chapter 17-section 9

7/31/2019 Chapter 17-Section 9

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Crisis and Coexistence,

1961-1964 Cold Wars most dangerous phase coincided

roughly with Kennedys presidency

Staunch Cold Warrior who loathed communism Feared nuclear war

Anxious to alleviate Third World discontents so that

Moscow could not capitalize on them

Blamed Russia for the Cold War and determinedthat the US would end it


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The Bay of Pigs

July 26, 1953- Fidel Castro launched a revolution against theBatista dictatorship

Castro stood for agrarian reform, reduced dependence on thesugar harvest, and the purification of Cuban society from USinfluence and corruption

December 31, 1958- Batista fled to Miami

January 8, 1959- Castros 26th of July Movement to control of theCuban government

July 1960- split was imminent between Cuba and the US

Diplomatic ties were cut off in January 1961

USSR jumped right in and declared that they would buy largequantities of Cuban sugar

Cuba now tilted toward the Soviet camp


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The Bay of Pigs

USSR gained a foothold in the Western Hemisphere some 90 miles

from Key West and a place to put their missile silos

Ike had given preliminary assent to a CIA plan to depose Castro

Using thousands of anti-Castro refugees who had fled to theUS in 1959-60

1961- Kennedy gave his final approval to what would become

known as the Bay of Pigs invasion

Kennedy believed that Khrushchev would unlikely move

against the US if they invaded Cuba

Others in the US thought that he would, but in Central

Europe- around Berlin


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The Bay of Pigs

CIA assumed that anti-Castro feeling in Cuba would lead to rioting in the streetsand defections from the Cuban army in the event of a US invasion

CIA believed that a brigade of fewer than 3,000 Cuban exiles could provide thespark to ignite the revolution

US involvement would be limited to two pre-invasion air strikes to disable theCuban air force

What went wrong?

No reliable evidence of widespread anti-Castro feeling in Cuba

Island too large for a quick coup with a small invasion force

Air strike failure would leave the land forces vulnerable

No back up plan

Original plan (Operation TRINIDAD) was to occur at a site from which thebrigade could take refuge in the mountains

Revised plan (Operation ZAPATA) would bring it ashore at The Bay of Pigs, fromwhich the mountains were inaccessible

Change never made clear to Kennedy or other key officials (US governmentwould take the heat on this tragic mistake)


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The Bay of Pigs

April 15, 1961- first air strike destroys only half of Castros fighterplanes, then Kennedy cancelled the second strike

CIA objected to the presidents cancellation

Told to call the president, but waited until April 17 so that hewould not scrub the whole attack

April 17, 1961- CIA asks for permission to have the aircraftcarrier Essex provide air cover for the landing forces

Kennedy denied the request and the landing failed

The invaders were routed

114 killed, 1,189 captured, the rest escaped to the sea

April 19, 1961- invasion over and the fallout begins

Kennedy privately blamed the CIA, but took full responsibility-then fired CIA director Allen Dulles and ordered a housecleaningof the agency

US self-image had not been lower since Pearl Harbor


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The Vienna Summit,

June 1961 Worst of all the Cold War summits

June 3-4, 1961- led to two major crises

One in Berlin and one in Cuba

In the two years following this summit, the two superpowersgoing to war with each other was a real possibility

Kennedys misperceptions about Khrushchev led to a series of

talks that were tense, grinding, and often not amicable

Issues that divided the two leaders

Bay of Pigs Invasion and Laos (peripheral issues)

The German Question (central issue)


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The Vienna Summit,

June 1961 Khrushchev proposed a limited compromise in the form of an

interim accord, by which the superpowers would indicate theirintent to turn the problem over to the Germans

Kennedy would not accept this proposal sensing that it couldundermine US credibility

Khrushchev stated that he wanted peace, but it seemed Kennedywanted war

Kennedy stated that the calamities of war will be sharedequally

Khrushchev threatened to sign a treaty with East Germany byDecember 1961 unless the US accept an interim agreement

Kennedy replied if that is true, its going to be a cold winter

Such hostilities had not been spoken to this point in the ColdWar


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The Vienna Summit,

June 1961 Kennedy learned that the US must respond

firmly to any challenge over Berlin

Especially after the Bay of Pigs and Vienna

Khrushchev returned home with the knowledgethat Kennedy was no match for him

But he sensed greater belligerence in Kennedy thanin Ike

Kennedys immaturity in the invasion of Cubadid not result in nuclear war, but it might overthe question of Germany


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The Berlin Wall, August 1961

July 8, 1961- Khrushchev rescinded the 1.2 million-man cut in

Soviet army strength he had announced in January 1960

July 25, 1961- Kennedy responded with a televised address in

which he asked Congress for authority to call up US reserves anddisclosed plans for a large military buildup, including

preparations for an encore of the Berlin airlift

With measures to provide fallout shelters in the event of

nuclear war (yikes!)

Showdown over Germany was looming Thousands of East Germans used the Brandenburg Gate to get

to West Berlin everyday

2,500,000 had used this place as an escape since 1949


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US knew that the Soviets could shut down the border without

breaking any previous agreements

East German commie boss Walter Ulbricht had been pushing

Khrushchev for months to let him close the border July 31, 1961- Ulbricht proposed that the air corridor between

Berlin and West Germany should be cut in order to keep refugees

from leaving

Khrushchev rejected this proposal for fear of war

Finally agreed to allow Ulbricht to seal the border with barbedwire and if the West did not try to break through, the wire

could be replaced by a wall


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August 12, 1961- construction of the wall began

US State Dept. had not prepared for the possibility that West

Berlin would be isolated from East rather than West Germany

Kennedys advisors suggested restraint National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy pointed out the

obvious propaganda advantages Ulbricht had handed the US

Berlin Wall actually defused the German Question

Khrushchev was able to stem the flow of East German refugees

and keep critics who urged him to deal resolutely with Berlin

at bay

West got a propaganda windfall from a highly visible symbol

of Communism


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US Arms Buildup and the

Soviet Response Kennedy accelerated the weapons-building programs begun under

Ike

Far exceeded the number of missiles beyond those that Ike hadconsidered more than adequate

1,000 solid-fueled Minuteman ICBMs

As many as 41 nuclear submarines

Each carrying 16 Polaris missiles capable of reaching theUSSR

Mid-1960s- US had an overpowering triad (land-based,submarine-launched missiles, and bombers) of awesomedestructive power far beyond anything the USSR could hope tohave operational by then

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (and many European andUS defense experts) felt that the Dulles doctrine of massive

retaliation had lost its credibility


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Soviet Response McNamara introduced a policy of flexible response designed to

provide decision makers with options for gradual escalation ofhostilities in the event of a conventional attack by Soviet forces inCentral Europe

McNamara also introduced a policy of counterforce whichimplied that US weapons would be launched not against Sovietcities but only against military targets

Soviets viewed these policies as moving toward a first-strikecapacity

Believed that with a well-coordinated attack on Soviet militarytargets might be able to destroy Moscows ability to retaliateand thus render the USSR defenseless

Soviets, whether the threat was imagined or real, saw little choicebut to protect themselves against it


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Soviet Response October 1961- Kennedy authorized Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell

Gilpatric to reveal to the world the extent of US superiority

missile gap had been exposed by McNamara in February, but withno specific numbers

Gilpatric stated- 5,000 warheads to 300

USSR deployed only 6 ICBMs capable of reaching the US (althoughthey had sub-based missiles that could reach the US also)

Result-

Soviet pressure on West Berlin eased noticeably

Disarmed and humiliated Khrushchev

Kennedy, in a March 1962 magazine interview, stated that in certainconditions, the US might launch a nuclear first strike against theUSSR

Khrushchev turned to Cuba


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The Cuban Missile Crisis

If you have time, check out the movie 13 Days to enhance your knowledgeof this topic

US, since the failed Bay of Pigs, had tried to overthrow or kill Castro in anoperation known as MONGOOSE

USSR knew about this and used it to their advantage Spring 1962- Khrushchev decides to station nuclear missiles in Cuba

Two immediate aims with this tactic-

To defend Cuba against a US invasion and to redress the strategicbalance by locating Soviet missiles close to America

Medium-range SS-4s (1,200 miles) and intermediate-range SS-5s(2,500 miles)

Khrushchevs plan to visit the UN in November suggests he may haveintended to reveal the missiles in Cuba at that time and use theresulting leverage to reopen the German Question from a morefavorable negotiating position


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Summer 1962- Soviets offered and Cuba accepted up to forty missilelaunchers each equipped with two missiles and one nuclear warhead

Khrushchev thought that this could be done in secret as he underestimated theUSs surveillance ability

He also thought that Kennedy would wait to tell the US public until after theNovember Congressional elections

He also expected Kennedy to allow the missiles in Cuba as Moscow hadaccepted US Jupiter-C missiles in Turkey

All of this was assumption and proved to be false

CIA director John McCone reported in August that Cuba was receivingfrom Russia large shipments that probably included missiles

Kennedy and McNamara did not believe it

Neither did CIA analysts as agents in Cuba were deemed not credible

Until they reported 80-foot cylinders being carried on trucks that couldntmake wide turns


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This got Kennedys attention- he issued warnings to Moscow onSeptember 4 and 13, but it was too late for Khrushchev to stop theoperation

They hadnt thought about what to do if the Soviets ignored the warnings

October 14, 1962- U-2 flight over Cuba brought back clear photographicevidence of missile launcher construction

Kennedy was alerted on October 16, 1962 and the Cuban missile crisiswas on

October 20, 1962- Executive Committee of the National Security Councilproposed and the president had agreed that the US objective should be

the removal of the missiles, not the Castro regime Kennedy was posited with three options

To negotiate removal of the missiles- unworkable since he had no bargainingchip

Conventional air strike to destroy the missiles

Naval blockade to prevent warheads and other weapons from reaching the

island


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Kennedy decided on the third option (naval blockade)

Against the advice of many, if not most of the ExComm

Kennedy had little faith in naval interdiction, but chose this option because itseemed the lesser of two evils

Air strikes may require multiple sorties followed by a land invasion Blockade offered a first step that could always be escalated if necessary

October 22, 1962- Kennedy addressed the nation about the missiles and theblockade

The US began a massive military buildup in south Florida

Khrushchev was taken aback at Kennedys maneuvering and stalled for time

For two days, Soviet reps answered questions with standard public relationsresponses

Kennedys approach in telling the nation about Gromykos failure to discloseinformation about the missiles assured NATO backing for the US and the OAS(Organization of American States) as well as several African nations


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October 23, 1962- Khrushchev warned the US that Soviet subs would sink USblockaders

The world watched and waited in horror as Cuba-bound Soviet vesselsapproached the American ships

October 24, 1962- Soviet ships stopped and turned around

Khrushchev had been bluffing (as he always had)

Khrushchev feared that Soviet ships would be boarded and searched andimportant Soviet info would be found out

Game over as Cuba could not fight the blockade and the Soviets were unwilling todo so

October 26, 1962- Khrushchev writes a letter which arrived at the US embassy in

Moscow He claimed that the missiles were deployed for defensive purposes only, but

admitted he could not convince Kennedy of this

He also stated that nuclear war was out of the question and proposed that hewould send no more weapons to Cuba in return for a US promise not to invadethe island


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The letter clarified several things-

Khrushchev knew that the blockade was highly effective

Khrushchev knew that Americas massive superiority in the Caribbeanprecluded him from using force to break it

Khrushchev knew from Kennedys prior warnings that to bring pressure onWest Berlin could lead to nuclear war

Khrushchev knew that he could not fire his Cuban missiles without ensuringnuclear war

Khrushchev knew that nuclear war was unacceptable

October 27, 1962- the most trying day of the crisis

Radio Moscow broadcast a second letter from Khrushchev

He offered to remove the missiles from Cuba but demanded in return both ano-invasion pledge and the removal of 15 US Jupiter-C missiles from Turkey

Kennedy knew that an agreement would look reasonable to the rest of theworld

He also knew that the Jupiter-C missiles were obsolete


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October 27, 1962- a U-2 spy plane is shot down over Cuba and thepilot is killed

Soviet higher ups tried to rebuke the general who called for theplane to be shot down, but too late

Khrushchev was now reeling and Kennedy knew that he couldntreact with an inflammatory public address

But he wondered how long he could wait for an air strike andland invasion of Cuba

Also caused Kennedy to become even more suspicious of

Khrushchevs intentions Reality was that Khrushchev meant what he said in his letter as it

was later found out that Castro begged Moscow to launch anuclear attack against the US that was ignored


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US decided to accept the first letter as an agreement, pledging not toinvade Cuba as long as the missiles were removed

The second letter would be ignored altogether (the one aboutremoving US missiles in Turkey)

US informed Khrushchev that the US was resolved to remove the missilesand that an invasion of Cuba was near

Robert Kennedy (then Attorney General) reiterated this sentiment toa Soviet ambassador and added that after the crisis the Jupiterswould be removed from Turkey (this part could not be publicized andremain a secretive part of the deal)

October 28, 1962- Radio Moscow broadcast another letter fromKhrushchev accepting the US assurance that Cuba would not be invaded,he would remove the missiles and return them to the USSR

No mention of the US missiles in Turkey

Cuban Missile Crisis was over and the Cold War was changed irrevocably


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Cuban Missile Crisis carried several keylessons for the Soviets

US naval power, not nuclear weapons, had provendecisive

The USSR would have to build a navy to match

Khrushchevs attempt to close the missile gapcheaply and quickly had failed

The US would not allow nuclear rockets so near itsborders

If they wanted nuclear parity, they would have tofollow the arduous and expensive path of buildingtheir own vast fleet of ICBMs


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The Western Alliance Waivers

Europe publicly supported the US during the Cuban Missile

Crisis, but privately wondered about the USs failure to consult

them on key issues

De Gaulle began to push the notion that a prosperous WesternEurope could take on a role of a third force between the US and

USSR

They sought to maintain ties with the US, but began to build their

own identity as a third force

By 1962, France seemed poised to make its own way in the ColdWar

Nuclear capability, thriving economy, and effective, farsighted

leadership


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Macmillan then joined the EEC, more so for economic benefits (asKennedy had hoped would happen), but France viewed itdifferently

De Gaulle didnt want Britain too close to France

He did not want them to dilute their dominance of the EEC

Brits had asked for special arrangements to protect their ownagriculture and the economies of their Commonwealthassociates

De Gaulle believed (as well as other W. Euro leaders) that any

country with special privileges would harm the EEC He also believed that Britains entry was to act as a monitoring

entity for the US (still had ill feelings over his treatment byAnglo-American forces during WWII)


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1962-63- turned out to be devastating years for Brit PM Macmillan as the USpulled out of a joint development project for Skybolt missiles and then the Frenchvetoed British entry into the EEC

Moreover Kim Philby (top official in Brit espionage service MI-6) defected to theUSSR and then Secretary of State for War John Profumo shared state secrets with

prostitutes Christine Keeler and Mandy Rice-Davies, who in turn passed them onto their Soviet clients

Macmillan resigned in October 1963

His replacement, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, would then lose the 1964 election toHarold Wilsons Labour party

Konrad Adenauer (87) preceded Macmillan into retirement by three days

His party had barely won the elections in W. Germany in 1961 and managedto sign the Franco-German Friendship Treaty early in 1963

US changed leaders that year also due to the assassination of Kennedy

De Gaulle never got his Europe that would stretch from the Atlantic to the Uralsby the time of his retirement in 1969


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Limited Test Ban Treaty

of 1963 Renewed talk of a nuclear test ban circulated

through both superpowers capitals

The obstacle of on-site inspections continued todefy an easy solution

Improved communications between theKremlin and the White House were developed

Creation of a hot line between the two leaders Very slow by todays standards and no voice contact, but it

did allow for messages to be wired more quickly thanprevious years


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of 1963 June 10, 1963- Kennedy gives his Peace

Speech at American University in Washington

Proposed that a reexamination of Cold War

attitudes was imperative if humanity hoped to avoidannihilation

Promised that America would not conductatmospheric nuclear tests as long other nations

refrained from doing so Sought to develop broad public backing for a test

ban treaty and to impress Khrushchev with acommitment to dtente with the USSR


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of 1963 June 26, 1963- Kennedy was in Berlin for the 15th anniversary of the Berlin Airlift

He was greeted by over a million people, gathered in a plaza within sight of the

Wall

An emotionally charged Kennedy gave an anticommunist speech in which he

stated that all free menare citizens of Berlin and concluded with the nowfamous words Ich bin ein Berliner

Made him a hero among the W. German people

More importantly, this anticommunist rhetoric did not hinder test ban talks

US had finally dropped its demand for on-site inspections and Moscow agreed to

what became known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, signed on August 5, 1963

Forbade atmospheric tests by its signatories (US, USSR, and Britain, but notFrance), but allowed underground blasts

Did not halt or even slow the arms race, but it did deal effectively with the

fallout problem and it showed that the Superpowers could work out an arms

agreement


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Exit Kennedy and Khrushchev

With a test ban in place and status quo in Germany, South Vietnam nowtook center stage in the Cold War

Buddhist demonstrations, a military coup, and Kennedys gnawingfear that the US was being drawn into a highly dubious venture

Kennedy rightly believed that Southeast Asia was too much on theperiphery (as Laos was in 1961) to cause an escalation in the ColdWar

November 22, 1963- Kennedy was assassinated and Lyndon Johnson tookover the presidency

Strong in domestic issues, but not experienced in foreign affairs

Fiercely anticommunist sentiment brought the US deeper intointernal affairs of Vietnam

Also proved unwilling to continue along the path of cooperationinitiated by the test ban


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Khrushchev was devastated by Kennedys assassination

He feared for the future of dtente and lamented the premature deathof an adversary with whom he had shared more than one seriouscrisis and whom he felt he had begun to understand

In the final year of his rule, Khrushchev kept a low profile in world affairs He quietly tried to restrain the Vietnamese communists, but failing

this he showed little interest in Southeast Asia

March 1964- rumors of his removal or death spread throughout the US,but they were premature

He had kept silent during the US presidential campaign hoping all the

while that the right-wing Republican Barry Goldwater By election time in the US, Khrushchev himself was gone, forcibly retired

on October 14 by a conspiracy fronted by Leonid Brezhnev and AlexeiKosygin, but orchestrated by party ideologist Mikhail Suslov


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Khrushchevs fall can be attributed to his failures in foreign

affairs, particularly Cuba and Berlin, but also for his plan to

restructure the Soviet Communist Party- a threat to standing and

careers of many party functionaries

Khrushchevs fall and Brezhnevs taking of the party first

secretary and Kosygin being named premier gave a huge boost to

the Soviet military establishment

These men would preside over a sustained weapons buildup of epic

proportions- no matter the cost to the Russian economy This would enable the USSR to surpass the US in number of

strategic missiles


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What to Expect from Brezhnev Colorless and unimaginative, yet determined and effective

Injected the Soviet leadership with an aura of stability, prudence,and pragmatism

Management by patronage and consensus, satisfying the variouselements of his coalition while consolidating his power andundermining his rivals

Clamped down on dissent and got rid of the more extremeinitiatives of Khrushchevs

Relations with communist China would deteriorate, he would

eventually seek to improve relations with the West meanwhilecontinuing the relentless arms buildup

Within a single year (October 1963 to October 1964) W. Germany,US, Britain, and the USSR changed leaders and the focus of theCold War would shift from Europe to Southeast Asia

chapter 17-section 9

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