Sri Lanka Report onCommunity Food Security Profiling

Kalinga Tudor SilvaNireka WeeratungeClaudia Ibarguen

Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA)29, Gregory’s Road

Colombo 7

Submitted to the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)

July, 2002

Acknowledgements

The authors of this report wish to thank the World Food Programme for inviting the Centre for Poverty Analysis to undertake this study. In implementing this study, the support and cooperation we received from all WFP staff, including Mr. Jeff Taft- Dick, WFP Representative in Colombo, Mr Hakan Tongul, Assistant Country Director, Ms. Selvi Sachiththnandam, National Programme Officer and Dr. Mahadevan Ramachandran, Regional Advisor. Our special thanks are due to Dr. Neville Edirisinghe who in addition to preparing the situation analysis was the Coordinator for WFP of the Comprehensive Vulnerability Analysis. Our thanks are also due to Mr. Sriyan Weerasinghe who carried out the Secondary Data Analysis and Mr. Amarajeewa Satharasinghe, Regional Data/GIS Assistant, for carrying out all the Vulnerability Mapping.

This study was implemented by a team of researchers headed by the authors of this report. We also would like to record with thanks the important contribution of the following members of the research team.

Coordination of Field Research/ Data Processing

Shakeela JabbarVigitha RenganathanK. Jeyanithe

Fieldwork

Sandika KamaniW.P. Ruvin BuddhikaW.M.K.B Wickramasinghe A.W.M. FahimManuel IndrasuriyanSidharthan MaunaguruBahirathy Jeevuueshwara

We would also like to place on record the cooperation we received from high ranking government and NGO officials who willingly participated in the national level workshops and Key Informant Interviews at various levels. Our deep gratitude goes out to the community members who took time away from their pressing day-to-day activities to participate in this study.

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Contents

Acknowledgements iAbbreviations ii

Executive summary vii

Chapter 1: Introduction to VAM/Community Food Security Profiling (CFSP) in Sri Lanka 1

1.1 Background

1.2 Objectives

1.3 Methodology1.3.1 Conceptual framework1.3.2 Methods1.3.3 Sampling1.3.4 Selection of study units1.3.5 Differences between sample planned and sample obtained1.3.6 Data collection methods

1.4 Limitations of the study

Chapter 2: Zonal variation in food security and vulnerability: An overview 112.1 Availability

2.1.1 Resources and food production2.1.2 Wheat flour distribution2.1.3 Market integration

2.2 Access2.2.1 Purchasing power2.2.2 Social safety nets and food subsidies2.2.3 Community support

2.3 Utilization2.3.1 Consumption2.3.2 Absorption

2.4 Risk factors2.4.1 Environmental risks2.4.2 Market and entitlement risks2.4.3 Nutrition and health risks

2.5 Overview of vulnerability issues

Chapter 3: Views of key informants on WFP vulnerability mapping, livelihoods and implementation capacities in selected districts 30

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3.1 Central Zone

3.1.1 Badulla district3.1.2 Nuwara Eliya district3.1.3 Ratnapura district

3.2 Dry Zone3.2.1 Anuradhapura district3.2.2 Hambantota district3.2.3 Moneragala district

3.3 Conflict Zone3.3.1 Jaffna district3.3.2 Puttalam district3.3.3 Trincomalee district3.3.4 Vavuniya district

3.4 Synthesis of key informant viewpoints

Chapter 4: Perceptions and Practices of the Most Vulnerable 52 4.1 Profile of villages4.2 Livelihoods4.3 Locating the most vulnerable4.4 Gender issues and intra-household food distribution4.5 Causes of food insecurity4.6 Coping strategies4.7 Sectoral priorities and best implementers4.8 Organisational landscape

Chapter 5: Baseline for Identifying Vulnerability 78 5.1 Typically vulnerable communities5.2 Typically vulnerable households

Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations 90

6.1 Verification of targeting

6.2 Baseline situation with regard to food Insecurity6.2.1 Market-related risks and vulnerabilities6.2.2 Conflict-related risks and vulnerabilities6.2.3 Environment-related risks and vulnerabilities

6.3 Community needs and priorities

6.4 Implementation capacities

References 101

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Tables

Table 1.1 Number of proposed study locations by Zone, District and level of food insecurity determined on the basis of Vulnerability Maps of January 2002Table 1.2 Study locations actually covered by Zone, District and level of food insecurity determined on the basis of Vulnerability Maps of June 2002Table 2.1 Rice production per capita per year, Central and Dry Zones, 2000Table 2.2 Issue of wheat flour and per capita availability per year, 2000Table 2.3 Estimated expenditure of households on food per month, in percentagesTable 2.4 Samurdhi Food Stamps Programme, beneficiary households, in percentages,

2001, in relation to the Combined Poverty Score (CPS)Table 2.5 Number of meals per day by Zone, in percentagesTable 4.1 Types of communities, by ZoneTable 5.1 Typically vulnerable communities in the Central ZoneTable 5.2 Typically vulnerable communities in the Dry ZoneTable 5.3 Typically vulnerable communities in the Conflict ZoneTable 5.4 Typically vulnerable households in the Central ZoneTable 5.5 Typically vulnerable households in the Dry ZoneTable 5.6 Typically vulnerable households in the Conflict ZoneTable 6.1 Agreement between WFP Vulnerability Mapping and KI responses

Annexes

Annex 1.1 List of study villages by Zone, District, DS Division and TypeAnnex 1.2 Households interviewed by ethnicity and genderAnnex 2.1 Paddy production by District,2000Annex 2.2 Rice production per capita, 2000, Central ZoneAnnex 2.3 Rice production per capita, 2000, Dry ZoneAnnex 2.4 Production of subsidiary food crops by District, 2000Annex 2.5 Production of selected vegetables by District, 2000Annex 2.6 Proportion of consumption met by local production in communities by Zone Annex 2.7 Estimated expenditure on food per month, by ZoneAnnex 2.8 Poverty levels, Combined Poverty Score (CPS), rank and percentage of HHs receiving Samurdhi, by DistrictAnnex 2.9 Number of meals per day by householdsAnnex 2.10 Percentage of households with latrines Annex 3.1 Distribution of population in Jaffna District by category and DS Division as of 31/10/2001Annex 3.2 Total no of families and no of families receiving Dry Rations in the Jaffna District by DS Division, 2001Annex 4.1 Predominant livelihoods and occupationsAnnex 4.2 Community perceptions of the food secure and insecureAnnex 4.3 Perceptions of socio-economic statusAnnex 4.4 Reasons for the socio-economic categorising of their householdAnnex 4.5 Prioritisation of intra-household food distributionAnnex 4.6 Causes of food security as perceived by householdsAnnex 4.7 Coping strategies Annex 4.8 Use of Income from the mortgage of assetsAnnex 4.9 Priorities for reducing food insecurity

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Annex 4.10 Services expected from Government, Community Organizations and NGOs (Households)

Annex 4.11 Organizations involved in food assistance Annex 5.1 Profiles of vulnerable communitiesAnnex 5.2 Profiles of vulnerable households

Charts

Chart 4.5 Prioritisation of intra-household food distributionChart 4.6 Causes of food insecurityChart 4.7 Coping strategies

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Abbreviations Used

CBO = Community-based OrganizationCEPA = Centre for Poverty AnalysisCFSP = Community Food Security Profiling DS = Divisional SecretaryFGD = Focus Group DiscussionHH = HouseholdKI = Key InformantLDO = Land Development OrdinanceLTTE = Liberation Tigers of Tamil EelamMFG = Men’s Focus GroupMFGD = Men’s Focus Group DiscussionGN = Grama NiladhariPDHS = Provincial Director of Health ServicesRRR = Relief, Rehabilitation and ReconstructionSA = Situation Analysis SDA = Secondary Data Analysis SLA = Sri Lanka ArmyTRO = Tamils Rehabilitation OrganisationWFGD = Women’s Focus Group WFGD = Women’s Focus Group DiscussionWFP = World Food Programme

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Sri Lanka Report on Community Food Security Profiling (CFSP)

Executive Summary

Introduction

The overall goal of the CFSP is to provide a participatory and qualitative assessment of the nature of food security and vulnerability and potential responses in selected areas of the country. The specific objectives of CFSP were to verify targeting emerging from the vulnerability maps compiled on the basis of secondary data analysis, establish a baseline for future WFP interventions, identify problems and needs of vulnerable communities and assess the implementation capacities in the selected areas. The study involved key informant discussions at the national level (15 participants in all), key informant interviews at District levels (10 districts in all), key informant interviews at DS Division Level (29 DS Divisions), focus group discussions with male and female respondents and semi-structured interviews with a total of 200 households drawing 4-9 carefully selected households from each of the 29 rural communities covered in the study. The study locations were purposively chosen using a stratified sampling framework, making sure that there is a proportionately higher representation of administrative divisions and communities identified as vulnerable compared to those identified as moderately vulnerable or not vulnerable. The findings of this profile are expected to be indicative and descriptive giving weightage to problems in most food insecure communities rather than statistically valid for assessing food security situation in the whole country.

Verification of Targeting

The SDA assessment of the conflict zone as mostly and uniformly food insecure is generally supported by CFSP data, including KI interviews, FGDs and HH interviews. This may be attributed to all the disruptions caused by 20 years of war, restrictions imposed on mobility of people and goods, weakening of delivery mechanisms particularly in the uncleared areas, limited income earning opportunities and increased dependency on dry rations issued by various relief agencies. Nevertheless, in the conflict zone, difference between “cleared” and “uncleared” areas is not evident from the mapping exercise in certain areas. The maps for the Trincomalee District are most inconsistent with findings of KI interviews and what the research team observed in the field. The reasons for uncleared DS Divisions of 302 and 306 appearing as green and 300 as blue are not evident. A greater part of the dry zone has been identified as red, followed by blue and green patches. Blue and green areas largely correspond to areas served by major irrigation systems, including the Mahaweli systems. The red areas are those primarily dependent on chena farming and/or those areas bordering the conflict zone. There are, however, some questions as to why Thambuttegama (40), a Mahaweli settlement situated in the Anuradhapura District is red, while Padaviya seriously affected by war-related disturbances, including large-scale population displacement, is green. Similarly in the Hambantota District Lunugamvehera and Suriyaweva described by all the KIs as most food insecure are blue, while Tissamaharama seen by many as better off remains red.

The Central Zone is by and large green or blue, the more vulnerable areas being largely confined to the drier and more isolated hilly regions such as Thumpane (151), and Passara (51), drier lowland divisions in Badulla (e.g. 56) and Ratnapura (e.g. 291) Districts or more

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marginalized plantation regions such as Deltota (139) and Kotmale (252). The relatively better off food security profile for the Central Zone is in keeping with higher degree of urbanization, greater integration with markets, greater stability and diversity in food production, and greater availability of wage earning opportunities in the estates and commercialised vegetable cultivation, but it is inconsistent with CFSP evidence showing a adverse picture for the zone compared to the dry zone in terms of staple food production, reported lack of work opportunities and malnutrition picture, particularly in the estate areas. Overall there is most agreement with divisions categorized by the WFP as green, but the distinction between red and blue divisions may require further scrutiny. On the whole while the DS Division may be perceived as an important unit for targeting assistance, in many DS divisions there is considerable variation in level of vulnerability among different localities. For instance, some of the divisions identified as green may contain pockets that are highly vulnerable and likely to be totally excluded in view of the overall assessment for the DS division. In order to address such issues either a further refinement of criteria used at the DS division level or taking vulnerability mapping to the Grama Niladhari level may be necessary.

Baseline Situation with regard to Food Security

This study found three types of vulnerabilities affecting food security in the study areas. They are conflict-related vulnerabilities, market-related vulnerabilities and environment-related vulnerabilities. In many of the study areas these three types of vulnerabilities reinforce each other in ways that affect availability and access to food, particularly among the more vulnerable sections of the population.

As regards availability, access to and utilisation of food, the worst conditions prevail in the conflict zone due to decreased food production, decreased capacity for food production, inhibitions to flow of goods from outside, lack of earning opportunities, gradual disruption of physical infrastructure and any pre-existing social capital and excessive dependence on dry rations supplied by relief agencies. There are chronic food shortages particularly in the uncleared areas, but temporary disruptions to the supply lines occur whenever armed confrontations break out or security operations increase. While the distinction between cleared and uncleared areas and differences among never displaced, resettled and relocated communities is important for understanding some differences in vulnerability, the constant mobility of people in and out of various localities particularly after the start of the peace process serves to complicate the picture regarding the need for emergency food aid, assistance towards settlement and support for increased food production. Those living in camps, those temporarily accommodated with friends and relatives, households with many dependents, including those with disabilities are among the most vulnerable within the local population. As the situation in the conflict zone changes from active conflict to conflict transformation, important changes may occur in the food security situation that might necessitate changes in required interventions.

In the dry zone, chronic and acute food shortages may be most evident in border villages affected by conflict-related disturbances and livelihood insecurities, but droughts are particularly common in communities (mainly purana villages and encroacher villages) dependent on minor irrigation systems and rain-fed agriculture, including chena farming. Food availability and access are partly determined by

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domestic food production, farm incomes, opportunities for wage labour, variable food prices and relief received under the Samurdhi programme. Utilisation of food may be adversely affected by customary dietary practices, late introduction of weaning foods, low educational level of mothers and gender disparities in intra-household food distribution. Droughts, crop damage by wild animals, poor terms of trade for farm produce as against cost of inputs and other commodities purchased in the market and security threats are the primary risk factors in the communities studied. The most vulnerable include the small farmers with usually unstable title to land and no access to irrigation facilities, landless wage labourers, and households affected by alcoholism.

In the central zone too there is considerable food production for subsistence and commercial purposes and better linkages with markets compared to the other two zones. There are, however, clear-cut pockets such as isolated, less accessible and often socially marginalized upland villages and neglected plantations in the midst of relatively food secure communities. The services and support systems are generally better than in the other two zones, but some of the isolated communities noted above suffer from the same difficulties as in similar communities in the dry zone. The environmental degradation inclusive of soil erosion, depletion of gem deposits in predominant mining areas and slump in certain economic activities (eg. Rubber economy) have adversely affected the livelihoods in several areas. The most vulnerable include casual wage labourers, elderly, disabled or chronically ill, households with alcoholic husbands and those with unstable incomes in general.

Community Needs and Priorities

Lack of work and inadequate income were identified as the primary causes of food insecurity in the central and conflict zones. In contrast, lack of land, scarcity of water, crop damage due to pests, wild animals and droughts and conflict-related disturbances and vulnerabilities were cited as the key underlying causes of food insecurity in the dry zone. Almost all coping strategies, including eating fewer meals, obtaining credit, mortgaging or selling of assets and food substitution were more widely reported in the conflict zone, followed by the central zone and the dry zone.

Priorities reported in FGDs varied between men and women, according to zone and type of community in each zone. In the conflict zone peace was uniformly mentioned as the most important priority in both male and female FGDs and irrespective of type of community, followed by roads and irrigation. In the dry zone, irrigation was identified as the most important priority in both male and female FGDs, followed by peace. Women in the dry zone attached a higher priority to peace and food supplementation compared to men. As for variation across community types in the dry zone, irrigation received highest priority in squatter villages, followed by colonies and purana villages while peace was typically more important for people in the border villages. In the central zone, job training was most frequently mentioned in both male and female FGDs, followed by food supplementation for children and women. While men in one village gave highest priority to food for work, peace was mentioned as an important priority in both male and female FGDs. Irrigation received a relatively low priority in the central zone compared to the dry zone, but roads were cited as an important priority in two upland villages and one lowland village.

Implementation Capacities

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In general state agencies were seen as better implementers of programmes catering to the food insecure households in all three zones. The state agencies reportedly had relevant capacities, regulatory frameworks and prior experience in implementing such programmes. However, KIs as well as some FGDs identified some key weaknesses in state agencies, including lack of funds, political interference, lack of transparency and some outright corruption in some instances. The state was much weaker in parts of the conflict zone particularly in the uncleared areas as well as in more remote dry zone areas due to the unpopularity of such places to government servants and frequent transfers in and out of the areas. Military and TROs played a key role in delivery of services in areas under miliary and LTTE control respectively, but their credibility with local populations could not be ascertained due to security considerations during fieldwork.

As regards the NGOs, some NGOs provided commendable service appreciated by the local communities as well as government servants in some instances. NGOs were particularly active in the conflict zone and in some dry zone districts such as Monaragala. They were seen as particularly successful in social mobilization, micro credit, conflict resolution and peace building. However, the informants mentioned several drawbacks of NGOs, including lack of coordination among themselves and with government agencies, lack of transparency, and lack of accountability to local populations.

Conclusion

Vulnerability maps can be a useful tool for planning and better targeting of WFP and perhaps other similar programmes in Sri Lanka. However, as vulnerability maps become an operational tool used in project planning, it may be necessary to further refine the mapping exercise, taking into consideration ground realities, responses of key stakeholders, felt needs in communities and significant variations within the primary unit of analysis used in the mapping process. While capitalising on real advantages of this tool over ad hoc decision-making, all efforts must be made to avoid the danger of it becoming a mechanistic tool not responsive to constantly changing ground realities in Sri Lanka.

The findings of this study support the recently introduced change in WFP focus and increased emphasis on utilisation of food aid as a tool for recovery and rehabilitation. This shift is in keeping with priories of target populations as well as changing ground realities in the country, including progress in the peace process. It may be necessary reassess the role of current implementation partners of WFP with a view to better serving the target populations, ensuring transparency of operations at the ground level and addressing emerging needs in various parts of the country.

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Chapter 1 Introduction to VAM/Community Food Security Profiling (CFSP) in Sri Lanka

1.1 Background

The World Food Programme's Comprehensive Vulnerability Assessment for Sri Lanka is made up of three components. They are as follows:1. A Situation Analysis (SA) 2. A Secondary Data Analysis (SDA) 3. A Community Food Security Profiling (CFSP)

The SA and SDA have led to a mapping of DS divisions in the country on the basis of their level of vulnerability to food insecurity using a composite index of available secondary data. All three components contribute ultimately to an integrated analysis of vulnerability to food insecurity within the country that meets WFP's needs for designing and planning of programmes, as well as providing a basis for an advocacy role in defining potential responses to improve food security.

1.2 Objectives of the Community Food Security Profiling (CFSP)

The overall goal of the CFSP is to provide a participatory and qualitative assessment of the nature of food security and vulnerability and potential responses in selected areas of the country.

The objectives as outlined in WFP documents are:

I verify targeting emerging from the Secondary Data Analysis (SDA)II establish a baseline for WFP programme impactIII assess needs and priories of communities in relation to food securityIV analyse implementation capacities in the selected areas

1.3 Methodology of CFSP

CFSP aims at generating qualitative primary data so as to expand the vulnerability assessment to include an analysis of communities and households, particularly in the most vulnerable sub-regions. The analysis so far resulted in 70 DS divisions in Sri Lanka being listed as food insecure in terms of at least three of the four indices used, and 80 DS divisions as moderately affected in terms of at least two indices and the remaining 173 DS divisions as least vulnerable. A significant aspect of the CFSP is to corroborate these findings at the field level. The findings of the profile are expected to provide a qualitative and descriptive account of food security issues in the selected study locations and communities so as to complement, verify and add to the quantitatively-oriented Secondary Data Analysis and related mapping exercise.

The CFSP in Sri Lanka followed the general conceptual framework outlined by WFP as regards vulnerability to food insecurity. However, it looks at specific conditions that relate to

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and define the Sri Lankan situation through data generated in the field. It is envisaged to serve as a baseline for future WFP planning and monitoring in Sri Lanka.

1.3.1 Conceptual Framework

Vulnerability to food insecurity here is defined in terms of availability, access and utilisation of food and related risks and coping strategies. The profile aims at identifying and analysing perceptions of food insecurity and its causes, most vulnerable communities and households in selected study areas, household strategies to overcome food insecurity and the types of external assistance necessary to respond to vulnerability.

Issues addressed in CFSP

Perceptions of the most vulnerable regarding the causes of food insecurity/vulnerability (in reference to availability, access, utilisation, risk and coping)

Perceptions of the most vulnerable regarding sectoral opportunities to address these problems

Perceptions of the most vulnerable regarding how to locate and identify the "most vulnerable" and "those who most need food", and how to monitor their condition over time

Recommendations for the identification features of potential WFP programming (target areas and populations, potential sectoral responses, analysis of the appropriate role of food aid, etc)

Recommendations for the identification of potential WFP programme-related resources and partners

CFSP focuses on four dimensions directly or indirectly associated with food insecurity and vulnerability within the selected communities in Sri Lanka:

i. agricultural production, livelihood strategies, income sources and seasonal variation and their impact on food availability and access

ii. the composition of the food basket, consumption patterns, intra-household distribution, including gender issues and their impact on utilisation of food

iii. household coping strategies in dealing with food shortages, issues of marginalisation and exclusion and principal risk factors

iv. the institutional landscape within the study areas so as to identify potential channels for improving food security in the relevant communities

1.3.2 Methods

Given the overall objectives of the CFSP that emphasise the need for a participatory and qualitative approach, the short period of 12 weeks allocated, and the requirement that the CFSP provide a baseline for future monitoring of WFP programming in Sri Lanka, a total of 30 DS Divisions distributed in 19 Districts was initially identified as potential study sites. Using the vulnerability maps developed as of January 2002, the CFSP included in its assessment DS Divisions that had been defined in the WFP mapping as 1) most vulnerable, 2) moderately vulnerable and 3) not vulnerable. In drawing the sample of DS divisions it was decided to give greater weightage to Divisions identified to be "most vulnerable" in order to better understand the underlying causes of food insecurity.

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1.3.3 The Sampling Plan

The sampling plan was developed using vulnerability maps evolved as of January 2002. Further refinement of vulnerability maps continued until the completion of the CFSP, but in drawing the sample plan we were guided by the maps made available to the CFSP research team in January 2002.

The CFSP identified a stratified sample of 30 DS Divisions distributed in 19 districts of Sri Lanka as a potential sample frame for locating study communities. Six districts (Colombo, Gampaha, Matara, Kalutara, Galle, Kurunegala) reporting minimal or no food insecurity, according to the secondary data analysis were excluded. Although Kandy District also features minimal food insecurity, it was decided to include one site in order to have an example from a District primarily composed of "not vulnerable" DS Divisions. The 19 Districts were grouped into four zonal clusters, according to ecological, socio-economic and political characteristics that affect food security, including the two significant risk factors of conflict and drought. Within the Conflict Zone, both “cleared” and "uncleared" areas were identified as potential study locations.

The zonal grouping of the various districts was as follows:Dry Zone - Moneragala, Matale, Polonnaruwa, AnuradhapuraConflict Zone - Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Vavuniya, Mannar, MullaitivuCentral Zone - Ratnapura, Kegalle, Nuwara Eliya, Badulla, KandyCoastal Zone - Ampara, Puttalam, Hambantota

The original sampling plan sought to identify 30 DS divisions from among the various districts and zones so as to represent different levels of vulnerability as specified in Table 1.1

Table 1.1: Number of Proposed Study Locations by Zone, District and Level of Food Insecurity Determined on the Basis of Vulnerability Maps, January 2002

Zone Most Vulnerable Red on the map

Moderately Vulnerable Blue on the map

Not Vulnerable White on the map

Districts # DS Divisions (sites)

Districts # DS Divisions(sites)

Districts # DS Divisions(sites)

Dry Zone Moneragala (2) Matale(2) Polonnaruwa Anuradhapura

6 Polonnaruwa 1 Anuradhapura 1

Conflict Zone

TrincomaleeBattiacaloaJaffnaVavuniyaMannarMullativuKillinochchi

7 BatticaloaMannar

2 Vavuniya 1

Central Zone

Ratnapura (2) KegalleBadulla Nuwara Eliya

5 KegalleBadulla

2 Kandy 1

Coastal Zone

Puttalam Ampara

2 Hambantota 1 Puttalam 1

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Total 20 6 4

The proposed sample comprised a greater number of DS Divisions classified as “most vulnerable” with a total of 20 sites. Six “moderately vulnerable” DS Divisions and four "not vulnerable" DS Divisions were also to be included in the sample with a view to make a comparative analysis of the extent and causes of food insecurity/vulnerability and potential differences in coping strategies. This would then represent approximately 34% (total 58) of the most vulnerable DS divisions and 16% (total 45) of moderately vulnerable DS divisions and less than 1% of not vulnerable DS divisions (total 220) according the vulnerability map developed as of January 2002.

1.3.4 Selection of Study Units

This study involved collecting primary information for selected districts and DS divisions, chosen study communities and selected households in the study communities.

In selecting the relevant study units the CFSP attempted as much as possible to devise a representative sample. However, it is important to underline that at each level study units were drawn purposively rather than randomly in view of the qualitative nature of the study.1

Nonetheless, certain steps and criteria were applied to select first the Districts, then the DS Divisions, then the communities and finally the households that would comprise the study units.

The total number of sites to be included was the product first and foremost of a pragmatic assessment of the number of study units that could be successfully covered in the time frame proposed. The number of communities to be chosen from the various administrative divisions was assessed to be 30 as specified in Table 1.1 and the number of households to be interviewed from within each study community was assessed to be 4 to 9 giving total sample of 120 to 270 households.

One of the main objectives of the CFSP is to generate information that could assist in verifying or ultimately modifying the mapping generated from the SDA. Likewise, the CFSP intention is to reveal the particular constraints and issues faced by food insecure communities and households. Therefore, it was decided that the sample would be composed of a majority of sites from the most vulnerable areas.

The original sample included at least one site from all Districts with considerable geographical portions under the "most vulnerable" category. (Please refer to the map 1). Hambantota containing large tracts considered "moderately vulnerable" and no regions under the "most vulnerable" category was included with one blue site. To offer comparisons four sites were selected from areas considered "not vulnerable." At least one District was selected from each of the zonal divisions. It was decided that those Districts that had a large combination of both red and blue areas would have two sites. As an example, Batticaloa, which contains a similar amount of land, categorised as red and blue had a site selected from each area. Finally, one site from each zonal division was chosen to represent the "not vulnerable" areas. For example, Vavuniya although having only two DS Divisions categorised as "not vulnerable" according to the vulnerability map of January 2002, was selected from the Conflict Zone because it was the only District from this zonal cluster that exhibited any white areas.

1 The selection of households was not achieved through a random sample from an exhaustive list. More intuitive methods of household selection were applied from the field enumerators themselves.

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Once the districts and the number of DS divisions under each vulnerability category to be studied from within each district were identified, it was necessary to establish which DS Divisions would be selected. The evolving WFP mapping offered the vulnerability status according to DS Divisions. For each District a listing of the red, blue and white DS Divisions was available. In the process of reaching a decision on which DS Division to select within a District certain practical considerations had to take precedence. Particularly in the conflict area certain DS Divisions had to be excluded on account of security/clearance considerations. For example, in Trincomalee district level key informants mentioned Padavi Sripura and Muttur as the most food vulnerable areas of the District but because they were "uncleared" they could not be accessed by the research team. Other DS Divisions that were deemed as potentially dangerous were also excluded from the sample.

The selection of the DS Division within the District was based primarily on information obtained from District level key informant interviews. To select a red DS Division within a District with more than one Division under this category a number of questions were posed to key informants. They were asked to specify thedivisions they considered to be most vulnerable from a list presented to them. On the basis of these responses DS Divisions were selected.

To select the community site within the DS Division the enumerator team visited each DS Division office and conducted extensive interviews with officials of various ranks in order to form a closer understanding of various aspects of the Division. Informants were asked to identify particularly vulnerable communities within their Divisions. At this stage field researchers also had to establish the type of villages/ communities found in the Division (purana village, squatter community etc.) as well as the main economic activities of the different communities (fishing, agricultural, wage labour). With this information the field team selected a village site.

Finally, the households to be surveyed were selected based on conversations with leaders of the community. Certain constraints necessarily determined which households were chosen. For example, households where both the men and women were outside the home working were more difficult to contact. Nonetheless the field team made an effort to cover the different types of households within a community taking into consideration differences in livelihoods, vulnerability status and household composition. In selecting households to be interviewed, the types of more vulnerable households as revealed in focus group discussions received priority, but one relatively wealthier household was also chosen from each study community for comparative purposes.

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1.3.5 Differences between Sample Planned and Sample Obtained

The sample actually covered in this study is given in Table 2.1

Table 1.2: Study Locations Actually Covered by Zone, District and Level of Food Insecurity Determined on the Basis of Vulnerability Maps of June 2002

Zone Vulnerable2 Red on the map

Moderately Vulnerable Blue on the map

Not Vulnerable Green on the map

Districts # DS Divisions (sites)

Districts # DS Divisions(sites)

Districts # DS Divisions(sites)

Dry Zone Moneragala (2) Polonnaruwa Anuradhapura ?Ampara

5 AnuradhapuraMatale(2)Hambantota

4 Polonnaruwa 1

Conflict Zone

Battiacaloa (2)JaffnaMannar (2)Mullativu

6 Vavuniya (2)Puttalam

3 TrincomaleePuttalam

2

Central Zone

Badulla 1 KegalleBadullaRatnapura Nuwara Eliya

4 KandyKegalleRatnapura

3

Total 12 11 6

The study locations covered in this study differed from the sample planned in three different ways.

First, two of the study sites, expected to be covered according to the original plan, could not be covered due to security constraints in the relevant areas. The Kilinochchi district could not be covered. The LTTE rook nearly four months to issue a security clearance for the study team that intended to visit the area. The planned visits were cancelled on several occasions due to non-availability of security clearance. In the end the necessary clearance came, but by that time it was far too late to conduct field research given the time constraints within which the study was implemented. Due to similar circumstances, an "uncleared" division within the Trincomalee district was inaccessible to the research team. In effect, the total number of districts covered decreased from the anticipated 19 to 18 and the total number of DS divisions and communities covered decreased from 30 to 29. More importantly this led to an inadequate coverage of "uncleared" areas.

Second, the vulnerability status assigned to various DS divisions covered in this study changed due to refinement of the mapping exercise using additional secondary data between January and June 2002. In effect, the number of "red" DS divisions actually covered decreased from the anticipated 20 to 12, the number of "blue" DS divisions covered increased from the anticipated 6 to 11 and the number of "white" DS divisions, now renamed "green", increased from the anticipated 4 to 6. This, in turn, had the effect of diluting the higher weightage given to the more vulnerable areas in the original sample plan. However, the actual difference in the results achieved may not be substantially different in view of the

2 In the revised WFP mapping "red" areas are categorised as "vulnerable", "blue" areas as "less vulnerable" and "green" (replacing the earlier "white") areas as "least/not vulnerable".

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purposive selection of more vulnerable study communities in each of the DS divisions covered in the study irrespective of the vulnerability status assigned to each area at the time of the study.

Third, while the study anticipated to cover the coastal zone as a separate study zone, when implementing the study it was evident that the identified coastal districts share most characteristics with either the conflict zone or the dry zone. Accordingly while the study site from the Hambantota district was included within the dry zone, those in the Puttalam district and Ampara were included in the conflict zone. In analysing data from the relevant communities, fishing is examined as a distinct livelihood, while recognising that many households are also engaged in other livelihoods.

1.3.6 Data collection methods

The study involved collection of primary qualitative data at national, district, DS division, community and household levels. The following procedures were used to obtain the required information at various levels.

1. Key informant interviews with experts at the national level

This was held on 25-01-2002 in CEPA. The objective was to get the concurrence of key decision-makers in planning, food policy, research and NGO fields for the vulnerability assessment process. An agreement was reached with the various stakeholders about the procedures to be adopted in this assessment.

2. Key informant interviews with Provincial and District Level authorities

The objective of these key informant interviews was to obtain their views on food security issues in the respective areas and the vulnerability maps already prepared by the WFP. Three senior researchers from CEPA, involved in the study, conducted these interviews. A topical outline was used for this purpose. (see attached key informant interview guide). The key informants interviewed at Provincial and District levels included Chief Secretaries, District Secretaries and their staff including planning officials, officials from health, agriculture, food and cooperative departments and some NGO leaders in the respective areas.

3. Key informant interviews with Divisional Level authorities

The objective of these interviews was twofold. First, to identify types of food insecure communities in the respective areas. And second, as mentioned earlier, to gather information and data to assist in the selection of the village to be visited by the assessment team. Trained field investigators, fluent in either Sinhala or Tamil conducted these interviews.

4. Separate Focus Group Interviews with a group of males (3 to 12) and a group of females (4-12) in the selected communities

The objective of these interviews was to obtain community wide information on selected topics. Separate FGD guides were used for males and females in order to ascertain their views on specific aspects of livelihood and food security. Each FGDs was conducted by a

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team of two CEPA field researchers who received class room and field training for the purpose (see Male and Female FGD guides used in the study).

5. Household interviews

In each selected community a total of 4 to 9 households was investigated using a semi-structured questionnaire in order to identify household level dynamics in food insecurity. The households were chosen in such a way that diverse livelihoods and socio-economic and demographic characteristics in the respective communities were represented to the extent possible given the time and resource constraints.

1.4 Limitations of the Study

As a community food profiling exercise, this study had several limitations.1. In view of time and resource constraints as well as methodological considerations, it

could only cover 29 communities purposively chosen so as to represent most vulnerable, moderately vulnerable and least vulnerable populations/communities in various parts of Sri Lanka. Given the complex diversity of livelihoods and food security environments in various parts of Sri Lanka, this may not be seen as fully representative of the whole of Sri Lanka. As already noted, we over sampled the DS divisions identified in the WFP vulnerability mapping as most food insecure so as to identify perceptions and practices of most food insecure categories. In this sense, the results of this study may not be used for purposes of establishing level of food security in the whole country.

2. The study intended to cover a reasonable number of conflict affected communities in "uncleared" (i.e. LTTE controlled) areas in Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka. Due to the security situation prevailing in the relevant areas at the time of conducting fieldwork, it was not possible to obtain within the stipulated time required clearance for entry into many of these areas. In effect, we managed to visit only one community in an "uncleared" area in the Mullaitivu District. Filed research in this LTTE-controlled area pointed to some important aspects of food insecurity in such areas. However, circumstances under which field research was conducted in this area were not entirely conducive to an uninhibited data gathering. In selecting relevant study units and in conducting field research in the selected area the study team was required to co-ordinate with the representatives of the local TRO. The study team selected the study village from among a list of villages proposed by TRO taking into consideration the criteria stipulated by the study team. A similar process operated in selecting study households. As the TRO representatives accompanied the field team when they visited the village perhaps it was difficult for the respondents to freely express their views. In any case the present study insufficiently covered food insecure populations in "uncleared" areas known to be highly vulnerable to conflict-related food insecurities. An earlier study conducted by CARE International on behalf of WFP in LTTE-controlled areas in Wanni may be seen as a useful complement to the current study in assessing food security situation in the relevant areas (CARE 2000).

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3. It is also possible that community perceptions of food security revealed in this study was affected by specific circumstances in the country at the time of the study. For instance, the drought that severely affected parts of Southern Sri Lanka in Dec 2001 to March 2002 is likely have affected perceptions in Southern study locations, while the peace process initiated since January 2002 may have influenced responses in the North East. Perhaps, part of the discrepancy between output of the WFP vulnerability mapping exercise using available secondary data relevant to earlier years and the results of the present study may be attributed to the rather dramatic changes occurring in the country at the time of fieldwork.

4. As already noted, the sampling process proceeded very much according to the original plan with the exception of the inadequate coverage of "uncleared" areas, but the fact that the refinement of the mapping proceeded side by side with CFSP meant that the sampling process was guided by an earlier output of the mapping process that differed substantially from the latest output. It must be noted however that despite the reclassification of the vulnerability status of the individual DS divisions studied, overall composition of the sample in terms of zonal and vulnerability categories represented did not alter substantially.

5. Even though coastal zone was initially identified as a separate zone in the initial period of the study, it became clear that the relevant issues are better addressed by including the coastal areas within the broader context of conflict zone. From secondary data or from key informant interviews it was not possible to get separate information about the so-called coastal zone.

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Chapter 2 Zonal Variation in Food Security and Vulnerability: An Overview

In this chapter a comparative overview of the food security and vulnerability issues in Sri Lanka is provided for the three zones under consideration in this study – Central, Dry and Conflict. The analysis focuses on four dimensions. The availability of food in terms of production, distribution and levels of consumption is examined. Access to food in terms of purchasing power, social safety nets and food subsidies, and community support is assessed. The utilisation of food in terms of intra-household food allocation, consumption and absorption, including dietary practices and health issues, is addressed. Finally, the major risk factors that increase vulnerability are outlined.

2.1 Availability

Food availability is determined by many factors. In this analysis we focus first on how resources and production within the zones and the communities surveyed are differentiated according to agro-ecological and socio-economic factors. Second, in communities that are not food self-sufficient availability depends on the reliability of distribution of food produced elsewhere. Here we focus primarily on the distribution of wheat flour, a widespread rice substitute in the country, as well as overall market integration of communities, including access to road and transport networks, terms of trade and logistical constraints due to the on-going conflict.

2.1.1 Resources and food production

An overview of the resources and food production of the three zones broadly demonstrates similarities, as well as clear-cut differences. The most heterogeneous zone is what has been categorised as the Central Zone. The districts covered within the Central Zone, Kegalle, Ratnapura, Nuwara Eliya, Badulla and Kandy include both highland and lowland regions, ranging over the Wet, Intermediate to Dry climatic zones, with a multiplicity of agro-ecological conditions and livelihoods. In ethnic composition, the Sinhalese constitute a majority in the Central Zone, followed by a sizeable population of Indian Tamils and a smaller minority of Muslims. This zone overlaps to some extent with what is categorised as the Dry Zone in some of its climatic and socio-economic characteristics and conditions, mostly in its drier lowland parts.

The most homogenous zone is what has been categorised as the Dry Zone. As defined in this study, the Dry Zone consists of the conventional dry zone districts of Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa, Monaragala, Hambantota and Ampara, as well as the north-eastern part of Matale. The Northern and Eastern Provinces are not included as a part of the Dry Zone in the present analysis. The Dry Zone here mainly incorporates lowland areas, and to a lesser extent coastal and highland areas. The districts included in the study, are inhabited predominantly by Sinhalese with small pockets of Muslim and Tamil populations. This zone overlaps with climatic, socio-economic and political characteristics/conditions in what is categorised as the Conflict Zone, especially in the so-called border villages.

The Conflict Zone which comprise the Northern and Eastern Provinces ranges over the Dry and Intermediate climatic zones, incorporating mostly lowland areas with a large coastal belt. The districts within the Conflict Zone, Jaffna, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Puttalam, Mullaitivu, Mannar and Batticaloa, are inhabited predominantly by Tamils, with a sizeable population of Muslims, and a smaller proportion of Sinhalese. This zone overlaps to a

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considerable extent with the Dry Zone, which has similar agro-ecological characteristics, as well as conflict conditions in its margins.

In terms of food production, the Dry Zone is clearly the rice bowl of Sri Lanka and the leading producer of subsidiary food crops. Although the Conflict Zone produces little food crops currently due to the conflict, it was a substantial food-producing region, growing both rice and subsidiary crops in the past. The potential is seen in districts such as Batticaloa and Trincomalee, which produce relatively large rice and maize harvests, despite the on-going conflict. The Central Zone, with some notable exceptions in the drier areas, grows a relatively small proportion of food crops, with its production mostly concentrated in market gardening of vegetables, perennial plantation crops and minor export crops. The Dry Zone produced seven times more rice per capita than the Central Zone.

Table 2.1 Rice production per capita, 2000Dry Zone Central ZoneDistrict Per capita District Per capita Matale 153.7 kg Kandy 37.8 kgMoneragala 181.7 kg Nuwara Eliya 21.4 kgAnuradhapura* 511.7 kg Badulla 144.6 kgPolonnaruwa 1096.9 kg Ratnapura 73.4 kgAmpara 739.9 kg Kegalle 61.6 kgHambantota 278.1 kg Zone Sub-total 494.6 kg Zone Sub-total 69.3 kgSri Lanka 169.4 kg**Computed from DCS 2000* includes Mahaweli -H ** excludes non-enumerated population in conflict areas

Characterised by low average annual rainfall (less than 1500 mm) limited to a three month period, a farming system comprising the complementary components of irrigated/ rain-fed rice fields, chena (swiddens) and homegardens, centred primarily on subsistence in the past, the Dry Zone has now become a food surplus region. Successive governments have invested in irrigation, resettlement and development programmes, resulting in the zone receiving a large influx of impoverished agrarian populations from the rest of Sri Lanka since the 1940s.

Around 52% of the rice production in Sri Lanka during 2000 came from these Dry Zone districts, comprising only 18% of the country's population (Annex 2.1). Rice production ranged from 68,000 MT in Matale to 436,000 MT in Ampara. The substantial increase in production is a consequence of irrigation development and opening up of new land in the last five decades. Per capita rice production was highest in Polonnaruwa and Ampara, with the lowest per capita rate within the Dry Zone being higher than the highest per capita rate in the Central Zone. All Dry Zone districts were above the per capita consumption requirement of 100 kg for self-sufficiency (see Edirisinghe 20023). The zone as a whole is a surplus producer of rice. In addition, these dry zone districts also accounted for some 65% of green gram, 73% of cowpea, 67% kurakkan (finger millet) and 69% maize production in the country (Annex 2.2). Some of these districts are also among the leading producers of so-called low-country vegetables, milk, curd, freshwater fish, and forest products including fruit (i.e. wood apple), game, and honey. Rice and subsidiary food crop production is both for consumption and sale. Key informants considered both Anuradhapura and Hambantota

3 Edirisinghe, Neville 2002 Food security in Sri Lanka: Situation analysis. World Food Programme, Colombo)

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districts as 100% self-sufficient in rice and surplus producers. Monaragala was estimated to produce 40 -75% of its rice requirements, while it was 100% self-sufficient in subsidiary food crops.

This macro picture for the Dry Zone as a whole was consistent to some extent with the micro situation of the vulnerable communities surveyed. Farming was the predominant livelihood in all 10 communities surveyed, with 9 reporting it as the activity of over 80% of households. One of these communities also reported foraging (for honey, game, nelli fruit, mee oil) as a livelihood of 90% of households. Only two communities reported a significant proportion of households engaged in wage labour - 75% and 50% respectively. However, in terms of food production, only three communities produced over 50% of their rice requirements, two produced over 50% of yams required for their consumption, 4 produced over 50% of subsidiary food crop requirements and 5 communities over 50% of their vegetable requirements. One community was 100% self-sufficient in fresh water fish. Thus, although the zone as a whole was a surplus food producer, it is clear that only four of the villages surveyed were able to meet their consumption requirements from their own production (taking into consideration their overall production) while the other six did not produce sufficient food crops to meet their consumption requirements (See Annexes 2.6 and 4.1).

The five districts of the Central Zone are also predominantly agricultural, producing plantation crops (tea, rubber), minor export crops (pepper, cloves) and vegetables for urban markets. Rice production, with some noteworthy exceptions in Badulla and Ratnapura districts, is mostly for consumption, while subsidiary food crops such as cowpea, mung (green gram) kurakkan (finger millet) and vegetables are cultivated mainly for sale. Rice production ranges from 15,000 metric tonnes in Nuwara Eliya to 112,000 metric tonnes in Badulla district (Annex 2.1). Altogether about 11% of rice produced in Sri Lanka in 2000 were from this zone, comprising 27% of the country's population. Badulla had the highest per capita rice production within the zone and was the only Central Zone district that was largely self-sufficient in rice. The zone as a whole is a net buyer of rice. Key informants estimated that Badulla district was 50% self-sufficient in rice, Nuwara Eliya was 30% self-sufficient and Ratnapura 25%.

Ratnapura and Badulla districts are the main producers of green gram, cowpea and kurakkan within the Central Zone (Annex 2.2). As a whole the zone produces 20% of kurakkan in Sri Lanka. The drier part of Badulla produces substantial amounts of maize (5799 MT, the fourth highest in the country) used mainly for consumption. Altogether the zone produces 24% of maize in the country. The Central Zone is also a large grower of manioc, accounting for around 24% of the entire country's production. In addition, the hilly parts of Badulla and Nuwara Eliya districts are the leading producers of so-called up-country vegetables, accounting for 99% of potato, 95% of cabbage, 83% of bean and 64% of tomato production in the country (Annex 2.3), predominantly for sale.

The macro picture for the zone is confirmed to a great extent by the micro situation in the villages surveyed. Out of 8 villages, farming was the dominant livelihood in only 3 of the villages. The estate population as well as the rural people mostly engaged in wage labour, were almost entirely dependent on the market for buying their food supplies. Altogether there were four rice producing villages but only one produced around 50% of local requirement. Production in the other three villages was below 10% of consumption. The majority of villages were net buyers of rice and other subsidiary food crops. The most commonly produced food items in the communities surveyed were vegetables and eggs. While six villages grew vegetables, only two villages reported 100% of consumption being

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met by their own production. A key informant in Nuwara Eliya district also pointed out that most vegetables cultivated within the district were not consumed by its population because of the high levels of pesticides and fungicides used.

In the five districts of the Conflict Zone food production varied considerably. Conflict related impacts such as laying of land mines in farm lands, and occupation of agricultural lands by the military have reduced local production considerably. According to one key informant, Vavuniya district, which as a whole cultivated 21,110 hectares of paddy land before 1990, today has only 10,000 hectares under paddy4. In addition, lack of water or access to irrigation was a frequently mentioned constraint to food production. However, even with the on-going conflict, the seven districts in this zone produced 13% of the rice in the country in 2000, slightly higher than the proportion from the Central Zone. Rice production ranged from an estimated 19,000 MT in Mannar to 137,000 MT in Battiacaloa (Annex 2.1). Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts had the highest rice production within this zone, higher than the districts within the Central Zone and at the lower end of districts within the Dry Zone. However, rice production per capita cannot be calculated as complete population data are not available for the districts within the Conflict Zone, apart from Puttalalam. The available data indicates this zone as a net buyer of rice.

Subsidiary food crop production is not very high within this zone, ranging from 4-5% of maize and kurakkan to 11% of green gram and cowpea production in the country in 2000. Mullaitivu had considerable green gram and cowpea production, while Batticaloa grew substantial amounts of maize. Batticaloa was also the leading producer of manioc within the zone, the 6th highest in the entire country. Overall, there is no indication to show that the zone was engaging in food substitution, replacing rice with other subsidiary crops, due to the conflict. The Conflict Zone is a net buyer of most of its food items. In addition to crop production, fish production within this zone has been greatly hampered by fishing bans and other security measures.

The macro picture was largely confirmed by the micro-level data from the communities. Of the 11 communities surveyed in this zone, only four were predominantly engaged in farming, with three producing 50-80% of their rice requirements. In both Vavuniya and Trincomalee, several communities pointed out that much of their productive paddy land was unusable due to mining and military occupation. Three coastal communities produced 100% of their fishing requirements. Apart from isolated cases, subsidiary food, vegetable, milk and egg production were very low or non-existent within this zone. Vegetables, fruit and other cash crops cultivated in small quantities included lady's fingers and snake gourd in Mannar, chilIie and banana in Vavuniya, and onions and tobacco in Jaffna. In nine communities, the predominant livelihood was casual wage labour, either in agriculture or fishing, and people were entirely dependent on the market or rations to meet their food requirements. Border villages in the Dry Zone had similar conflict-related restrictions of food production. These communities reported that they could not cultivate considerable extents of their fields because of ambushes and threats by the LTTE.

2.1.2 Wheat flour distribution

In keeping with the rice production trends among the zones, the reverse appears to be true for wheat floor consumption. Central Zone clearly has a higher distribution per capita of

4 Figures provided by the office of the Assistant Director of Agriculture, Vavuniya District.

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wheat floor than the Dry Zone. The Central Zone absorbs around 26% of the wheat flour distribution within the island. Wheat flour distribution ranges from 22,894 MT in Kegalle to 60,715 MT in Kandy district (Annex 2.4). The zone's average per capita distribution is close to the national average. Household data reveal that wheat floor consumption is higher in the estate sector than in the rural. This is supported by the district level data, which indicates that the Districts of Nuwara Eliya and Badulla with larger estate populations have higher per capita distribution levels of wheat flour, apart from those with a larger urban population like Kandy. Rural households still consume three meals of rice when available or alternatively jak and yams in the wet regions and kurakkan/maize thalapa (squares) in the dry regions.

Table 2.2 Issue of wheat flour and per capita availability, 2000Central Zone Dry ZoneDistrict Per capita District Per capitaKandy 47.8 kg Matale 38.3 kgNuwara Eliya 42.7 kg Moneragala 14.0 kgBadulla 31.0 kg Anuradhapura 27.4 kgRatnapura 26.4 kg Polonnaruwa 26.7 kgKegalle 29.4 kg Ampara 15.7 kgZone Sub-total 36.2 kg Hambantota 15.1 kg

Zone Sub-total 22.8 kgSri Lanka 37.7 kg*Computed from FCD statistics, 2000* excludes non-enumerated population in conflict areas

The Dry Zone in contrast accounts for 11% of the wheat distribution in the island, ranging from 5,552 MT in Monaragala to 20,485 MT in Anuradhapura (Annex 2.4). The highest quantity distributed in Anuradhapura in the Dry Zone is roughly comparable to the lowest quantity distributed in Kegalle in the Central Zone. The highest per capita distribution is in Matale district with a considerable estate population. The high distribution for Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa, both large rice producers, might reflect increased consumption by the military, as well as wheat flour eventually destined for the conflict-affected districts of Trincomalee, Vavuniya and beyond. Household data from the study reveal low wheat flour and bread consumption within this zone, with many households still eating three meals of rice when available or alternatively thalapa/roti made of maize or finger millet, in addition to yams.

In the conflict-affected areas, wheat flour distribution figures are unavailable for Mannar, Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi. Available statistics range from a low 7,224 MT in Batticaloa to a high 20,322 MT in Vavuniya (Annex 2.4). While per capita distribution cannot be estimated due to the lack of population data, it appears that wheat flour distribution is higher in the Conflict Zone than in the Dry Zone, while being lower than in the Central Zone. Household data support a higher consumption of wheat flour overall within the Conflict Zone, with relocated/resettled communities showing higher consumption than never displaced communities.

2.1.3 Market integration

Food availability and distribution in terms of market linkages and infrastructure is not a major problem in the Central and Dry Zones. Although many of the vulnerable communities surveyed were isolated to some extent and not adequately linked to major roads, all areas had some sort of link to regional markets within the district, or urban markets outside.

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Essential food items were available both in village stores, as well as nearby towns and households had no difficulty in purchasing these items as long as they had sufficient financial resources. However, terms of trade are perceived by most key informants and producers to be to the disadvantage of these communities due to the monopsonistic behaviour of traders, although a few key informants attributed this to high transaction costs, especially transport.

There are marketing problems since the infrastructure is bad. So there is the middleman problem. There are still places here where tavalams (cattle caravans) are used to transport goods. (Key informant, Moneragala)

In the interior villages prices of food items are high because of transport costs. You can't blame traders all the time. (Key informant, Badulla)

Market access to food was worse in more remote parts of the Dry Zone due to poor road networks and transport difficulties. The predominant chena farming areas, in the Moneragala district in particular, are particularly vulnerable to marketing problems. The pola system (i.e. periodic open-air fairs) of marketing, well established in many parts of both the Central and Dry Zones, provide for local and interregional exchange of farm produce within the zone, as well as the neighbouring areas of other zones.

In the Conflict Zone, the supply side of the food security equation is not as predictable as in the other zones. The problem is not only that local production has greatly decreased due to the on-going war but that the transportation and distribution network has been functioning inadequately, because of the security system (checkpoints) in place, as well as combat in the past.

Before the peace talks the villagers had to bribe the security forces with cigarette packets and bottles of arrack to bring commodities from other places. (Men’s focus group, Mannar)

The availability of food items varies considerably among and within districts, with the so-called "uncleared areas", especially in Mullaitivu, Kilinochi and Vavuniya, being worst affected. The availability of food in Trincomalee, Batticaloa and the "cleared areas" of Vavuniya is considerably better. Only a minority of households within the communities surveyed considered non-availability, as a cause of food insecurity. In most communities, it was pointed out, as in the other zones, that if financial resources were available, essential food items could be purchased. Food availability was also affected due to security problems in the border villages of the Dry Zone. The conflict situation compounds the relative isolation and poor road access of vulnerable communities in the Conflict Zone.

Sometimes even if we have money we will not have goods available in the village shop. (HH interview, Musali, Mannar)

Sometimes there is no rice here so we have to go to another village far away. (HH interview, Mullaitivu)

In the context of scarcity, restrictions on purchasing also affect the availability of products. People might theoretically have money but regulations (relating to quantities that can be taken into "uncleared" areas) stipulate that they can only purchase a set amount.

Much of the food items have restrictions. Food items like flour, wheat, sugar and kerosene. Each household can only buy one kg of rice. (Men’s focus group, Mullaitivu)

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On the whole, Sri Lanka has a reasonably well-developed road and transportation network that ensures the availability of goods. However, monopsonistic trade practices in all zones, as well as the black economy created by conflict in the Conflict Zone, and to some extent the border areas of the Dry Zone, has led to food problems for many vulnerable communities.

2.2 Access

Access to food is analysed first, in terms of purchasing power of households to acquire food if they are not producers or to acquire specific food items that they do not produce. Additionally social safety nets, such as Samurdhi and food assistance in the form of dry food rations/drought relief and food supplementation (Triposha distribution) programmes are discussed. Finally community support mechanisms in place to obtain help from relatives, neighbours and friends in times of scarcity is assessed.

2.2.1 Purchasing power

For most vulnerable communities in all three zones, access to food in terms of purchasing power was a bigger problem than the availability of food, since lack of income was perceived overall as the primary causes of food insecurity. In the Dry Zone although communities indicated that lack of water and land were the primary cause of food insecurity implying that food production could be increased, currently only a minority of communities were producing a surplus after meeting their consumption requirements. While only two communities had over 50% of households engaged in agricultural wage labour, most of the other communities were also selling what little they produced without meeting their own requirements, and were thus net buyers of food.

In the estates, as well as the upland villages of the Central Zone, substantial and more stable wage labour both in the formal and informal sectors, is in plantation crops such as tea, rubber, coconut and pepper. Thus, households in six of the communities were engaged in wage labour in estates in the formal sector, as well as in informal small holdings. However, work remained seasonal, making households vulnerable during both the dry and rainy seasons, depending on the area and the crop.

Apart from agriculture, gemming is an important economic activity in Ratnapura district and limited areas in Badulla district. According to a key informant, 30% of the economically active in Ratnapura district are engaged in gemming, including mining, trading, cutting and polishing gems. There is gem mining in five divisions of the district, including two surveyed – Pelmadulla and Balangoda. Poorer gem miners eke out a precarious existence from illicit mining in areas where gem deposits have increasingly become exhausted.

Since most households surveyed in the Central Zone were net buyers of food rather than net producers, lack of sufficient income was indicated as the main factor for food insecurity. In five of the communities the population (from 60 – 95%) was mainly dependent on wage labour. Even in farming villages a considerable segment of households, ranging from 7 – 50% were dependent on casual wage labour. In the Conflict Zone too the majority of households obtain most of their food through purchase. Not having enough disposable income, therefore, was perceived as the main risk against food security.

The availability of food items is good but we don’t have money. If we have money in hand then we can buy anything. (HH interview, Vavuniya South)

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In nine of the eleven communities, over 50% of households were dependent on unstable and insecure wage labour.

When it is raining in the period of June and July and when there is heavy drought from November to February we don't have any wage labour and so no money. Then mostly we go hungry. (HH interview, Musali, Mannar)

In all three zones, purchasing power was seen to have decreased over the last years due to increases in prices. More households in the Dry (18%) and Conflict (12%) Zones than in the Central Zone (7%) mentioned the high cost of living as a direct cause of their food insecurity. Most food items were perceived to have increased in price during the last year, particularly of staples such as rice, wheat flour, coconuts, onions and vegetables. There was no significant variation among the three zones in the food items mentioned, apart from milk powder, more often mentioned in the Conflict Zone and bread mentioned in the Central Zone. However, price increases were more pronounced in the Conflict Zone due to taxation and war-related restrictions.

Coconut, rice and potatoes are expensive because they are taxed. In the uncleared areas they are now producing their rice so it is cheaper. But whenever people in uncleared areas have to obtain food items from the cleared areas, the prices are very high. (Key informant, Vavuniya)

Overall estimated monthly expenditure on food ranged from Rs. 400/= to 10,000/= in the surveyed households, with 57% of households spending Rs. 3,000 or less per month on food expenses (Table 2.3 and Annex 2.7). Food expenditure was lowest in vulnerable communities in the Central Zone, followed closely by the Dry Zone and highest in the Conflict Zone. In the Central Zone 67% of households spent Rs. 3,000 or less on food per month while 46% spent 2,000 or less. Those who spent less than Rs. 2,000 were both from low-caste villages dependent on wage labour, as well as high-caste farming villages. Estate households, gemming households and more prosperous farming communities, reported higher levels of expenditure on food.

Table 2.3 Percentage distribution of households by Estimated expenditure on food per month

Expenditure (Rs)

Central Zone

Dry Zone

Conflict Zone

Total

# 56 # 79 #65 # 200<1000 16 11 9 121000-2000 30 34 15 272001- 3000 21 15 17 183001-4000 20 18 11 164001-5000 4 6 12 85001-6000 4 6 17 96001- 7000 - 2 3 27001- 8000 2 - 12 58000> 2 1 - 1Not known 2 5 2 3Total 100 100 100 100Source: CFSP Household Survey 2002

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In the Dry Zone 60% of households spent Rs. 3,000 or less on food, while 45% spent Rs. 2,000 or less. Those who spent Rs. 2,000 or less were mostly farming households in purana and squatter villages. More prosperous farming households from colonies, as well as many households in border villages revealed higher expenditure on food. What is significant is that there was no major difference in the amount of expenditure on food between the mostly wage labour-dependent households of the Central Zone from the mostly farming households of the Dry Zone.

In stark contrast to the other two zones, only 41% of households in the Conflict Zone spent Rs. 3,000 or less per month on food. A comparable 40% spent between Rs. 3,000 and 6,000 on food per month. Thus, the majority of households (52%) spent Rs. 4,000 or less on food in this zone. Expenditure on food is lowest for households in the never displaced communities and highest for resettled and relocated communities. From household data from both the Conflict Zone and border villages in the Dry Zone, it is clear that these households are forced to bear increased food costs due to the conflict. This largely confirms the special problems in accessing food items due to poor market linkages within this zone, as discussed in the section dealing with availability.

2.2.2 Social safety nets and food subsidies

The state’s poverty alleviation programme, the Samurdhi food stamp scheme, is the main transfer mechanism and safety net available to households in the Central and Dry Zones to supplement low incomes and meet food needs. For poorer households who have been targeted by the programme, Samurdhi benefits, although of a limited nature, is the only reliable means of income in an otherwise highly unpredictable pattern of livelihood. According to 2001 statistics, the Dry Zone has a higher coverage of beneficiary households than the Central Zone,. Coverage in the Conflict Zone is clearly less but cannot be enumerated precisely as population data are not available for most districts.

Table 2.4 Samurdhi beneficiary households in percentages, 2001, in relation to the Combined Poverty Score (CPS)

Central Zone CPS Dry Zone CPS Conflict Zone CPSNuwara Eliya 30% 70 Polonnaruwa 46% 68 Puttalam 52% 70Badulla 40% 75 Anuradhapura 53% 71 Vavuniya 9,844* -Kandy 47% 59 Matale 57% 72 Trincomalee 47,560* -Kegalle 53% 65 Ampara 58% - Batticaloa 84,589* -Ratnapura 65% 77 Hambantota 60% 66 Jaffna** -

Moneragala 62% 95 Mannar** -Mullaitivu** -

Sources: Samurdhi Authority 2001; ADB Poverty Reduction in Sri Lanka Report 2001* total no of beneficiary households ** not covered

Beneficiary coverage in the Dry Zone ranges from 46% in Polonnaruwa district to 62% in Moneragala. The proportion of households receiving Samurdhi overall is higher than in the districts of the Central Zone. Of the households covered in this zone, a high 75% received Samurdhi benefits, while only 30% mentioned food stamps as a coping strategy.

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Beneficiary coverage for the districts in the Central Zone ranges from 30.4% to 65.4% in Ratnapura. Plantation districts such as Nuwara Eliya and Badulla are least covered. The discrepancy in the coverage is clearer when relating the proportion of beneficiary households to the Combined Poverty Score (CPS), which incorporates the proportion of households under the DCS Consumption Poverty Line and the UNDP Human Poverty Indicator (see Annex 2.8). Although the CPS for Nuwara Eliya and Badulla is comparable or higher than for most other districts in Central and Dry Zones (indicating higher poverty levels), the beneficiary households are considerably lower in these two districts. Of the 56 households surveyed within the Central Zone, 57% received Samurdhi payments. However, only 32% mentioned food stamps, as a coping strategy in times of food scarcity. Coverage was extremely low among estate households.

In the Conflict Zone, 52% of households received Samurdhi benefits in Puttalam in 2001. Jaffna, Mannar and Mullaitivu were not covered by the programme, while Vavuniya, Trincomalee and Battiacaloa were covered to some extent. The macro situation was reflected at the micro-level, with only 35% of households surveyed receiving Samurdhi benefits. However, all these households mentioned it as a coping strategy indicating its overall importance in household food security. Dry rations provided by the government and NGOs, ‘Food for Work’ programmes supported by the WFP, food supplementation (Triposha programme) and drought relief provided by the state and private donors, are the main types of food assistance available to households. In the Conflict Zone, dry rations were the major form of food assistance with 41% of the households surveyed receiving benefits. The village in Mullaitivu was the only one where none of the households received either Samurdhi or dry rations. In Pier East in Mannar and in Mundal Puttalam, the villagers complained that they had not received the government dry rations for the past two to three months and they were now facing severe food access problems.

We don’t have any income and we are solely dependent on the rations. If the government gives rations we have food otherwise we go hungry. (HH interview, Mundal Puttalam)

The WFP “Food for Work” programme was functioning in several Dry Zone villages and lowland Central Zone villages. Drought relief both by the state, as well as private well- wishers had also been distributed in the same communities of the Dry and Central Zones. Around 14% of households surveyed in the Central Zone and 13% in the Dry Zone reported receiving WFP ‘Food for Work’ assistance and/or some form of drought relief. According to a key informant, households in the highland Lunugala DS division in Badulla district, also received drought relief during 2001, although the region did not experience any real drought.

The Triposha programme had the widest coverage in the Conflict Zone with 31% households surveyed receiving the food supplement for children, while 18% of households in the Central Zone and 10% of households in the Dry Zone were covered. In general, households with small children were positive about the programme. While the number of children under five encountered in the study was not very large, some households with underweight children (as revealed by their growth charts) in all three zones reported that they did not receive the food supplement. It is clear that Triposha coverage is much below the underweight levels recorded all over the country. District level health department key informants pointed out that Medical Officers of Health (MOH) did not always keep a close tab on distribution and that midwives were not always impartial in selecting beneficiary households. In Monaragala and Badulla districts, both key informants and households mentioned Triposha distribution through pre-schools as effective. Several households complained that Triposha packets they had received or stocks distributed to their clinic had to be disposed of due to weevil attack.

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In terms of safety nets and food subsidies, the Dry Zone communities were the best covered, with 75% of households receiving Samurdhi benefits alone. However, in overall terms considering dry rations, Triposha and Samurdhi together, the Conflict Zone was best covered, since at least a third of households received one or the other form of assistance.

2.2.3 Community support

In times of food scarcity community members were the first option for obtaining assistance available to the majority of households surveyed. Informal borrowing from friends and relatives was most prevalent as a coping strategy in the Central Zone, with 71% of households reporting this practice, followed by 64% in the Conflict Zone and 62% in the Dry Zone (Annex 4.7). However, in the Dry Zone more households resorted to borrowing from friends/ relatives than shops/money lenders (57%), while the former and latter practices took equal place (71%) in the Central Zone. Borrowing from shops/money lenders (73%) rather than from friends/kin was more prevalent in the Conflict Zone. This, in turn may be due to erosion of social capital caused by large-scale displacement.

There were functioning Funeral Assistance Societies in the majority of villages in all three zones, revealing a certain measure of security against some emergencies. However, the most vulnerable households were not always members, as they could not afford the monthly membership fee. Other frequent community-based organisations in the Dry and Central Zones such as Farmer Organisations were helpful in obtaining agricultural inputs, while many vulnerable households purchased food items at relatively lower prices from Co-operative Societies, although villagers complained of the low quality of these items.

2.3 Utilisation

Utilisation is based on two primary factors – consumption and absorption of food within households. Consumption focuses on intra-household distribution, diet and nutrition, including awareness of dietary requirements, while health and sanitation issues come under absorption.

2.3.1 Consumption

Overall there was no acute food insecurity in the communities surveyed with 71% of households managing to eat three meals per day, albeit with difficulty. The Dry Zone revealed the least food insecurity with 87% of households consuming three meals while the Central Zone followed with 78%. This was once again in contrast to the Conflict Zone where only 54% of households managed to eat three meals. Some 40% consumed only two meals, indicating that almost half of the households in the Conflict Zone consumed two or less meals per day (See also Annex 2.9).

Table 2.5 Percentage Distribution of Households by Number of Meals per Day, No of meals Central Zone Dry Zone Conflict Zone All1 4 - 6 32 16 15 40 18

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3 79 81 54 724 2 - - 1Not known - 4 - 2Source: CFSP Household Survey 2002

However while there was no acute food insecurity except in the Conflict Zone, 70% of all households reported that they ate fewer meals or went hungry during times of food scarcity, which was largely seasonal for most households, but a daily occurrence for some. The Conflict Zone reported the highest incidence of eating fewer meals or going hungry, with 88% of households engaging in this coping strategy, followed by 66% of Central Zone households and 58% of Dry Zone households (Annex 4.7). Furthermore, 66% of Conflict Zone and 57% of Central Zone households reported food substitution in contrast to a much lower 27% in the Dry Zone.

Breakfast was the most commonly skipped meal if a household had only one or two meals a day - this was most pronounced in the Conflict Zone. When breakfast was eaten the most common food is rice or roti in Sinhalese areas, and pittu or roti in Tamil areas. In some households breakfast and lunch comprised of nutritionally inadequate “butter biscuits” and tea, often given to children when rice was not available. In the Conflict Zone, when there was not enough money to buy food for breakfast some households consumed diluted rice water porridge (kanji). In vulnerable households all over the country, it was also common to eat remnants of dinner for breakfast.

In farming villages both in the Dry Zone and Central Zones, some households went without lunch during the cultivating season as they were too busy in the fields to take time off to cook. More prosperous farming households (as well as those with family members commuting for permanent waged work) cooked either breakfast/lunch or lunch/dinner together and consumed the meals at appropriate times.

For the majority of households in all three zones, the predominant diet for lunch and dinner was rice with vegetable curries. Dahl, cowpea, eggs, dried fish, fresh fish and game were included when available and/or if there were sufficient financial resources. Some households, especially in the Conflict Zone had difficulty in preparing even a single curry to accompany the rice.

We don’t put coconut in our curries, no oil and no chilli. We simply boil whatever we have in the garden. (HH interview, Vavuniya South)

Food substitution in the Central Zone comprised eating jak or yams in place of rice, mainly for lunch, but sometimes for dinner as well.

Sometimes we only eat jak for days. Our children cry refusing to eat jak because they have been eating it for so long and can't see it any more. We don't go to the other villagers and ask for food even though we're hungry because we can't really repay them. (HH interview, Kegalle)

In the Dry Zone it was maize, or a paste made with maize or finger millet, consumed instead of rice, also mainly for lunch. In the Conflict Zone, households indicated that they were forced to substitute bread or wheat flour derived food, following an increase in the rice price.

We eat only food items with flour because it is cheaper compared to rice. (HH interview, Vavuniya South)

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In discussions with women’s focus groups in all three zones, women in the majority of communities surveyed were aware of what food items were nutritious, especially for the growing children. Frequently mentioned were milk, eggs, meat, fish, greens and fruit. However, most women also admitted that they did not necessarily provide the children with such food. The primary reason articulated was that they did not have sufficient income to purchase nutritious food. Thus, they were compelled to give the children what they considered “grown up" or adult food such as rice, manioc and bread.

At the clinic mothers are told to give Anchor milk but there is no money so we have no choice but to provide the adult meal. (HH interview, Vavuniya)

In just two communities women reported that food such as rice, potatoes, cereals and biscuits (i.e. starch heavy items) were the most appropriate food for children. Key informants on the other hand, argued that people were ignorant of the nutritional value of most foods and that most households had sufficient land to grow nutritious food if they made some effort. They also pointed out that people wasted their valuable incomes on non-nutritious commercial snacks for their children, as well as alcohol and cigarettes for the men. Alcoholism emerged as a problem affecting food security in women’s focus groups and key informant interviews, as well as some household interviews. It was particularly acute in the Central Zone.

My husband is addicted to kasippu. Everyday he drinks, scolds and beats me. When I lose patience I sometimes beat him back. He spends about Rs. 40/= per day on kasippu. If he doesn't drink I could buy one kilo of rice with that money and feed the children. (HH interview, Kegalla)

In general the diet of the households was starch heavy. However, there is a notable cultural difference between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Sinhalese tend to eat more vegetables and greens but lack both animal (apart from dried fish in the more food secure households) and vegetable protein in their daily diet, except in the Dry Zone villages, which produce subsidiary food crops such as cowpea and mung. Tamils eat vegetable protein more often, particularly dahl, but lack vegetables and greens, as well as animal protein, in their diet most of the month. Estate workers eat more complete meals during payday but the diet deteriorates as the month progresses. Milk products and eggs are practically non existent in the diets of vulnerable households in the Conflict Zone, except on the rare occasions when they own either cows or chicken to cover their consumption needs.

Food taboos prevented many households in all zones, irrespective of religion, from consuming animal protein, especially beef and pork. However, chicken, fish, eggs and game were consumed when there was sufficient income and/or when these items were easily accessible. Pregnant and lactating women were deprived of so-called “heaty food” which included some varieties of meat, vegetables and fruit. These varied according to ethnicity and region. In general vegetables such as brinjal and tomato, and vitamin-rich fruit such as pineapple, mango and papaya, gaseous and oily food was avoided all over the country. However, many Dry Zone Sinhalese communities also tabooed protein rich "heaty food" such as dark tuna fish, game, meat and occasionally dried fish during this period. Some Conflict Zone Tamil communities tabooed sura fish and other kinds of "heaty" fish and meat. At the same time, pregnant and lactating women were encouraged to eat calcium/protein rich food such as milk, dried fish, pulses, as well as greens and fruit, in all the zones. Sweet balls made of Triposha were also considered appropriate. Women were also encouraged to eat starch-heavy jak fruit in the Sinhalese areas in the belief that this was milk-inducing. The rationale is symbolic as the jak bark, branches and fruit emit a milk-like resin. However overall, food taboos were not found to be entirely inimical to a nutritious diet.

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The DHS Demographic and Health Survey of 2000/20015 reveals the highest levels of malnutrition (underweight, stunting and wasting) in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, which corresponds to the Conflict Zone. Underweight was 46.2% in this region, with Batticaloa and Vavuniya districts recording over 50% of children under five years as being underweight. Zone 5 (which corresponds to the Central Zone of this study) records the next highest rate of underweight at 37.8% while Zones 6 and 7 (which correspond to the irrigated and rainfed areas of the Dry Zone) indicate 32.2% and 36.9% respectively. Thus, at an average, the underweight rates in the non-conflict zones are similar. However, the Central Zone has a higher rate of stunting while the Dry Zone has higher rates of wasting.

At the micro-level, in the vulnerable communities surveyed, where the weight of the children under five encountered in the households were checked against their growth charts, children from 33% households were found to be underweight. This is slightly higher than the national average of 29.4% (excluding the Northeast) found in the DHS Survey but could be explained by the fact that the communities in the study included the North and East and were in any case weighted for vulnerability. Central and Conflict zones households surveyed had the highest incidence of underweight (36% and 35% respectively) while the Dry Zone households had a lower rate of 26%. The highest incidence of underweight in the households surveyed was found in the estate and marginal upland villages in the Central Zone, the purana villages in the Dry Zone, and relocated and resettled villages in the Conflict Zone. The high rate of underweight in the marginal estates is corroborated by the DHS Survey, which found the highest sector rate, 44.1% in the estate sector in 2000. In terms of gender, the DHS survey reveals that there is no significant difference in underweight levels between boys and girls overall in the country, but in the North and Eastern Provinces underweight levels of boys is higher than of girls by 8 percentage points.

Intra-household food distribution at the micro-level however, shows gender disparities in food consumption which mostly disfavour adult females. In the surveyed communities overall, 52% of households prioritised children, while 36% prioritised adult males (Annex 4.5). In all these cases, women were the last to eat. The priority given to children was highest in the Conflict Zone, followed by the Central Zone and Dry Zone. Priority to adult males was highest in the Dry Zone, followed by the Central Zone and the Conflict Zone.

2.3.2 Absorption Appropriate absorption of food is effected by health and sanitation factors. Thus, sickness of household members, cleanliness in preparation of food, access to disease-free drinking sources and hygienic sanitation play a significant role. Sickness was identified as one of the main factors in food insecurity, particularly the prolonged sickness of some household members, both due to the loss of labour, as well as expenses incurred in seeking treatment. Sickness contributed to lower nutritional levels among household members, as much as lower nutrition levels resulted in sickness. Almost a quarter of households (23%) reported sickness as a cause of food insecurity in the Conflict Zone, followed by 16% in the Central Zone and 13% in the Dry Zone (annex 4.6). Ailments varied from permanent disability due to war or congenital defects, to illnesses, which ranged from common colds, influenza, diarrhoea, dysentery and malaria to heart and respiratory disease.

5 Sri Lanka Demographic and Health Survey 2000 and Sri Lanka Demographic and Health Survey 2001 (Northern and Eastern Provinces), Dept of Census and Statistics, Dept of Health Services, United Nations Children's Fund.

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The majority of households in the communities studied had no access to drinking water from protected sources and all communities had problems with getting sufficient water during the dry season. Many Central Zone communities used water from streams, while Dry Zone and Conflict Zone communities used water from rivers and irrigation channels, the majority of which was contaminated. The scarcity of water in general, as well as the lack of safe water in particular, had a negative impact both on personal hygiene and food preparation.

The overall situation of toilet facilities in the communities surveyed was not particularly problematic, with 68% of households having latrines, mainly of the pit type (Annex 2.8). However, there was a sharp difference between the Conflict Zone where 64% of households visited had no latrine and the Central and Dry Zones where 89% and 90% of households respectively had latrines. In the Central Zone marginal estates and lowland villages were most likely not to have toilets. In communities without toilet facilities, in addition to the general health problems caused by a lack of sanitation, the lack of toilets also lead to life threatening situations.

We are afraid to go to the jungle to fulfil the call of nature because I lost a daughter about five years ago due to snakebite when she went into the jungle. We tried to take her to the hospital quickly but we couldn’t find a vehicle in the night. (HH interview, Nuwara Eliya)

In general, food security in vulnerable communities is affected by utilisation. National level surveys reveal that underweight levels of children can be clearly correlated to the education level of the mother. However, there is also a correlation between education level and poverty. Public awareness of nutrition issues need to be addressed, including food taboos on pregnant and lactating mothers, and awareness programmes could make a difference in enhancing food security. However utilisation is clearly linked to access and the lack of purchasing power, especially in terms of child nutrition. Most women were aware of what constituted a nutritious diet for their children but felt they were unable to provide this to their children due to lack of financial resources. While there is some possibility of increasing the capacity to utilise financial resources more effectively to provide households with more nutritious food, a corresponding increase in purchasing power is far more important.

2.4 Risk factors

2.4.1 Environmental risks

Seasonal drought, landslides, floods and crop damage by pests were the main environmental shocks that the communities experienced overall. Seasonal food shortages due to drought are more of a characteristic of the Dry Zone, rather than absolute year round shortages leading to chronic starvation. The length and severity of droughts, in particular, have been key determinants of poverty and food shortages in various parts of the zone. Traditionally home gardens, irrigated or rain-fed rice fields and chena (swidden) constituted the three complementary components of dry zone agriculture, primarily geared for subsistence production. Stability and diversity of food was guaranteed by the chena harvest, which was also the most vulnerable to droughts. One index of food security was having adequate stocks of paddy, kurakkan and meneri in the granary (bissa/atuwa) of a household. Since much of the food production was limited to a three-month monsoon period, storing food for use in the remaining months was very important. Key informants in the Dry Zone pointed out that if the chena and paddy harvest were adequate households could have sufficient food for two years, especially since the chena grains such as kurakkan, meneri and gingelly did not easily spoil in storage. However, the storage facilities within

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households have increasingly deteriorated or are absent as farmers sell most of their crop soon after the harvest to pay debts and have cash in their hands. Sacks of grain stored inside households are ingeniously stolen by elephants while the household sleeps at night. In addition, less and less households are cultivating subsistence crops such as meneri and gingelly as cash needs of households have increased. In the Conflict Zone, which also climatically belongs to the dry zone, drought compounds conflict-related food insecurity.

Although drought was most intense for Dry Zone villages, many highland villages and estates in the Central Zone, located in the intermediate climatic zone, were also affected in terms of food shortages during this period. This was mainly due to the lack of wage labour in the agricultural sector. Two to eight months of food scarcity were reported from specific households, counting both the dry and the rainy seasons. Upland villages in the Central Zone and Dry Zone villages reported that households engaged in illegal felling of timber during vulnerable months of the year. In general, vulnerable households in the Central Zone experienced food scarcity for longer periods than in the Dry Zone. Deforestation and land degradation leading to landslides, in some cases, were mentioned by several communities. Most farming communities said that their soil quality had deteriorated due to deforestation and erosion.

Now we don’t receive as much rain as 10 years ago because of climatic changes. Most of the wells dry up during the dry season. Women have to walk 1-2 miles to fetch drinking water. Soil fertility has decreased because our land is on steep slopes. There is no more jungle here. People have cleared jungle and built houses. (Men's focus group, Kegalle)

Land degradation due to the cultivation of short-term cash crops is a serious problem in many communities dependent on farming steep hill slopes and has rendered land especially in Badulla and Nuwara Eliya districts no longer cultivable. Floods were reported primarily from the Conflict Zone, which is vulnerable to cyclones, especially in the eastern coastal belt.

Crop damage from pests, ranging from fungi and insects to wild boar and elephants, was another environmental risk reported by many villages in all three zones. Food insecurity due to crop damage was highest in the Dry Zone, with almost a quarter of the households being affected.

2.4.2 Market and entitlement risks

As the macro-economic situation is Sri Lanka deteriorated in the last year this was reflected in economic shocks at households level. Thus prices of most goods were reported to have risen, especially the main food items consumed by people.

We faced a lot of food problems, especially between May to August last year, because prices of food items went up. This year even if I take Rs. 100/= to the store, I cannot buy everything to cook a proper meal. A kilo of rice costs Rs. 44/= and a coconut Rs. 20/=. (HH interview, Kegalle)

In considering market risks, vegetable cash crops account for a large part of income earned by rural producers both in the Central and Dry Zones. These producers are by and large, net buyers of their staple food requirements. While there are a considerable number of villages and estates, which are not adequately linked to the road network, most areas are by now integrated with the regional markets in the main towns of the district, as well as Colombo.

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The pattern of agricultural livelihoods in irrigated colonies and new settlements in the Dry Zone, which is a surplus food producing region, no longer includes the chena component of the "traditional" system. Paddy, as well as other subsidiary food crops, have become more of cash crops, with a greater reliance on purchased foods. As a result, many paddy producers have also become net buyers of rice at least during part of the year, increasing their vulnerability to market conditions.

The terms of trade between rural producers and their buyers are generally seen as bad all over the country but they might have further deteriorated in the last year due to the macro-economic environment. However, the major problem seems to be lack of investment in agriculture to increase storage capacities and engage in value-addition, which is not necessarily recognised by farming households.

Chena crops are the biggest proportion of people's products here. During the cultivation season farmers put a lot of land under these crops and get high yields. Then the prices go down. Farmers don't have the capacity to store these and sell gradually. Nor are they organised properly. (Key informant, Ridimaliyadda, Badulla)

There is no national plan for production. We grew cabbages in my wife's land. It fetches Rs. 4/= per kilo which is a loss. We're letting it rot rather than cut them. Tomatoes and maize are also like that. There should be a national solution to get a more stable income from crops. Processing and preservation are also needed. (Key informant, Badulla)

In terms of entitlement risks, one of the major issues is that vulnerable households in marginal estates in the Central Zone are not covered by Samurdhi on the basis that at least one household member has formal employment in the estate. However, there are old people who are no longer employed, as well as female-headed or single income earner households with a large number of dependents who are vulnerable to chronic food insecurity, as wage work is seasonal and in any case not guaranteed, and the wages themselves are low.

We face food shortages every day although we don’t have famine here. We have to make do with Rs.101/=. Day by day our situation is getting worse because now the prices are going higher and higher, while our wages are not. (Men's focus group, Nuwara Eliya)

Samurdhi coverage is also low in the Conflict Zone where food rations are the main entitlement that buffers communities against food insecurity. The importance of Samurdhi as a coping strategy was much more appreciated within this zone, in contrast to the Dry Zone where people took it for granted that around 75% of households was covered by the programme. Many households were aware of the potential reforms to the Samurdhi programme being planned by the government and had mixed reactions ranging from anxiety of being cut from the programme, hope that they as the deserving poor would be included, and even pronouncements that the programme be entirely abolished because the deserving poor have been excluded. However, the composite impact of entitlements such as Samurdhi and dry food rations, as well as supplementation programmes such as Triposha, on food security need to be carefully assessed and any proposed cutbacks to accommodate budget deficits need to be closely monitored to ensure that safety nets remain in place for the vulnerable groups within the population.

In addition, the conflict situation makes more people vulnerable to economic and social risks linked to food security. The checkpoint system hampers the free movement of good and people, transport linkages are very much reduced, the conditions of the roads are poor due to damage caused by war and lack of repairs, and taxation by armed groups leaves very little resources in the hands of non-combatants. These translate into increased food and

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agricultural input prices for vulnerable communities with the result that food consumption, both in quantity and quality, has decreased.

2.4.3 Nutrition and health risks

Environment and market factors contribute to making vulnerable communities exposed to nutrition risks during critical months, such as the dry and rainy seasons, which varied across geographical areas. While a minority of households was vulnerable all year to poor nutrition, the majority was vulnerable from a period of 2-6 months per year.In terms of health risks, Dry Zone villages are exposed to malaria but otherwise no major epidemics were reported. However, fevers, respiratory infections and bowel diseases were widespread in the Conflict Zone and the marginal estates in the Central Zone. Overcrowded living conditions, poor ventilation during cooking, lack of clean water and sanitation systems, and the climate all contributed to this situation.

Lack of clean drinking water in all three zones exposes vulnerable communities to a gamut of diseases from diarrhoea to dysentery.

We don't have proper water to drink and there are health problems because of that. (HH interview, Ratnapura)

Diseases, such as dengue that have spread in more urbanised areas in the Wet Zone, was not reported as a major problem in the predominantly rural sample of this study.

In the Conflict Zone, the conflict itself due to destruction of housing, displacement and the crowding of people into welfare centres have resulted in deteriorating health conditions and the vulnerability to ill health. The widespread lack of toilets in this zone is a significant indicator of the potential for epidemics.

The majority of communities surveyed overall were served by reasonably good health facilities but access to the services due to bad roads and unreliable public transportation, made people vulnerable, especially during emergencies. Health facilities in marginal estates in the Central Zone, as well as the Conflict Zone, were particularly poor. In the Conflict Zone the situation is most acute as health facilities have been damaged, and are often ill-equipped and understaffed. Most health personnel refuse to work in remote areas due to security considerations. The "uncleared" areas do not receive adequate health supplies as the state restricts the movement of many essential commodities, including medicine and construction material to rebuild health facilities, to these areas.

2.5 Overview of vulnerability issues

The study indicates that the primary factor in food security in Sri Lanka is access. Both in the Central and Conflict Zones, and to a significant extent in the Dry Zone, the lack of purchasing power is the most serious problem for vulnerable households. In the Conflict Zone access is compounded by conflict-related constraints that affect availability, such as high transaction costs and unreliability of supply. In the Dry Zone, where food production is relatively high, availability of food remains a problem to vulnerable communities, hampered both by constraints to potential production (mainly due to inadequate water/irrigation) as well as distribution (due to poor market linkages within the zone). In all zones, utilisation could be improved by more awareness creation in nutrition, especially in relation to taboos on pregnant and lactating women, intra-household distribution of food, as well as management

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of household budgets. More investment in improving health and sanitation conditions within communities would also enhance the utilisation aspect of food security.

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Chapter 3 Views of key informants on WFP vulnerability mapping, livelihoods and implementation capacities in selected districts

One of the principal objectives of the CFSP is to analyse and compare the VAM vulnerability mapping carried out by WFP with the views of key informants located on the ground at district level. Altogether 10 out the 18 districts included in this study were selected for this exercise. This chapter attempts to assess the WFP mapping in terms of the most vulnerable sub-regions (DS divisions) in Sri Lanka. It will also identify the causes of vulnerability, vulnerable sub-populations and the implementation capacity of both the state and the NGO sector at the district level, as perceived by key informants.

The viewpoints of the different informants did not always coincide. Therefore, in order to obtain a systematisation of the array of perceptions it was agreed that only if two or more informants mentioned a DS division as "vulnerable" it would be classified as such (red) in the comparative table. (Please refer to Table 6.1). If only one out of several informants offered that appraisal it would be classified as "moderately vulnerable" (blue). If none of the informants singled out a division or if they expressly maintained that a division was not vulnerable it was categorised as "not vulnerable" (green).

3.1 Central Zone

3.1.1 Badulla District

Located in the drier eastern part of the central highland massif, Badulla District belongs to the Uva Province. In ethnic composition, its population is 72% Sinhalese with a large minority of "Indian" Tamils (18%) and smaller population (5%) of Muslims.6 The district has three quarters of its population engaged in agriculture.7 It’s southern mountainous part belongs to the intermediate climatic zone and the main economic activities of its people are in tea plantations, mixed paddy and vegetable cultivation, and forest plantations. Its northern lowland part is located in the dry climatic zone, partially irrigated by the Mahaweli river system, and partially rainfed or irrigated by minor tanks, with farmers engaged in paddy and chena cultivation. The district records very high levels of human poverty and high levels of consumption poverty.8

Most food insecure sub-regions and causes of vulnerability

In Badulla District, Lunugala, Passara and Rideemaliyadda DS Divisions are categorised as vulnerable (red), according to the WFP mapping. Ella, Haldummulla, Mahiyangana, Meeghakivula and Soranathota are in the moderately vulnerable (blue) category. Uva-Paranagama, Hali-ela, Kandeketiya, Badulla, Bandarawela, Haputale and Welimada are green and considered as non-vulnerable.

Key informants did not identify Lunugala (or Passara from which the former division was carved out recently), as particularly vulnerable, although one informant mentioned the estate sector in general as food insecure and the Passara/Lunugala area as particularly remote. 6 Preliminary Release, Census of Population and Housing 2001. Department of Census and Statistics (DCS) 2002.7 Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey . Fourth Quarter 1999. DCS 2000.8 Sri Lanka's Poverty Reduction Strategy 2002, GOSL.

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Around half of Lunugala's population is resident in estates. There was a consensus among informants that Rideemaliyadda, Meegahakivula and Kandeketiya were the worst affected in terms of food, while Mahiyangana was also mentioned by two. One informant mentioned Soranathota as vulnerable. The major criteria for vulnerability mentioned were the location in the Dry Zone, water scarcity, seasonal droughts and lack of irrigation. Lack of income, ignorance, consumption patterns and alcoholism were also seen as causes of food insecurity. Ridimaliyadda, Kandeketiya, Migahakivula and Soranatota, in that order, emerged as the divisions with the highest Samurdhi recipients as well. The biggest disagreement is over Kandeketiya, which key informants indicate as red and WFP as green.

Vulnerable sub-populations

Vulnerable groups identified within the district were mostly dependent on rainfed chena crops and paddy, casual wage labour in tea, rubber and pine cultivations. Vegetable growers were seen as somewhat vulnerable, depending on the size of land, and the fluctuations of the market. Those cultivators who grew perennial crops such as tea small holders and pepper growers, those under irrigated paddy, as well as those who were engaged in trade, skilled crafts and government employment, including the armed forces, were considered non-vulnerable.

Organisational landscape and implementation capacity

The state-level key informants saw the state as the better implementer in general, pointing out that it has a wider network that reaches every GN division, despite its weaknesses such as inefficiency and corruption, especially at the lower levels. The state, they pointed out, had more procedures to control and monitor progress, as well as preventing abuses, while people perceived NGOs as more corrupt. However, government was seen as spreading out benefits for political gain rather than giving to the needy, due to acute political interference.

Government and NGOs both have the implementation capacity. I'm a government servant so I say government is better. Our government service is still good whatever the criticism. We have a development network within the district, a way of controlling and monitoring. However corrupt we are supposed to be, the people have a feeling that NGOs are more corrupt. They are merely family clubs. They have spoilt the name for genuine NGOs. We are governed by more laws than the NGOs. (KI Badulla)

Politicians think a majority should get subsidies - that suits their political goals. So they don't want to give to the needy. At village-level officers have shortcomings - due to kinship, friendship and graft, assistance doesn't reach the people at the bottom. A pure system is difficult. There are too many officers rather than too little, while essential officers may not be there in some places. (KI Badulla)

Many NGOs were reported to be working within the district, overall 14 were mentioned by name, and 7 were indicated as working on food -related issues. Plan International, Future in our Hands, Sarvodaya, and the IRDP-established ICOs were considered to have broad networks. One informant pointed out that that NGOs/CBOs were more efficient and that the quality of work performed was better than state institutions.

Implementation must be done carefully. Most departments are no good. X department is no good at all - it just takes aid and misuses it… There are 260 Integrated Community Organisations (ICOs) established by the IRDP. Civil construction work (bridges, roads, steps) under Rs. 200,000 is undertaken by these ICOs. The quality of the work is good - better than when it was done by government departments. (KI Badulla)

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3.1.2 Nuwara Eliya District

Nuwara Eliya District is located in the interior highland region of Sri Lanka and belongs to the Central Province. It is mainly a tea producing area with a large portion of its population employed in the plantations. The district also includes colonies, settled under the Mahaveli scheme and purana villages. These two types of communities depend on agriculture, combining vegetable and paddy cultivation for their livelihoods. Purana villages have their own traditional patterns in cluster families. Most of them have not adopted newer technologies for cultivation. A little more than half of the population in the district is Indian Tamil. The Sinhalese account for roughly 40% of the total population and Sri Lankan Tamils just over 6%.9

Most food insecure sub-regions and causes of vulnerability

In Nuwara Eliya three of its DS divisions, Ambagamuwa, Nuwara Eliya and Walpane are considered as "not vulnerable" in the map and two, Hanguranketha and Kothmale, as blue. Most of the informants interviewed agreed that food insecurity could be detected throughout the district. One informant in particular stressed that in estate lines the general livelihood conditions were the worst, but there was no discernible differences from one DS division to another. When pressed, informants concurred that if one or two divisions had to be singled out, the ones in the worse situation were Walapane followed by Kothmale.

When comparing to the WFP map, there was a certain degree of agreement. Kothmale appears as moderately vulnerable in the map and was also mentioned as such by the informants. Walapane, however, was considered by all of those surveyed as the most food insecure division in the district. However Walapane is considered "not vulnerable" in the WFP listing. The informants agreed that the Nuwara Eliya DS Division is the one with the least amount of poverty and food insecurity, coinciding with its green map position.

Vulnerable sub-populations

Key informants divided the district's food insecure population basically into: 1. estate workers and 2. small farmers. One informant also included wage earners in a separate category. All informants coincided that estate workers, although they earn an income with which to buy food items, often use part of their earnings on alcohol consumption. Small farmers, for their part, obtain very low yields from their cultivation. This can be attributed to size of landholdings, non-optimal methods of cultivation, scarcity of water for irrigation (particularly in the DS Division of Walapane), and problems of soil erosion.

Moreover, all of the officials interviewed emphasised that the food problem of the estate population in Nuwara Eliya is not related to availability but utilisation. They stressed that there is plenty of food in terms of quantity but the diets have an excess of carbohydrates and not enough fruits and vegetables.

Organisational landscape and implementation capacity

9 Preliminary Release, Census of Population and Housing 2001. DCS 2002.

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Most informants agreed that the human capacities at the government level were present. The obstacles for implementing programmes were related to insufficient money to launch all the projects that the district needs. Key informants indicated that the difficulties surrounding the implementation of programmes in Nuwara Eliya could be traced to a deficient financial base as well as inadequate beneficiary response.

If government wants to help the estate population there is no response. They are not really interested in electricity, water etc but only in the upkeep of their temples. (KI Nuwara Eliya)

Another problem that was cited was the "dependence mentality," instigated by the government itself.

They think the government must do everything to uplift their condition. (KI Nuwara Eliya)

Similarly other informants expressed frustration at the difficulty in attempting to change methods of cultivation for what they consider to be more efficient and productive ones.

The government has tried to go in and help them modernise and introduce them to new technology, but they are very ingrained in their methods. It is a process that takes a long time. This is one of the main reasons for their poverty level and low yields in upcountry agriculture. (KI Nuwara Eliya)

There are just a few NGOs working in the district and of those, only CARE and Plan International were said to be working on food related issues, namely methods of agriculture for higher yields.

In terms of what the informants regarded as the priorities for their district three out of the four pronounced food supplementation for children to be their second priority. In the same vein, food supplementation for mothers was also deemed important with half of the informants reporting it as their number one priority. Finally another preference that emerged was improved agricultural inputs.

3.1.3 Ratnapura District

Ratnapura District is located in the southern interior part of the Sabaragamuwa Province. The main economic activities in the district are gem mining, tea, rubber and rice cultivation as well as subsidiary food crops in parts of the district. This district has only one rice surplus DS division, namely Ambilipitiya. All the other divisions are rice deficit and they depend on rice imports from either Ambilipitiya or other rice growing areas of the country, including Ampara.

Of the key economic activities in the district, gem mining and rubber cultivation have recorded considerable decline in recent years. Due to reported exhaustion of gem deposits, some miners have given up the activity, some have moved to other parts of the country where new deposits are found and some have even gone abroad, Madagascar being an important destination. However, most continue gem mining as an illicit operation, combining it with various other livelihood strategies, including farming, casual wage labour and other activities.

Rubber cultivation in the area has also suffered heavily due to rapid decrease in the price of rubber products in recent years. Many smallholders have simply abandoned rubber cultivation. Some, including some of the bigger plantations, continue “slaughter tapping”, namely taking latex as much as possible without fertilising or otherwise taking care of the

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crops. In some instances, estate companies have auctioned part of the rubber land for gem mining purposes. Tea cultivation in the district has picked up in recent years due to improvement in tea prices. Some of the plantations as well as the more dynamic smallholders are switching from rubber to tea, wherever conditions are suitable.

Most vulnerable Sub-regions and causes of vulnerability

According to statistics available at the district level, some 62.3% of the households in the district receive Samurdhi. This ranges from 45% in Nivitigala DS Division (a leading gem mining area) to 88.3% in Pelmadulla. Asked about variation in poverty levels within the district, officials first denied that there were any significant differences. However, later they pointed out there may be significant differences on the basis of agro-ecological conditions (the district having dry, intermediate and wet zone regions), remoteness or access to services, type of economic activities (relative impact of economic declines associated with gem mining and rubber cultivation) and nature of physical terrain. During last year drought affected divisions in or bordering the dry zone such as Ambilipitya, Kolonna and Weligepola. The drought relief programme has ended. According to PDHS, the World Food Programme assisted India mix programme currently operates in 2 DS divisions, namely Kolonna and Ambilipitiya.

Key informants identified the following divisions Imbulpe, Kalawana, Ayagama and Weligepola as most food insecure, in that order. Of this list, only Imbulpe has been identified as vulnerable in the WFP mapping. Ayagama has been identified as moderately food insecure. Kalawana and Weligepola are considered food secure. Kahawatta (a leading gem mining area), and Opanayaka were identified by the officials as relatively good in terms of availability and accessibility of food and Balangoda was mentioned as partially affected by food problems, with the drier areas bordering the dry zone experiencing seasonal food shortages.

According to the Kis, the primary causes of food insecurity in the district are droughts affecting farmers in the dry and intermediate zones, transport difficulties affecting accessibility of food in certain areas within the district, the economic slump affecting rubber and gem industries and the limited food production within the district.

Vulnerable sub-populations

One KI described the entire rural population in the district as vulnerable, compared to urban populations in Ratnapura, Balangoda and other small towns where people have stable incomes.

No matter whether you are engaged in tea, rubber or paddy cultivation or illicit gem mining in the rural areas, your incomes are unstable and subject to seasonal and weather and market related fluctuations”. (KI Ratnapura).

Most KIs, however, recognised internal differences among the rural populations in regard to their vulnerability to food insecurity. Based on information supplied by various KIs 4 categories of rural people most vulnerable to food insecurity and poverty in general can be identified.

1. Self-employed illicit gem miners and labourers in gem-minesAccording to one KI, some 30% of the economically active in the district are engaged in gemming, including mining, gem trade and cutting and polishing of gems. The main gem

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mining areas within the district are Ratnapura, Nivitigala, Kalawana, Pelmadulla and Balangoda. Most of the poorer gem miners are in illicit gem mining areas such as Pelmadulla. Although it has become increasingly difficult to secure valuable gems and returns are meagre, the hope of good fortune keeps many of the miners going. Referring to wage labourers in gem mines, one KI stated the following:

They are given food and weekly wages (sumana kasi) ranging from Rs. 50 to 100. If they discover a good gem the workers too get a good cut. When they have a good income from a precious stone they spend lavishly and within a few days the entire earnings are exhausted. During much of the year, most miners are reduced to skin and bone and rags (valeval ne). (KI Ratnapura).

2. Inhabitants in remote isolated hilly villagesIn many areas due to hilly terrain and transport difficulties, people are cut off from urban centres and services. Some areas also experience seasonal gusty winds making it difficult to grow perennial trees. They have limited access to food particularly during certain months of the year.

3. Encroacher-farmers in dry zone areasSouth-western border areas of the district have hinterland characteristics, including parts of Ambilipitiya, Kolonna, Weligepola and Balangoda DS Divisions. Most of the inhabitants in these areas are encroachers of abundant crown land in the dry zone. They have moved into these areas from densely populated other areas within and outside the district. Many are migrants from the deep South. Often they do not have full legal title to the land they cultivate and they frequently experience droughts resulting in extreme food insecurity. Some of them are engaged in illegal operations such as the cultivation of cannabis. The infrastructural facilities in these self-built squatter settlements are weak making it difficult for them to access outside markets as well as services from the state and other agencies.

4. Rubber tappersTwo KIs mentioned rubber tappers who are a special category of wage labourers in the district as an especially vulnerable group. Due to the slump in the rubber industry many tappers have lost their livelihood and have been compelled to compete for the limited casual labour opportunities available. Where they continue to tap rubber, their incomes have been drastically reduced due to decreased number of work days.

Organisational landscape and implementation capacity

In providing services to the most food insecure groups in the district, the government, local government, NGO and co-operative sectors were each identified as presenting specific strengths and weaknesses. The government network is widespread throughout the district. However, its reach was considerably weaker in the more remote areas due to transport difficulties, staff vacancies and transfers and inadequate supervision of lowest level workers. Political interference in activities of government agencies was mentioned by one KI as a key obstacle to delivery of services impartially. Of the various government programmes Samurdhi was seen as the most politicised and least amenable to routine governmental controls. Local government agencies, including Provincial Council and Pradeshiya Sabas only managed to provide rudimentary services due to resource constraints. There are numerous NGOs and CBOs in the district. However, only Sarvodaya and Artha Charya Foundation had widespread presence in many areas. The co-operative network too was considerably widespread, being the primary outlet of Samurdhi benefits and any rationed

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goods. One KI, however, mentioned that if Samurdhi benefits are not distributed through them, many of the co-operatives will basically run out of business.

3.2 Dry Zone

3.2.1 Anuradhapura District

Located in the interior, Anuradhapura District is part of the North Central Province. The KIs regarded the district as a surplus producer of rice and several other subsidiary crops, including maize and a variety of chena produce. The district has 8 major irrigation schemes and one of the Mahaweli systems, involved in large-scale rice production. The district also has many large and small reservoirs where inland fisheries are practiced. Even though there are large herds of cattle in some parts of the district, milk production is limited and the cattle herds are seen as a status symbol and a movable asset to be disposed of at times of crisis. Goat rearing is common only in Muslim villages dispersed in the district. Most parts are well connected with the rest of Sri Lanka by roads and railway lines. Some of the more remote villages, however, become relatively inaccessible in certain months of the year due to deterioration of road conditions following monsoon rains, problems posed by wild elephants and security risks associated with the north-east war.

Most food insecure sub-regions and causes of vulnerability

At the time of preparation of WFP vulnerability maps, the district consisted of 22 DS divisions. Of these five have been identified as red, twelve blue and the remaining five green. Of the five identified as red, one, namely, Palugasweva depend entirely on rainfed chena farming. In addition, Mihintale, Mahavilachchiya and Nochchiyagama also have significant areas under rainfed agriculture. All four divisions are characterised by poor accessibility, spatial marginality and periodic droughts. Mahavilachchiya and Nochchiyagama have also been affected by war-related disturbances in livelihoods and settlement patterns. It must be also noted here that two of the divisions identified as red, namely Tambuttegama and Nochchiyagama also include some Mahaweli areas. Several KIs did not consider these two divisions as highly food insecure in view of the improved irrigation and other infrastructure under developed the Mahaweli programme.

Padviya situated at the extreme northeast of the district, has been much affected by the north east war, including population displacement and related disruption of economic activities. Padaviya had been identified as a red area in the vulnerability map used at the time of the survey and it was confirmed as a highly vulnerable division by all the KIs. In the revised mapping it had turned to green and this is inconsistent with the responses of the KIs. Two other divisions described as highly food insecure by KIs, namely Kabitigollawa and Horowpathana, have been identified as blue regions in vulnerability mapping. These divisions have considerable areas under rain-fed farming, poor accessibility, problems posed by wild animals in addition to some fallout from the war. Finally, Weli Oya, a new DS division carved out from war-affected border regions of Anuradhapura, Vavuniya and Mullaithivu districts, was mentioned as most food insecure due to war-related disturbances.

According to several KIs, the availability and accessibility of food in the Anuradhapura district are affected by three sets of factors, which are relatively independent of each other. First, problems associated with peasant agriculture in general such as low productivity, low profitability, subdivision of holdings over generations, indebtedness of farmers, crop damage

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by pests and wild animals and increased limitation of land and water resources. Second, seasonality of food production in the area. Due to rainfall pattern in the area, most of the food production takes place in the Maha season spreading from September to March each year. In the remaining months farming is reduced in scale and range of operations, depending on availability of rain and/or irrigation water. Some areas within the district specified below are far more drought prone than others. Third, farming and other livelihoods in the border areas specified below have been by and large disrupted due to the North-east war due to attacks or potential attacks from LTTE, displacement and war-related breakdown in infrastructure and services. While it must be noted here that war has also brought some economic benefits to the district in that an estimated 20,000-30,000 youth in the district are employed in the security forces, inclusive of home guards, an even bigger number of people from the border villages has become IDPs fully or partially dependent on dry rations and other forms of assistance.

According to one KI, having adequate stock of homegrown paddy was particularly important in the local perception of food security.

It is matter of great consolation for many small farmers that there is a stock of paddy at home” (vi tika gedera thiyana eka hitata hari hayyak) (KI Anuradhapura)

Vulnerable sub-populations

Most KIs readily mentioned those in welfare centres and other IDPs as the most food insecure population category within the district. In addition, inhabitants of border villages, small farmers dependent on unstable rainfed agriculture in remote Purana villages, wage labourers, war widows and politically marginalised sections of the rural poor were identified as food insecure to varying degrees.

Organisational landscape and implementation capacity

All the government officials emphasised that government agencies have the capacity to reach most of the food insecure through village level officials, including Grama Niladhari, Family Health Workers and Samurdhi outreach workers. Their presence and effectiveness, however, may be weaker in the war-affected areas and more remote border villages. Where necessary the government network may be supplemented by NGOs with better links with special target groups like IDPs, resettlers and ethnic minorities. Among the leading NGOs active in the district are Sarvodaya, Sewa Lanka, SANASA, CARE International, FORUT, and World Vision. Asked to describe the prominent and active CBOs through which services are provided to the poor, irrigation and agriculture officials referred to Farmers Organisation, Samurdhi officials referred to the network of Co-operative Societies and NGOs referred to a range of organisations fostered by them. The truly indigenous CBO present in most of the local villages was the Funeral Assistance Society (Maranadhara Samithiya), which had limited if at all any developmental functions.

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3.2.2 Hambantota District

Hambantota District is in the south-eastern corner of the Southern Province. Ethnically, the district is predominantly Sinhalese (97%) with Malays (1%) and Muslims (1%) as the bigger minorities.10 Located in the dry and intermediate climatic zones, interior communities engage in paddy and chena farming, inland fisheries, coconut, cinnamon, pepper and cashew cultivation. Coastal communities are engaged in fisheries, trade and tourism. Around 60% of its labour force is in agriculture, 30% in the service sector and the rest in industrial labour.11 Hambantota reveals moderate levels of human and consumption poverty.12

Most food insecure sub-regions

The WFP vulnerability mapping indicates Tissamaharama as vulnerable (red), Lunugamvehera, Sooriyawewa, Hambantota and Ambalantota as moderately vulnerable (blue) and Katuwana, Weeraketiya, Angunukolapelessa, Tangalle, Beliatta, and Okewela as non-vulnerable (green) areas.

Apart from one key informant who indicated that around 25% of the population in all divisions were poor and therefore food insecure, others concurred that Lunugamvehera and Sooriyawewa were the most food insecure. Hambantota and Tissamaharama were indicated as vulnerable by two informants, and Katuwana, Weeraketiya and Tangalle were mentioned by one. The spatial assessment of the Dry Zone DS divisions was based on the factors of climate (characterised as Arid Zone), vulnerability to drought, water scarcity, pest (elephant) damage and disease such as malaria, lack of infrastructure and low education attainment. The inclusion of Intermediate Zone divisions such as Katuwana and Weeraketiya, as well as the assessment of the poor everywhere as vulnerable, was based on multiple factors such as low income, landholding size, access to credit and infrastructure, the open economy, environmental degradation and the destruction of social wealth. Thus, key informants confirm the WFP mapping in the case of Tissamaharama to some extent, while contradicting the mapping, especially in the case of Lunugamvehera and Sooriyawewa, which was considered as the two most vulnerable divisions.

Vulnerable sub-populations

Vulnerable groups identified within the district were paddy farmers under rainfed or minor irrigation schemes, tenant farmers in major irrigation schemes, and chena cultivators, both due to seasonal climatic changes, as well as the terms of trade. Inland fishers and livestock (mainly cattle/buffalo) farmers were considered vulnerable during the dry season and prolonged periods of drought, marine fishermen during the off-season and garment workers due to the prolonged energy crisis. Banana growers, fish traders and coconut estate owners (in Weeraketiya) were indicated as non-vulnerable.

Organisational landscape and implementation capacity

10 Preliminary Release, Census of Population and Housing 2001. DCS 2002.11 Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey . Fourth Quarter 1999. DCS 2000.12 Sri Lanka's Poverty Reduction Strategy 2002, GOSL.

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There was a consensus that implementation capacity at government level was satisfactory, apart from some shortcomings in the delivery of Samurdhi and drought relief at the local level.

Political interference is there. They want us to give everything to their catchers. It's not a big problem, we can handle it generally. But drought relief was very difficult. They wanted to send it all to areas where they have supporters and the needy wouldn't have got their share. (KI Hambantota)

Many NGOs were reported as working within the district, 10 were mentioned by name, as were 3 UN-supported projects and the Southern Development Authority. Eight were mentioned as working on food-related issues with World Vision, Plan International, Red Cross, Women's Development Foundation and Sarvodaya assessed as effective. The UN-supported projects implemented through the government were characterised by one informant as "white elephants". World Vision was singled out for its work:

World Vision operates in 22 GN divisions in Lunugamvehera. They did a lot of work during the drought. If not for them some people might have died. (KI Hambantota)

However, other key informants also held NGOs with suspicion.Most NGOs are ghost organisations without proper policies or programmes. They only work in a few DS divisions in the district. They exist for foreigners to learn Sinhalese and get trained in a developing country. (KI Hambantota)

3.2.3 Monaragala District

Located in the south-east of the country, part of the Uva Province, Moneragala District is overwhelmingly rural and remote. In its ethnic composition, the district is predominantly Sinhalese (95%) with 2% each of Muslims and "Indian" Tamils. Three quarters of its labour force is in agriculture. Its farmers in the dry climatic zone cultivating paddy, sugar cane and chena crops such as maize, finger millet, cowpea and mung beans. Part of its population inhabiting the intermediate climatic zone is employed in rubber, coffee, tea and lime cultivation, as well as gem mining. The Monaragala is considered one of the poorest districts in Sri Lanka in terms of both human and consumption poverty levels.

Most food insecure sub-regions and criteria

The WFP vulnerability mapping indicates a majority of divisions in Monaragala district as vulnerable (red) while Buttala, Kataragama, Monaragala, Siyambalanduwa, Tanamalwila, Wellawaya. Madulla and Sevanagala are regarded as moderately vulnerable (blue). Badalkumbura and Medagama are categorised as non-vulnerable (green).

Key informants had a clear consensus on Tanamalwila, Siyambalanduwa and parts of Wellawaya as the most vulnerable but otherwise diverged to some extent in their assessments. The criteria mentioned were the location in the Dry Zone, scarcity of water and susceptibility to drought. Siyambalanduwa was also considered vulnerable on account of its border villages, which were under constant threat by the LTTE and thus did not engage in continuous cultivation. Bibile, Kataragama, Buttala, Madulla and parts of Sevenagala emerged as other vulnerable areas, mentioned by two or more key informants. While Kataragama and Sevanagala were also identified as vulnerable due to climatic reasons, Bibile, Buttala and Madulla were considered remote, inaccessible, dependent on

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subsistence agriculture, and lacking infrastructure and linkages to markets. Thus, to a large extent, key informants were consistent with the WFP mapping in this district.

In Moneragala district, the divisions with the highest number of Samurdhi recipients, Madulla, Wellawaya, Buttala and Medagama (in that order) contrasted somewhat with those, which were considered as most food insecure by the key informants.

Vulnerable sub-populations

Vulnerable groups identified within the district were chena cultivators, settlers within minor irrigation schemes combining paddy/highland crops, those engaged in small-scale gemming, inland fishers and those employed in petty tourism-related activities (in Kataragama). The vulnerability was seen primarily in seasonal terms. Non-vulnerable groups were commercial chena operators (so-called pittani govi) who control large extents of land, sugar cane cultivators, those engaged in growing perennial/mixed crops such as coconut, pepper and tea and farmers under major irrigation schemes.

Organisational landscape and implementation capacities

In terms of implementation capacity, Moneragala was a district where key informants saw both administrative and political obstacles. It was mentioned that since Moneragala is remote and the population spread out, labour often had to be imported for big infrastructure projects. Since the district was often considered a hardship or punishment station, there were many state positions unfilled up to the level of Divisional Secretary. The lack of management skills and commitment, as well as inefficiency and corruption in some departments were seen as major human resource problems in the state sector. Political interference was seen as widespread and affecting even the highest officials within the district.

Everything has a political angle here - 90% of activities are done on political demand. I myself was a political victim. (KI Moneragala)

Samurdhi shouldn't go to so many families, half can be eliminated but politicians are worried about the vote so government officers won't cut. Loans and other assistance go to people who are not needy because of politics. Some time ago they distributed catamarans and boats for inland fisheries, not to fishermen but those who had never fished in their lives. (KI Moneragala)

State assistance was seen as contributing to an ever-increasing dependency mentality among the people of the district.

People here have a dependency mentality. They are used to receiving something rather than cultivating. They do not use labour productively. They tend to do nothing. Drought relief was a problem. People stood near culverts on the road waiting for the vehicles to pass by with aid. Most vehicles did not go beyond the main roads. People had "culvert stores" (bokku yata istoru) where they would store everything they received from one vehicle and wait for the next. They would collect several food packets, examine the contents, choose the best one and throw the rest. Children didn't go to school those days because this became their pastime. (KI Moneragala)

Over 100 NGOs were reported from Moneragala district, 23 were mentioned by name, and 12 were indicated as working on food-related issues. World Vision, Plan International, Sarvodaya, Vehilihini Development Centre, and SANASA were considered effective. The

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lack of co-ordination among themselves, as well as with the state, working for personal gain, and the lack of effective human resources and capacity building in the NGOs were seen as implementation problems, by a key informant in the NGO sector.

A potential funder said they could give 50 lakhs to the department if contractors employed villagers for the rehabilitation work. The department wanted 65 lakhs and delayed the proposal so nothing happened. All government officers think they will only improve if they take a cut because civil society is weak here. We have to fight all the time. There is a human resource problem here - no vision, no objectives - in working on a project together. There is insufficient capacity-building and human resources in the NGOs as well. (KI Moneragala)

3.3 Conflict Zone

3.3.1 Jaffna District

Located in the far north of Sri Lanka, the Jaffna District, prior to the outbreak of civil war, had been a surplus producer of fish and certain subsidiary food crops, including onions and chillies, and a deficit producer of paddy. However, availability and accessibility of food were ensured through market linkages with the rest of Sri Lanka. While Jaffna became a leading supplier of subsidiary food to the rest of the country, there was a constant supply of rice from the nearby rice producing areas, including the adjoining District of Kilinochchi.

The outbreak of war since 1985 and seesaw changes in the regime in military command over the peninsula served to aggravate the food security situation in the district in several ways. The control of Jaffna, hotly contested between the Sri Lanka army and the LTTE, adverse security situation in the area, armed confrontations, mass population displacement (especially “mass exodus” in 1995) and the resulting disruption of livelihoods had the effect of dismantling all production activities in the district, including food production. Specific restrictions imposed by the SLA and LTTE have had the effect of undermining key food production as well. For instance, the ban imposed by the SLA on the inflow of certain agricultural inputs, including agrochemicals and fertiliser, led to a decrease in agricultural productivity. Similarly some of the most fertile land in the peninsula has come under the high security zone of SLA, making it difficult for civilians to continue their farming activities. Most importantly the ban on deep-sea fishing introduced by the Sri Lankan navy as a means to prevent the operations of sea Tigers and LTTE infiltration into the area using sea routes, has vastly undermined the local fishing industry. Taxation and plundering of food produced by the civilians on the part of the LTTE had led to similar breakdowns in food production in the LTTE controlled (uncleared) areas.

The war-related disruption and breakdown of pre-existing transport networks and systems have also led to severe problems related to availability and accessibility of food in the local area. The closure of the A9 route had the effect of disrupting the main supply line to the peninsula, also minimising market relations with the rest of Sri Lanka. The ban on diesel imports into the district further disrupted long distance transportation of food items. During the past two decades, the district had heavily relied on the shipment of food and other commodities in and out of the district via KKS and Point Pedro harbours. This supply line too has been adversely affected from time to time by the fluctuating security situation as well as by changes in weather conditions leading to navigational problems.

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The relative isolation of the Jaffna district given the various restrictions and breakdowns and poor integration with external markets has given rise to a thriving black market where prices of some essential commodities shoot up from time to time. The food prices as well as prices of other essential commodities are particularly high in the December-January period, when sea transport to the peninsula becomes more unpredictable due to inclement weather and rough seas. This market is controlled by a limited number of traders operating from Pettah in Colombo.

“They send all the rejects, refuse and past expiry date items to Jaffna, knowing very well that they have a captive market in the peninsula. They are in monopolistic control over the supply lines to Jaffna”. (KI Jaffna)

Most food insecure sub-regions and causes of vulnerability

According to vulnerability mapping, all the 14 DS divisions in Jaffna are vulnerable (red). At the time of our fieldwork, a fifteenth DS division (Pallai) had been annexed to Jaffna from the adjoining Kilinochchi District. This too is a red area. The Kis consulted in this study largely agreed with this classification. The data available, however, indicate that the proportion of population displaced as well as the proportion of families receiving dry rations tend to vary significantly across various DS divisions (see Annexes 3.1 and 3.2). One of the obvious discrepancies in the data available is that while the reported percentage of IDPs in the total population in the district is about 22.4%, the percentage of families on dry rations is as high as 66.8%. This discrepancy may be partially attributed to the issue of dry rations to fishermen who may not necessarily be displaced, but it can not fully explain the magnitude of difference.

Asked to identify the most vulnerable DS divisions in the district, KIs agreed on four out of the 14 red DS divisions inclusive of Pallai, as the most food insecure. They are Thenmarachchi, Valikamam North, Islands South and Islands North in that order of severity. The high vulnerability in each of these subdivisions was attributed to war and security related circumstances. Thenmarachchi, which used to be a key paddy growing area, had been devastated by latest round of artillery fire and shelling whereby the security forces tried to prevent the advance movement of LTTE from Elephant Pass captured by LTTE in 2000. Nearly two-thirds of houses in the area had been fully or partially damaged during these attacks and a vast majority of the population was displaced and moved to other areas. The food production in the area had been entirely abandoned. As of March 5, 2002 when we visited the area, some of the displaced population was returning to the area in large numbers in response to the ongoing peace initiatives. Landmines, however, were seen as a major threat to resettlement and reestablishment of farming.

Valikamam North, noted for the highly fertile red soil, has also been a thriving farming area prior to the war. This area has come under the high security zone in view of Palaly, the main air force base in the district as well as KKS, the main harbour and the gateway to the peninsula being located in this division. This has meant stepping up of security operations in the area, building bunds and other special infrastructure for security purposes, and increased restrictions on mobility and economic activities of people, including a ban on farming and fishing in areas adjacent to major security installations.

According to a number of KIs, the food security in the islands off the shores of Jaffna peninsula has been adversely affected by restrictions on deep-sea fishing, difficulties in transporting goods, including dry rations, between the peninsula and the islands and the

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islands being under the control of paramilitary groups such as EPDP that have introduced their own taxes on goods reaching in and out of the islands.

Interestingly the three divisions identified by some KIs as less vulnerable compared to other areas in the peninsula are all relatively more urbanised and better connected with external markets. This includes Jaffna, the main urban centre in the peninsula, and the adjoining divisions of Valikamam West and Valikamam Southwest. In addition to better accessibility to markets, these three divisions tend to have a higher number of salaried workers and possibly more recipients of remittances from outside. One KI mentioned that these three subregions have been least affected by the latest rounds of clashes between SLA and LTTE. An additional factor is that fishing, the main food production activity in these divisions is mainly lagoon fishing that has been relatively less affected by restrictions on fishing introduced by the security forces.

Vulnerable sub-populations

Most KIs identified IDPs as the most food insecure subpopulation in the district. Having been displaced often more than once and having lost their assets and livelihoods as well as the chief breadwinner in some families, the IDPs were identified as chronically food insecure. Some KIs as well as official statistics in the kachchari made a distinction between permanent displaced and temporary displaced, former having returned to their original place of residence after a period of displacement and the latter living in camps and other venues outside their original places of residence. This appears to be an administrative distinction maintained for relief and resettlement/relocation purposes. The implications of this distinction for food security, however, were not clear. Several KIs mentioned the heavy dependence of IDPs on dry rations and other subsidies and the difficulty of encouraging the remaining residents of welfare centers to move out to resettlements or relocations.

Some KIs tended to identify the most vulnerable in occupational or socio-economic terms. As already noted the two largest occupational groups in the district, farmers and fishermen have encountered many problems in the prevailing security environments. The restrictions imposed on fishing has prompted the authorities to introduce a special dry ration scheme for the benefit of fisherman. Casual wage labourers were another group adversely affected by restriction of income earning avenues, restrictions on mobility and a marked decline in the real value of wages in the light of increased price of most commodities.

Some KIs mentioned female-headed households as a especially vulnerable group in view of their limited income earning potential, lesser ability to access markets and resources channeled through various agencies and greater vulnerability towards gender-specific discriminations and abuses. Two of the NGOs consulted gave priority to such households in selecting beneficiaries. There is, however, no clear information about the exact numbers of female-headed households with the district.

Organisational landscape and implementation capacities

The organisational landscape within the district varied depending on the prevailing security situation in each area. The civil administration of the government spread throughout the district but in reality the government machinery was weak in more remote divisions and areas directly under LTTE control, namely parts of Vadamarachchi East and Pallai. The military played a significant role even in civilian activities, particularly in the high security

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zone in Valikamam North. In the islands, EPDP and smaller paramilitary groups controlled many administrative, political and relief-rehabilitation activities.

Only a handful of UN Agencies such as UNHCR primarily involved in relief activities had a widespread presence throughout the district. Several INGOs, including CARE International and Action Forum, were involved in promoting income generating activities and livelihoods. Of the indigenous local organisations, Co-operatives were the most active being the primary outlet for dry rations and other subsidies and also involved in input supply, credit and other services in a range of economic activities, including agriculture and fisheries.

The Samurdhi programme had been introduced in some areas within the district, some military leaders having taken the initiative in introducing it within the district, but it was limited in coverage, range of activities, resources and popularity among the beneficiaries. Only those deserving persons who were not entitled to relief and dry rations meant for specific target populations, including displaced persons and fishermen, were covered by Samurdhi, the benefits of which were much more limited compared to relief programmes.

3.1.2 Puttalam District

Puttalam District is located in the western coast of Sri Lanka. It has an extensive coastline stretching from the central part of the country and reaching into the northern areas. Agro-ecologically Puttalam is part of the Dry Zone. It regularly faces periods of intense drought. The scarcity of water is a problem throughout the year, resulting in low yields. The main livelihoods are farming, fishing and wage labour on the salterns, prawn farms and coconut plantations. Most farmers are unable to cultivate the two seasons. The majority of the population is Sinhalese. In the northern parts it has a fairly large Tamil population. In addition, approximately one-fifth of the population is Muslim. This was increased substantially in the past ten years when most of the Muslims expelled from the Northern Province settled in this district. The main problems singled out by the key informants in Puttalam revolved around the lack of water, depressed labour markets and natural disasters. Puttalam faces not only recurrent droughts but also cyclones.

Most food insecure sub-regions and causes of vulnerability

Puttalam is composed of sixteen DS divisions. Of these, the WFP mapping identified two, Vanathhavilluwa and Karuwalagaaswewa, as "vulnerable" (red) and five, Anamaduwa, Mahakumbukkadawala, Mundel, Nawagattegama and Pallama as "moderately vulnerable" (blue). The remaining divisions came under the "not vulnerable" green category. When identifying the most vulnerable DS divisions key informants in Puttalam, with a few exceptions, generally concurred with this assessment.

One key informant indicated that four divisions have the worst overall living conditions in the district: Kalpitiya, Mundel, Vanathavilluwa and Pallama. On the same question a second informant cited three different divisions as the most vulnerable: Mahakumbukkada, Nawagattegama, Karuwalasgawewa. Another informant signalled out Mundal as a particularly poor DS division. He argued that at least 60% of the population are under the poverty line. The causes of poverty brought forth by the informants were related to natural conditions such as the recurrent droughts and the scarcity of jobs.

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One informant was more specific naming Mullipura, Manakkandu and Manathivu as GN divisions in Puttalam were, according to him, most children have some degree of malnutrition. Similarly the same informant mentioned that displaced Muslims populate the GN divisions of Thilledi and Rathmalyaye. They generally have big families so, according to the informant, there is a high population density and less work available. Another interviewee argued that vulnerability might be found practically throughout the district except in towns and in close proximity to urban/semi-urban centres.

As can be seen above and in Annex 6.1, the names of vulnerable divisions suggested by the informants and the red and blue divisions in the WFP map overlap significantly. However, it is interesting to note that none of the names were repeated in the two lists. Only Mundel was mentioned by more than one informant as a vulnerable division suggesting that it might merit a red classification instead of its current blue rank. Nonetheless, a composite list of vulnerable DS divisions identified by the two informants coincided with all of those divisions that appears as either red or blue in the WFP map. The only exception was Anamaduwa which, although it figures as a blue area in the map, was not mentioned by any of the informants interviewed. Another difference was that Kalpitiya was referred to as vulnerable by a high level key informant but is considered "not vulnerable" in the WFP map.

Vulnerable sub-populations

In terms of the most vulnerable sub-populations within the district, one key informant indicated that people living in the coastal belt are very poor. Fishermen have seen their catch and, therefore, income substantially reduced as a result of security restrictions. Furthermore, because of the conflict fishermen are unable to migrate to the East Coast during the off-season. Nonetheless, these populations, according to the interviewee, are poor but not food insecure as they always have fish, crab and prawns, which are highly nutritious foods. In contrast, people living in the interior exhibit more visible signs of malnutrition.

All informants referred to displaced populations as a subgroup with important food problems. The food insecurity of IDPs in welfare centres stems from the almost complete dependence on rations. Problems arise when these rations are delayed or directed elsewhere. Most IDPs, it was argued, don’t own land so they cannot even grow vegetables for their own consumption. Most are also without a source of income. According to one informant the unemployment rate among IDPs in Puttalam is 78% compared to island wide which is around 12%.

When the government has given IDPs tools such as for carpentry they are usually "eaten," in other words they are sold to cover their food necessities. (KI Puttalam)

For IDPs life situation is worse. They come here bare handed they have to start from the beginning. (KI Puttalam)

Another subgroup mentioned by one key informant was farmers. According to him, they get very little for their produce. There is a huge gap between what the farmer receives and the price at which it is ultimately sold, with the profit going to a few middlemen.

Organisational landscape and implementation capacity

The majority of the informants emphasised that the human resources in the government were adequate or very good. It was said that government people were, for the most part,

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trained and capable. One high-level informant indicated that the government has sufficient human and monetary resources. He also explained that as the government programmes go through District Development Committees their implementation systems are firmly rooted. Another informant, however, reported that they faced constraints as a result of inadequate funds.

Some of the informants, pointed to the targeting problems of welfare schemes such as Samurdhi. A Samurdhi officer acknowledged that close to 60% of families in the district receive Samurdhi but that in reality this coverage should be reduced substantially and the amount of monetary aid increased.

Coverage is blanket in that they try to touch everyone. When you divide among thousands of families the share is very small. (KI Puttalam)

One official interviewed explained that WFP had been distributing rations in the camps but had unexpectedly stopped it last October diverting these provisions to Vavuniya and Mannar13. The government took over as a temporary measure but its resource capacities were under stress. The same informant further noted that: "It is imperative for WFP to maintain at least a three-month buffer stock so that if they pull out it is done in a gradual manner." On the same subject another key informant had this appreciation:

WFP believes the refugees are in a better food situation than they actually are. So they help only in Vavuniya and Jaffna. But here 60% of IDPs are in a very bad economic condition. They also have food problems as the people in camps in Vavuniya and Jaffna. (KI Puttalam)

A number of non-governmental entities are also active in the district and were mentioned. Among these RDF, UNICEF, Child Vision, CARE, Muslim NGOs, NORAD and World Vision were listed as working on aspects related to food and nutrition. One informant complained, however, that government departments and NGOs were not working in an integrated and co-ordinated manner. He insisted that if all agencies worked under the Government Agent serving as an umbrella organisation there would be less wastage and duplication.

In Puttalam there was no absolute priority across the board. The only pattern of preference that could be construed was improved agricultural inputs with four of the six officials giving it a top ranking.

3.1.3 Trincomalee District

Trincomalee District is in the Eastern Province. It has an extensive coastline and a large natural harbour in Trincomalee town. A number of its southern DS divisions are considered "uncleared" and are under the authority of the LTTE. The primary livelihoods in the district are farming, wage labour and fishing. It also has a large population of IDPs still residing in makeshift camps. The majority of the population is Muslim with an almost equal number of Sinhalese. There is also a considerable Tamil population.14

Most food insecure sub-regions and causes of vulnerability

13 This KI was obviously unaware that the WFP has phased out food relief in favour of development-oriented food aid.

14 Preliminary Release, Census of Population and Housing 2001. DCS 2002. For Trincomalee the population figures for Muttur and Echchilampattai are not available.

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Trincomalee has eleven DS divisions. According to the WFP map Morawewa and Thambalagamuwa are the most food insecure and Kinniya, Muttur and Town and Gravets are considered moderately vulnerable.

In contrast to other districts, all the key informants in Trincomalee were fairly consistent and agreed on both the most vulnerable divisions as well as those that are relatively better off. All informants consulted indicated that the poorest and also most food insecure regions of the district are located in the "uncleared areas". The DS divisions of Seruvila, Echchilampattai, and Muttur were singled out as the most problematic citing the severe restrictions on the movements of goods and people. Although the soil is of good quality it is virtually impossible to access agricultural inputs or fertilisers. In addition, an extremely deficient communication and road system prevents any efforts at agricultural marketing outside of their uncleared enclaves. Various officials also indicated that the government is unable to access these areas to distribute dry rations and in fact, apart from ICRC security personnel and medical camps from Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), no other assistance was presently reaching these divisions. One high level informant added that a further problem of Muttur lies in its high population density. The available land is limited and plots are being further subdivided. The land extensions, therefore, are not big enough to produce large agricultural yields.

In comparative terms, some informants asserted that although divisions such as Kuchchaveli and parts of Morawewa are undeniably very poor, with very high proportions of displaced populations, they are relatively better than the aforementioned uncleared divisions. Some of the reasons proposed were that they at least have communication links and may be reached by government welfare schemes.

One key informant also argued that Padavi Siripura and Gomarankadawala should be classified as highly vulnerable. In the case of Padavi Siripura the problem lies in its geographical isolation. It is not connected to Trincomalee town and can only be accessed through Anuradhapura. Furthermore, the tanks are in a bad state and are not maintained properly. Gomarankadawala and also to a certain degree Morawewa face constant disruptions in their border villages where militant groups are active.

All informants concurred that the only divisions of Trincomalee District that are nearly exempt from food vulnerability are Town and Gravets, Kinniya and Thambalagamuwa which are geographically closer to Trincomalee Town. One key informant indicated that Trincomalee town is an important source of employment with textile industries and the big flourmill PRIMA. Kantalai was also mentioned as relatively less food insecure because it has big tanks and extensive paddy cultivation.

Important discrepancies arose when comparing the vulnerability mapping exercise conducted by WFP and the information volunteered by the key informants. The most conspicuous disagreement was the consistent selection of the three uncleared DS divisions of Echchilampattai, Muttur and Seruvila as the most food insecure by all the officials interviewed. In contrast, the mapping classifies Seruvila and Echchilampattai as green or "not vulnerable" and Muttur as blue or "moderately vulnerable." One key informant picked out Gomarankadawala and Padavi Siripura as vulnerable regions but the mapping also classifies them under the "not vulnerable" grouping. Furthermore, most informants categorised Thambalagamuwa, and even more manifestly, Town and Gravets as the only food secure regions of the district whereas the map classifies them as red and blue respectively. Morawewa categorised as red in the map was said to have certain problems

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particularly in its border areas but was not singled out as one of the most vulnerable divisions within the district. The only visible agreement was on Kantalai, which both informants and the map regarded as "not vulnerable."

Vulnerable sub-populations

In terms of vulnerable sub-populations the pattern of responses clustered around three identifiable groups: 1.Displaced populations still living in camps and wholly dependent on government dry rations. 2. Resettled populations who were only granted a 6,000-rupee compensation package. 3. Erstwhile farmers and fishermen that due to war related impacts on the exercise of their occupations, such as restrictions on fishing and access to their paddy land, have been reduced to relying on inconsistent low paid wage labour.

Those that have to depend on wage labour on many occasions do not have sufficient cash to buy foodstuffs One informant explained that except for the uncleared, the food security problems in Trincomalee could be understood as a problem of access and not so much of availability.

In Trincomalee food is available but the purchasing power is limited. (KI Trincomalee)

Organisational landscape and implementation capacities

Informants identified a number of NGOs as particularly active in the area. Among those most often mentioned where: Action Contre la Faim, Sarvodaya, ZOA and GTZ. UNHCR was said to be responsible for the displaced camps in the Kuchchaveli DS Division. Likewise, WFP was also said to be active in the displaced camps. Accordingly, the majority of the population that is not in camps obtains their assistance from the General Commissioner of Essential Services. The implementation capacity of the government in the "uncleared" LTTE controlled DS divisions were, as stated by a number of informants, very limited. They emphasised how these areas were very poor but were not even getting minimal governmental assistance.

3.1.4.Vavuniya District

Vavuniya is an inland district located in the northern half of the country. This district has been one of the geographical focal points of the conflict. The northernmost DS division, Vavuniya North, is currently under LTTE control. Its population has been among the most affected by the myriad disturbances associated with the war. Many of the welfare camps set up by the government are located in Vavuniya. The district is mainly agricultural producing paddy, black gram, chillies, brinjals, beans, onions and gourd. However, due to the war large tracts of paddy fields are not being cultivated. The majority of the population are Tamil with a roughly equal minority of Sinhalese and Muslims.

Most food insecure sub-regions and causes of vulnerability

In Vavuniya the map developed by WFP established three divisions, Vavuniya, Vavuniya South and Vengalacheddikulam as "moderately vulnerable" and Vavuniya North as "more vulnerable."

Some key informants stressed that incidence of malnutrition could be found throughout the district. Nonetheless, the prevalence and intensity of poverty and food vulnerability was

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most evident, according to all the informants interviewed in Vengalacheddikulam. It was described as particularly underdeveloped compared to other divisions with most people engaged in low yield farming or chena cultivation and constantly on the move due to war related disturbances. After this division, the "uncleared" division of Vavuniya North was identified by a number of informants as the most food insecure. One key informant maintained that while Vavuniya South has pockets of very intense food insecurity, this does not extend over most of the population as in the other two DS divisions. The only populations that could be regarded as food secure throughout the year are located in and around Vavuniya town in the DS division of Vavuniya.

Contrasting the responses from the informants with the WFP mapping renders a correlation on some, but not all, counts. The map points out Vavuniya North as a red region. The informants agreed. However, they also stressed that conditions in Vengalacheddikulam were as bad or worse than in Vavuniya North. Vavuniya South is considered, "moderately vulnerable" in the map agreeing with the information offered by the informants. The area around Vavuniya town in Vavuniya DS Division was said to be mostly food secure although it is classified in the map as a blue division.

Vulnerable sub-populations

Sub-populations mentioned as the most vulnerable in the district were landless farmers, welfare camp residents and displaced populations. In Vavuniya large numbers of farmers that previously cultivated their land must now engage in erratic wage labour. Large tracts of paddy under security restrictions must now lie fallow. An index of this is that the total amount of land that is cultivated in the district has been reduced by more than half. Before 1990 21,110 hectares of paddy land was cultivated. Today, this figure stands at only 10,000.15

In addition, chena cultivators are among the poorest in already distressed areas. In Kanespuram, one of the poorest regions within Vengalacheddikulam the inhabitants depend almost exclusively on cultivation on any available lands that they find.

Key informants also singled out welfare centre residents as food insecure. Their food security relies almost entirely on the dry rations parcelled out to them. All informants concurred that these provisions do not cover the minimum nutritional requirements of a family. Compounding the problem, in most cases, residents are unable to seek other sources of income to cover their non-food necessities. Selling the dry rations in exchange for cash oftentimes covers these gaps. This coping strategy, for people that have no access to income, has an adverse impact on their food security.

Key informants also referred to displaced populations in general as food insecure. They have most often lost everything and have no reliable source of income. One informant said that this group was not receiving sufficient food aid. According to her numbers, in the District there are 12,354 displaced families that came from outside the district. Of these 11,405 should be getting dry rations but only 7,409 currently are.16

Organisational landscape and implementation capacities

15 Figures provided by the office of the Assistant Director of Agriculture, Vavuniya District. 16 Figure provided by the office of the Assistant Director of Agriculture, Vavuniya District.

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The district level key informants concurred that insufficient funds limit the implementation capabilities of the local government. A high level informant indicated that the government has the human resources necessary for successful implementation but falls short because of lack of money. In Vavuniya a frequent criticism centred on the inability of the government to go ahead with plans for resettlement. Another key informant argued that welfare centres are a waste of money and saw resettlement as the only long-term solution. This district level informants were adamant that resettlement had to go forward.

The government policy of giving rations to welfare populations without resettling them has created a dependent society. Some of them do not want to leave the camps because they have been there for too many years. Thus society of dependants has been created by this policy of perpetual giving. (KI Vavnuiya)

Despite this notion that food relief was a negative activity contributing to a cycle of dependence, key informants were insistent that food aid could not be stopped suddenly and that unreliable food handouts caused problems. Furthermore, they questioned the type of food that was presently being delivered.

WFP must establish some kind of buffer stock arrangements or buy the food items they hand out locally. They must set the example by regularly and without delay supplying the dry rations. (KI Vavuniya)

It is important that agencies such as WFP study the food patterns before they decide on the type of assistance. For example it might be better that a portion of the dry rations are flour instead of rice because rice is difficult to consume if you don’t have the firewood to cook it. (KI Vavuniya)

Sewa Lanka and FORUT were said to be working on food-related issues in general and CARE on seeds and training for home gardens. Additionally, the Rural Development Fund (RDS) worked in unison with the Agriculture Department to supply fruit trees to home gardens.

In Vavuniya the top requirement according to key informants is, unequivocally, to establish peace. Of the three key informants who offered a ranking of priorities all considered it as the most important or second most important measure to improve the food security of their district.

3.4 Synthesis of key informant viewpoints

Key informants confirmed the WFP vulnerability mapping to some extent but also provided some contrary assessments. The difference is accounted for by the fact that informants were divided between using geographical/agro-ecological criteria and socio-economic criteria. Those who held the former perspective looked at issues of climate (Dry Zone), water scarcity and access to infrastructure, and saw food scarcity in spatial terms. The emphasis was on the availability dimension. Their assessments were closer to the WFP vulnerability mapping.

There are two types of DS divisions here. Six are in the Intermediate Zone - Tangalle, Beliatta, Weerakeitya, Katuwana, Angunukolapelesa, Okewela. The others are in the Dry Zone - Sooriyawewa, Lunugamvehera, Ambalantota, Hambantota and Tissamaharama. Of those Sooriyawewa and Lunugamvehera are in the very dry Arid Zone. In the IZ the economic pattern is based on traditional land, 80% of land titles are private and the climate is wet and they are engaged in livelihood activities the entire year. In the other

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zone, people have migrated from the IZ and settled on government land. It is dry and cultivated mostly with chena crops. They have only six months to make a living. (KI Hambantota)

Those who used the socio-economic approach saw food insecurity as a condition of a minority of the population, usually considered low income or "poor" spread throughout the divisions.

There are no major differences among regions. There are different social strata everywhere. Katuwana has a lot of rain but it has poor people. Tissa has irrigation systems with big farmers, mudalalis, and moneylenders. Every region has poor and rich people. Even in the major irrigation systems there are tenant farmers so one cannot only look at the infrastructure. (KI Hambantota)

In addition to the access dimension, utilisation problems such as ignorance of nutrition issues, consumption patterns and alcoholism were also mentioned. The differences between WFP and key informants can be explained to some extent by the weight given to availability indicators in the WFP vulnerability mapping based on secondary data, as well as the fact that there are pockets of food insecurity in any given division. However, cases of significant variance between WFP vulnerability mapping and key informant assessments need to be further investigated and discussed with stakeholders concerned.

Key informants from all the districts generally cited areas in and around towns and urban centres as more food secure. Government officials in most districts argued that the government had sufficient and capable human resources for implementation of relief and development programmes, despite certain weaknesses. It was also argued that the government could not perform better for lack of funds. In most districts key informants alluded to political interference and a dependent mentality/dependency syndrome that constrained development activity and prevented resources from reaching the deserving poor. In the conflict areas IDPs were mentioned by all key informants as food insecure.

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Chapter 4 Perceptions and Practices of the Most Vulnerable

This chapter begins with an overview of the types of villages covered by this exercise including a review of their livelihoods. It then examines issues such as locating the most vulnerable, gender and intra-household food distribution, perceptions on causes of food insecurity and coping strategies to deal with food scarcities. It also assesses, according to the community members themselves, sectoral priorities as well as the preferred implementers of measures considered effective to reduce food insecurity.

The chapter is based primarily on data from the household interviews and women's and men's focus group discussions. As far as possible those households that were particularly vulnerable within the community were selected, although in each site at least one relatively wealthier household was also chosen. It is important to point out however, that the number of households interviewed in each of the villages was relatively small (four to nine) and, therefore, any inferences based on the information might not necessarily apply to the entire village.

4.1 Profile of Villages

In the Central Zone, three categories of villages were surveyed. 1) Upland villages on steep slopes, 2) Estates and 3) Lowland villages with rain-fed cultivation or minor irrigation. In the Conflict Zone displacement is such an overwhelming reality that it served to differentiate the communities in the area. The three types of villages visited were: 1) Resettled communities, 2) Relocated and 3) Never Displaced villages. In the Dry Zone four types of villages, with varying degrees of food insecurity were identified: 1)Purana Villages, 2) Border Villages, 3) Irrigated Colonies and 3) Squatter settlements.

General Characteristics

4.1.1 Central Zone

Upland Villages comprise houses surrounded by some sort of "home garden" scattered on hill slopes, around valleys cultivated with paddy and/or vegetables. Some of them are old villages, claiming to predate the colonial period, while others are state-sponsored LDO settlements or village expansion schemes. In both cases, there is considerable encroachment of the surrounding land due to natural population increase within the village or inward migration from outside. All four of the surveyed villages were inhabited mainly by Sinhalese. The two most vulnerable villages were inhabited by so-called "low" castes.

Estates were surveyed in the Nuwara Eliya and Badulla districts. The two sites are large estates owned by the state and managed by plantation companies, and were selected for their vulnerability in consultation with managers. The workers were predominantly "Indian Tamil". Both divisions were relatively far from the main road, and most workers relied entirely on wage income and having no access to individual plots to cultivate vegetables or any other food crops.

Lowland Villages in Badulla and Ratnapura districts were included in the survey because the districts in Central Zone, although mainly comprising the central mountain massif of the island, include considerable extents of the low-country region as well. Both of the sites selected were old settlements inhabited mainly by Sinhalese. However, the village in Badulla

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district mostly comprised households, which had encroached on crown land. The village in Ratnapura district had expansion sponsored by the state, as well as encroachment. Both villages were dependent on rain-fed cultivation. These villages were similar to Dry Zone purana villages and squatter settlements in their geographical and socio-economic characteristics.

4.1.2 Dry Zone

Purana Villages are long established Dry Zone communities characterised by kinship and caste based social organisation, a communally maintained localised irrigation system, a combination of rice cultivation and chena farming and a considerable physical, social and cultural isolation from the society at large. The Purana Villages are found in all Dry Zone districts and in parts of the intermediate zone, including the northern part of the Kurunegala District and parts of Matale and Ratnapura districts. The more remote purana villages with poor road access, limited land and water resources and frequent crop damage by wild animals appear to be more vulnerable to food insecurity.

The Irrigated Colonies were established by the government of Sri Lanka in order to promote food production and relieve population pressure in the rest of the country. These objectives have been met with varying degrees of success. However, these colonies have developed a range of problems due to non-transferability of the relevant land holdings to more than one heir, increased poverty of children excluded from land ownership, social disorganisation, poor maintenance and subsequent deterioration of irrigation systems and emerging social problems such as marital instability and alcoholism. Colonisation schemes account for the bulk of the population in several Dry Zone districts, including Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa and Ampara.

The Border Villages are Dry Zone communities bordering LTTE controlled areas in the conflict zone. A majority of Border villages are Sinhala by ethnic composition, but there are also some Muslim and Tamil villages that come under this category. The Border villages can be purana villages, squatter settlements or irrigated colonies in their origin but presently their problems, including availability and accessibility of food, have been largely aggravated due to their direct or indirect exposure to armed conflict.

Squatter settlements naturally evolved from waves of population migration from outside their respective areas. The encroachers typically come and open up crown land and if they are successful in establishing themselves in harsh physical environments they try to secure a permit for the land. Once a reasonable number of families move into such an area they begin to demand services/infrastructure facilities such as schools, post offices and roads via relevant government agencies and political processes. It is the landless poor from surrounding or far-away areas, including the densely populated wet zone, that typically move into the vacant crown land in the Dry Zone. The Dry Zone squatter settlements are most prominent in Moneragala, followed by parts of Ampara, Hambantota, Puttalam, Matale and Polonnaruwa Districts.

4.1.3 Conflict Zone

Resettled Villages were the most common type of communities encountered in the Conflict Zone. These six villages were located throughout the Conflict Zone and were composed in their entirety of Tamils. Due to the conflict, all of these villages have been evacuated at least once and their population displaced. As conditions in their area became more stable, they

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returned and resettled their original villages. The dates of resettlement varied. Nasheevantivu in Batticaloa and Pier East in Mannar resettled in early 1990s. Kumburupitiy in Trincomalee, Poombuhar and Geneshapuram in Vavuniya in the late 1990s and Pottkeni in Mannar in 2001. Most of the families in the Resettled communities now rely on wage labour, after their established occupations and sources of income were lost or destroyed.

The Relocated Villages were composed of displaced populations. In contrast to Resettled villages the members of these communities have been unable to return to the village from where they had to flee and are now residing temporarily in another village. In Srimapura in Puttalam the village is composed entirely of Muslims who were forcefully expelled from Jaffna and Mannar more than ten years ago. They are still waiting for conditions to be amenable for their return to these two Districts. In the case of the village in Jaffna they were displaced first to the Vanni and now have been able to relocate in a semi-permanent manner in another location in Jaffna.

Never Displaced Communities as their name implies, are villages that have not been displaced at any moment during the conflict. In the case of Batticaloa it is a Tamil village expansion formed 25 years ago. It experienced a short displacement in 1990. Although the population did not move again they underwent periodic difficulties related to the conflict such as Army roundups and mobility constraints. The only "uncleared" community visited for this exercise was in Mullaithivu. It is a Tamil farming/wage labour community that, despite never having been displaced has endured a large number of difficulties related to the war. The village in Puttalam is an encroached settlement. It was the only village visited in the Conflict Zone composed of Sinhalese and that has been mostly insulated from the war.

4.2 Livelihoods

Most communities in the three Zones engage in at least two forms of livelihood activities. The predominant livelihood in the Conflict, and to a lesser extent Central Zone, is wage labour. In the Dry Zone the most common livelihood is farming.

As can be appraised in Annex 4.1 casual wage labour is practised by 50% or more of the population in all of the upland villages and in one of the Estates in the Central Zone. It is also the main livelihood for five of the six Resettled villages and all three of the Never Displaced communities in the Conflict Zone. In the Dry Zone only one Colony reported a significant amount of their workforce engaged in wage labour. Casual wage labour in the Central Zone is generally in the agricultural sector in small vegetable, rubber, tea and pepper holdings. In the Conflict Zone it is found in the agricultural fields but is also widespread in the fishing sector.

In the Dry Zone all of the villages that were surveyed have farming as their main livelihood. In the Conflict and Central Zones farming was also important but not as prevalent. Two of the three Never Displaced villages mentioned farming as an important source of work, as well as three of the Resettled villages although in the latter, two of the three villages specified that agricultural wage labour was more important. In the Resettled villages in Mannar and Batticaloa, however, farming was either negligible or non-existent. In the Central Zone farming was dominant in the two Lowland villages and in only one Upland village.

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Fishing was a significant livelihood only in the coastal villages visited in Mannar and Batticaloa and, to a lesser extent, in Trincomalee.

In addition, a number of households in the three Zones are engaged in industrial employment (mainly garment), trade, Middle East employment, and the armed forces inclusive of home guards. Although the overall percentages of people engaged in these occupations is relatively low, there where a number of exceptions. In a Lowland village in the Central Zone 22% of the population is employed in the Armed Forces. One Never Displaced village has approximately 15% of their workforce in the Middle East, and another reported 80% engaged in trade. In the two Border villages in the Dry Zone close to 35% of their population are home guards. Furthermore, the five upland villages in the Central Zone have from 1% to 5% Middle East employment and also from 5% to 10% of income coming from factory employment. In the Dry Zone all villages except purana villages have anywhere from 2 to 8% of the population in the Armed Forces and also half have from 3 to 10 % industrial employment.

As can be observed in Table 4.1, eight villages were visited in the Central Zone, eleven in the Conflict Zone and ten in the Dry Zone. According to the WFP mapping discussed in Chapter 3, in the Central Zone four of the communities were located in DS divisions that came under the WFP "red" category, three in the "blue" category and one in the "green" category. In the Conflict Zone, six villages were situated in "red" DS divisions, three in "blue" and two in "green". In the Dry Zone, six were in "red" Divisions, three in "blue" and one in "green".

Table 4.1 Types of communities by ZoneCentral ZoneDistrict DS Division Name of

village/Estate

WFP Category

No HH interviewed

Type of community

Upland Kegalle Deraniyagala Panikure Blue 5 Old village, (Berawa caste)

with encroachmentAranayaka Theleka Green 6 Old village, (Potter caste)

Ratnapura Pelmadulla Poranuwa Blue 9 Old village with encroachment

Kandy Pathahewaheta Kapuliyadda West

Green 8 Old village with expansion

EstatesNuwara Eliya Kothmale Dunshine Blue 5 Isolated tea estate divisionBadulla Lunugala Hopton Red 8 Isolated tea estate divisionDry lowland Badulla Ridimaliyadda Ikiriyagoda Red 8 Rain-fed settlement with

encroachmentRatnapura Balangoda Diyawinna Green 9 Old settlement, expansion

and encroachmentTotal 56

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Conflict ZoneDistrict DS Division Name of Village WFP

CategoryNo HH Interviewed

Type of Community

ResettledBatticaloa Koralai Pattu West Nasevanthivu Red 4 Displaced for short period in

1990. Mannar Mannar Pier East Red 6 Displaced as refugees to

India. Resettled in 1990-1992Mannar Musali Pottkeni Red 6 Displaced to Madhu.

Resettled in 2001Trincomalee Kuchchaveli Kumburupitiy Green 7 Displaced to Vanni. Resettled

in 1996-1998Vavuniya Vavuniya South Poombuhar Blue 8 Displaced to Madhu.

Resettled in 1998-1999.Vavuniya Vengalacheddikula

mGeneshapuram Blue 6 Displaced to Madhu.

Resettled in 1998-1999.RelocatedPuttalam Mundal Pubbudugama Red 6 Muslim expelled from Jaffna

in 1990. Jaffna Vadamarachchi

NorthKarudavil South Red 8 Displaced to Vanni.

Relocated within JaffnaNever DisplacedBatticaloa Manmunai West Karuveppankeni Red 4 Village expansion formed 25

years ago.Mullaithivu Thunnukai Thenniyakulam Red 4 Isolated. Village colonisation

scheme came into existence in 1965

Puttalam Arachchikattuwa Mukkanthalawa Green 6 Never Displaced. Encroachment on rail lines

Total 65

Dry ZoneDistrict DS Division Name of Village WFP

CategoryNo. HH Interviewed

Type of Community

ColonyAnuradhapura Rambawa Pandukabayapura Red 7 ColonyMoneragala Siyabalanduwa Kotiyagala Red 8 Colony / BorderBorderAnuradhapura Welioya Athawetunuwewa ? 8 BorderPolonnaruwa Welikanda Kandekaduwa Red 7 BorderSquatterPolonnaruwa Elahera Kiri Oya Green 8 SquatterAmpara Lahugala Hulannuge Red 8 SquatterPuranaMoneragala Bibile Mudiyagala Red 8 PuranaMatale Ambangangekorale Kawdagammana Blue 9 PuranaMatale Laggala Pellegama Rambukoluwa Blue 8 PuranaHambantota Lunugamvehera Angunukolaweva Blue 6 PuranaTotal 77

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4.3 Locating the Most Vulnerable

4.3.1 Who is Food Insecure?

When asked to identify the most food insecure households or groups in their community, villagers in the men's focus group discussion (MFGD) and women's focus group discussions (WFGD) most often differentiated according to occupations or livelihood strategies (please refer to Annex 4.2). Some reported, however, that the food insecure could also be detected by counting the number of able-bodied workers in a household, the number of daily meals or the prevalence of alcohol consumption.

In both the Central and Conflict Zone, food insecurity was identified repeatedly with households that rely solely on casual wage labour. In the Dry Zone, although not the leading criterion, it was also brought up in two Border villages. As can be observed in Annex 4.2, in the Conflict Zone dependence on casual wage income was mentioned in all types of villages and in seven of the eleven men’s focus group discussions. Similarly in the Central Zone the men's discussion brought this issue to the fore in six of the eight villages that were visited. Wage labour was also mentioned in the women’s focus groups. However, it was not as predominant as with men. Women were more inclined to mention a wider range of characteristics to locate the food insecure.

Wage labour is not permanent and not a stable means of income. Their food situation is the worst. They are not sure if they will have food the next day. (Participant, MFG Kegalle)

Households that depended on wage labour were considered vulnerable because their jobs are temporary and unreliable. Certain wage labourers such as the old and disabled, who often fall sick, cannot work hard and are paid a lower daily wage, were considered the most food insecure. In contrast, in all three Zones having a stable and permanent job, such as government employment, was counted as a reliable means to assure food security for the family.

Big people who have government jobs face no problems. (Participant, MFG, Kawdagammana, Matale)

The number of income earners in relation to dependants was an often-repeated measure to gauge the food insecurity of a household. In the Estates this was even presented as a ratio. The men's focus group indicated that a family with one earner and five or more dependants may be considered insecure whereas women calculated this number as two income earners and more than six dependants. In a number of communities in the Conflict Zone it was pointed out that a household that only had income from wage labour could, nonetheless, be food secure if many people within the household were working and contributing to the overall income of the family.

In some houses here are one or two children and both parents have work in the estate. Their food situation is ok. But if 5 children depend on a single income the situation is much worse (Participant, MFGD, Nuwara Eliya)

If three people in the family are working then they are middle income. (Participant, MFGD, Karuveppankeni, Batticaloa)

As cultivation is the predominant livelihood in the Dry Zone, issues relating to land were more recurrent in this region. In this Zone, landlessness was mentioned in a majority of Border and Squatter settlements as a measure of food insecurity. Likewise, in the Dry Zone

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people who have large holdings and more paddy land were counted as secure. In the Lowland villages in the Central Zone, which are also mainly involved in farming, land ownership, access to paddy lands and growing subsidiary food crops were deemed as important criteria to identify those families that are food secure.

Another common response was to single out households with only one source of income as more vulnerable. In contrast, if a household was able to draw on multiple layers and sources of earnings, or complement their main source with other income-generating activities they were considered food secure.

If a family has someone in the Middle East, is also receiving Samurdhi, has a small business and also does wage labour they are in a satisfactory situation. Those families that depend on casual wage labour or on this and Samurdhi are poor and have food problems. (Participant MFG, Arachchikattuwa, Puttalam)

Farmers had a mixed record in terms of their perceived vulnerability. In Mannar wage labourers, in comparison to farmers, were considered to be more secure because it was considered that wage labourers could always find a job. In a Colony and a Purana village in the Dry Zone paddy cultivators were categorised as insecure. However, in four of six Resettled villages in the Conflict Zone farmers were seen as more secure.

Farmers can cultivate their land and also do wage labour to complement their earnings from cultivation. (Participant, MFG, Poombuhar, Vavuniya)

In a number of cases in Resettled villages their populations had been engaged in farming before their displacement but today can no longer access their lands or have the capital to cultivate and have been reduced to working for a daily wage. Therefore, comparing with their prior situation they believe that if they could go back to farming their food security would improve.

Other characteristics not related to occupation or type of work, also surfaced. In Batticaloa, Jaffna, Hambantota, and Anuradhapura it was mentioned that larger families, with more children to feed, are more food insecure. Not surprisingly, in at least one woman's focus group in each Zone it was argued that families with substance and alcohol abuse could be categorised as more food insecure.

It is interesting to note that Mullaithivu was the only site where neither the men’s nor the women’s focus group discussions came forward with criteria to locate the most food insecure. In both group discussions it surfaced that they considered everybody, without distinction, to be food insecure.

Throughout the three Zones it was sometimes observed that the most prevalent livelihood in the community was also the same one signalled as a food insecurity indicator. Accordingly, communities that had a large proportion of their population working for wage income also generally identified people engaged in this occupation as the most insecure. In the Dry Zone, Pandukabayapura the village with the highest proportion working as day labourers from among the villages visited in this Zone was also the only one where both the men's and women's focus groups explicitly earmarked wage labourers as food insecure. In the Conflict Zone Pottkeni in Mannar, which reported that 100% of their population did some kind of farming was one of the few in the Zone that considered farmers as being the most food insecure.

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4.3.2 Perceptions of Poverty and Food Insecurity

As can be observed in Annex 4.3, according to their own perceptions, in the Central Zone 66% of households consider themselves to be poor or very poor and 23% middle income. In the Conflict Zone the number of households that regard themselves as poor or very poor is higher at 76%, with 23% as middle income. Finally in the Dry Zone more families think of themselves as middle income (29%) but more families than in the Central Zone, consider themselves poor or very poor (71%).

The notion of being "poor" is not necessarily identical to that of being food insecure. The household interviews attempted to draw out whether families considered themselves poor, middle income or rich and why. (Please refer to Annex 4.4 for a summary of these results). This information was compared to the responses in the focus groups, which discussed the characteristics of those that are food insecure. Contrasting the results offered a glimpse as to whether communities consider food insecurity and poverty to be equivalent. The information revealed that, to a large extent, food related considerations are intertwined in notions of socio-economic standing, but certain criteria are reserved as indicators for poverty.

In all three Zones, but particularly in the Conflict Zone, arguments revolving around food were used to explain a poor or middle-income self-imposed label. (Please refer to Annex 4.4) Statements such as "we do not have enough food" "we do not eat three meals a day" and "I can't feed my children" were common to explain poverty and "we eat three meals a day" were similarly given to indicate that a family considered itself middle income.

In fact, for a number of interviewees, being able to identify who was insecure and who was secure could be reduced to looking at the number of meals consumed by the family in a day. The most vulnerable, regardless of their occupation, were those households that, for whatever reason, cannot guarantee three full meals a day.

People who eat three meals per day are food secure, households that have one or two per day are food insecure (Participant, MFGD, Koralai Pattu, Batticaloa)

From Annex 4.4 it is possible to infer that many of the reasons given for poverty are similarly present as criteria to locate the food insecure. For example: many dependants, no steady income, depend on wage labour, only one source of income, no male earner, no stable job, large family, and wage labourers were mentioned throughout the three Zones as explanations for poverty. As discussed above, these were also offered as criteria to locate the most food insecure.

However there are certain characteristics that were reported to influence the food situation of the household but not their poverty. The most conspicuous was alcoholism. In the same vein, not having a proper house, and not having proper clothes, both visible manifestations of a family's condition were mentioned repeatedly throughout the three Zones as means to locate the poor but did not surface as characteristics of the food insecure.

4.4 Gender issues and intra-household food distribution

The particular manner in which a household distributes internally the food they have available may render some members of the family more food insecure than others. It is necessary, therefore, to explore variation in food allocation by gender and age.

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4.4.1 Sequence in intra-household Food Distribution

In the three Zones, and in all the communities surveyed, the results from both the household and the focus group interviews revealed that women eat less and last. This was the case even if the household reported no food scarcities. In those households where food shortages are frequent women will drink tea, chew betel and forego their share.

Mostly wives will eat last and they have to adjust with the balance of food. (Participant WFGD Manmunai West, Batticaloa)

Similarly, in the Conflict Zone a number of women focus group participants explained that they would also eat food of inferior quality. For example, they would not give burnt rice (dankuda/ adisoru) from the bottom of the pan to their husbands for fear that it might contain stones.

The differences that did surface consisted of whether the children or the husband (or male head of house) was given the first priority in food distribution. As can be observed in Annex 4.5 and Chart 4.5, in the Conflict and Central Zone the feeding priority was reported to be with the children. In the Conflict Zone this was much more pronounced with 72% of households claimed to feed the children before the men. In the Central Zone this was lower at 46% but still higher than the 39% which feed the men before the children. In many cases although it was reported that children were given priority, it was also indicated that male children were fed before female children and male children were sometimes permitted to eat first with their fathers. In the Dry Zone, based on household responses of 79 households, 44.3% of the households reported a male priority in allocation of food, as compared with a 39.2% child priority. Within the Dry Zone purana villages had the highest male bias with nearly 69% of the households reporting a male priority food allocation. This, in turn, suggests that a male bias is more pronounced in Dry Zone social settings, and particularly purana villages, where traditional social values and practices are more intact.

There was one recorded case in Jaffna where the woman said she ate before her husband. The woman herself explained that this was a temporary arrangement since she was pregnant at the moment.

The justifications for male and child priority where similar in the three Zones and clustered around four main reasons, 1. It is the tradition or custom, 2. The chief male breadwinner of the household is required to undertake more physically demanding tasks in the fields and work places. 3. Children were small, could not wait and needed proper food and nutrition to grow. 4. Women were not that much affected by hunger. Their bodies and constitutions made it easier for them to suppress their appetites.

My husband has to be given food before me. That is the culture. (Participant, WFGD, Arachchakituwa, Puttalam)

Wives are at home and they do not do much hard work. Husbands have to work hard to run the family so they should be given first preference. (Participant WFGD Pottkeni Mannar)

We have to make sure that the others have enough food. It is no problem that wives do not have enough food because wives have the pleasure of feeding their husbands and children. (Participant WFGD Kegalle)

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Mostly husbands eat first and a lot. If a visitor comes wives have to give their share to the visitor and drink a cup of tea. (Participant, WFGD, Ratnapura)

Feeding men first on the basis that they need the energy to be able to work hard is put to the test when women, in the same manner as men, also engage in strenuous work outside the home. In a village in Trincomalee the results from the women's focus group and the household data were inconsistent on this regard. In this community it is very common for women go out into the onion fields with men to do wage labour in-cultivation. The women's focus group claimed that working people will eat first (therefore both women and men), then children and then whoever stayed at home. Nonetheless, during the household interviews the typical pattern of sequencing, that is the woman last, also emerged. This suggests that this justification probably does not stand on its own to explain feeding prioritization but perhaps tradition and culture are more potent as determinants of intra-household food distribution. The results from the household and focus group reveal that despite some differences the intra-household food distribution conspires against the females. The practice is quite entrenched and is also present when no food scarcities are reported.

4.4.2 Alcoholism

Another important issue that surfaced consistently in women's focus groups throughout the three Zones, although not as clearly at the household level, was that in many vulnerable households adult males spend a considerable part of their earnings to maintain their substance abuse practices, including alcoholism. Thus alcoholism may be seen as an important aspect of the expenditure pattern of vulnerable households depriving them of money that could be better used for nutrition.

If kasippu (moonshine) consumption in the village could be stopped, all our problems would be solved. Men spend half of their wages on kasippu. We have to eat and dress with the rest. (Participant, WFGD, Kegalle)

Men are addicted to alcohol and they spend all the money on alcohol and they do not have left over money to settle debts. (Participant, WFG, Mannar)

4.4.3 Women's and Men's Household Responsibilities

In the Central Zone selecting and purchasing food was considered, in most cases, the responsibility of women. However, in some households men also participated in decision-making related to food purchase and consumption. In most villages in the Dry Zone, communities indicated that both husbands and wives discuss before they purchased goods and divided the responsibilities. Men were said, most often, to be in charge of the marketing and purchasing of food items while the women where responsible for the cooking. In the Conflict Zone the responses were also varied. While in some villages it was argued that the women would cook what the man bought in the market, in others it was said that both husbands and wives selected the food items. In yet another village a women focus group explained that it was only the women who took these decisions as they have the knowledge of what is best to buy and to eat.

4.5 Causes of Food Insecurity

According to their perceptions, households in the three Zones provided multiple, at times interconnected reasons that contribute to their food insecurity. A frequent cause identified in

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the Conflict and Central Zones was scarcity of work. (Please refer to 4.6 and Chart 4.6). In the Conflict Zone it was mentioned in almost three-quarters of all households, making it the undisputed leading cause of insecurity according to villagers, whereas in the Central Zone it was the most often repeated cause but only obtained 43% of household answers. In the Central Zone causes were more scattered with low income, lack of land and lack of water also high as causes of food insecurity according to villagers. Low income had the second highest number of responses in both the Central and Conflict Zones. In the Dry Zone 43% of households identified drought or scarcity of water as the main reason negatively impinging on their food security and landlessness as the second.

The pattern of responses regarding causes of food insecurity is linked to the type of livelihoods most prevalent in each region. In this manner, the Conflict Zone, which has the highest dependence on wage labour of the three regions, provided scarcity of work and low income as the leading causes of food insecurity. In the Central Zone which also has a high percentage of the population engaged in wage labour, particularly in the upland villages, these two causes also figured in the interviews although not as prominently as in the Conflict Zone. In the Dry Zone, which is principally farming, not having enough water for agriculture or not having land to cultivate were seen as the main causes of food insecurity.

Furthermore, in the Conflict and Dry Zone although not singled out as the foremost reason to explain food insecurity, conflict-related causes were also mentioned in 11% and 16% percent of households respectively. In the Dry Zone these responses came from Kandekaduwa, a border village, and a village in Polonnaruwa close to the conflict area.

4.5.1 Insufficient Income

Insufficient income was explained as a major problem by wage labourers who voiced that their daily salary was inadequate and farmers who elaborated this in terms of high input costs and low prices for their crops.

Even if casual wage labour was found some recounted how the pay is oftentimes so low that it is barely sufficient to cover food basics.

I earn 40 Rs per day. This is not enough to buy even 1kg of rice and 500 gr. of sugar. (Female head of household, HH interview, Pier East, Mannar)

Insufficient income was commonly said to lead to a continued cycle of indebtedness. Households with one income-earner found it difficult to make ends meet. Female-headed households with young children were particularly vulnerable, as female wage rates are considerably lower than male rates in the rural sector.

Our income is not enough. We have to pay credit. Our credit has increased more than our wages. Now we have to repay Rs.4,000/= to the store. They always ask for money but we don't have money to repay. When we take our wages home we hardly have Rs. 100/= to bring home because the people from whom we've taken money ask for their money. (Household interview, Nuwara Eliya)

When all the deductions from the salary like for flour, EPF, dhobi fees, barber fees, membership for the trade union are made, we get around Rs. 200/= to 300/= to our hand. How can we feed and educate our children with this money? (HH interview, Nuwara Eliya)

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In farming communities, many families recounted the difficulties in extracting a profit from cultivation. The most often cited reasons were a lack of capital, harsh repayment conditions and the rapid increase in the prices of purchased inputs, such as agro-chemicals, relative to the price of farm produce.

We bought fertiliser that cost more than our profits.(HH interview, Vavuniya South)Our income from cultivation was nothing. We gave two bags to the owners of the land and 2 bags to settle the credit. (HH interview, Mullaithivu)

One cannot expect a stable income from vegetable cultivation. If a farmer cultivates an acre of cucumber his costs are Rs. 13,000 but his income is only Rs. 11,000. This is not counting the labour that was expended. (Participant, MFG, Ratnapura)

4.5.2 Scarcity of Work

For villages that rely mainly on wage labour and have little or no cultivation or home gardens to complement their food purchases a limited job market has direct impacts on the food security of the community.

Not being able to find work was a problem in some villages and Estates in the Central Zone especially during the dry season and in the upland villages during the rainy season. In the Conflict Zone, villagers also talked of the sporadic and unreliable nature of their work particularly during the rainy season. They explained how on a given week they have no way of knowing how many days they will be able to find work. Casual wage labour is usually erratic, seasonal and by its very nature does not offer any type of safety net to fall back on if the worker is ill or temporarily disabled. The ability to put food on the table, on any given day depended, on whether work is found on that same day. In Trincomalee a villager explained it as a simple formula.

If we find work, then the family eats that day. If we do not find work that day then we either have to ask for a loan or considerably reduce our food intake or starve . (HH interview, Trincomalee)

If we do not go and do wage labour every day then there is a problem in our food supply. We can't stay home even if we are sick. (Woman in Pier East, Mannar)

Very rarely do we get wage labour. If I can get wage labour everyday then our situation will be much better. We will be able to earn around Rs. 200-250/=. Now we earn Rs. 100/= by making beedi. That is also if both of us work. (HH interview, Kegalle)

People in the Central Zone complained that there are no options for employment, such as better paying industrial employment available near their communities. Additionally, the lack of infrastructure, particularly roads, electricity and water, was seen as a constraint to engage in self-employment or start an enterprise.

There is no garment factory or coir industry here to work in. There is no water or electricity for any enterprise. So apart from wage labour there is no other work in the village that we can do. The men at least can make moonshine. (HH interview, Kegalle district)

Although wage labour is uncertain during the whole year during certain periods finding work was said to be almost impossible. In most cases, food insecurity in wage labour communities is a seasonal phenomenon, intimately linked to those times of the year when work is scarce. In the Conflict Zone almost all communities explained that the rainy season

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is the most difficult period for finding employment.17 During this period, it is difficult to move around outside, to commute to work to nearby towns or to find work in the fields. In these months many households reported not having a stream of steady income and therefore not having enough money to buy food.

During November and December the family can’t go to work because of the rains. We just sleep at home and eat anything. (HH interview, Kovalaiphatu, Batticaloa)

The seasons also impose constraints on fishing communities. From December and on for two or three months the water gets murky and it is very difficult to fish. When the sea is rough and windy we cannot go to the sea and there will be hunger and accumulated credit. (HH interview, Koralai Pattu, Batticaloa)

In the Central Zone while seasonal drought was most pronounced in Lowland villages, all communities had at least two months of the year that was considered “dry” or “windy” season. In the tea estates, leaf production was low and therefore days of work available were reduced. Some estates like the one in Badulla district attempted to compensate by balancing monthly payments for the entire year but workers found this a difficult time since casual wage work outside the estate was low as well. During periods of heavy rain, work on the estates could also decrease. In the upland villages dependent on casual wage labour both dry and rainy seasons were difficult. The lowland villages had subsidiary food crops such as maize for consumption for the first few months of the dry season but those dependent on wage labour were badly affected since the drought could last up to 4-6 months in these areas.

When there is heavy drought or heavy rain we don’t get wage labour. During that time we don’t have money in our hands and we mostly eat two meals a day and mainly rotti. (HH interview, Nuwara Eliya)

For three months there is food scarcity in the village because of drought. Then we even have to buy vegetables. (HH interview, Ratnapura)

We don’t have enough food for about 3-4 months. Before cultivation for the next season begins the food stored in the house is finished. (HH interview, Badulla)

4.5.3 Insufficient Farm Yields.

For farming communities a number of reasons conspire against abundant harvests, and are seen as direct causes of food insecurity. The most common was scarcity of water, which was the most repeated cause mentioned in the Dry Zone. In the Central and Conflict Zone it was also deemed relatively important with 36% and 19% respectively. Landlessness was considered as very important in the Dry Zone and Central Zone although fairly less important in the Conflict Zone. Finally, crop damages were also brought up by one quarter of families in the Dry Zone and 13% in the Central Zone.

Lack of water and reliable irrigation was the prominent response in the two Lowland villages in the Central Zone, as well as the more prosperous upland-farming village. It was also the preponderant cause in almost all villages in the Dry Zone with the exception of the two 17 According to the households the rainy season in the different Districts of the Conflict Zone occurs in the following months: Trincomalee-November to January; Batticaloa-November to January; Mannar-June to August; Mullaithivu-October to January; Puttalam May to August; Vavuniya October to February and Jaffna October to December.

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Border and one Border/Colony community. The limitation of water resources is reflected in increased frequency of droughts, decreased volume of water in irrigation systems and more frequent crop failures.

Due to the drought we cannot get a good harvest from paddy cultivation. Therefore we are facing food shortage. (HH interview Hulanuge. Ampare)

Limitation of land resources is particularly evident in the increased scarcity of land suitable for chena farming in Purana and Squatter communities in the Dry Zone. As a result of limited land resources chena farming itself has become more curtailed, more fixed rather than shifting and more perennial in character also leading to decreased soil fertility. Some of the conventional chena produce like kurakkan and meneri that contributed to diet diversity in purana villages have gradually disappeared.

In the Central Zone lack of land was a major constraint for both Estate and upland village households. Estate workers did not have access to any land and were wary of encroaching while upland villagers, especially from low caste communities, suffered land pressure, compounded by joint ownership of land. Most households did not have access to paddy-lands, which would give them a certain measure of food security. Even lowland villagers who controlled larger extents of land were vulnerable because they did not have clear title deeds.

We do not own land. This land belongs to my mother and we have built a house. But this is held in common (howla) by nine family members. Since this is owned jointly we cannot cultivate anything. (HH interview, Kegalle)

We can farm if we have land with water from the estate. (HH interview, Badulla)

Crop damages by pests and wild animals most notably elephants have posed a major problem for farmers in Dry Zone purana villages, Squatter settlements and Border villages in particular. Similarly, in the Central Zone all the communities experienced substantial crop losses to pests. The cultivation of subsidiary food crops such as manioc and yams were affected by attacks from wild boar and elephants. The health hazards of overuse of pesticides were also present. Pesticides were reported to be used extensively in vegetable producing upland villages.

People here cannot have a home garden because there are a lot of problems from wild boar. They come and damage all the crops and eat the yams. (HH interview Kegalle)

Wild elephants come to our land and eat all the manioc and the coconut trees. (HH interview, Ratnapura)

Droughts as well as excessive rains and cyclones have led to substantial crop damage from time to time in various parts of the Dry Zone.

We all are farmers. We are all in the same income level. If we have good rain we get a good harvest and then we have food security. When we experience drought we become food insecure. We experience gradual decline in rainfall due to deforestation, illicit logging of timber and other environmental change. (Male FGD, Kirioya, Polonnaruwa)

4.5.4 High cost of living

In the Conflict Zone and, to a lesser extent, in the Dry Zone the high price of foodstuffs and constant price hikes were pointed out as reasons that conspire against the family's food security. In the Dry Zone due to a rapid deterioration in the terms of trade for dry zone

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farmers, the prices they receive for their produce as against the prices they have to pay for commodities purchased from outside, including food, has gradually increased.

We do not think about the quality of food items any longer. Prices of food have been increasing all the time, but the prices of local production have remained static or even declined over the years (Participant MFGD, Hulannuge West)

In a number of villages in the Conflict Zone it was alleged that the price of rice and coconut had increased in the past year. In Vavuniya a number of households indicated that that they had stopped eating rice and were now mainly getting their staple nutrition from manioc.

Earlier a kg of rice was only Rs 17. Now it is Rs 40. If we buy a kg. of rice we cant buy anything else with our wage. (Participant FG, Mundal Puttalam)

In Thenniyakulam in Mullaithivu people also considered prices to be too high particularly when compared to the prices in the cleared areas. For example for a kilo of sugar they have to pays Rs 60 but in the "outside" it can be purchased for Rs 42.

4.5.5 Conflict related causes

For most of the communities in the Conflict Zone and for the Border villages in the Dry Zone the conflict has had a number of impacts that although may be rationalised by households as landlessness, unemployment, or no capital are an indirect result of the war.

Displacement has been a reality for a large proportion of families living in the Conflict Zone. In this Zone eight of the eleven communities visited had gone through at least one forced displacement. One of the most evident ways in which displacement affects the food security of a household is in the disruption it causes to established and stable occupations and sources of income. This may be because the tools with which to exercise an occupation have been destroyed, because networks of friends, and contacts have been severed or because a move implies that the services previously offered by the displaced person are no longer needed in the new place of residence.

In addition to having lost working tools and equipment most families after the period of displacement return to destroyed houses and dead or missing livestock. Their general economic situation is evidently affected by these losses. Therefore, the absence of capital might mean they are no longer able to resume previous occupations. In Trincomalee, for example, many farmers have had to work as labourers in their own fields.

Now we can't cultivate our 3 acres of paddy lands. All my tools, knives, sprayer, axes were destroyed. The war has robbed us of our livelihoods. I could do better for the family if it wasn’t for the war. (HH interview, Trincomalee)

The security threats posed by the LTTE and the army have led to a severe disruption of food production activities in Border villages. In these villages people conceptualise their enhanced vulnerabilities arising from the harsh physical environment, on the one hand and insecurity associated with the war on the other, in composite terms such as “elephant-tiger problem” (alikoti prashnaya). The LTTE have engaged in sporadic attacks typically staged from the wild that have led to a decreased capacity for guarding crops and property. This in turn has caused increased damage to crops, houses and even to humans by wild elephants. A related development is that in some Border villages many people have joined the army and the home guards, abandoning agriculture due to superior and more stable income to be drawn from work in the security forces.

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The disruption in food production is also evident from the amount of land that can be cultivated as well as their marketing options. It was often discussed how many acres of land must lie idle due to security considerations, Army occupation or because the lands are now heavily mined. In Vengalacheddikulam, Vavuniya the men in the focus group described how almost 200 acres of land are unused because of army camps and landmines. Fifty-four families from the village have land but no access to it. In Kuchchaveli, Trincomalee 10% of the paddy land is unused because it is in the jungle and there are land mines.

Due to the war the paddy lands are not used. (HH interview, Polonnaruwa)We could not cultivate 4 seasons after the LTTE attack in 1999 (HH interview Weli Oya)

The impacts of displacement and insecurity are the most obvious war-related contributors to food insecurity. There are, however, other war related causes that where mentioned by families in the Conflict Zone.

The security restrictions and regulations imposed on the civilian population by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) as well as the taxes extracted by the LTTE have affected the income generating capacities and therefore food security of households living in the conflict zone.

This year we cultivated two acres. We took a loan from a man in Mannar at 5% interest per month. Once we get the harvest we will have to pay tax to the LTTE. We have to pay tax of 1/2 of our harvest. After we pay the loan and give the LTTE I don't think there will be anything left over for us. (HH interview Musali, Mannar)

Fishermen have been hindered by the times and places where they are permitted to fish. Furthermore many fishermen on the West Coast who previously migrated to the East during the monsoon season now have had this possibility curtailed. In all of the five communities where fishing was reported as one of the main livelihood strategies the villagers indicated that war related restrictions had negatively affected the income they could extract from fishing.

There are Navy restrictions to fishing. Many times fish get rotten because of tardiness while Navy checks the boats. (HH interview, Mannar)Engine boats cannot be taken into the sea. This has a big impact on catching fish and the income obviously has gone down. (HH interview, Vadamarachchi, Jaffna)

The restrictions have also affected previously applied coping strategies. In Vavuniya villagers recounted how in the past they would go into the forest to collect honey to sell or to eat. They would also roam for iguanas, deer and jungle food. At present they are forbidden to go into the deep forest by the army. In Mullaithivu a man said that before he would go to the forest to retrieve firewood but the LTTE now does not permit the chopping of trees.

4.5.6 Unreliability of Dry Rations

In the opinion of many dry ration recipients their food security is linked to the rations apportioned to their family. Therefore when these dry rations are delayed or ultimately cut they face food scarcities. A number of families not currently receiving this assistance argued that if they did they would then cease to be food insecure.

In a relocated Muslim village in Puttalam a number of household respondents indicated that at least half of the food they consume comes from the rations. Other households argued that they were completely dependent on the rations for food

We don’t have any income and we are solely dependent on the rations. If the government gives rations we have food otherwise we go hungry. (HH interview, Mundal, Puttalam)

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For people living in the fishing community in Mannar a key factor to ensure their food security is the fisherman’s dry ration. They indicated that this ration has stopped since last December. All of the villagers received this assistance and therefore this interruption was causing problems for the whole community.

For resettled communities such as those in Musali, Mannar and Vavuniya South the transfer from the sheltered environment of welfare camps, where all food necessities had been provided, back into their original communities was said to have been extremely difficult. It was argued that this had been performed without sufficient support from the authorities. They had been left to their own devices before they were self-sufficient and presently, they alleged, it was very hard to feed the family.

When we were in the refugee camps we received dry rations. Now we don't have enough to eat. We were promised that until we started cultivating they would provide food but we received for only one month. After that we didn’t get anything. We eat for four days and starve for three. (HH interview, Vavuniya South, Vavuniya)

4.5.7 Sickness/disability

In the Central Zone sickness and disability were mentioned repeatedly as causes of food insecurity. This evidently is linked to the prevalence of estate and wage labour work where no wage is paid if the worker is absent. The response was more pronounced in the upland villages and estates. Occupation- related, as well as malnutrition-related sickness, was reported, in addition to water-borne diseases and cancer. The loss of an able-bodied worker and the expenses in seeking health treatment made households vulnerable and more prone to food insecurities. Entitlement schemes that existed in the estates did not necessarily function. Even better off households pointed out that they cut down on food during such emergencies.

I fell and broke my leg when I was plucking tea in the hills. I couldn't go for work for the last 9 months. I didn’t get my wages or insurance money so far although I've been working in the estate for more than 20 years. I went and requested for it several times but it's been no use. (HH interview, Nuwara Eliya)

If there is a sudden emergency, like sickness or death, we run short of money and then have difficulties in buying food. (HH interview, Kandy)

4.6 Coping Strategies

Households rely on a number of coping mechanisms, most often implemented jointly, to face food shortages during specific periods. As can be observed in Annex 4.7 the most common strategy used at some point by almost all of the households visited in the Conflict Zone (88%) is to eat fewer meals or go hungry. Acquiring food on credit was also widespread in this Zone reported by almost three-quarters of families surveyed. In the Central Zone borrowing from friends and relatives is the most frequent strategy. The practice is most widespread in the low caste upland villages, the estates and one of the lowland villages. These appeared to be the poorest communities in terms of household assets. In the Dry Zone borrowing from relatives and friends was also the most widely used coping approach followed closely by eating fewer meals and obtaining credit.

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On the whole (Please refer to Annex 4.7 and chart 4.7) coping strategies for dealing with food insecurities are used less in the Dry Zone communities. Only three strategies, eating less, borrowing and credit, are put into practice by more than half of the households surveyed. Other coping strategies such as changing jobs, redistributing family members and selling assets were uncommon and used only by less than 10% of families. In contrast, in the Conflict Zone five strategies were reported by more than half the households and all coping strategies on the list were used by more than one quarter of families, with the exception of selling livestock. In the Central Zone coping strategies were more widespread than in the Dry Zone but less than in the Conflict Zone.

This pattern may be interpreted in two different ways. On the one hand, it may be seen as indicative of lower food insecurity in the Dry Zone. On the other, it may be interpreted as a manifestation of a relative incapacity of the vulnerable dry zone communities to develop appropriate coping strategies where food insecurities prevail. The data, however, seems to point to the first alternative. There is considerable variation across Dry Zone communities in regard to adoption of specific coping strategies. For instance, the percentage of households eating fewer meals per day in the three Border villages studied (Welioya, Welikanda and Kotiyagala) is 79% as compared to only 58% for the rest of the dry zone sample. Similarly, figures for food substitution are 37.5% in these villages compared to 27% for the rest of the Dry Zone. This suggests that household food insecurity is much more severe in border villages affected by war-related disruption of food production, displacement and heavy reliance on dry rations.

In the Conflict Zone those villages that according to other indicators, such as number of meals per day, have been identified as more food insecure are also more prone to using a wider array of coping strategies. In this manner, most households in Poompuhar in Vavuniya South reported putting into practice almost all strategies, except for migration. In the same vein in the community in Mullaithivu all households said they ate less, substituted food and got credit. Although due to the war, coping mechanisms such as migrating or changing jobs were not options.

4.6.1 Eat fewer meals

Reducing their food intake was a coping strategy mentioned in more than half of the households, in all of the three Zones.

In the Conflict Zone, all of the households in Vavuniya South, Batticaloa, Puttalam and Mullaithivu reported that they ate less in order to deal with scarcities. In both sites in Mannar, 5 out of 6 household reported the same. Only in Jaffna and Trincomalee two or more households indicated that they do not go hungry if there were scarcities. This was further corroborated with the responses to the household question on how many meals a day were consumed by the family. In Trincomalee and Jaffna the majority of households replied that they consistently ate three meals a day. Nonetheless, even in these two communities five out of eight households in Jaffna and five out of seven in Trincomalee indicated having used this coping strategy at some point.

In the Central Zone this was a strategy engaged by the majority of households in all communities except for the villages in Ratnapura district. Households in the low-caste villages in Kegalle and the two estates, as well as the lowland village in Badulla district, were most prone to eat less food, or go hungry.

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When we get our wages, we eat rice or roti with vegetables for one week. On other days we just eat the roti or make a chilli or onion sambol to go with it. (HH interview, Nuwara Eliya)

However, skipping meals is not necessarily due only to food scarcity. Cultural practices that require women to prepare food and lack of flexibility in adjusting to a new work regime which demands that lunch be brought to work is also having an impact in the estates. In addition, the tradition of the estates to conveniently supply flour to workers also conspires to keep estate workers on a diet of roti.

Even in food secure households such as those in the village in Kandy skipped a meal. They reported cooking enough for only two meals, combining either breakfast with lunch, or lunch with dinner in order to accommodate their work schedules.

Sometimes when we are working in the fields, we skip lunch. But this is not because we are short of food. (HH interview, Kandy)

4.6.2 Food substitution

Food substitution is a common practice in both the Central and the Conflict Zone. Usually substitution is in the form of jak, yams, maize or flour products in lieu of rice, which is considered as the core of a meal. In the Conflict Zone substitution was most often reported as a means to circumvent what are seen as excessive prices for rice.

In the co-op the rice is bad and it is 35 Rs. The co-operative shop idea is to give goods cheaper for people in relief but it is more expensive. We mostly eat bread and rotti because rice is expensive. (HH interview, Mukkkanthaluwa, Puttalam)

In the Central Zone substitution was customary across the villages, with only households in the village in Kandy not engaging in this practice. In the upland villages eating jak or yams was common while in the lowland villages eating maize or long beans was mentioned.

I cannot lie that we go completely hungry. We manage to eat something for all three meals. We have jak and bread fruit trees here. (HH interview, Kegalle)

4.6.3 Borrowing from relatives and friends

Relying on social networks of friends, neighbours and relatives was the first resort of all three categories of households in the Central Zone. In the Conflict and Dry Zone it was also significant with more than 60% of households reporting to have used it to face food scarcities. In the Central Zone the practice was most widespread in the low caste upland villages, the estates and one of the lowland villages. These appeared to be the poorest communities in terms of household assets.

We don't buy goods on credit from the store because we are not sure when we will be able to repay. We borrow from the neighbours. (HH interview, Nuwara Eliya)

If we don’t light out hearth then the neighbours know that we don’t have food and they give us some rice and curry. (HH interview Arachchikatuwa, Puttalam)

4.6.4 Credit

One of the most prevalent strategies throughout the country is to obtain food on credit from the local shop (kade). In both the Central and Conflict Zones almost three-quarters mentioned it. In the Dry Zone this figure is lower although more than half of the households

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surveyed also reported it as a coping mechanism. A possible reason this coping strategy is not used as extensively in the Dry Zone is related to the seasonal cash flows that emanate from cultivation. Whereas wage labour permits households to obtain cash and settle debts in a relatively timely manner farmers may have to wait many months for the harvest, ultimately limiting their capacity to borrow from a small store. This is demonstrated by the daily/weekly/monthly borrowing cycles of wage labourers as opposed to longer periods by farmers.

People who depend on paddy cultivation do not obtain food on credit. They have no way of paying back. (HH interview Polonnaruwa)

The majority of households reported obtaining credit from the village store for basic food needs. For some it is a strategy only used in special moments of insecurity. For others however, it is a permanent strategy with money perpetually owed to the kade.

We repay ½ the credit from the sales of the catch and obtain fresh credit. (HH interview, Manmunai West Batticaloa)

In the Conflict Zone the terms that are imposed by the stores to liquidate debts vary substantially. In some cases the conditions are difficult or it is impossible to secure larger loans. Families are aware that not paying debts might imply cancelling that coping option for the future. In Batticaloa villagers said that shopkeepers would give credit but it would have to be returned the next day. In other cases such as in Pier East in Mannar and Arachchikatuwa, Puttalam some of the villagers appeared to enjoy more flexible terms of repayment.

We take a loan up to 4,000 Rs and pay it when we have money to the shop owner he does not expect anything. (HH interview Mannar, Mannar)

In the Central Zone buying food items on credit from shops, and to a lesser extent, borrowing sums of money from moneylenders to meet emergency needs was a common strategy adopted by the majority of households, regardless of their socio-economic status.

I always buy food items on credit and settle my debt once I get my wages. The maximum credit I take is Rs. 100 - 200/=. (HH interview, Kegalle)

However, households in the Upland village in Kandy were less inclined to borrow on credit. Many of the households that did not take credit were households who reported they did not experience any food insecurity. Nonetheless not only those families that are in a more stable position refrain from taking credit but also, on the other end of the spectrum, households that have so little income that they are not credit-worthy.

We pay back the 100 or 200 after we get public assistance nobody gives us more than 200 worth of food because they know that we have no money. (HH interview Ampare)

Most households bought food on credit from shopkeepers, with whom they had cultivated relations of trust. However, during emergencies they had to resort to credit from nearby convenient sources and were vulnerable to being cheated or paying very high interest rates.

We usually buy at the store in Poondaluoya town. In an emergency we buy food at the village store. We buy on the book. They put one amount and tell us another amount when we come to repay. We can't fight with them because they are giving us food in an emergency. If we fight with them they won't give credit after that. (HH interview, Nuwara Eliya)

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4.6.5 Mortgage assets

In the Conflict Zone the pawning of assets (principally jewellery) is a very common strategy to meet emergencies with more than 70% reporting to have done this in the past. In the Central Zone this figure was much lower but still substantive with almost 50% overall, but highest in the estates and the gem-mining upland village in Ratnapura district. In the Dry Zone the number was much lower with only 28% of households reporting it as a coping mechanism.

As can be appreciated in Annex 4.7 in the two communities in the Estates that are predominantly Tamil, this strategy was more pronounced than in the other villages of the Zone. In Lunugala five out of eight households and in Kothmale three out of five households reported mortgaging jewellery. This strategy is more widespread in the predominantly Tamil Conflict Zone and the Tamil Estates. A possible explanation could be related to a more pronounced inclination of Tamil families to invest and save in gold and jewellery. However, not mortgaging assets might also be related to asset poverty. Many households predominantly in the Dry Zone reported not having any goods to pawn.

We don't have anything to mortgage. Our income is only enough for survival. (HH interview, Badulla)

We borrow money from family and friends. We don’t have any valuable assets or jewellery to pawn. (HH interview, Monaragala)

For what purpose a family decides to mortgage assets is indicative of its degree of insecurity. Not all households mentioned expressly on what they used the money from the pawning of assets, however, from those that shared the information the patterns observed in Annex 4.8 emerged. The most common practice in the Conflict and Central Zone is to apply the extra income to face daily expenses such as food purchases or unexpected incidents such as accidents or serious illnesses. In the Dry Zone the money was used most often to buy agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertiliser. This implies that cultivation does not produce enough surplus cash from the sale of their crops to start a new cultivation cycle.

Families that do not have enough cash flow for food and day to day expenses and farming households that do not have enough income each period to buy the essentials for the next cultivation are among the most income insecure households. A minority of households in the Conflict and Dry Zone indicated that the money had been invested for more sustainable and long-term productive enterprises such as setting up a small business or sending a daughter to the Middle East. These are the households that can be assumed to be less vulnerable.

We would have food problems if my wife was not in the Middle East.(HH interview, Musali, Mannar)

4.6.6 Food Aid and Food Stamps

In all three Zones receiving some sort of food assistance was mentioned by 20 to 30% of households. A number of families in the Conflict Zone reported that the dry ration constituted the bulk of the food that their family consumed. Whatever food they could purchase with earnings was a complement to the rations. Nonetheless, the rations are not enough for the whole month. On average rations were said to last from 9 to 15 days out of a month. During this period many families said that they ate three meals a day. Afterwards the family would go back to reducing their food intake and their meals.

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We are getting dry rations so with the flour we make rotti. If the flour is over then we don’t eat breakfast and we go hungry. In nine days the ration is over. (HH interview, Mannar)

For people that presently do not receive rations being able to get entitlement to them is perceived as a means to achieve food security for their households.

In the Central Zone the proportion of households who mentioned food stamps as a coping strategy was only 32%, although 57% of households received food stamps. In fact, food stamps were referred to more often by two of the more food secure communities in Ratnapura district, rather than the poorer low caste communities.

4.6.7 Other Coping Strategies

Apart from the coping strategies revealed in Annex 4.7, the households proposed other longer-term strategies. The most cited where: (1) Cultivating a home garden; (2) Investing in the education of the children in order to depend on them in the future (3) Starting a small business; (4) Starting a savings account in the bank.

My children have studied to "advanced" level. If they are able to get a job then we are free from problems. (HH interview, Mannar)

For some wage labourers a strategy that could be envisioned was to start cultivating. This usually was not possible because water was not available, nor the capital with which to buy inputs.

I think if we could dig a well we could have enough water to cultivate our own land and we could earn a lot more money than with this wage labour. (HH interview, Arachachakitawa, Puttalam)

4.7 Sectoral Priorities and Best Implementers

4.7.1 Community Level

During the focus group discussions both men and women were requested to examine a list of activities and rank them according to their importance in helping to reduce food insecurity in their villages and in their households. They were also asked to mention whom they considered more competent to fulfil the tasks.

As can be observed in Annex 4.9, in the Conflict Zone an overwhelming majority of communities perceived peace as the most important component to improve their livelihoods and therefore their food situation. Only a few exceptions were recorded where peace was not considered the number one priority such as the women’s focus group in Trincomalee and Vavuniya South where peace was considered the third priority. In Arachchikattuwa, Puttalam a community not affected directly by the conflict the men’s focus group considered it last in its priority ranking but in the women’s focus group it was mentioned as the first.

After peace, villagers in the Conflict Zone gave no other measure such categorical importance. The rankings for the remaining measures were spread out fairly evenly among the rest of the options. Roads were repeated most often as a 2nd priority in Never Displaced communities. Job training, after peace, was mentioned most often within the first three priorities in all Conflict Zone communities and micro-finance was considered fairly important in men's focus group discussions. Apart from food supplementation for women and children, which was regarded as relatively less important, the rest of the choices such as food for

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work, improved agricultural inputs, and improved irrigation, had fairly similar ranking patterns.

In the Central Zone in keeping with the identification of lack of income and employment as the major causes of food insecurity, the number one priority for both men and women was job training. In 63% of the WFGD and 50% of the MFGD job training was among the first three priorities. As can be seen in Annex 4.9, no other measure received such a clear endorsement throughout the Zone.

In the Dry Zone improved irrigation was identified as the most important measure for dealing with food insecurity. It was ranked high in two of the purana villages, two Colonies and two Squatter settlements. Overall in 90% of the MFGD and 70% of the WFGD it was positioned in the top three choices. After improved irrigation, improved agricultural inputs was the most often mentioned priority. As expected, peace received high rank in the border villages. It must be noted, however, that peace was ranked low in all other communities, with the exception of Hulannuge, a squatter community situated in the Ampara District close to the conflict zone. Under the factors specified by the respondents themselves, solving the problem of wild animals was mentioned as an important factor in two of the communities

In the three Zones the government was mentioned most often as the best implementer. This probably reflects the better familiarisation with the governmental structure, and its role in social services, throughout the country. Nonetheless differences among Zones were apparent. In the Conflict Zone communities were much more inclined to give the government and NGOs equal implementing capacities whereas in the Central Zone NGOs were rarely mentioned. In the Dry Zone villagers were much more prone to mention the government over NGOs, or any other instance, as the most viable implementer.

In the Central Zone with the exception of a men's focus group in one village the state was identified as responsible for the priorities discussed. In a number of communities households indicated that they did not know of any NGOs operating within their area. One notable exception was in one lower-caste community in Kegalle where NGOs were seen as more efficient and transparent.

NGOs will not play out money. The state takes ages to do something small and the construction workers play out money. (Focus group participant, Kegalle)

In the Central Zone women generally had a more differentiated sense of institutions, perceiving different types of activities as better implemented by the state, NGOs or communities. Thus, peace was identified as an issue that people in general had to work on. In a few cases, NGOs were identified as more effective in food supplementation, health care, job-training and delivery of agricultural inputs. One upland village identified banks as the main source of micro-finance. Estate communities were divided between the state and estate management as the appropriate implementor of most measures.

In the Dry Zone NGOs were seldom mentioned as the best implementers for specific programmes and the government was considered the most capable countrywide machinery for reaching the food insecure. However, several weaknesses in the government programmes were noted.

When the government provides assistance to the people affected by the LTTE problem, the grama sevaka allocates money the way he wants without giving equal change to all the affected families. ( Participant MFGD, squatter settlement near the conflict zone).

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Dry Zone communities appeared to have a more refined sense of who in the Government should be in charge of the different activities. They singled out the Mahaveli Authority, for example, as the instance responsible for improved irrigation and job training. Additionally in two villages WFP was specifically identified as the best suited to carry out Food for Work programmes.

4.7.2 Household Level

At the household level a parallel exercise inquired as to the services and assistance (both food and non food related) that were considered most vital and that were expected from community organisations, government and NGOs. As presented in Annex 4.10, the array of perceived needs was wide ranging.

It was common for a household to express a specific need such as a house, land or loan and then mention that it was not relevant who, government, NGOs or CBOs, provided it. As it became apparent, many households do not have a marked preference for government or other organisations as long as they obtain the service.

I don’t know anything about NGOs. It does not matter who gives me money to build my house. (HH interview, Mukkandaluwa, Puttalam)

Nonetheless, certain patterns emerged. Not surprisingly villagers in all three Zones are aware that the government is in charge of programmes such as Samurdhi and dry rations. Therefore in the Conflict Zone they expect the government to provide either higher value Samurdhi or better and timely rations. In the Estates in the Central Zone many families, that do not currently receive Samurdhi, insisted that the government should extend this assistance "like they do to everybody else." (HH interview, Badulla)

As can be observed in Annex 4.10 the responses on what particular services are expected from NGOs is extensive. However certain services were ascribed more often to NGOs. Most notable were job training, technical skills, training in general and self-employment support. Wells and toilets, although also expected from the government and even CBOs, were most frequently associated with NGOs. This might stem from the type of work that these organisations have been involved in the past and that villagers are at least vaguely aware as a more "typical" NGO activity.

The few occasions when food was explicitly mentioned it was identified as a government responsibility although a few instances where recorded were NGOs were also deemed responsible.

Regarding CBOs communities considered that they should be involved in similar tasks as government and NGOs such as providing loans, wells, houses and employment. In certain villages it was specified that these organisations did not exist so it was pointless to expect services from them.

4.8 Organisational Landscape

During the focus group discussions members of the community described the particular organisational landscape in their community mentioning the specific CBOs and NGOs that are active both in food related assistance as well as in other areas. In general, more NGOs were reported to be operating in the Conflict and Dry Zones than in the Central Zone. In

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certain instances villagers also shared a candid perception on the relevance and the shortcomings of CBOs and NGOs.

As shown in Annex 4.11, NGOs involved in food assistance are not numerous and their engagement revolves, to a large degree, in responding to natural disasters such as cyclones and droughts. In the Conflict Zone FORUT, Oxfam, World Vision, Sewa Lanka and Sarvodaya were mentioned by name. In the Dry Zone the only NGOs that were explicitly singled out were in a village in Hambantota where Red Cross and World Vision had provided dry rations during the recent drought. In the Central Zone no village visited for this exercise indicated that NGOs had been active in food assistance in their region.

With regard to non-food items other NGOs and CBOs emerged in the discussion. In Resettled villages in the Conflict Zone, Sewa Lanka is providing loans in two of the villages and GTZ is active in school rehabilitation in Trincomalee. In at least four Resettled villages RDS is active. In one it is providing loans for a tube well and in another building roads through shramadana. In Relocated villages GTZ is also active in school repair in Jaffna. In Puttalam CARE has been working with water wells and Rural Development Fund (RDF) with building toilets and providing loans for school equipment. In the Never Displaced villages Oxfam and WUSC have nutrition programmes that concentrate on how to utilise green gram. In Mullaithivu UNHCR was reported to have given cloth for bed sheets and CARE loans for fertilisers.

A common complaint levelled against NGOs in the Conflict Zone was that they would decide their activities excluding the point of view of the villagers themselves. Another reproach was that they would give assistance but then expect villagers to pay back.

I don’t expect anything from NGOs because nothing as we expected happened. FORUT gives money for cultivation and then after harvest we have to repay everything. (HH interview, Poombuhar, Vavuniya)

NGOs don’t give what we want but what they want. And it is also with interest. (HH interview, Geneshapuram, Vavuniya)

In the Dry Zone NGOs mentioned by name were less numerous than in the Conflict Zone with only Sarvodaya, Vehilihiniyo, and CARE being explicitly recognised. Lack of familiarity with NGOs was common, as well as a perceived sense of favouritism in the focus of these organisations.

Although NGOs are operational in areas where there are Tamil communities we should also be entitled to benefit from them.(HH interview Anuradhapura)

We don’t know much about the NGO system. We have identified our needs but we don’t know whom to contact in what regard. (HH Interview, Anuradhapura)

We don’t expect anything from them [NGOs] because we are not sure of them. They always promise but never give. (HH interview, Matale)

The problems encountered with NGOs were many times associated with misplaced notions of what the role of NGOs is. Villagers usually expected NGOs to give direct monetary aid and where displeased when this help came with conditions.

Very little functions are done by NGOs. If there is an NGO people expect funds from them. If they don’t give funds people become frustrated and don’t go to them. (HH interview, Ampare)

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Despite a seemingly sparse NGO landscape the Dry Zone villages reported a larger number of and more activity by CBOs. In Hambantota the Women's Organisation is involved in awareness programmes about nutrition and cleanliness. In one community in Anuradhapura it assists the pre-school while in another it supports women who want to embark on self employment. Similarly, apart from the Funeral Society, which is present in practically all Dry Zone communities, many villages have active Farmers Organisations. In a Border village in Anuradhapura they conduct training on water management and also extend credit. In Hambantota and Polonnaruwa they provide loans and seeds.

In the Central Zone NGO presence was even more reduced than in the Dry Zone. There is, however, a fair amount of activity by CBOs. In one of the Estates a kovil society organises religious ceremonies. In Ratnapura, and Kandy Community Development Societies are considered key in building roads and wells.

All of the sites visited for this exercise reported having a working Funeral Society. It is interesting to note that not having the money to contribute fees to the Funeral Society is perceived as a manifest sign of vulnerability.

Nobody helps us. We are not members of the Funeral Assistance Society because you have to pay Rs 650 and we don’t have the money. (HH interview, Mukkandaluwa, Puttalam)

Finally, it was observed that in Kapuliyadda West, Kandy, one of the least vulnerable communities visited for this exercise, also had one of the most developed organisational landscapes as well as a fairly well organised civil society actively involved in addressing the communities' problems.

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Chapter 5 Baseline for locating vulnerability

Based on the empirical data collected from focus groups and households surveyed in this study, a set of tables have been prepared for identifying vulnerable communities and households. This is intended to help the WFP in targeting and monitoring their future programmes. The zonal variation, as well as the typologies of communities within the zones, has been maintained. The result is what could be considered checklists or matrices for "typically vulnerable communities" and "typically vulnerable households". Actual case studies of 10 vulnerable communities and 10 vulnerable households are provided in Annexes 5.1 and 5.2 for detailed reference.

5.1 Typically vulnerable communities

Vulnerable communities in all three zones share similarities in geographical isolation, lack of infrastructure, vulnerability to climatic and weather-related conditions, lack of stable livelihoods, housing conditions and assets. However, there are variations in the specific situation of communities, such as land tenure, types of crops cultivated, types of livelihoods and social exclusion issues, which can be taken into account in targeting. These are indicated in the following tables: Table 5.1 Typically vulnerable communities in the Central Zone

Characteristics Marginal upland Marginal estate Rainfed/small tank lowland

Geographical location

On steep hill slopes, 2-10 km from minor town, 1-2.5 km walk to nearest bus-stand

On hill slopes, 7-10 km from minor town, 1-3 km to nearest bus stand

Interior, 10-30 km from minor town, 3-5 km to nearest bus-stand

Climatic/agro-ecological conditions

Intermediate/Wet Zone; 3 - 4 months of dry season; 2 -3 months of heavy rain; land degradation due to steep slope cultivation and deforestation of gullies

Intermediate/Wet Zone, 3 - 4 months of dry season; 2 -3 months of heavy rain

Intermediate/Dry Zone, 3-6 months of dry season, vulnerable to droughts every 3-5 years

Infrastructure Lacks electricity, or over 40% of HHs not electrified; over 50% of HHs have no access to safe drinking water, lack of irrigation channels/reliance on rain water for cultivation

Lacks electricity; or over 50% of HHs not electrified; over 50% HHs lack access to safe drinking water

Lacks electricity, or over 60% of HHs not electrified; over 50% of HHs lack access to safe drinking water, especially during the dry season

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Livelihoods 60 -90% of HHs engaged in casual wage labour; self-employment in agricultural-based processing; engaged in illegal activities such as timber felling; considerable seasonal outmigration for work, especially before Sinhalese New Year

80-90% of HHs engaged in estate wage labour, which decreases during the dry season and in casual wage labour outside the estate

Over 90% of HHs engaged in rainfed chena cultivation

Crops/livestock/fish

Yams, vegetables; a minority of HHs do rice cultivation; extensive crop damage

No crops cultivated; HHs might own a few chickens

Rice and highland crops (maize, kurakkan, vegetables);crop damage and no storage facilities; majority of HHs own cattle and goats; freshwater fish

Land tenure Over 50% of HHs have no access to productive land; over 60% of sinakkara land jointly owned by 5-8 siblings; 0.25 -1 acres holdings; encroachment

No access to vegetable plot

Land permits and encroachment; control of 1-4 acre land holdings

Nutrition 50% + children under 5 yrs are underweight

50% + children under 5 yrs are underweight

35% + children under 5 yrs are underweight

Education The average level of education is between Grade 4-8; has primary or junior school (Grades 1-9)

Average level of education is Grade 4-8; has primary or junior school (Grades 1-7)

Average level of education is between Grades 4-8; has primary school (Grades 1-9)

Housing Temporary wattle-daub or semi-permanent/half completed housing; majority of HHs have pit latrines

Line rooms where ownership has not been transferred to HHs; majority of HHs have pit latrines or no latrines

Temporary wattle-daub or semi-permanent half completed housing; majority of households have pit latrines or no latrines

Assets HHs own a wall clock and radio

HHs own a wall clock and radio

HHs own a wall clock, and sometimes a radio

Alcoholism High rate of male alcoholism

High rate of male alcoholism and some female alcoholism

Social exclusion Predominantly “low”

90

caste (berawa, kumbal)

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Table 5.2 Typically vulnerable communities in the Dry Zone

Characteristics Colony Border Squatter PuranaGeographical location

5-10 km from minor town; 2-4 km to nearest bus-stand

15-20 km from minor town; 2-4 km to nearest bus-stand

10-15 km from minor town; 1-3 km to nearest bus-stand

6-15 km form minor town; 3-5 km to nearest bus-stand

Climatic/agro-ecological conditions

Dry Zone; dry season 3-5 months (July-Nov)

Dry Zone; dry season (3-5 months), rainy season (Dec-Jan)

Dry Zone; dry season (3-4 months); rainy season (Nov-Dec)

Dry Zone; dry season (3-4 months; rainy season (Jan-Feb)

Infrastructure Over 50% of HHs have no electricity; irrigation channels are inadequate to cultivate all the land; no safe drinking water during dry season

No electricity; rainfed or small tanks; no safe drinking water esp. during dry season

Over 75% of HHs have no electricity; rainfed or small tank; no safe drinking water, esp. during dry season

No electricity; rainfed with anicuts from river; small tanks; no safe drinking water esp. during dry season

Livelihoods Majority of HHs combining farming of subsidiary food crops/vegetables with wage labour

Majority of HHs engaged in farming of subsidiary food crops/ vegetables; home guards

Majority of HHs engaged in farming of subsidiary food crops; gemming

Majority of HHs engaged in farming of paddy and subsidiary food crops; foraging (honey, nelli, thumbakaravila), hunting

Crops/livestock/fish

Rice, maize, cowpea, mung, vegetables, chillies; around 50% of HHs have livestock

Rice, manioc, vegetables; game in the past but constrained by conflict; majority has no livestock

Cowpea, mung beans, manioc, vegetables; majority has no livestock

Rice, kurakkan, cowpea, maize, yams, vegetables; majority of HHs have livestock

Land tenure Mostly swarnabhoomi titles but also encroachment; control of landholdings between ¼ to 5 acres

Mostly encroachment converted to Jayabhoomi titles and cultivation permits; control of landholdings 0.5-2.5 acres

Mostly encroachment, some converted to Jayabhoomi titles; control of landholdings 1-3 acres

Sinakkara, nindagam land converted to Jayabhoomi titles, encroachment; landless to landholdings of 3 acres

Nutrition 30% + children under 5 yrs

35% + children under 5 yrs

35% + children under 5 yrs

50% + children under 5 yrs

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underweight underweight underweight underweight

Education Average education level Grade 8 – “O”level; has primary/junior secondary school (Grades 1-9)

Average education level; primary school (Grades 1-5)

Primary school (Grades 1-5)

Primary school; junior secondary school (Grades 1-7)

Housing Temporary, semi-permanent or under construction; pit or no latrines

Temporary, semi-permanent houses; pit or no latrines

Temporary, semi-permanent houses; pit or no latrine

Temporary, semi-permanent houses; pit or no latrine

Assets Radio, wall clock, bicycle

Radio, wall clock, bicycle

Radio, wall clock bicycle

Wall clock, radio

Alcoholism High rate of alcoholism among males

Alcoholism among males

Alcoholism among males

Some alcoholism among males

Conflict-related Restrictions on movement of people/goods; decrease in cultivated land and foraging; high prices of food items

Decrease in cultivated land and foraging

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Table 5.3 Typically vulnerable communities in the Conflict Zone

Characteristics Relocated Resettled Never displacedGeographical location

2-5 km from minor town; 1-3 km to nearest bus-stand

3 –19 km from minor town; 1-2 km from nearest bus-stand

8 -10 km to minor town; 2 -6 km to nearest bus-stand

Climatic/agro-ecological conditions

Dry Zone; dry season May-Aug (4 months); rainy season (Jan Feb)

Dry Zone; dry season (June-Aug); rainy season (Dec- Jan)

Dry Zone; rainy season (Oct-Jan)

Infrastructure 25% of HHs not electrified; no source of safe drinking water

Over 90% of HHs not electrified; no electricity

Over 50% of HHs not electrified; no electricity

Livelihoods Casual wage labour; food rations

Casual wage labour with farming/fishing, foraging

Casual wage labour with farming/fishing

Crops/livestock/fish No crops; chickens Manioc, cowpea, greens, vegetables, palmyrah, bananas; cattle, chickens

Rice, chillies, vegetables, banana, coconut, palmyrah, jak; chickens, cattle

Land tenure 10 perches up to 3 acres highland

Landless - 3 acres; titles, encroached + Jayabhoomi titles; tenant or lease cultivation

1/8 acre- 4 acres; titles and LDO permits

Nutrition 50% + children under 5 underweight

50%+ children under 5 underweight

50%+ children under 5 underweight

Education Primary school (Grades 1-3)

No school - primary + junior secondary school (Grades 1-10)

Primary school/secondary school (Grades 1- "A" level)

Housing Under construction; semi-permanent, permanent; pit or no latrines

Temporary, semi-permanent, pit or no latrines

Temporary/Permanent, no latrines

Assets Wall clock, radio, bicycle

Wall clock, radio Bicycle, wall clock

Alcoholism Some alcoholism among males

Some alcoholism among males

Toddy consumption and some alcoholism among males

Social exclusion Discrimination by host communities

Displaced people are excluded

Conflict-related Restrictions on movement of people/goods; high prices of food items

Restrictions on movement of people/goods; fishing bans; decrease in cultivated land and foraging; high prices of food items

Restrictions on movement of people/goods; fishing bans; decrease in cultivated land and foraging; high prices of food items

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5.2 Typically vulnerable households

Typically vulnerable households also share similar characteristics in all three zones in terms of livelihoods, nature of income, composition of household, access to resources, ownership of assets and nutrition levels. However, there are specific variations in the periods of vulnerability, expenditure on food, intra-household distribution, coping strategies and extent of indebtedness. These are outlined in the following tables:

Table 5.4 Typically vulnerable households in the Central Zone

Dimensions Marginal upland villages

Marginal estates/estate divisions

Rainfed lowland dry zone villages

Livelihoods Dependent entirely on casual wage labour (10 -12 days/month)

Unemployed

Estate wage labour (18 days or less)

Dependent entirely on casual wage labour (8 -10 days/month)

Chena farming + wage labour (3-12 days; less than half of income)

Dependent entirely on casual wage labour

Income No stable income no income

no stable income no stable income

Composition/size of household

One wage earner, 2 - 3 dependents

Female-headed with small/school-going children

1-3 wage earners, 3 - 4 dependents

Female-headed (elderly)

1 - 2.5 wage earners, 2 - 7 dependents

female-headed with school-going children

Displacement Displaced during riotsHealth Sick HH member Sick HH member Disabled memberAccess to natural resources

Joint landholding among 9 siblings

1/2 acre of highland

Landless (no vegetable plot)

1-4 acres chena land

Assets Temporary wattle-daub house; no latrine; no electricity; radio/wall clock; no livestock

Line room, pit or no latrine; with and without electricity; no livestock or 2 chickens; bicycle, radio, wall clock or no household assets

Temporary wattle-daub house; pit or no latrine; no electricity; no livestock; radio or no assets

Entitlements Samurdhi worth Rs. 350 - 500/=

No Samurdhi Triposha

None Samurdhi worth Rs. 450-700

WFP Food for Work

Crops grown Manioc, sweet potatoes for consumption, crop damage

No crops

None Rice, maize, low-country vegetables; crop damage

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Nutrition 2 meals/day rice/ jak,dhal + 1

veg rice/jak, greens,

bread + sambol underweight child

2 meals/day roti/rice, sambol +

1 veg roti/rice, sambol or

dhal or vegetable underweight child

2 meals/day rice/maize

squares + veg (no breakfast for 1/4 month, no dinner for 1/2 month)

tea, biscuits/roti for two meals; rice, greens and vegetables for dinner

underweight childPeriod of food scarcity

All year 5 months, dry season (July-Nov)

4 months (heavy rain or drought periods)

7 months (May - December)

All year (10-12 days/month)

Source of food items

Village co-operative/ shop/ home garden

Estate store/town store

Village store

Expenditure on food Rs. 600-1000/month Rs, 1200-1500/month

Rs. 750 (drought/rain)

Rs 1,000 - Rs. 2,000/month

Alcohol/drug use Rs. 250/month for alcohol

Rs. 50/month for betel

Male consumes alcohol

Rs. 50/month for betel

Intra-household food distribution

Child/husband/ wife

Children/mother (latter goes without food if food insufficient)

Child/adults Husband/children/wife

Children/mother

Coping strategies Eating fewer meals, food substitution, borrowing from friends and relatives, credit, redistributed family members, food stamps

Eating fewer meals, food substitution, borrowing from neighbours/relatives, sold household assets

Eating fewer meals, food substitution, borrowing from relatives/friends, credit, changed jobs, sold HH assets, migrated, food stamps, FFW

Indebtedness Rs 100-200 in an emergency

Monthly credit for expenses

No assets to mortgage

Pawns or have pawned jewellery in the past for food expenses

Monthly credit for expenses

Not creditworthy

Buying on credit based on wage income

Sold assets to buy food

No assets to mortgage

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Table 5.5 Typically vulnerable households in the Dry Zone

Dimensions Colony Border Squatter PuranaLivelihood Farming of

vegetables/subsidiary food crops/some rice; recent ME employment

Casual wage labour with farming of vegetables/subsidiary crops/some rice; gem mining

Casual wage labour with farming of vegetables/subsidiary food crops; gem mining

Casual wage labour with farming of subsidiary food crops, vegetables, some rice

Income No stable income

No stable income

No stable income

No stable income

Composition/Size of HH

1-2 wage earners, 3-4 dependents

1-2 wage earners, 2-8 dependents

1-2 wage earners, 3-4 dependents

1 wage earner, 2-3 dependents;

female-headed

Displacement - Hide in the jungle

Displaced once within district

Displaced from other district

Hide in the jungle

-

Health Sick HH member Sick HH member

Disabled HH member

Access to natural resources

1-2 acres of land; with titles

¼ to 2 acres of land; encroached; some Jayabhoomi titles

1-2 acres encroached; some Jayabhoomi titles

Landless – 2 acres

Assets Temporary/semi-permanent house; water seal toilets; with and without electricity; with (cattle, goats) and without livestock; bicycle, wall clock, sometimes radio

Temporary/semi-permanent house, pit or no latrine, no electricity, with (cattle, goats, chicken) and without livestock; wall clock, radio, sometimes bicycle

Temporary/semi-permanent; pit or no latrine, no electricity; no livestock; radio, wall clock, bicycle

Temporary/semi-permanent house; pit or no latrine; no electricity; no livestock; wall clock, radio

Entitlements Samurdhi Rs. 375-400

Samurdhi Rs. 250-700

No Samurdhi

Samurdhi Rs. 250-700

Samurdhi Rs. 250-700

No SamurdhiCrops grown Vegetables,

some riceKurakkan, maize, some rice, vegetables,

Cowpea, yams, manioc, vegetables

Rice, maize, kurakkan, vegetables

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cowpea

Nutrition 3 meals/day roti/rice,

cowpea rice,veg,

greens, dried fish/ freshwater fish

2-3 meals/day

tea, biscuit roti/rice/thalapa, vegetables, cowpea

underweight child

2-3 meals/day

rice/roti/ bread, sambol; rice, dhal/cowpea, vegetables, sometimes eggs

2-3 meals/day

rice/kurakkan roti, sambol; rice/kurakkan/maize thalapa, vegetables, greens

underweight child

Period of food scarcity

Aug (dry season), Jan-Feb (rainy season)

All year; 3-6 months (Mar-Aug) dry season

4-5 months; dry season (July-Sep); rainy season (Nov-Jan)

5-6 months dry season (June-Dec; Jan-May)

Source of food items

Village store Village/town store

Village store Village/town store

Expenditure on food

Rs. 2500 –3,500/month

Rs. 1000 – 4,500/month

Rs. 2,000-4,500/month

Rs. 500-2000/month

Alcohol/drug use

Betel Betel, cigarettes, some alcoholism among males

Betel, cigarettes Betel, bidi, some alcoholism among males

Intra-household distribution

Children/ husband/wife

Children/ husband/wife

Children. Husband/wife

Husband/children/wife

Husband/children/wife

Children/husband/wife

Children/mother

Coping strategies

Borrowing from friends/relatives, credit, food stamps

Eating fewer meals, food substitution, borrowing from friends/relatives, credit, migration, mortgaged assets

Eating fewer meals, borrowing from friends/relatives, credit, change jobs, mortgaged assets, food stamps

Eating fewer meals, food substitution, borrowing from friends/relatives, credit, migration, mortgaged assets, food stamps

Indebtedness Loan of Rs. 4,000/= until sale of vegetables

Pawned jewellery worth Rs. 3,000/=

Buy food on credit on monthly basis (20% interest)

No assets to mortgage

Pawned jewellery

Rs. 500/ worth every two weeks on credit

Not creditworthy

Pawned jewellery worth Rs. 3,000/

Buy food on credit on monthly basis or to be paid at harvest

No assets to mortgage

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Table 5.6 Typically vulnerable households in the Conflict Zone

Dimensions Relocated Resettled Never displacedLivelihoods Casual wage

labour (50% of income)

Craft (30% of income)

Dependent entirely on casual wage labour in fishing or agriculture

Chena farming Wage labour in

fishing/ tenant fishing

Income no stable income no stable income no stable incomeComposition/size of household

One wage earner, 6-7 dependents

1-3 wage earners, 3-9 dependents

female-headed with small children

One wage earner, 2-5 dependents

Widow living with relatives

Displacement/Impact of conflict

Displaced from other districts

Displaced to other part of district, other districts, India

Lost family members

Lost family members

Short period of displacement

Health Disabled HH members

Sick HH members

Disabled HH members

Sick HH members

Sick HH members

Access to natural resources

6 perches land; no titles; permits

1/2 to 6 acres; titles, encroachments

Landless to 1.5 acres

1/8 acre LDO permit

Assets Living in relative's house or house under construction; pit or no latrine; no electricity; no livestock; bicycle, wall clock, sometimes B+W TV

Temporary hut/wattle-daub; no latrine; no electricity; 3 chickens or no livestock; bicycle, old fishing nets

Semi-permanent/wattle-daub hut; no latrine; no electricity; bicycle, wall clock; fishing rod; 3 chickens or no livestock

Entitlements Dependent on dry rations Rs 1200

Dry rations Rs. 1,200

Transition to Samurdhi, receiving nothing

None Samurdhi Rs. 350 Triposha

Crops grown/Fish/game

None None Manioc, low-

country vegetables, crop damage

Sea and freshwater fishing

Game: iguana, deer

None Rice, chillies, low-

country vegetables

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Nutrition 2 meals tea, bread/pittu,

sambol; one meal of rice, fish, vegetables

Underweight child

1-2 meals rice and

vegetable, biscuits and tea

rusks, cowpea/green gram, rice/pittu and vegetables

1-2 meals pittu/roti; rice,

freshwater fish, vegetable

pittu/porridge/rice, vegetables

bread/rice, fish, greens

underweight childPeriod of food scarcity

All year, especially when dry rations are not delivered

All year; acute for two months, rainy season (Dec- Jan)

3 months, rainy season (Oct-Dec)

1-3 months (rainy season)

3 months (Dec-Feb) off-season for fishing

Source of food items

Co-operative/ store Store/cooperative Cooperative/store

Expenditure on food Rs. 700-1500 Rs. 2,250 - 6,000 Rs. 1400-6,000Alcohol/drug use HH member alcoholic local toddy

consumptionIntra-household food distribution

children/husband/wife

Children, adults (latter will forgo meals if food insufficient)

Children/mother (latter will forgo if food inadequate)

Husband/children/wife

Children/husband/wife

All together Children/

husband/wife Children/adults

Coping strategies Eating fewer meals, food substitution, borrowed from relatives/friends, credit, migration, changed jobs, redistributed family members, sold household assets, mortgaged assets, food assistance

Eating fewer meals, food substitution, borrowed from relatives/friends, credit, changed jobs, redistributed family members, sold household assets and livestock, mortgaged assets, food assistance

Eating fewer meals, food substitution, borrowed from relatives/friends, credit, changed jobs, sold household assets and livestock, mortgaged assets

Indebtedness Credit from store Not creditworthy Mortgaged

jewellery to buy food

Credit from store on a daily basis (Rs.600-3,800 to store)

Mortgaged jewellery to buy food

Credit from store on weekly basis (farming)

Credit from store on a daily basis (fishing)

Mortgaged jewellery

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Chapter 6 Conclusions and Recommendations

In keeping with the Terms of Reference for this study, this chapter addresses the issue of targeting, baseline situation with regard to food security, community perceptions of their needs and priorities and possible partners for WFP programmes.

6.1 Verification of Targeting

One of the key objectives of this Community Food Security Profiling Exercise was to verify the DS Division level vulnerability assessment made by WFP using available secondary data. Verification was done mainly through key informant interviews at the district level and overall assessment of primary data by the research team.

As regards the overall patterns of vulnerability evident from the map, there are notable differences among the three zones covered by the study. The conflict zone is more or less uniformly food insecure, the dry zone has large tracts of food insecurity and the central zone is relatively food secure with pockets of moderate to high food insecurity. This pattern is largely consistent with the responses of the key informants as well as with what the research teams observed in the field. However, there are important discrepancies to be noted later in regard to vulnerability status of individual DS divisions.

The assessment of most of the conflict zone as red is consistent with descriptions given by the key informants, data relating to displacements and population dependent on dry rations (see Annex 3.1 and 3.2), war-related damage and destruction caused to livelihoods, assets and support networks repeatedly noted in the study communities, increased reliance on wage labour, for which the opportunities were rather restricted and reported patterns of food shortages (see also Kodituwakku, Dharmasena & Perera 2001, CARE 2000, Reinhard & Kraemer 1999). Of the 47 DS divisions that comprised the conflict zone, in 30 there was complete agreement between vulnerability mapping and key informants (see Table 6.1). In the remaining 17 DS divisions too the disagreement was typically over whether a certain division is to be identified as red or blue or blue or green. Only in the case of three DS divisions differences were so marked that while they were marked green in the map, KIs identified them as red or the reverse pattern was observed.

The KIs from the conflict zone typically described the “uncleared areas” as more vulnerable compared to the “cleared areas”. This distinction is not evident from the map largely because much of the conflict zone is anyway red. More importantly some of the “uncleared areas” in the Trincomalee District are either blue (DS Division No 300) or green (DS Divisions 302 to 306), contrary to the expected pattern and the identifications made by the KIs (Table 6.1).

A greater part of the dry zone has been identified as red, followed by blue and green. Of the 44 Dry Zone DS Divisions for which data is available, the mapping and KI identification matched in the case of 28 divisions. In the remaining 16 DS divisions too only in two cases there were sharp contrast between mapping and KI identification. Interestingly most dry zone divisions identified as red are either predominantly chena farming areas (e.g. Monaragala) or those in border areas (e.g. Dimbulagala), also characterized by remoteness and transport difficulties. On the other hand, green or blue areas largely correspond to areas served by major irrigation schemes, including Mahaweli systems. There are, however, some problems relating to assessment of individual DS divisions. For instance, in the Anuradhapura District, Padaviya (34) affected severely by war-related disturbances was

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described by all KIs as most vulnerable but identified to be green in the map. On the other hand, one of the Mahaweli settlements in Anuradhapura District, namely Thambuttegama (40) has been marked red in the map, while many KIs considered it to be generally food secure (see Map 1). Similarly in the Hambantota District Lunugamvehera (117) and Sooriyaweva (119) described by all the KIs as most food insecure are blue, while Tissamaharama seen by many as better off remains red.

In the Central Zone most DS divisions are green or blue, with red pockets in selected areas. The most vulnerable divisions tend to be located in drier and more isolated hilly regions such as, Tumpane (151) and Passara (51), drier lowland divisions in Badulla (e.g. 56) and Ratnapura (eg. 291) Districts and more marginalised estate regions such as Kotmale (252) and Deltota (139). The relatively better off food security profile for the Central Province is consistent with higher degree of urbanisation, greater integration with markets, greater stability and diversity in food production, and greater availability of wage labour opportunities in the estates and commercialised vegetable cultivation. However, of the three zones agreement between mapping and KIs is lowest in the Central Zone. Of the 37 DS divisions for which data is available in 20 the two assessments agreed while they disagreed in 17 divisions. There were also four divisions (48, 254, 286, 294) where KIs identified them as red, while the mapping identified them as green. The food security profile in the selected study communities in the Central Zone too was typically poor in spite of the fact that three of them had been chosen from DS divisions identified as green and another three communities were chosen from divisions identified as blue and only two communities chosen from those identified as red. In some cases the food security situation in the communities studied did not show any consistent variation according to the vulnerability assessment at the DS division level. This in turn points to the fact that even in DS divisions identified as food secure there can be pockets of considerable food insecurity.

While the findings of CFSP generally confirm results of vulnerability mapping, important variation among zones must be noted. The consistency between the two assessments is greatest in the conflict zone, followed by the dry zone and the central zone. In order to further improve targeting the following measures can be proposed.

First, reasons for marked differences between vulnerability mapping and CFSP assessment for certain DS divisions (9 in all as specified above), must be further explored with a view to identifying possible means of rectifying the different outcomes. It may be that further refinement of variables used or cross checking the views of KIs is necessary in order to overcome the discrepancies noted.

Second, it may be necessary to bring down the vulnerability assessment and related mapping process to the GN division level in order to avoid the risk of not covering pockets of vulnerability in relatively better off DS divisions. It is known that at present most of the relevant data are only available at the DS division level so that GN division level assessment is not possible. However, future refinement of vulnerability assessment may require identification or even generation of relevant data at the GN division level.

Third, in the absence of relevant GN division level data, the procedure proposed in this study for identification of more vulnerable communities and more vulnerable households in such communities may be adopted as a preliminary guide for extending the vulnerability assessment beyond the DS division level.

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Fourth, as vulnerability maps become an operational tool used in project planning, it may be necessary to further refine the mapping exercise taking into consideration ground realities, felt needs in communities and significant variations within the primary unit of analysis used in the mapping process. All efforts must be made to avoid the danger of it becoming a mechanistic tool not responsive to constantly changing ground realities in Sri Lanka.

6.2 Baseline Situation with regard to Food Security

The previous chapters highlighted the marked variation in food security situation depending on the zone, nature of livelihood, type of community and category of household. As at time of the study the conflict zone was found to be most vulnerable for food insecurity as a cumulative effect of over 20 years of war, but depending on the success of the peace process and progress in reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts a period of economic and social stabilisation was expected. This in turn calls for a major reorientation of programmes from relief to reconstruction and rehabilitation. Food aid in particular must be carefully arranged so that while addressing the real needs of the most vulnerable, it does not serve as a disincentive for IDPs to move from camps to permanent settlements and pursue a more self-reliant path to re-establishing livelihoods.

While recognising differences, it is also important to identify similarities and possible linkages among zones in order to develop a more comprehensive approach to food security in Sri Lanka. On the whole this study identifies three types of risks and vulnerabilities affecting various study communities, namely market-related risks and vulnerabilities, conflict-related risks and vulnerabilities and environment-related risks and vulnerabilities. A brief account of each type of vulnerability follows.

6.2.1 Market-related risks and vulnerabilities

The food procurement patterns of the study communities varied, with some communities in the dry zone relying heavily on subsistence production, those in the conflict zone relying heavily on dry rations and estate residents in the central zone, almost exclusively dependent on food purchased from the market. Despite this variation, market-related risks, shocks and vulnerabilities affected food security in all the study communities to varying degrees.

Three types of market-related risks and vulnerabilities were observed in CFSP.

First, the sharp rise in food prices in recent years was noted in all study communities as elaborated in Chapter Four. The prices of essential food items such as rice, floor, sugar and coconuts reportedly increased sharply, with erratic price fluctuations in the case of commodities like rice and coconuts (see also Edirisinghe 2002). A black market situation has developed in regard to some essential food items in certain areas, including most of the conflict zone and more remote areas in the dry and central zones. Erratic fluctuations in food prices were more of a problem in communities heavily dependent on wage incomes such as those in central and conflict zones.

Second, food and other commodities produced in the study communities received low prices in the market, particularly in comparison to prices of commodities purchased from outside, including the price of purchased inputs. The food producers in study communities in all three zones, including fishermen in the conflict zone, noted numerous problems facing their livelihoods, including the exploitative role of middlemen to whom they are compelled to sell their produce at terms dictated by these traders due to lack of alternatives and indebtedness

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to them in the case of some producers. The market shocks were such that in some cases the producers had to sell their produce at below cost prices, even when their labour costs often not being included in the calculation of production costs. It must be noted here, however, that the transaction costs of middlemen can be quite high in several of the study areas due to poor road and transport networks as well due to arbitrary taxes imposed by local power holders (see also ADB 2001).

Third, in almost all the communities studied insufficient earning opportunities especially for casual wage labour was mentioned as a key factor affecting food insecurity. Seasonal fluctuation in demand for wage labour and stagnation of wage levels, especially for women in farm and non-farm sectors, seriously affected food security of the most vulnerable households in many of the study communities. Even in the estate communities where more contractual labour arrangements prevail, some workers did not get work throughout the year.

6.2.2 Conflict-related risks and vulnerabilities

While the study communities in the conflict zone were most adversely affected by conflict-related risks and vulnerabilities, selected study communities in the other two zones too experienced war-related problems and difficulties. In the relevant study communities conflict-related problems had changed from the period of active conflict to those related to peace and conflict transformation at the time of this study. At the time of active conflict, the key problems experienced related to displacement, disruption of livelihoods, assets and infrastructure, injury, ill-health and death caused by war, taxes and restrictions on movement of goods and people imposed by security forces and LTTE and development of a war economy in the conflict zone and adjacent areas (Kodituwakku, Dharmasena & Perera 2001, CARE 2000, Reinhard & Kraemer 1999).

Vulnerabilities associated with active armed conflict had declined at the time of study, but they were replaced by certain other vulnerabilities related to transformation of conflict. They included the fear of renewed conflict in some areas, fear of forced recruitment and increased tax burden particularly in LTTE-held areas, fear of loosing dry rations once peace is restored, and the fear of losing jobs on the part of home guards and other security forces personnel. These, in turn, are important issues to be addressed by humanitarian and development agencies involved in RRR efforts.

6.2.3 Environmental Related Vulnerabilities

This study found four types of environment-related risks and vulnerabilities affecting food security in the study communities.

First, weather and climate related vulnerabilities and risks were reported in the study communities in the forms of droughts reported in all three zones and floods and excessive windy conditions reported in some parts of the central zone. Food production in selected communities in all three zones had been adversely affected from time to time by various environmental hazards. Some of the study communities in Hambantota, Monaragala and Ratnapura Districts had fresh memories of the impact of the 2001 November-December drought affecting these areas.

Second, crop damage by pests and wild animals (elephants, wild boar and monkeys) was reported in selected study communities in all three study zones. In some communities

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farmers had completely abandoned certain farming activities due to this menace. This, in turn, was attributed to increased deforestation, extending farming into forest reserves and inability of the farmers to protect themselves against the wild animals due to lack of effective means (e.g. guns) to keep them at bay.

Third, more serious environmental hazards in the form of environmental degradation, including deforestation, soil erosion, and scarcity of water affected farming and food production activities in certain study areas. This was noted some upland villages in the central zone as well as in some dry zone villages.

Finally, depletion of natural resources also affected some other livelihoods in the study areas. Most notably, the impoverished gem miners in Ratnapura, Moneragala and Matale districts all mentioned rapid depletion of gem deposits as a key problem affecting their livelihoods.

6.3 Community Needs and Priorities

Focus group discussions with men and women were employed to ascertain community needs and priorities. As elaborated in Chapter Four, participants in these discussions were presented a list of potential development activities and asked them to rank them according to their importance in helping to reduce food insecurity in their communities. They were also asked to mention whom they considered more competent to implement the relevant tasks.

In the Conflict Zone the overwhelming majority of communities identified peace as the most important requirement to improve their livelihoods and therefore their food situation (See annex 4.9). This is understandable given the conflict-related risks and vulnerabilities noted above and the ongoing peace process as at the time of the study. In exceptional circumstances where peace was not considered the number one priority such as the women’s focus group in Trincomalee and Vavuniya South peace was considered the third priority. In Arachchikattuwa in the Puttalam District, a community not affected directly by the conflict, the men’s focus group considered it last in its priority ranking but in the women’s focus group it was mentioned as the first.

After peace, villagers in the Conflict Zone gave no other measure such categorical importance. The rankings for the remaining measures were spread out fairly evenly among the rest of the options. Roads were repeated most often as a 2nd priority in Never Displaced communities. Job training, after peace, was mentioned most often within the first three priorities in all Conflict Zone communities and micro-finance was considered fairly important in men's focus group discussions. It is important to note that food supplementation for women and children received relatively low priority in the conflict zone. The rest of the choices such as food for work, improved agricultural inputs, and improved irrigation, had fairly similar ranking patterns.

In the Central Zone in keeping with the identification of lack of income and employment as the major causes of food insecurity, the number one priority for both men and women was job training. In 63% of the WFGD and 50% of the MFGD job training was among the first three priorities. No other measure received such a clear endorsement throughout the Zone (Annex 4.9).

In the Dry Zone improved irrigation was identified as the most important remedy for food insecurity. It was ranked high in two of the purana villages, two Colonies and two Squatter

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settlements. Overall in 90% of the MFGD and 70% of the WFGD it was positioned in the top three choices. After improved irrigation, improved access to agricultural inputs was the most often mentioned priority. As expected, peace received high rank in the border villages. It must be noted, however, that peace was ranked low in all other communities, with the exception of Hulannuge, a squatter community situated in the Ampara District close to the conflict zone. Also it is important to note that solving the problem of wild animals was mentioned as an important remedy for food insecurity in two of the communities

6.4 Implementation Capacities

In the study communities in all three zones the government was mentioned most often as the best implementer. This in turn reflects the central importance of the state in social services and welfare provisioning in Sri Lanka throughout the post-independence period. Nonetheless differences among Zones were apparent. In the Conflict Zone communities were much more inclined to give the government and NGOs equal implementing capacities whereas in the Central Zone NGOs were rarely mentioned. In the Dry Zone villagers were much more prone to mention the government over NGOs as the most viable implementer.

In the conflict zone, in addition to government civil administration military and TROs played a key role in delivery of services in areas under military and LTTE-control respectively. However, their credibility with local populations could not be ascertained in view of possible security implications. In the conflict zone NGOs were active in RRR, social mobilisation, peace building, and micro credit.

In the Central Zone with the exception of a men's focus group in one village the state was identified as responsible for the priorities discussed. In a number of communities households indicated that they did not know of any NGOs operating within their area. One notable exception was in one lower-caste community in Kegalle where NGOs were seen as more efficient and more transparent. In the Central Zone women generally had a more differentiated sense of institutions, perceiving different types of activities as better implemented by the state, NGOs or communities. Thus, peace was identified as an issue that people in general had to work on. In a few cases, NGOs were identified as more effective in food supplementation, health care, job training and delivery of agricultural inputs. One Upland village identified banks as the main source of micro-finance. Estate communities were divided between the state and estate management as the appropriate implementer of most measures.

In the Dry Zone NGOs were highly active in several areas (e.g. Monaragala) but they were seldom mentioned as the best implementers for specific programmes. The government was considered the most capable countrywide machinery for reaching the food insecure. Dry Zone communities appeared to have a more refined sense of who in the Government should be in charge of the different activities. They singled out the Mahaveli Authority, for example, as the agency responsible for improved irrigation and job training. Additionally in two villages WFP was specifically identified as the best suited to carry out Food for Work programmes.

Key services expected of the government in all three zones included land, irrigation and drinking water, roads, jobs or assistance towards developing self-employment, assistance with housing and food rations, promotion of peace. In contrast, NGOs were expected to raise awareness, undertake vocational training, organise communities and provide relief at times of crisis. In general more diversified set of services were expected of the government compared to NGOs. In the conflict zone, however, the pattern was different with a higher

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range of services sometimes expected of NGOs. For instance, assistance towards building houses, drinking water supplies, school buildings was also expected of NGOs. This, in turn, reflects the relative weakening of government machinery in conflict areas for a variety of reasons and intensification of NGO activity in providing humanitarian assistance during the war.

While recognising the government as the most viable implementer of proposed activities. KIs and some FGDs identified certain key weaknesses in state agencies. Lack of funds, lack of transparency, political interference in affairs of the state, and some outright corruptions in government agencies were noted. The government officials repeatedly mentioned the difficulty of proper targeting any government assistance programmes, inclusive of theSamurdhi Programme, due to heavy political pressure to spread out benefits and serve political clientele irrespective of whether they meet any objective selection criteria. Reportedly, the NGOs had their own drawbacks, including lack of coordination among themselves and with government agencies, lack of transparency, lack of accountability to local populations, and partiality towards ethnic minorities (reported in Sinhala villages in the dry zone).

At the village level Funeral Assistance Society, Co-operatives, Rural Development Society and Farmers Organisations were among the commonest CBOs present. Even though Farmers Organisations were identified as one of the more active CBOs, it was not seen as a broad-based community organisation, particularly responsive to the most vulnerable sections of rural people. The credibility of the Department of Agrarian Services through which many food for work programmes are implemented was rather low in some of the study locations.

6.5 Key Recommendations

On the basis of the above analysis of vulnerabilities, community needs and priorities and implementation capacities the following recommendations can be made for WFP and related programmes.

First, vulnerability mapping may be seen as an important tool towards improved targeting of programmes using the available information. A refinement of the mapping process may be needed in view of discrepancies noted above. This may be addressed by further investigating data sources and some primary data collection in the DS divisions where the KI assessment and mapping outcomes show the greatest discrepancy. The possibility of extending the mapping process up to GN Division level must also be explored for reasons noted above. It must be noted here that given the problems posed by politicisation of government machinery at all levels towards improved targeting of services, mapping process may be seen as an important means of re-asserting some objective criteria in welfare and development programmes.

Second, targeting operations beyond the DS division level may be improved by identification more vulnerable communities and identification of more vulnerable households within the communities so identified. The classification of vulnerable communities and profiling of vulnerable households developed in this study may be used as an initial guide towards community and household targeting. These tools also must be further developed and refined as necessary in keeping with constantly changing ground realities in various parts of Sri Lanka.

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Third, in view of the high priority assigned to peace in the conflict areas, irrigation in the dry zone and income earning opportunities in the central zone, how far and in what ways these needs are addressed by various programmes must be assessed. It must be noted here that priority assigned to food relief itself is quite low in many of the vulnerable communities visited by the study team. The already introduced shift in WFP focus from food relief to food assistance with corresponding emphasis on relief and recovery assistance to IDPs, community managed rehabilitation of minor irrigation systems and assistance to settlers is amply justified by these findings. This study also found that this change in WFP focus is not fully understood by target populations as well as some key government officials contacted in this study. It may be necessary to disseminate the relevant information with a view to raise public awareness of the current strategy of WFP.

Finally, the current WFP strategy of implementing Food for Work Programmes through certain specific government agencies needs to be reassessed. A more diversified approach relying on a range of agencies that are active in different regions may be necessary in order to assess capacities and effectiveness of various agencies to implement specific interventions, promote healthy competition among agencies and prevent institutionalised corruption where one agency has a monopoly over the implementation of the programme. It must be also noted here that in some of the food insecure areas such as the conflict zone the government civil administration has been heavily undermined and certain NGOs are currently providing some of the essential services.

These tables provide checklists for locating vulnerable communities and households in selected areas in Sri Lanka. However, it is recommended that these not be used as a mechanistic tool but as broad guidelines for WFP targeting and monitoring. The texture and depth of vulnerability in specific communities and households are better revealed by the detailed profiles/case studies of vulnerable communities and households provided in Annexes 5.1 and 5.2.

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Table 6.1 Agreement between WFP Vulnerability Mapping and KI Responses* By Zone

Zone District DS Division WFP Classification KI ClassificationColour Red Blue Green

Conflict Jaffna Thenamarachchi Red Valikamam North Red Valikamam East Red Valikamam South Red Valikamam South-west Red

Valikamam West Red

Island South Red Island North Red Pallai ** Red Delft Red Jaffna Red

Nallur Red Vadamarachchi East Red Vadamarachchi South Red Vadamarachchi South-west Red

Trincomalee Kuchchaveli Green Seruvila Green Echalampattai Green Muttur Blue Gomarankadawala Green Padavisripura Green Morawewa Red Kanthalai Green Kinniya Blue Town and Gravets Blue Thampalakamam Red

Vavuniya V. Cheddikulam Blue Vavuniya North Red Vavuniya Blue

Vavuniya South Blue Puttalam Arachchikattuwa Green

Mahakumbukkadawala Blue Nawagattegama Blue Karuwalagaswewa Red Vanathaviluwa Red Kalpitiya Green Anamaduwa Blue Puttalam Green Pallama Blue Chilaw Green Madampe Green Nattandiya Green Wennapuwa Green Puttalam Green Mahawewa Green Dankotuwa Green Mundel Blue

* Where KIs disagreed among themselves more predominant view considered** Newly carved out division

Zone District Divisional Secretariat WFP Identification KI Identification

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Colour Red Blue GreenCentral Nuwara Eliya Kothmale Blue

Walapane Green Ambagamuwa Green Hangurankheta Blue Nuwara Eliya Green

Ratnapura Imbulpe Red Ahaliyagoda Green Alapatha Blue Ambilipitiya Green Godakawela Blue Kahawatta Red

Kiriella Blue Kolonne Blue Kuruwita Blue

Nivitigala Green Opanayaka Red

Pelmadulla Blue Ratnapura Green Kalawana Green Ayagama Blue Weligepola Green Balangoda Green

Badulla Lunugala Red Rideemaliyadda Red Passara Red XMahiyangana Blue Meegahakivula Blue Soranatota Blue Ella Blue

Haldummulla Blue Kandeketiya Green Uva-Paranagama Green Bandarawela Green Haputale Green Welimada Green Badulla Green Hali-Ela Green

References

Asian Development Bank2001 Poverty Reduction in Sri Lanka. Colombo: ADB.2001 Perceptions of the Poor: Poverty Consultations in Four Districts in Sri Lanka.

Manila: ADB.

CARE International2000 Household Livelihood Security Assessment in LTTE-controlled areas in Wanni.

Colombo: WFP and CARE International.

Department of Census and Statistics2000 Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey, Fourth Quarter 1999. Colombo: DCS.

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2000 Sri Lanka Demographic and Health Survey. Colombo: DCS.2001 Sri Lanka Demographic and Health Survey (Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Colombo: DCS.2002 Preliminary Release, Census of Population and Housing 2001. Colombo: DCS.

Edirisinghe, Neville2002 Food Security in Sri Lanka: Situation Analysis. Colombo: WFP.

Government of Sri Lanka

2002 Sri Lanka Poverty Reduction Strategy. Colombo: Ministry of Finance and Planning.

Kodituwakku, S., Dharmasena,S. & Perera, S. 2001 Food Security for Conflict-affected Areas in Sri Lanka: Situation in Wanni.

Colombo: CARE International (Unpublished report).

Reinhard, I. & Kraemer, D.1999 Baseline Survey on Health and Nutrition. Trincomalee: IFSP.

World Food Programme2002 Nepal: Food Security and Vulnerability Profile 2000. Kathmandu: WFP.

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Zone District Divisional Secretariat WFP Identification KI IdentificationColour Red Blue Green

Dry Anuradhapura Padaviya Green Galenbindunuweva Blue Galnewa Green Ipalogama Blue Kahatagasdigiliya Blue Kekirawa Blue

Madawachchiya Blue Madavilachchiya Red Welioya** Red Mihintale Red

Nachchaduwa Blue Nuwargam Central Blue Nuwargam East Blue

Palagala Green Palugasweva Red Rajanganaya Blue Rambewa Blue

Thalawa Green Thambuttegama Red

Thirappane Blue Kabettigollewa Blue Horowpathana Blue Nochchiyagama Red

Monaragala Bibile Red Siyabalanduwa Red Tanamalvila Red Wellawaya Red Buttala Red Kataragama Red Madulla Blue Sevenagala Blue Medagama Green Badalkumbura Green

Hambantota Tissamaharama Red Lunugamvehera Blue Sooriyawewa Blue Hambantota Blue Katuwana Blue Weeraketiya Blue Ambalantota Blue XOkewela Blue Angunukolapelessa Green XBeliatta Green Tangalle Green

* *newly carved-out division

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