chapter ii towaims lucknow pact. -...
TRANSCRIPT
CHAPTER II
TOWAimS LUCKNOW PACT.
The British Indian Government true to its policy
of 'Divide and Rule,* and despite some efforts
to the contrary, by the Secretary of State, John
1
Morley, succeeded in introducing communal electo
rate in the country. That Minto and some conserva
tive members of parliament were more 'Popish than
the Pope of Rome' is evident from the fact that
whereas the Muslims wanted an adequate number of
seats for them in legislative institutions, or
any other elective bodies, Minto designed and
perfected the idea of complete separation of
Muslims from Hindus in electoral systems and
representative institutions. This is established
by a letter written by Mohsijj-ul-Mulk to Viceroy,
on 7 October, 1908, which read: "Both on Supreme
and Provincial Councils an adequate number of
seats should be reserved exclusively for the
D^ihammedans, The present system of election
applicable to the general body of the people need not be interfered with and it should remain
2 open as hitherto, to all communities.'The Viceroy's
opinion was that "the only representation for whihh
India is at present fitted is a representation of
communities, as I said in my reply to the Muhomme-3
dan deputation." The shrewed Viceroy spared no
effort to see the success of his scheme, as against
- 39 -
the one , advanced by M»rley of 'Mixed Electoral ^ 5
Colleges,• Muslim League was encouraged, conserva-6
tive members of parliament were approached, and
through them was invoked the &elp of the King 7 *
hiaself« Thus pressurised by His Majesty the
King, the conservatives, the Viceroy, and the
Muslim League, the Secretary of State yielded
ground, and agreed to give up his proposal for
'Mixed Electoral Colleges,* and proposed to the - - 8 - • •
'Lords* a communal systea of elections* Lord
Curzon heartily approved of the proposal, and
said, "I think we all agree with his (Morley's)
decision • • • that he was willing to consider an
exclusively Mohammedan electorate returning repre
sentatives to an exclusively Mohammedan electoral
college, I think, if I may say so, that that is a
wise and statesman like decision. But I would like
^ 9
the noble Viscount to go rather further," The
Muhammadans were naturally jubilant.
These developments on the political fimam-
ent of India, were directly responsible for the
birth of organised communalism amongst the Hindus •
The Congress which had stood for the ideals of
Secularism and common nation-hood, got discredited
in the eyes of a section of the Hindus, The wisdom
of the Congress policy, of putting the entire burden of national unity on the Hindus, was
- 40 -
questioned. The Congress leaders were accused ef
sacrificing the interest of the majority to pfila*
cate the minority» which had no intention of forging
a coBUDon front for the national cnuse* It was felt
that the Hindus thoiald establish a separate orga*
nisation to defend their Just rights* The Congress
leaders had been propagating that national solida
rity was indispensable for political freedom* How-
everf as against this, the upper class Muslims
had demonstrated that communalism could be an alt
ernative to national solidarity, and nationalism.
The success of the Muslim League, in obtaining
special status and privileges for the Muslims,
without any agitation or struggle, made communal
politics an honourable and profitable profession.
The advantages of the Muslim model of communalism
over the CongiTess model of nationalism were too
obvious to ignore. A section of the Hindus, there
fore, chose to adopt the path of communalism,
little realising, however, that the Muslim Commu
nalism was not the work of the Indian Mu&Ums, but
the result of a conspiracy between a foreign Govenn-
ment (British Government) and foreign people (The
foreign Muslims), against the people of India.
Bengal, U.P.,Punjab and many other provinces
were aglow with communal fervour. The Punjab Hindu
Sabha, that was set up in 1907, in the wake of Land
- 41 -
Legislations of 1906, acquired added vigeur,
and held a series of annual cenferences fren 10
1909 enwards* It presented a aemerial te L«rd
Hinte, on the lines ef the Mulsim memerial ef
1906, theugh failed te elicit any favourable
response frea him* With the enthusiastic supp
ort of the Hindu leaders of Bengal, Bihar and
U«P«| the Punjab Hindu Sabha succeeded in estab
lishing an All India Hindu Mahasabha, at Hardwar,
in 1913* Although the Hindu Mahasabha failed to
cut much ice in the contemporary politics, yet
the heat generated by the speeches and writings
of some of its leaders, further deteriorated the
already bitter relations between the Hindus and
the Muslims, To cjuote only a few :
Sir TeJ Bahadur Sapru, reacting sharply
to the separatist stand of the League leaders
wrote: "the last meeting of the All India Muslim
League (May 23,1909) at Lucknow, once again
demonstrated the utter hollowness of all talk
about compromise between the Hindus and Mohamm
edans in the matter of political representation.
• • • Will the Hindus even now awake to their
sense of duty towards themselves, towards their
past, and towards their future ? That is the
question which seems to me ought to attract
the notice of every Hindu who has got mind to
- 42 -
think and c«urage t« speak vut* H«w l«ns are
we geing te cry h«arse ever the painful pres-
pect m£ separation ? And hew de we prepese te
prevent that separation ? It seems te me that
the Hindus sheuld net trouble themselves abeut
separation* We in U*P« will be most affected,
by this new doctrine• Will the Hindu aristocracy
or to use the new official phrase, "the natural
leaders of the people,' now come forward and
declare unequivocally what they and their fellow
religionists think and feel about the matter ?
Will or will net they take a leaf out of the book
of the Mohammedan aristocracy ? Or, are they
'leaders' only for the purpose of organizing 11
demonstration of loyalty and leading deputations?"
A section of Bengalee Hindus felt equally
exasperated and asked; "Is there any hope for
nationalism in the event of a misunderstanding
between the Hindus and the Musalmans?", auid
answered, "of course, there is; we should like to
work together. There is no question as to the
greater strength of the rope that is made of
double strand, but in the face of immense nume
rical preponderance enjoyed by one of the parties,
it would be quite clear, even if the history of
of the past had not already elucidated it, that
. 43 -
mutual c*->*perati»n •£ the two great sections vf
the Indian nation Is only an advantage n»t a
necessity te natloziallsa* Hindus are in ne way
inferier in prewess. The bravest race in India
is Hindu» net Mehanuaedans* We have the advantage
in educatlen* It is far the sake ef Mehaiunedans
themselves that we desire that nationality should
be the common causey not for nationality» v^ich 12
cannot utlimately lose whoever opposes it*"
The editor of the Bangalee wrote:"A Pan-
Hindu League has become a necessity of the times,
forced upon us by the circumstances which are not
our creation* If such an organisation is started,
we hope it will, its attitude will not be aggre
ssive or militant. Defence not defiance be its
motto. The great Hindu community has suffered
through the want of such organisations, while
13
others have enormously profited by it."
Lala Lajpat Ral did not think that the
interests of the Muslims differed from -those of
the Hindus. In a letter to the Times, London,
he wrote:"I think it will be relevant to inquire
on how many occasions within the last feirty-
seven years or so, since the Indian Council Act
of 1861 came Into force. Legislative Councils of
India had to deal with questions exclusively or
specifically affecting the Muslims of India as
- 44 -
distinguished from their non-Muslim c«untry»men«
• • • I d« net wish te say ene unkind werd in
reply te the argument based upen the se called
histerical and pelitical impertance ef the Meha-
ouaedans ef India, a vast majerity ef when are
only descendants of the Hindu converts, and are
as much divided into castes and sub-castes as
the Hindus* But does the All-India Muslim League
seriously think that backwardness in education,
want of organisation, and want of enterprise
are substantial grounds for claiming a larger - ' • - • - ~ • • - • - • - 1 4
representation than their numbers entitle them"?
Reflecting the sentiments of the Punjabi
Hindus, the editor of the Tribune commented
that the l>*aslims "were as unimportant or impor
tant as the other communities in this country.
The Mohammedan power had almost vanished when
the English appeared on the scene. Historically,
the English power had not succeeded to Mohammedan.
• • • The Sikhs, Marathas and Rajputs are politi
cally important, because they were holding power 15
when the English came."
Condemning the partisan stand of the Govera-
ment Lala Lai Chand, a founder-member of the
Punjab Hindu Sabha wrote: "The Secretary of State
speaks of the importance of Mohammedans as a
- 45 -
community in the U.P., in^pite of their minor i
numerical strength, but he takes it for granted
that the Hindu minority in the Pun;}ab is of no
importance against the Muhammedan ma;}ority so
that according to the Secretary of State where
the Mohammadens form a majority they must get a
lion*s share as a matter of course; and \^ere they are in a minority» they will get it on the
16 basis of their supposed impoirtance*'* Referring
to the Hindus of the Punjab he pointed out)
"Whether in riches^ intelligence, or influence with
the masses, the Hindus doubtless carry a greater
prestige. The Hindu money-lender may be hated
by some officials but they are ignorant ©f the
vast influence he possesses over the village
folk, including the Muhammedans, He may be parti
ally excluded from the village by the Land Ali
enation Act, but he is still there and cannot
be entirely ousted• He has only to accommodate
himself to his new environment but his influence
is only extended and not curtailed by his inabi-17
lity to invest in land," He asked the Government
vidiether it was "consulting its own interests
in declaring and acting upon the declaration that
Muhammodans possess greater importance? Was"it
not a suicidal policy to create a feeling of
sullenness among the teeming millions of Hindus
— 46 -
18 by telling them that they were ©f less importance??"
Lala Lai Chand showed his anger against the
Congress by condemning it as a "self-inflicted 19
misfortune" of the Hindus« He pointed out:
"There is one thing that is strictly forbidden
within the precincts of the Congress • • • it is
the term 'Hindu'• Resolutions may be passed to
favour purely Mohommedan interests but the Hindu
is tabood here," He blamed the Congress for en
couraging the, Muslim aggressiveness and said: it
"looks to be very height of folly and absurdity t©
go on crying for a united nation, when one impor
tant community, by its words and actions, makes
it persistently and absolutely clear that they
do not desire nor seek for union • • • The method
of offering the other cheek for being slapped
has now been tried over 20 years. There has been
enough of coaxing and fawning, which, by giving
undue importance to the other community, has
begotten only insolence and impudence. May we
not now try the counter-method and see its resulls ?
At least this is a method equally worth trying,
and am sure we shall not thereby be worse off 20
than we are," He exhorted the Hindus to be up
and doing particularly, when "The Mohammedan
community is taking vigorous measures to assert
and constitute its independent existence, it is
- 47 -
21 our duty t© do the same for the Hindus,"
A letter published in the reder*s column
of the Tribune read:"The agitation for poli
tical rights is doing serious harm to the Hindus
in all parts of India while the Muhammedans who
not only kept themselves aloof from their agi
tation but always opposed it, enjoy the fruits
of our labour* • • • The Hindus have been carrying
on agitation at great sacrifice for the last 2^
years for increased political rights being given
to the Indians. . • • Following the example of the
Moslems we must make it a point that whatever
we do, we do for the exclusive benefit of the
Hindu and need not bother for the other communi
ties who can well take care of themselves without
our help. , , • By ceasing from agitation we will
also win the goodwill of the Government which is
so necessary for our progress. The Muhammedans
have benefitted by this policy, and there is no 22
doubt that the Hindus will benefit likewise,"
The Muslim aristocracy, with the success
that the Morley-Minto reforms brought to them ,
were at the crest of the tide politically. Their
marvellous achievement in the face of a strong
nationalist opposition, whetted their appetite
still further, and they included in their future
scheme of things, the extension of the scope of
- 48 -
the communal electorate to the municipal and the 23
district beard leve, and raising the Aligarh
college to the level of a University, with rights
to affiliate colleges throughout the country*
A vigorous CDibpaign was laucnched» and with the
degree of influence that they wielded with the
Government, they were sure to achieve their twin
objective. But unfortunately, there lay in store
for them some disappointments.
The partition of Bengal of 1905, had
greatly flared up the Hindu-Muslim antagonism.
The British had posed themselves as the best
friends of the Muslims, and projected their
scheme ©f partition in the latter's best inter-25
est. Despite a vigorous anti-partition agitation,
launched by the nationalist forces, there could
be no going back on it. The partition was declared 26
a 'settled fact.' But this 'settled fact' was,
however, unsettled, and the re-partition of
Bengal was announced at the Delhi Durbar of 1911•
The province of East Bengal and Assam created in
1905 was to be reabsorbed into the Presidency of
Bengal, and a new province of Bihar and Orissa 27
was to be formed. The Muslims were shocked. The 28
repartition scheme was kept such a secret that
its announcement by the King himself at the Delhi 29
Durbar, left the Muslim League stunned, and the 30
conservatives at home bewildered. The League was
- 49 -
angry with the Government. Mohomed All concluded
in the Cotrade that the government's action
justified the use of vigorous protest; "agitation",
he declared, "is acknowledged by the Government
to be the only effective method of converting 31
then. • • • " Some others, such as Riza Ali,
Samiullah Beg, and Mushir Hussain Kidwai went
so far as to suggest that the Muslims should 32
join the Congress.
Another disappointment came with the
Italian invasion of Tripoli in 1911. The Muslim
aristocracy, with their extra-terriorial loyalties,
desired the British to so shape their foreign
policy as to make the protection of the Muslim
interests all over the world, as its principal
norm, as wrote Mahomed Ali:"One of the ideals
which the Indian Muhammedans have cherished for
long is that the British GoverTiment which rules
over the largest number of Musalman subjects,
should be bound in an alliance with the Muhammedan
powers and Kingdoms, so that their own terri
torial loyalty and extra-territorial patriotism 33
should work in the same direction,* But this
was to© high a hope. The entire British foreign
policy could not have been framed with this
particular end in view. Moreover, if the British
had cultivated the Muslim aristocracy, it was
- s c
ript for the sake mt the aristocracy itself,
but for the success •f their •Mm. (the British)
favourite policy ef »divide and rule.* The
Muslim aristocracy were mere tools in the British
hands to be used as and when desired. If the
Muslims profitted immensely in the process, that
was something different* In the face of the
developments like the bombardment of Meshed by
the Russians, and the invasion of Turkey by the
Balkan States, in addition to the Italian invasion
of Tripoli the Muslims accused the British of
indifference towards the Muslim interests abroad, 34
and felt bitter against them.
The Turkish affairs were important for the
foreign Muslims not only because their 'Khalifa•
was involved but also because they felt more
attached to these lands than to India, Their
immigration to India was purely for mercenary
ends* So long as they had wealth and wielded
authority, all was right, but as soon as that
power was gone, they remembered all those, they
had left behind at home* Every ebb and flow in
their fortune was a matter of concern for the
Muslim aristec]?acy, and so were the affairs of 34-A
Turkey* Accepted as the •natural leaders* of
the Muslims in India, by the British, they tried
to win the support of the Indian Muslims too.
- 51 -
f©r their (foreign Muslim's*) cause. Their efforts
had the effect of weaning the Indian Muslims
away from their Hindu brethren and neighbours,
with v^om they shared their all but religion.
They were persuaded to forget that they descen
ded from the same ancestors as did the Hindus,
and that India was as much a motherland, of
theirs as that of the Hindus, But the pan-Islamic 35
propaganda, had its effects. Simple folks as the
Indian Muslims were many of them were taken in.
This certainly had some dampening effect on
their relations with the Hindus,
The bitter disillusionment of the repar-
titition was still fresh in the mind, and the
British indifference about the Turkish affairs
was causing increasing discontent when in August
1912 the rejection of the Muslim University
Scheme, by the British, brought another dis-56
appointment to the Muslims, It was more so,
because the University plan was not merely an
educational deVice, but something more than that.
It was a political movement, no less than the
campaign to found the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental
College forty years ago was. **Aligarh is destined
to be the focus of all Muhammedan intelligence
and activity in India," the collector of Aligarh
warned the Government,"begun as a defensive move
- 52 -
it is already acquiring an ®ff4nsive character,
« • • The Muslims are not thinking of education in
itself at all, but of more bdys, more subscrip
tions, more candidates for government employment,
more lawyers to fill seats in Council, and more 37
political power generally, Mehamed Ali wrote
in Comrade that the Muslims had distinctive
religious and cultural traditions which they
wished to preserve* They had 'every ambition
to live and act as patriotic Indians and work
for a nationality of which they would be a
component yet conscious part* But they dread the
position of the second fiddle which the new
fangled "Nationalism" of some Indian public
men and newspapers assign to them: ai*Nationalism"
'which is avowedly Hindu in sympathies and aspi
rations, has developed Hindu symbolism and battle-
cries and formula of faith, and draws its ener
gising forces from Hindu religion and mythology.*
For this reason they were organising higher
education on a communal basis, to enable them
•to participate on something like equitable
terms in the vast process of political and 38
social change which is going on in thi^ountrV
The Muslims were sore about the Govern
ments' attitude towards their problems. The
impression went round that the government had
- 53 -
in given in;̂ the face of the agitational approach
of the nationalists, and had completely ignored
the past loyalties of the Muslims; and that the
Muslims too should follow the path of agitation,
and join the Congress to get the redress of 39
their grievances. But that v/as not the approach 40
•f the entire Muslim aristocracy, but only of
the young aristocrats. They were educated and
auBbitious youngmen, with high hopes, but unemp
loyed or under-employed, and with income from
lands either nil or negligible. To enter a Govern^
ment service of one's choice or to make a success
ful career in professions, were equally hard
41
during those days. The Muslims University camp
aign, the repartition of Bengal, the Cawnpore
mosque affairs, and above all the Turkish affairs
had opened up great vistas for the financial
benefits to the young aristocrats. Political
journalism, public subscriptions, and the patrons,
all combined to fill in the once empty coffers.
The disappointments that the Muslims faced
in quick succession, in a comparatively short
period, had their good effects as well, so far
as Hindu-Muslim relations were concerned. The
British policy of 'Divide and Rule' had amply
succeeded in separating the Muslims from the
Hindus and there was not much of love last between
the two communities; yet as they say in politics
- 54 -
there are no permanent enemies and no permanent
friends, the Muslims too were drawn towards the
Congress in the wake of anger that they nursed
against the British, due to the latter's anti-
Muslim policies,
A significant phenomenon of post Syed-
Ahjmed period was the emergence ©f a middle class
in the Muslim society, which, in politics, was
represented by a group of educated youngaen of
progressive tendencies, who strove for, and
succeeded in grabing the leadership of the League,
from the group of old aristocrats. Though both
the groups belonged to the old Muslim aristocracy,
and were descended from the Urdu-speaking elite,
yet they differed vastly in their political out
look. The older group were mainly prosperous
and well-to-do landed magnates, or successful
professionals or Serviceraen; were conservative
in nature, and belonged to the Syed Ahmed School
of thought. The younger group were educated,
and progressive in outlook. Being financially
not very secure, but otherwise adventurous,
they were always ready to employ any means for
their personal advancement, and that of their 42
community. If the government failed to protect
their interests they could discard their old
ally and benefactor, and make friends with the
- 55 -
43 once hated Congress, It were they who ousted
the old conservative leaders of their community
from positions of power and influence, themselves
assumed the leadership of the Mulsim League,
and revised the party constitution to bring it
on lines with that of the Congress, The process
started at the Delhi session of the League in
1910, when a few changes in the Party constitu
tion strengthened their (the younger group's)
position. The membership limit was increased from
400 to 800, the age limit was reduced from twenty
five to twenty-one, enterance fees were abolished
and subscriptions were lowered from twenty five
to twenty rupees per annum, with provision for 44
payment on instalment basis. By June I9II membei*-
ship had increased by 23%f and the majority of
the new recruits were professional men of progre
ssive outlook.
The decision to move the Headquarters of
the League frosa Aligarh to Lucknow was signifi
cant. At Aligarh the party was dominated by the
old and conservative section of the leadership,
while at Lucknow, it was the 'progressive'group
that was at the helm of the affairs. Wazir Hassan,
the Ali Brothers, the Raja of Mahmudabad, Mazhar-
ul-Haq, Syed Raza Ali, Hakim Ajmal Khan, and Dr.
M,A,Ansari, were to mention only a few, that
- 56 -
controlled the League politics, and gave it a
progressive and liberal complexion.
In February 1912 Wazir Hassan became the
Secretary of the League• His hold over the League
and its organisation, till 1919, was so tight
that it came t® be nicknamed the 'Waziri League.*
The first task that Wazir Hassan undertook was
to revise the constitution of the League, to
enable the 'progressives* to consolidate their
hold over it. The annual subscription was reduced
from twenty rupees to six, the educational quali
fications were lowered to •literate' with no
definition, the number of members of the League
Council increased from 40 to 300, and provision
was made for the affiliation of any Muslim .asso
ciation in side or out side British India* Phrases
for the collaboration with the Government, con
tained in clauses (a) and (b) of the old objects
of the League were wiped out, A new clause (d)
proclaimed the adUi of the League to work with
other groups for a system of selfTgovernment 45
suitable to India, The changes were ratified
by the League in full session held at Lucknow
on 22-23 March 1913. Thus the 'progressives'
brought the oboects of the League close to the
Congress, and opened the way for working with it.
The Indian National Congress ritht from
the beginning had been the target of attack
- 57 -
from the British and the Huslims of the Aligarh
hue. They condemned it as representing only a
microscopic minority, and as being a 'Hindu'
body. Despite this hostile propaganda the
Congress went on gaining increased popularity
with the masses, irrespective of their religion, " - -. --. ^ ^..-46 --^- -- • --•• -
caste, language or region. It.launched a vigo-< \ • • • ' • • " • - •
reus cjbmpaign against the partitition of Bengal
of 1905, and condemned the introduction of
communal electorates by the Indian Councils Act
of 190.9 as anti-national. To contain the communal
frenzy that followed the MoTley-Minto reforms,
it suggested to the Aga Khan that Hindu and
Muslim leaders should meet to discuss their
differences. They met at Allahabad on 31 Decem
ber 1910, Though nothing came out of the meeting,
yet the attempt was laudable. The portals of the
Congress were open to all, and that is why the
persons belonging to different communal organi
zations could at the same time, be members of the
Congress as well. This had the wonderful effect
of sobering down of their communal outlook,
Muslim League leaders like Jinnah, Mohamad Ali,
Mazhar-ul-Haq, Mirza Samiullah Beg, Dr.Ansari,
Hakim Ajmal Khan and many others held important
positions in the Congress, at one time or the
other, and so did the Hindu Maha Sabha leaders
- 58 -
like Lala Lajpat Rai, Pt.Madan Mohan Malviya,
M.R.Jayakar, C.Y.Chintamani, Ragindra Prasad,
Jalramdas Daulatram, and many others* Valuable
contributions were made by these leaders, to bring
about the Congress-League rapprochment.
Congress was always anxious to get the
Muslim Leagues' support in their struggle aganist
the British. During the 'Conservative' regine it
was not possible, but when the 'progressive group'
came at the helm of the League affairs, the Cong
ress-League entente appeared within sight* The
common educational background and the personal
relations that the leaders of the two parties
had had amongst themselves, played an Important
part in bringing the two parties nearer to each
other. Muslim League leaders such as Hyder Mehdi
and Kamal-ud-din Ahmed Jafari at the Allahabad
Bar, or Vazlr Hassan and Azher Ali at the Lucknow
Bar, were working alongside the Congress men such
as Moti Lai Nehru and TeJ Bahadur Sapru or A«p«
Sen and Jagat Narain Mullah. These leaders had
developed an affinity and understanding, suffi
cient enough for free and frank political discu
ssions. This amiable atmosphere and the progre
ssive outlook of the leaders of both the parties
were chiefly responsible for the Congress-League
collaboration. Important decisions like the accep
tance of the communal electorate by the Congress,
- 59 -
and the introduction of self-government clause,
in the revised constitution of the League were
taken in friendly atmosphere and in a spirit of
accommodation. It is relevant to note in this
connection that the decision to hold the Muslim
League session to ratify the draft of the revised
constitution was taken by the League council
at its meeting held at Bankipur on 31 December
49
1912. Wazir Hasan and his men were mainly inst
rumental for this decision. The Congress too
held its session there on 26-28 December,1912#
Mazhar-ul-Haq was the Chairman of the reception
committee, and the president R.N.Madholkar recog
nised the expediency of adopting communal repre-
50
sentation for Muslims, In May 1913 Mazhar-ul-
Haq addressed the UP Congress Committee on the
possibility of a Joint Hindu-Muslim Conference,
He brought the League behind the Congress in an agitation over the condition of Indians in South
51 Africa, In 19l4(May) Mazhar-ul-Haq declared that
"there were no political questions in which the
interests of both communities were not equally
involved, or with regard to which they differed.
As far as he himself was concerned he would much
rather be represented on the council by his
friend Gokhale then by anyone else. Our interests
are practically identical," The clause of 'Self-
- 60 -
Government for India within the British Empire*
adopted by the League encouraged the Congress
and the latter greatly appreciated the reali
zation of the League that the political future
of the country depended on the harmonious working
and co-operation of various communities in the
country. In the Karachi session of 1913f the
Congress resolved:
"This Congress most heartily welcomes
t.ie Ixope expressed by the League, that
the leaders of the different communities
will make every endeavour to find modus
operandi for Joint and concerted action
on all questions of national good and
earnestly appeals to all the sections
of the people to help the object we
all have at heart •"•̂''̂
Nawab Syed Mohammed Bahadur, a distant descendant
of Tipu Sultan, presided over the session, and
made an appeal to the Hindus and the Muslims to
unite in the interests of their country, Muhammad
All Jihnah Joined the efforts to make that unity
a reality.
The outbreak of the First world war added
increased strength to the already growing Hindu-
Muslim amity. The people of the entire country
rose as one to offer their support and good-
wishes to the Government, The Legislative Council
- 61 -
of India unanimously passed the resolution of
full support and loyalty to His Majesty's Govem-
raent. The princes of Indian states offered the
resources of their territories as well as their
personal services for the war. The Viceroy, the
Governors, and Lieutenant Governors received
letters and Telegrams from all parts of British
India, from Communities and associations religious,
political and social, also from individuals
•ffering their resonrces or asking for oppor
tunity to prove loyalty by personal service,
India also provided large quantities of men and
materials to fight the war. The achievements of
the Indian soldiers, who helped in bringing
the best trained army in the world to a halt in
France, not only raised them in self-esteem, but
also earned for them eulogies of the British
press. Overwhelmed by the loyalty and support
that India gave to the Empire, the British minis
ters solemnly pledged their gratitude, and within
three months of the out-break of the war the Under-
Secretary of State for India declared that India's
"partnership with us in spirit and on battle
fields cannot but alter the angle from which we
shall all henceforward look at the problems of 54-A
the government of India," Inevitably, India's
new sense of self-esteem was accompanied by a
broadening of political horizons, ,., The feeling
• began to emerge that after the war had finished.
- 62 -
Indian politicans could reasonably aspire t© a 55
further grant ©f political power,
Gopal Krishan Gekhale, who died in February,
1915 had demanded in his political testament, made
knovm in March,1915» provincial autonomy, and the
reduction of the secretary of States' control ^ 56
over the Government of India* Mrs«Besant asked
the\}*P» provincial Congress to claim Self-Govern
ment for India within the British Empire, after
the war, and provided them with a detailed scheme 57
of reforms* The Congress endorsed her views* Wazir
Hasan announced that the Muslim League was pre
paring a Schedule of political demand to be made 58
after the war* By mid-1915» the Indians had come
to believe that the reforms were imminent and
59
were acting on that assumption* Ihe Congress-
League friendship got further boost, and the
League declared to hold its annual session in
1915» in Bombay, at the same time and place as
Congress* The idea was, as explained Jinnah, to provide both the organisations with an opportu-
60 nitjf to confer together on the future of India*
In December 1915 the Indian National
Congress met in Bombay in its thirtieth session.
For the first time in history the All India Muslim
League too met at the same time and in the same
place as did the Congress, and there was the
opportunity for comradery between the leaders of
- 63 -
two great communities. The organisers of both
the bodies were in one mind regarding the need
for cooperation between the two organisations.
Bombay attracted a large number of delegates
from all parts of India to both the political
parties. Though they met in their respective
venues, it was so arranged that the Muslim League
in a body, came to attend the congress session,
"At a joiht Hindu-Mahommendan dinner, which was
organised by some of the educated youngmen of
either community, it was a gratifying and an
inspring sight to see the organisers wearing a
brilliant badge which combined the Crescent
with the Lotus, symbolising the union of the
two faiths in the Service of their motherland and
involving the eye of the thinker to see therein
the realisation of 'Akbar's dream* in the not-
distant future. The inauguration of this policy
of a 'Joint and concerted action' by the '̂ ongress
and the Muslim League has thus been a memborable 61'
feature of the Bombay '̂ ongress of 1915. With
Muslim League coming closer to the Congress, the
leaders felt bold to talk of a definite goal
•for India,
The 'Congress and Muslim league went ahead
in pressing for constitutional demands. Each
organisation foi'med a committee of its own to
draw up a scheme of reforms in consultation with
- 64 -
62
the other committee. The year 1916 saw consi
derable activity in Congress and League circles
in matters of unity and advance. Gandhi devoted
himself, among other things, to the question of
Hindu-Muslim amity. He described before his
audiences the picture of South Africa v/here the
Hindus, Parsis and Muslims lived as brothers,
"We shall accomplish the tasks that face us in.
India only when my Hindu, Muslim and Pars! bre-
them feel that they are all one,"
The Coiimiittees of the Indian National
Congress and the All India Muslim League held a
number of joint meetings in 1916, The principal
issues of discussion were separate electorates
and the percentage of Muslim representation on
the legislative Councils, The Hindus had all along
condemned the separate electorates and so had
done the Congress, but the Muslim League was
adament and was not prepared to give it up.
This spirit of discard and mutual recrimination
had now been discarded both by the Hindus and the
Muslims, Compared to the fast-growing and much
needed communal harmony, the 'separiate electo
rates'appeared a trifle. So the Congress gave
in to the Muslim demands and accepted the princi-
64
pal of separate representation; it even acquies
ced in their introduction in the Punjab and the
Central Provinces where they had not existed befoee.
- 65 -
Seats on the Councils were allotted on a generous
scale. The Muslims on their part agreed, not only
to surrender the additional advantage they had
obtained in 1909, of voting in general constitu
encies as well, but also agreed to reduce their
demand for Muslim representation in the Punjab
from 55 per cent to 50 per cent. A safeguard,
a notable depature from the doctrine of 'majo
rity rule,' was also provided to ensure that no
bill or resolution affecting a community should
be proceeded with if three-fourths of the repre
sentatives of that community were opposed to it«
The decisions taken by the committees were
placed before the annual sessions of the two
parties for ratification. The two bodies met
simultaneously at Lucknow and at their meetings
there was a spirit of complete unity and under
standing. They accepted and adopted the scheme
of reforms as prepared by the committees earlier.
It is known as the Lucknow Pact of 1915, and is
agreat land mark in the political history of India •
There were two parts of the scheme. One
dealt with the Muslim question and the other
with the reforms. The first part laid downi-
Adequate provisions should be made for
the representation of important minorities by .
election and the Mohammedans should be represen
ted through special electorates on the Provincial
. 66 -
Legislative Councils in the following Propor-65
tions:
Province Percentage of ̂ '̂ uslira Population
Percentage of Muslim seats in the Legislative Council
Bengal 52.6
Bihar and Orissa 10.5
Bombay 20.4
Central Provinces 4.3
Madras 6.5
Punjab 54.8
U.P. 14.00
40.00
25.00
33.50
15.00
15.00
50.00
30.00
Provided that no Mohammedan shall participate
in any of the other elections to the imperial or
Provincial Legislative Councils, save and except
those by electorates representing special interests.
Provided further that no Bill nor any
clause thereof nor a resolution introduced by
non-official members affecting one or the other
community, which question is to be determined
by the members of the community in the legisla
tive Council concerned, shall be proceeded with,
if three-fourths of the members of that community
in the particular council, imperial or Provincial,
oppose the Bill or any clause thereof or the reso -
lutien.
- 67 -
The second part of the scheme of reforms
demanded that in the reconstruction of the Empire,
India should be raised from the status of a
dependency to that of an equal partner in the
Empire as a self-governing dominion. The Provin
cial Legislative Councils should consist of four-
fifths of elected and one-fifth of nominated
members. Members of the councils should be elected
directly by the people on as broad a franchise • " — 6 6 - ^ - - - • ••- • ' '••' — --•' - ' - —
as possible.
The Congress-League agreement on India's
future constitutional development was hailed in
the nationalist quarters as a significant sign
of the time. The Congress at last, succeeded in
enlisting the support of the Muslim League for
the national cause. The Muslim response to the
resolution of self-Government was cordial and
constructive. The concept of a common land with
a common future became the dominant theme of the
time. With simultaneous assertion of their demand
for self-Government at the sessions of the Indian
National Congress, and The All India Muslim
League, Indian Nationalism came to assuae a more
formidable character. "There must be satisfaction
all over the country," wrote the Tribune,"that
the question(of Muslim representation in Councils)
has set at rest any further discussion in haggling
which was already assuming an unseemly form, and
that scheme of post-war ref ui-ias prepared by the
- 68 -
joint conference can now go to government, after
the Congress and League sessions have approved
it, with the seal of acceptance by the whole 67
community," The scheme was a hopeful augury
to many prominent leaders, both Hindu and Muslim,
While speaking at the Lucknow Congress in 1916,
Tilak made significant remarks about the impor
tance of Hindu-Muslim unity to achieve the goal
of self-government, "That was the cause of the
dissension ten years age"(at the time Surat
Split), said Tilak, "and 1 am glad to say that
I have lived these ten years to see that we
are going to put our voices and shoulders toge
ther to push on this scheae of self-government,'
Not only have we lived to see these differences
closed, but to see the differences of Hindus
and Muhammedans closed as well, • , , It has
been said by some that we, Hindus, have yielded
too much to our Muhammedan brethren, , , • I
would not care, if the rights of self-Government 68
are granted to the Muhammedan community only,"
Eulogising the part played by the Muslim
League and its leaders, Sarojini Naidu observed:
"Members of this Congress, citizens of India
who have come from the farthest corners in this
great country, I ask you in the name of the
nation that is to born today in this city of
Lucknow to offer your thanks to three men , • ,
- 69 -
the Raja Saheb of Mahmudabad, that fearless and
independent spirited Mazhar-ul-Haque, and thir
dly Mr.M.A.Jinnah, of whom it was that the late
Mr, Gokhale said to me, immediately after the
last Muslim League in Lucknow that he is the t
best ambassador of the Hindu-*Muslim community.
We are united today by the efforts of the Muslim
League, , • , Ours is the right of freedom; we
claim it; we take it; you dare not deny to us 69
the birth-right of humanity,"
Mazhar-ul-Haq, representing the progressive
Muslims of that hour, announced to the Congress$
"In all ay political life I have been of
this opinion that our Motherland cannot advance
without the unixy of the Hindus and the Muhltiame-
dens, , , , You are talkihg about self-Government
and Home Rule, and do you for a moment belieye
that you will get it by talking ? Unless and
until you make ybur rulers believe that you are
earnest, serious in your demand, you will never 70
get anything," •
j^dbiullah, the chairman of the reception
committee, of the Muslim League, at Lucknow observed:
"The affairs of the country which we
Muslims are proud to call our mother
land, have reached a stage, where
they call for the sinking of all petty
differences of race and creed and demand
united action. , . . The future of India
- 70 -
hangs in the balance. • • • Need India
wait for an answer, from the followers
of Islam in this great crisis of her
fate? . • • Let me assure our fellow
countrymen of other creeds, that a
Musalman cannot betray the cause of
India without betraying his whole past.
He shall, God willing, be in the vanguard
of the forces that are to fight the
battles of our constitutional freed,om.
His active political life is of a short
duration, but during this brief period
he has traversed the ground that the
great Hindu community took about a
quarter of a century to cover. The
history of the All India Muslim League
is a faithful reflftx of the political 71
growth ©f Indian Musalmans,"
In his Presidential address, at the annual
meeting of the League, at Lucknow, in 1916, Jinnah
observed:"It is a matter of infinite gratification
to me as well as to all patriotic Musalmans that
the Muslim communal position in this matter has been recognised and met in an ungrudging spirit
72 by the leaders of the great Hindu community."
He further remarked,"Be the time near or distant
the Indian people are bound to attain their full
stature as a self-Qoverning nation. No force in
- 71 -
the v;orld can rob tnor.u of their destiny and
thv/-art the purposes of Provindence , , , If
the Indians are not the Pariahs of nature, if they
are not out of the- pale of operation of the
laws that govern mankind elsev/here, if their
minds can grov/' in knov/ledge and power and can
think and plan and organise together for the
comiuon needs of the present and for the common
hopes of the future, the only future for them is
self-government, is the attainment of the pov/er
to apply through properly organised channels the
coh.mon National will and intelligence to the needs
and tasks of their National existence. The cant
of unfitness must die, the lav/s of nature and the
doctrines of couniion humanity are not different 73
in the East*"
Tae Congress-League Scheme v/as denounced
by those who felt that the concessions given to
them were insufficient or those given to others
were excessive. The Hindus of the United Frovic-
ces and the Punjab condeni-ied the Scheme as it
gave representation to the l-Iuslims over and
above what they v;ere entitled to. In his Presi
dential Address, V.P,Madhav Rao, of'Hindu Maha
Sabha, said at Lucknow, tiiat the object of the
Hindu Maha Sabha v/ould be to educate the Public,
mind on the evils likely to follov/ from a recogni-
- 72 -
tion of this principle and giving effect to it 74
in the coming reforms. The Local Hindu Sabhas
in Allahabad, Beneras, and Kanpur also denounced
excessive representation given to the Muslim
minorities in U,P., Bombay, Bihar and Madras, and
the poor treatment of the Hindu minority in the
Punjab,
Muslims, too, did not lag behind in conde
mning the Pact. Serious opposition came from the
Bengali Muslims, They felt that their interests c
were scarified to the claims of the minorities
in other provinces. The Central Mohammadan Asso
ciation, in a memorial, submitted to Mantagu and
Chelmsford in September 1918, argued "F«r England
now t« place the Indian Muslims, without prpper,
definite, and ample safeguards, under the heels
of a hostile non-Muslim majority, would your
humble memorialists venture respectfully te submi-f̂
be a cruel act of breach of faith and violation 76
of trust," *Resalat*, a Calcutta newspaper wrote :
"The success of the scheme will place the Muslims
under the thumb of the Hindus.Muslim interests
will not be safeguarded unless they get at least
equal representation with the Hindus in the
Councils, This is our and Bengal Muslim League's 77
opinion"• Many conservative Muslims vigorously
opposed co-operation with the Congress, which
they identified as a 'Hindu* body. The Secretary of State for India was told by one 'alim* in
- 73 -
Madras that there was no sanction in the QuraiT 78
for an alliance with non-Muslims. Even much
before the Lucknow Pact was actually signed, the
tirade of the conservative Muslims against the
League had intensified" The stereotyped Congress
Slogans", observed Syed Husain Bilgranii, "are a
79
threat to our very existence". Some Muslim news
papers too showed their annoyance at the Congress-80
League rapprochement. According to Al Bashir(U.P), the pro-C»ngress Muslims were isolated from their
81 community and were unaware of its problems, Al-
Mxzan (U.P.) denounced Wazir Hasan, as an oppor
tunist, whose ambition was to achieve prominence 82
through his alliance with the non-Muslims. The
Muslim opp.onents of the Congress-League rappr
ochement had earlier joined hands to prevent
the Muslim League Session from being held
concurrently with the Congress Session at 83
Bombay in 1915.
But all these voices of protest and idi-A
gnation were of little consequence and in-effec
tive. Sir James Meston, Lieutenant Governor of
U.P. wrote to the Viceroy:"The Christmas meetings
at Lucknow caught up and consolidated popular
sentiments as few political events have done.
Extremists and Moderates had united after years
of misunderstanding; and greatest marvell of all,
- 74 -
the Muhammadans also had come into the fold.
A few Moderates may grumble here and there,
and a few conservative Muhammadans may urge that
the League does not really represent their commu
nity. But they do nothing. They are voiceless in
public, they do not hold meetings, they have
completely lost command of the Press, For all
practical purposes they have, for the time at -
least, disappeared as a separate party. The resul
tant union «f all voices has filled educated Indja
with a pride and a feeling of nationality which EU
it is impossible to ignore,"
It is significant t© observe some British
reactions to the Hindu-iyhislim fraternisation. The
revised constitution of the League in 1913 invited 85
the following comments:
"I regret to say that in my opinion the
new constitution of our old friend, the Muslim
League, embodies a mistaken and dangerous policy.
If I were now a district Officer, I should feel
it my duty to disuade my Indian Muslim friends
from joining the League",
(C.R.Cleveland, Director of Criminal
Intelligence dated 4.2,1913)
"The League have now definitely joined
hands with the Congress in including in their
"objects" the attainment of self-government and
of thus confusing an indefinite ideal with a
- 75 -
visible goal, practical steps towards which can
only mean, at the present stage of Indian devel
opment, conflict with the authority, and violent
political agitation.
(R.H.CRADDOCK Home Member of the Viceroy's
Council, dated 15.2.13)
Even Sir James Meston, the Lieutenant
Governor of U.P. who later, had to concede the
strength of Hindu-Muslim entente at Lucknow,
in his memorandum to the Viceroy in April 1917f
was irked by their growing friendalaip. In a letter
written to Lord Hardinge on 23 December 1915» he
showed his unhappiness at the successful efforts
of Lord Willingdon, the Governor of Bombay, to
compose the differences of two sections of the
League, regarding the holding of the League
session of 1915» at Bombay. He wrote:
"Lord Willingdon in his good nature has
given our Locknow gang a somewhat inflated sense
of their own importance by his action in perso
nally composing their differences with the Bombay
moderates. • . • Had we been asked earlier, I
should have told Lord Willingdon that our people
( and, as far as I know the Punjab people also)
do not want the League to meet at Bombay Just now
and be snapped up by the Congress, that the small
clique which Wazir Hasan Organises and Mahmudabad
- 76 -
feeds, are in no sense representative of the
Muslims of North India, and that a triumph of
this coterie will be taken as a triumph for 86
Mohamed Ali and his followers",
Mr» Montagu, criticising the Congress-
League Scheme in the House of Commons, in his
speech on 5 June 1919, remarked "It does not
attempt to realize responsible government, but
it leaves an irremovable executive at the mercy
of a legislature which can paralyse it but net
direct it.*