Chapter Two

SALT I (1972) & SALT I1 (1979) TREATIES

Before one goes into the reasons, causes and effects of why

the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks Treaties (SALT) were

signed, one must also go into the elements that go into the

making of a treaty. One of the important elements in this

regard is that of summit meetings where treaties are usually

signed between the leaders.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SUMMIT MEETINGS:

Summit diplomacy is personal negotiations held

face to face between heads of state or government of the

major powers in the hope of resolving major conflicts, The

origin of summit diplomacy can be traced to the Congress of

Vienna of 1815. After Napoleon Bonaparte's defeat, the

question of settling the surrendered lands and redrawing the

map of Europe had to be resolved. To decide these, there

were monarchs and plenipotentiaries who had gathered there

by agreement. The Treaty of Versailles (Peace Plan),

concluded at the Paris conference, which was held from 18

January 1919, at the conclusion of World War I. It was

represented by the Allied countries and their allies.

President Wilson of the USA, Prime Minister Lloyd George of

Britain and French statesman, Georges Clemenceau, among

others, were there, to decide on the treaty's provisions and

reparations. Teheran, the Iranian capital, was the scene of

the first wartime summit conference from 28 November 1943 to

2 December 1943 and was represented by Winston Churchill of

Britain, Franklin Roosevelt of USA and Josef Stalin of the

USSR. Though it was mainly concerned with military matters,

the conference also saw the exchange of viers on the future

treatment of Germany, the post-colonial settlement, the

post-war frontier of Poland and the organization of

international security. Yalta, a town iq the Crimea, was

the scene of the second wartime summit conference m o n g

Churchill, Roosevelt end Stalin, from the 4 to the 11 of

February 1945.

Winston Churchill, Clement Atlee, Harry S Truman and Josef

Stalin held a meeting at Potsdam, a town in East Germany,

from the 17 of June 1945 to the 2 of July 1945, to determine

certain aspects of post-war control in Germany. The most

immediate apparent decisions were to demilitarize Germany,

put war-criminals on trial, revise German-Polish frontiers

and finally, to place the four zones into which Germany was

divided under the control of the military command of each

occupying power.

In a superpower summit, the superpower countries gather in. a

designated pre-determined place, along with their top and

Closest rides. The purpose of the summit meeting is to

t h r u b out and discuss about problems thrt beset and

confront the Powers and how best these powers can solve

them. It is ale0 to discuss the issues,ideologies and

differences thrt exist between the powers. It gives the

leader of one power a chance to explain to the other the

stand he has taken on Various issues and why he has done so.

Treaties and accords may or may not be concluded at such

summits.

A eummit is very important in the sense that it gives an

opportunity to the COu~trieS to try and understand the

other. In a world that faces and goes through regional

conflicts, terrorism and civil strife in almost all parts of

the globe, it is natural for the weak, small, undeveloped

and underdeveloped countries to give them security - a

security where conditions for peace and stability exist.

According to former US President Dwight Eisenhower, "Since

the days when President Wilson made his European trips to

participate in the formulation of the Treaty of Versailles,

many conflicting opinions have been expressed, most often in

generalities, as to the wisdom of a President of the United

States meeting personally with other heads of government. It

seems to me that conclusions of this kind rarely have value

if they are meant to apply universally and eternally; each

1 set of ~ir~\llr8t4n~eS has to provide the answer." Eisenhower

rightly recognised that the importance of summits could not

be written off completely, and that each summit had to be

looked into through its own set of circumstances which

brought it ( S u ~ i t ) about in the first glace, before it

could be called a success or failure.

The conclusion that follows naturally from the above show

that summits are very important for the treaty making

process. Not Only is a summit a place where treaties are

usually signed as a result of the dialogue processes set in

motion earlier, but it can also be a place where differences

are resolved amicably, at the highest level, when leaders of

various countries meet face-to-face, on a one-to-one level,

at such eummits.

Elements Present in a Super~ower Summit: According to David

D. Newson, the factors that went into the making of a

superpower summit were four primary elements of the process.

These elements which went into the adequate preparations

required for the holding of a summit between the two powers

were: the timing and circumstances of a decision to hold a

1. Dwight D Eisenhower, The White Rouse Years: Mandate for Chanae, 1953-1956, (Garden City, New York, Doubleday 8 CO*), p.503.

summit, setting the date and location, the issue of 2

preconditions (if any) and setting the agenda.

Other isrues which can be identified as among the decisions

that have had to be made in the preparation of at least some

of the meetings were: how to respond to the domestic and

foreign pressures for a summit; the division of

responsibility within the US bureaucracy for the planning,

particularly between the Vhite House and the State

Department; the channels through which advance discussions

with the Soviets were to take place; the degree of

consultation with allies; the preparation of agreements for

symbolic signing at a summit; the problem of record keeping

and interpretation and at what level the communique was to 3

be drafted. Certain observations that have emerged

regarding the preparation of summit meetings and the

relationships of the preparatory steps to the policies and

successes of the summit include: There did not seem to be a

single point at which the question of whether there should

be a summit meeting had been decided. In each

administration, the decision appeared to have been a matter

2. David D Newson, in the forward to Gordon R Weihmiller m d Dusko Doder, US-Soviet Summits, (University Press of America, Lanham, 1986), p.xi.

3. Ibid.

of the evolution of pressures to the point where a summit

became both a diplomatic and a political necessity. With

each succeeding administration, the assumption grew that

each president would need at some point, to meet with his

opposite counterpart. The requirement for a summit became

absolute.

Newson went on to say that the move toward a summit was a

process including both formal diplomatic contacts between L

the two sides and signals. The possibility of a summit

needed to be testedlfloated as an idea/ a speech made here

and there to see what response one got. Answers to such

questions as: What was the reaction domestically? Bow did

the allies like it and so on. All of this emerged rather

than being direct. The preparation of summits had two

effects on the policy process. The planning tended to move

the center of power to the White Rouse because the President

was involved. The fact of the summit created a deadline

that forced decisions on major policy issues - decisions

that otherwise might have been postponed.

Summits were also domestic political events and the

preparation involved as much the development of domestic

support as it did the arrangement with the Soviets. In some

case8, noted by those who had been involved in the process,

politialll, regardless of the the substance of the meeting

itself. Efforts to prepare for a summit meeting could give

an indication Of the true interest of the other power in

having such r meeting. While they might agree in principle,

their obstructionist tactices in the preparation phase may

well have been designed to force the other to withdraw, and

vice versa, 60 the onus of not having a meeting did not fall

on them. Apart from all this, the ceremonial aspects

counted too (to a certain extent) - the toasts, speeches,

wreath layings - were all part of the substance of a summit

meeting and often involved as much advance negotiation and

preparation as the issues of the meetings themselves.

It was symbolic of the course of global politics that, while

summit meetings before 1960 were multilateral discussions

that included the principal US allies, all of those since

had been bilateral meetings emphasizing concrete agreements,

The trend of the summit meetings had also moved from an

initial emphasis on multiple international problems to a

later emphasis on strategic nuclear weapons, Other aspects

that merit further examination if one is to have a complete

picture of the process of preparation would include: the

advance pass arrangements, security arrangements, the

decision on attendance at the meetings and the drafting of

the communique.

A BRIEF I&OS AT US-USSR SUYYIT MEETINGS: ( W I T VORLD WAR I1 TO lW8)

Before we come to why the SALT Treaties were signed, here is

brief look at the superpower summits held so far, between

the USA m d USSR, prior to the signing of these, treaties and

also a brief look at the summits held upto 1980.

m e first US-Soviet bilateral summit, held in 1958 in the

US denoted a thaw after more than a decadeeof chilling Cold

War. The meeting between President Dwight Eisenhower and

uikita Khrushchev from 25 September to 27 September 1959,

gave rise to a new term in the lexicon of world diplomacy,

'Camp David' spirit helped in lowering temperatures in the

chequered history of love-hate relationship between the two

once-mighty powers of the world. However, the whole process

of detente nose-dived in less than half a year and another

summit was planned between the same leaders. On the eve of

tbe summit, a US plane that took-off from Rawalpindi,

Pakistan, was shot down in the heart of Soviet land on 1 May

1960, at a time when Moscow was holding its traditional May

Day Parade. The summit was cancelled due to this incident.

A t the Vienna summit from 3 to 4 June 1961, President

Kennedy and General Secretary Khrushchev met. Though it did

mot lead to any substantial result, the two leaders were

mainlt ~ a l d in meacluring the strength and mood of the

~pposite side. The third superpower summit saw a change of

leadership at both the m i t e House and the Kremlin. Richard

Nixon was the new incumbent and Leonid Brezhnev had

succeeded Khrushchev. The summit took place in Moscow from

22 Yay to 30 1972. This heralded substantial changes in

the rigid approaches by the two powers. They signed the

famous ABY (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty and agreed upon a

number of measures Concerning the SALT I Treaty, Washington

was the venue for the fourth summit where the same two

leaders met and signed ten documents which denoted the

transition forin confrontation and cold war to cooperation

based on mutual benefits. This summit began on 18 June 1973

and successfully concluded on 25 June 1973. The fifth

summit took place at the Soviet capital, Moscow, and it was

the third meeting between Wixon and Brezhnev. The summit

commenced on 27 June and ended on 3 July 1974. A major

agreement signed by the two sides pertained to the limita-

tion of underground nuclear weapon tests.

The sixth summit which was called at a very short notice

took place in the Soviet Far-East city of Vladivostok.

Brezhnev and his counterpart, Gerald Ford, reaffirmed their

desire to sign s long term strategic offensive arms

limitation agreement. The seventh summit took place at

Vienna, frol the 1 to the 18 of June 1979, between Brezhnev

and US President Jimmy Garter. The second Strategic Arms

~imitrtion Talks Treaty mas signed during this summit. 4

gowever, it had not been ratified by the US Senate.

A CLOSER LOOK AT SUMMIT MEETINGS BETWEEN USA AND USSR LEADING TO THE SIGNING OF THE SALT I TREATY (GENEVA, JULY 1955 TO GLISSBOBO, JUNE 1967)

The summits preceding the signing of the historic SALT I

Treaty are important because they give us in idea about the

factors leading to the USA and USSR signing the first

important bilateral strategic arms accord treaty. The onset

of the Cold War, according to Elmer Plischke, gave rise to a

set of four basic requirements by the USA for tangible

evidence of better intentions on the part of Soviet leaders 5

before any summit would receive serious attention. These

preconditions specified the following: abandonment of the

Marxist principle of world revolution; cessation of

aggressive action; adherence to the principles of the United

Nations Charter; and fulfillment of international

agreements. However, some of these requirements were not

followed by the USSR. In the same way, the USA too, did not

4. The Telegraph, (Calcutta), 30 Hay 1988.

5. Elmer Plischke, Summit Diplomacy: Personal Diplomacy of the President of the United States, (College Park, University of Maryland, 1938), g.81.

follw tbe basic requiremento laid out by the USSR as a sign

that their intentions were serious. Inspite of these

eetbaoks, summit did take place between the two countries.

The Geneva Conference of Beads of Government, 18-23 juiy 1955:

The principals to the summit were the USA represented by

president Eisenhower (Conference Chairman) and Secretary of

State Dulles, the UK represented by Prime Minister Eden and

Foreign Secretary Macmillian, France represented by Premier

Faure and Foreign Minister Pinay and the USSR represented by

Premier Bulganin (nominal Head of Delegation), CPSU First

Secretary Khruschev, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense 6

Minister Marshal Zhukov.

7 There were no formal agreements after the summit. However,

there was a final Communique in the form of a directive to

the foreign ministers to undertake negotiations on issues

discussed at the summit in Geneva, in October, which 8

subsequently failed,

6. . Gordon B leihmiller & Dusko Doder, US-Soviet Summits, (University Press of America, Lanham, 1986) p.124.

7. - Ibid.

Khrwchchev raid about the summit, in his memoirs that, "We

return to YOSCOw from Geneva knowing that we hadn't achieved

any coacrete results. But we were encouraged, realizing now

that our enemies probably feared us as much as we feared

them.. . . The Geneva meeting was an important breakthrough

for us on our diplomatic front. We had established

ourselves as able to hold our own in the international 9

arena." Eisenhower, did in retrospect, evaluate the summit 10

as a "limited success." Due to the Cold War tensions

prevailing at that time, the very fact that the two leaders

were meeting proved that it was a limited success. However,

in terms of substantial results, the summit was not a

success.

Khrushchevte State Visit and Camp David Meeting: 15-27 September 1959:

The principals at the Camp David discussions were the USA

represented by President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon,

Secretary of State Herter, Ambassador Lodge, Fay Kohler

9. Nikita Khruschev, Khruschev Remembers, With Intro- duction, Commentary and Notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed.. Strobe Talbott (Boston, Little Brown &

10. Dwight D Eisenhower, The White House Years : Mandate for Chanpre. 1953-1056, (Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Co., 1B63), p.530.

(~epoty Assistant Secretary of State of European Affairs)

and by the USSR, rho Were represented by Premier Rhrushchev,

Foreign Minister Gromyko, and Ambassador Menshikov, Soldatov

(Chief American Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

The heads of the two respective countries were helped by

their respective foreign Yinisters. The issues and

discussions focused on the German problem resulting in

agreement to resume talks on Berlin without time constraints

imposed by the Soviet Union. Disarmament (control and

inspection), trade and credit and nuclear tests ban, were 11

the other issues. A joint communique affirming

constructive efforts toward general disarmament, peaceful

resolutions of international problems, renewal of Berlin,

negotiations and invitation for the US President to visit

the Soviet Union. Eisenhower consented to an East-West 12

summit conference. Though Khruschev's visit did not end

in any concrete results by way of treaties being signed, at

least the line of communications between the world's two

most powerful rivals of that era, was still open.

11. Gordon R Weihmiller & Dusko Doder, US-Soviet Summits, (University Press of America, Lanham, 1986), p.128.

12. See White House (Gettysburg, Pa.), press release dated 27 September 1959, in Department of State Bulletin, Vo1.41, No.1049, (12 October, 1959), pp.499-500.

the Parir Haads Of Government Conference, 16-17 May, 1~60:

The Paris Beads of Government Conference from 16-17 Yay 1960

could not take Place as scheduled because of the refusal of

president Eisenhower to apologize to Khruschev on the

downing of the 0-2 espionage plane. A western Communique 13

was released in Paris on 17 May 1960.

The Vienna summit: 3-4 June 1961: The principals were the C

USA represented by President Kennedy and the USSR by Premier

mrushchev and the issues discussed were nuclear tests ban,

disarmament, Germany and Laos. The communique issued on 4

June 1961 affirmed mutual support for a neutral and 14

independent Laos and effective cease-fire.

The Glaosboro Discussions : 23-25 June 1967

The principals were the USA represented by President

Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense

McNamara, Ambassador Thomson, while, for the USSR,

representation was by Premier Kosygin, Foreign Minister

--

13. See White House, (Paris.), release dated 17 May 1960, in De~artment of State Bulletin, Vo1.42, No.1093, (6 June IOBO),

14. See White &use (Vienna) press release dated 4 June 1901 in Department of State Bulletin, Vo1.44, No.1148, (26 June 1961), p.g99.

Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin. The iseues discussed were

the Middle East, (Six-Day War); Soviet insistence on prompt

Israeli withdrawal; Vietnam Var; US withdrawal; Non-

proliferation; general agreement on the importance of this 15

issue. There were no formal agreements signed on the

above issues and also no communiques. There were only 16

statements issued, by the President of the USA and the 17

leader of the USSR delegation, Premier Kosygin. Though

nothing was achieved in the way of agreements or treaties,

at least the two heads of government emphasized the need to

discuss the matters further.

STRATEGIC DOCTRINES FOLLOWED BY USA AND USSR FROM 1945 TO 1968 (US STRATEGIC DOCTRINES FROM PRESIDENTS TRUMAN TO JOHNSON)

STRATEGY

Broadly speaking, strategy refers to the art of formulating

objectives to means or resources. Strategy is developed at

15. Gordon R Weihmiller 8 Dusko Doder, US-Soviet Summits, (University Press of America, Lanham, 1986) p.137.

16. See President's Report to the Nation, Vashington 25 June 1967, White House Press Release dated 25 June 1967 in Department of State Bulletin, Vo1.57, No.1463, (10 ~ u l ~ v

17. Statement by Premier Kosygin at his News Conference at US IiQs, 25 June 1967 - Department of State Bulletin, Vo1.57, ~0.1463, (10 July 1967), p.38, Unofficial translation.

several levels. National strategy relates to overall

national objectivee and measures, For example, at this

level, strategy would deal with the relat,ive priority of

national ~ecurity and other national objectives, such as

improving education or providing social welfare, economic

growth and full employment. It would also deal with

cmbining the various m a n s of promoting national security,

as Leon Sloes has pointed out, as wag of example, promoting

national security including defence, diplomacy, trade aid 18

and arms control.

Defense strategy reconciles defense objectives and

commitments with available and projected defense resources.

~t this level, strategy begins with a definition of

national objectives and an assessment of the role of

military power in meeting those objectives. It also

involves priorities and tradeoffs. As an example, how much

total defense effort should be devoted to the defense of

Europe, Asia or sea lanes? In addition, defense strategy is

concerned with striking a balance between various military

instruments: nuclear and non-nuclear forces; strategic and

non-strategic forces; ground, sea and air forces: Defense

18. Leon Sloss, "The Strategic Perspective," in Ashton B David N Schvartz, ed., Ballistic Missile Defense, (Vaohington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1B84), p.25,

st rate^ must also thke into account decisions about the

relative importance of developing new types of weapons

systems, oodernizing existing forces, and ensuring the

readiness of currently deployed forces. Defense strategy is

also concerned with selecting the best way to achieve a

given military objective. Exsmple: strategists have debated

for years the capabilities required to deter nuclear attack.

TO really understand the need for the reason the SALT

Treaties were eventually signed we must go into the

evolution of strategic nuclear weapons in the nuclear

aresenal of both the USA and USSR.

The Strategic Triad: The USA and the Soviet Union had large

strategic arsenals, known as the strategic triad, i.e.,

three types of systems for delivering nuclear weapons or

warheads to their targets: intercontinental ballistic

missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missile

(SLBMs); and strategic bombers. Each survivable force of

this triad had distinct characteritics of nuclear weapons

systems that affect their performance, which, as described

by the Arms Control Association are: controllability, 19

promptness, penetrability, accuracy and yield.

19. Arms Control and National Security : An Introduction, (Washington, D.C., Arms Control Association, 1989), p.98.

~ntercontinental Ballistic Missiles CICBYsl: ICBMS are

landbased multi stage rockets, capable of propelling nuclear

~arheads Over intercontinental distances (i .e., more than

5500 kilometers). An ICBM can deliver several powerful

~arheads with exceptional accuracy to intercontinental

targets in under thirty minutes. The development of

multiple independently targetable entry vehicle (MIRV)

technology in the late 1960s allows each missile to carry a

number of warheads that can be targeted under separate aim

points. These characteristics enable ICBMs to carry out

time urgent, i.e., counterforce (military) targets and make

ICBMS potential first strike weapons. nigh accuracy also

makes ICBMs potentially useful as war fighting weapons in

specialized or limited options attacks. ICBMs are currently

deployed in massive concrete and steel silos just below the

earth's surface. Unlike bombers, ICBMs cannot be recalled.

Thus, launching ICBMa on warning of an attack, which might

be a false alarm would precipitate a general nuclear

exchange. Their potential vulnerability as fixed targets

increases the liklihood that ICBMs may be used prematurely

for fear of losing them to an attacker's weapons. To reduce

their vulnerability, ICBMs can be deployed in a mobile mode.

strategic Bombers: Strategic bombers are long range air-

Craft ckpable of carrying nuclear weapons over

intercontinental distances and then returning to an overseas

recovery base. Bombs were the first means of delivering

nuclear weapons and the United States of America, at one

stage, relied upon strategic bombers as delivery vehicles

for almost 40 per cent of its total strategic nuclear

arsenal while the Soviet Union had about 9 per cent in this

category. Bomber survivability is determined in the

readiness of the force. Bombers on the ground are extremely

vulnerable to attack. Bombers have more flexi-bility than

missiles, because they can be recalled and operate under

fail-safe procedures whereby they automati-cally return to

base unless they receive additional instruc-tions within a

fixed time period. Strategic bombers take many hours to

perform intercontinental missions. Large subsonic bombers

are also vulnerable to air defenses. Bombs can carry a

large number of accurate weapons with high yields. Once

they penetrate air defenses, bombers are, in principle,

capable of seeking out and destroying undamaged hard and

mobile targets, but, at least, in the case of hardened

silos, most of the missiles in them would presumably have

been fired by the time the bomber or their air-launched

Cruise missiles (ALCMs) arrive. .

Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles [SLBMs): SLBMs are

Similar to I C a s but are launched from submarines. The US

Q ~ W force wi th 6- 5300 warbeads carried about 40 per cent

the US s t r a t e ~ i c nuclear arsenals while Soviet SLYBS

carried sl ightly more than 30 per cent of their s t ra tegic

nuclear rarheada. SLBMs are inherently the most survivable

and thus the most r t r b i l i z i r leg of the s t r r tegic t r iad .

Deployed on submarines which patrol vast ocean rrearr, SLBYS

are d i f f icul t to locate and destroy, As a consequence, they

are considered e ~ ~ e l l e n t second-strike weapons which add to

both deterrence and s tabi l i ty . For the same reanon that

subaarines and SLBYs a r e relatively invulnerable, national

command authorit ies may have difficulty communicating.

Cruise Missiles: Both superpowers had deployed a new class

of s t ra tegic weapons: long range cruise missiles on a i rcraf t

and a t sea. Cruise missiles are small, pi lotless a i rcraf t ,

powered by miniature jet-engines and capable of f l y i n g long

distances, terrain hugging missions. With modern guidance

systems keyed to the terrain they are overflying, cruise

missiles can s t r i k e targets with great accuracy. Future

cruise missiles r i l l have reduced detectability(stea1th

technology) and increased speeds which w i l l make them even

less vulnerable t o a i r defenm systems. Moreover, the small

s ize , large projected numbers, and relative ease of

Production of cruise missilea make thei r verification more

d i f f i cu l t than other delivery systems. Tbese cruise

,issiler prooed their mettle during the Perrian Gulf war in

1991, when it war used by the US forces to bomb vital Iraqi

forcer.

The Truman AdainiBtration (1945-1952) - US Nuclear ~ o n o ~ o l p - Collective Security:

Immediately after lorld War 11, the lest adopted the p61icy

of 'Collective Security'. The idea was that peace could

best be assured if all countries acted together to Oppose

any threatened or actual aggression. For it to be

effective, the parties to a collective security system had

to have a shared definition of aggression, a common will to

respond to aggression, and finally, the means to implement

that response. In this case, several great powers had to be

willing and able to act in concert against any aggressor.

Given these prerequisites, collective security was unlikely

to work effectively in a world characterized by bipolarity

or by multiple alliance structures.

The United Nations was founded upon the theory of collective

security and was dominated by the countries tbat had won

lorld War 11. Their alliance, forged by the common need to

defeat the Axis powers and now esrential to collective

Security, war quickly undermined by c ~ petition between the

two emerging rupcrporers; the USA and the USSR. AS pointed

10 r ightly by Colt Blacker and Gloria Duffp, the port war

unity f ina l ly collrpsed under the r t r r in of the Cold War.

BY 1947, the USA had, i n e f fec t , abandoned collective

security in favour of what c w t o be known a s

lcontainment.' Prerldent Truman fe l t that Cormunirt idsology

committed the 8Oviet Union t o a continual e f fo r t to erprnd

the revolution, md t h i s aggression had t o be w t and

contained a t every point of attempted expaneion. Bowever,

tbe theory of Collective security envisaged r multipolar

world w i t h common 8ecurity interests . The Truman Doctrine

though, envisaged a bipolar world with d i rec t ly competing

interests . The USA supported the formation of a Western

military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

(NATO), comprised by the USA, Canada and most countriec i n

leatern Europe. The Soviet Union responded i n the 19508 by 21

forming tbe Warsaw Pact, an alliance of the Communist

countries of Eastern Europe. Tbe USA and the Soviet Union

~ i n t r i n e d an uneasy a l l i ance during World War 11. At the

end of the Vrr, the USA withdrew i t s forcer from Europ and

dumobilised i t s troops, while the Soviet Union retained an

20. Colt D Blacker and Gloria Duffy, ads., International Arms Control-Irruer and Arrwmentr, (California, Stanford University Presr, 2 edition, 1984), pp.190- 200.

21. Vitb the callapra of Coollunin i n Eartern Europe, tbe Varmam Pact has since been dirbrnded.

117

iucnre military establishment and set about installing

upp pet r e g ins in Eastern Europe. Pro-Soviet Communist

parties emerged as potent forces in Western

Europe, and it was feared that Greece, Turkey, Iran and west

Berlin right be absorbed into the Soviet sphere. Againnt

this background, there war a growing consensus in the USA

that the Soviet Union represented a clear and imrediate

threat to the security of the Vest.

The Truman administration believed that atomic weapons could

play a critical role in the evolving confrontation with the

Soviet Union. The US monopoly on these avesome weapons of

mrss destruction seemed an immediate and direct way to

compensate for Soviet conventional military superiority in

Europe. To deter Soviet aggression and even compel the

Soviet Union to act in a manner acceptable to the lest, the 22

USA began deploying nuclear-armed bombers in Europe. The

Soviet Union detonated its first atomic weapon in August

1949, several years earlier than most US observers brd

expected. Spurred by the Soviet accomplishment, the USA

undertook a crash programme to develop the hydrogen or

therronuclerr bomb. The " A " bomb was successfully tested in

22. Arms Control and National Security : An Introduction, (~ashington, D.C., Arms Control A8Socibtion, N E B ) , P. 19.

1952 with a tiold Which WAS a thousand tiwr greater than

the boob that dertroyed Birosbira. The US monopoly on there

weapons 1aot.d only until the firrt Soviet thermonuclrar

tost in 1953. The US arms COmPetitiOn bad now begun in

earnest. The USA remained far ahead for more than r decade

- in its capability to deliver nuclear weapons againnt the

Soviet Union. The first truly US intercoatinental bomber,

the 8-36, was introduced in 1948, and by the end of the

Truun Administrrtion, the USA had nearly 600 aircraft

capable of delivering atomic bombs ngainrt the Soviet Union

from the US or European bases.

The Eisenborer Administration: 1953-1960 - "Massive Retrliatiod*

The Cold War was at its height when President Dwight

Eisenhower took office in 1953. The USA was embroiled in a

costly land war in Korea against North Korern and Chineee

forces and renred a growing threat from the Soviet Unloa in

Europ and around the world. In 1954, Secrrtary of State,

John Poster Dulles announced that any attack on the United

Stater of America or its Allire would be net "10 r unner 23

and at a place of our orn choosing." The implicatton rrs

23. Quoted in fbid., OP.Clt., p.21.

that ADI CO..uoirt w r e r r i o n , whether direct or through

proxire, could well result in massive retaliation - a large

scale nuclear attack against the Soviet Union. ~t the 81.0

t i w , tbe USA began to integrate nuclear weapons into it8

forcer deployed i n the USA, at sea, and on the territory of

allied aAtiOn8.

~ h s Advent of Intercontinental Ballistic Ylssiler:

In 1957, the Soviet Union shocked the USA by orbiting

Sputnik, the world's first artificial satellite. Rapid

Soviet success in developing nuclear weapons had been widely

dismissed as something of a fluke which was highly dependent

on espionage. The launch of Sputnik suggested that Soviet

technical capabilities had been underestimated and that the

Soviet Union would soon be able to develop land-based

intercontinental ballistic missiles(1CBYs) capable of

delivering nuclear weapons against the USA. Fears grew that

the USA would be threatened by a missile gap. In response,

the USA undertook a crash programme to develop and deploy

its orrn ICBMs AS well as SLBYs. As a stop-gap measure, IR

missile8 were deployed in England, Italy and Turkey between

1957 and 1963. By 1959, the USA began to deploy ICBMs at

Vadenberg Air Force Base in California. In 1960, the USA

llunched tho first pol~ris ballistic missile rubmarine.

m e derelopent of ballistic missiles gave a new character

to nuclear mariare. Previously, nuclear weapons bad been

~arried by bomber aircraft which took many hours to reach

their targets. Deployed on ICBMs, nuclear weapons could

travel continent to continent in 30 minutes. , Dsployed on

submarines in mid-ocean, SLBMs, in mid-ocean, SLBus might

strike in even less time. Fears of a surprise Soviet

missile attack, designed to destroy US strategic boebers and

effectively disarm the country, led the Eisenhower

administration to develop and test a plrn to maintain some

bombers on continuous airborne alert.

The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-1960 - Mutual Vulnerability:

The Cuban Missile Crisis: When President John F. Kennedy

came to power in January 1961, US-Soviet relations were in a

poor state. The Bay of Pigs disaster and the Soviet

erection of the Berlin Wall dividing East and West Berlin

increased US-Soviet tensions during Kennedy's first year.

US-Soviet relations suffered a severe strrin in the postwar

period when, in October 1982, US aerial reconnaissance

Photographs revealed that the Soviet Union was secretly

building bases to deploy mdium range nuclear missiles in

Cuba. To demonstrate American resolve in the face of a

threat which va8 j w t 90 mile away tram Florida, Kennedy

08 nuclear forces on increared alert. For reven

tense days, the world watched the rtandofi between Kennedy

a d rhnuhchev. US naval forces blockaded Cuba while the

leader6 of the two 6UpcrPOwers negotiated. In exchange for

a Mviet conitnent to withdraw their missiles, the USA

pledged not to invade Cuba and indicated informally that

intermediate range US nuclear missiles in Turkey and Italy

would be withdrawn. This sobering brush with nuclear war

focused the world's attention on the risks of the arms race.

The Missile Gap: President Kennedy had campaigned in 1960

against Eisenhower's strategy of massive retaliation but

also had argued for a substantial build-up in ICBMs, largely

on the grounds of an alleged missile gap between the USA and

Soviet forces. By 1961, however, newly orbited

reconnaissance satellites revealed that the Soviet ICBM

force was in fact much smaller than US forces. But the

United States of America went ahead with plans to deploy a

large force of Minuteman ICBMs. Tbe USA and the Soviet

Union were also starting to deploy submarines capable of

launching long-range nuclear-armed missiles. Submariner

would enrure that both sides would have an invulnerable

retaliatory deterrent.

~ l e r i b l e B ~ B D O ~ J J ~ M d Assured Dertruction: m i l e in the

early 19608 the USA remained far ahead of the Soviet Union

in the number and quality of nuclerr forcer, the

destructive power of nuclear weapon8 ensured

*at even with fewer weapon6 the Soviet Union had the

u p a c i t y to inflict unacceptable levels of damage on the

*st. As the Soviet capability to attack or retaliate

againrt US territory grew, the Eisenhower's administration

policy of 'Ya88iVe Retaliation', which, in' a11 probability,

w u l d have led t o general nuclear war and the wholerale

destruction of both the USA and the Soviet Union, became

less credible. T h e threat to launch an all-out rttack in

response to non-nuclear conflicts did not seem to many

strategic analysts t o provide a credible deterrent to such

actions. The Soviet Union might have been tempted to call

the U S bluff. Moreover, events of the 1950s bad rhown that

nuclear ruperiority could not prevent Communist-supported

uprisings in the Third World. Kennedy believed that the USA

relied too heavily on nuclear weapons and that the

challenge8 of the 1960s would require more sophirticated

resPonse8 with greater emphasis on conventional forcer,

Counter-inrurgency teams, and economic and developmental

~ennodr, thus, Proposed tbe replacement of massive

retaliati~n with a strategy of deterrence through 'Flexible

~~sponse', which would involve "a range of appropriate

responses, conventional and nuclear, to a 11 levels of 24

aggression or throats of aggression." To allow for more

non-nuclear options, the Kennedy administration strengthened

conventional forces. Kennedy also carried out the

deployment, planned by Eisenhower, of s m e 7000 tactical or

battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe. The new strategy

aimed to provide a more credible alternative to a masrive

retaliation against a Soviet conventional or limited nuclear

attack. Some argued that more advanced technology, both in

missile guidance systems and in capabilities for monitoring

deployments and activities in the Soviet Union, would make

precision attack on enemy military targets possible with a

minimal level of civilian causalities or other collateral

damage.

Critics of flexible rerponse, however, did not believe

nuclear warfare could be controlled or its damage

constrained in any meaningful wag. Even the limited use of

nuclear weapon8 on the battlefield in response to r

Conventional attack by tbe Soviet Union would almost

24. Ibid., Op.Cit., pp.23-24.

e8mlrte rapid19 to an exchange of weapons between

the ruprporers and then to uncontrolled #enerr1 nuclear

war and mutual destruction.

NEED TALKS 011 STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIOI:

be rcronyan SALT, which expands to Strategic Arms

Limitation Talks, wrs coined by Robert Martin, who wre in

the Bureau o f Political Military Affairs in the State

bpartmnt of the USA. He was then r member of the

Political Section of the United States North Atlantic Treaty

Organization Mission in Brussels. Though the term war

resisted by some Washington officials for r while, it (the

acrongma SALT) was finally adopted when the CIA was 25

organizing Its filing system rround the tars 'SALT.

The talks were launched because there was r mutual need to

rolemnire the parity principle. To put it differently, SALT

talk8 were atartad to eetablieh an rcceptrnce by each ride

of the othor'a rbility to inflict unrcceptrhle retribution

in rerponro to r nuclear attack - which arsuaee here that

neither ride would initiate a first rtrike if the other'r

retaliatory capability was strong enough to survive it8

25. John Mewhouse, Cold Dawn : The Story of SALT, (Iarbiagton, Pergason-Brareey'r, l980), p.54.

i8p.ct. n o r , 8 u t u l deterrence rerts on the lwlrene88 by

each ride of the other's second rtrike capability.

~rms-control over the years had gained increasing importance

in relatioar between the USA and the Soviet Union and for

very good rerronr. The two powers had been rivals since the

closing days of World War 11, and their rivalry bad reached

almost every region of the world. As a result, profound dis-

trust and a mutual fear, if not hatred, characterized their

relationship. The arms race was an expression of their deep

political differences. The danger was tbat the rrms race,

fueled by continuing conflict would at some time spill over

into a nuclear war. One way each side had tried to avoid

such a cataclysmic end was to build up its nuclear forces as

a defense; the other was to meet and negotiate agreements

tbat reduced the chances of war breaking out. As rightly 26

pointed out by J.W. Spanier, since the basic conflict

bould not be resolved and nuclear weapons were unlikely to

be rbolisbd, the next best tactic, therefore,was to manage

the nuclear rrms balance by instituting arms control,

In the 19708, t h e w negotiations shifted to each side's

strategic iorcer. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks rtood at

26. Jobn 1 Bpmirr, American Poreitn Policy since World War XI, (Irrhington, D.C., C.Q. Prftm, 1988), p.203. -

126

the center of detente. It mainly had the following

objectives, the first of wbicb was to make the arms race

.ore predictable by establishing the numbers of strategic

weapons for each side. It was hoped that rucb knowledge

would reduce the anxietp of the arms race; uncertainty and

the fear that the opponent migbt be gaining superiority in

military strength fueled competition. The Soviet Union had

begun a steady, large-scale military build-up in strategic

and conventional weapons after the Cuban ai8sile crisis. By

tbe time Nixon became Pretident, the Soviet8 had overtaken

the US in number of deployed missiles, and the miraile

production continued. A new arms race, therefore, was

likely, unless mutually acceptable ceilings on missiles

could be negotiated. Indeed, given the anti-military eood

in the USA following the Vietnam War and congressional

hostility to increased defense spending, the pressure on the

Rixon adminirtration to negotiate an agreement was intense.

The alternative would be a missile gap in favour of the

Soviet Union.

SALT'S recond objective was to ensure parity. The

assumption mar that if the two sides had approximately the

same number of warheads and bombs neither ride could launch

1 crippling ride on the other. More specifically, parity

w.8 a condition in which no matter who struck firrt, the

a t t a e d side would atill have the capability to retaliate

and destroy the aggressor. When each power posrersed

mistilet with Single warheads, even with reasonably accurate

warheads, r 2:l superior it^ was needed to launch a

devastating first strike. Short of such a superiority, the

USA and USSR would each have retained a sufficient

retaliatory capability to assure the continuation of

deterrence.

Another objective of SALT was to reduce threats to each

aide's deterrent forces. By the early 1970s, the deterrent

balance wrs threatened not only by the continuing Soviet

quantitative rtrategic growth but also by te~bn010gi~al

innovations that were widely believed in the USA to be

undermining the stability of American-Soviet deterrence.

One matter of concern was the development of r new defensive

weapon. The Soviet Union had deployed ABYs around Yoscov

and were thought to be working on a second generation ABM

for possible nrtionwide deployment. If ABYa could shoot

down enough incoming American ICBMs and reduce the

destruction inflicted on the Soviet Union to what they felt

was an acceptable level of a few million crrualties, the

ABYs would undermine US deterrence, which depended upon it8

capacity to impose aseured destruction. In turn, this

defensive weapon rtimulated the USA to improve its offensive

~cbnolOgY, r w c i f i c a l l ~ the develomnt of the MIRVS. M I R V

is an ICBM w i t h multiple warheads that wn 8eparate i n

f l i gh t , cbrnge trajectory, and f l y independently to assigned

md disperred targets. The advantage of MIRV was that the

large number of warheads would be able to overcome any ABM

b f e n s e , meaning that the USA would s t i l l be able to destroy

Qaviet rociety i n a re ta l ia tory blow.

MIRVs a180 threatened to dertabil ize the deterrent balance.

I t war one thing for the USA and Soviet Union to possess

~ i s s i l e s with single warheads, even i f these warberds were

reasonably accurate. I f s ide A had 1000 missiles and side B

1400, B s t i l l d i d not have the 2 : l superiority i t was

assumed necessary to destroy A'a missiles. But i f both

possessed the same number of missiles - l e t us assume 1000 - but A's missile could carry 10 warberds and B ' a could carry

only 3, the rat io of warheads would be greater than 3 : l .

This mould permit A with only 200 missiles to launch a f i r r t

# t r ike to disarm the l a t t e r . Multiplying the wrrbeads and

providing them w i t h greater accuracy thus undermined the

mtability of the nuclear balance because i t placed a premium

oa attack. lbicbever r ide got i n the f i r s t blow was l ikely

to w i n because i t might have been able t o prevent any major

retaliation. Tbir war a potentially dangerous ri tuation.

men both rider possesred such counterforce weapons, the i r

mutual fear of a preventive war, and especially of I

preemptive strike during a Crisis would have made both

jittery. Each would fear that if the other struck first, it

would be unable to retaliate with sufficient force to

destroy the otber; the very vulnerability of the opponent's

forces, therefore, provided an incentive to attack first.

u c h would then feel that it had to either use the nuclear

weapons or else it would loce them.

Finally, SALT I was necessary for detente. On the one hand,

a failure to arrive at an agreement or at least to continue

the SALT dirlogue was bound to have a deteriorating effect

on their overall political relationship. On the other hand,

only a relaxrtion of tensions could provide the diplomatic

atmosphere that would enable the two nuclear giants to

arrive at an arms agreeaent that would leave them feeling

.ore secure, sanctify the etrategic parity between tbem, and

avoid new costly offensive and defensive arms racer. SALT,

in brief, becrae a symbol of detente. With it, detente

seemed to blossom; without it, detente reeaed to fade.

Succerr or failure to achieve a SALT agreement, therefore,

according to John Spanier, became the barometer of 27

detente.

n. ~bia., 09. cc".

TBE m a B m I T t MAY 22-30 1972: TRE SIGHING OP SALT I TBEATT and the INTERIM AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC O P P ~ S I V E ARMS

According to Kissinger, President Nixon entered the White

~ o u s e convinced like his predecessors, particularly

Eisenhower, that a summit meeting with the soviet Union

could only succeed if it was well-prepared. He said, "Hi8

original intention was to use the prospect of a summit only

when it could be a means to extract 'important Soviet 28

~~ncessions."

In the account given by Gordon leihmiller and Dusko Doder,

the first Soviet feeler about the prospects for a Bummit

meeting was raised by Ambassador Dabrynin in talks with

Kissinger on 20 January 1970, but Kissinger refused, stating

that the timing was not yet right. The two met again in

April and Dobrynin floated the possibility of a meeting when

Premier Kosygin attended the opening session of the United

Rations in New York; but this was again rejected. Other

exchanges continued and on 23 June, Dobrlnin suggested that

the tw leaders might want to discuss developments in the

Middle East, China and Soutbeart Asia, as well re European

Security. Purther exchanges about the poseibilities of a

28. W a r y A fiesinger, White Bouee Years, (Boston, Little B m a 8 Co., 1979), p.552.

meeting later in the year continued until September 25, when

the Soviets suggested postponing further talks on summit

prospects until the following pear. A month later, on

October 22, Dobrynin and Poreiga Minister Gromyko met with

Nixon, Kissinger, and Secretary of State Rogers, who had not 29

previously been invol7ed in the s u m i t discussions.

Gromyko appeared amenable to the idea of a summit but wanted

to see a settlement on the Berlin problem first. Efforts to

resolve tbat lingering problem were undertaken in January

1971, in talks between Kissinger and Dobrynin, in Washington

and were directly linked to the prospects for a summit tbat

year, by the Soviet Ambassador. Also, in Jlnuary, Prerident

Nixon initiated back channel communications with Moscow in

an effort to resolve differences and break deadlocks in the

strategic arms limitation talks.

Throughout the spring of 1971 summit prospects were

alternately connected with progrecs on SALT, the Berlin

situation, and Vietnam. It appeared that both tides were

now trying the carrot-and-stick routine, with the summit in

the balance. Another effort was u d e on June 8 to coos to

an agreemeat on a date for the summit as Kirringer and

29. Cordon R Ieibmiller and Dusko Doder, US-Soviet Summits, (Lanham, University Presr o f America, 1986), pp.55-56.

Dobrpin m t at kvid, but again, the details of timing

were put off. Shortly after, as given in the account of SO

~ a c o b Bean, in earl9 July, Kissinger was off on his secret

trip to Chin. resulting in President Nixon's suboequent

announcement that he would visit China in February 1972.

Moscow's interest in a US-Soviet summit suddenly peaked. On

10 August 1971, the President received a formal invitation

to virit Moscow for talks in Yay or June of 1972. After the

details were arranged, a joint anriouncenent of the trip was

made in Moscow and Washington on October 12.

Though the reception in Moscow mas chilly and

notwithstanding the various tirades against the bombing and

mining of North Vietnam's harbours, the summit was a

success, as exemplified most notably in two agreements: the

'Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems', which limited

each country to the construction of two systems: and the

'Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive

Arms,' which mtated that neither country would start

construction of additional land bared ICBY launchers alter 1

July 1072, thus freezing their levels to the numbers

deployed and under construction at the time. The Protocol

30. Jacob Bean, Multiple Exposure: An American Ambarsador's Uniaue Perrpsctire on Eailt-lest Issues, (Mew York, 1.V. norton & Co., 1078), pp.260-63.

to the Inter Agreement further specified, inter alia, that

the USA was limited to 710 SLBY launchers on 44 modern

submarines, and the Soviet Union to 950 launchers on 82

w d e r n submarines, along with 4 provision for trade-offs on

replacement for SLBYs on older type submarines.

This agreement, later dubbed SALT I, was the culmination of

a long Process. Three years earlier, President Nixon bad

decided t o resume the efforts initiated by President Johnson

at the Glassboro summit for formal strategic arms limitation

talks with the Soviets, rnd these commenced in November of

1969 at Helsinki. They continued for the next two-and-a-

half years in Vienna and Geneva under the direction of

Ambassador Gerard C Smith, Director of the Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, and his Soviet counterpart, Deputy

Foreign Minister Vladimir Semenov, who was assisted by

Colonel General Ogarkov, first Deputy Chief of the General

Staff of the Armed Forces.

According to Raymond Garthoff, throughout the early stages

of the negotiations, delegations consisting of about ten

psople on each ride, conducted meetings twice weekly,

followed by i n f o r m 1 rerrionr. Subsequently, the 08 rlde

took to preparing YtYCONs (*menoranda of converrations*)

numbering over five hundred in tbe two-and-a-quarter year

pried. The Mencons were dispatched to the SALT community

in Iashington, ~ 0 n S i ~ t i n g of about fifty government experts,

~ s t l y in the Dcplrtments of State and Defense, as well 1 s 3 1

in the A n s Control lad Disarmament Agency. National

Qecurity Advisor Kissinger, kept track of their progress

through meetings of the Verification Panel, tbe rroup he

chaired to review the inspection or policing arrangemeate,

and significant problems were occasionally brought to the

attention Of the National Security Cohncil. Then, in

addition (and as P r e ~ i ~ ~ S l g noted), President Nixon began

tbe back channel correspondence with Kosygin in January

1971, which mas supplemented by the Kissinger - Dobrynin

talks. After the 24th Party Congress in April 1971,

Brezhnev began to replace Kosygin as the Kremlin's chief

8pokesman and by 1972 became the recepient of the 32

backchannel cwmunications.

In sum, then, as pointed out by Raymond L Carthoif, there

were four different levels of arms control discussions going

On at the same time: formal plenary and informal resrions

between the SALT terms: tbe Kissinger-Dobrynin talks; and

31. B.ymond L Garthoff, "Regotiating SALT", The Wilron 9 u r t e r l ~ , (Autumn 1977), p.78.

32. Ibid., p. 80, and Gartboff, "Negotiating mitb the Rueriaas : Some Lessons from SALT," Internationrl Security, Vol.1, 10.4, (Spring 19771, p.6.

33 the hack-channel between Washington and uoscow. Neither

~mbasrrdor Smith nor Secretary Rogers was informd of the

back channel, w a v e r , unt i l the day before President

~ i x o n ' s announcement of Yay 20 that an agreement had been

reached with the Soviet Union to separate the ABY treaty

from related progress on offensive weapons limitations, i n

e f fec t , a major break through i n the deadlocked

negotiations.

The f ac t that the SALT negotiations were proceeding a t a l l ,

l e t alone making significant progress, dates back to

fundaaental agracaent between the two rides i n 1968 on the

common objectives and conceptual framework to be employed 34

during the process. The emphasis of the main objective

was on the need for s t ra tegic s t a b i l i t y , and that required

l imitat ion of offensive weapons i f deterrence was to be

ef fec t ive for eitber side. I t was agreed that neither ride

should be allowed a military advantage, and agreements would

be based on parity i n nuclear weaponry. I t war also agreed

that further measurer were required to reduce the risk of

nuclear war from aiscalculation or accident.

34. For details , see Lyndon Baines Johnson, Tbe Vanta e Point : k r s ~ ~ c t i v e s of the Presidency.- (New York, b l t ,Rinehar t , and Winston, 1871), p.485-90.

joint announCeMnt in Moscow and Vashington on 12

October 1971 of agreement to bold tbe summit meting in nay

1972 put additional pressures on the SALT negotiators to

c w e to t e n 8 with rwaining issues. By the time the rummit

there mere three such outstanding problems: Tbe

distance permitted between tbe two ABY systems that would be

allowed; what increases in size or volume, if any, would be

permitted for ICBM8 and tbeir silos; and what SLBYr to count

( e l tbe SLBMs on new versus older submarines).

Resolution of these matters became the principal tack of

President Niron and Kissinger at tbe summit meeting. The US

President would negotiate directly with General Secretary

Brezhnev on tbese details, a task, as be stated i n bia 35

memoirs, was befitting the leaders of the two countries.

Tbe summit put prersures on the negotiations to finalize

agreements in t i n for rignature by the principals, which

resulted in sore bartily concluded SALT documents. The SLBY

portion of the Interim Agreement, contained in the Protocol

to that agreement, bas been cited m r t often a8 an example;

it apparently had to be done over after rignature and signed

again by the leaderr a day or two later.

35. Picbard M BW Iiron, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, (New Tork, Grorset a d Dunlap, 1978), p.211.

Among the other agreements signed, which covered such

matters as environmental Protection, wdical science rrd

technology, and Prevention of incidents at sea, the ore

entitled 'Basic Principle~ of Relations Between the United

states of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics' was of spacial significance to Yoscow. Soviet

interest in such an agreement was initially raised t y

Ambassador Dobrynin in his talks with Kissinger !n

Washington, and its consummation at the summit was construe$

in Moscow as symbolizing US recognition of the Soviet Unicn

as a coequal superpower. Although this agreement rrs

generally devoid of operative content, Kissinger observed 36

that:

... the fundamental achievement was to sketch the outline on which coexistence between the democracies and the Soviet system must be based. SALT embodied our conviction that a widely spiraling nuclear arms race was in no country's interest and enhanced no one'r security; the "Basic principles" gave at least verbal expression to tbe necessity of responsible political conduct. The two elements reinforced each other; they symbolized our conviction that a relaxation of tensions could not be based exclusively on arms control; the ultimate test would be restrained international behaviour,

36. Benry A Kissinger, White Rouse Years, (Boston, Little, B r w n and Co., 1979), pp.1253-$4.

A joiat cawunique was released on Yay 29. It was all but

c ~ p l e t e before the summit took place, as Kissinger and

mbrynin bad started work on it in Wrshington. There was

only one U j O r rrea of disagreement to be settled rnd that

concerned tbe Yiddle hat. Tbe Soviets wanted a rtrong

statement on joint efforts to &chieve peace in the region;

but, unwilling to open the door to further Soviet

involvement and influence in the Middle East, Kissinger

would agree only to a bland strtement on tbat mrtter. He

lrter attributed President Srdrt's expulsion of Soviet

advisers in July of tbat year to Moscow's inability to 37

achieve more for its Arab client state at the summit.

Upon the President's return to Washington on 1 June, he

immediately reported to Congress tbrt " the foundation has

been laid for r new relationship between the tvo most 38 - -

powerful nations in the world."

7

37. Ibid., Op.Cit., p.1248.

38. President Nixon's Address to Congress on 1 June 1972, "The Moscow Summit : Nev Opportunities in US-Soviet Relations" Reprinted in US OIDartment of State, Bulletin, Vol.66, 10.1722, (26 June 1972), p.855.

39 AS succintly s u u e d up by Kissenger,

The contert 1s well as the contert of the r u r i t made it r mrjor ruccess for Americrn foreign policy. The fact that we bad faced down Brnoi and yet coapleted mrjor negotirtions with Yoscow . . . evoked the prospect of 1 w r e hopeful future and tbus put Vietnrm into perspective. The summits helped us complete the irolrtion of Rrnoi by giving Moscow and Peking r stake in their ties with ur. Vbrt war even more novel, re were freed for the better part of the year from the domestic turmoil on which tbus far U n o i had rlwrps been rble to count. Thir, together with the military defeat of the North Vietnrmere offensive, led to r break through in the perce negotirtions within .onthe. The summit was equally rignificrnt for the evolution of the Middle Erst .... It u r k e d r turning point at which moderate Arab larders begrn to move toward Inshington..,.

The summit was r success for the American lerdership. It

was during tbe summit that concrete strategic nuclear rrme

cuts were signed, for the first time in bilateral superpower

history. It also gave time to the US rdministrrtion to

concentrate more on the ongoing war they were going through

with Vietnam, 1.0, for them to reek honourable wry8 to get

out of r war they were losing on all frontr men, orterirlr

and money. The ABY Yirrlle Systems Treaty wrr approved by

the &nrte Foreign Relrti~ns Committee and endorsed 88-2 by

39. Benry A Kirringer, White Ifouse Y a r s , (Boston, Little, Ems and Co., 1979), p.1253.

the full kaate oa 3 August 1972. The Interim Agreement was

by botb Aoures of Congress in September and oa the 30

o f that m t h , Prerident Uiroa signed the joint resolution

.uthorizin# approval of the Interim Agreement and Protocol

thereto, botb accords then b e c u e effective on 3rd October

witb the excbange of rrtificrtions.

MAIN PROVISIOIIS OF SALT I ACREWENT

Tbe ABY Treaty: The preamble to the treaty stater iuportant -- preaieer for the agreement (and for the whole Strategic Arms

Liaitation Talks): the devastating consequences of nuclear

war, the oeed for measures to decreare the risk of outbreak

of nuclear war, the contribution of limitation of ABY

syrtear to meeting thir need, and the importance of ABY

liaitatiou as a prior condition for limiting rtrategic

offensive arar.

The objective of the treaty ir very clearly embodied in its

provirionr. It is to prohibit all ABY activities and

deployments. The parties undertook (Article I ) pot to

deploy Am rystems for the defense of the territory of their

countries or to provide the bare thereof, and not to deploy

AW ryrtru for regional defense except as rpecif icallg

provided. Article 111 rpecifies in detail the mirsile

launchers m d &BY radars pdrmitttd for defenre of: r the

national Capital, and b: one ICBM field - 100 missiles and

launcberr At eacb. The 1974 Protocol reduced the permitted

deployment to one or the other of there sites.

be probibition8 and limftations are further reinforced

(Articles V and VI, and some rlreed statements and common

understandings). Sea-based, air-based, space-based or

w b i l e land-based components are probibited; this is

essentially because mobility is inconsistent with the basic

prohibitioa of other than limited regional defense.

Verification was to be by national technical means, and

interference with these means and concealment were banned.

Tbe treaty provided for a Standing Consultative Commission

to facilitate working of the treaty, including dealing rith 40

verification and compliance questions.

TRE INTEBIY OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT OF 1972

This agreement was essentially applicable to ICBM8 and SLBYs

but not to bombers, for a five-year duration while a broader

and more detailed agreement could be negotiated. ICBM

bollbars used were frozen at tbe number alraady oper&tional

40. Philip J Parley, "Strategic Arm& Control, 1967-87*, in Alexander L George, Philip J Parley, Alexander Dallin, (dr.) , US-Soviet Security CooWration, (Oxford, NOW York, 1988), p.217.

o r under construction. New fired bombers (silos) could not

b~ started; the dimensions of silos could not be

significantly increased; bombers for light or older ICBMs

could not be converted into bombers for mordern heavy ICBYS.

Bombers for SLBMr could be increased beyond those

operational or under construction, up to an agreed level of

each for each party, but only if a corresponding number of

older ICBM or SLBY bombers were dimantled or destroyed.

Verification provisions corresponded wi th those of the ABY 4 1

Treaty.

The formal SALT negotiations and agreements recorded during

the decade 1969-79, represented only the conspicuous

negotiating phase of the SALT process. Integral to this

process and even more protracted was the two-decade period

-ram 1949 (when the Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear

test explosion) until the opening of formal negotiations in

1969. During tbia period, the two powers in a parallelled

and then interactive process, came to recognise that the

primary goal of national security policy in the nuclear age

had to be avoidance of nuclear war, that strategic arms race

- even with both sides seeking to deter rather than to win a nuclear conflict - was an inadequate and risky rag to pursue 41. See the fnteria Agreement on Strategic Offrnsive leapons

Treaty.

143

security and that negotiations and agreements on strategic

arms might contribute to r@curity in rays tbat rtrrtegic

arms alone could not.

Entering into negotirtions on such premires, a8 Philip 42

Parley noted, mould imply acceptance of the other side as

r worthy negotirtinz partner, a notion with compatible even

if not identical security goals and standards, tbur making

it conceivrble that a fair, balanced and verifiable

agreement aight be arrived at, complied with and found

effective. Thie premiae, implicit, rather than explicit, rt

least initially, during the SALT process, crme to be highly

contentiour -especirlly in the USA -with the the decline of

detente beginning in the lrtter years of the 1970'r.

Soae Problear Internal to the Regime Treaty Provirionr: The Case of the ABM Trertp

According to Gloria Duffy, reverrl of the ccmpliance

disputee in the first half of the lB8Os concerned provisions

of agreement tbat were an imperfect coapromise at the time

they mere negotiated, establishing qualitative conrtrrintr

12. Philip J Parley, *Strategic Armr Control, 1867-87", in Alexander L George, Pbilip J ?arlry, Alexander Dallin, ( e d ) US-kvirt Mcuritt CooMrrtion, (Oxford, Iewyork, 1@88), p. 270.

on weapons or behaviour, but doing so in a way that 43 --

contained rubstrntial ambiguities. Such deficiencies

provided u p l a room for differing US and Soviet

faterpretations of tbeir obligations under the agreementr.

Such ambiguities were involved in each of the central

compliance disputes between the USA and USSR in the 1980s.

Certain provisions of the 1972 ABY Treaty conta ined

ambiguities that contributed to the compiirnce disputes in

the early 1980s. The agreeaent prohibited deployment of

large-phared array radars (LPARs) for tracking incoming

ballistic missiles and relaying tbeir flight prth to ABY

radars and interceptors except at the one permitted AB M site

choren by each country. Tbe intent of the negotiations in

including this provision was to prevent deployment of the

most costly, longest lead time component of an ABU system,

the existence of which could allow one of the parties to

most easily and quickly breakout of the treaty limits to

mount a regional or nationwide ABY defense.

The precire wording of Article VI of the ABY Treaty was

designed to distinguish LPARr that could be used for

43. Gloria Duffy, 'Conditions that Affect Arms Control Compliance,* in Alexander L George, Philip J Farlry, Alexander Dallin,(odr.),US-Soviet Securit~ Cooperation, (Oxford, Hew York, 1@88), p.270.

purporsr of attacking incoming mirrilsr from tbore used for

early warning, since from external observation, LPARs would

appear t o be the same. In 1972, both the USA and USSR were

beginning modernitrtion programer for their early warning

networks involving the deployment of new LPARr. Artciler VI

coamitted the parties not to deploy new early warnlag radars

except at the periphery of their national territories, and

oriented outward. Due to their location and vulnerability,

radars deployed in this fashion would be ill-suited for ABU

battle-management.

However, at Soviet insistence, a further qualification to

the limits on LPARs, war appended to the treaty by Agreed

Statement F. This clause stated that an exception to the

rule would be provided for LPARr used for space-tracking or

verification, much LPARs could be located other than on the

periphery of the country and other than oriented outward.

The Soviet LPAR at Abalrkoro war located inland and was

oriented toward6 the north-eart, giving it coverage over at

least 3000 kmr of Soviet territory which did not qualify at

'0riented outward'. Due to tbir loophole provided by Agreed

S t a t e w n t P, the USSR had been able t o claim tbrt the rrdrr

war for rpace-tracking purporer, although tho overthelming

likelihood was that the radar war for early warning.

&b.lakoro clored tbe la8t cmplete gap in the Soviet early

warning network, mbicb should otbenire have lacked radar

coverage without thir inrtallation. It war rpecifically

oriented to detect tbe launch of US long-range C-4 and D-5

Sl,SWr deployed on the Trident rubmarine 'force in the

northern Pacific Ocean. It was moat likely a technical

violation of the ABW Treaty, even though it may not have

violated the rpirit of the agreement,. which sought to

prevent the deployment of ABY defenrer.

Until the radar operated, the Soviet care could not be

proved or disproved. The differencer between LPARs for

space-tracking and for brllirtic mirrile early warning are

not phgrically obrervable by national technical means of

verification, and relate mostly to the roftware or control

rgttemr, which govern the radar's operation. Once the radar

begin8 to operate, it emits rignals that may be monitored to

determine the function it ir rervinc at that time. But its

functions can be changed at any time, by manipulating there

r a m internal controls. The ABY Treaty contained no

rpecific interior or guidelines lor di8tinguirhing LPARr

from thore that were permitted for $pace-tracking and

rerfication, which hrd allowed varying 08 and 8oviet claimr

about h w the treaty provirionr related to their radar

programer.

The ABY Treaty Provisions governing LPARs had permitted the

USA as well as the USSR, to move toward8 action8 that might

not bavo been constituent with the 8pirit of the agreement.

Article V I of the treaty ClOlrlY prohibited the deployment

of new LPARs except 18 permitted for space-tracking,

verification, use at test ranger, and for early warning, if

on the periphery and oriented outward. It did not, however,

explicitly prohibit the modernization of exirting LPARa,

wherever tbey might have been.

44 In Leslie B Gelb's account, the USSR charged in 1985 that

US upgrading of two LPARs at Thule, Greenland and Flyingdale

Moors in the United Kingdom violated the Article VI

ttrictures that new radar8 for early warning could not be

deployed except on the periphery of US national territory

and oriented outwards.

According to the Soviet Union, modernization of there two

sites actually involved building a new radar and clearly,

neither of them were located on the US periphery and

oriented outward. Soviet Union a180 hinted, ju8t a8 the USA

had chclrged with regard to Abalrkor, that tbey believed the

purpose of upgrading t h e ~ e radar8 was to provide ABY battle-

44. k r l i e B Gelb, " Y o s c w Prop0808 to End r Dirpute on Siberia Radar", Wcr York Timer, 29 October 1085, p.1.

capabilities. T h e USA responded that tbese

radars were not for ballirtic missile defense and tbat their 45

modernization was not probibitad under treaty terms,

be extent of the planned US improvement of tbese facilities

raised tbe question of the dividing line between

Mderoization of OXirting rYSte.8 and the creation of radars

that represented a new level O f technology and thus were

errentially oew systems. Tbe problem8 faced by USA and USSR

while trying to implement, Article VI of the ABY Treaty,

showed tbat tbe treaty was not without its flaws,

contradictions and ambiguities.

ABM Treaty and Strategic Defence: In March 1983, most

strikingly, the Reagan Administrrtion announced that it

intended to mount s national rerearch effort directed

towards a nationwide space-based ballistic mirrile defeare

for tbe USA. The Soviet Union immediately took tbe porition

tbat rucb a programme would violate tbe ABM Treaty, Article

I of wbicb rtrter tbat:

45. Por Reagan Administration, reinterpretation roe, "The Treaty and the SDI PrOgraUIe," Testimony by Ambrsrador Paul B Uitee, Special Advimor on Arms Control Matters and Abraham D Safaer, h @ a l Advisor to the State Ikpartwnt before the Sub Conittee on Arms control, Int. Security and Science o f the Boure P o r e i ~ n Affairs - - . . . - -

Committee,' - 12 October 1985, US De~artment -of State, Bureau o f Public Affairs, Current Policy 10.755.

46 each party undertakes not to deploy ABY rystems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide for such a defense, and not to deploy ABY r y s t m u for defense of an individual weapon except as provided for in Article 111 of this Treaty.

47 Article I11 of the ABY Treaty permitted tv3 ABW systems to

be deployed by each country, around their national capitals

and around a single ICBM field. A 1974 protocol to the

treaty restricted each side to a single rite.

Several key treaty ambiguities surrounded the issue to

whether the US SDI programme would violate the ABM

rgreement. Perhaps the most important of these was

contained in Agreed State~aent D of the Treaty. This

provision stated thrt in the event of the emergence of ABM

systems based on "other physical principles" in which

coaponents not foreseen would be subject to discussion

through the Standing Consultative Co~ittee(SCC) and

possibly serve as the basis for amendment to the treaty.

This provision meant that systems based on "other physical

principles" could be puruued only if legitimized by future

amendments to the treaty; otherwise, they would be

46. See tbe ABY Treaty.

47. Ibid.

prohibited under Article I of tbe Treaty. Proponents of the

SDI brd neglected the lrtter rltnerrtive and rdvrnced r more

penisrive interpretrtion, while opponents preferred the

.ore restrictive reading of the trarty.

Otber ~ b i ~ u i t i e s in treaty prOVirion8 brd led to rimilrrly

dirsrging interpretrtion6. Tbe trerty probibited

*development or testing 02 ABY ryatear oe their components,

mbich are rer-brsed air-based, space-brsed, or mobile lrnd-

based." (Artilce V).

Vrs the US SDI progrrame purely r rererrcb programme even if

its ultimate rim mas to produce rn ABY system? Were rome

te:bnolo~ies under development in the 19801, rucb as lreerm,

permitted becruse they mere not prime factor connected with

an ABU system; or probibited becrure they could be

compcaentr of such r cyrtem? Agrin, the treaty provided

little guidance. There rmbiguitier rlloaed an intense

debate to develop within the USA in 1985 and 19136 end

between the USA m d USSR, rr the Reagan sdmiairtrrtion

sought to jurtify its SDI p r o g r a m by reinterpreting ABY

tnaty provision6 to p n i t rererrcb and developrent on

erotic SDI ryrtrmr.

Critics alleged that such interpretrtionr did not reflect 48

the latent or negotiating history of the trerty. lowever,

the ambiguities in the rcturl text of the trerty, Permitted

the Reagan Admi~i~trrti~n to build tomething of r care for

it8 reinterpretation,

S&T I rad Detente: The SALT procerr began at r time when

expectations for broad improvement in US-Soviet relrtionr

were running high. The Nixon-Kisaiger notion of r security

regime recognized the principle that such recurity regimes

were very difficult to achieve unless they were supported by

r network of common interests rad cooperrtive rrrrngements.

Even in retrospect, the principle reems round. The USA and

the Soviet Union hrd managed to avoid war for 25 yerrr in

1969 and r kind of modus vivendi had emerged for maarging

the intense politicrl rivrlry without resorting to war. The

48. Among many critiquer, ree Testimony of John B Rhinelrnder before the Subcommittee on Arms Control Internrtionrl Security rod Science of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Testiaony 24 April 1985. Christopher Prine, "The ABY Trerty : Looking for Loopboler," Bulletin of the Atomic 8cientist8, (Augurt/September 1983), pp.13-16. Gerard Smith, "How The Adminirtrrtion Anended the ABY Treaty," Letter to the Mew York Timer (23 October 1085), TOD Wicker, *Subverting r Treaty," Mew York Times, (25 October 1085), R Jeffry Smith Star Wrrr' Tests and the ABY Treaty,* Scieace ( 5 July

1985), pp.29-31.

tenet8 o f tbe nuclear p a c e are well-8tated by tewis Dunn 49

who said:

The stakes of the Soviet -Imer!can confrontation remained limited even at the height of the Cold la?. Neither country sought to challenge the territorial integrity or political independence, let alone the physical survival of the other. Despite periodic East-lest crises froa the late 19408 to the early 1 W O s over Western Europe'8 political orientation, neither power believed that recourse to military force and the ri8k of escalation to a nuclear exchange mas justified.

Additionally, the Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, though

reprehensible froa the American point of view, rent

unchallenged. The risks mere Just too great.

litb this 25-year history in mind, Kirsinger and others

developed policies aimed at codific&tion of the rtrtus quo

and the selrch for explicit rules and norms of behavior to

replace the tacit practire of restrrlnt. Patterned

behaviour could generate convergent expectation6 leading to

conventialized behaviour. This dercription mort certainly

fits postwar Soviet and American behaviour. Therefore,

while the preferences were pretty straightforward in SALT,

49. Lewle, A Duan, COntrOlllOg the Bomb, (New York, heatlstb Century Fund, 1982), See also the more detailed explanation o f Jobn k . 1 ~ Gaddis in 'The Long Peace, ' International security. 104, Spring 1886.

it war w r e Complex when it came to detente. In areas of

the world where in areas like the Third World, competition

was bound to continue, the avoidance of war was only one of

several agenda-items. This made the search for a broader

security regime difficult.

Statur of SALT - 1 Trertr: As SALT-I was of r limited

duration of five years and there was the expectation that it

would be replaced by a permanent Trerty, the SALT-I was an

Interim Agreement rather than a formal treaty. The Interim

Agreement formally expired on 20 October 1977. It had

originally been thought that five years would allow

sufficient time to negotiate a more comprehensive agreement.

A t the SALT-I1 trlkr continued beyond this date, both the

USA and Soviet Union pledged to contiae to observe the

Interim Agreement. In Yay 1986, President Rergrn formally

repudiated this political cosoitment to SALT-I. The USSR,

however, upto the beginning of the Bush Administrrtion,

reuined within the SALT-I Treaty limit8.

Succesr of the ABY.Trertp: The ABY Treaty is one of the

most important and rucce8sful arms control agreements to

date. The baric goal of the treaty bad unequirocally been

achieved. Beither power bad deployed a nationvide defenre

agriast etrrtegic ballistic mirriles. As Rorold Brown, the

former SQcretary of Defense bad rightly pur it in a

nutrhell, "Tbe Anti-Blllistic Yirrile Treaty i s the moat 50

substantial a g m e w a t . b i l e neither the ABY Treaty nor

tbe Interim Agreement succeeded in stopping the build-up in

offensive rtrategic forcer tbrt mas underray ia 1872, the

pace and scale of that build-up would have been creator bad

tbe ABY Treaty not cut the possibility of a miss:le defense

race at its start. In 1985, rs James Schleringer, the

former Secretary of Defense, rightly pointed ou:, *The ABY

Treaty has forestrlled rn explosion of otfenrivo development

on both cides. Back in the 19606, when the E.>viet Union

first started to deploy defenses around Yorcow, the United

States government war examining expanding offrctive forcer

up to 40-50,000 reentry bodies or warhead8 12 order to

penetrate those defenses. The ABY Treaty brr been the 5 1

cornerstone of restraint for the lart 13 pc~rs." By

averting a defensive rod offensive buildup, the ABY Trerty

bad contributed rubstantirlly to the rtrjility and

predictability of the rtrategic balance. In tbt rbrence of

tbe ABM Treaty, tbe rheer economic costs moult bare been

rtaggering. The US A n 8 Control and Dirarmawnt Agency baa

50. Ar quoted in Matthew ~um'r, loundatico for the Future : ?be ABM Treaty rod llationrl k c u i t , (Arar Control Aarociation, Varhington, D.C.. 1881), i . 1 7 .

conservatively estimated that one hundred billion dollars

had been avoided by Preventing an offense-defenre race over

the last two decades. The SALT-I Treaty succeeded a8 the

firrt bilateral arms control agreement between the two

powers.

TRE SIGII#G OF SALT I1 AND ITS MAIN PROVISIONS

The SALT 11 agreement in its completed version was signed by

President J i m y Carter and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev

in Vienna on 18 June 1979, Carter then had it transmitted

to the US Senate on 22 June 1979, for its advice and coneent

to ratification. SALT I1 was an extremely detailed and

technical document which had 19 Articles and nearly 100

explanatory 'Agreed Statements', and 'Common Underrtaadings'

which attempted to leave as few loopholes and ambiguities as

possible.

The SALT I1 Treaty, had it been ratified, would have

provided for: an equal aggregate limit on the number of

strategic number delivery vehicles - ICBM and SLBY

launcherr, beavy bombers, and air-to-air rurface ballirtic

mlrsiles ( A s ) . Tbis ceiling would hare been 2400 as

&(red at the Vladirostok S u a i t of 1974 between the leaders

of tbe two countrier. The ceiling would have been lowered

t o 2250 at the end of 1981; an equal aggregate limit of 1200

on the total number o f launchers of MIRVed ballistic

rnirsiles and heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles;

and an equal aggregate limit of 820 on launchers of MIRVed

ICBMs.

In addition to these numerical limits, the agreement would

have included: a ban on construction of additional fixed

ICBM launcherr, and on increases in the aumher of fixed

heavy ICBM launchers, a ban on heavy mobile ICBM launchers

and on launchers of beavy SLBMs and ASBMs; a ban on flight-

testing or deployment of new types of ICBMs, with an

exception of one new type o f light ICBM for each side, a ban

o a increasing the number of warheads on security types of

ICBMs and a limit of ten warheads on the one new type of

ICBM permitted to each party, a limit of 14 warheads on

SLBMs and 10 warheads on ASBMs. The number of long-range

cruise aissiles for heavy bombers would have been limited to

a n average of 28; and the number of long-range cruise

missiles for beavg bombers of existing types would have been

limited to 20; ceilings on the launch-weight and throw-

weight of strategic ballistic misrile and A ban on the

cooversion of light ICBM launcher-to-launcbrr of heavy ICBM6

- a ban on the Soviet 85-10 1 C W ; a ban on rapid relord ICBM

systems, a ban on certain new types of strateaic offennive

systems which were technologically feasible, but which had

not yet been developed. Such systems included long range

ballistic missiles on surface ships, and ballistic and

cruise missile llunchers on the seabeds; advance

notificatioa of certain ICBM test launcher; and an agreed

data base for systems included in various SALT-limited

crtegories. The Treaty included detailed definitions of

limited systems, provisions to enhance verification, a ban

on CirCUmVentiOn Of provisions of the agreement and a

provision outlining the duties of the SCC in connection with

the SALT I1 Treaty. The duration of the Treaty would have

been upto 1985. SALT 11, like SALT I, provided for the

verfication of compliance by National Technical Means (NTU),

In addition to extending the SALT I provisions prohibiting

interference with and concealment from NTM, SALT I1 included

a specific ban on encryption of missile telemetry when it

impeded verification of treaty compliance. Another

cooperative measure required aircraft with different

aissions (i.e., ALCY carrying bombers versus ordinary

bombers to be distinguishable through NTM by Functionllly

Related Observable Differences (PRODS). In addition to the

basic provisions and explanatory details o f the treaty, SALT

I1 also contained a protocol and a 'Joint Statement of

Principler'. Tbe protocol, which was to bave remained in

force until the end of 1981 would bave temporily banned the

deplopePt of mobile I C B M , SLCUS and GLCYs with ranges over

500 MS. The ultimate disposition of tbese systems was in

dispute during the SALT I1 negotiations and the protocol

delayed their deployment in order to allow some time for

discwrsion o f these systems in follow-on talks., The Joint

statement Committed tbe USA and USSR to seek 'significant

and substantial reductions' in follow-on negotiations on

nuclear arms for a SALT 111 agreement.

Status of SALT I1 Treatl: The US Senate resisted tbe SALT

I1 Treaty much more than it did the SALT I Interim Agreement

and the ABY Treaty. Its critics challenged both treaty's

basic provisions and also the broader relationship of the

Carter Administrations's Arms Control Policy to US foreign

and defense policies. After the Soviet Union's 1979

Afghanistan invasion, President Carter asked the Senate to

postpone consideration, but in March 1980, he pledged that

the USA would abide by the Treaty'r terms, provided the

Soviet UnFon did likewise. During Ronald Reagan's election

camprign, b e opposed the treaty and called it 'fatally

f a In 1981, Reagan formally announced that the USA

did mot intend t o ratify SALT I1 but pledged not to undercut

it i f the USSR showed equal restraint. Thereafter, US

adherence t o the treaty ceared to be a requireaent of

, n t e r n ~ t i ~ n a l law and instead became a question of political

cornmi tment.

The Soviet Union adopted the same no-undercut pblicy but

made it clear that it would not cut its forces to the

aggregate limit of 2500 (to have been reduced to 2250 by the

end of 1981) Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The

Soviets claimed that this provision, which would have

required sf gnif icant Soviet force reductions was

specifically tied in the treaty to the entry into force of

this treaty. Although not specifically required to do so,

:he Soviet Union also maintained that it had kept it's

internationalforces at or below its June 1979 level of 2504.

The Reagan administration announced in Yay 1986 that in

response to alleged Soviet violations of SALT 11, the USA

was terminating its commitment to the "SALT structure". The

L'SA remained in tecnical compliance with SALT I 1 until

Sovember 1986, when the ongoing conversion of 8-52 aircraft

to carry cruise missiles put tbe USA over the 1320 limit on

the number o f MIRVed missiles and ALCY carrying bombers.

The USSR too, on its part, indicated that it intended to

continue to abide by the SALT I 1 limits, and until 1989, the

evidence indicated that it had remained within the sublimits

of the treaty.

~ f f e c t s of SALT I and SALT 11 on Strategic Nuclear Weapons

00th the SALT accords are historic landmarks in the sphere

,f strategic nuclear weaponry. For the first time, USA and

~ S S R agreed on reductions in both offensive or defensive

strrtegic weapons that were of the state-of-the art

technology, thus, halting to a certain extent, the mad

spiralling nuclear arms race between the two countries.

Both countries had realised that they possessed in their

respective nuclear arsenals enough weapons to wipe each

other out and also the world many times over - they vere on

a MAD mode and had an overkill arsenal, With the

development of eacb new offensive or defensive strategic

weapon, the other country would take counter-measures to

both acquire that technology and also to admit the new

seapons by counter-acting its capabilities. Thus, the arms

race threatened to become a never - ending cycle towards

vertical proliferation unless serious steps were taken to

reduce or halt this process. The USA and USSR recognlred

this need and through the signing of the SALT accords, they

took step8 t o halt the dangerous arms race which was eating

into a major portion of the economy - finance which would

have been better utilired for other a8pectr for the welfare

of the country's citizens. The accordr were ruccerrful in

halting the MAD arms-race to a certrin extent. The

provision o f NTY o f verification were very useful for future

,ccords which would have even more intensive forms of

~crification. Finally, the SALT treaties laid the

fcundation for more comprehensive forms of future strategic

nuclear rccorde.