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Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior

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Page 1: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Chapter 27

Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior

Page 2: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2

Introduction

The number of languages decreased by 40% during the past 10,000 years, even as the global population exploded.

This example, although based on language, helps us understand scarcity, positive market feedback, and network effects that exist in markets.

These concepts, in turn, help us understand oligopoly and strategic behavior.

Page 3: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-3

Learning Objectives

• Outline the fundamental characteristics of oligopoly

• Understand how to apply game theory to evaluate the pricing strategies of oligopolistic firms

• Explain the kinked demand theory of oligopolistic price rigidity

• Describe theories of how firms may deter market entry by potential rivals

• Illustrate why network effects and market feedback can explain why some industries are oligopolies

Page 4: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-4

Chapter Outline

• Oligopoly

• Strategic Behavior and Game Theory

• Price Rigidity and the Kinked Demand Curve

• Strategic Behavior with Implicit Collusion: A Model of Price Leadership

• Deterring Entry into an Industry

• Network Effects

• Comparing Market Structures

Page 5: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-5

Did You Know That...

• Only two private companies, AccuWeather and the Weather Channel, provide weather forecasts on a nationwide basis?

• In the microprocessor and defense industries, the top five firms account for about 80% of all sales?

• Similarly, the top three publishers of college textbooks generate well over 70% of all of the textbook sales?

Page 6: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-6

Oligopoly

• An important market structure that we have yet to discuss involves a situation in which a few large firms comprise an entire industry.

• They are not perfectly competitive, nor even monopolistically competitive, and because there are several of them a pure monopoly doesn’t exist.

Page 7: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-7

Oligopoly (cont'd)

• Oligopoly

A market situation in which there are very few sellers

Each seller knows that the other sellers will react to its changes in prices and quantities.

Page 8: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-8

Oligopoly (cont'd)

• Characteristics of oligopoly

Small number of firms

InterdependenceStrategic dependence

Page 9: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-9

Oligopoly (cont'd)

• Strategic Dependence

A situation in which one firm’s actions with respect to price, quality, advertising, and related changes may be strategically countered by the reactions of one or more other firms in the industry

Such dependence can exist only when there are a limited number of firms in an industry.

Page 10: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-10

Oligopoly (cont'd)

• Why oligopoly occurs

Economies of scale

Barriers to entry

MergersVertical mergers

Horizontal mergers

Page 11: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-11

Oligopoly (cont'd)

• Vertical Merger The joining of a firm with another to

which it sells an output or from which it buys an input

• Horizontal Merger The joining of firms that are producing or

selling a similar product

Page 12: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-12

Oligopoly (cont'd)

• Measuring industry concentration

Concentration RatioThe percentage of all sales contributed

by the leading four or leading eight firms in an industry

Sometimes called the industry concentration ratio

Page 13: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-13

Table 27-1 Computing the Four-Firm Concentration Ratio

Page 14: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-14

Table 27-2 Four-Firm Domestic Concentration Ratios for Selected U.S. Industries

Page 15: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-15

E-Commerce Example: Market Concentration in the Computer Printer Industry

• The computer printer industry generated $50 billion in revenues in a recent year, and four firms had a high market share.

• Of the four: Hewlett-Packard earned $24 billion, Lexmark $9.7 billion, Dell $6.9 billion and Epson $5.2 billion.

• These figures imply a concentration ratio of 91.6%. Thus, the printer industry is very concentrated.

Page 16: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-16

Oligopoly, Inefficiency, and Resource Allocation

• To the extent oligopolists have market power—the ability to individually affect the market price for the industry’s output—they lead to resource misallocations, just as monopolies do.

• But if oligopolies occur because of economies of scale, consumers might actually end up paying lower prices.

• All in all, there is no definite evidence of serious resource misallocation in the United States because of oligopolies.

Page 17: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-17

Oligopoly, Inefficiency, and Resource Allocation (cont'd)

• The more U.S. firms face competition from the rest of the world, the less any current oligopoly will be able to exercise market power.

Page 18: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-18

Strategic Behavior and Game Theory

• Explaining the pricing and output behavior of oligopoly markets

Reaction Function

The manner in which one oligopolist reacts to a change in price, output, or quality made by another oligopolist in the industry

Page 19: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-19

Strategic Behavior and Game Theory (cont'd)

• Game Theory A way of describing the various possible

outcomes in any situation involving two or more interacting individuals when those individuals are aware of the interactive nature of their situation and plan accordingly

The plans made by these individuals are known as game strategies.

Page 20: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-20

Strategic Behavior and Game Theory (cont'd)

• Cooperative Game

A game in which the players explicitly cooperate to make themselves better off

Firms collude for higher than competitive rates of return

• Noncooperative Game

A game in which the players neither negotiate nor cooperate in any way

Relatively few firms with some ability to change price

Page 21: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-21

Strategic Behavior and Game Theory (cont'd)

• Zero-Sum Game

A game in which any gains within the group are exactly offset by equal losses by the end of the game

Page 22: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-22

Strategic Behavior and Game Theory (cont'd)

• Negative-Sum Game A game in which players as a group lose at

the end of the game

• Positive-Sum Game A game in which players as a group are

better off at the end of the game

Page 23: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-23

Strategic Behavior and Game Theory (cont'd)

• Strategies in noncooperative games

StrategyAny rule that is used to make a choice such as

“always pick heads”

Dominant StrategiesStrategies that always yield the highest benefit

Page 24: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-24

Example: The Prisoners’ Dilemma

• Two people involved in a bank robbery are caught.

• What should they do when questioned by police?

• The result has been called the prisoners’ dilemma.

Page 25: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-25

Example: The Prisoners’ Dilemma (cont'd)

• The two are interrogated separately and their interrogator indicates the following:

1. If both confess, they each get five years in jail for the crime.

2. If neither confesses, they each get two years based on a lesser charge.

3. If only one confesses, that person will go free, but the other receives ten years.

Page 26: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-26

Example: The Prisoners’ Dilemma (cont'd)

• Question

What would you do in this situation, keeping in mind no cooperation is involved between Sam and Carol?

Page 27: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-27

Example: The Prisoners’ Dilemma (cont'd)

• The prisoners’ alternatives are shown in a payoff matrix. There are four possibilities:

1. Both confess.

2. Neither confesses.

3. Sam confesses; Carol doesn’t.

4. Carol confesses; Sam doesn’t.

Page 28: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-28

Figure 27-1 The Prisoners’ Dilemma Payoff Matrix

Page 29: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

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The Prisoners’ Dilemma Payoff Matrix

• Regardless of what the other prisoner does, each person is better off if she or he confesses.

• So confessing is the dominant strategy, and each ends up behind bars for five years.

Page 30: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-30

Strategic Behavior and Game Theory (cont'd)

• Applying game theory to pricing strategies

Would you choose a high price or a low price?

Remember No collusion

Page 31: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-31

Figure 27-2 Game Theory and Pricing Strategies

Page 32: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

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Strategic Behavior and Game Theory (cont'd)

• Opportunistic Behavior Actions that, because long-run benefits of

cooperation are perceived to be smaller, focus on short-run gains

An example might be writing a check that you know will bounce.

Implies a noncooperative game which is not realistic—we make repeat transactions

Page 33: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-33

Strategic Behavior and Game Theory (cont'd)

• Tit-for-Tat Strategic Behavior

In game theory, cooperation that continues so long as the other players continue to cooperate

Page 34: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-34

Price Rigidity and the Kinked Demand Curve

• Let’s hypothesize decision makers in an oligopolistic firm assume rivals will react in the following way:

They will match price decreases (in order not to be undersold)

But not price increases (because they want to capture more business)

Page 35: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-35

Figure 27-3 The Kinked Demand Curve, Panel (a)

•d1 is relatively elastic

•If one firm raises its price, the others will not and it will lose market share

•d2 is relatively inelastic

•If one firm lowers its price, the others lower their price so gain in sales is small

Page 36: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-36

Figure 27-3 The Kinked Demand Curve, Panel (b)

The kinked demand curve indicates the possibility of price rigidity

Page 37: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

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Figure 27-4 Changes in Cost May Not Alter the Profit-Maximizing Price and Output

Changes in cost do not impact output and prices as long as MC remains in the vertical portion of MR

Page 38: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-38

Price Rigidity and the Kinked Demand Curve (cont'd)

• Criticisms of the kinked demand curve

Oligopoly prices do not appear to be as rigid, particularly in an upward direction, as the kinked demand curve implies.

During the 1970s and 1980s, when prices were rising overall, oligopolistic producers increased prices frequently.

Page 39: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-39

Strategic Behavior with Implicit Collusion: A Model of Price Leadership

• Price Leadership

A practice in many oligopolistic industries in which the largest firm publishes its price list ahead of its competitors, who then match those announced prices

Also called parallel pricing

Page 40: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-40

Strategic Behavior with Implicit Collusion: A Model of Price Leadership (cont'd)

• Price War

A pricing campaign designed to drive competing firms out of a market by repeatedly cutting prices

Page 41: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-41

Strategic Behavior with Implicit Collusion: A Model of Price Leadership (cont'd)

• Markets where price wars are common

Cigarettes

Long-distance telephone companies

Airlines

Page 42: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-42

Strategic Behavior with Implicit Collusion: A Model of Price Leadership (cont'd)

• Markets where price wars are common

Diapers

Frozen foods

PC hardware and software

Page 43: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-43

Deterring Entry Into an Industry

• Entry Deterrence Strategy

Any strategy undertaken by firms in an industry, either individually or together, with the intent or effect of raising the cost of entry into the industry by a new firm

Page 44: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-44

Deterring Entry Into an Industry (cont'd)

• Increasing entry cost

Threat of price wars

Government regulationsEnvironmental regulation

Safety standards

Page 45: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-45

Deterring Entry Into an Industry (cont'd)

• Limit-Pricing Model

A model that hypothesizes that a group of colluding sellers will set the highest common price they believe they can charge, without new firms seeking to enter the industry in search of relatively high profits

Page 46: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-46

Example: Switching Costs Keep the HDTV Market on a Dim Setting

• Consumers are not the only ones who face switching costs in the market for HDTVs.

• Indeed, the complications that consumers face arise in part from the fact producers have also been struggling with switching costs of their own.

Page 47: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-47

Example: Switching Costs Keep the HDTV Market on a Dim Setting (cont'd)

• The substantial switching costs have slowed sales in the market for HDTVs.

• At present, sales of HDTVs account for only slightly more than 10% of total television sales.

Page 48: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-48

Network Effects

• Network Effect

A situation in which a consumer’s willingness to purchase a good or service is influenced by how many others also buy or have bought the item

Page 49: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-49

Network Effects (cont'd)

• Positive Market Feedback Potential for a network effect to arise when

an industry’s product catches on

• Negative Market Feedback The tendency for industry sales to spiral

downward rapidly when the product falls out of favor

Page 50: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-50

E-Commerce Example: Jumping on the “i” Bandwagon

• Apple simultaneously developed iTunes and the iPod knowing something about market economics.

• A key feature that helped iTunes catch on with consumers is its ability to store audio data in binary format.

• Positive market feedback and network effects have boosted Apple’s market share in music downloads to 70%, and digital music players to 60% of the industry.

Page 51: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

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Network Effects and Industry Concentration

• In some industries, a few firms can potentially reap most of the benefits of positive market feedback.

• There is a network effect present in the online auction industry, in which eBay, Amazon and Yahoo account for more than 80% of sales.

• When a small number of firms secure the bulk of payoffs resulting from positive market feedback, oligopoly is likely to emerge as the prevailing market structure.

Page 52: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

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Comparing Market Structures

• We have looked at perfect competition, pure monopoly, monopolistic competition and oligopoly.

• We are in a position to compare the attributes of these four different market structures.

Page 53: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

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Table 27-3 Comparing Market Structures

Page 54: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

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Issues and Applications: The Network Effects of Languages

• The use of language is a classic situation in which network effects apply.

• Network effects can generate both positive and negative market feedback.

• Half of the world’s population uses ten languages as a first or second language.

Page 55: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

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Figure 27-5 The Top Ten Languages Used as First or Second Languages

Page 56: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-56

Summary Discussion of Learning Objectives

• The fundamental characteristics of oligopoly Economies of scale

Barriers to entry

Strategic dependence

• Applying game theory to evaluate the pricing strategies of oligopolistic firms Game theory looks at competition for payoffs

Depends on the strategies that others employ

Page 57: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-57

Summary Discussion of Learning Objectives (cont'd)

• The kinked demand theory of oligopolistic price rigidity If a firm believes that rivals will follow price cuts

but not price increases, it will be reluctant to change price.

• How firms may deter market entry by potential rivals Raise entry costs Limit pricing Switching policies

Page 58: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-58

Summary Discussion of Learning Objectives (cont'd)

• Why network effects and market feedback encourage oligopoly

Network effects arise when a consumer’s demand for a good or service is affected by how many other consumers also use the item.

Oligopoly can arise because a handful of firms may be able to capture all of the positive market feedback.

Page 59: Chapter 27 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved. 27-2 Introduction The number of languages decreased

End of Chapter 27

Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior