chapter 2 introduction to electrical safety

I N T R O D U C T I O N T O E L E C T R I C A L S A F E T Y

CHAPTER 2Introduction to Electrical safety

1. Electrical hazards and electrical safety

Electrical accidents, unlike most other industrial accidents, quite

often happen to professional and supervisory staff. In some

situations they may be at greater risk than the manual staff. In a

typical year 47% of electrical accidents in factories in Great

Britain involved electrically skilled persons out of a total of 805

reported accidents. These accidents were analyzed according to

types of apparatus and their voltage (see Table 2.1). At the time

of that analysis the then legislation made the distinction between

high voltage and lower voltages at the arbitrary level of 650

volts.

The statistics also related solely to those premises subject to the

Factories Act in Great Britain. Changes to legislation and

administrative changes to the enforcing authorities have changed

the manner in which such accidents are reported and processed

but the accident situation represented will not have substantially

altered.

Much of the apparatus and working practices have changed but

many of the old problems persist and the same electrical

accidents are seen time and time again. Throughout the working

population one may expect this same pattern to be repeated, or

at least to be similar to that shown in Table 2.1. Since only about

one-third of the employed population work in factories, the scope

for electrical accidents per year is considerably larger than is

illustrated here.

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Table2.2 analyses those accidents by occupation: 57 accidents

were to supervisory and testing staff, and electrical trades people

accounted for 302 of the total 805 accidents. Tables 2.3-2.5

analyze a year of accidents by location, causation and voltage,

respectively.

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Table 2.1 Electrical accidents analyzed by apparatus.

The other points to note about electrical accidents, which may

not be apparent from study of these tables but which, if one

knows about them, may be seen to fit into the patterns shown,

are:

(a) A very large proportion of those accidents to electrical staffs

do not involve electric shock but cause flash and arc burns due to

incorrectly working on live exposed conductors. Too much work is

done live, and by persons who should know better, although they

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are as likely as not to have had quite inadequate training in live

work. The law in the UK is now strongly against live working.

Table 2.2 Electrical accidents analyzed by occupation.

Table 2.3 Analysis of reportable electrical accidents by

location in one year.

Table 2.4 Conditions leading up to accidents in one year.

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(b) Most electrical fatalities are due to electric shocks at the

lowest distribution voltage of 240 volts (415 volts, 3 phase).

Contrary to some commonly held beliefs, 240 volts is a very

dangerous voltage.

(c) Nearly all electric shocks, even at 240 volts, are potentially

lethal. For every fatality, there have been many narrow escapes

and an even vaster number of minor shocks and ‘tingles’. The

key factors are discussed in Chapter 3, but it depends crucially on

whether the victim is able to ‘let go’ of the live conductors or not.

Mostly the answer is yes, hence the large number of lucky

escapes.

Table 2.5 Reported electrical accidents by a.c. systems in

one year analysis.

2. Control of staff

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From time to time, we all make mistakes, but when life and limb

are at risk it is inexcusable to take chances. It would be very sad

to go through the rest of one’s life knowing that someone had

been killed or injured due to one’s own negligence.

Even if one were not distressed at causing pain or death to

others, there is also the legal aspect to consider. Everyone must

conduct their work these days in accordance with statutory

legislation; in particular, in the UK the Health and Safety at Work

etc. Act 1974 and, in the case of electrical hazards, the Electricity

at Work Regulations 1989 apply. These regulations place duties

on all employers, the self-employed and all employees in respect

of work with, on, or near electrical equipment. Even office

workers do not escape the scope of these regulations.

Engineers hold a special place in our society. They not only hold

responsible positions in many industries and institutions but carry

special responsibilities for the safety of work people and for the

public where these engineers are in control of work processes or

activities. As an example, an electrical engineer in charge of the

high voltage testing of a piece of electrical equipment must fully

apprise him or herself of all the potential hazards and risk points

associated with that testing. There must be proper control of the

work and of the persons working on that task. These people must

be properly supervised at all times. The duties are not just legal

ones, they are moral ones too. At root of the whole issue there is

also the financial penalty associated with errors. Accidents can be

very costly indeed.

No one should be allowed to do anything which is likely to be

dangerous unless they have the necessary skill and experience

and the technical knowledge to do the work safely. Managers and

supervisors must therefore satisfy themselves that no one is

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asked to do any work for which they are not qualified and

particular care must be taken with trainees and apprentices.

As a first step, an electrical engineer should equip him or herself

with a copy of the Memorandum of Guidance on the

Electricity at Work Regulations (HSE, 1989). This is essential

reading since it reproduces the important regulations and gives a

commentary on them indicating the thinking of the main

enforcement authority, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).

This memorandum also lists many other relevant and useful

guidance notes and publications. Note also the article by Dolbey

Jones (1989).

3. Permits to work

Much electrical work is done in industry, and particularly so in the

electrical power supply industry, using a system of work and staff

control known as ‘permits to work’. The purpose with most of

these procedures is to control who does what, on what and when,

and to document this in a formal manner.

Generally, the principle is to make the particular piece of

equipment to be worked upon as safe as possible, for example by

making it dead, isolated and earthed. That does not necessarily

mean that all danger would be eliminated in the area of the work.

The permit itself should be written in such a way as to alert

persons to such residual dangers, for example from adjacent live

equipment which is still in service during the work.

When there may be danger, and some electrical work

(particularly in testing and maintenance) cannot be made

absolutely safe, instructions must be precise and unambiguous

and these should be recorded on the permit which should be

issued and, in due course, cancelled, in an orderly and clearly

defined manner. A full record of all permits issued must be kept

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so that it is possible, at any time, to find out what is going on,

who is involved or at risk, and what precautions have been taken.

The permit must state clearly and fully to whom it has been

issued (this person should be present at all times and is

responsible for what happens), name those persons who may be

present in the danger area, and state what special precautions

have been taken. The safe and unsafe areas must be stated, and

clearly indicated on the site. The work to be done must be clearly

defined, and no other work must be carried out, because it may

entail risks not contemplated by the person issuing the permit

who therefore may not have taken the necessary extra

precautions.

At the end of the work there must be a clearly defined procedure

for handing over. A check must be made that all persons have

been withdrawn and the result recorded. Before the permit is

cancelled, a statement must be recorded (preferably on the back

of the cancelled permit and also in the log book where one has

been kept) of what work has been done - and what is left undone

- and what steps have been taken to render the site safe for

normal operations. Until the permit has been cancelled the

person to whom it was issued remains responsible for everything

that happens.

If the work lasts for more than one shift there must be an

appropriate method of handing over and ensuring that

the new shift supervisor is familiar with the state of work

and the terms of the permit. It is often preferable to

cancel the first permit and issue a new one. Sometimes

the person with the authority to issue permits takes

charge of the work; in that case he should issue a permit

for himself.

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All this detailed procedure may sound very fussy, but experience

has shown that it is essential. The routine not only ensures that

there is a record which should show the cause of any mistake,

but the mere writing down of all the details is a great help in

preventing anything being overlooked. As the persons concerned

must sign all records and statements, the routine helps to ensure

that instructions have been read and understood.

4. Testing and research work etc.

Some testing and research work presents its own hazards. As the

conditions are likely to vary greatly, it is impossible to lay down

rules in detail. What can be said, however, is that the law treats

the activities of testing and research work no differently from any

other activity. The general principles therefore are exactly the

same. In short, there is no special license to work on or near live

conductors (or to allow live conductors to be accessible) simply

because the activity is testing or a necessary part of research

etc.

Routine testing using dangerous voltages is normally carried out

in enclosures having interlocked doors so arranged that the

power supply is completely disconnected and, if the

circumstances require it, the conductors are earthed, before the

person may gain access.

Alternatively, if the testing can be undertaken with a very low

and harmless voltage, for example 12 volts, the need for

enclosure can be dispensed with.

When the equipment under test is so large that interlocked

enclosure is inappropriate, special measures will have to be

devised. The principle of excluding persons from the vicinity of

the equipment while voltage is applied should always be

observed. When voltages above say 1000 volts are involved (i.e.

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high voltage) the exclusion of persons from the area becomes

imperative. If the test facility is a permanent one there is no

excuse for persons to have access during testing to conductors

energized at high voltage. The HSE publish guidance in addition

to that mentioned in section 1.2 above (HSE, 1980) on the

subject of safety in electrical testing.

There are some specialized activities where work on live

conductors is commonly accepted practice and where

appropriate precautions have been developed. The official

guidance in HSE (1980, 1989) describes some of these. (Also see

Appendix 1 for further HSE guidance.)

5. Non-electrical causes

Some so-called ‘electrical’ accidents are the result of mechanical

and other causes. Examples of these are mechanical ‘stress-

raisers’, thermal shock on insulators, resonant vibrations of

conductors leading to fractures, low temperature brittleness or

corrosion fatigue. To deal with such troubles it is necessary to

have more than a narrow interest in electrical matters.

The official report on the enquiry into the disastrous explosion

and fire at Flixborough stated that engineers should have

academic and practical training in all branches of engineering,

outside their specialty, which may affect their work. That disaster

was caused by an inappropriate and amateur modification to the

highly complex chemical plant.

The official report of the inquiry by Lord Cullen into the disastrous

explosion and fire on the North Sea oil platform, Piper Alpha, in

1988, in which 167 men died (Cullen, 1990), concluded with a list

of 106 recommendations comprehensively covering the

shortcomings. Of particular importance was the recommendation

for the adoption of Safety Management Systems by the company.

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This was to ensure that the design and operation of the

installation was safe.

6. Equipment design

Standards are necessarily very precise about small details of

apparatus to ensure that it is not only safe when leaving the

manufacturers but also remains safe in use and after repairs.

Some of the conditions laid down may appear trivial, but are, in

fact, essential. It is not easy to decide what to specify so as to

attain safety without limiting choice of design.

Some important basic requirements of standards are:

The insulation of conductors shall be unable to come into

contact with moving parts.

Earthing terminals shall be adequately locked against

loosening. These terminals shall not serve for any other

purpose, e.g. for securing parts of the case.

Electrical connections shall be so designed that the contact

pressure is not transmitted through insulating material

other than ceramic or other materials not subject to

shrinkage or deterioration.

Knobs, handles, operating levers and the like, which when

removed or damaged render live points accessible, shall be

of adequate mechanical strength, and shall be so attached

to the shaft that they cannot become detached

inadvertently, even after extensive use. They shall be so

arranged that contact with live shafts cannot be made by

thin metal objects allowed to fall between the knobs and

the case.

Soldered connections shall be so designed that they keep

the conductors in position if the conductor breaks at the

point of connection. Protective insulation shall be securely

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fixed in such a way that it cannot be removed without

making the tool unfit for use (e.g. if it were omitted during

repair it would be impossible to reassemble the tool in a

workable condition), and so on.

In many situations it is important that fingers, steel rules or

even knitting needles shall not be able to touch live or

moving parts and a number of probes have been devised to

prevent this, including a standard test finger which is

hinged and can feel round corners.

7. Investigations

Most engineers will, at some time, have to investigate an

accident or plant failure. The first requirement is to make

sure that one has all the relevant information and that it

is correct. Persons who have witnessed a severe accident

are often shocked and emotionally disturbed. They may be

quite unable to distinguish between what they have seen and

what they think they ought to have seen, or, perhaps, what they

have imagined when trying to rationalize their confused

memories. Some people may also have good reason for wanting

to mislead. The person injured is sometimes less upset and a

better witness than the onlookers: for example, a girl who lost

several fingers in a guillotine was much calmer the next day than

others who saw it happen.

It is also important to remember that the impossible does

not happen, and the improbable only happens

occasionally. On the other hand, one should always be

suspicious of an explanation which comes too readily. With

perseverance, the truth can nearly always be found. It is

important to examine the debris very carefully after a

failure and be very critical of stock wiring diagrams; they

frequently have mistakes or refer to the wrong apparatus.

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Modifications may not have been recorded. For example, after a

switch-cubicle explosion which had been attributed to ‘a surge’,

on enquiry it was found that no system disturbance had been

noticed anywhere else. On examining the wreckage a severed

conductor showed clear evidence of a fatigue fracture, not

entirely obscured by arcing. The cause of all the trouble, as

checked by calculation, was that the conductor had resonated at

the supply frequency, work hardened, and fractured while

carrying load current.

Having determined how the accident happened, it is

important to find out why. Was the equipment suitable for

its duty? If an accident occurs because someone closed

the wrong switch, it is important to find out why they did

it.

Were they familiar with the job or equipment? Were standing

instructions vague or ambiguous, was the position of the switch

handle misleading, were the circuits confusing, or were the

switches inadequately labeled, etc.?

Temperament is important in some jobs. A control engineer

may have long periods of dull routine punctuated by

occasional emergencies when quick and correct decisions

are necessary. In such a situation, people require enough to do

to keep alert, but not so much that they do not respond instantly

when the emergency arises. The UK Medical Research Council

Applied Psychology Unit has found that a tired man can usually

perform such a job quite as well as a fresh one in normal

conditions, particularly if he has had a great deal of experience,

but may fail to meet an emergency.

8. Report writing

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The purpose of an investigation is to ascertain the facts and

achieve any necessary action. Usually a report will be necessary,

and should be presented in clearly written, easily understandable

form. If the report is muddled or unconvincing the time spent on

the investigation will have been wasted. It is useful to consider

the following points when writing a report.

1. Fully understand the sequence of events which led to the

incidence or accident. Arrange the report in a logical

sequence, for example to reflect the chronological sequence

of events. Each paragraph should follow naturally from its

predecessor. Give the report a title, use subheadings and

number the paragraphs.

2. The text should flow, carrying the argument forward and in

such a way that the reader is almost expecting what

follows.

3. Direct the language at the recipient reader. Use language

and terminology which he or she will understand. If

necessary explain special or difficult technical terms in

basic, everyday language.

4. Put detailed technical material in appendices.

5. If the report is long, provide a short and cogent summary.

6. End the report with conclusions. If appropriate then add

recommendations.

7. Sign it and date it.

Much has been written and published on the correct use of

English and a lot of nonsense is talked about what is, and what is

not, allowed. There are actually no rules in English, despite what

the experts may wish one to believe: that is what has made it

such a resilient and successful language!

There are, however, some very useful conventions (which are not

the same as rules) which are helpful to know about. Gowers

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(1965, 1987), Jespenson (1943) and Carey (1958) may be of

interest.

9. Developments in engineering

There is an old saying about even the most advanced and up-to-

date pieces of machinery or technology, especially it is said of

modern advanced aero- planes, that they are ‘out of date before

they leave the drawing board’. Even drawing boards are

becoming out of date nowadays, with computers reaching into

every aspect of our lives and, of course, into engineering drawing

offices.

Solid state devices have been with us for many years, nearly half

a century in fact, and their reliability is well established. It is

possible to compute the probable ‘life before failure’ of most

devices. However, this does not help one trace those defective

components which operate only in emergency and could

otherwise remain unused and defective but undetected for years.

It is virtually impossible to detect all weak links with certainty.

Similarly, software can harbors weaknesses which can be

extremely difficult if not impossible to detect. The hazards of

relying on untried software in safety critical systems is

becoming a growing area of concern as our society

assigns more and more control processes to the

microchip.

An associated development has been the increasing use

of fiber optics for the transmission of information and

instructions, and the subsequent development of ‘optical’

switches and relays. These reduce fire and explosion

hazards. They also eliminate the disturbance of control systems

and telecommunications by electrostatic and magnetic induction,

and by gradients in the ground and structures caused by power

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faults and lightning discharges. Fiber optics are already well

established as are some optical devices, the latest of which

appears to be a ‘transistor’, and development is rapid at the

present time.

Another important development has been the realization of the

seriousness of the toxic hazards arising from the use of

polychlorinated biphenyl’s, used increasingly from the mid-1950s

to about 1975 or later in place of mineral oil in power

transformers to reduce the danger from fire and explosions.

Oil-less, otherwise referred to as dry or sometimes air-cooled,

transformers have been used to some extent, but, even it not

immersed in an insulating liquid, conventional solid insulation is

itself a fire risk. In addition these transformers are prone to

failure caused by absorbed moisture from the air and from

surface contamination and tracking in industrial situations. Fire

risks due to oil escape are an increasingly important industrial

hazard and the losses have at times amounted to several million

pounds.

There have also been important developments in understanding

the havoc which may be caused in control, telecommunication

and instrumentation systems by electrostatic and

electromagnetic radiation. There has also been much work

carried out on the subject of earth potential gradients caused by

power circuit failures.

10. Legislation and its administration

There have been many developments in the ‘political’ climate. To

understand their significance, particularly in the UK, it is useful to

refer back to the beginning of the organized electrical supply

industry. The period 1880 to 1895 was one of very rapid

development. In 1880 Edison in the USA and Swan in Great

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Britain perfected a practical carbon filament electric light bulb.

This was the trigger to a vast electrical industry including central

power supply and electricity distribution systems.

Following these early steps, legislators took an early interest. To

lay mains in the streets in Great Britain, for example, it was

necessary to introduce special legislation. Hence the first Electric

Lighting Act was passed in 1882. In due course this was followed

by numerous modifying and amending Acts. On the safety side

there are two important sets of Regulations.

The first of these was in 1896, the Electricity Supply

Regulations, which were introduced for ‘securing the safety of

the public’ and for ‘ensuring a proper and sufficient supply of

electrical energy’. Dealing with the minimum heights of overhead

power lines, maximum voltages of distribution systems and

maximum permissible leakage currents etc., these Regulations

were very detailed and prescriptive and were administered by the

then Board of Trade. It is interesting therefore that their eventual

successors are still entitled the Electricity Supply Regulations (of

1988 as amended in 1990) and cover many of the same matters

as their earliest predecessors, but refined in many ways through

numerous revisions and amendments down the decades. Their

principle and objectives remain the same; the safety of the public

from the electricity distribution system up to the consumers’

terminals and the preservation of the ‘security of the supply’.

The other set of statutory (i.e. criminal law) Regulations in

Great Britain, which had an early provenance and was directed

solely at electrical safety, was made under the Factories and

Workshops Acts. These were the Electricity Regulations of

1908 and they protected employees working in premises subject

to the Factories and Workshops Acts. They also had many

detailed and specific provisions but their strength lay in some

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very generally drafted provisions together with flexible

enforcement by Her Majesty’s Factory Inspectorate (HMFI) over

many decades. They also protected those working in power

stations and in those substations which were ‘large enough to

admit an employee’. These Regulations were amended in

1944 and became known as the Electricity (Factories Act)

Special Regulations 1908 and 1944. However employees

were not protected by this legislation from electrical hazards

arising in the course of their work from the other parts of the

electrical distribution system, e.g. working on cables in the street.

This was not fully redressed until 1989 when the 1908 and 1944

Regulations were finally revoked and replaced by the more

comprehensive Electricity at Work Regulations 1989 which were

made under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974

(HSE, 1989; Dolbey Jones, 1989).

These new Regulations are considerably simpler than those which

they replaced. A great deal of dead wood has been eliminated,

mainly where technology had overtaken specific requirements in

the Factories Act Electricity Regulations that reflected the

technology of the beginning of the 20th century when electrical

power distribution was in its infancy. The new Regulations are

thus less specific and deal only with general principles.

This has the advantage that they should not restrict the

development and application of new ideas in the future.

On the other hand, in the absence of specific material

requirements (such as those relating to dimensions at

switchboards in those early Regulations), the electrician at the

workplace, or the engineer for that matter, may be at a loss to

know what is and what is not acceptable practice.

Under the statutory Factories Act, Electricity Regulations (of

1908/1944) there had for many decades been an official

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publication known as the ‘Memorandum’ (Form 928). That was

withdrawn when the Electricity at Work Regulations 1989

superseded those Regulations and a new guidance document by

the Health and Safety Executive, Memorandum of guidance on

the Electricity at Work Regulations (HSE, 1989), was issued.

This publication gives a commentary on the legal duties and

mainly rather generalized advice on the technical interpretation

of these regulations.

The Health and Safety Executive also issues a series of guidance

publications in addition to the Memorandum (HSE, 1989) on a

number of specific hazards, working situations and equipments.

11. ‘Consumer’ safety

Whereas the safety of employees from electricity used in

factories and workplaces, and the safety of the public from the

electrical distribution system in the streets etc. were matters

adequately catered for by legislation of early provenance,

consumer protection has been only relatively recently a

matter for comprehensive legislation. In Great Britain the

principal legislation is now the Low Voltage Electrical Equipment

(Safety) Regulations 1989 made under the Consumer Protection

Act 1987 to implement and align with the EEC directive known as

the Low Voltage Directive (LVD). In essence these Regulations

follow the principle that products which conform to consensus

standards agreed in International forums, e.g. CENELEC and IEC

are deemed safe and are thus allowed to be placed on the

market for sale to the public. That is a considerable simplification

of the LVD and to think of its scope simply in terms of hairdryers

and toasters would be misleading, but in terms of market share

and numbers of persons protected it is primarily a consumer-

orientated matter.

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Within the four walls, so to speak, of the home, electrical safety

becomes almost exclusively the responsibility of the individual

householder. The product that he or she purchases may have

been made to a standard and may adequately comply with the

statutory safety Regulations and the LVD but its manner of use

and the wiring within the home are a matter for the individual.

That is the case in Great Britain at least and is repeated in similar

patterns in many countries. Prescriptive requirements about

wiring up plugs or obligatory requirements for house wiring are

rare internationally.

The well-known and highly regarded ‘Wiring Regulations’, which

have been issued by the Institution of Electrical Engineers in

many revised versions since the turn of the century, have

become the cornerstone of good electrical installation practice in

many countries as well as the UK. In the international context the

IEE Wiring Regulations have been redrafted to reflect the general

harmonization that is taking place in many technological

standard making forums. While the latest edition of the IEE

Wiring Regulations (IEE, 2008) does not pretend to equate

precisely word for word or even Regulation by Regulation with

internationally parallel documents, the format, scope and

technical principles are converging.

12. Low voltage - below 1000 volts a.c. etc.

Like the Electricity Supply Regulations and the LVD, the IEE

Wiring Regulations reflect the current international adoption of

1000 volts A.C. as a significant or at least useful ‘cut-off’ voltage.

This is almost entirely an arbitrary voltage and no safety

significance can usefully be attached to its choice. Other voltage

limits appear in Standards and even in statutory Regulations but

only at the extra low voltages, e.g. 50 volts, do these have some

useful safety context. It is interesting to note that the Electricity

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at Work Regulations 1989, unlike the principal Regulations which

they replaced, refer to no specific voltage levels or voltage

‘bands’.

The Regulations actually define electrical danger without

reference to voltage, which is, after all, only part of the

consideration of what is dangerous in any situation. It must be

remembered that most electrocutions, i.e. fatalities due to

electric shock, occur at the predominant domestic electric

voltages, particularly 240 volts a.c.

13. Technical advice and expertise

There is no short cut to the acquisition of technical knowledge

and competence in a particular area of expertise. The published

material by itself is seldom sufficient ground upon which to

develop an adequate depth of understanding in a particular

subject. The reading of the statutory Regulations and associated

guidance may enlighten one as to the outline and maybe reveal a

few details of the hazards while the more detailed codes of

practice such as the IEE Wiring Regulations are so detailed in

themselves that at first reading they will serve to confuse as

much as to enlighten. Those Regulations themselves refer to a

multiplicity of further codes and Standards, some of which may

seem obscure to any but specialists in their particular fields.

The warning must therefore be that the prevention of accidents

and disasters rests not simply with considerations of all the

relevant laws, standards, codes and guidance but with an in-

depth understanding of the principles and practice of the

particular subjects. There is little substitute for well founded

experience and without it accidents will continue to occur.

14. Conclusion

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The art of electrical accident prevention has been founded

primarily on the investigation of accidents by professionally

qualified engineers. The science of accident prevention is based

on a logical analysis of their reports. Some aspects involve highly

technical considerations and this is particularly true of

investigations of failures where a correct interpretation of small

details such as fracture types or surface corrosion, or possible

causes of over-voltages, is important. But it is an essentially

practical subject and its practice is conditioned both by

psychological and financial considerations. It is important to

spend money first on the action which will bring the greatest and

if possible quickest benefit.

There is also a growing recognition that safety is something that

cannot simply be bolted on to an existing organization by training

the workforce in various safety routines but that it needs

managing as part of a company’s corporate strategy. It is only

partially useful to react solely to accidents and to correct the

discrete failings identified by these events. A spate of recent

disasters, the Kings Cross Underground fire, the sinking of the

Herald of Free Enterprise, the Clapham Junction Railway crash

and the Piper Alpha oil rig fire were all fully investigated with

benefit of public inquiry and published reports. In each case

severe failings in management at levels right up to the top were

identified. Organizational problems were being exposed and

highlighted. Responsibilities were being laid at the doors of chief

executives.

To steer an organization into a safer regime takes great skill and

determination. At the very least it requires the best possible

information feedback from the workplace where the hazards

exist. This requires attention to be paid to various audit and

management information controls. One particularly useful safety

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management tool is to collect and analyse data on all ‘near miss’

incidents (van der Schaaf et al., 1991). On the iceberg theory,

there are many more of these than there will be of actual

accidents and, provided that one can get those involved to be

forthcoming about these incidents, a great deal of useful

information can be gleaned about an organization’s robustness

and fitness to avoid accidents. It is likely to be much more

revealing than trying to identify the weaknesses after the

accidents themselves.

The prevention of accidents is actually much more than the

technical discipline of identifying risks and adopting the right

technical solutions to counter those hazards. It is about managing

all levels of an organization and involves applying the principles

of total quality throughout and to all activities (HSE, 1991).

Finally, there is actually very little which is completely new in the

field of electrical safety. Most of the lessons have been

discovered many years ago, the problem is that each generation

of engineers needs to learn them and older engineers may need

to refresh their memories from time to time of the hazards and

the proper ways to do this: that is, if they ever knew these things

in the first place. There is a lot of material. We hope the following

chapters will at least assist some to discover the best and safest

ways to proceed.

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chapter 2 introduction to electrical safety

Documents