CHAPTER-I

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: BRIEF HISTORICAL ACCOUNT

CHAPTER-I

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: BRIEF HISTORICAL ACCOUNT

1. 1. Introduction

The role of the United States as the primary military, economIC, and diplomatic

supporter of Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the most contentious issue in

the Islamic World. West Asia has remained one of the top diplomatic priorities for the

United States since the second half of the twentieth century, devoting and spending

tremendous resources in the region. Economically, it has provided maximum aid to

the region (mainly to Israel) than any other in the world.

The political order in West Asia has been by and large shaped to America's

interests. The US is seen as having its own interests in playing active mediatory role

owing to its deliberate concerns. These include security of oil supplies from the

region; commitment to protect Israel's security and prosperity the US-Israeli 'special

relationship' as a strategic ally. The factors behind this relationship were significant in

terms of diplomacy, aid, arms supply as well as strategic consideration.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a direct outgrowth of the World War II and

the Holocaust, to which the Jews were subjected and a responsible largely of the

national reawakening for Jews around the globe. The decisive juncture in this conflict

was the year 1948, when the Zionist movement won the war and established the State

of Israel. This fulfillment of the Zionist aspiration came about at the expens~~ of the

Palestinian people, for whom the same date is remembered as 'al-Nakba' or the

catastrophe.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is among the most longstanding and intractable

conflict of the modern era. The Arab-Israeli conflict has spawned more episodes of

violence than any other enduring conflict in the post-World War II era. Over the past

half-century this conflict has regularly given rise to violence, communal unrest,

border encounters and wars. It began at the end of the nineteenth century as a struggle

between two national movements, the Zionist and the Palestinian, with competing

claims over the same territory.

During the 1948 War, some 750,000 Palestinians lost their homes and

became refugees; the Palestinians then found themselves divided between those who

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had remained in Israel and those who were now outside Israel.I That moment was a

turning point for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, fragmenting it into two passages.

First was the external conflict led by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)

which, since the early 1960's, fought for the Palestinians' right to self-determination

and the right to return to their homeland. In the late 1990's, they appeared to be on

their way to eventual resolution with the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside

the State of Israel. Unfortunately, the peace process failed to accomplish its goal.

These issues are at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian agenda. The second passage was

the internal conflict, which involved those Palestinians who remained within the State

of Israel and were transformed almost literally overnight from a majority controlling

most of the land and resources of an extensive territory to a small minority,

dispossessed of most of its land, completely deprived of national rights, and broadly

discriminated against in terms of civil rights.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict provides distinct opportunity to examine a host

of concepts important to the understanding of West Asia politics more generally.

These concepts include national identity and self-determination, the plight of

Palestine refugees, the relative importance of international organisations such as the

United Nations in dealing with complicated conflicts, big power intervention, diverse

forms of radicalism, and violent and non-violent conflict resolution. Given the

theoretical and political significance of these issues, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is

among the most researched topic across academic disciplines as well as in applied

settings. It also receives regular and prominent coverage in mass media.

This conflict played a central role not only in the daily lives of the people

throughout West Asia but also in the lives of Palestinians and Jews living outside

Israel and the 'Occupied Palestinian Territories' many of whom see their existence as

inseparable from political developments in the region. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict

has shaped the lives of at least ihr~t: gt:nerations of both israelis and Palestinians.

I Benny Morris (1989), The Birth of the Palestine Refugee Problem 1947-1949, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2

Map 1.1 West Asia and East Asia

Source: http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/septemberll/images/neareast.jpg.

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1.1.2. Theoretical Framework

There are frequent and persistent -conflicts In the world affairs. Contemporary

international politics is mostly concerned with conflicts and peacemaking. Conflict

occurs at many different levels such as inter-persona~ inter-group or inter-state

disagreement. It is also caused by a clash of cultures, ideological differences, interest

or communal hatred. The situation of incompatibility may arise when the parties are

competing for the same prize such as government office, territory or raw materials.

Political scientists and scholars of international relations have centred their works on

political and international conflicts and peacemaking? A conflict situation usually

arises between parties who perceive that they possess mutually incompatible

objectives. International conflict is undoubtedly one of the most crucial of all the

forms of conflicts, because it could threaten the very existence of the whole

international system. In the light of various types of conflict there are varIOUS

theoretical approaches to the understanding of conflict and peacemaking.

Conflict management and resolution means the transformation of relationship

between conflicting parties by bringing a problem into a form of solution. More often,

the term peacemaking is associated with conflict resolution without the use of

violence. Peace can also mean coexistence of different cultures and societies to be

obtained by improved communication with others, common understanding and ability

to tolerate one another. Since violent conflicts are dreadfully destructive and costly,

peaceful settlement is the best option to handle them. The most obvious form of

violence is an act to do physical harm to other people. In peaceful settlement,

importance is placed on refraining from threat or use of force. It is opposed to

coercive intervention. Jacob Bercovitch has identified three methods of conflict

management: violence and coercion; bargaining and negotiation; the involvement of

third parties in mediation or arbitration or good offices. 3

Numerous examples of third party assisted negotiation exist in both modem

and ancient social settings. In primitive societies, tribal elders mediated differences

between their community members. The third party intervenes when inter-personal

and inter-group negotiations break down in any kind of conflict or deadlock. The

main tools of a third party to intervene in a conflict are through mediation, facilitation

and arbitration. Through mediation the third party aids the disputants in reaching an

2 Raimo Vayrynen (1991), New Directions in the Conflict Theory, London: Sage Publications p.26. 3 Jacob Bercovitch (1984), Social Conflicts and Third Parties, Colorado: Westview Press, p.l.

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agreement. The function of a mediator is to attempt to establish, or re-establish,

sufficiently good communications between conflicting parties, so that they can talk

sensibly to each other. It suggests solutions without any decision making power.

Through negotiation, the disputants voluntarily abdicate their own decision making

power in favour of the arbitrator.

Mediation is not aimed at helping one party but bringing about mutual

agreements. It has been widely seen as an alternative to violence.4 In principle, third

parties keep confidentiality in delivering intentions, bring the reassurance of mutual

sincerity, and do not advocate particular outcomes. Since the goal is not to help one

party win, the process is geared toward encouraging the parties to accept

compromised solutions. The trust of both sides can be gained by the impartiality of an

intermediary. Maintaining an attitude of impartiality throughout is expected to ensure

that all parties show confidence in the process. Neutrality can be achieved by not

taking sides. However, being neutral does not necessarily mean a lack of care or

interest in the fair outcome.

By the end of the nineteenth century, mediation had become the most

important way of settling international conflicts. Good offices can be used if the

conflicting parties wanted to avoid direct contact despite the need to resolve serious

disputes. Various types of peaceful settlements can be found throughout history. The

twentieth century has shown a growing awareness and institutionalisation of conflict

management and peace building processes. Chapter VI of the UN Charter calls for

peaceful settlement of disputes through the use of a wide range of methods, including

negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement.s

In international mediation, a third party can be a national government,

international organisations, or private intermediaries. Ideally, third parties should not

have a direct interest in the disputed issues. However, the involvement of the United

States in West Asia peacemaking seemed to derive from the influence of domestic

constituencies and geo-strategic interests. The thesis focuses on the United States'

role in the Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking as a third party mediator. The US as a third

party has been immensely involved in a series of mediation and facilitation through its

good offices, assisting the conflicting parties to reach an agreement in this conflict.

4 Ho-Won Jeong (2000), Peace and Conflict Studies, Burlington: Ashgate, p.180. 5 UN Charter Chapter VI Pacific Settlement of Disputes, [Online: web] Accessed on 18 October 2007

URL: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter6.htm.

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Despite numerous drawbacks, the US seems to be in stronger position to facilitate the

peace process than any other third party involvement. Moreover, the parameters

involving peacemaking and its strategic interests in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are

momentous in the field of conflict management and peacemaking.

1.1.3. The AI-Aqsa Intifada and its Impact

After the failure of the Camp David talks, both the Israelis and the Palestinians lost

their faith about the prospects of the Oslo peace process. Consequently, under

different and much more complicated circumstances, the conflict had arisen to a new

height of bloodshed and destruction in the form of the al-Aqsa intifada. The outbreak

of the al-Aqsa intifada which started on 28 September 2000 brought a new phase in

the history of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The threat perception of Israel has been

drastically intensified when range of Palestinian militants carried out wide-ranging

acts of extremism in the form of suicide bombing. The events of 9/11 altered US

perception regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. President George W. Bush

directed the State Department to include Bamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front

for the Liberation of Palestine to the US list of terrorist organisations. As the al-Aqsa

intifada was raging, the US alleged that Palestinian organisations were engaged in an

organised, systematic, and deliberate campaign of terror, aimed at inflicting casualties

upon the Israeli population. It demanded the P A to dismantle terrorist infrastructures

and threatened to cut off aid to the Palestinians.

Palestinians further demonstrated their frustration at the lack of progress in the

peace process and their failure to achieve statehood. There were several incidents of

suicide attacks, primarily targeting civilians in busy streets, cafes and hotels. In

response, the Israeli Defense Forces (lDF) adopted a wide range of deliberate and

coercive counter measures to curb Palestinian militancy. Since 29 September 2000,

Israel Defense Forces (lDF) and the Palestinians have been engaged in violent

confrontation.

Despite various allegations, the al-Aqsa intifada was not planned or shaped as

part of the policy of one side or the other. The al-Aqsa intifada was primarily a

reaction to Israeli and the US attempt to impose unacceptable permanent-status

settlement on the Palestinians and force them to concede on two major issues:

Jerusalem including control of Haram al Sharif and the refugee problem. Although the

uprising was directed primarily at Israel, it was also directed against the Fatah

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dominated Palestinian Authority and its failure to establish a viable state institution

engaged in a process of national reform and reconstruction and democratic practice.

The launch of the US 'war on terror' to encouraged Israel to step up its army

assaults on P A targets and ultimately reoccupied six major Palestinian cities.

Furthermore, the failure of Bush administration in solving the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict through its peace plans led to more violence. The resumption of violent

conflict brought the most fragile peace related activities to a virtual standstill. The

demise of the Oslo process was seen as the failure of the peace movement in its

entirety. The occupation of Palestinian territories, with Israeli settlement constructions

and colonial policing undermined not only the future Palestinian state but also Israel's

democratic ideals. The IDF inflicted severe damage on Palestinian governmental and

civilian infrastructures but far worse was the damage done to the idea of a "partner".

As a result of this uprising Israel was confronted with one of the worst security threats

in its history and several measures were taken to counter the uprising. Despite these

setbacks, the United States sponsored a peace talk at the Sharm aI-Sheikh in October

2000.

1.1.4. Clinton Diplomacy and its Setbacks

The US devoted remarkable energy and resources to the Israeli-Palestinian peace

process during the tenure of President Bill Clinton. Clinton invited Israeli and the

Palestinian leaders to Camp David as part of the persistent effort to bridge the

substantial gaps that existed between them. The unequivocal Palestinian rejection of

the American proposals at Camp David in July 2000 upset Clinton's calculations.

Though President Clinton listened with great attention and understanding to the

Palestinian viewpoints, he was restrained by America's known foreign policy stance

supporting Israel. The Camp David summit showed clearly that the peace envisioned

by Palestinians was not the peace Israel was prepared to offer. The positions of the

parties on the key issues reflected wide differences. Clinton avoided taking stand on

many of the most controversial issues such as refugees, borders, and security, urging

the parties to strike a deal between themselves. Nevertheless Clinton's role at Camp

David was unmistakable and both the negotiating parties seemed to have a degree of

confidence in him.

Although they were unable to resolve crucial differences the Camp David

constituted a concrete basis for future negotiations. It created a favourable

environment where each side for the fIrst time got a glimpse of the other's bottom line.

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Camp David provided the palestinians an opportunity to present their version and

positions directly to the American President whereby the US understood the limits of

the Palestinian positions. Despite the failure of the summit, it certainly transformed

the character of the peace process.

Clinton proposals of December 2000, addressed the most contentious issues

such as Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem, security, and end ofthe conflict. But it failed

to satisfY the conditions required for a permanent peace. Clinton could not do much in

bringing the sides together for a comprehensive final status agreement. He hardly had

three weeks from leaving his office when he met Arafat in January 2001. As a result,

sufficient progress could not be made in the peacemaking. He could bring the

conflicting parties to the threshold of peace, but at that crucial moment, the untoward

violence that erupted in the late September 2000, destroyed much of what had been

achieved in the previous years. Although Clinton declared that he was committed to

reaching an agreement between Barak and Arafat in the waning days of his

administration, neither Barak nor Arafat was able to end the crisis on mutually

acceptable terms. Consequently, Clinton's credibility as a mediator was not sufficient

to bridge the differences. Certain factors constrained his peace initiatives. Pressure

from the US Congress was a problem for him. The Republicans controlled both

houses, and pro-Israeli resolutions regularly commanded near unanimous support in

the Senate and the House of Representatives. Moreover, President Clinton had his

own calculations and restraints- America's known foreign policy stance of supporting

Israel.

1.1.5.9111 Impact on the Bush Administration

Initially, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained peripheral for the Bush

administration. It assumed that the American interests in the region were threatened

much more by Iraq than by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its approach to the conflict

was to stabilise the situation so that it could move on with plans to overthrow the

Saddam Hussein regime. Meanwhile, the US pressed Israel to take steps for ceasefrre

talks, and pressurised the Palestinian Authority to undertake reforms and stop

violence. He demanded from the Palestinians to change their leadership, reform their

institutions and 'fight terror' before they could come to the negotiating table.

However, there has been a considerable shift in the US policy towards the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict after 9/11. Bush administration designated the al-Aqsa

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Martyrs Brigades, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine as "Foreign Terrorist Organisations." The US demanded the P A to dismantle

terrorist infrastructures and threatened to cut off aid to the Palestinians. The Bush

administration made terrorism as the prime focus in its foreign policy approach

towards West Asia rather than on Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. The

Israeli occupation and subsequent US support to it has consequently fuelled much of

the anger and frustration that has driven Islamic groups to support terrorism and

extremist ideologies.

Since 9/11, the Israeli 1aw- enforcement authorities worked closely with their

American counterparts to track and tackle West Asian terrorism and continued to play

significant role in containing radicals, be it Islamic or secular. Arafat was seen as part

of the problem. The US incorporated in its defence posture the principle of pre­

emption. As a result it abandoned or downgraded traditional tools of diplomacy but

concentrated on the strategy of military pre-emption as the means of establishing a

peaceful, democratic, and durable world order. Its national interest in the region is

perceived to be best served by replacing Islamist expansionism with the promotion of

liberal democratisation across the region- even if this means direct military

intervention to achieve regirnechange and impose democracy from above.

Successive US administrations tried to remain an active partner in the Arab­

Israeli peace process to make existence of Israel acceptable to Arab governments. But

of late, peace process has been used as a method to deter terrorism. Even after the

9111, the US continued to take action on the Israeli-Palestinian situation only when

necessary to protect other policy goals. The September 11 attacks placed the US in a

sticky situation: Bush's "war on terror" required at least tacit support from the Arab

and Muslim states, but these states viewed Israeli actions against the Palestinians as

state terrorism. They were reluctant to legitimise the US military action against Bin

Laden and Taliban unless the US made efforts to restrain in Israel.

George Bush outlined his policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on 24

June 2002. it included: two states, living side-by-side, in peace and security;

provisional Palestinian statehood based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and

338. However, there was considerable scepticism on the dubious concepts of

"provisional statehood" and "how the Palestinians could be expected to carry out

elections or reform themselves while in a totallockdown by the Israeli military."

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The Quartet decided to adopt the Bush vision as the basis for a phased

programme to stop the cycle of violence and terror and settle the israeli-Palestinian

conflict by peaceful means and thus launched its roadmap for peace in 2002. The

roadmap, for the ftrst time had included a global commitment that had a genuine

third-party participation to provide verification and accountability. However, the

roadmap, practically speaking, had been dead since the Israeli government posed its

fourteen-point reservations, of which the US administration had accepted twelve.

Bush's endorsement of Sharon's unilateral 'disengagement plan' in April

2004, marked a major shift from traditional US policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict, reflecting a dramatic departure from the formal policy positions of all

previous administrations and from the UN Resolution 242. The administration

directive was issued by Secretary of State Colin Powell to his subordinates that they

were no longer to use the term "peace process"- a term that was particularly current in

the vocabulary of the Clinton administration. The post of "Special Middle East

Coordinator" was abolished, the term "peace process" was discarded, and the conduct

of the State Department's West Asia policy shifted back to the "Bureau of Near

Eastern Affairs".

The administration's antipathy towards Arafat and its obsession with terrorism

blinded it from the outset to the true root cause of the conflict. There were strong

domestic political pressures on him, specially the influence highly ideological group

of pro-Israeli policy analysts. President Bush and his policymaking team have been

almost totally uninterested in any serious effort to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli

conflict. The above argument suggests that the Bush administration had

fundamentally undermined the negotiating power of the Palestinians, who were not

even consuhed, while formally stating its sympathy for Israeli claims.

1.1.6. Peace Process Constraints

Palestinian Authority as a governing authority failed to protect its population against

abuse. It could not defend its people against the most damaging politics of the

occupation regime. The PA became synonymous with corruption and tyranny. Fatah

activists thus entered the scene from this angle, i.e., challenging the Authority's

credibility as a revolutionary force. The Palestinians feared that internal struggle

would degenerate into bloody civil war.

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The existence of extremist elements among Israelis and the Palestinians

thwarted the peace process and that created potential constraints to a peaceful

settlement. The US mediation attempts had been overshadowed by the escalating

violence between the two. Hamas was successful in significantly damaging the Oslo

Accords. Fatah's use of suicide bombing during the time of the al-Aqsa intifada was

the last nail in the coffm of the Oslo Accords. The situation undoubtedly hardened

positions on both sides with the extremists in both Israel and the Occupied Palestinian

Territories claiming all of historic Palestine.

Sharon took a hard-line attitude toward Palestine, when he came to power,

causing the confrontation to be more intensified. His visit to the Temple Mount

sparked the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada. Lack of faith in any Palestinian

partnership drove Sharon's decision to disengage from Gaza unilaterally, without any

coordination's with the Palestinians. Throughout he maintained a close and effective

relationship with Bush administration.

The international consensus for peace III West Asia has involved the

withdrawal of Israeli forces to internationally recognised (pre-June 1967) boundaries

in return for security guarantees from Israel's neighbours, the establishment of a

Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a shared Jerusalem as the co­

capital of both states, and a just resolution for the Palestinian refugees. President

Clinton toward the end of his presidency and President Bush in a more direct way in

2001 declared that the United States would support a Palestinian state in parts of West

Bank and Gaza Strip. However, both administrations made clear that the US would

not support anything beyond the very limited sovereignty and severely circumscribed

boundaries that the Israeli occupiers were willing to offer.

The American factors is evident as the popular American notion views Israel

as a democratic struggling COlLl1try and the only US ally in West Asia threatened by

the fanaticism of terrorism. The Jewish lobby continues to contribute substantially to

the existence of a special relationship between America and Israel. It was mostly

because of the United States support the Israel as a Jewish state could survive and

extend its territories at the expense of the Arab neighbours. It is the American help­

military, financial, and diplomatic, which sustained Israel and indeed strengthened her

to the extent of waging very costly wars. The US continued to fmd strategic relevance

of Israel even after the disintegration of Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

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The proactive role in the peace process seemed vital for constant strategic interests of .

the US in the region.

Relations between Jews and Palestinians in Israel have not been the same

since the al-Aqsa intifada. The fracture could not be mended without a security

guarantee to the Israelis and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

There could be no comprehensive solution to the Palestinian Israeli conflict without

resolving one of its key comJ?onents: the plight of the Palestinian refugees.

The Palestinians alleged that America's support made the Israelis arrogant and

less concerned about criticisms against Israel in the international forums. There was

no evidence that indicated the P A or the majority of Palestinians abandoned the two­

state solution. However, the two-state theory is seriously threatened by the

construction of Israeli settlements and by-pass roads in the Occupied Palestinian

Territories aimed at incorporating into Israel. Without a stop to such construction, a

two-state solution will simply be impossible to implement and ultimately the call for

peace in the region will remain illusive.

1.2. Concise Historical Background

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be fully understood without the knowledge of

an early history of Palestine. The claims of the parties to the conflict between the Jews

and the Palestinians are rooted deeply in the early history. Therefore, it is essential to

examine their respective associations with Palestine as well as the events that went

into the making of the Palestine problem before it exploded in 1948.

Although history, particularly the Holy Bible, mentions the existence of

several groups of people in ancient Palestine, only three groups playa leading role so

as to have a lasting impact on it- Canaanites, Philistines, and Israelites. The

Palestinians are the descendants of the Canaanites and the Philistines; meanwhile the

Canaanites were the earliest known inhabitants of Palestine and are thought to have

settled there after 3000 B.C. The early inhabitants were semi-nomadic tribes, however

about the twentieth century B.C. The Canaanites began to settle in the coastal plain

along the Mediterranean Sea. They buih villages and developed their own cuhure.6

In the Holy Bible, the country is called 'the Land of Canaan' (Numbers 34:2,

Joshua 5: 12) or 'the country of Canaanites' (Exodus; 3: 17). Among their cities was

Salem inhabited by Jebusites tribe of Canaanite, and was invaded by King David the

6 Henry Cattan (1970), Palestine the Arabs & Israel, London: Longman group, pp.2-9.

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Israelite during 1000 B.c. who renamed it Jerusalem or 'Zion the City of David.'

"The Philistines and the Israelites came to the land of Canaan almost

contemporaneously with each other in the later part of the second millennium B.C."7

According to the prevalent tradition, the common ancestor of the Jews and the Arabs

was Abram who is also known as Abraham (meaning father of many nations) and

originated from Ur the land of the Chaldeans while eventually settling in Haran. In

one encounter with God, God made a Covenant with Abraham saying: "Leave your

country, your people and your father's household and go to the land I will show you. I

will make you into a great nation and I will bless you; I will make your name great,

and you will be a blessing," (Genesis 12:1-2, NIV Bible).

The specific and precise separation of the Jews from the Arabs occurred

supposedly through the two sons of Abraham- Ishmael and Isaac. 8 Ishmael, his first

son born of his second wife Haggar, an Egyptian maidservant was specifically

dispossessed of this covenant. God is quoted by Jewish historians as having specified

that Abraham's second son Isaac born to his first wife Sarah, would inherit the

covenant. The rapacious, bitter and grasping Sarah caused Abraham literally to force

out Haggar and Ishmael into the desert, admonishing Abraham, "Get rid of that slave

woman and her son, for that slave woman's son will never share in the inheritance

with my son Isaac" (Genesis; 21:10, NIV). The account of subsequent lack of concern

for Ishmael, despite Abraham's intercession with God on his first son's behalf is

summarised in Genesis 17:18, and 17:20. Nevertheless, Ishmael known to be the

father of the Arab race was blessed and made fruitful. Indeed God is quoted as

promising, "I will the son (Ishmael) of your maid-servant into a nation also, because

he is your offspring" (Genesis 21:13).

Even the brief philosophical-theological inquiry into the mystery of Ishmael

and Isaac revealed an irresistihle and indeed a remarkable significance of the bitter

rivalry between the two offspring of Abraham. After entry into Canaan, the

Abrahamic clan of Israelites continued with its nomadic ways and during one specific

famine, they entered Egypt to save their lives. Four centuries later the colossal

exodus of Israelites from Egypt marked the transformation of previously nomadic

clans into a formative nationhood. In the twelve century B.C. as they re-entered into

the land of Canaan they found once again a settled population and an established

7 Henry Cattan (1988), Palestine Question, London; Croom Helm. p.3. 8 For more see Gwyn Rowly (1984), Israel Into Palestine London; Mansell Pub. p. 9.

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culture. The Israelites subjugated many of the native kingdoms with a systematic and

perpetual invasion. These- included the invasions of the Canaanites tribes such as;

Hittites, Perizzites, Jebusites, and Hivites, along with the Amorites, the Gibeonites

and the Philistines (Joshua 11 :3). The Canaanites and the Israelites never peacefully

coexisted thenceforth. They were constantly at war with each other. However, the

Philistines and the Canaanites were never completely subdued by the Israelites or any

other invaders who could retain control of their coastal plain along the Mediterranean.

It was the Philistines who gave the modern name of Palestine. The rest of the

country was occupied and settled by the Israelites who established the dominion of

Israel. The Israelites conquered and settled much of the 'Promised Land' (Canaan)

under the leadership of Joshua and the Judges, and eventually a monarchy was

established under King Saul (1020-1004 B.C.). He was succeeded by King David

(1004-965 B.C.) who unified the Jewish tribes, pacified the area and made Israel into

a major regional force. 9 During King David's reign, the territory of Israel was

expanded by military conquest. But even at the heights of his power, David could not

completely subdue the Philistines. The kingdom was split into the Kingdom of Israel

in the North and the Kingdom of Judah in the South. In 722 B.C. the Assyrian

kingdom overran the Northern Kingdom that ended the existence of a sovereign

Israeli state. The Jews in the Kingdom of Judah maintained its capital at Jerusalem

until 586 B.C. but with the destruction of 'Solomon's Temple', the Southern

Kingdom too came to an end and much of the Jewish population was exiled to

Babylon. With the exile of the Jews, the Hebrew language gradually disappeared from

Philistine and was replaced by Aramaic, which was used alongside the Arabic

language for several centuries. Aramaic was the main language used in the countries

east of Mediterranean Sea during Jesus' earthly ministry in the first century A.D.

After the destruction of Judah, a succession of people ruled Palestine. In 538

B.c., Cyrus, the king of Persia conquered Babylon and allowed Israelites to return to

their homeland (Ezra 1 and 7:13-26). In 332 B.c., Alexander the Great conquered

Palestine. In 166 B.C., the Jews revolted against their rulers and established the

Maccabean Kingdom. In 134 B.c., Antiochus Sidete, the king of Syria besieged

Jerusalem, and in 63 B.C. Roman Emperor Pompey conquered Palestine thus ending

the Maccabean rule making Palestine a Roman province of Judea In 40 B.C., Herod

9 For more see Bernard Reich (1985), Israel Land of Tradition and Conflict, London: Westview Press, p.49.

14

became king of Judea and rebuilt the Second Temple of Jerusalem It was during his

. rule that Jesus Christ of Nazareth, the founder of Christianity was born in Bethlehem

thereby making Palestine the 'Holy Land' of Christendom.

The Jews revolted twice against the Romans, once from 66 AD. to 70 AD.

during which Titus the Roman Emperor destroyed Jerusalem and the Second Temple

and again between 132 AD. and 135 AD. leading to either the death or dispersal of

Jews unto the four comers of the Roman Empire.

Under the Roman Emperor Hadarian Jerusalem was designated as a Roman colony, in which Jews were forbidden either to reside or to enter, and in an attempt to blot out Jewish identity in the land, Judah was renamed as Palestine, supposedly after the Philistines, an Aegean people. 10

Since that time until the middle of the NinteenthCentury, there were practically no

Jews in Jerusalem and only a small number lived in Palestine, but mainly at Tiberias

and Safad. Roman Emperor Constantine, when converted to Christianity, issued a

decree in 323 A.D. making Christianity the religion of the Roman Empire. Palestine

was then governed for over 200 years as part of the Eastern Roman Empire from

Constantinople. In 638 AD. Palestine came under Islamic rule. I I Whether Muslim or

Christian, the Palestinians share a collective memory of the glories of Arab-Islamic

Empire from 732 AD. through 1258 A.D. It was the most powerful and advanced

empire of its time, renowned for military conquests and brilliant intellectual

achievements in medicine, philosophy, the arts, and other fields. But the Arab

civilisation was destroyed by the Mongols who exercised brutal and tyrannical rule

for nearly 260 years. 12

In 1517, Palestine came under the supremacy of the Turkish Ottoman Empire

and remained within their control for four centuries until 1917. In 1917, Palestine was

captured by British forces and placed under British military administration untill the

period of the League of Nations Mandate in 1922.13 The Turkish conquest and the

Hritish coionisation did not alter or affect the character of its inhabitants, language,

customs and cuhure which basically remained Arab in nature. Notwithstanding the

long and bloodstained history of wars, invasions, and conquests in Palestine, the

original indigenous characteristics of the population remained unchanged untill the

middle of the twentieth century.

10 Rowley (1984), n.8, p.13. 11 Moshe Gil (1997), A History of Palestine 634-1099, London: Cambridge University Press, pp. 45-51. 12 Cheyrl A. Rubenberg (2003), The Palestinians in Search of a Just Peace, London: Lynne Rienner

Publishers, pp.1-5 13 Pamela Ann Smith (1984), Palestine and Palestinians 1876-1983, London: Croom Helm, pp.38-44.

15

Palestinians: The term Palestinian refers to Arab- Christians Muslims and

Druze, who lived in Palestine for centuries. The number of Palestinians worldwide is

estimated at more than 5 Million usually divided into three major subgroups:

1) Palestinians who lived in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

2) Those who live inside Israel's pre-1967 borders and hold Israeli

citizenship.

3) Those live as Diaspora. (The dispersion of the Palestinians outside

Palestine).

The Palestinian Diaspora is a direct result of the creation of the State oflsrae~ which

resulted in the disintegration of Palestinian Arab society, dispersing hundreds of

thousands of Palestinians to live in exile or as refugees. 14 They are the original

inhabitants of Palestine who traced their historic roots in Palestine from the time of

ancient Canaan. They lived in Palestine and in other parts of West Asia before the

advent of Islam. There was acculturation of other racial elements into the Palestinian

group, mainly the Greeks, the Romans, the Moslem Arabs and the Crusaders.

However, this Palestinian group which comprises both Muslims and Christians

continued to constitute the main element of the population until the majority of

inhabitants were displaced during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Apart from the Muslims

and Christians, there existed other minority communities which lived in their midst

these included Jews, Armenians, Assyrians, and Kurds. Jews represented only a small

community from the later part of the first century until the middle of Twentieth

century A.D. At the time of the Balfour Declaration (1917), the Jews represented less

than 10 per cent ofthe total popUlation of Palestine.

Christians as well as Muslims have deep religious ties to Palestine- it is the

birth place of Jesus Christ and the site ofthe Prophet Muhammad's ride to paradise. It

is the third holiest site in Islam and is commemorated in Jerusalem by the Dome of

the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque which are both situated on the Harem ai-Sharif. 15 For

the Christians, Jerusalem is equally sacred, containing the Church of the Holy

14 Simona Sharon a (2000), and Mohammed Abu-Nimer, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict", in Debora J. Gerner (ed.) Understanding o/Contemporary Middle East, London: Lynne Riener Pub, pp. 61-195

15 For more understanding of Christian and Islamic as well as Jewish attachments to the Holy Land, see, Karen Armstrong (19%), Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths, New York: Ballantine Books.

16

Sepulchre, the Via Dolorosa, and many other hallowed places. Bethlehem, Nazareth,

Galilee, and other sites throughout the country are also revered.16

1. 2. 1. Zionist Movement

With the Roman sieges of Jerusalem in 70 A.D. and 135 A.D., Judaism lost its centre

in Palestine. At this point, the history of Diaspora began, during which the Jews lived

in communities throughout many parts of the world. Palestine was revered in Judaism

in religious tenns but not a political sense. There were no programmes of "return" and

no political ideologies.

Zionism emerged in the late nineteenth century in Europe in response to the

rise of European nationalism and anti-Semitism. 17 It represented the translation of

Diaspora religious orientation into a secular ideology inspired by the political thought

of 'Gentile' Europe. Three concepts on the Zionism were profound: One reaffIrmed

the cultural isolation of the Jews and adherence to tradition. Another sought to assert

Jewish identity in terms of a national ethos and a "return" to Palestine under political

auspices. The third concept advocated the participation of the Jews in the social and

cultural life of the West, while retaining a sense of separate identity. The political

Zionism emphasised the importance of a politically independent Jewish state and had

chosen Palestine as the site. ls

The founder of the Zionist Movement in its preliminary pre-political phase

was Leo Pinsker (1821-91), a Russian Jew. Although he was preceded by several lone

precursors of Zionism, Pinsker was the first thinker-, whose work evoked immediate

response, producing an organised effort to promote immigration to Palestine as a step

towards solving the Jewish problem. His pamphlet 'Auto-Emancipation' published in

1882, coinciding with the spread of terror and massacre of Jews throughout Russia

was the fi.rst coherent Zionist statement of the Jewish problem and its proposed

solution. He expressed concern for the perpetual persecution of Jews around the world

which could only be satisfactorily resolved if they became a normal nation with

independence in its own territory. The crux of the solution was independent national

existence, and it was of little consequence which territory was settled for this purpose.

16 CheyrJ A. Rubenberg (2003), The Palestinians in Search of a Just Peace, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp.I-5.

17 Sharon a and Abu-Nimer, (2000), n. 14, pp. 61-195. 18 Ibrahim Abu-Lughod eds. (1971), The Transformation of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and

Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, p.12.

17

Pinsker however, realised that if Palestine was placed at the centre ofthe doctrine, the

emotional drive of the enlightened Jews couid be turned to advantage of the

movement. 19

IndependentlY of Pinsker, Theodor Herzl, an Austrian Jewish Journalist, set

forth a more elaborate and audacious solution for the Jewish problem. In 1897, Herzl,

founded the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) which continued to carry on his work

after he died in 1904. By the turn of the nineteenth century, Zionist repatriation efforts

became systematic, methodical, and internationally organised. In 1897, the fIrst

Zionist Congress was held in Basle, Switzerland, with the stated objective of creating

a Jewish state in Palestine by means of prodigious Jewish immigration, land purchase,

settlement construction and institution building?O Out of the Basle programme

emerged the World Zionist Organisation, a Jewish National Flag, National Anthem

and the National Fund.21

1.2.1.1 Indigenous Challenge to Zionism

Palestinians strongly refuted the idea that Palestine was 'a land without people for the

people without a land' as the Zionist slogan proclaimed. They reiterated that it had an

existing indigenous population who sought independence fIrst from the Ottoman

rulers and later from the British. It was obvious in conflict with the rights of the

people of Palestine who had inhabited the country since time immemorial.

Palestinians argued that Jewish presence in Palestine had almost ceased from later

part of the First Century A.D. The Zionist objective of creating a Jewish state in

Palestine was the root cause of the trouble and the source of the Palestine tragedy.22

According to the Palestinians:

1) The Palestinians are the original inhabitants of Palestine who trace their

historic roots 1...11 Palestine from the time of ancient Canaan.

2) Historically, the Jews were neither the earliest inhabitants nor the owners of

the land in Palestine.

19 David Waines, "The Failure of the Nationalist Resistance," see in Ibid, p.211. 20 Noah Lucas (1974), The Modern History of Israel, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, pp.20-38,

also see in David Rodman (\995), "Patterns of War Initiation in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Note on the Military Dimension," Israel Affairs, 2 (1): pp.l15-126.

21 Ritchie Ovendale (1984), The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars London: Longman, p. 5. 22 Evgeni Primakov (1984), "The Problem of Palestine in the 20th Century: Origins, Evolution,

Prospects, " Oriental Studies in the USSR, (9), Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences, p. 8.

18

3) The Jewish occupation of Palestine in Biblical times was simply an episode in

the long history of the country.

4) The modern Zionist Jews, the great majority of whom can hardly claim to be

descendants of the ancient Hebrews, seized upon a short biblical episode and

began to stake a political claim upon the territory of Palestine after more than

twenty centuries.

According to Palestinian interpretation, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a modern

phenomenon whose origins lie not in the Bible but rather in Zionist ideology and its

implementation in Palestine through policies that are reminiscent of other settler­

colonial projects around the world. 23 According to Charles D. Smith, modern Zionism

was the wish to establish an independent Jewish existence in Palestine, the ancient

land of Israel, which the Jews had last governed nineteenth hundred years before.24

The fact that such a claim was incompatible with the facts of history, justice and with

the rights of the real owners of the country was ignored.25

Contrastingly, the Israeli version of history according to prevalent Jewish

interpretation portrays an opposing account. To them Zionism was an attempt to

ensure the return of Jews to the land of Israel (Eretz- Israel), which God promised to

Abraham and his seed. They claim the conflict is centuries old and argues that:

I) Palestinian claims to be related to the Canaanites are a recent phenomenon and

contrary to historical evidence.

2) The Canaanites disappeared from the face ofthe earth three millennia ago, and

no one knows if any of their descendants survived or, if they did, who they

would be.

3) They claimed a connection to Palestine of more than 1,000 years, dating back

no further than the conquest of Muharnmad's followers in the seventh century

A.D.

4) By contrast, no serious historian questions the more than 3,000-year-old

Jewish connection to the Land ofIsrael, or the modern Jewish people's relation

to the ancient Hebrews.26

23 Sharona and Abu-Nimer, (2000), n. 14, pp. 61-195. 24 Charles D. Smith (1992), Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict New York: St. Martin Press, p. 25. 25 Cattan (1988), n. 7, p. Il. 26 Mitchell G. Bard (2006), "Myths & Facts Online, Israel's Roots," [Online: web] Accessed 9 August

2006, URL: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org. Bard is the Executive Director of the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise (A ICE).

19

For the Israelis, their national movement, Zionism, is a natural response to the

tragedies of Jewish history. Ever since the destruction of the Second Temple in

Jerusalem in 70 A.D., Jews had been dispersed and without a homeland. Dispersal

had made Jews weak and vulnerable, and led to repeated expulsions and devastations.

Zionism meant a cultural, psychological, and political renaissance. It meant creating a

homeland for Jews that could be a safe haven.27

The Palestinians and many others, however, view Zionism as an exclusive

ideology that underlies the settler-colonial movement responsible for the occupation

of Palestine and the dispossession and exploitation of its indigenous population. The

problem Zionist faced in Palestine was that it was an inhabited country at the time of

Basle Programme in 1897. Ottoman census records 'circa' 1860 illustrate the

demographic composition of Palestine prior to European Jewish colonisation. Out of a

total population of 600,000; 96 percent of the inhabitants were Arabs, including 80

percent Muslims; 10 percent Christians, and 6 percent Jewish. Armenians, Europeans

expatriates, and others accounted for the remaining 4 percent.28

Violent Palestinian resistance accompanied Zionist settlement m Palestine

from its inception in the 1880's. In March 1886, the fIrst clash occurred between

Palestinians and Jewish immigrants. In 1893, Palestinian leader Tahir al-Hussani,

Mufti of Jerusalem began to publicly expressed concern over the threats inherent in

Zionist efforts to buy land and enlarge the Jewish population through mass

immigration.29 Urban Arab notables manifested political objection to the Zionist

enterprise, which was portrayed as an existential threat to the Arab-Muslim nature of

the land and its population. The Zionist goal of reviving the Jewish homeland through

gaining a majority of the population and establishing Jewish sovereignty over

Palestine became intense sources of concern among Arabs. This was expressed in

meetillgs, pamphlets, articles in press, and in petitions to the Ottoman authorities, in

attempt to prevent Jewish immigration and settlement.3o

Theodor Herzl believed through diplomacy and [mance that he could secure

the sympathy and cooperation of the Great Powers, and that the Sultan could be

persuaded to give the World Zionist Organisation a charter for the establishment of

27 Dennis Ross (2004), The Missing Peace, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux p.16. 28 Janet L. Abu-Lughod (1971), "The Demographic Transformation of Palestine," in Abu-Lughod n.

20, p.155. 29 Rubenberg (2003), n. 12, p.3. 30 A vraham Sela ed. (2002), The Continuum Political Encyclopaedia of the Middle East, London: The

Continuum International Publishing Group, p.58.

20

his Jewish Palestine. But several governments were approached with no effective

results,31 The Zionist founding fathers were wen aware of the fact that the

establishment of a country that is already the national home of another politically alert

people would be a very daunting task. However, they were determined to carry out

their plans at any cost by adopting certain strategies which included the

implementation of the Basle programme in spite of the opposition of the indigenous

Palestinians.

1. 2. 2. British Colonialism of Palestine

World War I provided an opportunity for the Zionist movement to make important

gains. It was finally during this time, when the collapse of the Ottoman Empire

appeared imminent, that the British Government announced its support for the Zionist

political objective in Palestine. During the war, Great Britain played a duplicitous

diplomatic game. It entered into three contradictory agreements.

1. Husayn-McMahon Correspondence: It involved the Arab nationalist

movement represented by Sharif Husayn, Guardian of the holy sites in Mecca.

The Arabs pledged to assist the British war effort by revolting against the

Ottoman Turks. In exchange, the British promised to facilitate, the Arab

nationalist goals of independence and unity in a contiguous territorial entity

including Palestine after the war.

2. Sykes-Picot Accord: In 1916, Britain and France secretly signed the Sykes­

Picot Accord in which they agreed to divide most of the Arab world into

spheres of influence; France was to have authority in Syria, from which it

curved out Lebanon, whereas Britain was to have control of Iraq, Transjordan,

and Palestine.

3. Balfour Declaration: In 1917, Britain issued the Balfour Declaration, pledging

support for Zionist objective in Palestine.32

Substantial efforts by the Zionist Organisation, with a special role played by Chaim

Weizmann (a Russian-born Jew and a British chemist who having made significant

contributions to the British war effort was a permanent Zionist leader who later

became the first President of Israel), preceded the government's decision.

Tl-t - , S-Cf4i 3 I C. H. Dodd and M.E. Sales (1970), Israel and the Arab World, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,

p.6. 32 Ibid., p.5.

21

Map 1.2 Palestine 1946: District Centres during the Mandate Period

r.u.unHl 1'.6: ~~ Dlo"'/a~.~W" .• nUJ" Pf,'riod

~19""IP"~Jiu~~-UJIfl

• 1 -: ~1,,! 1 , ---

• • • • + •

Source: Palestine Remembered (2008), [Online: web] Accessed 6 July 2008, URL: http://www.palestineremembered.com/Acre/Maps/Story583 .html .

22

1. 2.2.1. Balfou r Declaration

On 2 November 1917, the British Government issued the Balfour Declaration. The

declaration took the form of a letter from Arthur James Balfour, the Foreign

Secretary, to Lord Rothschild a prominent Zionist leader. 33

It stated:

I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations, which as been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that noth ing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious right of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

The text of the declaration was approved by the US President Woodrow Wilson

immediately. It was endorsed publicly by France in February 1918 and Italy in May

the same year. The Zionists concluded that the British Government had undertaken a

solemn commitment to facilitate Zionist colonisation of Palestine, the objective of the

establishment of a Jewish state.34

The Arabs bitterly contended that the Balfour Declaration was issued without

the knowledge or the consent of the Arabs. They protested to the British Government

against it but put in a disadvantageous position from the very start. According to

Palestinian historians, the root cause of the Palestinians' disadvantage lies in two

political decisions made in Europe. First in 1897 by the World Zionist Organisation,

that resolved to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. Second, the Balfour Declaration,

which undermined the right of the indigenous Palestinian population.

The Turkish Empire was liquidated when the World War I ended in November

1918. Britain formally assumed the Palestine mandate in 1922 and maintained its

control until May 1948. Immigration ofthe Jews continued despite restrictions placed

by the British. The post-war troubles in the Eastern Europe and the British

administration prompted new waves of Jewish immigration to Palestine. Between

1920 and 1939 almost 3, 50,000 Jews entered Palestine. The contradiction between

Britain's dual commitments in fostering Jewish self-determination and safeguarding

33 Reich (1985), n. 9, pp. 54-55. 34 Abu-Lughod (1971), n. 18, pp.l-7

23

Arab rights soon became apparent, and the inevitability of the clash between Jewish

and Arab nationai aspirations became manifested.35

The Palestinians resisted Zionist encroachments, whereas the Zionists, backed

by British, crushed the rebellions. There were relatively minor Palestinian uprisings in

1920 and 1921 but one of the most dramatic escalations of the conflict occurred , , during the Arab Revolt from 1936 to 1939.36 This revolt was the longest-running

Palestinian protest against Jewish national aspirations in Palestine prior to the

establishment of the Jewish State of Israel. The revolt was sparked by the Peel

Commission Report (which was also known as Palestine Royal Commission)

recommending the partition of Palestine into two states in order to accommodate the

Jews. Owing to the fierce resistance of the plan among the Palestinians and the Jews,

Britain was eventually forced to abandon the 1937 partition plan.

Nevertheless, the partition plan continued to gain international legitimacy in

the aftermath of World War II and the Holocaust which resulted in the near

destruction of the Jewish people in Europe. During the war, the Jews extended full

support to the Allies in the hope that at the end of war they would be given their

promised homeland.

1. 2.2. 2. The UN Partition Plan Britain handed its 'Palestine problem' to the Untied Nations. The General Assembly

appointed a committee in May 1947 called the United Nations Special Committee on

Palestine (UNSCOP) which recommended the partition of Palestine. On 29 November

1947, contrary to the wishes of the indigenous population, the UN General Assembly,

under strong US pressure, approved UN Resolution 181. It suggested the formation of

a Jewish state and an Arab state with Jerusalem under international control. The three

areas were to be linked by a common economic union. The 1947 UN Partition Plan

also known as UN Resolution 181 Ll1dicated that British Mandate over the area was to

end on 15 May 1948.37

35 Benny Morris (1990), 1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians, New York: Clerrendon Press), p.4.

36 British suppression of the uprising was brutal and oppressive. It included the imposition of harsh emergency regulations and practices, including closure of newspapers, search-and-seizure operations without warrants, mass arrests and widespread curfews and other forms of collective punishments. Rubenberg (2003), n. 16, p. 6, also in Dodd and Sales (1970), n. 31, p. 10. For more detail on the Palestinian uprisings see, Barbara Kalkas, "The Revolt of 1936: A Chronicle of Events," in Abu-Lughod (1971)n. 18, pp. 237-273.

37 United Nations General Assembly Resolution-UNGA Res. (1947), UN Doc. 181 (11),29 November. UN Official Records Assembly Resolutions, New York: Lake Success, pp. 131-150.

24

Map 1.3 1947 -UN -Partition-Plan-1949-Armistice-Comparison

Unired Nation~ Partition P lan UN Re",lulion 18]

1947

• \Iedlferrilnt'tlll

,\'""

1949

-4-

~ P{opoHO ~ SIN

J AfCJb 1erJ'1C«y Tet"'fIOrileS seized by Iyael be)'Ond ~ area bi !he p!'0p0:ted J~ St.aW!

...... tln .... Academic Society for the Study of International AHa .... ("AUlA)

Source: http://www .passia.orglpalestine _ facts/MAPS/ 1947 -un-partition-plan­reso.html.

25

The Zionists accepted the resolution with reservation, and proceeded to make

an arrangement for the transitional process for partition and independence, which the

resolution provided. By March 1948 a provisional Jewish government had been

announced. 38 The Arabs opposed partition as a so lution in any case, and announced

in December 1947 that they would intervene with military force to prevent its

implementation while abstaining from making any of the arrangements for the

transitional process. From the Palestinian perspective, the UN Partition Plan was an

illegal and illegitimate attempt to divide Palestine. They feared that the establishment

of two states would result in the expulsion of Palestinians who lived in the areas that

would face within the designated territory of the Jewish state.

1.2.3. The Arab-Israeli War 1948 The British terminated its mandate over Palestine on 14 May 1948. On the afternoon

of 14 May Israel declared its independence and Ben Gurion became the first Prime

Minister oflsrael. Within minutes de facto recognition was accorded to the State of

Israel by USA and USSR. Britain recognised Israel only after the end of fighting in

January 1949. Other countries like Turkey, and Iran followed them. However Arab

countries like Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq could not reconcile with the

creation of an independent Jewish state and declared war against it in 1948. The

official Arab-Israeli War began a few hours after the proclamation of the State of

Israel on 15 May 1948. Throughout the period from the partition resolution in

November 1947 to the completion of British withdrawal on 15 May 1948, a state of

non-exercised sovereignty and undeclared war existed within Palestine. 39

With the British decisively departing the country, the Zionists were

determined to implement partition by force and the Palestinians were equally

determined to resist. There followed two wars: a civil war, largely between the Jewish

community and the Palestinian community before the end of the British Mandate on

15 May 1948; and a regular war after 15 May between Israel (established on that date)

and units of the regular Arab armies. In the civil war the Palestinian community was

crushed and routed. According to Walid Khalid~ "it was during the civil war that the

38 For further analysis see William Roger Louis and Robert W. Stookey eds. (1986), The End of the Palestine Mandate, London: I.B. Tauris, also see Michael 1. Cohen (1982), Palestine and Great Powers, 1945-1948, Princeton: Princeton University Pres.

39Ibid., p. 13.

26

Palestinian Exodus and Diaspora began to take place.'.4O Jews refer to the 1948 War

as the 'war of independence' marking the fulfilment of their national aspirations with

the establishment of the State ofIsrael. However, the Palestinians considered the 1948

War as the 'Nakba' or disaster and destruction.41

In the wake of the Palestinian War 0 f 1947-48 and the Arab-Israeli hostilities

of 1948, Palestine was politically transformed into Israel. Egypt occupied the Gaza

Strip, and Transjordan annexed the West Bank of the Jordan River and renamed the

country as Jordan. In the resulting war, the Israelis seized approximately 78 percent

of Palestine. Neighbouring Jordan and Egypt took control over the remaining 22

percent of Palestine.

The political transformation had apparent effects in transforming the

original conflict between the Europeans and the Arabs in Palestine into one between

nation states in which the character of the conflict was thought to be primarily Israel

and the three adjacent Arab states. However, the conflict had its origins in Palestine

and the people most adversely affected by its outcome were the Palestinians. Starting

in 1948, the US viewed the Palestinians as "refugees" and were removed from the

public mind as an original party to the conflict but projected them as a "problem" in

search of a solution. In that context the Palestinian people became a secondary factor

in the Arab-Israeli conflict.42

Following the creation of Israel, the issues surrounding the question of

Palestine became obscured in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Palestine and Palestinians re­

emerged as the centre of the conflict only after 1969 when Vasser Arafat and his

Fateh resistance organisation assumed control of the Palestine Liberation

Organisation (PLO), and the Palestinians remained at the heart of the Arab-Israeli

conflict. 43

1.2. 3.1. Flight of the Palestinian Refugees The most pressing problem in the immediate aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War

was the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem, which was a major political

consequence. The position of the Palestinians seemed hopeless, their society was

ravaged and their political hopes in ruins. For instance the armistice agreement left

40 Walid Khalidi (1992). Palestine Reborn London: I. B. Tauris, pp. 5-15. 41 Simona and Abu-Nimer (2000), n. 14, p. 71. 42 Abu-Lughod (1971), n.18, p. xi. 43 Rubenberg (2003), n. 12, p. 18.

27

Gaza under Egyptian control, with its pre -1948 population of 70,000 increasing to

270,000 through the influx of refugees. The Gaza Strip soon became a byword for

deprivation as even the indigenous population had become separated from its

farmlands by the Armistice lines and the area was then cut off from its economic

hinterlands. Having left their farms, shops, and workshops, they had no means of

survival. For shelter, some found mosques, churches, schools, or hospitable Arab

families, but most were in temporary camps that offered rudimentary protection.44

After the war, Israel took every possible step to prevent the refugees' return,

including facilitating the demolition of hundreds of Palestinian villages and towns and

constructing Kibbuttzirn (communal farms or settlements), moshavim (cooperative

farms), and Jewish towns over the ruins. It seized the properties Palestinians left

behind, and deterred by force the Palestinians attempting to harvest their crops.45

The UN General Assembly Resolution 194 established a Reconciliation

Commission on 11 December 1948, to assert that refugees wishing to return to their

homes and live at peace should be allowed to do so, that compensation should be paid

to the other and that free access to the holy places should be assured. But the

Commission failed to secure a settlement. Resolution 194 remains the fundamental,

although not the only, legal basis for the refugees' right of return.46 On 8 December

1949, the UN General Assembly established the United Nations Relief and Work

Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine refugees; it was charged with providing assistance to

the refugees in the fields of food, shelter, education, and health services. It differed

from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in that it was not

authorised to seek either the local integration or resettlement of refuges in another

country.

Reasons for the Palestinians Exodus: According to Henry Cattan the exodus

of the Palestinians in 1948 War was mainly due to three causes: Jewish ito lorance,

expulsion, and break down of security and government machinery.

1) The violence against the Arab popUlation was not spontaneous but was a

policy of the Zionist leadership which wanted to establish a single national

state in Palestine. Many villages were destroyed even after the UN resolution

of II December 1948.

44 Morris (1990), n. 37, pp. 4-10. 45 IIan Pappe, "Israeli Perceptions of the Refugee Questions," in Rubenberg, (2003), n. 12, p. 12. 46 Ibid., p.13.

28

2) The expulsion was carried out by the Israeli forces, and on various occasions

they used loudspeakers to threaten the civilian population and ordered them to

leave.47 Zionist propaganda utilised the massacre at Deir Yassin which

occurred on 9 April 1948, that forced the Arabs flee their homes.

3) After the outbreak of violence following the partition vote by the UN, the

British Government was neither able to maintain law and order in Palestine

nor willing to commit its forces for that purpose. The mandate was corning to

an end on 15 May 1948, and the British Government concerned itself mainly

with the evacuation of its personnel and equipments. The evacuation of the

British personnel began during March 1948

Between September 1947 and January 1948, approximately 70,000 Palestinians,

mainly from the upper classes who sensed the impending war, left their country

without their possessions, yet, did not sell their properties, indicating expectations of

their return. The land belonging to the Palestine refugees was confiscated and most of

the land owned by Arabs who remained was expropriated.48

The question of what caused the Palestinians to become refugees has been a

controversial issue between Israel and the Arab states for more than half a century. In

general, Arabs claimed that the Jews expelled Palestinians with predetermination and

preplanning, as part of a grand political-military design. On the other hand Israeli

official version stated that the Palestinians fled voluntarily not under Jewish

compulsion and that they were asked to do so by the Palestinian leaders and the Arab

states.49

The flight of the refugees was aggravated by the 1967 War; with hundreds of

thousands of people being forced to abandon their homes and become refugees. This

time the West Bank of Jordan and Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and the

Sinai Peninsula were occupied by the Israeli troops. Many were twice refugees who

left their camps set up after 1948 and moved to the East Bank of Jordan, Syria,

Lebanon and Iraq.5o Between 1948 and 1967, the UN General Assembly adopted 19

47 Cattan (1970), n.6, pp. 61-62. 48 Ghada Karmi (1994), "The 1948 Exodus: A Family Story," Journal of Palestine Studies, 23 (2):

pp.31-40. 49 Though the Israeli Government claimed that the Palestinians left their country voluntarily, Israeli

historians and others using archival material from the Israeli Government and it antecedents reveal that there was indeed a calculated policy to force the bulk of the Palestinians popUlation into exile. One of the most famous works is Benny Morris' (1989), The Birth of the Palestinians Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, New York: Cambridge University Press.

50 Primakov (1984), n. 22, p. 13.

29

resolutions confirming their right to repatriation. or if they did not want to return, to

compensate for the loss of property, but Israel never complied with these

reso lutions. 51

The flight of Palestinian refugees took place in two major phases: the first in

the 1948-1949 Israeli-Arab War; after twenty years interval the second phase began

durIng the 1967 War. For many years the problem of Arab refugees from Palestine

had loomed large in West Asia. Since 1948 it became a constant feature of the Arab­

Israeli conflict. To the Arabs and the Palestinians in particular, it symbolised the

injustice to which the Palestinians have been subjected by Western powers and Israel.

The Zionists look upon it as symbolising the refusal of Arabs to accept the existence

of Israel. It has proved to be one of the most difficult problems to come up before the

United Nations-a problem involving more than a million homeless and landless

Palestinian people who feel as though they had been condemned and exiled forever to

live in misery and bitterness at no fault of theirs.

1.2.4. The Issues of the West Bank and Gaza Strip

The term West Bank is relatively new in the lexicon of international politics. It is the

area of historical Palestine lying west of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea

designated by the United Nations Palestine Partition Plan (UNPPP) to become part of

an Arab state. To the north and south is the State of Israel; to the west are Israel and

the Gaza Strip. It was not used until after 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Before the League

of Nations adopted the Mandate for Palestine in 1922, Palestine was a geographical

name of rather loose application. The Jordan River was considered the line of

demarcation between Western and Eastern Palestine. Under British administration the

East Bank became Transjordan and the West Bank was generally designated as the

rest of the Palestine, or the area in which the provisions of the Balfour Declaration of

the 1917 were applicable. 52 The present West Bank grew out of a number of factors:

The 1948 Arab-Israeli War.

l) The subsequent Israeli Transjordan Armistice Agreement of 1949.

SI Arab's spokesmen from 1949 onwards spoke of a total of 900,000 refugees. But on the other hand, Israel officially stuck to the low figure of 520,000-530,000 (Benny Morris). The Government of Jordan estimated the number of Palestinians displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a result of the Israel-Arab War of June 1967 reached 410,248 persons. The total number of Palestinian refugees existing as a result of the two conflicts of 1948 and 1967 need some clarification. See Cattan (1988), n. 7, p.107.

S2 Don Peretz (1986), The West Bank: History, Politics and SOCiety, London: West View Press, p. 4.

30

2) Jordan annexation of the areas in western Palestine in 1950.

3) The change in name from Transjordan to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Thereafter the kingdom was divided by the Jordan River into the East Bank

and the West Bank.

The Palestinian autonomous areas are located in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A

part of these areas formed the territory in which an independent State of Palestine may

be declared. Along with theeastern half of Jerusalem, the West Bank was occupied by

Jordan during the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli War. On 24 April 1950, the parliament of

Jordan passed legislation designed to unite the West Bank and the East Jerusalem

with Jordanian territory east of the Jordan; however, this annexation was largely

ignored by the international community. 53

Apart from the urban centres of Bethlehem and Hebron to the south, the

majority of the Palestinian population is concentrated in the northern localities around

Ramallah (Ram Allah), Nablus (Nabulus), Jenin (Janin), and Tulkarm In November

1988 the Palestine National Council (PNC) proclaimed Jerusalem as the capital of a

newly declared independent State of Palestine. In fact West Jerusalem has been the de

facto capital of Israel since 1950. During the June 1967 Six Days War the Israeli

authorities formally annexed East Jerusalem, but the UN never has recognised its

annexation. 54

Jordan continued to control effectively the West Bank, the Old City (East

Jerusalem) and its northern, eastern and southern environs, from the time of the

General Armistice on 3 April 1949. In the summer of 1988, King Hussein of Jordan

announced that Jordan was disengaging politically and administratively from the

area. 55 Rarnallah is the administrative centre for the West Bank.

In the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Israel captured the West Bank and Gaza.

Since conclusion of the war. Israel has been in control of the whole of the former

territory of Palestine under the British Mandate. Israel took administrative measures

to unify the city of Jerusalem. It has exercised a military government administration in

the West Bank and Gaza Strip, allowing minimal powers to the local Arab Mayors

53 Bernard Reich and David H. Goldberg (2000), Political Dictionary of Israel, London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc, p. 412.

54 Europa (2005), The Middle East and North Africa, London: Europa Pub., 51 51 edn., p. 930. 55 Reich and Goldberg (2000), n. 53, p. 412.

31

and town councillors. It has considerably extended the number of new Jewish

settlements in the Gaza Strip. 56

Representing an administrative provmce under the British Mandate of

Palestine, the Gaza Strip was transferred to Egypt after the 1949 Armistice and , remained under Egyptian administration until it was passed into the hands of the

Israelis during the Suez War of October-November 1956. However, Israel vacated the

area in 1957. In the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Gaza Strip was once again

captured by Israel and was put under military administration with the management of

day-to-day affairs being the responsibility of the area's Israeli military commander.

Neither Israeli law, nor governmental and public bodies including the Supreme Court

could review or alter the orders of the military command to any great extent.

Gaza City is the main inhabited area and the administrative centre for the

Palestinian Authority CPA) Pursuant to the Israel-PLO Gaza-Jericho First

Implementing Agreement (Cairo, May 1994), control over much of the Gaza Strip

was transferred to the Palestinian self-rule authority, with the exception of a handful

of small settlements in northern Gaza. In 2001 an estimated 42 percent of Gaza Strip

was under Israeli control, including Jewish settlements, military bases, bypass roads

and a 'buffer zone' along the border with Israe1.57 Its ultimate status is yet to be

decided.

The future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the issues related to Jewish

settlement, Palestinian refugees and Israeli control policies would have much impact

on the broader scope of West Asia politics. These issues have affected the relations

between Israel and the US, Egypt, Jordan and other Arab countries. These issues are

an integral part in the approach to West Asian peace settlement.

The 1948 War and the subsequent armistice agreements failed to solve the

Arab-Israeli prohlem. In essence, the Arab-Israeli conflict has changed in character

very little over the years, but it has taken different forms and has been powerfully

affected by trends in international politics. 58 The world now looked forward to a

negotiated settlement of the Palestine problem. Thus the genesis of the Palestine

problem historically dates back to the rise of Basle Programme of 1897. The Zionist

repatriation had taken place in two major phases: the first, from 1918 to 1948 and

56 Hassan Bin Talal (1981), Palestinian Self:Determination. London: Quarter Books, pp. 43-45. 57 ( Europa 2005), n. 54, p. 930. 58 Dodd and Sales (1970), n. 31, p.15

32

after an interval of nearly twenty years, the second phase began in 1967. During the

ftrst phase, the demographic, economic, military and organisational infrastructure of

the Jewish state was laid at the expense ofthe indigenous Palestinian population.

1.3. United States Peacemaking: A Brief Preview

There was a widespread assumption in the US that resolution of the conflict between

the Israelis and the Palestinians is an extremely complex issue. Despite the prevalent

portrayal of the US as an honest broker in West Asia, American opposition to a

comprehensive all-parties peace settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbours

goes back at least a quarter century.

The US had consistently rejected international peace conferences that led to a

comprehensive all-parties peace settlement, and instead pushed for successive

bilateral arrangement that could maximise American influence in the region, such as

the 1978 Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt and the 1994 peace treaty

between Israel and Jordan. Neither of these could effectively address the underlying

source of the Arab-Israeli conflict- the fate of the Palestinians.59

1.3.1. Origin ofthe US Involvement: Pre- 1967

President Woodrow Wilson endorsed the Balfour Declaration soon after its issuance

in 1917 and the US Congress did so in the 1920s. Despite these and other statements

the support of a Jewish state or homeland in Palestine, no substantial gestures of US

support for Zionist aspirations took place until after World War II when the status of

Palestine became a matter of considerable international attention.

After World War II, United States support for a Jewish state grew with the

desire to help settle the large number of Jewish refugees, displaced persons, and

survivors of the Nazi Holocaust. Popular support for Israel among US Jews and

signiftcant segments of the Christian community supplemented by a general

identification with Israel as an advanced democratic society with strong liberal and

humanitarian values aided in the generation of support of Israel as sovereign state.

When the British turned the Palestine Mandate over to the United Nations in 1947, the

United States supported the concept of partition and lobbied extensively for that

59 Stephen Zunes (2003), Tinderbox: u.s. Foreign Policy and the Roots of Terrorism. London: Zed Books Ltd., p. 112.

33

objective.6o As per Britain's request, the United Nations Special Committee on

Palestine (UNSCOP) was constituted on 15 May 1947. On 31 August 1947 the

UNSCOP report was submitted to the general Assembly and the majority supported

the division of Palestine.

Harry S. Truman (1945-1953): On 14 May 1947 Harry S. Truman made up his

mind to follow a ''politically beneficial Palestine policy" as per the advice of the

political advisors. President Harry Truman recognised Israel on 15 May 1948, within

minutes after Israel declared its independence. Since 1947, the stated American

foreign policy objectives in West Asia continued to be governed by domestic

considerations regardless of apparent conflicts with cherished American values.61

Truman had been a member of organisations dedicated to a timely implementation of

the Balfour Declaration, the pledge made by Britain back in 1917 to create a Jewish

state in Palestine. He believed America's commitment to create the Jewish state was

clear and unequivocal and that there must be no going back.62

The stage was set for the contemporary Arab-Israeli peace process by the

1967 War. Until then, the conflict between Israel and the Arabs had seemed almost

frozen, moving neither toward resolution nor toward war. The ostensible issues in

dispute were still those left unresolved by the Armistice agreements of 1949. At the

time, it had been widely expected that those agreements would simply be a step

toward final peace talks but the issues in dispute were too complex for the many

mediation efforts of the early 1950s. By the mid-1950s the Cold War rivalry between

Moscow and Washington had left the Arab-Israeli conflict suspended somewhere

between war and peace. For better or worse, the Armistice agreements had provided a

semblance of stability from 1949 to 1967.

During the 1950's and first half of the 1960's, US-Israeli official relations

were usually friendly but wary. American diplomacy advocated Israeli-Arab peace

within the general working context of United Nation's diplomacy. Certain events

produced enormous strain, notably President Eisenhower's rage at Israel during and

after the 1956 Sinai campaign, and tense standoffs between President John F.

60 Reich and Goldberg (2000), n. 53, p. 396. 61 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (2004), "American Foreign Policy in the Middle East and Its Impact on the

Identity of Arab Muslims in the United States," in Ernest J. Wilson III, Diversity and u.s. Foreign Policy, New York: Routledge, pp.240-255.

62 Paul Charles Merkley (2004), American Presidents, Religion, and Israel: The Heirs of Cyrus, London: Praeger pub., p. 724.

34

Kennedy (President 1961-1963) and Prime Minister David Gurion (Israeli Prime

Minister 1948-53 and 1955-1963) and Levi Eskhol (Israeli Prime Minister 1963-

1969) over US desires to inspect Israel's nuclear facility at Dimona.

It was the America's military, fmancial and diplomatic aid which sustained

Israel and indeed strengthened her to the extent of waging very costly wars and

retaining ill-gotten territories. Washington kept Israel at arm's length because of an

acute sensitivity to America's strategic interests, clearly identified with Saudi Arabia

and its oil reserves as well as with the need to avoid complication of the NATO

(North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) allies' traditional ties to Israel's Arab enemies.

Regarding the Palestinians, US policy deliberately ignored the political dimension of

the issue, which allowed for- the Palestinian's right to self determination and

independence.63 In the post 1948 period the American policy essentially operated on

two levels:

1) Continue to support financially to improve the poor living conditions

of the refugees.

2) Attempt a workable solution to the refugee problem and thereby a

resolution of the Arab Israeli dispute.

1.3.2. Post- 1967 Arab-Israeli War Another major milestone was the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967. Israeli troops

crossed the Armistice lines of 1949 and occupied Gaza Strip and the entire Sinai

Peninsula an Egyptian territory; the West Bank, and East Jerusalem which was

annexed by Transjordan after the first Arab-Israeli War on 1948-49. Syria lost parts of

the Golan Heights. All attempts to persuade Israel to withdraw failed. Most

significantly, the UN Security Council Resolution 242 failed to mention the

Palestinians.

The defeat of Egypt and the Arab states in 1967 War, made the Palestinians

realised that they had to carry on the struggle on their own and resorted to guerrilla

war against Israel.64 The traumatic experience of the war had two major impacts:

1) It focused upon the need to negotiate with Israel on the question of

evacuation of territory belonged to the Arab states. That gave a new

defmition to the term 'occupied' territories. Israel then offered the

formula of 'land for peace' to these Arab states.

63 Samuel w. Lewis (1990), "The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance", Middle East Journal, 53 (3): pp. 364-392.

64 Farah Naaz (1999), "The Israeli-Palestinian Track," World Focus, 20 (9): pp. II-l3.

35

Map 1.4 West Asia after June 1967 War

The Near Eatt after the 1 % 7

ECYPT

JORDAN

SAUDI ARAIHA

...... " ' ••• IIS ...... G~ ...... ~ ... ~ ...... fN:INMAI

.v,Uf'ce,' Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (2008), (Online: web] Accessed 7 July 2008, URL:http://www,passia.org/palestine_facts/MAPS/ 1967 -no<;t-jlll'E' \'·'G'-

israel.htm1.

36

2) The popUlarity and legitimacy of the Palestinian 'fedayeen' rose from

small disorganised groups into well-armed and substantially funded

movement.

1.3.2.1 Yom Kippur- October War 1973

In October 1973, Syria and Egypt tried to regain their lost territory by force. In that

Syria lost more of its territory in Golan Heights. Israeli forces, have also crossed the

Suez Canal, and occupied parts of its east bank, thereby posing a direct threat to the

entire Nile Valley. The October War was another turning point in Arab-Israeli

relation. Egypt, the major frontline Arab state, opted out of the Arab policy of military

confrontation with Israel. Jordan, by not joining the war had already signalled its

stand on the issue. Iraq-Syria rivalry precluded any concerted action on their part.

Syria was effectively isolated in the region.

Thus, the October War of 1973 had demonstrated the futility of a military

confrontation with Israel. It opened up series of negotiated settlement between Israel

on the one hand and individual Arab states on the other. Since the Palestinian issue

had been linked with the over-all Arab-Israeli peace process, it was determined to

gradually de-link the Palestinian question per se from the question of peace between

Israel and individual Arab states. Hence, the Palestinian issue was pushed as an

autonomous question outside the framework of the peace settlement between Israel

and the individual Arab states after 1974-75. Arabs legitimised the issue first in the

Rabat Conference in 1974 and the General Assembly put its stamp upon it in 1975.65

Now, some Arab states with Egypt taking the lead could with a free conscience

initiate steps leading to a peace treaty with Israel.

Arab states demonstrated willingness to use oil as a weapon in support of Arab

interests, through embargo and price increases. In October War 1973, Arab leaders

unanimously proclaimed the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the sole legitimate

representative of the Palestinian people, with Yasser Aratat as its ieader. Now the

Palestinians could speak for themselves. The PLO became a powerful political entity,

able to arouse strong support in international forums from the Arabs, the Soviet

Union, most Third World countries, and many others. However, the US government

pledged not to recognise or negotiate with the PLO until the organisation officially

accepted UN Resolution 242, which required the acknowledgment of the sovereignty

65 K.R. Singh (1999), "Peace Process Sans Peace Environment," World Focus, 20 (9): pp.3-10.

37

and political independence of every state in West Asia (including Israel) and their

right to live in peace within secure and recognised borders.66

Anwar Sadat, President of Egypt, realised peace with Israel through American

good offices would offer enhanced security as well as return of the lost territories.

Sadat's option for peace with Israel under US mediation led to the signing of Camp

David Accords in September 1978. Though many Arab states and Palestinian

organisations condemned Egypt for those steps, the process of disintegration in the

Arab ranks had been truly set.67

1.3.3. Jimmy Carter Years (1977-81)

It was US President Jimmy Carter who after his election in 1977 for the first time

talked of 'homeland' for the Palestinians. He was the first US President to recognise

the existence and acknowledged their legitimate rights, though earlier administrations

also took note of the need for Palestinian participation in any meaningful peace

negotiations.68 He stated, "Since the United States had to playa strong role in any

peace effort, I reviewed the official positions of my predecessors on key issues." US

constant policy had been predicated on a few key UN Security Council resolutions,

notably 242 of 1967 and 338 of 1973. Approved unanimously, these resolutions' basic

premise is that Israel's acquisition of territory by force is illegal thus Israel must

withdraw from occupied territories. He stated that:

1) Israel has right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries.

2) The Palestinian refugee problem must be settled.

3) There was a need to call for the international community to assist with

negotiations to achieve a just and durable peace in West Asia.

4) The US policy was that Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza were

"illegal and obstacles to peace".

One of his first and most controversial public statements came in Clinton,

Massachusetts on 16 March 1977, just a few weeks after he became president. Carter

famously remarked, "There has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian

refugees who have suffered for many, many years. ,,69

66 Jimmy Carter (2007), Palestine Peace not Apartheid, New York: Simon &Schuster paperbacks, pp. 37-38.

67 Singh (1999), n. 65, pp. 3-10. 68 For further readings see Y. Rafeek Ahmed (2000) "U.S. and the Palestinians," in A.K. Pasha, Arab-

Israeli Peace Process: An Indian Perspective, New Delhi: Manas Pub., p. 147. 69 Carter, (2007), n. 66, p. 38.

38

President Carter shifted the 'terrorist-refugee' perception when he said the

Palestinians deserved a homeland on 4 January 1978. i\S Walid Khalidi put it "Carter,

a born-again Christian was like a breath of fresh air for the Palestinians. He was the

first American President to recognise the people-hood of the Palestinians through his

early call for a 'homeland' for them". He was adamantly opposed to settlement in the

Occupied Territories, including East Jerusalem. 70

1.3.3.1. Camp David Accords (September 1978) The Camp David Accords, signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli

Prime Minister Menachem Begin and officially ratified by both governments,

reconfirmed a specific commitment to honour UN Resolution 242 and 338, which

prohibit acquisition of land by force and call for Israel's withdrawal from occupied

territories. The Camp David Accords was an effort towards a Palestinian state which

prescribed:

1) Full autonomy for inhabitants of the occupied territories.

2) Withdrawal of Israeli military and civilian forces from the West Bank and

Gaza Strip.

3) The recognition of the Palestinian people as a separate political entity with a

right to determine their own future.

4) Palestinians were to participate as equals in further negotiations.

5) The final status of the West Bank and Gaza was to submit to a vote by the

elected representatives of its inhabitants.

The Camp David Accords mentioned 'the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.7l

However, the autonomy plan in the agreement did not implement Security Council

resolutions 242 and 338 which demanded complete Israeli withdrawal from all

occupied areas. It rejected the Palestinian Liberation Organisation as the sole

legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people and expressly excluded it from the

negotiations. Thus, the broader objective of fmding a peaceful resolution to the

Palestinian question remained elusive. According to Farah Naaz, Israel and the US

dictated the course of the talks in accordance with their own wishes. The treaty

70 Walid Khalidi (1998), "The American Factor III the Arab-Israeli Conflict", Middle East International, 16 January (566 ): pp. 19-21

7\ Carter (2007), n. 66, p. 48.

39

between Egypt and Israel remained a separate treaty and Egypt achieved nothing for

the Palestinians. 72 As Carter has stated:

Our celebration of the Camp David Accords was short-lived, as we endured weeks of tedious and frustrating negotiations to implement our commitment to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. ... Although this crucial peace treaty has never been violated, other equally important provisions of the agreement have not been honoured since I left office. The Israelis have never granted any appreciable autonomy to the Palestinians, and instead of withdrawing their military and political forces, Israeli leaders have tightened their hold on the occupied territories.73

1.3.4. Ronald Reagan Era (1981-89) President Ronald Reagan (the 40th President of the United States) came to office in

1981, a strong admirer and emotional supporter of Israel. Reagan and his fIrst

Secretary of State Alexander Haig saw Israel as strategic asset against Soviet

Incurslon in West Asia because of both its democratic values and its military

prowess.74 The characteristic of Reagan's policy displayed towards West Asia could

be outlined as:

1) Strong commitment to Israel as the only reliable friend of the United States in

West Asia.

2) The contest in West Asia was described almost exclusively in Cold War terms

with scant mention of the peace process.

3) The only reference to the Palestinians in the written opinion piece that had

appeared during his election campaign came in a warning against the creation

of a radical Palestinian state on Israeli borders.

4) The words "Camp David," "peace process," or "negotiations" were nowhere

to be found.

5) The idea of Israel and Egypt as partners in peace was missing, replaced by a

description of Israel as a formidable strategic asset.

6) Reagan shifted American policy in the region away from the Camp David

approach toward a tough competition with Moscow for influence.

7) Engaging in peace talks was accorded lower priority than bo lstering American

influence in the gulf region. 75

The Reagan administration tried hard to shut the PLO out of the peace process

essentially denying the validity of Palestinian nationalism. Reagan and most of his

72 Farah Naaz (1999), "The Israeli-Palestinian Track," World Focus, 20 (9): pp. \\-13. 73 Carter (2007), n.66, pp. 5\-52. 74 Reich and Goldberg (2000), n. 53, p. 397. 75 William B. Quandt (2005), Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since

1967 - Third edn., Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 246-247.

40

political compatriots took policy back to the thinking of the early 1970's recreating a

reality in which the Palestinian issue did not exist, and the Cold War politics and

diplomacy was the US first priority and Israel was regarded as a necessary ally, no

matter what its West Bank policy or its Lebanon policy or its human rights records.76

Alexander Haig developed a "strategic cooperation concept for the Reagan

administration, believing the US could work separately, but in parallel with two sets

of allies in the region, to checkmate Soviet threats. Simultaneously, the Reagan team

strengthened ties with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other Gulf states despite being unable

to deal successfully with Syria. Towards the end of Reagan's term, the outbreak of the

first Palestinian intifada in 1987 began to sour public American sympathy for Israel

somehow, as its army was increasingly depicted on television screens around the

world as a brutal occupier.77

As the death toll from the first intifada approached five hundred, the Reagan

administration pressed both sides to stop fighting and start talking about a peace-for­

land deal. Insisting that "'Israel's brutal crackdown was doing great damage to its own

interests." Secretary of State George Shultz privately urged Israeli Prime Minister

Yitzhak Shamir in January 1988 to "halt expansion of settlements in the occupied

territories" and to hold free elections on the West Bank for a "Palestinian self­

governing authority" within one year. He also warned until the PLO accepted Israel's

right to exist and renounced the use of terrorism, Shultz declared that the United

States would never recognise Arafat's organisation as a legitimate negotiating partner.

1.3.5. George H. W. Bush Years (1989-93) and the First Gulf War

During George Bush's single term in office, the end of the Cold War and America's

triumph in the Persian Gulf seemed to clear the way for the Arab-Israeli peace

process. Prospects for peace remerged to improve in July 1988, when King Hussein of

Jordan decided to reduce Jordan's administrative role in the West Bank, and Vasser

Arafat announced the PLO would accept several UN resolutions that recognised

Israel's right to exist within 1967 borders, and publicly disavowed terrorism as a

means to achieve PLO's goals. On 14 December 1988, during a press conference in

76 Kathleen Christison (1998), "Bound by a Frame of Reference, Part II: U.S. Policy and the Palestinians, 1948-88," Journal of Palestine Studies. 27 (3): pp. 21-85.

77 Samuel W. Lewis (1999), "The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance," Middle East Journal. 53 (3): pp. 364-377.

41

Geneva, Switzerland, Arafat confirmed that the "PLO undertakes to live in peace with

Israel and it condemns individual, group and state terrorism in all its forms.,,78

Meanwhile the 'glasnost' (a policy of the Soviet Government allowing free

discussion of social problems) policies of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev helped

to end the Cold War, making it possible for the two Super Powers to co-operate.

Meanwhile, Syria and other Arab nations lost their strong political and military

support from Moscow as they became more willing to ease tensions in the region. In

May 1989, Arab leaders accepted Egypt back into the Arab League, and the same year

USSR permitted hundreds of thousands Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel.79

In an unprecedented development in the region, Iraqi troops invaded and

annexed Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The UN Security Council quickly adopted

resolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanded Iraq's immediate

withdrawal. 80

On 16 January 1991, the American-led coalition launched massive air strikes

against Iraq. Almost immediately it was clear the Iraqi fighting force was doomed.

Saddam tried to drag Israel into the First Gulf War by firing Scud missiles at Tel

Aviv. If the Israelis came into the war, Saddam presumably believed, the Saudis,

Egyptians, and Syrians would switch sides. But under considerable American

pressure, Israel did not retaliate; the Arab allies in the coalition held firm; and

Saddam's forces, faced with a ground offensive, beat a hasty retreat from Kuwait at

the end of February 1991.

During the Iraq War the Soviet Union did nothing to protect the Iraqi regime.

In fact, the Soviets voted against Iraq in the UN along with the United States, in a

graphic display of post-cold war cooperation. The decisive defeat of Iraq by

Multinational Forces left the PLO demoralised and dangerously isolated. The PLO's

prestige seemed lower than ever before due to the public solidarity its leaders had

manifested with Iraq. The PLO was punished by the Gulf monarchies, which stopped

fmancial aid to the organisation and the occupied territories during the war and

afterwards. Consequently the PLO made a significant effort to secure a renewal of the

peacemaking process after the war.81

78 Quoted in Douglas Little (2003), American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945, London: l.B. Tauris, pp. 295-6.

79 Carter (2007), n. 66, p. 131. 80 Zunes (2003), n. 59, p. 76. 81 Sela (2002), n. 30, p. 109.

42

Saddam Hussein proposed to link Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait with an

Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories which was greeted with great

enthusiasm by Palestinians. But Bush had refused to accept Saddam's effort to link

the occupation of Kuwait with the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, but

in a gesture toward the Arabs, Bush hinted he would turn his attention back toward

Arab-Israeli peacemaking when he had settled accounts with Saddam. Bush and his

Secretary of State James Baker saw an opportunity coming out of the Gulf crisis to re­

launch the peace process. During the war against Iraq, West Asia team at the State

Department believed the outcome of the war might create conditions in which Arab­

Israeli peace negotiations would prove possible. 82

1.3.5.1. Madrid Peace Conference

As the war came to an end in February ]991 with the US emerging as the only world

superpower following the end ofthe Cold War, Baker embarked on an intensive effort

to convince all the concerned parties. Between March and October 1991 Baker made

eight trips to the region which made possible for the Madrid Conference in 30

October 1991. This was convened jointly by the US and the USSR, attended by Israel,

and several Arab countries including Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, several Palestinians

from the Occupied Territories.

The conference was a breakthrough in which Israel and all of its immediate

enemies initiated face-to-face negotiations for the first time. Subsequently, several

formal rounds of bilateral talks were hosted by the US, aimed at peace agreement

between Israel and its immediate neighbours.83 The Israeli Government, led by

Yitzhak Shamir, took part on condition that PLO was not invited. The only

Palestinians present were the representatives from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,

the part of Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The Israelis and the Palestinians tried to

reach an agreement on five-year period of interim self-government in the West Bank

Gaza, but the talks broke down because the Palestinians insisted on recognition of

their right to sovereignty.84 The Madrid Conference ended without agreement or an

agenda for next round of negotiations. Although the Madrid effort brought no specific

resolution of the issues, the willingness of the participants to communicate with one

82 Quandt (2005), n. 75, pp. 302-303. 83 Carter (2007), n. 66, p. 13l. 84 Jocelyn Grange (2002), quoted in Reporters Without Borders (ed.) Israel/Palestine: the Black Book,

London: Pluto Press, pp. 1-8.

43

another reduced regional tensions and renewed hope of future progress towards

peace.85 The conference was an important step on the roads to peace involving direct,

bilateral, public, and official peace negotiations between Israel and its Arab

neighbours.86

The US-Israel relationship was prickly during the Bush Administration.

However, its fundamentals were not damaged and the stage was set diplomatically for

a quantum leap forward. 87 Bush and Baker were widely credited with realizing that

the end of the Cold War and the defeat of Saddam Hussein created a new opportunity

for Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy. Baker's persistence in working out the procedures

for Madrid Conference won high marks as a tactical skills negotiator.

1.3.6. Clinton Administration and the Peace Process

Bill Clinton came to office with a more promising set of circumstances for promoting

peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Radical Arab nationalism, as

represented by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, had been discredited. Israeli hard-liners

had lost the 1992 election. The political situation changed, with the electoral victory

in Israel of a left coalition led by Yitzhak Rabin, leader of the Labour Party. Secret

negotiations began in London and then in Oslo, between Israel and PLO envoys

through which tentative agreement was reached at the end of August 1993.88

1.3.6.1. Oslo Peace Process 1993

During Clinton's fIrst months in office, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators continued

to meet in Washington. Both sides concluded that the talks were going nowhere, in

part because of intense media attention inside the Beltway. Unconvinced that the

United States knew best, yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat quietly set up their own

secret back channel in Norway. By July 1993 Israel and the PLO were quietly edging

towarci" a peace-for~land deal. Norway's Foreign Minister Johann Jurgen Holst, as

well as, Professor TeIje Larsen and both their wives helped to orchestrate highly

secret peace talks between the Government of Israel and the PLO.89 On 20 August

85 Shibley Telhami (1999), "'From Camp David to Wye: Changing Assumptions in Arab-Israeli Negotiations," Middle East Journal, 53 (3): pp. 379-392.

86 Reich and Goldberg (2000), n. 57, p.250 87 Samuel. W. Lewis (1999), "The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance,"

Middle East Journal, 53 (3): pp.364-380, also see Christison (1998), n. 76, pp. 21-85. 88 Grange (2002), n.84, p. 5. 89 Cited in Cater (2007), n. 66, p. 133.

44

1993, Norwegian Foreign Minster Johann Holst confirmed the two sides had reached

a tentative agreement calling for the PLO to officially to- recognise Israel and

renounce terrorism. For the Israelis to turn over the Gaza Strip and West Bank town

of Jericho to the new Palestinian Authority by the end of the year. Once full

recognition and partial withdrawal were completed, Israel and the Palestinian

Authority would commence negotiations on the final status of the West Bank,

including the fate ofthe Jewish settlements and the future of Jerusalem. 90

On 13 September 1993 Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and PLO Chairman

Yasser Arafat signed the Oslo Accords 'Declaration of Principles' (DOP) in the White

House Rose Garden. The two sides reached an agreement on mutual recognition of

Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The precise details of these

'Oslo Accords' were kept deliberately vague, nonetheless it included:

1) Early withdrawal ofIsraeli forces from Gaza and Jericho area.

2) The redeployment ofIsraeli troops in other areas of the West Bank.

3) Creation of a 'Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority.'

4) The gradual transfer of civic power to a Palestinian Authority.

5) The creation of Palestinian Police Force.

6) The election of a Palestinian Council.

7) Called for a permanent settlement in 5 years. 91

The formal signing oflsraeli-PLO Declaration of Principles on Palestinian Self-Rule

took place in Washington on 13 September 1993 and concluded with a brief but

symbolic handshake between Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat. The implementation

of the agreement was however, delayed due to differences on key security issues

between the two parties. Eventually on 4 May 1994, Israel and the PLO signed an

agreement providing for the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho (withdrawal

completed 11 May 1994).

The Interim Agreement signed on 28 September 1995 (also called Oslo II or the Taba

Agreement), provided:

1) Elections for the 88-seat Palestinian Assembly.

2) Release ofIsraeli-held prisoners.

3) Israeli withdrawal from six West Bank cities.

90 Little (2003), n. 78, p. 30 I. 91 For the text of Oslo Accords (1993), see [Online: web] Accessed 12 June 2005, URL: http://www.

brookings. edu/ press/ appendix! peace_ process. htm.

45

Map 1.5

ISRAEL

I

' .... '2::> -. - - - ,/ _.- -- ._-_."'"

1c=J Ar~ A - Pa'lel!>¢jni;Jn citi~

Ar:ea B - Pale6!Unian villages

Area C - Israeli f>ettllement. military area. and :»ale lan<ts lMaln IST"8efl -&ett:iement&

'.- ---~ ..0- .

-:. I ...

- - - c::

~""-______ ...... ." __ ..-" _ I ... ~n ... ti .. n ... _ ..... § ':_.,., Source: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (2008),

Online: web] Accessed 6 July 2008, URL: http://www.israel­palaestina.de/ landkarten/Oslo-II-1995.gif.

46

Map I.S

ISRAEL

I

- -_ . / ' . D "" _.- -- ._,_0" - .- .

Area B - Pa:tetHinian villages

Ar821 C - IsratJli settllemenl. mili~ry area§ and state lands Main lMitetl ~ttle:n1lenu;

~ ..... __ _ -......c 5_ ..... __ ...."." l_ .... __ bb~

l_J"', Source: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (2008),

On line: web] Accessed 6 July 2008, URL: http: //www.israel­palaestina.de/landkarteniOslo-II-1995.gif.

46

The Israeli establishment withdrew from the West Bank cities by the end of 1995, and

the Palestinian Assembly was-elected on 20 January 1996, sworn in on 7 March 1996.

Although Israel recognised the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians in

the peace negotiations and promised five years of further progress, Arafat failed to

obtain other specific concessions concerning a timetable for Israeli withdrawal from

the Occupied Territories. He got from the Oslo Accords the assurance of organising a

form of Palestinian government and staying in power in order to administer

Palestinian affairs in the West Bank and Gaza.

Although Yitzhak Rabin, Simon Peres, and Vasser Arafat all received the

Nobel Peace Prize for their historic achievement, there was strong opposition from

radical elements on both sides. The hope for further steps towards peace following the

Oslo Agreement was severely damaged with the assassination of Rabin in November

1995 by Yigal Amir, an Israeli right-wing religious fanatic, who declared that his goal

was to interrupt the peace process. "The Israeli Prime Minister died minutes later,

leaving the country in shock at this unexpected act of violence and peace process

without one of its most crucial players.,,92

Unfortunately for the peace process, Palestinian extremists carried out two lethal suicide bombings in March 1996, a few weeks after the Palestinian election. Thirty-two Israeli citizens were killed, an act that probably gave the Likud's hawkish candidate, Binyamin Netanyahu, a victory over Prime Minister Shimon Peres. The new leader of Israel promised never to exchange land for peace. Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon declared the Oslo Agreement to be "national suicide" and stated, "Everybody has to move, run and grab as many hilltops as they can to enlarge the settlements because everything we take now will stay ours .... Everything we don't grab will go to them.93

This policy precipitated Israel's tightened hold on the occupied territories and aroused

further violence from the Palestinians.

The Oslo Accords was the first Arab-Israeli agreement since 1967 that was

negotiated without significant involvement by the United States. President Bill

Clinton may not have done much to produce the Oslo Accords, but he was a gracious

host and spiendid guarantor. The United States, he implied, would be ready and

willing to lend its help for further steps on the way to Arab-Israeli peace. Indeed,

shortly after the White House ceremony, Clinton helped to mobilise international

economic support of about $ 2 billion over several years for development in the West

Bank and Gaza, including a $ 500 million contribution from the United States.94

92 Quantd (2005), n.75, p. 337. 93 Quoted in Carter (2007), n. 66, p. 147. 94 Bill Clinton (2004), My Life, (Autobiography), London: Hutchinson, p. 545.

47

Clinton made strong and sustained efforts to fmd some reasonable

accommodation between Israelis and Palestinians, and endorsed the negotiations to

take their own course. Unlike Camp David in September 1978, Oslo was not an

American-designed agreement, and therefore the parties had less reason to tum to

Washington when disputes arose.95

A nine-day summit conference was convened at Wye Plantation in Maryland

on 23-31 October 1998. This time some agreements were reached involving

redeployment of Israeli troops, security arrangements, prisoner release, and the

resumption of permanent status negotiations. But within a few weeks the Israeli

cabinet voted to postpone execution of the Wye River Memorandum. Consequently,

the implementation of the memorandum did not proceed smoothly. The Israeli­

Palestinian peacemaking was again stalled at Camp David in July 2000 and remained

suspended since the Palestinian uprising began in September 2000.

Conclusion

As a consequence, violent clashes erupted in the West Bank between Palestinians and

Israeli security forces. Since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa inftifada on 28 September

2000, Israeli Defence Forces and the Palestinians have been engaged in confrontation.

Palestinians further demonstrated their frustration at the lack of progress in the peace

process and their failure to achieve statehood. Despite these setbacks, the United

States sponsored a series of peace talks at Sharm ai-Sheikh, Bolling Air Force Base,

and at Camp David in July 2000. The subsequent chapters will undertake a detail

analysis regarding the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada, its consequences, and the

series of peace talks initiated by the US during the last presidential years of Bill

Clinton as well as the fIrst presidential term of George W. Bush.

95 Quandt (2005), n. 75, pp. 330-342.

48