Chapter III

EXTERHAL Ilfli'LtJ!.<]\lCES s ROLE OF THE ffi'JITT.!:D STATES, 1.'.JEST ASIA AND CHIN A

Chapter III

EXTERNAL llJFL U:EN C ES : ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES , WlmT ASIA AND CHlli A

The three main influences on Pakistan's nuclear

programme have been those of·: (a) The United States,

(b) West Asia, and (c) China. Let us look into these

influences one by one.

I. Role of tlle UD1~ Sta~U :

The active role of the United States in Pakistan's

external p~licy began in 1954, the time when the two signed

the Mutual Defence Agreement, negotiations for which had been 1

going on for some years. Liaquat Ali Khan himself had, while 2

touring America, talked in terms of alignment with the u.s.

Extremely difficult internal conditions, discussed in

the previous cr~pter, and the fear of a larger neighbour -­

India -- were the main guiding factors which turned Pakistan

towards the West. According to Venkataramani, Jinnah and

L1aquat Ali had also sought massive rnili tary aid. While the

former• s request was ignored, the US decided to ship "secretly" 3

arms to Pakistan on latter9s request; the move, however, failed.

-----·--1

2

3

S.M. Burke, 'Ma1ll§Pt1ngs .Q!_lndian angPak;is!fani Forew PoliQ1,~§ (Minneapolis, 1974) , p. 121. .r--·· /"

Liaquat had saids ur have come to assist America discover Pakistan." He also pledged support to US actions in Korea, wbic h he said "were saving Asia from danger of world Conmn.mism''. See Arif Hussain, J?~ista~ Ita [ore1gn Policy: Alld...l~o~ (London, 1961), p. 93 and iaquat Ali Khan, ~~Jhe Heart Qf. A§i.a (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1950)' p. ~. .

M.s. Venkatar8Dlani, Ameri~aan £tol§ in P8kJ..ratan, 1947-.l9.58 (New Delhi, 1982), p. 21, 127.

73 uranium to India.

·ts

One of the first steps of gesture towards Pakistan was

the offer of aid worth~ 400 million out of which~ 200 million 74

was military aid. President Zia rejected the Carter aid

offer term,1ng it "peanuts" and instead, sought a treaty 75

guaranteeing Pakistan's security.

In February 1980 a high level US team comprising National

Security Advisor Zbignew Brzezinski and Deputy Secretary of

State Warren Christopher visit~d Pakistan. While downplaying

the prospects of such a treaty, held open prospects of ?6

increased aid. They also warned that a Pakistani nuclear

test would spell the end of any US assistance.

Pakistan was adamant on the nature of co~nitment during

the subsequent discussions also. In fact a US military team

visited Pakistan as Brzezinski visit was drawing close. There

were a ntmber of lists drawn up consisting of what the US was

prepared to give and what Pakistan felt it needed, the

------73 The reason offered by Carter was that since the US had

already shipped 200 tons of enriched uranium, it would be foolhardy to stop now, because the Indians would reject even the limited safeguards. ~ (London), 1980 and Tahir-Kheli, no 11, p. 141.

74 Spector, n .. 31, p. 85 ..

75 Zia called ~ 400 Million "Peanut".. 1nternat1®al ~erald Ttl~, lB January 1980.

76 Ibid•

79

77 discrepancy was enormous. Both sides maintained their

respeetive positions and an impasse was reached in the months 78

that followed. The situation, however, changed when Ronald

Reagan succeeded Carter.

Shortly a-rter taking office in 1981, the Reagan

administration began negotiations with the Pakistani

President, Gen. Zia,for a US economic and military programme

far larger than the one that had been proposed by President 79

Carter. By June an agreement was reached on a siY.:-year

$ 3.2 billion aid package, including sale of 40 advanced C-16 80

fighter bomberse In approving the aid in 1981 the Congress

granted a six-year exemption from the Symington amendment•

However, it also strengthened a portion of law prohibiting US

aid to any non-nuclear .,.1eapon state that subsequently detonated 81

a nuclear explosive device. Under Section 670 of the Foreign

?7 Tahir-Kheli, n .. 11, p. 103. The Pakistani list would ha,re cost~ 11 billion. Inclurled in it were radar, aircraft, anti- tank missiles, armed helicopters, tanks, APCs light field art illery and guns.

78 Lord St. Budies, "New Perspective on the H1ndukush", Intem.a..tigna1 Se~rl:t.I', vol. 15, no. 3, Hinter 1980/81, p. 170.

79 Don Oberdorfar, "US, Pakistan Progressing on New Aid Package", \jasl;i,.Ilil.tgn PQ~~' 22 April 1981 ..

80 Spector, n. 63, p. 104.

81 Foreign ASsistance Act of 1961, Sect~on 670 (b)(2) 1981. Quoted in Spector, n .. 31, pp. 91-93 and also see Spector n. 63, p. 282o Under the 1981 amendment the US aid shotiid be cut off automatically, although the President could continue assistance for 30 days of "continuous session if he determ:f.ned that termination of assfstance would be detrimental to the national security" of the United States 7 after that aid would cease unless restored by majority vote of both Houses of Congress·.

80

Assistance Act, prior to its amendment in 1981, Pakistan was

ineligible for assistance because of its import of enrichment

equipment. This restriction was removed by the Congress, 82

Pakistan became eligible for the % 3~2 billion aid.

In 1982 the Reagan administration warned Gen. Z1a that

US aid would be jeopardized if Pakistan began to extract

plutonium from spent fuel at its unsafeguarded New Labs 83

reprocessing plant.

As has been stated in earlier chapters, by 1984 Pakistan

had made considerable progress in the enrichment field.

Dr. A.Q. Khan declared that Kahuta plant had succeeded in

producing enriched uraniumo Gen. Zia subsequently confii~ed

the point but said that non-e;rade \veapon material had been 84

produced. In a speech in June 1984, Senator Cranston

declared that Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme was continuing, 85

Reagan administration offic:i.als also admitted this. The

Kry"tfort affair, also discussed earlier, further lent

credence to these assertions. The ACDA Chief, Kenneth

Alderman wa~Ged against the "daneers of Pakistan's nuclear

programme". The US-Pakistan ties) ho-...-rever, remained cordial.

82 Spector, n. 63, Pe 282.

83 Ambassador Renold I. Spiers's speech to Karachi Institute of Foreign Affairs (International Corrununication Agency News Release), p. 13, cited in Spector,_liew NugleAI lim~ (Carnegie Endowment, New York, 1985), p. 116.

84 Nucl~ar EwU, 27 February 1984, p. 11.

85 Senator Alan Cranston, ''Nuclear Proliferation and US National Security Interests", Cgngressionsal...fu!~, 21 June 1984, p. S 7904.

86 Patriot and Hindustan Times, 13 October 1984.

81

In fact there were reports of the United States offering

nuclear umbrella to Pakistan, provided Pakistan gave up . 87

the nuclear option. In September 1984 President Reagan

sent a letter to President Zia expressing strong US concern

over Pakistan's continuing nuclear activities, threatening

grave consequences in the event of Pakistan enriching uranium 88

to more than the specified five per cent.

But an amendment moved by Senator Cranston to the

continuing resolution appropriating money for fiscal year

1985 that woulrl have cut-off aid to Pakistan, unless the

President specified that it was not developing a nuclear

explosive device or acquiring technology and material for 89

detonating a device was rejected by the Senate.

On 16 November, Yaqub Ali Khan, Pakistani Foreign

Minister visited the United States assuring the Reagan

administration of Pakistan's willingness to limit the output 90

of the Kahuta facility, as a reply to Reagan's letter.

In February 1985 Gene Zia said that Pakistan had acquired

------87

88

89

90

Nawa-1-Wagt, 5 October 1984e The US embassy in India denied to comment on the correspondence between President Reagan and Gen. Zia. The spokesman for the embassy said that the "President has regular correspondence with the world leaders, but we do not con1rnent on any of that correspondence or whether such correspondence took place."

David Ignatius t "US Pressuring Pale is tan to Abandon Controversial N ... Arms Programme", Wall St,t~~.Joyrna.J., 28 October 1984.

Spector, n. 83, p. 117.

"Shadow of an Indian H-bornb", lgr~igp B~~' 13 Dec ember 1984.

82

enrichment to a grade necessary to run the plant ••• less 91

than five per cent.

On 13 March 1985, Reagan administration agreed to

supply Pakistan with sophisticated air-to-air missiles to 92

bolster its defence against Soviet and Afghan incursions.

In 1985 while approving aid for Pakistan, Key House

Sub-committee and Senatorial Foreign Relations Co~~ittee

adopted an amendment seeking to restrict Pakistan's nuclear

programme. \.Jhile the Sana to rial committee noted that aid

could continue as long as the President determined that it

did not yet possess a nuclear device, the sub-committee

adopted an amendment to suspend aid to any non-nuclear weapon

state that violated US export laws in order to obtain equipment

for the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device. The

provision gave the President a broad discretion to waive the 93

application.

On 21 June 1986, the Soviet Union, in its series of

warnings over Afghanistan, for the first time warned Pakistan

against developing nuclear weaponsa The United States warned

the Soviet Union, in a reply to the warning, not to interfere

------91

92

93

"A Step nearer the bomb ••• " .Q.Q§eryer (London) , 24 February 1985. Zia repeated this in an interview to ~ri§ti~D Science Mgn~~' 1 March 1985.

''Pakistan to get US air-to-air Missiles", l~~ia], T:1Jp~, 14 March 1985. ·

International Security Development Co-operation Act of 1985 7 P.L. 99-83, Sections ..,._ 1204 a.md 902, cited in Spec tor, n. 83, p. 287·~

83

94 in Pakistan's affairs. However, when Junejo, Pakistan's

Prime Minister, visited Washington in July 1986, the United 95

States expressed concern over the Pakistani nuclear programme.

Amid reports of the nuclear activities discussed in

detail in the earlier chapters, including those of the US

intelligence on Pakistan's success in producing weapon grade

material, President Reagan certified in October 1D86 that 96

Pakistan "does not currently possess a nuclear explosive dev-ice".

On 18 December 1987, a Pakistan-born Canadian Arshad

Parvez, was 1:onvicted in Philadelphia for attempting to export 97

bErryllium, a metal used in nuclear weapons to Pakistanc The

verdict in the case made clear that the jury believed that the

material was intended to support Pakistan's nuclear weapons

progranune. The Government of Pakistan bas denied any involve-98

ment in the episode. Nevertheless, in mid-January 1988,

94

95

96

97

98

Bob Woodward and Don Oberdorfer1 "US Pakistan Clash on Pakistani Bombn, .lntSitDM:1QDsJ.. H~~l.d Tribun~, July 1.986; "Soviet Warns PakiStan on Bomb, America Complains to Russia) N.e\j X2.tt It.ID~, 16 July 1986, reproduced in ~~~~ Pl~~ vol. 17, no. 12, December 1986, pp. 1R10, 1811.

Spector, n., 63, p. 116,,

Bob Woodward, "Pakistan reported near Atom Bomb Production", lifghii:"ton &:qst, N oYember 1986, reproduced in Stru~ ~ __ e __ , n. 94, p. 1815.

~an ~Dr~s[, 19 December 1987 and~~' 17 February 1988. Parvez was convicted of five of eight charges levelled against him including the charges of violation of US export control laws and conspiracy to defraud the US Department of Commerce.

Patti~, 7 December 1986. Gen. Zia said the Pervez case had been cooked up by the us.

84

President Reagan determined that Pakistan had violated the

Solarz Amendment. The President simultaneously waived the

cut-off in the provision, however, to permit continued

assistance to Pakistan.

Thus one can safely conclude with an excerpt from

a Carnegie Endowment report, prepared by a Task Force of

16 specialists which says :

In sum, on several occasions, the United States has backed a\..ray from enforcing the sane tion of an aid cut-off against Pakistan permitting the waiver of Symington Agreement through legislation in 1981 and again in 1987; waiving the Glenn Amendment by Presidential Action in 1987!• declining to react to the production of highly enr ched uranium in 1986 and 1987 to avoid suspension of assistance even though Pakistan had apparently acquired the wherewithal for its first nuclear device; and waiving Solarz amendment in early 1988, despite finding that Pakistan had attempted to smuggle material out of the United States to be used in the manufacture of nuclear explosive device. 99

The inference which follows from the above stated facts

can be summarized as :

(a) It may not be fully correct to say that the ball is no

longer in the US court. It never \vas -- in the earlier stages

US role was minimal because the programme itself was modest.

In the later stages, Pakistan was, at not cost, ready to give

up the option. The us, despite concrete evidence, was forced

to waive its 0\.J"n rules in 1981 and again in 1988.

99 NucJ.~ar Wla12gn§ an!L§.21!th Asun Se,.9ur_!tx : Report of the Carnegiendowment Taslc Force on Non-Proliferation and South Asia Security (Carnegie Endowment) (Washington, DC, 1988) ' p. 4.

85

(b) The myth that the US is interested in implementing non-

proliferation measures stands exploded. Not only the President,

but some of the most ardent advocates, Senators Church, Percy

and Glenn almost retraced steps w·hen the vested interests came

up.

(c) The success of US in getting the deal cancelled was not

a success in terms of achieving the so-called non-prolif'erati6DL

.D.J!:a::W Pakistan. In the controversy 1t turned Pakistall (and

successfully so) in adopting the other route to the nuclear

weapons, namely enrichment.

(c) Pakistan was successful in obtaining the parts from

Europe and other nations because of the commercial interests

of the companies involved and because of the gap in the guide­

lines of the London Supplier Group of which Pakistan made use

of, just as it was able to get the ban on arms sales lifted.

II. liQle of Wes.t JU!iA i Iswic BQml2.

In an interview to a local daily of Jeddah, Gen. Zia-ul

Haq called for a careful study of the meaning and implication

of the word "Islamic Bomb". The President said the us, Israel,

Soviet Union and India have atomic bombs and asked as to why

they were not called "a Christian bomb, a Jewish bomb, a communist 100

bomb or a Hindu bomb". In another interview A.Q. Khan

described the word "Islamic Bomb" as a "figment of the Zionist

-------100 ~~~r M~, 14 March 1982, quoted in JD~News Revie~

___ S_uth Ask_ and Ind,lan O~ean, 1982, p. 162·.-

86

mind" which r1.as been used in full force by the anti-Islamic 101

Western countries".

Gen. Zia and so would A.Q. Khan do well to remember the

concept was mooted by Zia's predecessor, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. In

his last testament he had said, "we know that Israel and South

Africa have the full nuclear capability. The Christian,

Jewish and Hindu civilization have the capability. Only the

Islamic civilization was without it, but this position was 102

about to change".

I slam, as shall be seen subsequenUy, has played an

important role in the country's politics, nuclear issue being

no exception. Louis Hayes has said : "The political and 103

social essence of Pakistan is Islam".

While this is debatable, the fact remains that Islam

has been made use of, time and again, by every leadership,

sometime or the other, beginning with the Objectives Resolution

of 1949, which sought to base the constitution on the ideals of 104

Islam. Thus all tbe three constitutions have declared

---101

102

103

104

Interview to N.fLa~t.-vJaJl.ti 10 February Supplement, ci ed-rn ~Qr_d~de RepQrt UQJ.1ferat1on sng_ DW-eloJ2ment, JPRSo 1984, p. 33.

Bhutto, n. 44, p. 138.

1980 Magazine : Nyclegr mB - 84-85, 5 March

Louis Hayes 1 £.Qlitics :j.n ~at;J.stan-L...§..kyggle fi>.t J;.§g1t1~ ~London, 1.984), p. 40. ·

G.vr. Choudhury, ~stirutioU£r~velopm~nts !D f~~ (London, 1~9 , edn 2, pp. 35-36.

87

105 Pakistan as an "Islamic Republic of Pakistan". Ayub had

106 initially dropped the word "Islamic" but had to reinstate it.

The constitutions also talked of enabling the Muslims to lead

their lives in accordance with the tenets of Islam and fostering

unity among l-1Us11ms, nationally and internationally, by setting 107

up advisory councils. When Fatirna Jinnah was put as a

candidate against Ayub, he got a Fatwa issued from Ulama that

the head of the state could not be a woman under the Islamic 108

law. His land reforms in accordance with the Islam 109

showed lip-service being paid to Islam.

By the time Bhutto came to power, Islam had already

percolated down to masses, as a state religion, pragmatisnt

guided him not to disturb the status quo. In his manifesto

Islam was the din of the party, apart from the usual Islamic

features, there was a separate section - Part IX - containing 110

provisions relating to Islam. Vlhile in his election speeches

he called it Islamic soc ialisrn, to rai sa public sentiments in

his favour, be imposed some Islamic provisions when popular

dissent rose against 'bJ.m towards the end of his career -- he

Choudhury, n .. 104, p. 72 ..

Munir, n. 106, p. 84 ..

Hussain, n. 2, p. 43 ..

Munir, n. 106, p. 86 ..

88

declared Ahmadiyas as non-Muslims (without saying who a Muslim

was), introduced prohibition on a stricter scale, banning 111

gambling and declared Friday a holiday.

When Gen. Zia came to power on 5 July 1977, he sa1.d 112

he had accepted the challenge as a "true soldier of Islam".

His Islamization measures include setting up of Shariat

benches (imposing Islamic punishment), Islamic baik1ng,

levying "usher" and "zakat" ~ not to miss banning political. 113

parties that do not believe in Islam, to name a few.

Compared to the domestic politics, the role of Islamic

foreign policy has had sharper variations.

114 uinnah had said : "lt1 11 be friendship with all nations".

Pakistan, ho'"ever, espoused the cause of Arabs on the

Palestinian issue and stood for creation of Er1 trea on the 115

basis of Islamic brotherhood.

Disillusioned with the Commonwealth Conference in May

1949, Liaquat Ali Khan stated in terms of option open to

Pakistan and launched a campaign to bring Husl1m countries

--------111

112

113

114

115

Ibid., pp. 90, 96.

Jamil Rasheed, "Islamisation Vs Politic1sat1on Poses DUemma in Pakistan°', !Ju:...J!:~stern §c..Qnomic fteyiey 9 June 1984, p. 42 ..

Z1a' s speech to Majl1s-e-Sboora on 12 August 1983. Asian Sury~y1 vol. 24, no. 2 1 February 1984, pp.219-20;

"Zia Vows to ~tep up ISlamization", ]indu§tau Tim~, 1 February 1985.

Qaig-1-Az.wn_§.rula.l\.2 (Karachi, n.d.), p. 93.

Hussain, n., 2, p. 134 and f~~§tan....ligtlz.Q.D 1 vol. 12, no. 3, 1960,·p. 126. The reason given in that the Muslim population was against anything like Ethopean rule.

89

116 together. First International Islamic Economic Conference

was held in Karachi in December 1949. During 1950-51, treaties 117

of friendship were signed with many Muslim countrieso There

were also reports about Pakistan supplying arms to many Arab 118

countries. Zafrul1ah Khan toured several Muslim countries

in 1952 to invite 12 Muslim Premiers to attend a conference

for setting up a system of consultation on the question of

common interests.. The conference, however, never took placeo

By 1953 Pakistan was giving up "its policy of running after 119

MUslim countries".

Pal';:istan• s join:i.ng \-/estern alliance system came in for

sharp criticism from the Arab countries, both from the

conservatives and radicals. Thus while Saudi Arabia wondered

how an ISlamic state of Pakistan could accede to those who had

joined hands with Zionist Jews, Egypt, which had deep hostility

to Turkey, saw 1 t as a manouevre to split the Arab world at 120

Egypt's cost.

Pakistan's role during the Sue:~ Canal crisis was

peculiar. Popular sentiments were in favour of Egypt.

Suhrawardy ;howevel] sho\.red cool detachment for Egypt. This

116 ~§ian News (New Delhi, Embassy of Pakistan), · 18 September 1951.

117 Hussain, n. 2, p.£t3 Iran and Iraq supported Pakistan on the question of Kashmir.

118 ~f!.:tan News, 3 June 1950. The report was, ho\.rever, denied.

119 l~ E£QDQill1~ (London), 29 May 1953.

120 :Hushtaq Ahmad, UJ,cistsn.!.§ Eoretgn !:21~ (Karachi, 19 68) ' p • 71.

90

the Prime Hinister said that "what has happened in Egypt is a 121

threat to P.uslim world, but the threat has not come from UK". In fact, in a statement issued later on 23 November 1956 he

said: ttEgypt ivas blocking the canal" and the reason for not

calling UK the aggressor vras because the UN had not found her 122

so". The crisis thus brought loyalties to the surface.

Patcistan' s relations with Egypt deteriorated further when

Nasser did not welcome the idea of President Mirza visiting

Egypt in N overnber 1956, who was visiting MUslim countries, nor

did it accept any contribution

was in the wake of these deteriorating relations that Pakistani

Prime Ninister said, "The Arab vrorld is divided, even 1f they 123

\..rere united zero plus zero would always be zero."

Ayub toured several Islamic countries, but there were

no particular change in Pakistan's policy. In April 1960

when Nasser visited Pakistan, he said, "I do not vrant to use

Islam in international pol! tics" though P ak.-UAR agreement 124

required the inspiration of ISlamic brotherhood.

In the 1965 Indo-Pak war Syria and Iraq sided with

Pakistan. Material assistance came from Iraq and Turkey and

----121 H.R. Khan, "Pakistan's Relations with UAR",

~~istgn HQrb~~ vol. L3, no. 3, 1960, p. 45.

122 ~~~ ContemQgr~ry Archiv~ (London, 1956), p. 15230.

123 Hussain, n. 2, p. 144.

124 Da,vn, 11 April 1960. Nasser was honoured with Nishane-e-Pakistan$ He offered to mediate in Kashmir issue but not unless India is prepared~

91

125 Jordan argued for Pakistan at the United Nations. In 1966

Ayub condemned Israeli attack on Jordan and sent fighter planes 126

to latter. ·His policy \-las pursued by Yahya, in fact there 127

were reports of Pakistanis fighting in Jordan in 1970.

In the 1971 Indo-Pak war Egypt was reported to have 128

allowed USSR to use its territory for lifting weapons. 129

According to Bhutto Iran had helped Pakistan during the war.

After the 1971 war Bhutto worked assiduously to strengthen

ties with the Huslirn states, after being disillusioned with the

US and China for their role in the war. He appealed to all

Arab nations to stall any proposal to accord recognition to 130

Bangladesh.

Pakistan played an active role in the 1973 Arab-Israeli

war. According to Bhutto Pakistan had made response to the 131

request for arms. Pak training missions were conspicuous

-----

·-·

125

126

127

128

129

130

Madmood Safdar, A Pol1.~1gal Stugy _of P ~is :tAD (Lahore, 19?2), p. 222; Pakistan also received military assistance from Regional Cooperation Development (RCD) under military offshoot of CF.NTO.

12..Swn~ 14 November 1956 and 25 November 1966.

Pak;~stan Ob§~I'::l~, 18 Narch 1970;_ .illJ}Q.u§ta;n_lliru!, 28 1ay 1970 and lbe 6r~~' 21 uctober 1970.

Al Ah!:am (Cairo) , 12 March 1976 quoted in Dawn, 19 March 1976; also see ~~' 1~ April 1976.

Hingustan Time~, 23 Kay 1972.

The Hin..<.m, 21 JUly 19?2 •

131 12ID£D, 12 July 1973; But he refused to specify the nature of contribution·.

~ I

92

in Syria, Egypt, Saucli Arabia and an appeal was made to the

UN Secretary General and President Nixon to review American 132

policy in Middle East. Kausar Niazi, the then Federal

Information Minister said an attacl<: on Arabs was "an attack 133

on us".

Bhutto continued his tour vJhich he had broken short in

the wake of Arab-Israeli war. Bhutto took the lead in

organising the Islamic Conference and hosting the second 134

Islamic sumrn1 t in Lahore in 1974.

With the rise in the wealth of the Arab states in 1970s,

Pakistan benefited economically from these relationships

receiving hundreds of dollars as economic aid. According to

the Pakistan~Q.llQ.m;!.Q....§~: "Pakistan has special relation­

ship with the countries of the Middle East and has received

valuable economic assistance from these countries since 1973-74

by way of general purpose, balance of payments support as well

as loans for the implementation of country's priority 135

development projects". What these priority development

projects are, it does not specify.

In 1974-75 Pakistan was the second largest recipient of

the OPEC aid and bet'"een 197~4 to mid 1976, five Arab countries

132

133

134

135

1--t.G. Vleinbaurn, "Pakistan Enters Middle East", in Rat, n. 6, vol. 2, p. 793.

~~' 8 October 1973.

Tahir-Kheli, n. 11, pp. 63-64e

fat1s~n Ec~ex..t-1.91.a::8.0 (Ministry of Finance, Governmen~r-P~-rstan, Islamabad), p. 159.

93

136 and Iran provided grants and loans vTorth nearly $ 1 bi1liona

From 1973 to 1979-80 asststar.ce 'lororth ~ 1222.5 was received 137

from Iran, Libya, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and OPEC Fund.

Besides equity participation aid loan for financing important 138

high priority projects met with considerable success".

Total economic assistance from these sources upto March 1980

amounted to~ 1776 million, ~ 88&66 million in the form of 139

grants and $ 1688.14 million as loans.

In the background of Bhutto era, Pakistan's relationship

with Libya deserve& special mention. The ties between Muammar al­

Qaddafi and Bhutto were strong particularly in 1974, the time

when an agreement was signed under which Libya agreed to 140

finance Pakistan's nuclear programme. According to a BBC

report, there '.vere various secret meetings between Libyan and

Pakistani representatiYes. The Libyans wanted the entire

capab111 ty an<1 were ready to supply the money. According to the

--------

137

138

139

140

Sheikh R. Ali "Pakistan• s Islamic Bomb", j~Pacl£1~ Con~n~ty, no. 16, Spring 1982, p. 77a

~~_]£QP~m1g syiY~z, n. 135.

These included Pak-Arab refinery in Mus1tan, an Engineering and Medical College in Baluchistan 500 KW transaction line from Tarbela to Karachi, Pak-tibyan Holding Company, cement plants, Pipri thermal project etc.

§ynd~l I1~s (London), 18 January 1981, p. 8, quoted in JPRS, W~u:J.gw1de R~pgrt, Nucl§ar Dey§J.oument and frQl1ferat1Qn, 26 February 1981, p. 1.

Herbert Krosney and Steve Heisrnan, fslamic B~~ (Times Book, USA, January 1983 reV" sed edn. , pp. 62-65; Edward Yirardeh , "Is Qaddafi Financing Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb", Qhti.§ti§D §ciens;;~ Monits>r, 19 December 1979.

94

report "stagging consignments of money -- somet:tmes as much

as a hundred million dollars in cash -- was specially flown 141

The flights began in December 1975. from Libya to Pakistan".

Thr~'e countries out of sixteen, 'lis! ted ,by Bhutto along with

Khalid Hassan were Sudan, Ethtopia and Libya. According to

K haJ.id Hasan, "He didn't get 1 t from Haile Selaissie, I can 142

assure you".

There were other countries, the Gulf states and Saudi

Arabia alqo interested in the project. Their interests,

however, were different from those of Qaddafi. They

principally wanted Pakistan to possess the expertise. Qaddafi

extended his stay in Pakistan 11hen he came to attend the

Islamic Conference. Addressing a meeting he told the

Pakistanis "our strength is your strength, our resources your 144

resources". Money was offered according to Feldman, "during

Qaddafi's visit in 1974 and to have been agreed to bring 145

Jallaud'ti 1978 visit". It is quite possible that since

the meetings stated in the BBC programme vJe.-<t<e highly secretive,

this was seen as the first open attempt by Libya to have offered

the aid. In return Libya was said to expect a sample of future

141

142

143

144

145

"!:~~ 7Q6 : The J;slamic Bomb", Recorded from BBC Programme, ~anora~a, 15 June 1980, p. 4.

Ibid., p. 3.

Ibid.

~' 26 February 1974.

Shai Feldman, ~~~~l~ar Detetren5~ ; A §trategy ,iQr the1980~ New York, 1980 , p. 31·.

95

146 Pakistani bomb. There were also reports of a joint

147 Libyan-Pak plan for nuclear test in Libyan deserto

According to Spector, "Although it has been widely

speculated that in return for this aid Pakistan promised to

provide complete nuclear vJeapons to Libya, the consensus in

the US intelligence community, according to knowledgeable 148

officials :f.s that Pakistan never agreed to sue h a quid pro quo""'

Arguing along the same lines Feldman says, "If Qaddhafi

really expected to receive Pakistan's nuclear weapons, he was

bound to be disappointed. Pakistan is unlikely to surrender

control over mass destruction weapon to leader of such ill

repute. The political costs likely to follow a possible

intelligence penetratlon of this sort of transaction would 149

be enormous."

He, hm-.rever, does not rule out a mora modest contribution

to Libyn. from Palcistan, for instanc~e, in providing enrichment

or reprocessing services, whereby Libya could get weapon grade 150

material through a "short cut«. With the fall of Bhutto, 151

ties w1 th Libya touched a lmv ebb.,.

146 For~1gn ijeugrts, 9 August 1B78.

147 Feldman, n~ 145, Pe 81.

148 Spector, n. 31, p. 77.

149 Feldman, n. 145.,

150 Ibid.

151 John K. Cooley and Lisa Kauforem, "Deterring a Qaddafi Bomb" 1 ~§JJ~.o.n Po~, 26 December 1980; Fore.ign Re:got», 9 July 1981.

.. I

96

As stated earlier Gen. Zia maintained the "Islamic

links" with the l-1usl1rn countries. Aid has continued to flow

even in the subsequent years. In 1981 Kuwait gave aid worth 153

and Islamic Banl{ worth fZ 19. 4 mUlion. 152

1 130 million, 154

In 19S2 OPEC gave a loan of Jl 25 million,· 155

and Saudi Arabia

Jl 500 million (for buying six F-16s)G Military assistance 156

from oil rich nations in 1983 amounted to Jl 1000 million.

The Jeddah based Islamic Development Bank launched operation 157

worth% 89,170,000 in June 1984. Besides workers•

remittances from Middle East rose from 25.5 per cent in 1972-?3 158

to 77.9 per cent in 1985-86.

So far as aid for nuclear plan is concerned, the ties 159

were maintained. Niger supplied uranium in 1979.

After the US s t~pped the aid, Mufti Mahmurl, PN A Chief,

visited a number of Arab countries and said that these countries 160

would make up for the loss in aid. Saudi Arabia became the

------152 .,Ims of India, 2:3 August 1981.

153 ~U§1~s~ Becotdar, 27 August 1981.

154 _The Irtbijne, 15 August 1982.

155 T~m~§ of !.Dw, 14 January 1982.

156 Ibid., 26 February 1983.

157 Ibid., 26 Jtme 1984.

158 Pa,tist51n m£,onomlc _survev: ll;l86-87, p. 61.

159 State~ma~, 12 December 1979.

~,-~0 ID~...l'.!:iburw, 16 July 1979·.

. t

97

161 main donor. Saudi Arabia's willingness to provide

financial support for Pakistan's nuclear programme, says

Feldman, vras aimed- at "preventing Pakistani-Libyan or 162

Pakistani-Iraqi nuclear co-operation".

In fact in 1981 Saudi Arabia reportedly offered $ 500

million to help make a bomb, seeking an agreement to exclude

Iraq and Col. Qaddafi from the proposed project. Pakistats

made good usa of the opportunity.. In the initial meetings held

between Saudi Deputy Minister of Defence and Aviation, Prince

Turki-as-Sajar a~d Petroleum Minister, Sheikh Yamani, and Agha

Shahi and M.A. Khan, Pakistanis said that they had no, money and

were left with the choice of either dropping the project or

going to Iraq. Sheikh Yamani offered % 250 million, which was

turned down by Pakistan. Saudis were forced to offer more 163

money -- ~ 800 million --vThich was acceptable to Pakistan.

Besides there were reports of Turkey having offered 164

its site for testing Pakistan's ntr.lear device. Kuwait,

reportedly also tried to help Pakistan's nuclear plan by 165

making a bid to buy heavy water for Pakistan.

---·----161 "Saudis Reportedly aiding in Bomb",

~shtngton st~r, 19 January 1981.

162 Feldman, n. 145, p. 155.

163 Edith Leonard, "Saudi Offer to help Zia build H-Bomb", Sund~..ll~, 18 January 1981.

164 Times of India, 29 September 1981; also see ibid., 10 September 1982. '

165 lb~~~~' 1 December 1983, p .. 40, cited in ~! JlQ.Ildw1Q.e Report gn N ugl~..J2Uels;wm!)nt and l:!.Ql.i!erall,Qn, 12 January 1984. -

98

The Arab compulsion tovrards acquisition of nuclear bomb,

has been explained in terms of the uncertainty in Israeli

nuclear strategy. ·Israel has a full fledged nuclear programme, 166

The Arabs are \..ri th speculation abounding on its posture. 167

in search of a deterrent against the Israeli capac! ty.

Within the Arab world, the most fre~uent Arab response

to the possibility that Israel will acquire nuclear weapons

has been to threaten that this would lead Arabs to do the

same. Thus Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Jordan have on more

than one occasion individually expressed the desire to acquire 168

nuclear weapons 11~~ IsraelG

Then came the question of alternatives within the Arab

world. Egypt has a modest nuclear proe;rarnme since. the 50S,

------166

167

168

According to Feldman, the uncertainty about Israeli nuclear strategy is about whether Israel's position is that of "nuclear option" or "bomb on the basement"e The former, according to him, "implies that operational weapons have not yet been assembled but that the capability exists to do so wi.thin a relatively short time. A bomb in the basement positive nuclear weapons have been assembled but that this fact has not been disclosed. Those who believe in Israel's posture to be "nuclear option" speculate the length from a few weeks to a few years. Among those who believe that Israel has \·!Capons in the basement estimates range from a few to more than two dozen. See Feldman, n. 145, pp. 7-8.

Zalmay Khalizad~ "Pakistan and the Bomb", liDlle:tjn ot 'fomic Scientis~~' vol. 36 no. 1 January 1980, p. 15,

srael•s EViden Nuclear tapabiltties have increased the incentive of these countries (Arabs) to acquire similar capabilities.

Feldman, ne 145, pp. 69-70. Detailed reference of speeches by Sadat, Assad, Qaddafi, Saddam Hussein and Iraqi leaders from 1974-81·.

99

169 which received impetus after it ratified the NPT in 1981.

Iraq \>Tas also a moderate power till mid 70s, which could ?\..ot

have emerged as a nuclear power had its reacto~en destroyed

by Israel on 7 June 1981, became a signatory to NPT on 170

29 October 1969. Syria's programme is still in embryonic

stages, its economic energy commissions having been established 171

in 1976. In Libya, also a party to NPT, Libyan Atomic

Energy Commission was established in 1973, subsequent

___________ _,

169 The Egyptian Atomic Energy Commission was founded in 1955, and the Centre for Nuclear Research was opened in 1957. In 1961 Egypt acquired a 2 mw Soviet made nuclear research reactor. However subsequent attempts to acquire reactors - 130 }M from UK in 1963, 2600 MW from USA in 1974 (promised during Nixon• s visit did not materialise). It \>~as only after Egypt decided to ratify the NPT that agreement 1.ri th USA and Germany materialized. John Cooley, "Egypt Assessing Nuclear Strength", Qbrlstian ~~~on1t£),I, 2 January 1975; John Cooley, "Cairo ~s Clear of A-race" Ibid., 2 January 19?6· lnternat1ona1 H~t~ld Tr!bu¥1, 7 August 1976; Feldman, ~. 145, pp. 70-71; lPterna iona1 Herald Irinull§, February 1981; Financial Times, 8 February 1981.

170 Spector, n. 31, PPo 166 .. 71. "HO\..r Iraq lost its nuclear option" 1 Iofie1::: Repoe, 11 April 1979; "Iraqi Nuclear Arms Option , ~sbln _n Post, 8 August. 1978; · "Iraqui build up stirs Concern", Washington Post, 27 February 1978; "Iraq's Nuclear Plan setback by three years", Jerusalem~, 9 June 1981-. According to Spector, n~ pp. 163-65, France has agreed to in principle to help rebuild the facility under strict non-proliferation controls, the matter remains under negotiations.

171 Feldman, n. 145, p. 76. Syria plans to build six Goo HW reactors, first of which is expected to be completed by 1991. Intetnational Herald Tribune, 17 June 1981.

100

172 developments have been slow.

According to P alit and N amboodiri, Bhutto exploited the

Arab sentiment (yis-.a::.D.§ finding a deterrent to Israeli bomb).

It was sometimes around 1973-74 that Bhutto sold the idea of 173

Islamic bomb to Col. Qaddafi and King Faisal. According to

Weinbaum and Sen, "Bhutto had tried to convince Arab states

that· they would profit from Pakistani know-how, should the 174

French build the nuclear plant". Besides, the Arabs anyway

were providing "considerable generous economic and military 175

aid to Pakistan after the 1973 oil price revolution".

The Middle East connection can be seen in Pakistan's

reaction to US decision in 1979 to cut off aid. Pakistan

172

173

174

175

According to Spector, l'{YQl~ar f.J:Qlif'erati,.QJ) IQ.dtcr, n. 31, p. 149, Libyan programme appears to be limited·~ training students abroad and operation of a small Soviet supplied reactor research centre at Tajoura. In March 1976 France agreed to supply a 600 MW nuclear power reactor. The agreement was signed during Chirac•s visit to Tripoli, hm.;ever France backed out of it later. "Rumours of Libyan Atomic Bomb Quest Raise Fears", }&asW.ngtQn PQst.,., 30 July 1978; !:greig!) Report, 9 August 1978; F,g:r:ei.&n B~.:wn:L 18 June 1980 p. 35. Libyan repeated attempts to puT·chase atomlc bomb from China did not succeed and later refused. ~eLgn ReQg~ 9 August 1978. s~e Feldman, n. 145, p. 75.

Ma.i. Gen D.K. Palit and P.K.S. Namboodiri, Pak,istan .and_J:sla.mi<: BQlll:Q (New Delhi, 1969), p. 86.

Heinbaum and Sen, in Rai, n. 6, p. 800 ..

Rodney 11. Jones, "Nuclear Proliferation : Islam, the Bomb and South Asia", ,lia§J1i~t2D Paper§_N.Q.a_S,2_ (published for Centre for-strategic and lnternational Sttldies, Georgetown University, 1981) , p. 51-.

101

charged that the decision was "the outcome of Israeli efforts to

stop Pakistan from sharing advanced nuclear research with . 176

fellow Islamic countries".

Discussing the Islamic bomb concept Akhtar Ali says, "A

Pakistani nuclear bomb may not be that Islamic and that there 177

are severe limitations to its usage". He lists instances of

infighting among the Arabs, Egypt Vs Syria, Egypt Vs Iraq, Syria

Vs Iraq, Iraq Vs Jordan, to name a few, besides dividing them

into the conservatives, moderates and radicals.

Arguing it further he adds, "Even if we assume that

Pw~istan ventures to do so (transfer nuclear weapons), it

might be possible only in normal peace time, when military

vigilance is low, to clandestinely affect sue h a transfer.

But who would be the recipient? No Arab country would be

willing to take the risk." With heavy American influence in

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Gulf States and Egypt, he thinks transfer 178

is not possible without the knowledge of Americans.

Pakistan in contrast to all these countries had a well

established civiliF.tn nuclear programme. Another notable feature

was that while all the other Arab countries had acquired wealth

in the recent years (thanks to the oil bloom and the consequent

----------------176

177

178

David Buchan, "Gate Shuts on Pakistan• s N~lear Sale11 ,

.U.!1~m1al. Times , 11 April 1979 •

Akhtar Ali b1£ts~:n• s Nucle~uru~ Energi.-aJJL S~qurity_Qi~e~ion§ (New Delhi, 1984), pp. 91-92.

Ibid., p. 95.

102

cartelization of the petroleum exporting countries) they still ~

lacked the inffastruc ture, the leadership w1 th the requisite

vision and skilled personnel. A bomb could not be supplanted

in the relatively hollow infrastructure of these countries

whereas Pakistan with its well established earlier nuclear

programme was a much better choice compared to the best of

potential Islamic countries. Pakistan had a well established

infrastructure, the trained personnel and requisite leadership,

and the only difficulty was financial which the Arabs were ready

to solve. It is possible the Arabs saw Pakistan as the only

u1 timate choice (to meet the Israeli threat).

A more acceptable conclusion has been drawn by Cronin,

· who says:

If Pakistan transformed a nuclear device or placed its nuclear capabilities in th~ service of Arab states, Pakistan would play its card for a questionable gain and would face severe penalties from the ~~est, Nonetheless, a Pakistan nuclear :::apabili ty \-IOuld have a great impact on the 'Hiddle East in view of Israeli perceptions concerning the 1 Islamic bomb' • 179

While attempt has been made in this chapter to trace

Pakistan's links with the Arab world, at no point~ time it

is implied that Pa1(istan is acfluiring the capability to fight

the Israelis or submerging its identity with the Arabs. The

entire gamut of Pakistan and Arab connection is traced just

179 Ric hard P. Cronin, "India and Pakistan", in Synder c., F. Samuel Wells, Jr., eds, ~~ liuclear £roillerat1QD (Massachusetts, 1985), p. 78·.

63

As far as the United States was concerned the alliance

was part of the US move to promote a "regional association of

non-communist countries in South Asia" and securing such 4

military mights in South Asia. It got "base facilities for

reconn!sance flights over USSR and China -- significant 5

privileges in the era before spy satellites". Incidently,

1954 was also the year the US exhibition "Atoms for Peace"

toured Pakistan and was seen by hundreds and thousands in the

major Pakistani cities. The exhibition, which carried a

message from President Eisenhower, explained "the virtues of

the new found sources of alternative answers to man's search 6

for energy, food and medical treatment".

The signing of the Mutual Defence Agreement served as

a precursor to a number of other agreamentso Pakistan became

a member of the Sout"' East Asian Treaty Organisation on 7

8 September 1954o It joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955

(renamed in 1959 as the Central Treaty Organisation). The 8

United States, however, never formally joined tbe Pact.

4

5

6

7

8

Ibid., p. 138.

Rodney .Jones, "Mending Relations with Pakistan", .lfa§l}iDJdjgn Quar.t.flrly, Spring 1981, p. 20.

Shirin Tah1r-Khel1, ''P akistan• s Nuclear Option and US Policy", in Hameed A.,K. Ra1 , . ed., ForS'J.gn Pol1,cx pf fikt§~iD (Lahore, n.d.), vol. 2, p. 501.

~2cwnswts gn ilil~rt~Jl!l.Eoreigp R§lat1,on~s, 1954_ New York, 1955 , PPo 373-78 •

. :·

Venkataramani, n. 3, p. 368. It was felt by the US that indigenous Pact members sought to use the pact for their own narrower purposes that were not in consonance with us policies.

J

The alliance, according to Dulles, however, was not directed 9

against India. Nehru also claimed to have been thus 10

reassured by the American side.

In 1957, under the "Atoms for Peace" programme

inaugurated by the us, Washington supported Pakistan's entry

into the UN International Atomic Energy Agency and helped 11

elect it to the Board of Governors. Several research

institutions (including Oak Ridge, Brookhaven and Argonne)

entered into bilateral agreements with Pakistan to help train

its personnel for a role in the programme of Pakistan Atom:lc 12

Energy Commission.

As the relationship unfolded in the 1950s there was no

incongruity between 1 ts pursuit of nuclear policy and the US

policy. In fact, as stated earlier, nuclear issue itself had

not assumed prominence in the Pakistani politics till the

sevent13s. Therefore the question of its being or playing a

determinant role does not arise. The argument that "nuclear

issue was fairly typical of the big-brother attitude adopted 13

by the US and welcomed by Pakistan in 50's", does not carry

9 Ibid., p. 361. Dulles in fact said that he had sought "categorical assurance" from Pakistan. "Under the principles of UN Charter, the us would be supporting India, if it became victim of any armed aggression", he said...

10 ~ot sa~ Debat~, 12th session, vol. II, 1956, pp. 3041-50.

11 Sbirin Tah1r-Kheli, Un~~=~ Sfi~~ ~~P.alli~D L Tbft JWoJ."iiQ.n of oo Inrliie:c Jle riihiD (Praeger, 1982) , p. 11 •

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid .• I i

I

65

much weight. In fact in 1960, the US and Pakistan allowed

their nuclear co-operation agreement to expire anticipating . 14

that Pakistan could seek further assistance from the IAEA.

The only contribution of significance was that in 1960

the US Atomic Energy Commission approved a grant of 1 350,000

to Pakistan for the installation of a 5 MWe pool type research

reactor at Rawalpindi, estimated total cost of the project was 15

~ 3.5 million. In 1961, the US firms were retained to study

the feasibility of construe ting one or more nuclear plants in 16

Pakistan.

A nmnber of radiation centres were set up at Labore,

Tandojam, Faisalabad, Karachi, Islamabad and Pesha\var where

isotopes and x-rays were utilised for agricultural, medical

and industrial purposes. It has been claimed by some writers

that "in all phases of the Pakistani nuclear programme the US

was generally helpful until a series of events occurred in the 17

1970s". The details of the help) however, have not been giveno

14 Warren H. Donnelly, f.WUftM~ s. NuclJiar ~ttvtlli,LLA.. g~ooolggi of [gyt-E~~Cor~resstonal Research Services, T Library of Congress, Washington DC, 22 August 1986), p. 21.

Ibid. 15

16 ~Y§M ~~ sEa ~Iis ~gui nmte'r <;apa91.11tj.es o~ Ind!§., rag! fbya ailSista : epor prepared for the ub-

comm t ea on arms con rol, oceans and international operation and enrichment of the committee of foreign relations, us Senate by the environment and natural resources policy division. Congressional Research Service (Library of Congress, January 1982), p. 50.

17 Shirin Tarrl.r-Khel1 7 n. 11t p. 118.

I

66

In fact in the 60s the US-Pakistan relations in general

were not very good. Soon after Ayub Khan came to power, he

wanted to change the pattern of relationship with the West -­

favouring a relationship based on equality rather than that of lS

Western dominance. In practice, however, the relationship

remained unchanged. In fact, under the Bilateral Agreement

of Co-operation with the US in Harch 1959, the US got access 19

to Peshawar base for ten years. The US-Pru{istan axis 20

w1 tnessed 1 ts climax in the U-2 spy plane incident&

. Things, however, changed soon w1 th the victory of Kennedy 21

in 1960 elections who had a "soft-spot" for India. In the

1962 Sino-Indian border war, India sought and got assistance 22

from the United States. The aid was not contingent on Indo-23

Pak settlement on Kasl'mlir issueo Pakistan henceforth started 24

looking for allies elsewhere -- in Chinao Since Pakistanis

lB Mohammad Ayub Khan, ~§..Not Mast'i!r§ ; ~1tica.L ~n:Wlz (London, 1967), p. 156.

19 Sbirin Tahir-Kheli, n. 11, p. 7.

20 A US U-2 plane flown from Peshawar by Francis Gary Powers was shot down while flying high across the Soviet terri­tory. The Pakistanis had leased a cite for electronic intelligence base at Badaber in Peshawar.

21 Sangat Singh, Paki§tan•s Egr~ign fg~ (Delhi, 1970), p. 92.

22 Frank N. Yager, "US and Pakistan : A Fiure of Democracy", in Ra1 , ad., n. 6, p. 446.

23 Russel Brines, The Indo-P~ QonfliQt (London, 1968), p. 210.

24 Burke, n. 1, p. 179; China offered an aid of 1 60 million and an assistance on Kashmir issue to Pakistan. I:~istaD ]Qr1za1J (Karachi), vole 17, no. 1, First Quarter 1.9 4, p.4-.

I I

were aware that they could not do without aid from the United 25

States, Ayub decided not to break away from the alliance.

During the 1965 war Ayub sought President Johnson's

intervention but the US remained neutral, imposing a ban on 26

both India and Pakistan. The ban, however, was lifted on 27

12 April 1967. With the ascendancy of Richard Nixon in 1969,

US proved favourable to Pakistan, as Pakistan was seen an

effective via media by the US in its attempts to normalise 28

ties with China.

However, in the Indo-Pak war in 1971, the United States

by and large refrained from any direct action apart from sending

a task force led by an aircraft carrier "Enterprise" into the

Bay of Bengal on 15 December 1971, a day before the war ended 29

and condemning India at the United Nations. Earlier the 30

United States had cancelled its aid to Pakistan on 8 November 1971.

25 Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Preliminary Analysis of Pakistan's Foreign Policy", in S .P. Verma and K .P. Mishra, ed., ~1gp pol1c1es LD South~a (Bombay, 1969), p. 103 and Mohammad Ayub Khan, "Pakistan and American Alliance" in Rai, n. 6, p. 429.

26 Denartm~nt gf Sl§u BuJJ..s?..t1D (Washington, D.C.), vo1. 2, no. 1346, October 1965, p. 543.

27 Burke, n. 1, p. 190.

28 Tah1r-Khe1i, n. 11, p. 35.

29 Ibid., p. 44. According to her, Nixon was not using the Task Force as a military instrument but rather as a political instrument.

30 The Anderson Papers 1 however, revealed that Nixon did not stop aid to Paklstan but manipulated transfer or arms through third countries. Jack Anderson and George Clifford, The Anderson Papers (London, 1970), pp. 205-69.

/.

68

The year 1972 is significant from the point of view of

nuclear developments~ AS stated earlier, this was the year

when the crucial decision to go nuclear was taken at Mul tan.

Wl111e it cannot be ruled out that the failure of the United

States to help Pakistan could have influenced Pakistan to

develop its own security options, it would perhaps be too much

to say that the US inaction guided Pakistan on a nuclear path.,

AS stated earlier, Bhutto had all along ·9Lle:J. for developing

a nuclear weapon option. In fact the US did not make .any move

to dissuade Pakistan till the reprocessing deal was signed.

Clearly, the United States did not see Pakistan as a~ potential

nuclear power till then, at least not till the Indian nuclear

explosion in 1974.

Part of the explanation lies in the fact that these

developments were highly secretive~ For instance, the small

secret reprocessing facilities - New Labs - was built with the

help of the Belgian firm - Belgonucleaire and SGN, "although

the French Government may not have been a\ltare of SGN 31

participationno The Programmes were,according to a US 32

analyst, unknown to the US officialso

Thus while Pakistan was negotiating with France for

the reprocessing plant, India detonated a device in Rajasthan

-·------31

32

Leonard Spector, HJtclear fLQlH§.U..tJ.gn...Igda.y (Carnegie Endowment Book, Vin ga Books New York, 1984)! p. 75; Steve Weismann and Herbert Krossnay1 :tslal!LC~mn,b (Times Books, 1983 Rev Edn. New YorkJ, p. 83.

Spector, n. 31; p. 78.

33 desert near the Pokharan mountainse Bhutto characterized

the Indian explosion as a "fateful development", saying, "the

explosion has introduced a qualitative c bange in the situation 34

prevalent in the subcontinent" o He sent his Foreign Minister,

Aziz Ahmad, to various Western capitals in search of a "positive

response to Pakistan's request for protection against possible 35

nuclear blackmail from India". The move did not yield any-

thing bee ause the United States and other Western nations did

not want to get involved in matters that, according to their 36

judgement, did not directly impinge on their national interests.

Following the exploston, however, the US intensified

efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. In the fall

of 1974 the US convened a secret meeting of the principal

nuclear suppliers nations in London in an effort to gain 37

acceptance of a uniform set of nuclear export standards.

The fact that Pakistan's nuclear plans were not in the

open was made use of by Bhutto adequately. Thus just prior

to the lifting of arms embargo in February 1975, Bhutto said

that Pakistan's nuclear weapon policy was "under constant

review" and depended on whether Washington provided Pakistan

33 K.K. Pathak, Nucle~r Policy gf Ind1a (New Delhi, 1980)' Po 132.

34 ;ottjgn Atf9Irs Recor~ (New Delhij Ministry of ore gn Affa rs), vol. 20, no. 6, une 1974, p. 195.

35 Tahir-Kheli, n. 11, p. 120.

36 Ibid.

37 Spector, n. 31, p. 78o

I

70

38· with sufficient conventional weapons.

The us did not doubt Pakistan's intention: till February

1976 as stat~d earlier in the previous chapter. It voted in

favour.of the Pakistani-IAEA agreement embodying these controls

when it came before the IAEA Board of Governors and appeared 40

prepared to go along with the sale on these terms.

I

Things changed soon, however,. The election year - 1976 -

found Ford on the defensive Iis-a-~1§ campaign by Carter

especially on non-proliferation issues o The latter lamented

that the "Republicans had rewarded India with additional supplies

of nuclear material even though India, not an NPT party, used 41

our past aid to explode a nuclear device". Ford thus felt

"obliged to respond" and to somehow placate the fears within

the Indian lobby inside the Congress and the State Denartrnent 42 -

of another pro-P ak1stan1 tilt i.n the making. The growing

Congressional pressure particularly from Senators Rebicoff,

Glerm, c;hurch and Percy compelled Ford administration to

pressure Pakistan to dissuade 1t from advancing its nuclear 43

programme. Accordingly, the United States approved the

38 E ok.i§ tan Tim~, 7 February 1975.

39 Tahir-Kheli, no 11, PP• 122-23. According to her, "If the pursuit of nuclear option was at one end of the security spectrum, pursuit of a more concrete conven­tional supplies was at the other."

40 Spector, n. 31, p. 79.

41 ~all, St.r~fAt Jo\WlaJ., 11 January 1978.

42 Tahir-Kheli, n~» 11, p. 124.

43 Ashok Kapur, "A Nuclear! zing Paltistan : Some Hypotheses", j.S1,QD Sy,;o;u, volo 20, no. 5, May 1980, p. 509.

71

Canadian action to cut off the supply of fuel to KANUPP.

As stated earlier, Kissinger personally journeyed to

Pakistan and France in 1976, to pressure both to cancel the

deal. It was during this meeting that Bhutto said Kissinger

had threatened him to cancel the deal or else we "would make 44

a horrible example of you". Kissinger is also reported

to have offered 100 A-7s to break the deadlock for the

cancellation of the reprocessing deal, the offer 1 however1 d1d 45

not materialise.

The US pressure on France, also, did not yield anything

initially. The Gaullist government rejected the US measures

as being ineffective and impinging on matter of French national

sovereignty. Chirac had called the deal a matter between two

sovereign states and that there was no question of accepting

US pressure "in an affair that concerned only France and 46

Pakistan".

After Chirac's resignation in August 1976, there was 47

a shift in Franc h policy. Giscard d' Estaing visited the US

in October 1976 and in December 1976 the French Government's

order on discontinuing the further sale of reprocessing

44

45

46

47

Bhutto, lL.un..AsAa~sinat.wl (New Delhi, 1979), p. 138·.

l~ .. iin<:W, 17 November 1.976; Warren w. Unna, liUS ttempt to Wean Pindi Away", .2.:talumaD.a. 17 November 1976.

f,ak,istan .Urnes, 7 August 1.976.

WA§bingt~n ~2~, 6 December 1976.

72

facilities was made. 'rbe order as stated earlier, however, 48

was not to affect the existing deal with Pakistan.

Things changed in the US also with the ascent of

Carter. For Nix:on-Kissinger-Ford proliferation was not

a high priority issue as it v1as to Kennedy and Johnson. 49

Ford's response to elections (Congressional pressure) has to

be seen in the context of the elections. There was a feeling

in Washington that once the elections were over, Congressional 50

fervor could be controlled.

One of the first measures adopted by him was to stop

the sensitiv~ transfers of nuclear technology even though the

NPT permitted sue h transfers with safeGuards. The Inter­

national Security Assistance Act of 1977, which amended tbe

Foreign Assistame Act of 1961 and authorised international

security assistance progranunes for 1978 required changes

which carne to be popularly known as Symington-Glann Amendment

(Section 670). It dealt with nuclear reprocessing transfers

and nuclear detonations and stated that no US funds were to

bu used for providing military assistance or granting military

education. Further, no military credits were to be made or

48 I~ ~iQd~, 12 December 1976.

49 Kapur, n .. 4..'3, PPo 509-10 ..

50 Ibid. This optimism was, according to Kapur, under­lined by Nixon-Kissinger-Ford approach to keep the US dialogue with potential proliferator alive bilaterally. This team had insisted India after 1974 explosion but was unwilling to persuade India by cancelling contract for supply of enriched uranium which fuelled the eight water reactors.

73

guarantees given to countries which deliver nuclear reprocessing

materials or technology to any other country or is not a nuclear 51

weapon state as defined in the NPT.

The amendment was, however, accompanied by a provision

that the President may furnish assistance other~nse prohibited

under the act if he certified in writing to the House and the

Senate that the termination of the aid would be "seriously

prejudicial to the achievement of US non-proliferation 52

objectives or jeopardise its common defence and security".

The US pressure did not break any grounds with Pakistan.

Bhutto had condemned the US efforts of delaying the deal had 53

talked in terms of revoking the allia~e. "We are not treated

as well as many other countries which are not even friendly with 54

the US", he had said. He also accused the US of a "massive

huge international conspiracy against the Islamic State of 55

Pru<istan, including a plot to oust him (Bhutto)". While it

51

52

53

54

55

Richard P. Cronin, "Prospects of Nuclear Proliferation in South ASia", !UW:UEJ Eg,st fftm.a.J,, vol. 37, no. 4, Autumn 1983! pp. 612-13 and Comm ~ee on Foreign Relations and Comm ttee on Foreign Affairs ~Qgial~iog gn-E2teigtt !lela:t1.0:fLih:rough 19Za (Joint Committee us Congress, Washing on D.C., US Printing Office, 1979), vol. 1, p. 146, cited in Tah1r-Khel1, n. 11, p. 132.

Ibid.

Nattgna1 Herald, 9 November 1976.

D~~ 4 December 1976.

Times of Indta, 29 April 1977. The United States, however, pro ested against the allegation. H1 ndu~~- . .Iime s, 30 April 1977.

is difficuJ.·~ to assess the viability of the charge, the fact

remains that the US succeeded in getting the French reprocessing

deal cancelled. President Carter visited France in January 56

1978; consequently the Frereh modified the proposal (of the

co-processing plant), which was unacceptable to the Pakistanis f17

lead1Dg to the cancellation of the deal.

It is important to note that the US success was, if it

can be called so, limited to .exerting pressure on France.

For, first, it did not, in any way, discourage the Pakistanis

from the nuclear path (despite terminating military aid, 58

economic aid to Pakistan in September 1977 p,nd seeondly, it

lad to Pakistanis co:ooentrating the attention on the enrichment

path secretly. Particularly noteworthy is the fact the new

Government in Pakistan also did not deviate from the policies

of the previous government, so far as the nuclear issue waS S9

concerned.

Having got the reprocessing deal careelled, the US started

revieWing the question of aid. A senior officer, Newson, was

56 Statesmw;;, 8 January 1978.

fn Jonathan Kendelt, "Frame Cancels Contract on Atom:tc P1ant for Pakistan", IQtq;rnaj;.,g'Qal Herald itilm&ll,

24 August 19'79.

5B Spector, n. 31, p. 80.

59 Ibid., P• 81; l!,at,§tan T;tmJ, 29 June 1978._ General Z1a. reiterated Pakistan determination to go ahead with the de~, hoping that Frame would maintain its stand on the tssue.

77

According to Kapur, a high-level meeting was bald in

Washington D.C. between the two governments on 16 and 17

October 1979 to discuss with Pakistan its participation in the

Gulf security fore e, and in return the US would lift embargo

on US military aid. The deal could not be clinched because

of reveal tion by the head of the US ·team, General Smith, of

concrete evidence of Pakistan's nuclear activities up to the 70

po.inte

On 25 December 1979 the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan,

leading to a dramatic change in US policy. The non-proliferation

policy was relegated to the background as Senators Glen, Percy,

ardent opponents of aid earlier, now op::f.ned that in view of the

Soviet action in Afghanistan, Washington should make an exemption

to its nuclear policy and accept Pakistan's assurances on their 71

nuclear plans. Senior officials of the State Department and

Department of Defence emphasised the need to aid Pakistan,

even th0ugh they remained g~eQlY qQm~itted to the non-prolifera-72

tion policy. The non-proliferation objectives were further

affected when Carter overruled Nuclear Regulatory Commission

ruling and, thereby authorizing the shipment of enriched

70 Kapur, n. 60, p. 190.

71 Tahir-Kheli, n. 11, pp. 139-140 (detailed statement).

72 India-Pakistan Nuclear Issues, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 96th Congress, 18 Narch 1.980, (Washington D.C~, Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 1. Emphasis added.

75

60 sent to Pakistan followed by a senior level delegation. The

argument used·was that CHASNUPP was not in operation, so

Pakistan was no longer violating US Congressional legislation,

hence aid ties could be resumedo And aid was resumed in 61

October 1978 •

The US learned of Pakistan's attempts to put together

the enrichment plant in 1978. An inquiry was ord€red in

October 1978 following disclosures in UK (amid a labour

dispute), described earlier. Estimates from the CIA, §,.ttfte

Department, and ACDA all converted to one conclusion that

unless action was taken immediately Pakistan would go miclear 62

within a year. Already armed with relevant Congressional

legislation, the US now moved quickly to impose sanctions in

1979 when it made public its concern over the enrichment 63

programme. Announcing that the US was terminating aid to

Pakistan, the ASsistant Secretary of State Thomas Pickering,

declared in a Congressional testimony "that the Pakistan

progran1me is not peaceful, but related to an effort to develop

60

61

62

63

Ashok Kapur, f~1stan•~~~D§velopment {New York, 198'7, p. 189. The delegation ireluded Warren Christopher from the State Department and TP Thornton from National Security Council Staff.

Donnelly, n. 14, Pe 16.

Tah1r-Khel1, n. 11, p. 134.

Leonard Spector, yoing Nygl~ar (Massachusetts, 1987), p. 103.

76

a nuclear explosive capability.

In a new policy move, guided by developments in Iran

and Indian Ocean, President Carter offered a sale of 50 Northrop

F-5- fighter planes equipped with ground to air missiles and

promised diplomatic backing for Pakistan proposal for a

nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia, if it accepted the 65

full scope safeguards. Pakistan rejected the offer.

US began increasing the economic sanction by taking a 66

tough stand on the country's appeal for debt rescheduling.

Gen. Z1a visited the United States in September 1979 and

assured him of peaceful intention of Pakistan's nuclear 67

programme, seeking a review in the US policy. It did not

yield anything. Even when Agha Shahi met the US Secretary of

State Cyrus Vance the next month, neither was ready to 68

compromise. Pakistan failed to solve the nuclear dispute 69

with the us.

65

66

67

68

69

Testimony of the Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas R. Pickering, Hearings on Nuclear Proliferation, the situation in India and Pakistan, US Senate Sub-committee on Governmental Affairs i May 1, 1979 (Washington DC, US Government Printing Off1ce, 1979), p. 10, cited in Spector, n. 63, p. 103. ·

Dan Oberdorfer t "Pakistan Urged to Stave Off A Bomb", .lia~gton Pg~:t, 6 August 1979.

Richard Burt, "US will press Pakistan to halt N-arms Project", tj IDf Yor}S: Time.§, 12 August 1979.

~ndu~~ Tim~, 24 September 1979.

~~of In~, 17 October 1979.

Dan Oberdorfer, "Uranium Parley with Pakistan Itx!onclusive", ~' 18 October 19'79.

103

to point out how Pru:istan exploited the Arab need to meet its

O\fn interest. It is a matter clear to all including Pakistan

that the Arabs would not invest so much money to develop a

nuclear capability against any other country other than Israel.

III. The Role of Cbi~

The role of China in the nuclear programme of Pakistan

is based on speculation and qypotheses for the simple reason

lack of clear cut evidence. This has been compounded by the

silence of Chinese leadership over the issue, except, perhaps

mUd denials every no\.f and then.

Besides the subject itself is so new, many questions

pertaining to the acquisition of the capability by Pakistan

need to be answered satisfactorily. The role of China,

consequently, becomes even more speculative.

Sino-Pa.k relations date back to 1950, the year 180

People's Republic of China (PRC) was recognised by Pakistan. lBl

Pakistan supported PRC's claim to the UN seat. During the

Korean crisis, P ru\:istan \Toted for the resolution branding N ortb

Korea as an aggressor but refrained from the one declaring

180

181

~? 5 January 1950. Pakistan was the first Huslim country and second Con'IJnonweal th country to do so·. The diplomatic ties hovl9ver were established in 1951.

GAOJB, session 6, Plen. mtg. 283, 25 September 1950, p. 91. Sir zafrullah said, "China is not applying for membership, it is a member state, a permanent member of the Security Council.

104

182 China the same (ar,gressor). It also abstained from voting

on a resolution seeking sanctions against China and North

In return PRC showed remarkable forbearance of 1.83

Ko:r:-ea. 1.84

Pakistan's membership of the SEATO. This paved the way

for meeting between Chou En-lai and :Hohammad Ali Bogra at 185

Bandrmg in April 1955. The achievement of the meetings

can be summed up as, in terms of Chou En-lai : "We achieved

a mutual unc1erstanding although we are still against mil! tary . 186

treaties". The sen tirnents ·Here reiterated when Suhrawardy 18?

visited China in October 1956.

These sta ten1ents notwithstanding, PRC scrupulously

avoided making any statements on the Kashmir issue that would

be against Pakistan's interest for it knew that attitude of a

-----182

183

184

185

186

187

A Staff Study, "Pakistan• s Relations with People 1 s Republic of China", fa},sistan I:igr1'7.on, vol. 14, 1961, p. 217.

Ibid.

Peking Radio described SEATO as an aggressive military alliance, hostile to the people of China and Asian people, ~~esman, 5 September 1954, but it did not send a formal .note of protest against members of SEATO, whereas USSR did. Hoharrmad Ayoob, "India a.s a Factor in Sino-Pakistan Relations", ~rnatiruJa.l Sty,die§, vol. 9, no. 3, January 1968, p. 279.

William Rushbrook, ,Ihe State o{ f!!ki§.tSD (London, 1962) , p. 120o Accordingly the Chinese Government assured Pakistan that there was no clash of interest between the two countries but that did not apply to India-China relations, where a conflict was expected in near future.

K. Sarwar Hasan ed., 12g£uments QD tne Ff.t§ign folfgi ,gLPa~ist&n_.J.. Ch:t..na, Indu Llnd Pak1s~ Karachi, 196), pp. 3 1-6 •

~' 21 October and 24 October 1956.

105

country to the issue was for Pakistan "a touch stone by which friendship or animosity are listed 11 ..

188 Thus, China, according

to Mao Tse-tung in 1957, was going to be neutral. He advised

other countries to do the same. This stand was welcomed by

Pakistan. 189

To begin with the Chinese were suspicious of Ayub, "the Main

ur~h.itcct of UO:>·-PuJ: alliance 11 •190 r.rhe fears compounded by Pakistan's

neutrality in the 'raiwan issue andp permitting pilgrims from

Nationalist China, yet the Chinese did not send a protest note

to Pakist sn vlhen the f"Iut ual Defence .A.greement was signed between 191

Pakistan and the US.

Pakistan began mending its relations with China only after

the offer of mutual defence pact made by Ayub to India, in the

wake of disturbances and clashes in Sino-Indian border was rejected

by JawahArlal Nehru. 192 India rejected the proposal asking 'joint

d . \.. I 19 7

) . t. f f k" t efence Bfa1nst W110 ? ' After reJec 10n o the o fer, Fa 1s an

begen mending its relations with China. China and Pakistan·

Bf:~reed to bold discussions on border demarcAtion in

188 Werner Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 35, 1962, p. 222.

189 Dawn, 21 July 1957 .. 1tie1coming the Chinese stand,Pakistan Foreign l"linister,Firoz Khnn Noon,seid if the Soviet Union also adopt the same stand,Kashmir question would be settled immediPtely. Hasan,n.186,pp.364-65.

190 Semina Yasmin,Pakistan-China Relations(Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 19?o),pp.6-?.

191 Pakistrn Horizon,n.182,p.226. According to Sangat Singh,China had,howe~er,proscribed the agreement.Sangat Singh,n.21,p.192.

192 Times of India, 3 and 6 !'lay 1960. Nehru said the real motive behind the offer was not joint defence but Kashmir.

193 Burke, n. 1, p. 141.

106

1961 and cons~quently talks began in 1962, a few days before the 194

Sino-Indian war. Pakistan, as stated earlier, protested

against US arming of India during the war. In addition, in

radical contrast to Ayub' s offer, Bhutto declared in the Rational

Assembly, "Pru{istan will not join India in any action against 195

China, even if the Kashmir dispute was resolved amicably''.

A few days after the Sino-Indian war in 1962, an agreement

was signed between China and Pakistan in regard to demarcation 196

of border. This was followed by an air transit agreement in

the month of August the same year. Ties \vith China continued

to improve with Chou En-lai visiting Pa~istan in 1964 and 197

Ayub's China visit in 1965.

------194

195

196

197

pawn, 16 January 1961. China turned down Indian .request that Azad Kashmir border problem should be discussed between officials of Government of India and China as overall border problem. Hasan, n. 186, p. 380.

l:.a!i.istauJ1aJ,ion&L&?~Sl.!Ilhl.Y..J2ebai.e§a ~' vol ... 2, p. lOe QUOted in Ayoob, n. 184, p., 292. Bhutto said "Pakistan• s friendship w! th China \'l'as not dependent on any factor". Debates, p. 92.

Agreement was finally signed on 2 March 1963 between the Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Y! and Bhutto, Pakistan Foreign Minister. Out of 3,400 square miles, Pakistan secured 1,350 square mlles and China 2,000 square mil~s. According to Pakistani claims it got 750 square milP-s which had been under the possession of China. ~' 3 }1arch 1973; "Ramification of the China-Pakistan Border Treaty", f.~lli-..Aff.~U.. vol. 51, no. 8, Fall. 1964, p. 40.

Pek;J,ng ReYl.ID:!, no. 10, 19 March 1965, pp .. 9- 10.

107

From 1966 om·Jards Pakistan again started championing 198

admission of China to the UN. In 1964, China came ·out with

an open support for Pakistan's claims to the state of Jammu and 199

Kashmir.

That China could be an ally to depend on \vas confirmed

during the Indo-P ak war of 1965 when it had lent full moral

and material support to Pakistan including condemning India 200

as an aggressor.

Followine a ban by US on sale of arms to India and

Pakistan in the wake of 1965 war, Pakistan turned to China 201

for military aid. Despite unsettled conditions in 1966

following first phase~ of cultural revolution, ties 'l..,rith Pakistan

were unh~pered. In fact, Pakistan was the only country with 202

which some diplomatic contact was maintained" It was in

this light that Pakistan rejected a proposal on regional

economic ·~a-operation between India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and 203

USSR movted by Kosygin., Continuity in US-Sino-Pak relations

-------198

199

200

201

202

203

Ayoob n. 184, p. 294. Pakistan had changed its stand on seat to China -- Representation·be deferred unless support for China became near unanimous. In 1961 it changed its stand and voted for PRC.

Ibid.

Hasan, n. 186, p. 429.

On its National Day on 23 March 1966 Pakistan displayed F-59 tanks, 510 - 19 fighter planes.

Joseph Yi Cheng, "China's Foreign Policy", ,Alli Qu~tterJ.y, no. 4, 1976, pp. 297-98; ibid., no. 1, 1977, pp. 2 -35.

Pakistan expressed its inability to join a pact directed against PRC • .UlllruJ....Q( India, 16 July 1969.

108

was a major factor that US asked Pakistan to convey its desire 204

to establish a new relationship. After the sizable with ..

drawa1 of US forces from Vietnam in 1971, China decided to

receive Kissinger in July 1971. \11th this Yahya' s role as a 205

"courier" came to an end.

Compared to the 1965 war, the role of China in the 1971 206

war had been minimal. In fact vJhen before the war Bhutto

had visited Pe1'::ing in November then Chinese leaders refused 207

any active military support.

VJhen 3hutto visited Chtna in 1972, the c~e Government

converted four past loans amounting to % 107 million into grants

and deferred the payment of 1970 loan of % 200 million for 208

20 years. It refused Bhutto a defence pact, though it . 209

promised to meet Pakistan's defence requirements. The

Shanghai comruunique issued at the end of Nixon's vis1 t 1972 210

mentioned support for P al\.istan.

Soon after the Indian explosion in 1974, the Chinese

leaders critlcized the Indian Government for harbouring to

204

205

206

207

208

··- 209

210

· G. 1.~. Choudhury, .Q.l:lina..J,n }:lqrltj Affa.tr:LL..Ill§ ;Eoreign PoU,C.L .Qf_Qhina stnce_l~'m_(Colorado, 1982 , pp. 264-66.

Ibid., pp. 266-68.

}':.A.. Chaudhuri, "Strategic and Jvlilitary Dimension in P a}<;. is tan-China Relations", ~lilSJ.D HQr;!.zQ,D, vol. 39, no. 4, Fourth Quarter 1986, p. 23.

rekine Review, no. 46, 12 December i971, p. 12.

Nilofar Mahdi, "Sino-Pak Relations: Historical Background", Pal~~st~ Hor1z&U, vol. 39, no. 4, Fourth Quarter 1986, pp. 60- 8. Asia~ Research Bulletin (Hong Kong), 1-28 February 1973, p. 1 23.

Current Bac~r£~£, no. 952, 27 March 1972, P• 36.

109

211 become a sub-super power. They pledged support to Pakistan

212 specifically against "nuclear threat and nuclear blackma11 91

•

In 1975 the Chinese Vice Premier visited Pakistan and pong

·other things, lent support to the Pakistani proposal for 213

nuclear weapon free zone in South ASia. The importance of

the subsequent year vms revealed by Bhutto in his death cell

testament where he had said :

In the light of recent developments which have taken place, my single most important achieve­ment which I believe will dominate the portrait of my public life is an agreement which I arrived at after an assiduous and tenacious endeavour spanning over eleven years of negotiations. In the present context, the agreement of mine concluded in June 1976, will perhaps be my greatest achievement and contribution to the survival of our people and our nation. 214

By deducting 11 years mean the agreement must have begun

in 1965. According to ~3amina Yasmin soon after the civil

aviation ae;reement was sie;ned 1 there \1ere rumours of a secret 2.t5

Sino-Pa.Y military agreement.,

A high level delegat1on headed by Bbutto visited

Beij illg between 26-30 May 19?6, V-Thic h included the f a.mous

211 fw<::1.sta!L11~, 5 July 1974.

212 E,Slli,.l.!lL_Revievr, 5 July 197 4, p.. 14.

213 P ak;l..stan Time§, 21 April 1975; .E.a_r Eastern Ec.QDQJTI.!Q.. Beyj.~}i, 16 }1ay 1975, p. 34o

214 Bhutto, n. 44, p.

215 Yasmin, n .. 190, p. 17. According to her, however subse­quent events proved that the scheme of Sino~Pak relations essentially remained limited politic ally, economically and militarily.

110

Pakistani nuclear physici.st and nobel laureate Dr Abdul Salam,

Bhutto's Scientific Adviser. Two agreements were signed--. 216

one on scientific and the other on military co-operation.

According to Namboodiri, the Chinese help to Pakistan

consisted of transfer of nuclear weapons' design information,

assistance in setting up an enricrJnent plant, supply of nuclear

test data, conc1uct of nuclear test on Pakistan's behalf or to

make test site available, the supply of heavy Hater and the 217

transfer of plutonimn reprocessing technology. According to

Sinha and Subramanian, the pact a1.luded to was \4'1. th China who

helped Pakistan builo its reprocessing plant because it wanted 218

to gain access to Pakistan's CANDU reactor technology.

According to David Hart, PRC provided technical assistance at 219

Kahuta in 1979. According to Ashok Kapur) "The agreement which

Bhutto highlights in his memoirs was between China and Pakistan.

This agreement was established after, possibly in response to,

the cut-off of Canadian nuclear aid to Pakistan, even though 220

idea of such a ceoperation existed pr.Lu.L ..,v ~---- _

216

217

218

219

The joint comr'iuniflue issued after Bbutto1 s visit said :

liork,1ng Pe~wJ&.' s Dail,y 7 f) J\IDe 1976.

P.K.s. Narnboodiri, "China-Pakistan Nuclear Axis", ~,tegM; Anplysis, vol. 6, no. 7, October 1982, pp. 407-47.

P~Bo Sinha and R.R. Subramanian, li~~~istan 0\ ew Del hi, 1980), pp. 41, 48.

David IIart1 Nuclear Power tn Ind1.a (A Comparative Analysis) ~New Delhi, 1983 , pp. 132-33.

220 Kapur, n. 60, p. 245o

111

Pakistan's Prime Minister thanked the Chinese Prime }linister for China• s firm support to the proposal of the Pakistani government for nuclear free zone in South Asia and expresEied deep gratitude at China's willingness to assume appropriate cornmi trnents arising therefrom.

However, it was never specified what these appropriate

commitments v;ere. This gave rise to a number of speculations.

None, hovlever, Has followed seriously. J-.1uch later in 1980 a

report said, China had suspended nuclear co-operation with

Pakistan after the overthro-vr of Bhutto in July 19?? but after

the Soviet assisted coup in Afghanistan in April 19?8 China

suclc1enly became very friendly vTi th the Zia regime in Pakistan 221

and some nuclear liaison were resumed.

The change in government in Pakistan in 19?? did not

affect the Sino-Pak relations adversely. Gens Zia had said

in a message to Den Xtaopeng that 11 the traditionally close and

friendly relations between Pal'\istan and China would continue 221

to r;row ctnd e;ain strength \V:f_ th each passing day".

After the Chinese Vice-Premier Gen. Piao 1 s visit to

Islamabad, it was reported by the Iraqi news agency that a

"generous offer" of nuclear co-operation -- to help build a

reprocessing plant -- was made by China in view of the special

relationship that existed between the two countries. According

----·--221 Edgar 0 1 Ballance, "Pakistan Persuaded China to Supply

Nuclear Technology and Apparatus", Natio.D~~§.::~ge (Hashington), vol. 64, no. 363~ December 1980.

222 Pakistan Ttme~, 26 July 19??.

·-·

112

to this report, it was also meant to bring Pakistan on par with

India in the nuclear field and also to minimise India's influence . 223

as a nuclear power in the regiona

There was no significant development from 1977-79 in the

nuclear relations between the two countries, at least evidence

is not available. However in June 1978 Karakoram Highway was

formally opened, lirJking Xingjaaf'.g with Tibet through Aksai 224

Chin. According to Ashok Kapur, during 1977-79 China did not

do much to the agreement because it did not trust Zia as it had

trusted Bhutto and it was only after the Afghantstan invasion 225

that Pakistan-PH::! c a-operation sw1denly increased.. In 1979,

according to Chaud.l1ur1i hoHever /:;hina made pleas on behalf of

Pakistan, when Viee Premier Deng ht3ld discussions vJith Carter 226

urging the US not to penalise Pakistan for an illleged bomb.,

In 1979 after, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China 227

increased aid to Pakistan. On 18 January 1980, Beijing

accused USSR of seel<::ing a stepping stone for a southvJard thrust

·------223

224

225

~26

227

l1n~~.ia.l_l'.i..mslli (London) , 16 Aueust 1978. Quoted in .JJ1~AN ew~..Jl.P~!LQ!L~~DQe and Tec))nolQ,gy, August 1978, p. 25 c

G.H. Choudhury, "China's Policy to,..,rards Pakistan", Cqrrent H.llism, 'lol. 76, no. 448, April 1979, p. l8le

Kapur, n. 60, pp. 245-16.

Choudhuri, n. 204, p. 262 6 According to him, "similar p1c.;-as have been made by China to top ranking US policy ma1~:ers who have visited China in recent years 11 •

Ibi.d., p. 27.

113

228 toHards PTIC and the vJhole Subcontinent.

After the failure of initial round of talks with the us,

General Zia visited Beijing in Hay 1980 where he told senior

Vice-Premier Deng and Premier Hua that China was the only 229

country that had struck to its principles.

General Zia-ul-Haq visited Beijing in August 1980. It

was at that time that reports on a likely Pal<:-China collabora­

tion on a nuclear test appeared. The London based Lebanese

magazine Jl.r.y~.a.l._A.:r:£l}2:3, reported that China had "responded

positively" to a Palds tani request to con duet a nuclear test 230

on China's soil. The Arab ovmed magazine ~1.[ also

reported that follovring Gen .. Zia' s visit, Chinese nuclear

experts had arrived in Pakistan to speed up Pakistan's first 231

peaceful nuclear explosion. Another report published in

uw Sci§l].tist (London) in 1981 and attributed to American and

Israeli intelligence sou:r,~;es said that China may provide a

site for PUl\istan's first bomb (which Has expected to explode

later that year ( 1981). It also stated that negotiations had

already taken place bet\veen China and Pakistan to ready the ~32

site by the end of summer. A denial of this report was

-------~

228

'229

230

231

232

Mehdi, n. 208, Po 69.

Della Denman "Pakistan's Best Friend", E~ .,Ea.s:te.I:n Econ.QJD;I&_Reyiew, 16 May 1983, p. 23 o

Cited in P.K.S. Namboodiri, "Foreign Links: Axis with China", .:do.rld_E~, vol. 5, no. 7, JUly 1984, p. 19·.

Ibid.

N ~H SQ1en.:t1li (London) , 23 July 1981~

114

made by the Pa1dstani Embassy.

In an interview in the subsequent month, James Malone,

Assistant Secretary of the State and Reagan Administration's

chief nuclear negotiator, said that China had apparently

supplied to Pakistan material other than fuel related 1 terns, 233

which he declined to specify .. A month later, a J;Iew Yorl) Tim§..§

report said that the US Government officials were disturbed by

intelligence report suggesting that China had helped Pakistan in 234

trying to develop a capacity to enrich uranium for weapon use.

A BBC report later said that the information that China was

aiding Pakistan's nuelear programme was conveyed to the US

administration in its briefing to the US Senate Foreign

Relations Committee just before Gen. Zia met the Committee 235

in Washington.

The US adr::inistration made this out as an excuse to

justify American military and economic package worth % 300

million so that Pakistan does not seek aid from other countries

like China to ac11uire nuclear weapon technology, the BBC said.

Supply of mili.tary equipment to Pa1{istan, the US administration

maintained, would create confidence and security in Paldstan•s

mind.. BBC added that Paldstan~ s nuclear weapon issue \-las

discussed thoroug'rlly \vhen President Zia met Senate Foreign

-------233 liucleQ111~ \'Jee~, 19 August 1982.

234 .N e~ Y.Qrk_Times., 19 September 1982.

235 Ill~--~~' 16 December 1982.

115

?,36 Relation Committee o In early 1983 there vrere reports of

Pal';:istan having received from China a sensitive information

concerning the design of nuclear weapons themselves. Accordingly,

the US officials said that China may have cofl.firmed for Pakistani 237

technicians that a particular nuclear weapon design would work.

According to another report, though there was a difference of

opinion in the intelligencecomrr.unity as to what China has

supplied to Pa1dstan, there vras consensus that what has been

supplied is critical in Paldstan' s suspected nuclear 238

programme. A June 1984 report indicated that China had

actually given Pa1dstan the design for the \veapon used in 239

China's fourth nuclear test, 240

a low-yielding uranium device

to be detonated in 1986. China, however, denied that it 241

had validated Pa1dsta.ni nm"!lear weapon design.

Further information on Sino-Pak nuclear collaboration

carne in June that year when Senator Cranston told the Senate

that Pa1dstan had already acquired the nuclear. capabilitye

According to him "Pakistan can maJ;;:e at least a dozen bombs"

and he warned tbat there '"'as a danger of a nuclear \var between

-----236 Ibid.

237 .tl.§...9..bi.D.£ioD I:~, 28 January and 28 February 1983.

238 tlY.~leQnk.s.J:ill~'i., 23 January 1983 ..

239 E.~ro..rliJ.J..IDS.l!., 2:1 J1mo 1984.

240 Ibid.

241 "PTIC denies nuclE.lar co-opora tion with Pakistan", A P 12?.0, 26 February 1983, reprinted in FBIS N_y~ ~veJ.smmw.i...1llld l'rgltferat..ti>.!h 21 Earch 1983, p. 9.

116

242 India and Pakistan.

What ie interesting about Cranston's revelation was

that most of tbe information came to him fron1 a secret 15-page

document that has now been declassified. This document on

Pakistan's nuclear proe;rann~:e and China's assistance to

Pakistan had been prepared by 90 e'rperts. He said that the

State Departrnent had been hidine; this fact frorl' the Congress

because the officials feared if Conr,ress came to know of this,

it \voulrl stop tbe 3.2 billion aid,.

The United States suspended the talks on transfer of 243

nuclear technology to China in September 1982 because of

the An1erican suspicion that China Has helping Pakistan in 244

latter's efforts to acquire nuclear capability. The talks

had been dragging on for one full year because of US

insistence and Chinese reluctance to accept restrictions

incorporated in the US Atomic: li.:nergy Act. Under this Act

no foreign buyer conlc1 reprocess the fuel from American

reactors. But they secured a US commitment that this

restriction ivoulc'i not be used to inhibit the growth of the . 245

Chinese nuclPar industry.

242 llmes of Ind~, 22 0une 1984.

243 Spector, n. 31, p. 102 and New YQr~-!1ll~, 19 September 1984.

244 NycleonJ.,cs He~, 20 January 1983. According to it, it was a paramount concern to us, "what China has supplied to Pakista.nu c Also see ibici.,, 4 January 1983 and Time~ PI I_ngj.a, 30 Setpember 1986.

245 S.D. l'iuni, "The US and the Asian Giants", Qlra1eg~c Anglys1~, 1984, p. 212.

117

The talks were resumed \vhen Premier N e Zou Zeyang

visited United States in January 1984. During President

Reagan's trip to Peking in April, the US-Chinese t~ade pact 246

was initiated.

The Sino-US accord was signed in July 1985, before ~

signing the accord the Chinese President twice assured his 247

country's intention to use nuclear ent:~rgy for peaceful purposes.

At the time of si8ning the accorcJ, it Has announced that the

agreement enabled the Am eric an industry to partie ipa te in tbe 248

building of 10 Chinese nuclear reactors worth 20 billion.

This "highlighted U1e fact that the US was keen to have a

share of China's lucrative nuclear market, which was basically 249

dominated and controlled by West European countries".

Reacting to the Sino-US accord, Yaqub Khan, in a BBC

interview, dismissed the idea that Pakistan would benefit

rrorn nuclear tee hnol.ogy that China was to buy from US, as

fantastic. "The aereement rPaehed between the two countties

in April is a matter of those two countries alone. It has 250

nothing to do w1 th P a'F.:istan", he said.

------246

247

248

24B

250

Nucl§:.Q~s 'deek, 3 }iay 1984, Po 9 ..

.D.mw, 25 July 1985.

Hahab Siddiqui, "Sino-Pak Nuclear Accord", -~~ IIo;r1.zJJ.lh vol. ::39, no., 4, 1986, p. 54.

Ibid., also see Nw;leonics .l:J~ n. 233. According to the US Assistant Secretary of State James Malone, the accord was a "pre-requisite for US companies to sell certain nuclear rna terial to the world markettt.

~kistaD Tws, 19 June 19841 and JfRS J Jlgr,l!Jvride ~po;U:

1~~~fi~g b~!~~~w~n~e~;~;ef~~a~5E' G~T~uU }:!' 1§s4f.

118

Hhile on the one hand China concluded an accord \vith

the us, on the other a decision to negotiate an agreement with

Pakistan, was reached v11 th Pal<:istan, during Junejo' s visit in 1985 251

to 13eij ing. An accord on nuclear energy was reac bed between 252

Pakistan ancl China on 15 September 1986. At the signing

ceremony the Chinese Prirne l'linister, Zhao Ziang said "China

does not subscribe to NPT, regards it discriminatory, it does

not believe in proliferation of nuclear weapons nor does it 253

help other country do so". The Pakistani Foreign 1-1inister

Sahebzada Yaqub Khan said tllat Pakistan also believed in peaceful ' 254

uses of nuclear energy.

The as:recment, reportedly for co-operation in peaceful

uses of nuclear energy, incorporates all the safeguards laid

do..,m by the IAEA to cover all material and equipment covered 255

under the aceord. Acc:ording to one report quoting A Q Khan,

among the facilities involved in the agreement is the secret 256

enrichme~t plant.

A nuclear collaboration between Pakistan and China

is advantageous to both. For China, it is Pru{istan who has

251

252

253

254

255

256

SiddiCJ.ui, n. 248, p. 56.

.HiJ1dlliitan T~, 16 September 1986 and Indian..lx:m:~!4 ~ep ember 1986.

Pakistan I!we~, 18 September 1986.

l:iQrn:1,n~_N ews,. l8 September 1986.

Siddiqui, n. 2 4S, p. 56.

Einan~I1~, ~9 September 1986 and -~~_l~, 30 Septen,ber 1986.

~ I

11.9

ab·tays been an important factor, particularly, in vievr of its

bal~nce against the South Asian r,iant -- India. The construction 257

of Karakoram High\._ray and Khyb(:1r Pass, despite the Indian

protests are evidences of Chinese attempts at consolidation

of ties ,,ri th Pakistan against India. From the Chinese point

of view, a nuclear Paldstan could one day fill in the gap in

South-\·Jest Asia in the nuclear containment of the USSR. The

South-western region propaGat~d to be the target for the

Soviet push do\vnarc1 can be fitted, as \ve shall see subsequently,

once Pakistan acquires the nuclear capability.

IIm-.rever, there are certain other assm1ptions whi.ch

tend to discotmt the possibility of a serious military

collaboration behJ•?en China a;~1d Paldstan. There is very

11 ttle evidence of' voltmtary tJ"ansfer of nuclear secrets or

nuclear rna terial, exc::: ept the US-Israel, US-South African

connection. It is up to the Chinese to test the viabilt ty

of friendship of a nuclear P a1-:istano After all Soviet Union

·v1as reported to hav·e helped the Chinese nuclear programme

(sec Chn.pter I) ~mrl th(-J Chinese turned ar;a1.nst them.