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Corporations: A Contemporary Approach Chapter 16 Public Shareholder Activism Slide 1 of 65 Fortune Magazine (Cover), “The Gray Art of Insider Trading” (Aug 1

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Chapter 25 Insider Trading. Insider trading basics What it is – classic / misappropriation Debate: pros and cons State law: ho-hum Majority rule: no fiduciary duty to shareholders “Special facts” rule Federal law: abstain or disclose Cady Roberts : fairness or equal access? - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Chapter 25 Insider Trading

Corporations:A Contemporary Approach

Chapter 16Public Shareholder Activism

Slide 1of 65 Fortune Magazine (Cover), “The Gray Art of Insider Trading” (Aug 13, 2013)

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Chapter 25Insider Trading

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Chapter 25Insider Trading

• Insider trading basics– What it is – classic / misappropriation– Debate: pros and cons

• State law: ho-hum– Majority rule: no fiduciary duty to shareholders– “Special facts” rule

• Federal law: abstain or disclose– Cady Roberts: fairness or equal access?– Chiarella: duty of trust and confidence– Dirks: (1) tipper breach + (2) tippee knows– O’Hagan: misappropriator “defrauds source”

• Specific issues – SEC rules– Rule 10b5-2: duty of “trust and confidence” defined– Rule 10b5-1: “state of mind” defined / trading plans

• § 16: Disgorgement of short-swing trading profits

Module VIII – Stock Trading

Citizen of world

Citizen of world

Law profession

Law profession

Corporate practice

Corporate practice

Bar examBar

exam

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Insider trading primer

(in 30 minutes)

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US Insider Trading

Story of Raja Rajaratnam• Curriculum vitae• Crime• Punishment

US law of “insider trading” • Duty to “source of information”• Breach of duty • Federal enforcement

Comparison to EU regulation• Definition: “inside information”• Categories of persons• Prohibition against “use”

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Story of Raj Rajaratnam

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Raj Rajaratnam

Personal

Born:  June 15, 1957 (Sri Lanka)

Married:  Asha Pabla (3 children) 

Education

U Sussex / Engineering 

MBA - Wharton / U Penn (1983)

Work experience

Loan officer:  Chase Manhattan

Analyst --> President: Needham & Co.

Founder & CEO, Galleon Group 

Director, Goldman Sachs

Investments

Personal net worth $1.8 B

Owns 50% of Sri Lankan stock market

Charity

$5 MM for 2004 Tsunami fund

$3.5 MM Tamils Rehabilitation (frozen)

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Guilty• 14 counts of insider

trading (conspiracy)• Age: 53 (married;

children 14-19)• 11 years in prison

(until July 2021)• $60 million in trading

gains• $150 million in civil

/criminal fines

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Some questions:

What is a hedge fund?

What was Raj’s crime?

How was he caught?

Why case brought as conspiracy?

Portfolio

Fund investors

Hedge fund[Galleon]

Public company

Public company

IBMIntel

Public company

Public company

Public company

McKinsey & Co

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US insider trading law

“Trading on basis of material,

non-public information”

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Classic Insider Trading

INSIDER

Company shareholders

Misappropriation(Outsider Trading)

Tippee Tippee

Trading violates “duty of trust/confidence”(Silence = fraud)Trading on tip is illegal when --

(1) Insider-tipper violates duty*(2) Tippee knows / reason to know

* improper benefit

Outside shareholders

Trading violates “duty to source”

Rule 10b5-2: Trading illegal when --• Confidentiality agreement• Confidentiality practice • Family member (functional)

Rule 10b5-1: specifies illegal state of mind when person trades “on the basis” of material, nonpublic information

• Person “aware” (“conscious knowledge”)• Not part of “pre-existing trading plan”

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Insider trading

Classic insider trading

Outsider trading(misappropriation)

Chiarella (US 1980)

Silence = fraud in face of “duty of trust or confidence”

Dirks (US 1982)

Illegal tipping = (1)tip breaches duty*

(2)know or reason to know*for personal benefit

O’Hagan (US 1996)

Misappropriation = fraud on source (duty)icw securities trading

Rule 10b5-2

Duty: agree confidentiality /business practice / family

Reg FD

Tell one analyst: tell public!

Securities fraudRule 10b-5:

Misstatements ofmaterial fact

Rule 10b5-1

Mind = awarenessPre-existing trading plan OK

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Purposes for Insider Trading Regulation

Provide“fairness”

Provide“fairness”

Assure mktintegrity

Assure mktintegrity

Reduce “cost of capital”

Reduce “cost of capital”

Protect“property”Protect“property”

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“Insider trading corrodes investor confidence. It undermines the integrity of the markets by tilting, unacceptably, the playing field in favor of those whose greed drives them to betray the duties and confidences they owe others.” Robert Khuzami

SEC enforcement director

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Sanctions for insider trading• Private enforcement

– Owner of information / traders– Trading gains /avoided losses– Private actions rarely brought

• SEC enforcement– Investigation (with NYSE)– Disgorgement of profits – Civil penalties (3X losses)

• Criminal enforcement– Department of Justice– Criminal fines (up to $5 MM)– Imprisonment (up to 20 years)

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SEC Insider Trading Enforcement Actions

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EU insider trading law

“[Specified persons] prohibited from using inside information [precise +

when revealed significant price effect]”

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“Use of inside info”

PERSON

Securities of issuer

“Use of inside info”

Tippee Tippee

Art 2: Possesses inside infoby virtue mgmt or capital

(or criminal activities)

Art 4: Prohibition of Art 2 and 3applies to others who know“inside information”

Securities of other issuer

Art 2: Possesses inside infoby virtue of employ, prof, duties

Art 4: Prohibition of Art 2 and 3applies to others who know“inside information”

Art 2: prohibits use of “inside info” by acquiring Financial info to which inside info relates

Art 3: Tipping prohibited

Art 3: Tipping prohibited

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Insider trading hypos

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End

Insider trading primer

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What is insider trading?

Good news, bad news

Outsider trading

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Insider trading

Corporation

Non-public, material information

Stock market

Insider

Buy from existing shareholders

Buy “call options” • option to buy stock at mkt (let’s say $25)• profit = new price (let’s say $35) less exercise price ($25)

Good news

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Insider trading

Corporation

Non-public, material information

Stock market

Insider

Sell to existing shareholders

Buy “put options” • option to sell stock at mkt (let’s say $25)• profit = exercise price ($25) minus new price (let’s say $15)

Bad news

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What is outsider trading …

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Outsider trading

Corporation

Non-public, material information(such as takeover plans by Corp)

Investors / shareholders

shareholders

Target Company

Good or bad news

Insider

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Good Thing Not a Good Thing

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Evaluate insider trading

Pros

• Sends “soft information” to markets – thus protecting proprietary info

• Encourages insiders to own company stock

• Compensates insiders for developing “good news”

Cons

• Unfair to those without information

• Discourages investors from entering market

• Adds to trading “spreads” in markets

• Constitutes theft of corporate intellectual property

• Distorts company disclosures as insiders manipulate company info

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State law …

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Goodwin v. Agassiz (Mass 1933)

Corporation

Secured options to land (geologist’s theory - leads to mineral strike)

Stock market / Goodwin

Agassiz & McNaughton

Buy from existing shareholder (impersonal market)

Good news

Fraud (tort of deceit)• Material

misrepresentation• Intentional (Def

aware of truth)• Reliance (Pl relies

reasonably)• Misrepresentation is

cause of loss• Damages

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Goodwin v. Agassiz (Mass 1933)

Corporation

Secured options to land (geologist’s theory - leads to mineral strike)

Stock market / Goodwin

Agassiz & McNaughton

Buy from existing shareholder (impersonal market)

Good news

Fiduciary duty (to shareholders)

• Majority rule – no duty in impersonal markets

• “Special facts” –personal dealings on the basis of highly material facts

• “Strict / Kansas” rule – face-to-face transaction, not necessarily special facts

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 "The contention that directors also

occupy a position of trustee toward individual stockholders in the corporation is plainly contrary to repeated decisions of this court [and other courts]"

 "Purchase and sales of stock dealt in on the stock exchange are commonly impersonal affairs.  An honest director would be in a difficult situation if he could neither buy nor sell on the stock exchange shares of stock in his corporation ..."

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts:

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Corporate recovery …

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Diamond v. Oreamuno (NY 1969)

“Bad news”Lower earnings

Investors / shareholders

Sell to new investors

Corporation

Non-public, material information(IBM puts squeeze on earnings)

Corporation

Non-public, material information(IBM puts squeeze on earnings)

Oreamuno / Gonzalez

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Corporate recovery

Arguments for:

• Distinguishes “good” companies from “bad” companies

• Agent can’t take from principal, even if principal not harmed

Arguments against:

• Recovery screwy:– Good news: Recovery

goes to non-trading Shs who held stock, not those who sold stock

– Bad news: Recovery goes to all Shs, does not fully compensate Shs who bought

• Possible multiple liability (see Rule 10b-5)

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Federal law of insider trading(duty to abstain or disclose)

Theory under Rule 10b-5

Chiarella: duty of trust and confidence

Dirks: tipper-tippee liability

O’Hagan: misappropriation liability

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Section 10(b) / Rule 10b-5

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Act § 10

It shall be unlawful for any person ...

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe

Fraud (tort of deceit)• Material misrepresentation• Intentional (defendant

aware of truth)• Reliance (plaintiff relies

reasonably)• Misrepresentation is cause

of loss• Damages

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Is silence fraudulent?

Conventional wisdom:• Must disclose latent, not patent,

defects. • Fiduciaries (confidential

relationship) must give full disclosure

But:• Unequal access to information not

significant factor • Courts over time less likely to

require disclosure!!

Krawiec (UNC-CH) & Zeiler (Georgetown) – 2004(466 contract cases / 200 years)

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Enter SEC …

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Cady Roberts (SEC 1961)“Bad news”

Curtiss-Wright

Non-public, material information(directors vote to cut dividends)

Investors / shareholders

Gintel (director)

Sell to new investors(sell short)

What is theory?

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Parity of information

We hold that Gintel’s conduct violated clause (3) [of Rule 10b-5] as a practice which operated as a fraud or deceit on the purchasers

If purchasers had available material information known by a selling insider, their investment judgment would be affected. Sales by an insider must await disclosure.

Gintel has been fined $3000 by the NYSE .. And the protection of investors will be served if Gintel is suspended from the NYSE for 20 days.

Chair WiIliam Cary(“race to bottom”)

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Enter Supreme Court …

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Chiarella v. US (US 1980)

Acquiror Inc

Non-public, material info(takeover plans)

Shareholders

shareholders

Target Company

Pandick Press

Chiarella

Insider

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Duty

"... silence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as fraud actionable under § 10(b) ... But such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.”

.... duty to disclose ... guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the shareholder's welfare before their own, will not benefit personally through fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information.

Justice Lewis Powell(corporate lawyer)

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Tipping …

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Dirks v. SEC (US 1983)

Equity Funding

Non-public, material information(massive accounting fraud)

Investors / shareholders

Dirks

Secrist

Clients dump stock

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Duty, again

... a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.

Whether the "tip" was a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty [depends on] whether ... the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit that will translate into future earnings.

Justice Lewis Powell(very influential)

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Some hypos …

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Hypos

Equity Funding

Non-public, material information(massive accounting fraud)

Investors / shareholders

Secrist

#1

Spouse

#2

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SEC v. Stewart (2003)

Imclone

Non-public, material information(FDA likely to disapprove drug)

Stock market

Martha Stewart

(at airport to Mx)

SamWachtal

(CEO)

#1

#2

#1#1

Faneuil(broker’s asst)

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Outsider Trading (Misappropriation)

“Fraud on source”? “in connection with” trading?Rule 10b5-2: Fiduciary relationship

Rule 10b5-1: Insider awareness

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Section 10(b) / Rule 10b-5

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Act § 10

It shall be unlawful for any person ...

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe

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Attorney O’Hagan’s indiscretions …

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US v. O’Hagan (US 1997)

Grand Met

Non-public, material info(plan to make tender offerto Pillsbury shareholders)

Shareholders

Shareholders

Pillsbury

Dorsey &Whitney

O’Hagan

Option sellers

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Duty to source

The "misappropriation theory" holds that a person commits fraud "in connection with" a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information. See Brief for United States 14. 

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg[civil rights lawyer]

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ICW trading

[The "in connection with the purchase or sale of [a] security"] element is satisfied because the fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities. The securities transaction and the breach of duty thus coincide.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg[civil rights lawyer]

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What is insider trading?

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“Insider trading”(in the United States)

– Classic insider trading: • Fraudulent silence under Section 10(b)• Duty of trust and confidence to “abstain or disclose”• Actionable silence in confidential relationships

– Tipping: • Tippee knows or should know that • Tipper breached duty for direct/indirect personal benefit• Necessary to extend prohibition

– Misappropriation (outsider trading):• Duty of trust and confidence to source • Fraud on source “in connection with” securities trading• Maintain integrity of securities markets

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SEC rules• Rule 10b5-1: state of mind when

trading “on the basis” of material, nonpublic information– “aware” (“conscious knowledge”)– Pre-existing trading plans OK

• Rule 10b5-2: duty to source in business/personal relations– Agree to maintain confidentiality– Practice of sharing known

confidences– Spouse, parent, child, sibling –

unless dysfunctional family

• Regulation FD: no special access for stock analysts

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Q&A: The In's and Out's of Insider Trading

The Wall Street Journal October 4, 2002

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Insider trading quiz

1. You work as CFO in Up-N-Rising, a bakery franchiser, that is opening high-end bakery shops throughout the country. The numbers have been good, until this month when you notice an internal report showing a 25% fall in royalties from pastry sales.

Question: You sell some of your stock. Insider trading?

1. Yes. This is classic insider trading.

• Only question is whether drop in pastry sales is “material”

• State of mind – use versus knowledge – resolved by Rule 10b5-1 (“aware”)

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Insider trading quiz

2. You are outside counsel to Up-N-Rising. The CFO at Up-N-Rising calls you and tells you about this quarter’s 25% fall in pastry sales - resulting in a 15% drop in earnings . She asks whether the company should disclose this in a press release. 

Question: You sell Up-N-Rising short. Insider trading?

2. Yes. You are temporary insider (see fn 14 - Dirks case) and owe a duty under 10b5-2.

• Drop in royalties is “material”

• Duty to source in business/ personal relation (Rule 10b5-2)

– Agree to maintain confidentiality

– Practice of sharing known confidences

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Insider trading quiz

3. You are a friend of Ralph, who you know is sales manager for Up-N-Rising. Ralph tells you that “something” is happening at the company and you might want to consider selling your Up-N-Rising holdings, if you have any. Ralph says no more. Question: You sell your Up-N-Rising stock? Insider trading?

3. Probably. You received a tip (duty to inquire).

• If “something” is material, nonpublic

• Elements of illegal tipping

– Breach of duty by tipper (personal benefit)

– Tippee knows or reason to know of violation

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Insider trading quiz

4. You are a member of a golf foursome. One of the foursome says, “I think something’s happening at Up-N-Rising. You’d probably do well to short it.” He says no more.

Question: You may no further inquiries and buy Up-N-Rising put options. Insider trading?

4. No. Probably no duty to inquire.

• Materiality: What does “something happening” mean?

• Awareness: – What are you aware of

with “something”?

– Who was the source of information?

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Insider trading quiz

Jeffrey Haas, a professor of securities law at New York Law School: “If not from a company insider, you’re probably stupid to just listen and trade on it” … “You don't have a duty to find out where it came from.“

Nancy Grunberg, former assistant director of SEC enforcement: "The SEC would want to know -- unless it was on a piece of paper that fell out of the sky -- whether you asked about the source of the information before you acted on it."

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Insider trading quiz

5. New scenario. You are the CFO of KK Donuts and have been cogitating on what to do with all the company’s extra cash. You talk with the company’s CEO and investment banker, who agree buying Up-N-Rising would be a good move. You begin to form a takeover team.

Question: You buy Up-N-Rising stock. Insider trading?

5. Yes – actually “outsider trading.” You cannot misappropriate your company’s info.

• “Material”• Duty to source• “Awareness”

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Insider trading quiz6. You are the spouse of the CFO of KK Donuts, who tells you that she will be out of town for the next few days. “We’re looking at buying Up-N-Rising.” You know that this is only going to complicate your life. You wish there were a silver lining.

Question: You buy Up-N-Rising stock. Insider trading?

6. Yes: both (1) tip and (2) duty

• Tipper personal benefit?– WSJ: “Prosecutors

have an easy time. Courts say it’s enough that person's reputation among colleagues enhanced for being good tipper.”

• Recipient had duty to source

– Rule 10b5-2: “duty” presumed in close family relations, unless no expectation of confidentiality

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Insider trading quiz

7. You are the head of strategic planning at KK Donuts. You are no fool. You figure that when KK Donuts announces it is acquiring Up-N-Rising, the stock prices of competitors of Up-N-Rising will likely fall. The Up-N-Rising acquisition is moving apace.

Question: You sell short the stock of Up-N-Rising’s competitors. Insider trading?

7. Well, maybe

• Clearly no duty to outside companies

• But perhaps duty to source?

– Current academic “state of art” issue

– What were source’s confidentiality expectations

– ECMH: trading in competitor affects target’s stock price

– Reach of insider trading prohibition?

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Insider trading quiz

8. You are an outside “public relations” consultant to KK Donuts. The company's CEO calls and tells you KK Donuts may be buying Up-N-Rising to expand into the high-end French bakery business. Given the current political climate, you are asked if this would be good for public relations. You have no confidentiality agreement.

Question: You buy Up-N-Rising stock. Insider trading?

8. Yes (probably)

Rule 10b5-2 • Defines duty to source• “Persons … have history,

pattern or practice of sharing confidential information … so recipient had reason to know communicator expected confidentiality.”

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Insider trading quiz

9. You are the founder KK Donuts. You hold about 40% of the company’s stock and want to diversify. Problem is if you sell, during this volatile expansion period, you will be accused of insider trading. You tell your broker to sell 1% every month over the next two years – reducing your KK position to 16%.

Question: You sell (under the plan) when you are aware of the Up-N-Rising deal. Insider trading?

What if you discontinue the plan?

9. Yes (if done right)

• Rule 10b5-1 (Martha Stewart defense)

– Pre-existing trading plan negates “awareness”

– Must show• Binding contract,

instruct another, written plan – when “unaware”

• Plan has specifics, formula, or disables

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Insider trading quiz

10. You are best friends with Karl Konners, founder and CEO of KK Donuts. You both use the same broker. This morning the broker called you and blurted, “Karl is selling. Karl is really selling.” You knew that KK Donuts was being investigated by the FDA over its products’ fat content. Question: You sell your KK Donuts holdings. Insider trading?

10. Yes (perhaps)

• Similar to facts of Martha Stewart – Imclone– Insiders selling -

“material” information?– Breach of duty by CEO

when “informed” broker– Sub-tippee knows or

should know

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Martha Stewart

The mere fact that insiders are selling, even heavily, isn't necessarily "material," or market-moving information (though nonpublic). But if it turns out that the sales truly are unique -- that the founders had never sold shares before, for example -- you may be courting trouble.

David M. Brodsky, head securities litigation,

Latham & Watkins, New York:

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Insider trading quiz

11. You are in a taxi on a rainy night in New York City. The driver stops to pick up two wet customers. “My gosh,” you think, “It’s Karl Konners, the head of KK Donuts.” Karl talks to his associate in animated whispers about the FDA dropping its fat-content investigation. “Great news for KK Donuts,” you tell yourself.

Question: You buy KK Donuts stock. Insider trading?

11. No.

• No breach of duty when KK talked to associate

• No duty of eavesdropper to source

– No misappropriation– No tipping

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Insider trading quiz

12. You are the head of investor relations of KK Donuts. You have been besieged by inquiries about rumors of an Up-N-Rising takeover. You talk to senior management and decide on a script: “KK Donuts is in preliminary talks with Up-N-Rising management.” And so on. You answer no questions.

Question: . You call three leading analysts of KK stock and read the script. Can you?

12. No

• Regulation FD (fair disclosure) – Addresses systematic

tipping to analysts and preferred analyst back-scratching

– Treated as form of insider trading

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Regulation FD (fair disclosure)

• “Advice” to market professionals of material nonpublic information– Intentional: simultaneous public disclosure– Unintentional: public disclosure within 24 hours– Applies to senior management, investor relations

• Exceptions:– Normal course of business– Government officials– Road shows when going public– Disclosure by foreign private issuers

• Enforcement only by SEC (no private action)

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Insider trading quiz(answers)

1. Yes

2. Yes3. Yes (inquire)

4. No (probably not inquire)

5. Yes

6. Yes

7. Maybe8. Yes (probably)

9. No (if done right)

10. Yes (perhaps)

11. No

12. No

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The end