CHAPTER]

The 'Bolivarian Revolution' refers to apolitical process and social movement in

Venezuela that emerged in early 1990s; and which is still experiencing ups and downs

in its evolutionary course. The very process of change has evinced scholarly interest.

For one, 'Bolivarian Revolution' experimented first with a military coup. Having

failed in that, it adopted the path of constitutionalism and ascended using electoral

democratic process. At another level, the Bolivarian revolutionaries once in power

introduced a series of constitutional and electoral changes to consolidate their political

gains but with no effort to eliminate or subordinate the political opposition. In this

context, the Constitution that was framed in 1999 has many innovative provisions

including those related to a participatory democracy, social ownership of means of

production etc. Venezuela is a constitutional democracy with prospects of political

opposition some day ascending to power through elections. No less significant are the

changes at the economic level. One of the principal reasons for the political popularity

and electoral victory of Bolivarians is their rejection of neo-liberal path of economic

development. Rather, it seeks to promote strategies of economic development that are

alternatives to market-based policies and the process of economic globalisation. Here

is a capitalist state that is sufficiently integrated with the global economy but how it is

building what it claims to be the '21 st century socialism' bears theoretical and

empirical relevance. Not only private sector remains strongly present, the reform

process rather is encouraging the formation of a large section of small entrepreneurs

and those who are self-employed. Bolivarian Revolution is building a new equation

. between state and market so as to formulate and implement varieties of social

programme including those providing for ownership of means of production by the

state and the working masses. Underpinning political and economic changes is the

idea of a society that would be more just and egalitarian. After almost ten years in

power, it is appropriate to make an assessment of the social change that has come

about in Venezuela. The most prominent leader of the revolution is Hugo Chavez

Frias, the founder of Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR) or Fifth Republic

Movement! and the current president of Venezuela. Bolivarian Revolution seeks to

regionalise and globalise itself; for it is inspired by the ideal of continental unity that

Simon Bolivar, the Liberator of South America had cherished and upheld in the

J MVR has been replaced by the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) in 2007.

1

nineteenth century. Bolivarian Revolution also urges and strives for unity of

developing countries for a just international order and seeks to build bridges with

other contemporary power centres so as to usher in a multipolar international order,

which would be away and independent of US-led unipolar world order.

The present study is a modest effort to describe and analyse the various facets of the

Bolivarian Revolution. Spread over six chapters, the present study adopts an

analytical and comparative approach to delineate the Bolivarian Revolutionary

policies and programmes ever since the 1998 elections which brought Hugo Chavez

to the office of president of Venezuela.

The present introductory Chapter explores the political and ideological roots of the

Bolivarian Revolution. It briefly describes the long history of the· events and

circumstances which are responsible for the emergence of a complex socio-economic

and political phenomenon that claims to be revolutionary. What was the nature of the

old order that established an electoral democratic system but one where power

regularly alternated for forty years between two parties-Accion Democratica (AD­

Democratic Action) and Comite de Organizaciones Politica Electorallndependiente

(COPEI-Committee of the Independent Electoral-Political Organisations). This kind·

of a power-sharing arrangement between elites has been called Pacto de Punto Fijo

(Pact of Full Stop), meaning thereby that the somewhat populist-nationalist AD and

an equally somewhat Christian-democratic COPEI together would and could subsume

the entire political system and process of Venezuela. Venezuela experienced a

remarkably long period of political stability, starting 1958. How did these two parties

work out a power-sharing arrangement and perfonn at the political, social and

economic levels? What kind of approach-inclusionary or exclusionary-the two

parties adopted towards various social groups and classes and political forces? Why

was decade of 1970s a peaceful period for Venezuela? Why and how did the groups

like Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucianario-200 (MBR-200) emerge? Why did the

urban riots of 1989 take place? The most important question is how leader of an

attempted coup in 1992 became the president of the country in 1998 elections? An

these and other related questions have been dealt with in the present Chapter.

2

There are four major sections in the Chapter. First Section deals with the political

process from 1958 to 1989. This is the period when the Pun to Fijo regime enjoyed the

stability and oil boom in the 1960s and 1970s. Then it faced the economic crisis, the

urban riots and adopted neo-liberal policies in the 1980s. Second Section examines

the impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) on Venezuelan economy

and. politics after 1989. This is the period when power-sharing arrangement fell apart

and Venezuelans rejected neo-liberal economic policies. The third Section traces the

origin of the Bolivarian Revolution, in particular the ideological and organisational

pattern that has evolved since 1992. It also examines in specific the political

inclinations and activities of Col. Hugo Chavez and other military officers in the

armed forces and their interaction with civilian political elements and the support of

the civil society organisations. The fourth Section examines the number of elections

and referenda that have been held between 1998 and 2007, all of which have been

won by Chavez and his political supporters. Electoral process in Venezuela indicates

some long term trends such as popular support for the leadership of Chavez and his

hold over the reins of power. The regime does not fear the political opposition which

remains fairly strong and critical of Chavez's policies and programmes. However, the

high rate of electoral absenteeism could be a worrying feature of the system. The ,

Section looks into the antecedents of the Bolivarian Revolution including the

ideological and organisational features of the revolution, and the electoral evolution of

the political revolution since 1998 presidential election.

Crisis of the Old Order

The story begins from 1958 when a democratic regime was established after the end

of the dictatorship of General Marcos Perez Jimenez. B. F. Crisp and D.H. Levine

argue that the end of Jimenez was seen as the second chance for democracy, an

opportunity to correct past mistakes and thus, avoid repeating the political disaster of

the past (Levine and Crisp 1999: 379). With this end, several political groups had

surfaced. They started to engage in making pacts and coalitions. After the downfall of

Jimenez in 1958, a provisional government (under mixed military and civilian rule)

had taken over the reigns of power. There were three major political parties who

3

They pledged themselves to the Pact of Pun to Fijo. R. Lynn Kelley states that the

pact was a decisive act committing the party signatories to a common minimum

programme. This was the beginning of democracy in Venezuela, which scholars

described as a model of liberal democracy or as an example of 'consociational'

democracy, worthy of emulation by rest of Latin America. Cooperation between

leading political parties and leaders produced a new constitution in 1961 and orderly

transfer of power through regularly-held elections (Kelley 1977: 27). Elections were

held in December 1958 and AD's Betancourt was elected president with 49 per cent

of vote. The former provisional president Wolfgang received 34 per cent and Rafael

Caldera of COPEI could get only 16 per cent. But significantly, no body cried foul

and Venezuela became a model of democracy where political elites played the norms

(Martz 1977: 95). Although the URD left the coalition in 19605, An-COPEI coalition

continued, more so as Betancourt government had to face new threats and challenges

from a rebellious military on the Right and guerrillas who represented the

revolutionary left.

The stable two-party coalition was dominated by the president. Presidencialismo,

(Presidentialism) in Latin America dates back to the rise of caudillismo (rule by a

strong man or caudillo) in the aftermath of independence. In nineteenth century,

caudillos were the source of both stability and instability. Caudillismo meant building

a hierarchical coalition of powerful regional bosses, landowners and merchants and

foreign investors around, some times a charismatic, strong man--often a military

man. The long periods of military rule only reinforced the caudillista tradition in

Latin American politics. Venezuela too was dominated since nineteenth century by

strong and powerful executives; and the post-1958 democratic developments,

including a new constitution in 1961, did little to change the well-entrenched political

tradition. The 1961 Constitution granted enormous powers to the president including

power to declare a state of emergency and to restrict or suspend civil liberties and

guarantees. These rights of the executive were subject neither to referral to congress

nor to the courts in the first instance (Kelley 1977: 28).

presidency. The military was not ready to play any subordinate role and demanded extra cabinet seats when denied they removed president from the office in 1948. 5 URD left the coalition following the refusal of the foreign minister (a URD member) in 1960 but it rejoined the coalition in 1963 to support the government of AD's Raul Leoni under the new coalition namely Ferente Nacional Democratica (FND). URD again left the coalition in 1968.

5

The 1961 Constitution had provided for a single five year-tenn to the president who

would be elected by the simple majority of the popular vote in the manner of

universal adult suffrage. The president was ineligible for another term until ten years

had elapsed from the last day of his incumbency. There was no provision for a vice­

president. The all powerful president enjoyed three types of powers; broadly, those

which he exercised through his council of ministers, those exercised by individual

ministers, and the third category of powers which were exclusively exercised by the

president. The important point here is that notwithstanding constitutional provisions,

the very coalitional nature of governments restrained presidential powers. AD's

Betancourt and Raul Leoni governed with the support of COPEI and URD

(Lott 1970: 288-89).

Besides, the presence of strong party mechanisms restrained presidents; as party

bosses controlled many levels of powers and regarded presidents as representative of

a political party. Betancourt and Leoni were relatively weak presidents because they

had no extra source of power other than their party (Lott 1970: 277).

In 1968, AD failed to restore its nominee to the post of president, and COPEl's Rafael

Caldera became the new chief executive in a break of the tradition of alternating in

the presidential office. The development also marked the end of coalition between the

two leading parties. COPEI did not go for a coalition for a number of reasons:

guerrilla threat had been successfully checked; and COPEl's rank and file had waited

for more than a decade for fruits of patronage and graft and therefore were not keen to

share rewards of power and pelf with AD supporters (Kelley 1977: 35). Further,

leaders and representatives from the military, banking and cultural establishment were

inducted into Caldera's cabinet. In this way, COPEI unilaterally occupied the national

executive for five years. The violation of the power-sharing norm however turned

legislature into an arena for partisan fights and bargain for spoils of office.

Hamstrung, COPEI was forced to negotiate a partisan alliance with AD in congress in

1970. This became the basis for conducting government business between the

executive and the opposition in legislature (Kelley 1977: 36). In 1973, Carlos Andres

Perez of AD was elected president and to avoid executive-legislature tussle, he ran the

6

government with the council of ministers composed entirely of independents

associated with the party.

The 1961 Constitution provided for a bicameral legislature elected on the basis of

proportional representation of parties (Kelley 1977: 37-38). If a state was entitled to

elect ten members for the congress and any party which got thirty per cent of the total

vote in that particular state, then the party would be able to send three members out of

ten in the congress. But these members must be from the list the party had submitted

to the Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE) or Supreme Electoral Council. In other

words, the electoral law had established party's control over members of both the

houses. Naturally these members were loyal to parties not to the legislature or the

president. They did not feel any responsibility towards the electorate of their

constituencies. Admittedly, public service was not considered a serious work.

Due to party dominance, the congress also did not discharge its legislative

responsibilities. Presidents who did not enjoy majority support in the congress often

resorted to bargains and pay-offs to secure majority support for their programmes and

policies. Most congressmen were representatives of special interests, groups and

regions. They were from church, business groups, military and big land-holders. The

overall character and behaviour of the main political parties was such that it did not

yield to popular representation or mould public opinion in favour of the government.

This behaviour also could never ensure the stability of the system until president

Perez secured majority in both the houses in the elections of 1976. He introduced the

Organic Law which authorised the president to decree extra-ordinary measures in

regard to economic and financial matters (Kelley 1977: 41). Thus, the executive got

rid of congressional impediments in the area of finance.

In a pattern common to presidentialist powers in Latin America, judiciary remained

an arm of the executive under the 1961 Constitution. Judges of the Supreme Court

were appointed by the legislature for the staggered term of nine years

(Lott 1970: 293). R. Lynn Kelley argues that the political nature of the selection of

judges could not establish the institutional norms in the country. Courts were not

considered prestigious enough even by those who sat in there (Kelley, 1977: 43).

Such a situation built many arbitrary and even authoritarian norms and practices into

7

the system. Accountability, representativeness, judicial guarantees and remedies

which are norms in any liberal democracy either simply did not exist or were

conveniently bypassed.

Voters' registration was simple in Venezuela and with no strict eligibility criteria for

popular participation, voters' turnout was generally very high during elections.

During the period of two party rule (1958-1988), the percentage of the registered

voters who actually came out to vote was around 82 per cent (Komblith and Levine

1995: 56). Venezuelans used to vote once in five years for public office until 1979,

when separate municipal elections were instituted. To cast their vote, voters had to

make two choices: one for president by selecting or marking a large card with the

appropriate party colour or symbol, and another by repeating with a small card,

thereby casting a vote for the party's slate for al1 legislative seats i.e. members for the

Senate and Chambers of Deputies on the national level and also for state legislative

assemblies and municipal council.

AD and COPEI dominated the Venezuelan politics in terms of vote share throughout

three decade of democratic regime (1958-88). Their vote share has been shown in the

Table 1. They shared 64.7 per cent in 1958, 53.5 per cent in 1963, 50.0 per cent in

1968, 74.7 per cent in 1973, 79.4 per cent in 1978, 78.6 per cent in 1983 and 78.4 per

cent in 1988 «Levine and Crisp 1999: 400-401).

Table]

(Percentage of Vote Share ofthe Political Parties in Venezuela, 1958-1988)

Parties 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988

AD+COPEI 64.7 53.5 50.0 74.7 79.4 78.6 78.4

AD-COPEI 34.2 11.9 1.5 14.2 0.1 21.2 12.4

OTHERS 35.3 46.5 50.0 25.3 20.6 21.4 21.6

Sources: (Levine and Crisp 1999: 401).

The data shows that vote percentage in the 1960s of both the parties was not very high

but it increased in the 1970s. In the 1960s two parties were trying to establish

8

themselves as political organisations and other political groups like PCV and other

leftist organisations were also having support among the people. But in the 1970s, AD

and COPEI marginalised these groups politically. The two parties could get the huge

share of vote due to the strong support by the big businessmen and the government.

With this support, it was easy for the parties to bear the heavy cost of the electoral and

organisational expenditure. It is to be remembered that 1970s was the decade when

Venezuelan government received huge oil revenue due to oil price hike. And the

government provided money to the parties to contest elections and for other

expenditure. In this way, oil and oil revenues played a major role in Venezuela's

electoral politics too.

Kelley explores the political attitudes and culture of different sections In the

Venezuelan society on the basis of income, occupation and employment during this

long period of two-party domination. The middle class was the largest section of the

society containing 57.3 per cent of the population. Other major groups were working

class which accounted for four per cent; the lower class at 6.2 per cent and the poor

who accounted for 24.6 per cent of national population. The upper class accounted for

no more than 1.1 per cent of the popUlation. Kelley keeps 6.8 per cent of the

population out of any class configuration (Kelley 1977: 56-57). Data, presented above

shows that the six out of ten Venezuelans considered themselves as the middle class.

Therefore, this section of the society had major role to play in Venezuelan politics.

The middle class and the other two classes, working and the poor, had different

opinions about the state and Punto Fijo regime. Depending upon the gains and

benefits received, various classes and groups perceived the governments as

democratic and legitimate. Lower and poor classes did not like the politicians, while

the middle and the working classes had good opinion about them. Middle class was

more active politically but the poor and middle class did vote only when it was

required essentially. They were of the view that they cannot influence the government

policies; but the middle class felt more competent in this respect. Service workers,

peasants, agricultural labourers and those bound permanently to the lands of the large

landowners, that is the peones, believed that the government rarely did the right things

and they wanted to remove the politicians from the government. The poor and the

marginalised had no faith in the established political parties and their politics because

they cared only about the elections and nothing more. Merchants, professionals,

9

technicians, and clerical workers were less critical of the regime and considered them

more efficacious (Kelley 1977: 57).

Major socio-economic developments during these thirty years were some limited

agrarian refonns, import substitution industrialisation strategy, and greater control

over oil industry by the state. In particular, AD was more oriented to land refonns and

alleviating urban poverty. Wages also increased and unemployment was kept under

control. Military remained contended with high pay packets and modem weaponry

(Wesson 1982: 72). But significantly, these were not independent and stable

developments. Government revenues were still coming from the oil income. Agrarian

refonns remained highly limited; and industrialisation through import substitution

reached a point of stagnation in the 1970s. Venezuela had become a typically oil­

dependent economy. High international oil prices and demand meant a windfall to be

spent immediately; low price and demand meant a sudden collapse of the economy.

The middle position was thin as there was not much else to fall back upon. Since

upper class of the society controlled the greater share of the national income, rest

tended to suffer during periods of economic downturns. The distributive philosophy

of AD and COPEl proved more of a rhetoric as large numbers of rural and urban poor

could never join the modem and skilled workforce required by the capital intensive

industrialisation (Ewell 1984:156). It were precisely these disaffected among the

urban middle and poor classes and the rural poor who responded to Hugo Chavez in

the 1990s.

The political leaders who had been supporting the electoral democracy since 1936

wanted to establish sovereign control over oil. They were of the view that oil benefits

should be distributed between state and oil companies equally. They were also in

favour of a non-oil based diversified national economy. Since, the foreign oil

companies were the principal supporter of the authoritarian regime in the 1950s, the

democratic political forces after 1958 sought to establish state control over oil

revenues to sustain themselves in power. The breakdown of the authoritarian regime

had pushed the country into severe political and economic crises. Political leaders

could resolve the political crisis to some extent but the economic crisis was a big

challenge for them. The streets were full of crowds demanding jobs, condemning the

oil companies for the support of military regime. At that time the provisional

government introduced a Plan de Emergencia which provided for wage subsidies and

10

a massive public works campaign intended to defuse the intense mobilisation while

containing the potentially hostile reaction of the dominant economic class

(Karl 1987: 80). Therefore, all these circumstances ensured the political intervention

in the economy. But during the 1960s, political actors could not do enough in this

regard due to the threats by the foreign oil companies of shifting their investments and

operations to countries in West Asia. In this way, the oil companies had become the

source of intense pressure; and they told the government to limit its economic reform

programmes (Karl 1987: 81 ). The decade of the 1960s was therefore one of

preoccupation with both political and economic challenges.

During 1970s, with the oil boom, finance became the source of conflict between the

economic and political elites. The Arab oil embargo and the oil price hike in 1973 in

the international market had given Venezuela an opportunity to utilise oil for national

development. Wealth from oil seemed to solve all the economic and social problems

in one go. A culture of conspicuous consumption swept Venezuela particularly the

large middle class saw its income and consumption rise enormously. But it is doubtful

whether much of the oil wealth reached the poorest and the least skilled of the

population of the country (Ewell 1984: 193).

Carlos Andres Perez of AD became the president in 1973. Soon after his inauguration

in 1974, he declared that he was in favour of the oil industry controlled by the

Venezuelan state. The new government made an official declaration to nationalise oil

companies in 1975 and nationalised the oil industry on 1 January 1976 and the state­

owned oil monopoly, Petroleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anonima (PDVSA) came into

existence. The policy of nationalisation was adopted to maximise the fiscal revenues

collected from the oil export. In the two years prior to nationalisation, for every dollar

of oil export the government collected eight cents in rents, royalties and taxes. By

1976 the government had asserted a right to levy export taxes at its sole discretion,

effectively leaving the companies with nothing but a regulated profit. Thus, the

control of the oil business was transferred from companies to the Venezuelan

government; and oil companies could not maximise their profit at will. Given the

uncertainty in global oil market and the spectre of energy crisis, oil companies and

their parent government did hardly resist nationalisation of the oil industry

(Mommer 2003: 132).

11

Once Perez left office in 1978, the subsequent governments could not control the

industry and PDVSA began to develop its autonomy from the government control and

oversight. It was soon becoming a 'state within state.'

It is true that nationalisation transferred the ownership of oil industry to state but the

management of PDVSA remained in the hands of executives who were sti11loyal to

the foreign companies. Their prime objective was to displace the Ministry of Energy

and Mines (MEM) because this was the instrument of the state to inspect the process

of industrialisation in the country by which the Perez Government wanted to create

'Great Venezuela.' David Eugene Blank describes the relationship between the

directors and managers of the PDVSA and the Ministry of Energy and Mines. The

officers of the PDVSA believed that there was no need for the Ministry in its present

form. President Perez's Minister of Energy and Mines, Valentine Hernandez Acosta,

was unhappy with the decision to grant PDVSA the planning, coordinating and

supervisory authority for the industry rather than the Ministry (Blank 1984: 155). The

PDVSA never tried to maximise fiscal revenue; on the reverse, once the 'Great

Venezuela' dream crashed, it sought to limit its own fiscal obligations. This failure of

the developmental policy made executives of the view that generating more fiscal

revenues was not going to help the economic elites anyway because revenues would

help only political elites who would siphon them off into. the treasury as part of

increased state expenditure. Thus, the economic elites tried to undermine the

politicians of the country and paved the way for the return of the private investors.

In the tussle between the economic and political elites during the late 1970s and

1980s, political elites were on the losing side. There were factions between and within

parties and differences over policy choices. Some of them were in favour of private

sector and others in favour of the public sector. COPEI was always against the reform

agenda of the AD. The COPEI was formed on the basis of hierarchy of the Church in

1946 by groups which were conservative (Ewell 1984: 98). Then there were several

distributive conflicts including those involving labour unions which were affiliated

with AD. The AD, which dominated Congress, initiated more radical labour laws and

encouraged a more combative labour movement. As a result, COPEI administrations

(1969-1974 and 1979-1984) were plagued by large-scale labour conflicts which

12

increased the polarisation and political instability in the country (Coppedge 1994: 34).

There were factions within AD also between the old group led by the former president

Betancourt and the new group headed by President Perez. Betancourt was in favour of

links with the traditional family conglomerates and a more limited state role while

Perez led a faction demanding a more assertive state with programmes based on more

public enterprise production, and most importantly, the financing of an emerging set

of smaller scale entrepreneurs to challenge the economic dominance of the family

conglomerates.

In this way, factionalism led to increased competition over patronage, which in turn,

fuelled a greater degree of politicisation and political polarization in the era of higher

oil revenues. If the Perez faction of AD had wanted to redress the dominance of the

old oligarchy, many other factions within AD and COPEI and within the business

associations challenged the rise of new oligarchies (the twelve Apostles)6 in the

private sector and the rise of the state enterprise oligarchy within the state. One can

argue that there was a breakdown of inter-party agreement in the period of 1976-1980

as compared with the period of 1967-1971. Increase in political factionalism was

accompanied by an increase in whistle-blowing and the use of corruption as a weapon

of political competition (Karl 1997: 138-185). Therefore, it is significant to note that

the policy of oil nationalisation in 1976 and the very large increase in revenues

undoubtedly upset the political balance in the country. In particular, nationalisation

upset the balance of inter-party relations, and thus, fuelled increasing factionalism as

competing interest groups vied to capture power in an increasingly state-centred

economy.

Venezuela has had a long history of military rule and military intervention in politics.

The first golpe de estado (coup d'etat) was carried out against the vice president and

acting chief of the state when the Liberator, Simon Bolivar, was away on a military

campaign in 1819-eleven years before Venezuela became an independent republic

(Bigler 1977: 113). The long dictatorship of Generals Juan Vicente Gomez

(1908-1935) and Marcos Perez Jimenez (1948-1958) had deeply entrenched military

in politics and weakened· prospects of democracy. The civilian government

6 The economic groups which were close to the Perez administration were popularly known as the "Twelve Apostles", many of whom came, like Perez, from the Andean region.

13

inaugurated in 1959 had remained under the shadow of military threats. Only an

understanding with the military elites had allowed democracy to be established in

1958 wherein the armed forces agreed to abide by their constitutional role.

It was Romulo Betancourt established a clear presidential role and tradition within the

overall system of civilian control over military. Alfred Stephan describes it as the

model of 'civil-military relations.' In recognition of its increasing professionalism and

role in national defence, President Betancourt largely insulated the military from

partisan interference and left specialised military matters to the military itself

(Stephan 1971: 59-60). He continued the policy of removing politically adventurous

military officers from active duty, especially those who were suspected to have had

close relations with military dictator Perez Jimenez. A second pattern of presidential

leadership implemented by Betancourt to establish systematic civilian control might

be called the visibility of the commander-in-chief. He went out of his way to establish

his leadership by making frequent appearance at military bases. He made himself

available for numerous personal contacts with military officers.

This pattern was maintained by his successors too. Carlos Andres Perez also had

continued to dedicate a substantial amount of time and resources as commander-in­

chief of the armed forces. He respected the autonomy and enlarged the sphere of

military activities. Other civilian presidents also largely relied upon and respected

military channels, organisations and objectives in exercising control. For this purpose,

the office of the Minister of Defence had become indispensable as the centre of all the

civilian-military relationships (Bigler 1977: 122). Successive governments seriously

. entertained the threats of guerrilla insurgency and conceded on the presence of foreign

elements in guerrilla campaigns. The outbreak of guerrilla insurgency in the context

of Cold War allowed the civilian government to orient military towards greater

external threat perception and the imperative of defending national borders rather than

develop ambitions for a domestic political role. In this way it was possible for

Venezuelan democracy to work out and sustain a stable civil-military relation. The

onset of a severe economic crisis in the early 1980s brought first major strains in this

relationship when groups such as Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionari~200

began to be formed by officers who were dissatisfied with both the civilian

14

democratic rule and its handling of the economic crisis especially in terms of the

impact of economic crisis over anned forces.

Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and their Impact

Venezuelan political elites have their diverse social origin and orientation. COPEI

was founded by the oligarchic elements who were against the social reform agenda

and the hegemonic ambitions of the AD-led government during the trienio period

(1945-1948). In contrast, AD drew its main support from the lower classes

(Myers 1998: 502-503). COPEI had also sympathised with the military overthrow of

the elected government in 1948 (Roberts 2003: 56-57).

Punto Fijo was a political pact between the otherwise conflicting class interests and

elite perceptions. Over the years, political stability and elite consensus produced some

meaningful changes in the economy and society. For instance, the size of the white­

collar workers and government employees increased. The percentage of middle class

increased by seven per cent due to availability of salaried jobs in the state and private

sectors, immigration, professionals and those in the armed forces, commercial and

industrial entrepreneurs and the class of highly paid bureaucrats and technocrats.

Wealthier sections of the society tended to become conservative and fearful of lower

class demands and mobilisation. Many among the middle class and professional

groups had begun identifying themselves with the upper class interests and its values

(Lott 1970: 267). In the rural areas, the gap between large landholders and the poor

was more glaring as land reforms failed to produce a rural middle class.7 Until the

beginning of the I 960s over 80 per cent of the rural population was landless, poverty

stricken, illiterate and diseased. They were either unemployed and migratory or

economically tied to the great landed estates. Leo B. Lott has concluded that upward

social mobility was possible in Venezuela provided the aspirant could somehow

acquire the necessary cultural and economic requirements such as education, proper

speech and clothing and suitable employment (Lott 1970: 267).

7 Before the agrarian refonn programme one per cent of the population owned more than 50 per cent of the land in many areas of Venezuela.

15

Economic modernisation had to an extent'reduced class cleavages by 1970s. AD and

COPEl had successfully negotiated a series of social, economic and political pacts.

Oil revenues had made it possible to induce business, labour, church and military

cooperation with the democratic regime and they ultimately encouraged a

programmatic convergence between the two dominant parties. AD and COPEl had

finally settled on a state-led model of economic development that protected the

interests of big business and landowners. The two parties eschewed from the

redistributive reforms while bestowing patronage payoff on the major organised

interest groups including unionised labour. Consequently, the upper and middle

classes did not see their ever increasing levels of consumption and cosmopolitan

cultural orientation as threatened by popular demands, since state income continued to

rise. Expanded education, health and public works expenditure did not depend on

taxing private wealth. The popular sections of Venezuelan society, especially, the new

urban majority of the population, expected continued upward social mobility. Thus,

Venezuela seemed to be a modern and integrated society where both democracy and

development worked.

All the pretensions of democracy and development got exposed with collapse of the

oil prices in the international market towards the end of the 1970s. Edgardo Lander

observes that a significant decline in per capita oil income anticipated the foreign debt

crisis and devaluation in 1983. The financial crisis in Venezuela occurred later than

those in other Latin American countries, but its political impact proved more

profound because expectations of sustained growth and improved living conditions

had sunk deep roots in the Venezuelan mode of thinking: In addition, the economic

crisis became more prolonged with deterioration in the living conditions of majority

of the population lasting more than two decades. According to an estimate, total

poverty in the country nearly doubled between 1984 and 1999, from 36 per cent to 68

per cent of the population (Lander 2005: 26). These changing conditions affected the

Venezuelan society and political culture deeply. With these changes, a divided society

took shape in Venezuela. Social divisions and exclusions, which were absent during

economic boom, became more visible in the country. Social segregation was quite

visible in urban areas. The result was that the feeling of insecurity became generalised

throughout the population. This feeling was very different from the feeling of the

previous two decades. A different culture of violence emerged, different from the

16

culture of tolerance and peace that survived during the decade of 1970s. All the

benefits of that decade suddenly became inaccessible and the problems of exclusion,

segregation and fragmentation surfaced in the country which led to the socio­

economic decay especially in the urban areas in the beginning of the 1980s. Countless

streets in middle and upper class neighbourhoods were closed and privatised; .

increasingly bars and electric fences surrounded houses and buildings in these areas.

Lander calls those affected as the 'dangerous class' and the perceived threat

represented by this very class came to occupy a central place in media-frequently

with racist overtones-along with demands that drastic measures be taken including

the death penalty or direct execution by the police (Lander 2005: 27).

Jesus Maria Herrera Salas argues that the economic crisis that began with the decline

in international oil prices and the devaluation of the 'Bolivar'-Venezuelan

currency--on Black Friday in February 1983 brought to fore the profound racism

directed not only at Afro-Venezuelan and the indigenous but also at the poor in

general. Upper and middle classes berated the under classes calling them 'vermin',

'mixed breeds', 'Indians', 'barefoot' and 'rabble.' In other words, the worsening lot of

the vast segments of the society met with racist contempt and abuse. The political

economy of racism was a historical continuation of the long process of conquest and

slavery of indigenous and . A fro-Venezuelan population that began in 1496

(Salas 2005: 72). The upper and the middle sectors blamed the Afro-Latin Americans

and indigenous migrants as responsible for the economic crisis of 1983. In this racist

and xenophobic discourse, nobody would admit that Venezuela had squandered a

large portion of its petroleum income rather the argument ran as follows: those blacks

from Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Haiti as well as the Indians of Peru and

Ecuador that entire rabble had made the country falter. These types of comments were

also extended to the Afro-Venezuelan and indigenous inhabitants and members of the

popular sectors in general (Salas 2005: 79). In short, there was a political economy of

racism at the beginning of 1980s. Descendents of the slaves and 'free blacks', the

'mixed' and the indigenous had remained at the bottom of the society; and now they

were not only to suffer the consequences of economic dislocation but also put up with

racial abuse.

17

Be that as it may, collapse of oil price produced a profound crisis in Venezuela.

President Luis Herrera Campins of COPEI decided to make a steep devaluation in the

exchange rate of 'bolivar' (Venezuela currency). It was 18 February 1983, and since

then the day is called the 'Black Friday.' The government refused to maintain the

current exchange rate of Bolivar 4.3 to US $ 1. For decades, the government had used

petroleum revenues to buy and sell foreign exchange, making foreign made consumer

and capital goods affordable. By the end of the March, despite government

intervention into the exchange market, the value of the Bolivar had slipped to B 8 to

US $ 1 (Levine and Crisp 1999: 387-88). The devaluation ofthe currency initiated the

period of depreciation, economic stagnation and inflation. Table II shows the depth

and patterns of economic decline. Data shows that gross domestic product per capita

had grown steadily until 1977, but by 1983 it was below its 1967 level; and hit a more

than twenty year low of U.S. $ 2,410 in 1989. Venezuelans never had to contend with

significant inflation until the late 1980s; but it increased sharply from the late 1980s

through the mid 1990s. The inflation decreased the purchasing power at the same time

as GDP per capita was shrinking, putting Venezuelan consumers in a double bind.

18

Table II

Indicators of Economic Crisis

Year GDPper Consumer Price Exchange Rates

capita Index (Bolivar per

(1990 US $) (1990=100) dollar)

1966 2,651 5.2 4.45

1968 2,709 5.3 4.45

1970 2,881 5.5 4.45

1972 2,865 5.9 4.40

1974 3,037 6.6 4.29

1976 3,106 7.9 4.29

1978 3,157 9.1 4.29

1980 2,937 12.4 4.29

1982 2,778 15.8 4.29

1984 2,447 18.7 7.02

1986 2,536 23.2 8.08

1988 2,678 38.5 14.50

1990 2,514 100.0 46.90

1992 2,793 176.4 68.38

1994 2,577 391.8 148.50

1996 2,513 1,252.3 417.33

Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook

(Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 1997).

Worst affected were the working class and the urban and rural poor. Workers' income

was reduced during this period by approximately half (Lander 2005:26). Wages and

social spending fell even more rapidly than the national income. Both real and

industrial wages stood at less than 40 per cent of their 1980 levels by the late 1990s

(ILO 1998:43). The huge cuts in wages and social spending led to an increase in

poverty. Between 1984 and 1995 the portion of the population living below the

poverty line increased from 36 to 66 per cent, while the portion living in extreme

19

poverty more than tripled increasing from 11 to 36 per cent. The biggest change

coincided with the process of structural adjustment in 1989. In that year the poverty

rate increased from 46 to 62 per cent, while those living in extreme poverty more than

doubled from 14 to 30 per cent of the population. The chronic poverty had remained

blight on Venezuela's developmental model even during the oil boom of the 1970s,

but the economic crisis of the1980s and the 1990s transformed the scope and

character of the poverty. Whereas previously poverty affected a minority of the

populace who had yet to share the oil bonanza, by the 1990s it afflicted an absolute

majority, who were systematically excluded from meaningful participation in the

development model (Roberts 2003: 59-60).

The economic crisis accentuated the social crisis. The political crisis was also the

result of economic crisis as industry, agriculture and commerce, which all relied on

foreign made inputs and capital goods went into decline. The classes related to these

sectors lost their interest in political activities. One early sign of the crisis was the

long term increase in the rates of electoral abstention. In 1988, voter abstention

jumped to over 18 per cent and to almost 49 per cent in the 1993 presidential elections

(Levine and Crisp 1999: 387-88).

The governments of Jamie Lusinchi (AD) established the Comision Presidencial para

la Reforma del Estado (COPRE-Presidential Commission for the Reform of the

State) in 1984 to tackle the economic crisis. The main objective of COPRE was

decentralisation; and proposals for change covered every level and branch of

government. The commission concentrated its energy on four areas: strengthening the

checks and balances within the national government, moving decision making

authority to lower levels of government, decreasing the role of parties in elections and

making more transparent the internal workings of the political parties. Many of its

proposals met with resistance but the commission also found a good deal of support

from citizens' groups. The commission was of the view that decentralisation and

devolution would produce popular support and legitimacy for the Punto Fijo regime.

These changes proved cosmetic and ephemeral. When Carlos Andes Perez was

elected president, it was hoped that he would restore the good times of the past. His

first administration (1974-1979) had raked in the financial bonanza of the 1970s; and

20

now he had again promised an 'economic turnaround.' Popular enthusiasm for Perez

did not last in his inauguration as president. On assuming office, he announced that he

had already negotiated a Structural Adjustment Programme with the International

Monetary Fund (IMP) and the World Bank (Hellinger 2003: 31). Faced with a severe

crisis of international reserves, fiscal as well as trade and balance of payments deficit

and an external debt that under those conditions could not be paid, Perez had signed

the structural adjustment package. It involved massive and immediate cuts in

government spending, trade liberalisation, free exchange and interest rates, reduced

price controls, a sale tax and price adjustment including those of gasoline

(Lander 1996: 52-53). Adopting the SAPs meant the adoption of orthodox economic

ideas jettisoning the social-democratic he had promised during his electoral campaign. ,,;,~~

.,'.G.~""""'" 'r',l~" .," ~

'-', ('l The Caracazo TH-168s 0 :;'\ t;A '" . .:.--,~ .. ' , <'-" ) ~, "'>--~ /'';

,,/ -': r :<"~:

Caracazo is the name given to the nation-wide violent protests against the austerity -~~

programme of Perez. Violence and shooting by the police particularly happened in big

cities, most notabl,y in Caracas on 27 February 1989. The immediate cause was

protest over sudden increase in bus fares, fuel hike and the rejection of the students'

discounts and the price hike of basic goods (Hellinger 2003: 31). Government turned

to the military to restore law and order in what became known as the Caracazo. The

rioting spread to nineteen other cities and lasted until 5 March. When it was over, it

was estimated that 1,000 to 1,500 persons had died during the protests, which was

well above the official figure of 287 deaths (Hellinger 2003: 31 ). Obviously, Perez

had underestimated the depth of the popular frustration and anger and secondly, he

had overestimated the ability of the system to manage the protests

(Levine and Crisp 1999: 390). The police and the military who were called to put the

protests down with a heavy hand themselves were the victim of austerity measures.

Moreover, the intensity and scope of violence were unprecedented, as was the image

of troops occupying urban centres and firing on civilians. Public support for the

government plummeted, and demonstration and protests became an everyday affair.

In addition, the experience of being used as an urban shock force in support of an

unpopular government brought a growing cadre of young military officers into a

circle of concerned military officers who launched a coup on 4 February 1992. The

21

coup attempts of the 1992 (4 February and 27 November) proved a major blow to the

status quo. Thereafter, the Punta Fija regime faced the setbacks regularly. Amidst this

crisis situation, Perez was impeached by the congress in May 1993 on grounds of

financial embezzlement. Amidst the crisis, the presidential elections held in December

1993 became crucial. Rafael Caldera of COPEI won the elections but in order to

move forward, the first thing he did was to jettison his own party which he himself

had founded. Caldera built his electoral campaign around his rejection of neo-liberal

SAPs and the two-party system.

Origins of the Bolivarian Revolution

Venezuelans witnessed the total political transfonnation in the late 1990s with the

election of Hugo Chavez Frias, the leader of the two failed coup attempts in 1992, as

the new president of the nation in 1998. This happened for the first time in the thirty

years of Punta Fija regime that a non-AD and non-COPEI leader was elected to the

highest post of the country. The military men who were conscious of the corruption <

and incompetence of the old order and the new social movements and political groups

in the civil society made the downfall of old order possible. Chavez had been active in

MBR-200 since the early 1980s and this organisation was the key in the fonnulation

of the revolutionary ideas and the programmes of the Bolivarian Revolution. The

present Section discusses the origin and the evolution of the Bolivarian Revolution. It

examines the circumstances and the actors who catalysed the process of change,

major events and turning points during the decade of 1990s including the failed coup

attempts and the transfonnation of the coup leaders into electoral political fonnations.

The Section also examines the presidential elections of 1998 and 2000 in tenns of

their changing agenda and outcomes.

Origin and Growth of the MBR-200

Richard Gott observes that the military did not stay on the margins of the process of

examination and debate of the economic and political tunnoil in the ]980s. Various

groups within the armed forces met on a regular basis to discuss politics and evaluate

the existing order (Gott 2000: 6]). These included the young Colonel Hugo Chavez

22

and other captains, like Jesus Urdaneta and Felipe Acosta Carles, who founded a

clandestine organisation called the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucianario-20rl

(MBR-200 or the Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement-200) on June 24, 1982, in

honour of the 200th birth anniversary of Simon Bolivar, the 'Liberator' of Venezuela

and other South American countries. It is said that the group later took the oath under

the historically famous tree known as the "Saman of Guere,,9 in Maracay on 17

December 1982 that they would rescue the values of the fatherland, dignify the

military career and fight against the corruption (Zago 1992: 21). The MBR-200 was

composed of middle ranking young officers. Most like Hugo Chavez were no more

than twenty eight years of age in 1982, but they had already begun developing

political concerns. They discussed, for instance, the 1973 military coup against

Chilean President Salvador Allende and the Panamanian military experiment of 1970s

led by Omar TOrrijos.1O In their reading of the national history of Venezuela, the

group identified Simon Bolivar as the "chief general", Ezequiel Zamora (the

Venezuelan who struggled against the landed oligarchy in 19th century) as the

"warrior" and Simon Robinson Rodriguez (the teacher of Simon Bolivar) as the

"teacher." This trio became their ideologues. MBR-200 worked as the clandestine

organisation in the beginning of its foundation. Civilian ties during these early years

were relatively scarce; still they were significantly influenced in the political

orientation of their ideas and movement through relatives and close friends. The

officers came into contact with the activists and leaders of various leftist parties that

were· defeated during the guerrilla struggle of the 1960s. The most important was the

Partido de la Revolucion Venezolana (PRV) or Party of the Venezuelan Revolution

led by Douglas Bravo who was the principal guerrilla commander in the western parts

of the country. Chavez's brother, Adam Chavez belonged to the PRV and appeared to

have facilitated the first meeting between the two leaders at the beginning of the

decade of the ] 980s (Gott 2000: 60).

8 The organization MBR-200 was founded on the occasion of 200tb birth anniversary of Simon Bolivar therefore, number 200 was put with MBR. 9 The Saman of Guere is a tree under which Simon Bolivar is said to have slept with his troops before the battle of Carabobo (1821), which sealed Venezuelan independence. JO Omar Torrijos was the commander of the Panamanian National Guard who led a successful coup against democratically elected President Arnulfo Arias in 1968 and remained de facto leader of Panama till his demise in 1981. He is known for his social refonns and Torrijos-Carter Treaties, signed in 1977. He is also known as a great nationalist in Panama as well as in Latin America.

23

Besides former guerrillas, the MBR-200 was also said to have been in contact with

prominent leftist intellectuals and activists, although this appears to have occurred

somewhat in the late 1980s. These included the members of the Froente Patriotico

(patriotic Front) such as Luis Miquilena, Manuel Quijada, Jose Vicente Rangel and

Omar Mezza, and university figures such as Luis Fuenmayor, Hector Navarro, Jorge

Giordani Trino Aicides Diaz and Adina Bastidas. To be noted, all of them did occupy

ministerial positions in the Chavez Government after 1998 (Harnecker 2005: 31).

Caracazo of 27 February 1989 was a milestone for the MBR-200 and other social and

political groups. The popular revolt had spread in all the urban areas of the country,

paralysed the government and revealed the terminal state of the political institutions

(Maya and Lander: 2000). It was evident that the era ,of two-party democracy is over

and henceforth any regime would have to depend on the support of the military.

Popular protests could be put down during Caracazo because military had fully

backed the actions of the civilian government. But there was no guarantee that it

would happen again in future. Caracazo of 27 February 1989 had demonstrated that

the reforms were in urgent need. Since cosmetic changes and mild reforms in rest of

the years until 1998 failed to address the crisis, the government, political parties and

organised labour all lost credibility. The vacuum was partly filled by the alternative

organisations which sought to reconstruct the basis of political interaction. In

particular, new leaders and institutions emerged from two sources. One of these was

the process of decentralisation (under COPRE reforms) and the other was in barracks.

In 1989, Venezuelans voted for the first time for governors and mayors. In some

states, the gubernatorial elections permitted the emergence-of new political leadership

distinct from those of AD and COPEI (Dietz and Myers: 2006) The Movimiento af

Socialismo (MAS) or Movement towards Socialism, a leftist political party, which had

never occupied executive offices, captured the governorship of the state of Aragua.

A second round of regional elections occurred in November 1992, following the two

abortive military coups of that year against President Carlos Andrez Perez. Governors

of the opposition, who had maintained a distance from the national government, were

generally successful at the polls. In 1993, these governors played a significant role

during the difficult months prior to impeachment of President Perez on 20 May 1993.

During these months a convention of the governors held in the city of Valencia

24

demonstrated the administrative continuity at the regional level projecting an image of

regional stability and autonomy in the midst of the crisis of central government. The

meeting boosted the legitimacy of these leaders and their parties, strengthening the

political commitment to decentralisation. In the following years, governors, mayors

and organisations engaged in important political works at the local level, provided

new faces and ideas in the arena of the socio-political transformation. They held the

view that decentralisation would be the right path for the democratic development in

the country.

MBR-200 and Other Leftist Organisations

The repression carried out against the poor and defenceless civilian population during

the caracazo, started to influence the behaviour in the barracks in some critical

manner. Some of the Bolivarians, having exercised control of troops at that time, felt

shame, indignation and a sense of having defended the wrong side (Gott 2000: 48). If

the idea of rising up in arms had already gelled, now plans accelerated and contacts

with civilians, particularly with PRY and La Causa Rll (LCR-the Radical Cause)

became more constant. Moreover the military base of the movement expanded, as

members of different forces approached the group. Leftist group came alive with the

popular revolt and began to contact and make alliances. The PRY began to meet

frequently with the MBR-200, sharing ideas and strategies. With the expansion of the

relations with civilian organisation the differences also became visible among them.

The civilian believed that their participation in the attempt should be equal to that of

their military companions, and Douglas Bravo, a former guerrilla, even argued that

the civilian action should precede that of the military (Gott, 2000: 62-63). Kleber

Ramirez of the PRY, who was in charge of drafting the decrees that were to be

emitted by the provisional government and felt that military officers distrusted

civilian capabilities, left the movement. The rifts at this time between the Bolivarians

and leftist leaders set the tone for the tense relations that prevailed even after the 1998

II Beginning in the 1980s, insurgent groups began seeking a voice in labour unions, most notably in the steel industry of the state of Guayana, in eastern Venezuela. In the face of opposition from goon squads, a pliant Ministry of Labour and national labour federations controlled by the main parties, insurgent finally gained legitimate status and took control of the steel unions in the late 1980s. lbis was the origin of what soon became a major new political movement of the left under the banner of new political party La Causa R. The organisation grew out of the same division in the communist party that spawned the Movimiento Al Socialismo.

25

election. Here, one should mention the system of education and training programme

which directly contributed to the politicisation of military officers. Since 1971, the

education that the military officers received was broader and more complex than they

received in the previous years. The education was provided under the 'Anderes Bello

Plan' which allowed the officers to undertake more advanced course works or

university degrees in social sciences at public universities (Gott, 2000: 41-42). All this

bestowed the officers with an uncommon outlook and encouraged interaction with the

intellectual and academic strata of the Venezuelan society.

The Military Coups of 1992

The coup of 4 February 1992, failed militarily, as the rebellious soldiers were unable

to capture the presidential palace (Miraflores) and subdue strategic military sites in

Caracas. Having failed to achieve the principal objective of seizing the president, the

coup leader Colonel Chavez surrendered and asked to speak on the television to his

companions-in-arms to do the same in order to avoid bloodshed. Chavez and two

other rebels were promptly jailed. However, his appearance on television for less than

one minute gave the entire nation the face of the coup and it captured the collective

imagination of broad sectors of the population (Hamecker 2005: 17). The revolt

. transformed Hugo Chavez into a symbol of rebellion against political corruption,

market reforms and two-party dominance. Although Perez government had survived,

its legitimacy was questioned. Aside, the first military coup of 1992 conveyed the

message that political regime cannot any more rely on the support of armed forces for

its neo-liberal economic agenda. The political consensus built in 1958 had stood

fractured and exposed.

The MBR-200 constituted yet another group comprising junior and middle ranking

officers. It was called COMACATE (Comandante, Major, Capitan, Teniente) which

staged the second coup in November 1992. This time the officers from the air force

also came with the armed forces. Later it was revealed that leaders of the November

coup were high ranking officers from all branches of the military: Air Force General

F. Visconti, Rear Admirals E. Gruber Odreman and L. Cabrera Aguirre, Army

Colonell. Castro, and National Guard Lieutenant Colonel A. Coleoglu Dore were all

involved in one way or the other with the coup attempt. The second coup took place

26

on 27 November 1992. The coup conspirators released a pamphlet after the attempt

was suppressed. It described the situation in the country as;ta 'national crisis', which

had reached the highest point and affected everyone's interests. The authors of the

document condemned Perez's economic policy which increased the social

marginalisation of the masses, the growth of crime, the inefficiency of the judicial

system, and the poor state oflaw and order in Venezuela. They also declared that their

proposals had been ignored and rejected by the government while they were for the

betterment of the situation. 12 For these reasons, the coup leaders declared, that they

were not against the constitutional order which was continuously being violated by

the government of Perez, but against the inefficient regime which was destroying the

country. The document did not provide any detailed description of their programmes

and policies. The conspirators promised to respect all international treaties signed by

Venezuela, and to maintain cordial relations with the international community. Their

transient domestic policy was the speedy restoration of social, peace and order, free

elections, and the establishment of a 'government of national consensuses'

(Babukiran, et al. 1999: 145-148). The second coup attempt was also prevented by

the loyal military officers and the dissidents were sent to jail. But with this coup

attempt, the dissidents had convinced the entire political class that the fall of the Perez

government was inevitable.

Such a perception became widespread and came to be shared by civilian elites who

began to search for a peaceful and sustainable solution to the deepening crisis. Perez

government had made the Illistake of implementing SAPs without first securing

national political support. As a result, the government failed to implement substantial

political and economic changes between 1989 and 1992. After the second failed coup

of 27 November, the government had become highly ineffectual. Common people of

Venezuela rejected the political parties of the establishment because of their

incapacity to alter the course of these events. The change of attitudes gave rise to the

distancing of the electorate from the institutionalised political system. Although the

SAPs did yield some positive macroeconomic results after 1990, (see Table II) but

social indicators continued to fall and the gap between the incomes of the poorest and

12 In October, ] 992 they issued a declaration to the press in which they warned the Perez Government about the danger of civil war if the president did not begin a dialogue with the opposition. Their proposals were ignored by Perez and as a result political tension mounted within the officer corps.

27

the richest continued to increase. Venezuelan society was simply getting

disarticulated and disintegrated.

1993 Elections and MBR-200

The 1993 elections produced a break in the two-party system. Caldera who was the

founder of COPEI and former president (1969-74) made a surprise move when he left

COPEI and floated a new political formation called the Convergencia Nacional (CN)

or National Convergence. With that he tried to avoid any identification with the

traditional parties. The alliance consisted of MAS and sixteen other small parties

(Harnecker 2005: 17; Hellinger 2005: 33). AD and COPEl together had shared no less

than 75 per cent of popular vote after 1974 and cornered 80 per cent of the seats in

Chamber of Deputies and about 88 per cent seats in the Senate (Crisp 2000: 44-46).

But in 1993 presidential elections, the system-sustaining parties (AD and COPEI)

could secure only 46 per cent of total votes. Caldera of CN was declared winner with

31 per cent of total popular votes (Dietz and Myers 2007: 66).

MBR-200 had decided not to participate in the 1993 elections. But the Bolivarians

(cadre of the MBR-200) had begun campaigning for what they called 'NO' to the

parties; 'NO' to the elections; and 'YES' to the proposal for a peoples' constituent

assembly and a new constitution. With these slogans they travelled, visiting several

regions, which enabled them to consolidate their organisation, mobilise the people

and gather signatures in opposition to the elections. All the work of organising for the

electoral abstention allowed them to strengthen the organisational structure of the

MBR-200, and to increase its range of action. They talked about a variety of topics

like the purpose of the abstention, the idea of the constituent assembly and their

critical appreciation of the political system. They organised forums, workshops and

they also got the word via a few radio and TV interviews. But those were rare of

course, as the mainstream media had already cut them off from 'gaining popular

support. But in the end they succeeded to increase electoral abstention rate which was

• higher than all the predictions.

When Carlos A. Perez was sent to prison on the charges of embezzlement in 1993, the

system's rhetoric changed to the line about how his arrest proved that the institutions

28

did function properly. This event had convinced the Bolivarians about the possibility

of the peaceful revolution throughout the country; a revolution that could bring the

true 'socialism' through a constitutional democracy. Therefore, they accelerated the

campaign for a constituent assembly and a new constitution.

From Prison to Freedom

The Bolivarians travelled throughout the country after being released from the jail in

March 1994 by the then president Rafael Caldera. They wanted to convert their

movement into a national political organisation which would be different from the

establishment parties (AD and COPEI). They also disseminated more extensively the

ideological positions they had been deVeloping since the 1980s, laid out political

strategies and elaborated the framework of long-term political programme that they

called the 'Simon Bolivar National Project.'

Margarita Lopez Maya suggests that the organisational structure of the MBR-200 was

not particularly original in comparison to other political and non-political

organisations. The primary organisational base was 'Bolivarian Circles' which were

composed of small local groups very similar to committees or cells of other

organisations. However, the Bolivarian Circles had a different style of recruitment.

Those who desired to join the organisation had to make a 'Bolivarian commitment',

specifically an oath to be 'hard working, honest and humble and exercise solidarity'

(Maya 2003: 80). Bolivarian Circles were organised at various levels: municipal,

regional and national. National directorate was above all the three I evels_ (circles,

municipal and regional). The fourth structural level was the highest body and made all

the final decisions for the organisation. The directorate was composed of two former

officers of the armed forces, one of whom was Hugo Chavez and other was Luis

Davila, who later became the foreign minister. Others in the directorate were Freddy

Bernal, who later became the mayor of the Libertador municipality, and two civilians,

one of whom-Leticia Barrios-was a woman. The MBR-200 carried out the

additional activities to train members; for example through study circles and courses

where national and international history was discussed. The Bolivarian Circles

frequently organised local assemblies to discuss developments and politics. By 1996

the Bolivarians had managed to organise regional assemblies in states like Miranda

29

and Carabobo. The movement was expanding in other states too. The procedure for

making decisions at various assemblies of Bolivarians was to engage in discussions

until the consensus was made. But this was not a rigid position, and the voting process

was recognised as a possible option in some critical circumstances.

As stated earlier, the trio of Simon Bolivar, Simon Rodriguez and Ezequiel Zamora

was the symbol of the movement.13 Nevertheless, the Bol~varians, especially Chavez

achieved command of the symbols and image of nationality and applied them to

political propositions in a way that was novel and these became one of the key aspects

to the political process. Consequently, the trio became the national heroes as Chavez

and other Bolivarians used their name during the election campaign of 1998.

Towards the Political Power: 1998 Elections

In 1997, the MBR-200 reversed its stance on electoral abstention and decided to

compete in the 1998 national elections, forming a broader electoral front known as the

Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR) or Fifth Republic Movement. The MVR was

formed on 21 October 1997 (Hamecker 2005: 18). The front took the name of Fifth

Republic because Venezuela legally prohibits using the name of Bolivar to register

any political organisation with the Comision Nacional Electoral (CNE) or National

Electoral Commission. Nevertheless, MVR sounded like MBR; therefore it facilitated

the transfer of identity. Margarita L. Maya explains why it was called the Fifth

Republic. The Bolivarians carefully used the term because with this they insisted on

'refounding' of the Venezuelan republic, taking into consideration what they called

the "Fourth Republic" that had begun with Venezuela's separation from Gran

Colombia in 1830. The Fourth Republic in their view, has been dominated by the

oligarchy and remained totally detached from the common people

(Maya 2003: 82-83).

It is true that the MVR was not conceived as a political party rather it was an electoral

front led by MBR-200. Soon however MVR began to dominate the MBR-200 for

electoral purposes. The successes achieved by the MVR in constructing alliances and

l3 The symbol of the tree, with three roots, later became the doctrine of Chavez's political party Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR) or Fifth Republic Movement.

30

planning strategies to win elections in less than three years left the MBR-200 without

any role, thus causing its eclipse. MVR became the primary vehicle of the Bolivarian

Revolution after landslide victory registered by its presidential candidate Hugo

Chavez in the 1998 election (see Table III).

Chavez and MVR wanted to have a system which would not be identified with the

previous regimes. They had developed a discourse on inclusion and participation.

Chavez's most valuable weapon was his incorporation of the term el pueblo (the

people) into his political discourse and relating it to the audience he addressed. The

concept of el pueblo is a source of historical identity for poor, marginalised and

excluded, providing them with a sense of self esteem and hope. The discourse of the

Bolivarians and that of Chavez in particular greatly appealed to the el pueblo.

Bolivarians were of the view that los pueblos are the people with great achievements

in the past. They were the great warriors who played a great role in the wars of

independence in the nineteenth century. In short, they can be depicted as brave, noble

beautiful and valiant-in short, the makers of history (Maya: 2000b).

The result of the 1998 elections (congressional, gubernatorial and presidential)

brought a different and young generation to the helms of affairs. Traditional parties

like AD and COPIE had to face a big defeat at every front. CN did not launch any

presidential candidate in 1998 elections. AD did believe that it stood a chance of

victory in these elections and Luis Alfaro Ucero was its presidential candidate. 'In

early March, COPEI decided that it would support an independent candidate Iren

Saez, a former beauty queen and then mayor of Chacao district in Caracas. Henrique

Salas Romer was an independent candidate who also stood for an anti-party

programme.

In view of MVR's land sliding victory in the legislative polls, which were held prior

to the presidential election, both AD and COPEI decided to withdraw support for their

respective presidential candidates. Luis Alfaro Ucero refused to withdraw from the

contest and was promptly expelled by the AD. Iren Saez also refused to have her

name removed from the ballots, and decided to support the candidature of Henrique

Salas Romer. Elections were held on 6 December 1998 and Hugo Chavez was elected

with a huge popular support. Chavez styled himself radical and promised to usher in a

31

Bolivarian revolution and get a new constitution for the country.14 Chavez won 56.20

per cent of the total valid votes and led his nearest rival Salas Romer who got 39.97

per cent of valid votes.

Table- liltS

Summary of the results of 6 December 1998 Presidential Election

Candidates Parties Votes 0/0

Hugo Chavez Fifth Republic Movement 3,673,685 56.20

Henrique Salas Romer Project Venezuela 2,613,161 39.97

Irene Saez -IRENE 184,568 2.82

Luis Alfaro Ucero -ORA 27,586 0.42

Others 38,304 0.59

Total (turnout 54.0%) 6,537,304 100.00

Source: Report of National Electoral Council (Venezuela)

Bolivarian Circles played an important role in the dissemination of the ideas and

programmes of the Boliyarian revolution. These circles were engaged in a variety of

grass-root level activities, including consciousness raising and' political education,

participating in local economic activities, advising and organising local groups and

individuals for access to state resource, and planning and implementing varieties of

social policy programmes. These efforts pushed the boundaries of conventional

politics, and both AD and COPEI could never match their campaign. The two

established parties had realised that their time is up; they could not or did not even

finalise their presidential candidates. And when they did, they withdrew party support

to salvage at least their party names and prestige.

14 For more details 'see, the Europa World Book: 2004, pp 4554-4560. 15 http://en.wikipedia,orglwikilVenezuelan yresidential_ election,_1998#Results

32

The reverse stand of the party Causa Rafter 1993 elections also helped Chavez's

victory. Along with Caldera and the parties that supported him, Causa R capitalised

on popular discontent by putting forth anti-neoliberal positions in the 1993 elections.

But following Caldera's victory, in 1993 Causa R dropped its intransigent stand and

anti-party discourse at the same time that it supported certain neo-liberal policies

adopted by president Caldera. As a result, the party split into two. The more moderate

faction which kept the party name adopted even more conciliatory positions and was

thus, no longer perceived as representing a true alternative to the establishment. This

faction (LCR) was headed by Andres Velasquez and the other faction was headed by

Pablo Medina who founded a new party namely Patria para Todos (PPT) or

Fatherland for All. In June, 1998 PPT announced that it would support Chavez

presidential aspiration. Then another alliance, led by MVR, was formed including

other left parties like PPT, MAS, Causa R and Partido Comunista de Venezuela

(PCV).J6 The alliance came to be called the Polo Patriotico (PP-Patriotic Pole). The

PP achieved the victory in forthcoming presidential elections of 1998 and 2000. The

alliance also made a great success in 1999 elections for constituent assembly.

Electoral Evolution of the Political Revolution

Electoral triumph of MVR and Hugo Chavez in 1998 elections was the first step

towards the development of Bolivarian Revolution. Promising a new constitution,

Chavez and his alliance got another landslide victory in the elections which were held

in July 1999 for a constituent assembly. MVR won as many as 125 seats compared to

six won by the opposition. This was a great opportunity to draft a new constitution in

the way they wanted. They could bring the revolution in the form they wanted

through the written constitution. They could establish a system according to their aim

and objectives. The constitution was written in just over three months, which was

approved in a national referendum held in the December of the same year. J 7

16 PCV is a Marxist-Leninist political party, and the oldest continuously existing party in Venezuela. It remained the main leftist political party in Venezuela from its foundation in 1931 until it split into rival factions in 1971. Later it became the part of the electoral alliance Polo Patriotico (patriotic Pole) in 1998. 17 For more details see-http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilC onstitution _of _ Venezuela, accessed on February 2008.

33

Presidential Election of 2000

Chavez was elected president under the constitution of 1961. He had wanted the new

Constitution of 1999 to reaffirm him as president. There were several reasons for the

decision: for him and his supporters, the 1961 Constitution was the symbol of a

corrupt system that had fed popular apathy and written by the leaders of the two

traditional parties AD· and COPEI whom they considered responsible for the social

crisis in the country. Secondly, the presence of the leftist groups in the system made

the replacement of the document understandable because they were the victims of

exclusion during Pact of Punto regime. Besides, Chavez and his supporters had

wanted re-election provision to be added into the new Constitution which would pave

the way for his re-election in 2003.18 Further, he had wanted to pursue the

constitutional path to entrench his Bolivarian revolution enshrine the goals of his '21 st

century's socialism' in the document. His Critics accused him of becoming a dictator

and charged him with subverting Venezuelan democracy. Unfazed, he called for the

'mega-election' in July, 2000 after winning the approval of the new Constitution

through a popular referendum. Finally, Chavez was elected president under the new

Constitution for a full six year term in the elections held on 30 July 2000. He won

59.76 per cent of the total valid votes cast in the presidential poll, compared with the

37.52 per cent of the ballot received by Francisco Arias Cardenas of Causa R19 and

the 2.72 per cent secured by Claudio Fermin (a former mayor of Caracas)

(See table IV). In the concurrently held elections to the new, 165-seat National

Assembly, the ruling MVR secured a majority of 93 seats, the AD stood second with

32 seats, and others could get seats only in single digits?O

18 Later, with an amendment, the term became of six year and Chavez was elected for the same in 2000. 19 In 2000 elections Causa R left the PP just before the 'mega elections and supported Francisco Arias Cardenas the main opponent of Chavez. 20 For more details see the Europa World Book, 2004: pp 4554-4560.

34

International media also joined and echoed the same charge without however any

evidence (Hellinger 2005: 12). However, a disconcerting element was the higher rate

of absenteeism compared to the 1998 elections. It was 43.69 per cent as compared to

36.5 per cent in 1998 (Hellinger 2003: 27-53).

After the 2000 elections, Chavez started to formulate various policies and

programmes. He presented the 'Plan Bolivar 2000' to fuse military capabilities with

those of other public institutions so as to attack social problems with specific

programmes in areas of construction, housing, sanitation, health, indigent care, public

transport and food distribution22 (Larry 1999: A 15).

Military and the Revolution

On military's role in politics, Chavez announced the principle called 'civil-military

union.' It meant that the military should be as integrated as possible with the civilian

population, being in constant contact with them and taking on civilian tasks in the

process (Harnecker, 2005: 24-25). The military has thus become heavily involved in

the various developmental 'missions.' Chavez depicts army as the agent of the social

change. It is true that military had to playa key role in "Plan Bolivar 2000" but it also

means solutions often came from above. And participation can not be decreed; people

need to learn how to participate. Chavez's government also expanded the military's

presence in the police work. With the 'National Plan for Citizen Security' instituted in

May 1999, the National quard acquired central responsibility for combating

Venezuela's public safety problems. In the process, the National Guard essentially

assumed the role of the police.

On the negative side, the military's new role has brought allegations of corruption and

abuse in its ranks. It has also been blamed for violating human rights and for tis

involvement in some scandals (Norden 2003: 106). Others have apprehended that

greater exposure of the armed forces to civilian task will compromise its

professionalism at a time when the country need strong defence forces to defend

national sovereignty and territory against hostile foreign interests' and powers.

22 "Plan Bolivar 2000" and other social programmes would be discussed in Chapter IV.

36

Regional Elections of 2004 and National Assembly Elections of 2005

CNE conducted the mayoral and gubernatorial elections on 31 October 2004. These

elections were the test of the capacity of the Bolivarians to sustain their electoral

mobilisation. The MVR and those supported by it received the majority in regional

elections. Chavista candidates won 21 out of 23 governorships and the metropolitan

Caracas government. MVR-Ied alliance also won the 70 per cent of the municipalities.

The Chavistas won in the state of Carabobo and Miranda which were the strongholds

of the opposition parties (Hellinger 2005: 20-24). Once again, the regional elections

established the strong support for Chavez and his Bolivarian Revolution.

In a pattern similar to the presidential election of 2000, AD pulled out of the contest

just four days before the polls. Four other opposition parties, which together with AD

accounted for ten per cent of the candidates, also dropped out. The number of

candidates ran shrank from 5,500 to around 5,000. New automated voting machines

were used in the elections, allowing the votes to be tallied the same night. They

showed that about 25 per cent of the electorate had voted (Joubert: 2005).

Opposition argued that higher rate of absenteeism is the proof ofMVR's unpopularity

and failure of Chavez to enthuse ·the masses. The abstention in the regional elections

had reached a high of around 70 per cent. After receiving reports from hundreds of its

observers, the European Union (EU) declared the elections to be 'fair and

transparent.' In spite of the important guarantees offered by the CNE, principal

opposition parties had decided 'not to participate' and explained high rate of

absenteeism to their boycott. But the election also paved the way forward for the

Bolivarian Revolution and so called '21 51 century's socialism.'

Venezuelans voted for parliamentary election on 4 December 2005 to elect the

deputies to the National Assembly. The elections were held for 167 seats in the

National Assembly_ Once again the MVR got the majority, winning 114 seats. Rest of

the seats were won by the allied parties because the opposition parties including AD,

COPEI and Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT-A New Erai3 once again boycotted the

elections accusing the CNE of biases in favour of Bolivarians. Jose Vicente Rangel,

23 The party was founded by Omar Barboza and came into existence in 1999 _ The ideology of the party is • centre-leftist' _

37

then Vice president, stated that opposition knew it would perfonn badly, as pre­

election surveys had indicated. He also accused the US Embassy in Caracas for their

withdrawal from the elections.24

Presidential Elections of December 2006

CNE held presidential elections on 3 December 2006. Venezuelans voted in a contest

between incumbent President Hugo Chavez of MVR and opposition candidate

Manuel Rosales, governor of Julia, who was supported by UNT. Rosales had

campaigned on the slogan: "jNi el imperio, ni el barbudo! (Neither the [U.S.] empire,

nor the [Cuban] bearded oneD. Rosales said: "The Empire must respect our

sovereignty, and we must respect the Empire, and we cannot be looking at societies

like Cuba as a model to be copied. We want modernity, transfonnation,

development.,,25 On its part, Chavez's campaign rested on defence of national

sovereignty and promotion of world peace. According to Union Radio, the chief

campaigners of Chavez added the theme of "country's freedom to no longer be a

North American colony.26 As expected, Chavez won securing 62.84 per cent and

Rosales 36.9 per cent of the total vote caste.27 In this way, Chavez began his six-year

presidential term on 10 January 2007.

Apart from these elections, Venezuelans have also voted in the referendum of 2007,

regional elections of 2008 and again in the referendum of 2009. After every electoral

victory, Bolivariaru claim that the mandate is for the expansion and deepening of the

Bolivarian Revolution. Popular participation at regular intervals legitimate the

programmes and policies of Chavez government and maIntain popular support for

building '21 st century's socialism.' Nobody has dismantled the state; in a sense, old

order in the form of civil service exists. Private business is guaranteed freedom and

protection by the 1999 Constitution. Kaitherine Bradstreet argues that Venezuelan

Revolution can not be explained as socialist revolution· because here in Venezuela

24 For more details visit the webpage­http://en.wikipedia.orgiwikiNenezuelanyarliamentary_election,_2005 25 For more details see the webpage: http://en.wikipedia.orgiwikiNenezuelanyresidential_ election,_ 2006 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid.

38

state is not dismantled and replaced by the democratic workers and that is the basic

nature of the socialism (Bradstreet 2007).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Puntofijismo worked only as long as it could. It instituted a stable

and orderly power-sharing arrangement between contending elites who had organised

themselves into stable political parties. The system did work as long as state received

rents from petroleum earnings and so long as popular demands either did not exist or

could be managed within the system. The economic crisis produced a profound

political and social crisis that was in the making long before the economic crisis.

A remarkable development in the 1980s was the fonnation of MBR-200 and

emergence of military elements as an expression of viable opposition. MBR's ability

to align with varieties of political and civil society groups enabled to broaden its

appeal and popular base and transfonn itself into MVR. One can argue that the

closeness of the military to the government in the name of the 'civil-military

relations' and 'new military education' gave chance to it to know the flaws and

shortcomings of the regime on the one hand, and to understand the Venezuelan

society and its problems on the other. All this made it capable to rise, with other social

and political groups, as the driving force of Venezuelan politics. They organised at

social and political levels and convinced the Venezuelans that the alternative and

better regime was possible through the Bolivarian Revolution. The masses, excluded

during Pun to Fijo regime, mobilised themselves in favour of fonner military coup

leader Hugo Chavez and gave him the mandate to govern the country in 1998.

Writing of a new constitution in 1999 by an elected constituent assembly and a series

of national, regional and municipal elections have affinned the Bolivarian

revolutionary commitment to the path of parliamentary politics. In tenns of ideology,

Bolivarians clearly draw ideas and principles from national historical experiences of

the past two hundred years. Their ideological orientation and programmatic contents

all indicate that it is a peaceful parliamentary revolution which is set out to achieve its

social and economic development goals under the aegis of a state that plays its

39

regulatory and reformative role in an economy that remains capitalist and well

integrated with the global market forces.

As the next Chapter describes the process of constitution making and delineates the

themes and principles of the 1999 Constitution, not only the goals and aims of the

Bolivarians become clear, it also describes about the sources of Bolivarian ideology

and their commitments to constitutional path.

40