stalin took to keep even the altered

article from being recognized as Lenin's theses. Beside changing the title from "The

Political Situation" to "The Political Mood," Stalin deleted Lenin's identifying subtitle—

"Four Theses"—and identified the author only as "W". No effort was made to inform

readers who "W" was. Stalin's transparent intent was to prevent the article from being

recognized as Lenin's theses. In this he succeeded beyond his wildest dreams: even

though Lenin's original manuscript was found and published in 1926, "The Political

Mood" was not recognized as Lenin's theses until 1959.37

Stalin's foremost goal in concealing Lenin's theses probably was to minimize the

absent Lenin's influence at the Sixth Party Congress, which, after a series of delays,


16

finally convened on July 26. But three days before this, another significant event

occurred: the appearance of a new Bolshevik leading daily paper, Rabochy i Soldat

(Worker and Soldier). Stalin, the senior of five editors, quickly seized this opportunity to

shape opinion. For the first three issues he composed six articles, and a longer seventh

piece appeared on July 27. Among his predictable attacks on the government, jabs at

Menshevik leaders, and attempts to raise workers' spirits, several points stand out. First,

Stalin indirectly voiced renewed support for the Zimmerwald peace movement by

criticizing Menshevik leaders as "pseudo-Zimmerwaldists" who had forgotten their

internationalist principles. He further insinuated his support by sarcastically noting that

a Cadet newspaper deplored "the disastrous trends of Zimmerwaldism and 'utopian'

socialism.”38 Though Stalin had espoused Zimmerwaldism in March, in mid April he had

come out against it, a shift which had signaled he had joined Lenin's camp.39 By

reversing himself again, however obliquely, Stalin was asserting his renewed

independence from Lenin and also holding open the prospect of a common front with

other Internationalists.

Stalin put additional distance between himself and Lenin in a long article on the

election campaign for the Constituent Assembly. On July 7, Lenin had slighted the

planned gathering as "the S. R. Constituent Assembly," expressed doubt it would ever

meet, and denied that it could accomplish any "great reforms."40 Stalin's effort in

devoting a long article to the election campaign suggests that he saw advantages for the

Bolsheviks in the campaign, if not possibly a constructive role for the Assembly itself.

More significant, Stalin used the article to square off publicly against Lenin on the issue

of the Soviets. He proposed as the final plank of a model campaign platform a statement

that the Bolsheviks "are in favor of all power in the country being turned over to

revolutionary Soviets of Workers and Peasants."41 Here was "All Power to the Soviets!"

resurrected by the magic of the word "revolutionary," in full accord with the Central

Committee's position.


17

Stalin evidently also used his editorial power once again to shelve a Lenin

manuscript. "Constitutional Illusions," which Lenin wrote on July 26, was not published

in Rabochy i Soldat until August 4 and 5, after the Sixth Party Congress had concluded

its business.42 Lenin's branding a Constituent Assembly as the grandest of illusions and

his attacking the Menshevik-Internationalist leader Martov for "philistine whining"

probably were unwelcome to Stalin. And when the piece finally did appear, an

expectation in Lenin's manuscript that class conflict would become "armed struggle" was

neutered.

As the Sixth Party Congress convened on July 26, Stalin had done what he could

to restrict Lenin's influence over the proceedings. But he succeeded only in part. On

July 30, just prior to Stalin's presentation of the Political Report, Kronstadt sailors, still

arch-militant and evidently mistrusting Stalin, distributed to the delegates copies of

Lenin's pamphlet "On Slogans", quite possibly fresh from the press.43 Lenin also made

his presence felt through the Political Report, which he wrote (at least in part), as well as

through draft resolutions he sent to the Congress.44 His authority was considerably

undermined, however, by his absence, which correspondingly enhanced Stalin's

influence.

In his first appearance at the Congress, on July 27, Stalin delivered the report on

the Central Committee's activities.45 The speech itself is a largely unremarkable chronicle

of events during May, June and the first six days of July. However, a reference in it to

Lenin—and there is only one—warrants notice. After explaining the Central Committee's

decision on the night of July 3 to support the demonstration the next day, Stalin said,

rather off-handedly, "By the way, about Lenin. He was not present: he left on June 29 and

returned to Petrograd only in the morning of July 4, after the decision to intervene in the

movement had already been taken. Lenin approved of our decision."46 Slusser notes

that Stalin's telling has "a bare, almost perfunctory character," and that Lenin is not

portrayed in "a leadership role" but instead "is limited to endorsing a decision already

taken by the party CC."47 It would seem, indeed, that the sole purpose of Stalin's


18

gratuitous mention of Lenin was to insinuate his superfluousness. Perhaps, though,

Stalin showed considerable restraint in not pointing out that Lenin had helped pull the

rug from under the June 10 demonstration and that he had actually preferred not to

participate in the July 4 action.

Also interesting are remarks Stalin made in reply to comments. It was here that

he reopened the question of Lenin surrendering to authorities, on the excuse that "it is

still unclear who holds power"48—a view with which Lenin most certainly disagreed.

Stalin also found a way to smuggle in a flattering statement about the Central Executive

Committee of the Soviets, calling it "the voice of the whole organized revolutionary

democracy." The man had unequalled gall. 49

But the most subtle and significant bit of subversion in Stalin's replies was an

assertion that

It is evident from the discussion that no one criticized the political line ofthe Central Committee or objected to its slogans. The Central Committeeput forward three major slogans: all power to the Soviets, control ofproduction, and confiscation of the landed estates. These slogans wonsympathy among the worker masses and the soldiers. These slogansproved to be correct, and by fighting on these grounds, we did not lose themasses. I consider this a major fact in favor of the Central Committee. Ifthe Central Committee issues correct slogans in the most difficultmoments, this shows that it is fundamentally right.50

What a slick performance. Stalin begins with the observation that no one at the Congress

criticized the political line and the slogans that the Central Committee put forward during

the past period of May through July 6. (Curiously, he had not mentioned in his report the

Central Committee's decisions of July 13-14.) Then Stalin shifts tense in his last

sentence to the present, thus converting this lack of criticism in the past into an

endorsement of the Central Committee line in the present. From Lenin's perspective, it

was precisely whether the present line of the Central Committee was correct that was at

issue. But in Lenin's absence Stalin surreptitiously planted in listeners' minds the idea

that the Central Committee line is correct and hence that “All Power to the Soviets” is still

a correct slogan.


19

The more important report, indeed the centerpiece of the Congress, was the

Report on the Political Situation (or, as Stalin called it, the Report on the Current

Situation).51 This report was to clarify contemporary class relationships, explain their

consequences for political life, and recommend the direction the Party should take as a

result of these factors. It was originally intended that, in Lenin's absence, Trotsky should

deliver this report to the Congress,52 but he was arrested on the night of July 23, less

than three days before the Congress convened. To Stalin, probably because of his

seniority among available Central Committee members, fell the honor—or task—of pinch-

hitting.

Neither the authorship of the Political Report nor its content can be stated with

certainty. The essence of the problem is that there are two quite different versions of the

speech. Indeed, the two versions overlap only in occasional phrases, never in extended

passages. The earlier version appeared on August 17, two weeks after the Congress

adjourned, in a substitute for Pravda known as Proletarii, which Stalin edited. The

second variant was published in 1919 in the complete protocols of the Congress.53 The

editor of Stalin's collected works "settles" the issue of authorship by claiming the report

as Stalin's. And he "solves" the problem of content by hashing together selected

elements of the two variants and adding some wholly new wording in the process.54 He

justifies this dubious methodology by alleging that "the brevity and obvious inadequacy"

of the protocol version obliged him to consult the "official" record in Proletarii.55 Robert

Slusser also draws "on both variants, assuming that the sum of both represents

approximately what Stalin said at the Congress."56 Neither of these approaches helps

clarify authorship of the speech or explain why there are two so widely different variants.

The protocol text offers sustained and complicated thinking, expressed in

substantial paragraphs, and seeks to explain and persuade rather than declaim. It is

much more compatible with Lenin's style than with Stalin's.57 These considerations

suggest that Lenin is the author of the protocol text, and that this text was delivered

(read) by Stalin at the Congress. But even if this conjecture is correct, questions about


20

the protocol text remain. It is unusual in several ways. It is relatively short compared to

similar speeches delivered by Lenin himself.58 More significant is what the report, as

presented by Stalin, does not say: there is no dismissal of the current Soviets or rejection

of the possibility of working with them, and there are no calls to prepare for an armed

uprising or to reorganize the Party. These are curious omissions. They suggest either

that Lenin, realizing his weakness vis-à-vis the Central Committee majority, decided to

drop his more contentious positions, or that Stalin gutted Lenin's manuscript to remove

elements with which he did not concur. That Lenin chose not to express his central

ideas about tactics seems unlikely. But Stalin's efforts prior to the Congress to conceal

parts of Lenin's proposals and his flippant if not dismissive attitude toward Lenin in the

Central Committee Report leave little doubt that Stalin was wholly capable of "editing"

Lenin's draft. He had motive and opportunity.59

The other variant, the Proletarii text, differs markedly in style from the protocol

text and strongly suggests Stalin's authorship. Paragraphs are generally short, very

often just single sentences, creating a staccato quality. Ideas are simplified. The version

given in Proletarii two weeks after the Congress thus appears to be a wholesale rewriting

by Stalin, perhaps to present the speech as he would have written it. If Stalin

incorporated any significant elements of the Proletarii text into the speech he read at the

Congress, the recording secretary did not hear them.

What Stalin read to the delegates on July 30 is a survey of the changing political

situation and class relationships from April through the July Days. Though emphasizing

analysis more than recounting events, it covers much the same ground as the Central

Committee Report and is almost as unremarkable. Its major significance, again, lies in

what it does not say. Only in the closing moment of the speech is the future direction of

the Party briefly glimpsed. After noting that the Provisional Government could exist "for

a few more months" solely due to the cover provided by so-called "socialists," the author

predicted that the growth of "the developing forces of the revolution" would soon bring

forth the moment "when the workers lift up and rally around themselves the poorer strata


21

of the peasantry, raise the banner of the workers' revolution and open the era of socialist

revolution in the West."60 There is no hint of the toughness and specificity of Lenin's four

theses or even of "On Slogans."

Though the Political Report was largely silent about the Soviets, in replying to

questions Stalin left no doubt about his position on this crucial issue. When asked "What

forms of militant organization" he proposed "in place of the Soviets," Stalin went to

considerable lengths to make it clear that he “did not oppose the Soviets as a form or

organization for the working class." They "are the most appropriate form of organization

of the working class struggle for power," he said, adding that they are "a purely Russian

form." But, he argued, "it is not a question of form but of the class to which power is to

be transferred … a question of the composition of the Soviets." When asked to explain

the Party's attitude toward the existing Soviets, he replied that some Soviets "still have a

role to play" and he hoped they would "live and flourish." "If the point at issue is the

transfer of all power to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, this slogan is

obsolete. And," he insisted, "this is the only point at issue." Thus did Stalin limit the

discussion—and indicate the limit of his agreement with Lenin. "The idea of

overthrowing the Soviets is a pipe dream," he continued, "Nobody here has suggested it.

The fact that we are proposing to withdraw the slogan 'All Power to the Soviets!' does

not, however, mean 'Down with the Soviets!'"61 Stalin was essentially repeating and

refining the case he had made at the Bolsheviks’ Petrograd City Conference two weeks

earlier. One can wonder, however, whether his assertion that no one here had suggested

calling for the overthrow of the Soviets was a backhanded acknowledgement that

someone absent held that position.

The draft resolution on the political situation that Stalin presented to the

Congress has not been published and may not have survived. Delegates expressed

sufficient disagreement with it, however, that it was decided—over Stalin's objection—to

refer the draft to an editorial commission. Stalin's objection to revising the original draft

suggests that he was an architect of the proposal and that he feared tinkering might undo


22

his work.62 It is quite possible that the original proposal was a compromise agreed to by

Lenin and Stalin before the Congress met.63 In any event, Stalin was elected to the seven-

member editorial commission.64 The revision that issued from the commission was

couched largely in umbrella language that was compatible with the views of Stalin and

the Central Committee majority and with some elements of Lenin's thinking. As approved

by the Congress, 65 the resolution required the Party to "take on itself the role of the

foremost fighter against counter-revolution," liberate "the majority of the people" from

the compromising influence of the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries, and

rally the poor peasants. "The slogan of transferring power to the Soviets … was a slogan

of the peaceful development of the revolution," according to the resolution, and "At the

present time such peaceful development and painless transfer of power to the Soviets

has become impossible." The Congress specified that the "only correct slogan at the

present time" is "the complete liquidation of the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary

bourgeoisie." Provocations and premature action should be strictly avoided. Finally, it

directed the "revolutionary classes to devote all efforts to taking state power into their

own hands and to guiding the state, in alliance with the revolutionary proletariat of the

advanced countries, toward peace and the socialist reconstruction of society."

Though the call to transfer power to the Soviets was being shelved for the time

being, the general treatment of the Soviets in the resolution followed the line of Stalin and

the Central Committee majority. The Soviets were portrayed as "suffering in painful

agony" while "disintegrating as a result of the fact that they did not at the right time take

all the power of the state into their own hands." The resolution further specified that the

Party must defend against counter-revolution "all mass organizations (the Soviets, the

factory and shop committees, soldiers' and peasants' committees) and above all the

Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies." 66 Moreover, it "must preserve

and strengthen the positions in these organs won by the internationalist wing" and

"struggle energetically for influence in these organs."67 It is hard to imagine Lenin

subscribing to these views about the Soviets.


23

The question of relations with other Internationalists was addressed in the

Congress' resolution on Party Unity. Here Lenin's view prevailed over Stalin's. The

resolution allowed efforts toward unity only with internationalists who had "broken

organizational ties with the defencists"68—a requirement Stalin had previously contested.

However, a Menshevik-Internationalist and a close associate of Martov, Yuri Larin,

received a warm welcome when he spoke at the Congress and declared his group's

readiness for just such a break. He also offered some reinforcement for Stalin's position

when he warned the Bolsheviks that his group "could not go together with you" if the

Bolsheviks chose the "dangerous path" of abandoning the Soviets.69 Stalin's denial of

any intention to bring down the Soviets was doubtless meant, in part, for Larin's ears.

One other statement by Stalin at the Congress merits notice, and it expresses a

deep confidence in Russia's socialist revolution. Delegate E. A. Preobrazhensky,

troubled by the vagueness of the political resolution's anticipation that the Russian

proletariat would advance toward socialism "in alliance with the revolutionary proletariat

of the advanced countries," proposed an amendment specifying that Russia's advance

toward socialism could go forward only if there were a successful socialist revolution in

the West. "I am against such an amendment," Stalin replied, arguing that "The

possibility is not excluded that Russia will be the country that will lay the road to

socialism." The Russian proletariat enjoyed several distinct advantages, he said, among

them freedom and the support of the poorer elements of the peasantry. "We must

discard the antiquated idea that only Europe can show us the way. There is dogmatic

Marxism and creative Marxism," Stalin concluded, "I stand by the latter."70 Stalin was

evidently so pleased with his formulation that he inserted another expression of it into

the reworked Political Report that he published more than two weeks later in Proletarii.

After again listing advantages of the Russian proletariat, he stated that "It would be rank

pedantry to demand that Russia should 'wait' with socialist changes until Europe 'begins.'

That country 'begins' that has the greater opportunities ….”71


24

Though boldly stated by Stalin, this point of view was not original with him.

Months earlier, Lenin, defending his advocacy of socialism in the April Theses from the

opposing orthodoxy "that socialism must come from other countries with a more

advanced industry," had called the traditional belief "a parody of Marxism." "Nobody can

say who will begin [socialism] and who will end it," Lenin argued, adding an implication

that even Marx himself had been wrong on the issue.72 Stalin was following in Lenin's

footsteps on this question, but he wore heavy Russian boots.

Stalin was not yet arguing, however, that Russia could go it fully alone, and he

made this clear in the revised Proletarii version of the Political Report. Claiming that

seizing power was "easy," he pointed out that the problem was to hold it. "For this," he

said, "it is necessary to have support from the side of the revolutionary workers of the

West." Because the imperialists of Russia and of the West were allied, an alliance of

Russian and Western workers was needed to counter the might of their united enemies.

Thus the task of the Party, he maintained, was "to strengthen and expand the proletarian

army in Russia, strengthen and expand the bonds of this army with the revolutionary

workers of the West," and rally the peasant poor of Russia.73 Stalin's militaristic

overtones indicate that he expected the transfer of power to involve fighting, just as his

firm attachment to the Soviets anticipated that the transfer would be effected through

them. Power could no longer be transferred "simply," Stalin acknowledged, but

nonetheless it could be transferred—all of it.74

After the July Days, the Bolsheviks had faced a difficult situation. The Party

organization lay in shambles, and the tactic it had followed since April seemed a failure.

With Lenin and other senior leaders in hiding or under arrest, the tasks of salvaging the

Party organization and charting a new course fell principally on officials of the second

rank. Sverdlov, only recently named to the Central Committee, directed the rebuilding of

the Party apparatus. To Stalin fell a leading role in assaying the political situation and

forging a new tactic. The difficulty of this task was compounded by Lenin's advocacy of

a wholesale turnabout of policy, abandoning peaceful methods and the Soviets in favor of


25

an armed uprising by the Party. The available evidence does not indicate the precise

extent of the role Stalin played in crafting the new line that emerged from the expanded

Central Committee meeting on July 13-14, but the fact that he was the chief defender of

the Central Committee line before the Petersburg Committee and at the Sixth Party

Congress suggests that he played the major role in formulating the policy. In assessing

the new situation, Stalin agreed with Lenin on some points, but his conduct demonstrates

his essential independence from Lenin. Stalin recognized the obvious fact that the

Provisional Government's use of violence against the Bolsheviks had brought to an end

the peaceful period of the revolution, probably obliging the Bolsheviks to use some

armed force to come to power. In this he agreed with Lenin. But he did not share Lenin's

view that the path to power lay primarily through violence. Though for the moment he

agreed with Lenin that "All Power to the Soviets!" was a dead slogan, Stalin continued to

regard the Soviets as the essential institutional vehicle for the revolution. In accepting

the likelihood of some armed action, Stalin cast off the easy overconfidence that he had

absorbed following Lenin's return to Russia. In its stead, he resumed the cautious

posture he had held in March. From April to July Lenin's self-assured militancy had

seduced Stalin into supporting a more aggressive line, but the July Days—and the

evidence that Lenin was not prepared to march in the streets alongside the workers and

soldiers—disabused Stalin of overly optimistic, painless approaches. Whatever

confidence he had in Lenin's leadership was also a casualty. Revolution was hard

practical work, not an intellectual's whim.

Among the many similarities between the policy adopted by the Central

Committee after the July Days and the approach which Stalin had suggested in March, it

is the aim of trying to create a broader alliance of revolutionary groups which most

strongly points to his leadership in shaping policy. He had championed efforts to forge

an alliance with Mensheviks March, and this aim was similar to his long-standing

objective of a broad but unified Party. In contrast to Lenin, who preferred a small group

which he could control to a larger one where his authority might be more readily


26

contested, Stalin believed that narrowly based forces and divided forces were inherently

weak. Unity, though, had to be achieved by adherence to essential precepts: before the

1917 Party unity had to be based on firm acceptance of illegal activity, in 1917 the

coalition had to be based on uncompromising opposition to the imperialist war. For

Stalin broader groups would have the merit of weakening Lenin’s voice, but otherwise he

would gain no personal advantage; his purpose was to strengthen the forces of

revolution.

The gradualist tactic to which Stalin returned in July aimed at discrediting the

Provisional Government and building the broadest possible coalition of revolutionary

forces led by the Bolsheviks. The Soviets would be the institutional frame of this

coalition, providing it with democratic legitimacy and a nationwide organizational

structure and reach. In March Stalin had stressed that in developing the revolutionary

coalition the minority Bolsheviks had to avoid needlessly alienating petty bourgeois

elements. After July the list of potential allies of the Bolsheviks had shrunk, but, judging

by Stalin's explanation in 1924 of the events of October 1917, he was still urging a similar

path then in order not to drive away the "irresolute, vacillating elements." An essential

part of this tactic was his continuing commitment to the Soviets, a commitment doubtless

recommended by his familiarity with the democratic attitudes of the worker and soldier

masses and their attachment to the Soviets. Stalin had gained this familiarity through his

several roles in the capital's worker-based political organizations and by living among the

workers.75 The notion that an armed uprising that disregarded the common people's

democratic sensibilities and their loyalty to the Soviets could succeed was a fantasy

more appropriate to the privileged stratum—privileged even during the revolutionary

upheaval—that Lenin inhabited.76


27

1 LCW, 25:186.

2 Another attempt by Lenin to shift blame occurred during a Central Committee meetingin the early morning hours of July 5, after the demonstration had been called off. Leninquestioned K. A. Mekhonoshin, a representative of the Military Organization, todemonstrate to him that it had failed to make detailed troop estimates or plans forsecuring bridges, providing weapons and food supplies, and other matters pertinent to amilitary coup attempt. Lenin's questions, Mekhonoshin recalled, "immediately soberedus. Frankly speaking, we had made no such estimates with a possible decisive clash inmind, having limited ourselves to a general estimate of the situation." (Quoted inRabinowitch, Prelude, 204-5.) One might well ask why Lenin had not asked suchquestions much earlier—for instance, before the aborted June 10 armed demonstration.But the key point is that by indicting the Military Organization for failing to effectivelyimplement what was not Bolshevik policy, Lenin was absolving himself of responsibilityfor the failure of the actual policy which he had imposed on the Party.

3 N. Podvoiskii, "Voennaia organizatsiia," 84. If Podvoisky is accurate in stating thatLenin said that the proletariat must abandon its illusions, Lenin was again seeking toduck responsibility for failure. The illusions were his own, not the proletariat's.

4 Ordzhonikidze is quoted in William Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 2 vols.(New York, 1965), 2:184; see also Rabinowitch, Power, 59.

5 LCW, 25:171-75; emphases in the original. The article was published on July 19 in aBolshevik magazine for women.

6 Service, Lenin, 2:201.

7 Text in LCW, 25:178-80 and 41:440-43. In an aide mémoire Lenin prepared in planningfor the Sixth Party Congress he referred to "my theses on the political situation (for thecongress)" (PSS 34:443). In Lenin's handwritten manuscript (the first page of which isreproduced at PSS, 34:3), the title is given as "The Latest Political Situation. FourTheses," but the words "Latest" and "Four Theses" are crossed out. It is not clearwhether Lenin crossed out the words or a later editor (presumably Stalin) deleted them.Also, no number is assigned to the first three theses; only the fourth is indicated with anArabic numeral. I am inclined to believe that Lenin began writing the piece with fourspecific points in mind, but—as the first several points seamlessly connected with eachother as he wrote—he failed to number them until he reached his final point. When helooked back over what he had written, he realized that "Latest" was both superfluous and,since he could not know whether the political situation might change before the congresssaw the piece, potentially misleading. Also, noticing that he had not numbered all thepoints and perhaps that there were more than four, he presumably struck "Four Theses"from the title, but forgot to delete the number 4 from the last thesis. He continued,however, to think of the piece as his "theses." Central Committee members who saw theoriginal manuscript also referred to it as Lenin's theses, and by this name it generallybecame known in the Party. When the piece did appear in print on July 20 in theKronstadt newspaper Proletarskoe delo, the title had been changed to "The PoliticalMood." The subtitle "Four Theses" was not restored to the title as given in Proletarskoedelo, and it is unclear whether the theses were numbered, though other editorial changeswere made. See LCW, 41:595-96; A. M. Sovokin, "Rasshirennoe soveshchanie TsKRSDRP(b) 13-14 iiulia 1917 goda," Voprosy istorii KPSS 1959, 4:125-38; and Slusser, 165.


28

8 No protocols of the meeting have been published. The resolutions are at RDCPSU,1:247-49; all quotations from the resolutions are from this source. See also Rabinowitch,Prelude, 217; Rabinowitch, Power, 60-61; and Sovokin, "Rasshirennoe soveshchanie."

9 SW, 6:355-56.

10 Martov's efforts continued through July. See Rabinowitch, Power, 24-25; AbrahamAscher, ed., The Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution (Ithaca, NY, 1976), 101-3; andJohn D. Basil, The Mensheviks in the Revolution of 1917 (Columbus, OH, 1984), 116.

11 Rabinowitch, Power, 60-61.

12 Text in LCW, 25:185-92. "On Slogans" was published as a pamphlet later in July. Themanuscript is undated, but it can be placed prior to July 16th. The evidence for this isStalin's use of the word "quixotic" in a speech on July 16 to describe the use of "AllPower To the Soviets!"—a usage he clearly borrowed from Lenin's "On Slogans." SeeSlusser, 172 (though he misdates Stalin's speech to July 14). Similarly, some wording in"On Slogans" seems to be taken from the Central Committee's resolution, thus datingLenin's manuscript to on or after July 14. Evidently the Central Committee's resolutionwas rushed to Lenin's hiding place (which was only a few miles from Petrograd); afterdrafting "On Slogans" in reply, his new manuscript was sped back to the CentralCommittee.

13 Service, Lenin, 2:202-3, sees "On Slogans" as a sign of Lenin's willingness "to move alittle towards the Central Committee." He agues Lenin's article made "clear that hisrejection of the soviets was not to be regarded as permanent," and he speculates that"Perhaps [this] nudged Stalin and the Central Committee majority towards accepting thatLenin's hostility to the 'All Power to the Soviets!' might not be as impolitic as they hadthought."

14 Stalin mimicked Lenin's ovine metaphor in an article on July 26 in which he referred tothe " Soviets, led by 'bad shepherds'" (SW, 3:155).

15 All emphases are Lenin's.

16 SW, 6:355-56.

17 SW, 3:110-13.

18 SW, 3:114-33. Stalin's remarks came in two reports, a set of replies to writtenquestions, and a reply to the discussion of the second report. Because my analysis ofStalin's position pulls together statements from throughout his remarks, page referencesto specific quotations will be provided. See also Rabinowitch, Power, 66-70, and Slusser,166-71. The editor of the Conference minutes, P. Kudelli, asserted that Lenin had agreedwith the "basic positions" of Stalin's report and that the report conformed to thearguments in Lenin's "Three Crises." See VTPOKB, 5.

19 SW, 3:119, 121-22.

20 SW, 3:132.

21 SW, 3:125-27.

22 SW, 3:132-33; see also 130.


29

23 SW, 3:119, 131.

24 SW, 3:121, 128-29; see also Slusser, 169, who quotes a very similar extended passagefrom the conference protocols. It was during these remarks that Stalin recalled Martov'sstand on July 5 against the anti-Bolshevik actions of the Central Executive Committee.

Slusser, 168, notes that "the editors of Stalin's Works have made numerouschanges to the text, one of which might mislead the incautious reader into believing thatStalin did in fact support Lenin's negative position on the Soviets." The example he givesis of Stalin's original language, "the right wing of the revolution had betrayed" theworkers, being changed to, "the Soviets had betrayed" the workers. There are, in fact,two additional very similar examples: (1) the original language, "against the counter-revolution, against the right wing of the democracy," being changed to, "against theSoviets," and (2) the original language, "the right wing wanted blood," being changed to,"the Socialist Revolutionary military men wanted blood." (Compare SW, 3:118 and 128with the texts in either VTPOKB, 54-55 and 68, or B. Elov, "Posle iiul'skikh sobytii,"Krasnaia letopis,’ 1923, no. 7:97 and 109.) I do not discern a clear or single purposebehind these changes; in any event, Stalin's original language contains a number ofinstances of his attacking the Soviets and the majority parties for their actions during theJuly Days.

25 During consideration of terms for a possible bloc with other internationalists inelections to the Petrograd Soviet, Stalin proposed that the only requirement beagreement on the basis of the Bolshevik platform; a tougher, rival proposal also requiredthe bloc partner to break organizationally with defencists. Stalin's proposal wasdefeated. See VTPOKB, 96.

26 SW, 3:129.

27 SW, 3:129.

28 SW, 3:133 (emphasis added).

29 SW, 6:356-58.

30 VTPOKB, 71.

31 Slusser, 170.

32 See Barbusse, 39; Ludwig, Nine Etched From Life, 349, 369; Lion Feuchtwanger,Moscow 1937. My Visit Described For My Friends (New York, 1937), 71, 105-106; SirAnthony Eden, Facing the Dictators (New York, 1962), 175; Medvedev, Judge, 65, 254,618; Medvedev, On Stalin and Stalinism, 10; and Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, The Time ofStalin. Portrait of a Tyranny (New York, 1981), 216, 225-26.

33 Sovokin, "Rasshirennoe soveshchanie," 129, and Slusser, 170.

34 We may deduce what Stalin mumbled by recognizing that Lenin's "four theses"

were actually five, expressed in this order: [1] Counter-revolution has triumphed and

taken over state power. [2] The Soviet majority parties' leaders have betrayed the

revolution and supported the counter-revolution. [3] Hopes for peaceful development


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have vanished, and the only choice open to the proletariat is armed uprising. [4] The

slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" is no longer correct, there is no peaceful path, and the

proletariat must "resolutely prepare for the armed uprising." [5]—but numbered (4)—

Reorganize, combine legal with illegal work, act as in 1912-14.

Stalin related Point [1]. Point [4] he related in part, leaving out Lenin's reiterationof his call (from point [3]) for an armed uprising and adding Stalin's own idea that classesmattered rather than institutions. Only points [2] and [3] can be candidates as the"second" thesis. Because Stalin did not disagree with point [2], the only logical choice asthe mumbled "second" thesis is point [3].34 Not that Stalin disagreed that chances for thepeaceful development of the revolution had passed—for he expressed this view himselfat the Conference. Or that he ruled out the possibility of an armed uprising. But he didnot agree with Lenin's call for armed uprising when it was linked with repudiation of theSoviets. (In this regard, it is significant that Stalin misrepresented Lenin's position andopened the door to working through the Soviets by inserting his own argument that itwas the class character of an institution that mattered.)

Point [3] can also be recognized as Lenin's second thesis if Lenin's chargeagainst the Soviet leaders of betraying the revolution by supporting counter-revolutionary repression is recognized as a subset of the first thesis, that the counter-revolution had triumphed, rather than as a separate thesis.

35 Sovokin, "Rasshirennoe soveshchanie," 128.

36 SW, 3:110-13.

37 Slusser, 165; Sovokin, "Rasshirennoe soveshchanie," 128.

38 SW, 3:142-43, 156.

39 See chapter 10 of the present work.

40 LCW, 25:175.

41 SW, 3:158-65 (the quote is from 165). The article appeared on July 27.

42 LCW, 25:196-210, and the note at 25:522.

43 Rabinowitch, Power, 85. "On Slogans" was published by the Kronstadt PartyCommittee (LCW, 25:192). That the sailors did not distribute "The Political Mood," whichhad been published in the newspaper of the Kronstadt Soviet, does indicate, however,that even they did not realize the article was Lenin's theses—thus confirming the successof Stalin's effort to conceal Lenin's more sharp-edged and dangerous text.

44 According to the memoir of Lenin's underground companion A. V. Shotman (Lenin vpodpol'e [iiul'-oktiabr' 1917 goda] , [Moscow, 1977], 10), Lenin sent the draft resolutionsfor the Congress to Sverdlov.

45 On the several variants of this speech, see Slusser, 178-79; the collected works versionis at SW, 3:166-79.


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46 Shestoi s"ezd RSDRP (bol'shevikov). Avgust 1917 goda. Protokoly (hereafter cited asShestoi s"ezd) (Moscow, 1958), 18-19. This passage is not included in the text in thecollected works.

47 Slusser, 182.

48 SW, 3:182.

49 SW, 3:180; Shestoi s"ezd, 27. Even more amazing is the fact that this description wasnot deleted from the collected works.

50 Shestoi s"ezd, 26; SW, 3:179.

51 The Congress protocols refer to the speech as the Report on the Political Situation, butStalin introduced his comments as concerning "the question of the current situation"(Shestoi s"ezd, 110), a term which was more in line with previous Party practice. Forexample, Lenin's main speech at the Seventh Party Conference in April 1917 had been a"Report on the Current Situation" (LCW, 24:228).

52Rabinowitch, Power, 85.

53 For the two variants of this speech, see Shestoi s"ezd, 110-14 (the protocol version)and 281-85 (the Proletarii version).

54 Most of the additions are relatively minor, usually to clarify meaning, condense, orprovide transitions. One of the additions strongly suggests Stalin's personal role in theediting process. I refer to a two-paragraph insertion which mimics scripture: "Thus it wasin April. Thus it was in July." (SW, 3: 184.)

55 SW, 3:182-90 (for the text), 200 (for the explanation). Although the Works text iscomposed of extracts of roughly equal length taken from the two basic variants, theeditor shows a preference for the Proletarii text (taking about two-thirds of it) over theprotocols text (of which he borrows only about one-half).

56 Slusser, 190.

57 Sovokin and Slusser believe that Lenin wrote the Political Report. (See A. M. Sovokin,"Rezoliutsiia VI s"ezda partii 'O politicheskom polozhenii,'" in Istochnikovedenie istoriiVelikogo Oktiabria (Moscow, 1977), 9-25; Slusser, 191.) Rabinowitch, Power, 85, seesLenin's influence on the speech and is inclined to think the resolution was Lenin's work.It is unclear, however, to which variant(s) they refer.

58 For example, at the Seventh Party Conference in April, Lenin's report on the currentsituation, though hurriedly written in response to the April Crisis, had been roughly halfagain longer than the report Stalin delivered at the Sixth Congress. For the AprilConference, moreover, Lenin had managed to write several other speeches, one of whichwas substantial. Lenin's circumstances underground in July were certainly more difficultthan in April, but he had considerably more time to write and the nature of the "currentsituation" facing the Party called for the fullest analysis.

59 Perhaps Stalin not merely deleted parts of Lenin's draft but also substituted his ownwords for Lenin's on the key omitted issues, but the protocol text, inexplicably, does notappear to include such substitutions. However, Stalin dropped a hint that he hadsubstituted his own thoughts for Lenin's when he said, in reply to a question, that,


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compared to the speech, "Comrade Lenin in his pamphlet ["On Slogans"] goes further."(Shestoi s"ezd, 143; SW, 3:196-97).

60 Shestoi s"ezd, 114; SW, 3:190.

61 SW, 3:190-92, also 194, 198. Emphasis added. Van Ree ("Stalin's Bolshevism," 45)sees Stalin as coming "close to rejecting Lenin's conclusions."

62 There is one good indication that Stalin wrote at least part of the draft resolution:specifically, a paragraph that described the Soviets as "suffering in painful agony" and"disintegrating as a result of the fact that they did not at the right time take all the powerof the state into their own hands." The editorial commission deleted this paragraph fromthe draft, but Stalin pleaded successfully to restore it. (Shestoi s"ezd, 248.) It seemslikely that Stalin himself—not Lenin—authored this paragraph. A statement he madeimmediately after presenting the original draft resolution indicates his personal interest init. "I want to clear up one point in the resolution," Stalin said, “until July 3 the peacefulvictory, peaceful transfer of power to the Soviets was possible. If the Congress ofSoviets had decided to take power into its own hands, the Cadets, I think, would not havedared to come out openly against the Soviets, for such opposition would have beenforedoomed to disaster. But now, after the counter-revolution has organized andstrengthened itself, to say that the Soviets can take power into their own handspeacefully—that's empty talk. The peaceful period of the revolution has come to and end,a violent period has begun, a period of combats and explosions.” (Ibid., 114; this passagehas been omitted from Stalin's collected works.) Stalin's "clarification" referred to thefailure of the Soviets "at the right time [to] take all the power of the state into their ownhands." It was apparently a point of considerable importance to him. And rightly so,for—as he had revealed in an earlier account of the July events—he had personally urgedthe Central Executive Committee to break with the Cadets, seize power and join with theBolsheviks, only to have its members ridicule him. For Stalin, that moment had been aturning point and he evidently needed to memorialize the blunder of the men who hadsneered at him while refusing to take power at the right time.

63 Lenin and Stalin met sometime before July 26. No details of their discussion areknown, however. See VILBK, 4:304.

64 Shestoi s"ezd, 144-45.

65 RDCPSU, 1:254-55, presents the most important clauses of the resolution.

66 Shestoi s"ezd , 144-45. Emphasis added by the present author. The words, "and aboveall the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies," were added to the editorialcommission's proposal on an amendment from the floor; Stalin, who presented thecommission's draft, accepted the amendment without discussion. (Ibid., 249.) Earlier,Stalin had promised that Bolsheviks would help Soviets "defend themselves against theattacks of the Provisional Government" (SW, 3:192).

67 Stalin argued that winning a majority in the Soviets "in itself is very important," thoughnot as important as overthrowing the counter-revolution (SW, 3:192).

68 RDCPSU, 1:260. See also the resolution on blocs in the elections for the ConstituentAssembly, 1:257-59.

69 Shestoi s"ezd, 69-71. In a letter to the Congress, Martov counseled that therevolutionary democracy should unite to conquer power, rather than a minority of the


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democracy trying to conquer power against the will of the majority (Israel Getzler, Martov.A Political Biography of a Russian Social Democrat [Cambridge, 1967], 163).

70 SW, 3:199-200.

71 SW, 3:186; Shestoi s"ezd, 283.

72 LCW, 24:246.

73 Shestoi s"ezd, 285; these remarks were omitted from the text presented in Stalin'scollected works.

74 SW, 3:196. Stalin's use of simply in quotation marks alludes to an assertion by Leninnear the end of "On Slogans" opposing "All Power to the Soviets!" because it "might beconstrued as a 'simple' appeal for the transfer of power to the present Soviets" (LCW,25:192). Stalin's allusion indicates his agreement with Lenin on this point, though headded, "Comrade Lenin, in his pamphlet, goes further"—suggesting that he (Stalin) didnot agree with Lenin's more extreme views.

75 During 1917 Stalin lived in working class districts, from August with the family of theworker Sergei Alliluyev.

76 From his return to Russia until his flight in July, Lenin resided with his sister, MariaIlyinichna, and her husband, Mark Yelizarov; the Yelizarovs were well off and had aspacious apartment with a domestic servant in residence. (Krupskaya, 348, 367.)

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