chapter iv connecting the city and disconnecting...

Chapter IV

Connecting the City and Disconnecting People

The Metro has changed the face of Delhi forever, from a city of construction, to a city with connectivity ... Delhi Metro has put great expectations and increased the aspirations of the city and its people for the best.

At'tkur Bhatia Chamber of Indian Industries (C/1) 260

Metro is running in some areas ... but who is going to use that ... is it the worker? The worker uses the bicycle and even that space on the road is taken away from him ...

Dharshana Resident of Bhalaswa Resettlement Co/on/61

The Delhi Metro Rail (DMR) initiated its operations, albeit partially, in 2002 ·

and was quickly celebrated by the state, media and middle class of Delhi as the city's

greatest step towards world class status and global recognition. The DMR enthusiasts

gushed, often in dramatic tones, that not only would this 'modem technology' to sort

out the twin challenge of vehicular congestion and pollution in the city but also, more

crucially, credibly enable popular access to mass transit.262 Whilst such a coupling of

modem transport technology with speed is crucial to 'making possible' the global

city, this chapter argues that the DMR needs to be critically situated outside the

widely described narrative of its technical conquests. Put differently, the DMR -

intended to be linked with the process of gentrification - produces a set of economic,

political and social effects as important as its technical achievements.

260 Ankur Bhatia, Chairman, Chamber of Indian Industries (CII), Delhi State Council in a one day Delhi Annual Session and Conference on 'The Brand Delhi: What Does it Represent?', 22"d March 2006, New Delhi.

261 Dharshana, resident of Bhalaswa resettlement colony. The colony is located in the northern periphery of the city. Quoted from the documentary film 'New Delhi Private Ltd.' produced by Hazards Centre, 2006.

262 Whether the DMR is effectively reducing congestion and pollution in the city, though a crucial question, is not the focus of this chapter.

115

Consequently, in order to reveal the DMR as economic, political and social

technology, rather than just a means to address contemporary transportation

challenges, this chapter will argue for recasting the conceptualisation of Delhi's quest

for speed. The DMR, in other words, can be shown to be crucially linked to several

overlapping processes of political economy that are shaping or attempting to

transform Delhi into a 'world class' city: an urban-space whose primary objective is,

in the words of David Harvey to reduce the 'turn-over time' for capitalist

accumulation and which is therefore critically marked by a series of dispossessions.263

The argument for this chapter comprises four sections. The first section

presents a brief history of the emergence of the idea of the DMR. It argues that,

though the initial plan for introducing mass rapid transit system (MRTS) in Delhi was

first discussed in 1969, it was only finalised in the early 1990s. This is the period,

when process of restructuring was initiated in Delhi. The second section takes the

discussion further by arguing that the DMR project was essentially aimed at pursuing

the process of gentrification fuelled by integration of middleclass residential colonies,

business centres, and service class work places, real estate speculation, and generation

of funds for the project form the Japanese Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC)

as a soft loan. The third section discusses how this troubled quest for gentrification is

followed by a series of dispossessions, made evident in terms of environmental

destruction, displacement of low income housing settlements, de-routing and

curtailing public buses, and high fare structure of the DMR. The fourth and final

section aims to tie the above three sections into the larger claim that the DMR, has

critically structured as political and social project, ended up geographically

connecting the city while disconnecting its people.

263 David Harvey. 2001. Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography. UK: Edinburgh University Press.

116

Emergence of DMR

The history of the DMR goes back to 1969, when there was an official

recognition of the need for a mass rapid transit system in Delhi. According to E.

Sreedharan, the Managing Director of the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC), in

developed countries planning for metro systems usually begins when a city's

population exceeds 10 lakh, so that it may be in place by the time the population is

between 20 and 30 lakh people. However, in Indian cities an extended jurisdictional

tug of war between the central and state governments over who controls urban mass

rapid transit, in combination with a general paucity of funds for large-scale projects,

has resulted in an under investment in such systems?64

Indian cities and their residents have had little experience with metro or

commuter rail systems. While cities such as Mumbai and Chennai have had urban

mass rapid transit systems, the only direct experience with Metro that the country had

before the DMR was in Calcutta. The first serious mention of MRTS for Delhi

emerged out of a 1969 traffic and travel characteristics study. 265 Since then, many

official reports by a wide variety of government departments have been

commissioned to explore the issue, with key areas of contention related to debates

over technology (underground rail, surface rail, light rail, bus based, etc.), route

alignment, and whether urban mass transit was ultimately the jurisdiction of the

national government or the DelhiUnion Territory government.266 As such, the desire

for extensive technical study, in addition to ongoing political contestation, the search

for appropriate financing, has contributed to the extended planning period.

264 E. Sreedharan. 2002. Delhi MRTS Project. Indian Rai{ways. New Delhi: 81-7.

265 Government oflndia (GOI). 1970. Annual Report I969-70.New Delhi: Delhi Administration: 29.

266 E. Sreedharan. 2002. Delhi MRTS Project. Indian Railways. New Delhi: 81-7.

117

Apparently, in 1990 the project got a green signal, when the Rail India

Technical and Economic Services (RITES) prepared a Feasibility Report on MRTS

for Delhi recommending a three-component system comprising rail corridors, metro

corridors and a dedicated bus way adding up to 198.5 km. While the report was

submitted in 1990, it received approval from the Central Government only in

September 1996.Z67 In 1995, the Delhi Rail Corporation (DMRC) was registered

under the Companies Act (1956) for the purposes of implementing and operating the

Delhi MRTS. It was also decided that the DMRC would have equal equity

participation from the Government of India and the Government of National Capital

Territory Delhi.Z68 The first phase of the DMR was taken up by DMRC in 1996 itself.

The actual construction, however, began only in October 1998.269

The DMR was planned and developed as a technology exchange, whereby

international firms with expertise in development of metro railways were contracted

to aid with specific tasks such as general planning, station design, construction

management and rolling stock production. These international firms from Japan,

Korea, France and the US were required to partner and transfer their expertise to

Indian firms, so that indigenous companies could take a lead role in the later stages of

the Delhi Metro project. It was also planned that the indigenous firms would later be

able to disseininate their knowledge to other cities in India that were seeking to

develop metro railways. 270

267 Staff Reporter. 1996. Union Cabinet Approves Delhi MRTS Project. Times of India. September 18, New Delhi.

268 http://www.delhimetrorail.com/corporates/about_us.html

269 Staff Reporter. 2002. Dashing through the Depth of Delhi. Geography and You 2 (6): 43-44.

270 Matti Siemiatycki. 2006. Message in a Metro: Building Urban Rail and Infrastructure and Image in Delhi. India International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 30 (2): 280

118

One of the governments stated intentions for introducing the DMR was that it

would serve as a viable and efficient mass transit system for the entire city.

According to the Managing Director of DMRC, E. Shreedharan,

It will be much more than a cheap and safer means oftranspcrt. It will reduce congestion on roads making movement easier. It will also reduce atmospheric pollution to a great level making the environment healthy ... The Metro will totally transform our social culture giving us a sense of discipline, cleanliness and enhance multifold .<fevelopment of this

I. . 271

cosmopo 1tan city.

Before the completion of phase I in 2003, he also claimed that 'the first phase will

generate substantial benefits to the economy by way of siphoning off the roads 21.8

lakh commuters per day. This would mean 2,500 less buses on the roads' .272 A re

examination of facts after completion of phase I, however, revealed a different story.

In December 2005, the ridership of the DMR, after the completion of all three lines,

was a mere 5 lakh passengers per day.273 Thus, if the DMR has consistently not been

able to draw in the claimed number of commuters, then it throws open the question of

its usefulness and cost efficiency for the city. Namely, for whom is the DMR actually

designed and what interests does it really serve?

It has to be noted that the idea and plan for the DMR emerged as a mode of

mass transit when Delhi, as an imagined neo-liberal urban space, was being reworked

in the early 1990s. The restructuring of Delhi, in tum, has to be viewed in the light of

the new economic profile that has been systematically imposed on its landscape by

the imperatives of neo-liberal economy. The shift in economic priority away from

manufacturing to the financial services, the transformation of parts of the city into ·

271 E. Sreedharan. 2002. Delhi MRTS Project. Indian Railways. New Delhi: Sl-7.

272 E. Sreedharan. 2003. Delhi metro rail...2,500 less buses on roads. www.indiainfoline.com: January 03.

273 Times News Network. 2005. On New Year -Eve, take the new metro line to Dwarka. Times of India. December 25, New Delhi.

119

landscapes of hyper consumption, the new requirements for flexible mobility, and the

redrawing of connectivity between middle class residences and work places have

combined to create intense pressure for a redefinition of transport and mass transit.

Thus, the emergence of DMR, in several ways, was a response to the felt need to

reorganise urban space for realising a type of mobility suitable to a neo-liberal

economy.

DMR for Gentrification

According to Neil Smith, gentrification is not merely about retaking the urban

core of cities for the middle class, rather it involves far more complex processes of

political economy. Rather than thinking about gentrification from the perspective of

consumption, or as a certain 'trend' in the preferences of the middle class in the

direction of centralised urban (rather than suburban) living, Smith argues that

gentrification should be seen from the perspective of the production of space. That is,

gentrification needs to be seen as part of a deliberate state strategy to convert low rent

spaces into high rent spaces: to valorise urban space by displacing older, lower value,

historical, land uses for newer capital intensive development that absorb surplus

capital and fix it in physical infrastructure and land; that is in space itself. 274

Gentrification as a capitalist process of urbanisation has evolved into a vehicle

for transforming whole urban areas into new landscape complexes that pioneer a

comprehensive class-inflected and capital intensive remake. These new landscape

complexes now integrate housing with shopping, restaurants, cultural facilities, open

space, employment opportunities - entirely new complexes of recreation,

274 Neil Smith. 1996. The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City. US: Routledge.

120

consumption, production, and pleasure, as well as residence. Just as importantly,

gentrification as urban strategy weaves global financial markets together with large

and medium sized real estate developers, local merchants, and property agents with

brand name retailers, all lubricated by city and local government tax incentives. Here,

just as we have seen with the DMRC's aggressive promotion of private sector real

estate development in favour of older land uses, government operates under the

assumption that social outcomes derive from free markets rather then from sate

investment in public services and housing. Most crucial in this nco-liberal urban

configuration, real estate development becomes a centerpiece of the city's productive

economy, an end in itself, justified by appeals to jobs, taxes, and tourism275.

DMR's contribution to the process of gentrification is threefold. Firstly it~

routes are carefully designed to integrate and to provide fast mobility to the middle

class residential zones, shopping centers and business offices etc. But the DMR does

not only facilitate this class's mobility, it also plays a second role in the process of

gentrification by actively remaking urban space by creating and promoting capital

intensive real estate development and speculation. The DMR contributes to the

gentrification process in a third way also, by generating funds for the project form the

JBIC bank as a soft loan for the construction of DMR.

Integrating Middle Class with Service Economy and Consumption

The DMR project has been modified several times since it was first proposed.

The first modification took place in 1995, when RITES prepared the Environment

Impact Assessment (EIA) report for the modified Phase I of the MRTS. Out of a total

proposed project length of 198.5 km, the modified Phase I, which was supposed to be

275 Neil Smith. 2002. New Globalism, New Urbanism: Gentrification as Global Urban Strategy. Antipode 34 (3): 443.

121

commissioned by 2005, included 45 stations and covered 55.3 km of track subdivided

among 11 km under-ground rail, 22.15 km of elevated rail, and 22.15 km of rail at

grade. This modified Phase I was divided into 8 operational sections, as given below

in the Table 4.1.

Table 4.1

Modified sections of DMR Phase I

Section Length (km)

Vishwavidyalaya- ISBT 4.5

ISBT- Connaught Place 4.2

Connaught Place - Central Secretariat 2.3

Shahdara- ISBT 6.4

ISBT - Shakur Basti 10.6

Shakur Basti- Nangloi 8.0

Subzi Mandi ~ Siraspur 12.8

Siraspur- Holambikalan 6.5

Total 55.3

Source: Government oflndia (GOI). 1995. Environment Impact Assessment for Integrated Multi Modal Mass Rapid Transport System for Delhi, RITES: 13

As noted above, Phase I was modified in 1995, but the present status shows

that during the period of construction it has gone through further major re

modifications, as shown in the Table 4.2 below.

122

Table 4.2

Present Routes of DMR Phase I

Route Length (km) Stations

Shahdara-Tri Nagar-Rithala 22.06 18

Vishwavidyalaya-Central Secretariat 10.84 10

Indraprastha-Barakhamba Road-Dwarka Sub City 32.10 31

Total 65.00 59

Source: http://www.delhlmetrora•l.com/corporates/proJeCtupdate/phase I_ network.html

Table 4.2 shows that the necessary eight operational sections originally

proposed were reduced down to three, whereas the total length of phase I was

increased from 55.3 km to 65 km. These modifications also show a rise in the number

of stations. In 1995, the number of stations proposed was 45, whereas after the last

modification, the number of stations rose to 59. The present project comprises only

the first four sections of the modified Phase I, along with additional lines to Rithala

and Dwarka. The other four sections of the DMR were simply cancelled during the

actual implementation of the plan. It should be noted that the sections which were

cancelled were mainly connected to the working settlements of the city.

The utility of the DMR for the privileged minority of tl1e city can be seen if

we carefully look at the route map of Phase I and Phase II of its network. The map of

present and proposed lines ofDMR below suggests that there is a clear motive behind

the selection of DMR routes.

123

ROUTE MAPPHASE-I & II

Figure 4.1

Route Map of DMR Phase I and Phase II

()WA"'K.oll SEC '~ ElWA~ SEC'l

""'<UII().SECII O'o',&.il ~.:. S!:C 10

DWA?I\.-.SEC'J

,o ..... aeo~R .: o~.;;,,

,;~"-. ~ .._$<- O .... o c;1.1.A.:u>'.l!: t,+O'~:.._v'<..~.;.<: . ."~~·.,"> ,. .u.;;IOit~~--A..'ifiJ":

~t.0 <:i' ~ :.;¥' :,~ ., o ~A'< •cc,:.,;.-, SCI1:>Cl

~ .. .a- - o~ ~ -- ..o A.:t!J. .. ~AR"I

lj' SUStioliH.OK

- .·:•1·.-"J !I'"

\EW.:OS - >: .~4~ ;

\0,~:o:.:;:: r;: ~ ~~

~ :·) :0.\ i E·:-c;; -~ '60104.C -y c f.~i'\ ~

~)!:;:. ;::.-:·o"!·! o,,0

., o-~~:ct~sc~:cRJ2 ~-.;,ii~.LG.;.~ : :: ~

0 ·. ·.~f'l. 'I< 5":.•:-..·:;

Source: htrp ://www.de lhimetrorail .com/commuters/route_map.html

Figure 4 .1 shows that the present and proposed routes of the DMR are

designed to integrate and to provide fast mobilit) to the gentrified city consisting of

middle class residential zones, shopping centers and business offices etc. Firstly, it is

connected to colonies like Rohin i, Dwarka, Dilshad Garden, Sushant Lok , Vaishali

etc., which are mainly inhabited by the middle class . Secondly. it will connect places

like Noida and Gurgaon to Delhi. which ptimarily provide livelihood opportunities to

the middle c lass English-speaking workforce. Thirdly. it is connected to the shopping

centres such as Connaught Place and Karol Bagh etc., where th is gentrified class can

fu nction as consumer. Thus, it could be argued that most of the lines of the DMR

exclude working class settlement and have been chiefly designed to integrate the

gentrified city.

124

Developing Property

The DMR plays a second role in the process of gentrification by actively

remaking urban space by creating and promoting capital intensive real estate

development and speculation. The low ridership figures described above indicate that

revenues are lower than expected from ticket sales, and the facts reveal that the DMR

is not financially viable as a commuter service. The pattern of DMRC revenues

generated with the completion of Phase I is summarised in Table 4.3 below, on the

basis of its annual accounts starting from the year 2001-02 and going to 2005-06.

Table 4.3

Profit and Loss Account ofDMRC (Rs. in crore)

Particulars 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06

Income 5.9 46.6 72.2 448.9

Expenditure 6.7 5.8 32.0 52.2 102.4

Profit before 1.7 0.1 14.6 20.0 346.5

depreciation and

interest

Profit/ (Loss) (8.3) (32.4) (76.3) (33.8)

Source: I) Government of India (GOI). 2002. Annual Report 2001-02. New Delhi: Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.: 21.

2) Government of India (GOI). 2003. Annual Report 2002-03. New Delhi: Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.: 19.

3) Government oflndia (GOI). 2004. Annual Report 2003-04. New Delhi: Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.: 15.



As can be seen, the five years trend of DMRC finances suggests that contrary

to the claims, the DMR was actually running at a loss. While incomes have not been

given, the declared profit of almost Rs 1. 7 crore before depreciation and interest in

the first year (2001-02) is inexplicable. The trend of loss from 2001-02 to 2005-06

125

continues. From Rs. 8.3 crore of loss in 2002-03, the DMRC loss is mounted to Rs.

76.3 crore in 2004-05. Surprisingly, in the subsequent year (2005-06) there is a fall in

the loss to Rs. 33.8 crore. Upon a deeper probe, one finds that the revenues of the

DMRC, in fact, are far less dependent on ridership growth than on real estate

development, thus revealing the DMR's role as actually functioning to spur real estate

investment and real estate based revenue generation/speculation. 276

Table 4.4

Details of Income (Rs. in crore)

Particulars 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06

Traffic Operation 2.4 12.7 53.5 113.2

Consultancy 1.3 6.6 5.9 10.1

Real Estate 1.7 24.0 0.6 296.2

Others 0.3 3.2 6.8 29.2

Total 5.8 46.5 72.2 448.9

Source: l) Government oflndia (GOI). 2002. Annual Report 2001-02. New Delhi: Delhi Metro RaJ! Corporation Ltd.: 21.





The major sources ofthe DMRC's income are traffic operation, consultancy,

real estate and others. The table 4.4 shows that until 2004-05 there has been a gradual

increase in the generation of income from traffic operation and others, whereas there

has been a negative trend of generation of income under the heads of real estate and

consultancy. But suddenly in 2005-06, there is an extraor-dinary rise in income from

traffic operation and real estate. The income from traffic operation has increased from

276 See Appendix 4 .I a to 4 .I d

126

Rs. 2.4 crore in 2002-03 toRs. 113.2 crore in 2005-06, whereas the income under real

estate has increased from Rs. 1. 7 crore in 2002-03 to Rs. 296.2 crore in 2005-06.

Thus, from 2002-03 to 2005-06, there was a 4 7.1 time increase in the income from

traffic operation, and a 174.2 time increase in the income from real estate. It has to be

noted that real estate comprises 65.9 percent of the total income generated by DMRC

in 2005-06.

Table 4.4 seems to suggest that the DMR's primary effect, in fact, has been to

fuel real estate speculation and growth. Since the completion of Phase I, the DMRC

has been extensively using the land available on both sides of the DMR lines to

develop property for residential and commercial purposes. One of the first major

projects undertaken by the DMRC for property development was the Information

Technology Park located at Shastri Park, which was completed in April 2005. The

Information Technology Park is considered to be at the heart of the city. It has been

constructed to provide a sylvan environment for IT corporates on a 6-hectare plot, the

location of which was selected keeping in view the issue of connectivity to the rest of

the city. The southern side of the park is connected to Shastri Park DMR station and

the northern side is connected to Grand Trunk (GT) road.277

The Information Technology Park is just a beginning of the process. Based on

the information available in the public domain, some of the other areas in the city

where the DMRC would develop real estate along with quantity and space available

are summarised in Table 4.5 below. It should be noted here that the Delhi Master Plan

2021, which was notified in 2007, but drafted in the early 2000s, specifically

discusses the role of the Metro in densifying the city and leading to the formation of

high-density and high-rise commercial development. It thus provided different

277 http://www .delhimetrorail.cornlcorporates/projectupdate/propertydvp/shashtri _park.html

127

building by-laws and land use norms for all segments of the land within 500 meters of

any Metro line, specifically increasing the Floor Area Ratio (FAR) and allowing

denser and higher buildings to be constructed. This demonstrates the manner ih which

the Metro has been envisaged as a strategic infrastructure project for rebuilding Delhi

into a more capital-intensive and commercially oriented city. Thus, while the land

given to the DMRC for the Metro was meant to be for the public good of the city's

residents, it is currently being sold off or leased to private developers for speculative

purposes, and virtually none of the land acquired by the DMRC that is not occupied

by the Metro rail is being used for public purposes.

The table 4.5 below shows that along with the construction of Phase I, the

DMRC has planned to develop property for residential purposes in six different

locations on 212,026 sq. meters of land. Similarly, it has planned to develop property

for commercial purposes in nine different locations on 66,464 sq. meters of land. In

total the DMRC would be developing property on 278,490 sq. meters of land. The

Delhi Development Authority (DDA) has persistently claimed that there is a shortage

of land in the city to house the poor; on this basis the DDA has increasingly been

displacing the urban poor to the city's peripheries. If there is no land available in the

city then how is the DDA managing to provide the DMRC with such a huge quantity

of land for property development?

128

Table 4.5

Property Development by DMR

Residential

Place Area (sq.m.)

Khyber Pass 68,000

Rithala 12,026

Vishwavidyalaya 30,000

Dwarka 30,000

Netaji Subash Nagar 12,000

Najafgarh 60,000

Total 212,026

Commercial

Place Area (sq.m.)

Shahdara 7,704

Inderlok 5,630

Inderlok Annexe 3,195

Pratap Nagar 2,000

Tis Hazari 1,892

Seelampur 1,446

Seelampur 41,000

Welcome 1,097

Kashmiri Gate 2,500

Total 66,464

Source: Prabhakar Smha. 2006. Metro Matters. Times of lndza. 7 January, New DeihL

129

Apart from developing property on both sides of the DMR corridor, the

DMRC is also engaged in selling/renting space at the DMR stations for shops, ATMs,

billboards and hoardings. The major DMR stations where this process has already

been initiated include Khyber Pass, Vishwavidyalaya, Seelampur, Welcome Colony,

Rohini West, Subhash Nagar, Pratap Nagar, Rithala, Dwarka, Najafgarh, Khayala,

Inderlok, Wazirpur, Kashmiri Gate, Kohat Enclave, and Pitampura.278

Thus, by developing property, DMRC is generating revenue as a land owning

agency - a surrogate landlord under the guise of a public body operating for the

common good-and a part of the surplus generated by land development is being

further employed to acquire land to earn yet more surplus, much of which benefits the

private sector at the expense of diminishing public land.

Generating Funds for the Project

If we observe only the funds for Phase I of the DMR, we can see that 56

percent of the total cost has been funded largely by the JBIC through a soft loan at the

interest rate of 1.8 percent. 30 percent of the project cost has been financed through

equity contributions subscribed equally by . the Central Government and the Delhi

Government. The two Governments also gave an interest-free loan to cover the cost

of land acquisition, which roughly works out to 8 percent of the project cost.

According to the DMRC, the balance 6 percent of the project cost is to be met by

raising money through property development. Table 4.6 gives the details of the

generation of funds for Phase I ofthe project.

278 Prabhakar Sinha. 2006. Metro Matters. Times of India. 7 January, New Delhi.

130

Table 4.6

Funds from Different Sources

Source of Fund Percentage of Total Cost

Equity contribution from Governments of India 15 percent each

and Delhi

JBIC Bank 56 percent approximately

Revenue from Property Development 6 percent approximately

Subordinate debt towards cost and land 8 percent approximately

The above financial plan is based on:

0 Debt equity ratio of2: 1

0 Fare: Base rate of Rs. 5.00 (at April, 1995 prices) per passenger trip of 7.12

km.

Source: http://www.dmrc.delhtgov.m

Excluding taxes and duties, the estimated completion cost of Phase I of the

DMR project by the year 2005 was about Rs.l 05700 crore, including the cost of land

and rolling stock. Considering this amount of investment in the light of the above

ridership figures, and taking into account" the manner in which the modifications to

Phase 1 of the DMR strategically excluded working-class settlements, on what basis

can it be said that the DMR was built primarily to serve the need of mass public

transit?

As discussed above, 56 percent of the project cost has been given as a long

term loan by the JBIC bank at a low interest rate of 1.8 percent. This rate is somewhat

misleading because Japan's domestic rate for short-term lending is less than 1.5

percent and hence there will be no loss in profits to the lender. Furthermore, the loan

has to be repaid by India in Yen currency, which protects the Japanese investment

131

fully. Given the Rupee's declining value in the international market, India will

actually pay almost 15 percent in interest in the long-term. In addition, a large chunk

of the Japanese loan is being used to pay Japanese consulting firms and

manufacturers for design, engineering skills, fabrication, and equipment. Indian

executives of the DMRC are even required to take loans to buy Japanese cars279•

Thus, in the long run, the Japanese economy is likely to benefit a .great deal from the

construction of the DMR project.

The funding of this mega project and other important projects in Delhi by

capitalist institutions such as the JBIC should be examined within the conceptual

framework defined by Harvey (2004) in the context of capitalist accumulation, which

is the problem of the overaccumulation of capital. After a cycle of economic

expansion and growth, a surplus quantity of capital is generated. Was this stock of

capital is accumulated; it has to be put back into circulation, lest it lose value. In such

moments of overaccumulated capital, when there is a shortage of lucrative investment

opportunities that can earn favorable returns on capital, a risk of devaluation arises

within capitalism.

Harvey argues that one of the main strategies to overcome this problem of

'overaccumulation and devaluation of capital' is what he calls a 'spatio-temporal fix,'

which is an investment in the fixed, built environment (i.e. space) that is capable of

absorbing surplus in space. The temporal· dimension of such an investment is that

once the investment is fixed in a physical form as a long-term investment, that

quantity of capital is locked up in an investment for a long period of time and does

not have to be booked for profit and accumulation for a long time. This process

279 Dunu"Roy. 2002. The Sun Rises in the East! India, Japan and the Environment. Unpublished Paper.

New Delhi: Hazards Centre: 1-2.

132

allows the problem of overaccumulation to be displaced through investment in long-

term capital projects (e.g. infrastructure investment, like a metro rail) or social

expenditures (e.g. public goods, like education, health care, that offer long term

benefits to the population) that defer the re-entry of current excess capital into

circulation well into the future. A certain portion of the total capital becomes literally

fixed in some physical form for a relatively long period of time (depending on its

economic and physical lifetime )?80 The formation of physical and social

infrastructures provides an excellent opportunity to shift continuing surpluses to the

future, as such investments are long-lived, difficult to alter, spatially immobile, and

capable of absorbing large and lumpy investments.281

Dispossession and the DMR

The DMR's contribution to the process of gentrification is followed by a

series of dispossession in the city. Harvey argues that capitalist accumulation is

always m concurrence with dispossession, termed as 'accumulation by

dispossession'282, which is a concept that draws upon the notion of 'primitive

accumulation' that Marx used extensively in his various writings. He states that the

concept of accumulation by dispossession reveals a wide range of processes. These

include commodification and privatisation of land and forceful expulsion of local and

squatter; conversion of various forms of property rights-commons, collective, state

280David Harvey.· 2004. The 'New' Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession. Socialist Register2004, 40: 64.

281 David Harvey. 2001. Spaces ofCapital: Towards a Critical Geography. UK: Edinburgh University Press: 319.

282 David Harvey. 2004. The 'New' Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession. Socialist Register 2004, 40: 74.

133

etc.- into exclusive private property rights; dismissal of rights to the common;

commodification of labour power and the destruction of alternative, indigenous forms

of production and consumption; colonial, neo-colonial, and imperial processes of

appropriation of assets, including natural resources; monetisation of exchange and

taxation, particularly of land; slave trade; and usury, the national debt and ultimately

the credit system. He argues that the state, with its monopoly of the means of violence

and the power to define legality, plays a crucial role in both backing and promoting

these processes?83

The DMR is causing dispossession in the following ways: 1) through

environmental impact; 2) through slum demolition and displacement; 3) by curtailing

and de-routing buses plying on routes adjacent to DMR lines; 4) by keeping its fares

higher than the fares of public buses; and 5) by not providing any concessional

scheme for the vulnerable section of the commuters.

Environmental Impact

Environmental impact of the DMR is manifested in the form of depletion of

the water table during the construction of underground lines, adverse impact on land

use and ecology, noise pollution, seismicity of the area, oil pollution, excavated soil

disposal and waste from maintenance of the DMR.

Impact on ground water: Since about one sixth of the DMR's route is

underground, it is expected that it would involve extensive water pumping during the

time of construction. Extensive pumping of water will actually create depletion of the

ground water table in and around the area. Additionally, the ground water recharge

will be reduced, as the construction of large concrete structures will prevent the

283 ibid.

134

percolation of water. In Delhi, it has been observed for the last several years that as

the water table falls, the contamination of ground water also increases. Extensive

pumping out of depleting ground water will further deteriorate the quality of water,

especially in terms of increase in nitrates and fluorides. 284

Impact on land use and ecology: The EIA of the DMR Phase I agrees that the

change in land use and ecology will have some negative impact - which is not

specified - but the EIA was carried out for a particular route, while the DMRC has

constructed the MR TS on a separate, and longer alignment. Such construction would

significantly alter the land use pattern converting agricultural, residential, and planted

areas into built-up areas. This would significantly impede the natural drainage pattern

of the city. While the EIA does not give any drainage details, it is also obvious that

the actual adverse impacts will differ from the impacts as assessed in EIA. In .

addition, there are already reports of impacts on utility lines, particularly sewerage,

and of vibration on nearby bmldings, which have not been considered at all in the

EIA.2ss

Noise pollution: The EIA acknowledges that during the operation phase, the

Metro workers as well as the commuters would be exposed to high levels of noise

(70-1 OOdb ). Drivers will be exposed to more than 92db of noise and even the

passengers will be exposed to 70-72db of noise level. As the EIA report states, 'The

levels are not comfortable for communication and other functional activities of

commuters and can cause hearing impairment'. Unspecified 'control' measures are

supposed to reduce the level to less than 70db. It should be remembered that the

284 Pritpal Randhawa et al. 2006. Delhi Metro Rail: A New Mode of "Public" Transport. New Delhi: Hazards Centre: 12.

285 Ibid. p.l3.

135

permissible levels in residential areas are much lower at 55db by day and 45 db by

night.286

Seismicity of the Area: The DMR project falls under seismic Zone IV, which

is second in severity only to the highest Zone V and is defined by the Bureau of

Indian Standards as High Damage Risk Zone, meaning that earthquakes of 3 to 6.7

magnitudes on the Richter scale have occurred in the past in the zone. Any seismic

episode may affect the stability of the underground and overhead structures of Metro.

But, curiously enough, the checklist of impacts in the EIA bluntly states that there

will be "no impact" from the risk of earthquake. It accepts the India Meteorological

Department's seismic factor of 0.07 (which was set in the 1930s) to be adequate for

the design of civil engineering structures. It is not mentioned in the EIA how this

factor will be incorporated for the proposed phase nor are the geological faults and

other unstable structures in and around the project area described.287

Oil Pollution: The EIA states that the collected oil from the DMR could be

either sold or incinerated to avoid any water pollution problem. This statement

ignores the possible pollution after its sale or incineration. DMR includes workshops

for maintenance of rolling stock at Khyber Pass, Shastri Park, Nangloi and Badli, of

which Shastri Park is in the fragile ecological zone of the river Yam una. The

Environment Management Plan suggests measures for removal of waste oil at the

source, but no specific treatment, recycling, or disposal provisions have been

mentioned in the EIA 288.

286 Ibid. 16.

2871bid.

288 Ibid. 17.

136

Excavated soil disposal: According to the EIA, the first phase would handle

5.59 million cum of excavated soil, which would be disposed of in 6 different sites

including 2 sites in the Ridge area, which are under reserve forest. The potential

conversion of disposal sites into wastelands and pollution of the groundwater,

particularly in the fractured terrain of the Ridge, have not been considered in the

EIA.289

Waste from maintenance of DMR: There is no treatment and disposal facility

for the wastewater generated from washing of coaches. An automatic washing facility

has been installed at Shastri Nagar, but the treatment of the wastewater has not been

specified. Thus, there is every possibility of all the wastewater draining into the river

Yamuna.290

Displacing the Marginalised for Construction

According to the EIA, 2502 slum clusters were supposed to be rehabilitated

due to the project.291 The construction of Phase I was completed in 2005, but no

credible and verifiable data exists on how many people were displaced during the

construction. As per the data acquired through the Right to Information Act, 2005

from the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), 699 slum squatter families

inhabiting the land owned by the MCD were displaced for the construction of Phase I

of DMR. Table 4. 7 below gives the details of the clusters demolished and families

relocated in this process.

289 Ibid.

290 Ibid.

291 Government of India (GOI). 1995. Environment Impact Assessment for Integrated Multi Modal Mass Rapid Transport System for Delhi. New Delhi: RITES: 58.

137

Table4.7

Relocation by MCD due the construction of Phase I of DMR

Year Name of cluster Relocated families Relocation Site

1999-2000 Makki Sarai 271 Narela

1999-2000 Shahdara Railway Station 21 Narela

1999-2000 Shastri Park 120 Narela

1999-2000 Taj Colony 65 Narela

2000-2001 JJ Cluster Pul Bangash 71 Tikri Khurd

2000-2001 Seelampur 14 Bhalswa

2000-2001 JJ Cluster Thomson Road 15 Narela

2000-2001 JJ Cluster Amba Bagh 10 Bhalaswa

2003-2004 Bhai Veer Singh Marg, Gole 82 Holambi Kalan

Market

Total 669

Source: Government of NatiOnal Capttal Terntory of Delht (GNCTD). 2005. NO. SD/JJ/RIA/05/052, Municipal Corporation ofDelhi, New Delhi, 10 January.

There is no data available regarding the displacement of people inhabiting the

land owned by the DDA, Railways or any other agencies. Since the EIA report of

1995 is applicable to only some of the sections of the present Phase I of the project,

and there have been ad-hoc extensions into other areas, there is a possibility that

many more families would have been displaced. Furthermore the EIA does not even

mention anything about the demolition and displacement unfolding in the process of

property development along the DMR corridors. The Map below shows that there

were several slum clusters that were demolished during the construction of Phase I of

the DMR, as much as those that would be demolished during the construction of

Phase II.

138

Figure 4.2

Demolitions due to the construction of Phase I and II of DMR

Source: Pritpal Randhawa et al. 2006. Delhi DMR Rai l: A New Mode of·'Public" Transport. New Delhi : Hazards Centre: 19.

Any Resettlement and Rehabilitation Plan requires a complete listing of all the

affected families and their socio-economic condition . 2.502 slum clusters in

unauthorised areas, 195 permanent (pucca) houses, 292 permanent shops. and 3 71

temporary shops houses with a total population of 10. 788 people were supposed to

be displaced because of acquisi tion of land for the project. 292 However, fo r the

purposes of the EIA, only an 8 percent sample of the a ffected families was taken to

determine their profile. Even this statistically insignificant sample indicates that more

than 75 percent of the families had been living at the land acquisition site for more

than 7 years (that is, from before 1988), and over 92 percent were on the voters' list,

~92 Ib id. XV .

139

while almost 89 percent held ration cards for the specified areas. However, in spite of

this long record of settlement, the level of insecurity can be gauged from the fact that

only 15 percent had built pucca houses, and merely 9 percent had their own toilets.

In spite of this perceptible level of sub-standard living, the EIA states rather

glibly, 'potable drinking water is available to all families' (although only 44 percent

is from hand pumps), 'medical facilities are available for all' (63 percent from private

doctors), and 'education facilities are utilized by 89.5 percent' (with enrollment

dropping rapidly from 56 percent at the primary school level to 6.1 percent at the

college level). A more realistic estimate is that 50 percent of the people work as

casual labourers and 86 percent fall in the 'low income group of less than Rs 18,000

per annum', of which 76 percent is spent on routine items such as food and

clothing.293 For this unfortunate population, DMRC has set aside the princely amount

of Rs 45,000 per family for construction of 'new jhuggies' (slum clusters),294 where

'reasonable and adequate community facilities' will be provided. But, the EIA makes

no attempt to analyse the impact on livelihoods and services when this population

was eventually relocated to a distant area in the peripheries.

Curtailing and De-routing Buses

Buses are the main mode of public transport in the city at present, catering to

the travel needs of more than 60 percent of commuters. The majority of this 60

percent consists of the city's working poor. Buses provide this population with cheap

and affordable transport through an extensive network of approximately 800 different

routes, which provides wide range of coverage it provides, in comparison to the

293 Ibid. 47-54.

294 Ibid. 98.

140

limited network of DMR routes. Since the completion of Phase I of DMR, it has

impacted negatively on the bus system by reducing the number of routes.

There are a number of figures to prove that buses plying on routes· along the

DMR line have been asked to be deliberately taken off. The DMRC demanded that

the Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) and State Road Transport Authority (STA)

de-route buses on the routes parallel to the DMR. Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 show the

details of the routes affected due to the induction of the DMR.

Table 4.8

DTC buses affected due to DMR

Route No. No. of buses affected

Discontinued routes 247 9

132 -167 -

Routes curtailed up to Metro 817 13

832 10

405 10

805 2

61 1

Routes extended up to Metro 778 3

801 4

915 2

927 1

968 1

Routes diverted through Metro station 233 1

917 1

Total 15 58

Source: Government of National Capital Terntory of Delht (GNCTD). 2006. NO. TRISH/RIA/06/161, Delhi Transport Corporation, New Delhi, December

141

Table 4.9

ST A buses affected due to DMR

Route No. No of buses affected

Route curtailed 832 29

817 61

Route cancelled 247 16

Total 3 106

Source: Government ofNat10nal Capttal Terntory ofDelht (GNCTD). 2006. NO. TR/SH/RIA/06/161. New Delhi: Delhi Transport Corporation, December.

Until March 2006, 15 routes of DTC and 3 routes of STA adjacent to DMR

routes have been affected. 106 buses of ST A and 58 buses of DTC have been

curtailed, de-routed or cancelled.

There could be two reasons behind this process. Firstly, as mentioned earlier,

the DMR ridership figures are almost three fourth below the expectation for Phase I.

Therefore it is possible that buses are being curtailed or de-routed to force bus users

to commute on the DMR. Secondly, as we know that Delhi is being reshaped to

transmute into a world-class city, the public transport in the city is also being

gentrified to suite the needs of a the agenda of 'world-class city', which means the

replacement of bad looking DTC and blueline buses with the posh and world-class

look ofthe DMR.

Keeping the Fare Structure Higher than Public Buses

The poor are also impacted because the DMR has a much higher fare structure

than public buses. Even while it claims to be the most efficient and feasible mode of

public transport in the city, it is not affordable to the majority of the commuters. The

Table 4.10 below gives the details ofthe DMR and bus fare.

142

Table 4.10

Comparison ofDMR and DTCFare (in Rs)

NoofKm DMR DTC

1-2 6 3

2-4 8 3

4-6 9 5

6-9 11 5

9-12 12 7

12-15 13 10

15-18 14 10

18-21 15 10

21-24 16 10

24-27 17 10

27-30 18 10

30-33 19 10

33-36 20 10

36-39 21 10

Over 39 22 10

Source: I) http://dtc.mc.m/dt3.htm 2) Staff Reporter. 2005. New Line, New Rate. Times of India. 25 Dec, New Delhi.

The DMR has a fare structure with a minimum ticket price of Rs 6 and

maximum ofRs 22 as compared to the public buses' minimum ofRs 3 and maximum

of Rs 10. This means that the DMR does not really attract low-income group

commuters who travel short distances. It only attracts the commuters who travel for

long distances. It has to be noted that there has been a significant increase in the fare ·

of the DMR after the completion of the third line of Phase I. Earlier the maximum

143

fare was Rs 14 and after the completion of third line in 2005 it is Rs 22. It could be

argued that the fare should increase because the network has increased. This means

that each time the network increases there will be a rise in fares. But since the DMR

is projected as a mode of public transportation, the fare cannot be increased arbitrarily

merely on the basis of an increase in the network.

Depriving the Marginalised without any Concession

Normally, any mode of public transportation offers concessional fares to its

commuters. In Delhi, the DTC offers seven different categories of passes, namely

student pass, resettlement colony pass, general all route pass, police all route pass,

press all route pass, senior citizens pass and free pass, to different sections of

commuters. In contrast, the DMR does not offer any concessional scheme to its

commuters. All it offers in the name of concession is a 10 percent bonus travel on

Smart Cards, which are cards that require a minimum purchase of Rs. 50 and can be

used for multiple trips until they require recharging295• Table 4.11 below gives the

details of these categories.

295 Times News Network. 2005. New metro takes in Rs 21 lakh on Day 2. Times of India. July 5, New Delhi:

144

\_ ~-Table 4.11

Concession Scheme in DTC and DMR

S. No Type of Concessional Passes in DTC Charges Concession in metro (in Rs)

1. Student Passes

a) Monthly Destination 13/-

b) All Route Passes 13/-

c) All Route (G.L.S.) 55/-

d) All Route Ordinary Pass 150/-

2. a) Resettlement Colony 0 to 10 km. 501- No passes for any

b) Resettlement Colony Above 10 km. 100/- category of commuters.

3. General All Route Passes (G.L.S) 450/- Only 1 0 percent bonus

4. Police All Route Passes 400/- travel on smart cards for

5. Press All Route Passes 100/-all categories of

6. Senior Citizens (All Route G.L.S.) 50/-commuters.

7. Free Passes

a.) Disabled Persons

b.) Freedom Fighters with one Attendant

c.) Sportsman (International)

d.) National Awardees

e.) War Widows and their Dependents

f.) MLAs/MPs of Delhi with Attendant

.. Source: http://dtc.mc.m/dt3.htm#3

Thus, it could be argued that by keeping the fare structure higher than public

buses and by not keeping any concessional scheme, DMR is not only denying the

right of vulnerable sections of the city access to travel on a 'fast' and 'efficient'

145

public transportation system, but it is also transforming what was previously a right to

low cost movement into a consumer choice by forcing people to commute on it by

curtailing or de-routing the bus service on DMR adjacent routes.

Conclusion

The DMR, as argued, cannot be understood, located nor its impacts calculated

merely as a technological system. Rather, the DMR was designed, crafted and

structured to address the unique pressures that were generated following the attempts

to transform the city of Delhi into a globalised urban space: a 'world-class' city that

was now intended to express the need for a faster 'turn-over time' for neo.:liberal

capital. A fresh template for capitalist accumulation, marked by the economic

dominance of financial services, hyper-consumption, real estate speculation and the

unprecedented growth of the white collar middle class. The DMR, put differently,

gives expression to the need for this new spatio-temporal fix, in which neo-liberal

economic practices are made possible by encouraging different kinds of mobility

through a 'modern' capital intensive transportation technology.

The new regime ofneo-liberal economy for post-1991 Delhi, however, is not

merely about acquiring speed and the technical imperatives for enabling mass transit.

The DMR in essence is meant to carry out several unstated political and social

objectives. Chiefly, as I have argued, it has enabled a version of gentrification

through displacement or enclosure and sought to transform a part of Delhi's urban.

landscape into a site for real estate speculation. That is, the DMR has systematically

carried out a double dispossession involving the eviction of slum clusters and the

urban poor along its routes as well as the pricing out of the underclass from access to

speed and faster mobility through its restrictive fare structure. Thus, one could argue

146

that the DMR has reinforced the economic dominance of the middle class as the

beneficiaries of the new economy. Secondly, as part of its social project, the DMR

has shaped its route as essentially a zone for real estate speculation. A landscape, in

other words, that feeds into the logic of gentrification and serves to tum urban lands

into commodities for extreme speculation. In sum, the DMR must be explained and

explored as much for its technological effects as it must be understood for its

political, economic and social imperatives. The DMR, thus, is tied in more ways than

one to the great neo-liberal churning and transformation of the city of Delhi.

147

chapter iv connecting the city and disconnecting...

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