charting dynamic trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

38
 Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna Q1 Charting Dynamic Trajectories: Multinational Enterprises in India In this arti cle, we provide a synthesi zing framework that we call the  dynamic trajectories framewor k to study the evolution of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in host countries over time.  We argue that a change in the policy environment in a host country presents an MNE with two sets of interr el at ed decisions. First, the MNE has to decide whether to enter, exit, or stay in the host country at the onset of each policy epoch; second, conditional on the  rst choice, it has to decide on its local responsi veness st rategy at the onset of each poli cy epoch. India, which experienced two policy shocks shutting down to MNEs in 1970 and then opening up again in 1991 offers an interesting laboratory to explore the dynamic trajec- tories perspective. We collect and analyze a unique dataset of all entry and exit events for Fortune 50 and FTSE 50 rms (as of 1991) in Indi a in the peri od from 1858 to 2013 and, addi ti on- ally, we document detailed case studies of four MNEs (that arguably represent outliers in our sample). I n a report published in November 2012,  Computerworld  reported that IBMs India workforce likely exceeded the size of the U.S. IBM  workforce. 1 Earlier, in March 2009, IBM was in the news for outsourcing thousands of technology jobs from the United States to India.  Business- Week reported that the worldwide workforce at IBM went from 386,558 at the end of 2007 to 398,000 at the end of 2008. But U.S. IBM employ- ment fell from 121,000 to 115,000 during the same time. These develop- ments were ironi c for a rm that was asked to le ave Indi a in 1977 because it refused to comply with local regulations. IBMs exit from India and S000768051300144Xjra pp: 138 Techset Composition Ltd, Salisbury, U.K. 2/1 5/2014 The authors wish to thank Mohit Agarwal for his help as a research analyst on this project. 1 Patrick Thibodeau,  In a Symbolic Shift, IBMs India Workforce Likely Exceeds U.S.,Computerworld , 29 Nov. 201 2, ava il able athttp://www.computerworld.com/s/article/ 9234101/In_a _symbolic_shift_IBM_s _India_workforce_likely_exceeds_U.S.; Web site accessed on 26 July 2013.  Busine ss History Review 88 (Spring 2014): 138. doi:10.1017/S000768051300144X © 2014 The President and Fellows of Harvard College. ISSN 0007-6805; 2044-768X (Web). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 422 43

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Page 1: Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 138

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun KhannaQ1

Charting Dynamic Trajectories Multinational

Enterprises in India

In this article we provide a synthesizing framework that we callthe ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to study the evolution of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in host countries over time

We argue that a change in the policy environment in a hostcountry presents an MNE with two sets of interrelateddecisions First the MNE has to decide whether to enter exitor stay in the host country at the onset of each policy epochsecond conditional on the 1047297rst choice it has to decide on itslocal responsiveness strategy at the onset of each policy epoch India which experienced two policy shocksmdashshuttingdown to MNEs in 1970 and then opening up again in 1991mdashoffers an interesting laboratory to explore the ldquodynamic trajec-toriesrdquo perspective We collect and analyze a unique dataset of

all entry and exit events for Fortune 50 and FTSE 50 1047297rms (asof 1991) in India in the period from 1858 to 2013 and addition-ally we document detailed case studies of four MNEs (thatarguably represent outliers in our sample)

In a report published in November 2012 Computerworld reported

that IBMrsquos India workforce likely exceeded the size of the US IBM

workforce1 Earlier in March 2009 IBM was in the news for outsourcing

thousands of technology jobs from the United States to India Business-

Week reported that the worldwide workforce at IBM went from 386558

at the end of 2007 to 398000 at the end of 2008 But US IBM employ-

ment fell from 121000 to 115000 during the same time These develop-

ments were ironic for a 1047297rm that was asked to leave India in 1977 because

it refused to comply with local regulations IBMrsquos exit from India and

S000768051300144Xjra pp 1ndash38 Techset Composition Ltd Salisbury UK 2152014

The authors wish to thank Mohit Agarwal for his help as a research analyst on this project1Patrick Thibodeau ldquoIn a Symbolic Shift IBMrsquos India Workforce Likely Exceeds USrdquo

Computerworld 29 Nov 2012 available athttpwwwcomputerworldcomsarticle

9234101In_a_symbolic_shift_IBM_s_India_workforce_likely_exceeds_US Web siteaccessed on 26 July 2013

Business History Review 88 (Spring 2014) 1ndash38 doi101017S000768051300144X

copy 2014 The President and Fellows of Harvard College ISSN 0007-6805 2044-768X (Web)

1

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422

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subsequent reentry was in stark contrast to the continued presence in

India of multinationals such as Unilever and British American Tobacco

(BAT)

In this article we develop a historical perspective on the policy regime change related to multinationals in India and describe using

both time series and across-home-country variation the different

reactions of multinational enterprises (MNEs) to the same policy

events We analyze the events through two epochsmdashIndia shutting

down to MNEs in the 1970s and reopening to MNEs in 1991 (ie 1991

onward)mdashand develop insights into how multinationals chart varied

dynamic trajectories during these two epochs We argue that for an

MNE such a change in policy environment represents two sets of

decisions First the MNE had to decide whether to exit or stay in Indiain the 1970s and then whether or not to reenter in the 1990s (conditional

on exiting in the 1970s) Second at the onset of each policy epoch the

MNE had to decide on continuity or change in its local responsiveness

strategy represented by investments in the input side (manufacturing

plants plantations trademarks patents and talent) output side (func-

tional focus product mix pricing distribution etc) and host country

government relationships We also argue that both the direction (ie

what lever the MNE uses to change local responsiveness investment

in physical intellectual or human capital or modi1047297

cations in functionalfocus and product mix) and the degree (ie the extent) of change in local

responsiveness are endogenous to the decision to stayexitenter As an

example if an MNE decides to stay at the onset of a negative policy

epoch it might decide to focus on changing its local responsiveness strat-

egy on the input side and concentrate less on drastically changing the

product or functional mix for reasons of continuity However if the

MNE follows an exitreenter strategy it might be able to drastically

alter its functional and product mix on reentry after several decades

as there are fewer concerns about continuity with the passage of timeInvestments in the input side also generate employmentmdasha lever used

to navigate dif 1047297cult government negotiations

Given these strategic choices to be made at the onset of both policy

epochs MNEs have a choice of decisions leading to possible dynamic

trajectories in the host country We will detail this ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo

framework later We also collect and analyze a unique dataset of all entry

and exit events for Fortune 50 and FTSE 50 1047297rms in India in the period

from 1858 to 2013 and additionally we document four detailed case

studies of Anglo-Dutch British and American MNEs to develop thedynamic trajectories perspective The four case studies developed

using archival and other data gathered from multiple sources such as

LinkedIn arguably represent extremes in our sample While the two

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 2

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European multinationals Unilever and BAT followed a well-crafted

ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multinationals Coca-Cola and

IBM successfully executed an ldquoexitreenterrdquo strategy The study of

extreme differences in strategy is intended to identify large differencesin the adoption of dynamic trajectories We start the analysis with a

description of the policy regime in India prior to 1970

Indian Policy toward MNEs Prior to 1970

Business historians have long studied the history of multinational

1047297rms in India Tirthankar Roy in his article in this special issue of the

Business History Review provides a history of foreign trading 1047297rms in

colonial India He outlines how European trading 1047297rms started inCalcutta as agency houses and attracted Scottish Welsh English

German and French capitalists Some of these 1047297rms moved inland and

focused on indigo processing factories while the rest remained in

Calcutta and conducted three functions related to the indigo trade ship-

ping 1047297nancing and insurance After the Indian mutiny ended and

Crown rule began in 1858 ldquo born-industrialrdquo foreign 1047297rms that had

become industrial after a relatively short period in trading entered

India Examples of such 1047297rms included Andrew Yule in tea jute and

coal McLeod Russell in tea Balmer Lawrie in engineering and coaland Bird Brothers in jute and coal2

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Geoffrey Jones docu-

ments the evolution of India as a destination of inward foreign direct

investment (FDI) over time In 1914 India was ranked eighth (behind

the US Russia Canada Argentina Brazil South Africa and Austria-

Hungary) in terms of inward FDI In 1929 India ranked third only

behind Canada and the United States3 B R Tomlinson provides

several estimates of FDI in India from 1921 to 19604 By 2002 according

to Jonesrsquos estimates India had fallen way behind as a destination forinward FDI with only 04 percent of the world total FDI In his book Dis-

lodging Multinationals Indiarsquo s Strategy in Comparative Perspective

political scientist Dennis Encarnation describes the decline of British

colonial agencies and the evolution of Indian business houses and new

British multinationals in India over time starting with independence

in 1947 He outlines ldquoThe Indianization of Colonial Enterprisesrdquo post-

2

Tirthankar Roy ldquo

Trading Firms in Colonial Indiardquo

Business History Review 88 (Spring2014)3 Geoffrey Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism (Oxford 2005) ch 104 B R Tomlinson ldquoForeign Private Investment in India 1920ndash1950rdquo Modern Asian

Studies (1978) 657 Table 1

Multinational Enterprises in India 3

87

88

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19475 Given that the London and Liverpool headquarters of these

agencies were not able to invest overseas Indian business houses

began to invest capital in the British agencies and by mid-1948

Indian businesses held more than 85 percent of the equity in colonialmanaging agencies The takeover of British business interests in India

particularly in Bengal was largely engineered by Marwari business

groups (including the Birla family Juggilal Kamalpat and Surajmull

Nagarmull) Tomlinson provides a detailed account of this shift in own-

ership6 In her classic study of the history of American multinationals

The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise business historian Mira

Wilkins documents that US direct investment in India in 1929 was

$327 million a mere 04 percent of the total US direct investment

abroad ($755 billion)

7

Postindependence the institutional environment for multinational

1047297rms changed quite rapidly In his article ldquoTreatment of Foreign Enter-

prise in Indiardquo legal scholar Matthew Kust writes ldquoforeign enterprise no

longer has its own way as it did when India was under foreign rule rdquo On

April 6 1949 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru released a policy

statement on foreign enterprise in the Constitutional Assembly of India

stating ldquo As a rule the major interest in ownership and effective control

of an undertaking should be in Indian hands Government will not

object to foreign capital having control of a concern for a limitedperiod if it is found to be in the national interestrdquo During the 1047297rst

years of independence foreign enterprise almost never gained majority

ownership of a new industry Kust notes that one ldquonotable exception was

the licensing of three oil re1047297neries to Stanvac Caltex and Burmah-Shell

during the early 1950s where 100 percent foreign ownership was

grantedrdquo8 Majority ownership by foreign enterprise was a rare exception

with only twenty-six of more than four hundred collaboration agree-

ments concluded in 1961 giving the foreign company majority owner-

ship In addition in 1955 the Fourth Amendment to the IndianConstitution removed from the scope of judicial review the adequacy

of compensation upon state acquisition of private property and business

interests After this amendment India nationalized the Kolar gold

mines which had been completely British-owned and the Imperial

Bank of India (later the State Bank of India) and the life insurance

5 Dennis Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals Indiarsquo s Strategy in Comparative Per-spective (Ithaca NY 1989) ch 2

6 B R Tomlinson ldquoColonial Firms and the Decline of Colonialism in Eastern India 1914ndash

47rdquo

Modern Asian Studies (1981) 455ndash

867 Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise American Business Abroad from 1914ndash1970 (Cambridge Mass 1974) 59 Table 34

8Matthew J Kust ldquoTreatment of Foreign Enterprise in Indiardquo Rutgers Law Review 17(1962) 364 354

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 4

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business which had minority foreign ownership In his book Foreign

Enterprise in India Kust described the policy instruments on industry

classi1047297cation licensing capital controls and taxation employed by the

government of India to protect ldquo

new (domestic) industryrdquo9

In the years leading to 1970 Indiarsquos policy toward multinational

1047297rms was captured in a central planning policy document known as

the ldquoFive-Year Planrdquo The 1047297rst Five-Year Plan (1951ndash1956) outlined

that foreign investment was allowed where the nation needed new pro-

duction lines where special skills not available locally were required

and where the domestic production volume was insuf 1047297cient to meet

demand and there was no expectation that indigenous industry could

expand quickly In 1961 the government also released a list of industries

where foreign investment was particularly welcome noting the gaps inproduction capacity of the nation The list included extremely pro1047297table

industries such as pharmaceuticals aluminum and fertilizers This

policy regime attracted several multinational corporations particularly

pharmaceutical companies to India In 1970 in fact India was home

to forty-six foreign pharmaceutical companies The Hathi Committee

of 1975 noted the evolution of pharmaceutical MNEs setting up manufac-

turing subsidiaries in India These companies were attracted to India

because of its large domestic market mild drug control measures

limited competition and tax concessions The government also sentout invitations to MNEs such as Glaxo General Motors and Ford

Motor to invest in India with an informal suggestion to include local

equity MNE investments increased substantially in the 1957ndash1963

period10

However foreign 1047297rms did face certain constraints in conducting

business in India The Indian currency the rupee was nonconvertible

and high tariffs and import licensing prevented foreign goods from

reaching the market Any business that wanted to operate in India

needed a license and several permits Multiple restrictions required com-panies to go through several government departments before getting

permission to set up shop in India A 1047297rm would have to get the green

1047298ag from up to eighty agencies before it was granted a license to

produce in India Even after getting a license the state interfered in

matters like the nature of the item produced and the quantity and

pricing of the 1047297nished product (in certain industries) The state also pre-

vented laying off workers and closing factories as well as limiting the

9

Matthew J Kust Foreign Enterprise in India Laws and Policies (Chapel Hill 1964)10 Medha Kudaisya The Oxford India Anthology of Business History (Oxford 2011) AmarNayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Developing Country(New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 and Nagesh Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Indus-trial Organization The Case of India (Thousand Oaks Calif 1994) ch 1

Multinational Enterprises in India 5

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number of licenses it issued in each industry Each industry had a cap on

licenses usually four or 1047297 ve for the whole nation creating a monopolistic

market Investors focused on procuring licenses rather than on improv-

ing their services and products Owing to the limited number of players alicense guaranteed pro1047297ts Thus regulation with extreme controls on

FDI along with a high tariff wall sheltered domestic companies from

overseas competition This policy emerged from the nationrsquos socialist

viewpoint and the prior experience of colonial exploitation but this

monopolistic situation hurt the country rsquos overall infrastructure

1970 India Shuts Down to MNEs

In the early 1970s the Indian government gradually began tighten-

ing the regulatory noose on MNEs operating in the country This shift

was driven by a concerted effort by the Indian state and local 1047297rms to

ldquodislodgerdquo multinationals from India Encarnation outlines a ldquocausal

modelrdquo of how MNEs were dislodged from India In the 1047297rst step local

1047297rms gained 1047297nancial independence and managerial autonomy from

MNEs in the second step Indian 1047297rms began to secure technology

free of foreign capital and in the third step Indian 1047297rms acquired

control of markets previously dominated by MNEs11

From a policy point of view this converged into two new policies

designed to control Indiarsquos economic resources and foreign interests

especially to curb the out1047298ow of capital in the form of earnings Both

of these policy instruments directly affected multinational 1047297rms We

1047297rst examine the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA)

FERA was passed by an act of Parliament in 1973 and came into

effect on January 1 1974 This act consolidated and amended the pre-

vious FERA Act of 1947 FERA rsquos goal was to restrict dealings in foreign

exchange and other securities that could impact the nationrsquos currency

and foreign exchange reserves The act had a provision to cap the

foreign investment in all companies operating in the nation and

foreign companies had to dilute their shareholdings to 40 percent

FERA also vested power in the hands of the Reserve Bank of India

(RBI) to regulate the foreign equity in the companies operating in

India and to ensure that the cap was maintained As a result all compa-

nies came under the direct control of the Reserve Bank of India 12 All

1047297rms operating in India with more than 40 percent foreign equity had

to obtain permission from the RBI to continue operations after

11 Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals12 Harpreet Dusanjh and AS Sidhu ldquoPolicy Framework for Multinational Corporations in

India A Historical Perspectiverdquo Indian Journal of Economics and Business (2010) 527ndash29

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 6

216

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January 1 1974 FERA affected already-established foreign companies in

India that had foreign equity stakes exceeding 40 percent and it applied

regardless of a 1047297rmrsquos initial terms and conditions FERA also outlined

that all companies operating in India (with the exception of foreignairline shipping and banking companies) would be incorporated

under the Indian Companies Act which would curb tax-free out1047298ows

of pro1047297ts Additionally the maximum foreign equity percentage stake

differed by industry Violations of FERA would incur criminal charges13

Out of the 881 companies that applied to the RBI only 150 compa-

nies were allowed to keep a higher level of foreign equity than the pre-

scribed cap the others diluted to 1047297t the ambit of FERA Companies

that found the terms unacceptable began to wind up operations in

India Fifty-four companies applied to exit India by 1977ndash

1978 andnine companies applied to exit in 1980ndash198114

1970 Patent Act Spurs Reverse Engineering in Pharmaceuticals

In addition to FERA the Indian government introduced the Patent

Act of 1970 and this policy change had far-ranging implications for both

multinational and domestic 1047297rms particularly in the pharmaceutical

industry The two policy instruments FERA and the new patent act were introduced within a span of three years and represented parallel

attempts to tighten control of MNEs In accordance with Encarnationrsquos

causal model of dislodging MNEs the new patent act intended to level

the playing 1047297eld for Indian 1047297rms in the domain of intellectual property15

As of 1970 multinational companies controlled 68 percent of the

market share in Indiarsquos pharmaceuticals These multinationalsmdash with

the support of the Patent Act of 1911mdashprevented local Indian companies

from manufacturing new drugs The patent law allowed the MNEs a

monopolistic position and they used their stronghold on the market tocharge extremely high prices resulting in little access to medicines for

the Indian masses

The Indian government replaced the Patent Act of 1911 and also

decided to introduce drug price controls through the Drug Price

Control Order of 1970 The Patent Act of 1970 represented a set of

rules that laid out the legal management of intellectual property in

India The act was a keystone in the nationrsquos treatment of intellectual

property

13Kudaisya The Oxford India Anthology of Business History Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Industrial Organization

14 Nayak Multinationals in India15 Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Multinational Enterprises in India 7

259

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3002

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The central piece of the patent law was that it recognized only

process patents and not product patents in the pharmaceutical and agro-

chemical sectors It also reduced the patent period from sixteen years to

seven years in these sectors and to fourteen years in other cases Thisprocess patent regime triggered reverse engineering in the Indian

pharmaceutical sector for drugs patented in other countries Indian com-

panies could now discover alternate processes for manufacturing drugs

that were not patented in India16

In summary from 1970 to 1990 FERA and the Indian Patent Act of

1970 had leveled the playing 1047297eld for Indian 1047297rms with regard to MNEs

FERA gave Indian 1047297rms 1047297nancial and managerial autonomy from

foreigners and the patent act gave Indian 1047297rms an opportunity to

reverse engineer products

1991 India Reopens Doors to MNEs

By the early 1990s India was deep in an economic crisis triggered by

both political and economic factors The two years prior to 1991 had seen

political turmoil with four prime ministers and four 1047297nance ministers

This led to unclear policies and virtual economic paralysis The years

before 1991 saw increased defense expenditures reduced tax revenue

slow growth in the export market and a lack of a coherent budget which brought about an ever-increasing de1047297cit and in1047298ation FERA

was hampering Indiarsquos ability to compete with other countries During

the Persian Gulf War of 1990ndash91 India had purchased oil at an extre-

mely high price and instability in the Middle East affected India as

well Additional problems included an annual rate of in1047298ation of 17

percent an unsustainably large 1047297scal de1047297cit and widespread 1047298ight of

capital The need for economic reform was further accentuated by the

collapse of the Soviet Union a country with which India had had

strong political and economic ties A major concern in 1991 was the unprecedented possibility that

India would default on its external debt something that had not hap-

pened since independence Indiarsquos foreign debt stood at $72 billion

making it the worldrsquos third-largest debtor after Brazil and Mexico This

growth in debt was rapid as the foreign debt of the nation stood at

$205 billion in 1980 In 1991 India had only $11 billion in its hard cur-

rency reserves enough for only two weeks of imports Realizing that it

did not have enough money to pay for its imports and was nearly bank-

rupt India reconsidered its stance on Western in1047298uence The govern-ment entered talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to

16 Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Industrial Organization

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 8

302

303

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seek emergency aid India needed more than $5 billion from the IMF to

meet its immediate obligations Taking such a huge loan from the IMF

would grant the IMF substantial lobbying power with India as the inter-

national body disbursed loans under ldquo

conditions that often includedaltering policies viewed by the fund as mistaken or counterproductiverdquo17

Among the IMFrsquos demands was a reduction of the budget de1047297cit a

decrease in the licensing requirements for companies opening doors

for foreign companies and liberalizing investment

Though India was traditionally socialist in its policies after indepen-

dence this was not the country rsquos 1047297rst attempt at economic liberalization

A prior attempt in 1966 was reversed in 1967 after which a stronger

socialistic model was adopted The next major attempt was in 1985

driven by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi it came to an end in 1987 Thefour or 1047297 ve licensed producers in each industry were instrumental in

blocking the 1980s reforms18

Spurred by the IMF in 1991 the government of Prime Minister

P V Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh pushed

for structural policy reform These policies included opening the

country to international trade and investment deregulation privatiza-

tion of state-owned entities tax reforms and in1047298ation-controlling

measures The country went through a deregulation makeovermdashone

that encouraged foreign investmentSince 1991 arguably India has sustained the spirit of liberalization

despite changing governments making these reforms more sustainable

This liberalization resulted in Indiarsquos rising GDP growth peaking at 9

percent in 200719 With economic reforms came relaxation of the FDI

norms While the GDP growth of the nation prior to 1990 was a little

under 4 percent on average the GDP growth postreform stood at

between 6 and 7 percent toward the end of the 1990s20

FERA was repealed in 1999 by the government of Prime Minister

Atal Bihari Vajpayee The less stringent Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) replaced it loosening restrictions on foreign exchange and

investment in India FEMA was more aligned to the new economic

17 Bernard Weinraub ldquoEconomic Crisis Forcing Once Self-Reliant India to Seek Aidrdquo New York Times 29 June 1991 available at httpwwwnytimescom19910629worldeconomic-crisis-forcing-once-self-reliant-india-to-seek-aidhtml Web site accessed on 21Oct 2013

18Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson Why Nations Fail The Origins of Power Prosperity and Poverty (New York 2012)

19

Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook India available at httpswwwciagovlibrarypublicationsthe-world-factbookgeosinhtmlEcon Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

20BBC News ldquoIndia The Economyrdquo 3 Dec 1998 available at httpnewsbbccouk2hisouth_asia55427stm Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 9

345

346

347

348

349

350

351

352

353

354

355

356

357

358

359

360

361

362

363

364

365

366

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368

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370

371

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373

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377

378

379

380

381

382

383

384

385

3862

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reforms the nation was witnessing FEMA made all violations regarding

foreign exchange civil not criminal offenses making it more investor

friendly FEMA tried to consolidate legislation relating to foreign

exchange in India with an ultimate goal of allowing external trade andpayments and to facilitate the development of a foreign exchange

market in India The reforms also immediately reduced the number of

steps required to procure a license to four or 1047297 ve approvals mainly

environmental Most goods underwent a tariff cut apart from goods in

the consumer sector

Indian Patent Reform Starting 1999

Following FEMA the Indian patent system underwent a number of reforms starting in 1999 triggered when India signed the agreement on

Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) at the

World Trade Organization and joined the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)

Product patents in medicine food and agrochemicals were now

allowed and the patent expiry period was extended to twenty years

similar to that in the US The average time required to get a patent

was reduced from 1047297 ve to three years The patent 1047297ling fee did not

change during this period and remained substantially less compared to

that of the United States Patent and Trademark Of 1047297ce (USPTO) Thepatent system also granted exclusive marketing rights (EMRs) based

on patents granted this enabled multinational 1047297rms with patents to

derive competitive advantage in selling their patented products In the

past twenty years Indian patent law has been amended three timesmdash

in 1999 2002 and 2005mdashto increase compatibility with TRIPs and to

allay MNEsrsquo fears of intellectual property theft

With the Indian patent reforms a lot of MNEsrsquo worries regarding

intellectual property protection seemed to disappear An analysis of

Indian patent 1047297lings shows a steep rise in the total number of patents1047297led in India with an in1047298exion point in 1997 This increase is attributed

to positive expectations about the 1999 reforms From 1995 to 2004

MNEs from fourteen countries 1047297led a total of 8426 patents of which

MNEs from the US 1047297led the most (2477 patents) followed by 1047297rms

from Germany and Switzerland Patent applications by foreign MNEs

in India started increasing further around 2000 and have been increas-

ing ever since The EMR ldquomailboxrdquo provisions and the belief that India

would abide by TRIPS gave MNEs con1047297dence leading to a surge in the

number of applications In contrast Indian entities 1047297led 1486 appli-cations in the same period21 The number of patents 1047297led in India

21 Analysis conducted by researchers

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 10

388

389

390

391

392

393

394

395

396

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412

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414

415

416

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418

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420

421

422

423

424

425

426

427

428

4292

430

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ranged between 2000 and 4000 patents per year from the early 1970s

all the way to 1993 Post-1993 there was a rapid increase in the number

of patent 1047297lings with a spike of around 10000 patents per year in 1997 in

anticipation of the 1999 reforms

22

MNEs Stream into India Analysis of Fortune 50and FTSE 50 MNEs

With the initiation of economic reforms India attracted unprece-

dented foreign direct investment Average annual FDI rose from $100

million in the mid-1980s to around $2 billion in the mid-1990s The

stock of FDI rose from less than $2 billion in 1991 to almost $39

billion in 200423 The World Investment Report (WIR) of 2007 indicatesthat the 1990 inward stock level of FDI was roughly $17 billion the 2000

inward stock was $175 billion and the 2004 inward stock was $387

billion The city of Bangalore became one of the largest magnets of

foreign investment in India in 2001ndash2002 alone a total of 230 MNEs

setupof 1047297ces in Bangalorersquos industrial parks employing 25000 engineers

In this section we analyze unique data that documents every entry

and exit event for each Fortune 50 and FTSE 50 multinational 1047297rm

The entry and exit events were tracked from 1858 to 2013 and multiple

data sources were used including historical narratives of several 1047297rmsSEC company 1047297lings (the complete list of subsidiaries was found in

Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm) and data on company registration

in India from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Govern-

ment of India As the Fortune 50 and the FTSE 50 lists have changed over

time we have compiled data for the lists as of 1991 as well as 2013 In our

primary analyses and in the Appendix we use the Fortune and FTSE lists

from 1991 the year of the IMF-induced reforms

There are several limitations in conducting historical analysis using

currently available primary data Wilkins describes these limitations assometimes introducing ldquo blinders that obscured important past occur-

rencesrdquo24 To circumvent some of these constraints in addition to con-

ducting our own primary research we based our analyses on prior

articles in business history on multinational entry in India25 Appendix

22 Information from Technology Information Forecasting and Assessment Council(TIFAC)

23Chandana Chakraborty and Peter Nunnenkamp ldquoEconomic Reforms FDI and Econ-omic Growth in India A Sector Level Analysisrdquo World Development 36 no 7 (2008)

1192ndash

121224Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Conti-nents new ed with new intro by Mira Wilkins (Cambridge UK 2011) 11

25For example Tomlinson ldquoForeign Private Investment in India 1920ndash1950rdquo Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 A History (Oxford 1993) Wilkins and

Multinational Enterprises in India 11

431

432

433

434

435

436

437

438

439

440

441

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443

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467

468

469

470

471

4722

473

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Table 1 documents the data on the entry and exit of Fortune 50 multina-

tional 1047297rms as of 1991 with operations in India over the period 1905ndash

1999 Appendix Table 2 documents the data for the FTSE 50 1047297rms as

of 1991 with operations between 1847 and 1999

26

Analysis of the data in these tables reveals several interesting

insights In comparison to the FTSE 50 Fortune 50 MNEs exhibit

greater number of entries but also greater numbers of exit events

While Fortune 50 1047297rms have a total of forty entry events the FTSE 50

1047297rms only have twenty entry events On the other hand FTSE 50 1047297rms

have a total of two exit events in this period while Fortune 50 1047297rms

have a total of eleven exit events Between 1971 and 1990 Fortune 50

1047297rms have a total of seven exit events while FTSE 50 1047297rms only have

one exit eventIn addition Fortune and FTSE 1047297rms had differences in functional

focus Fortune 50 1047297rms had a more balanced focus in terms of manufac-

turing and salesservices while FTSE 50 1047297rms had a greater focus on

salesservices Also the Fortune 50 1047297rms show a slightly higher concen-

tration on RampD in India compared to the FTSE 5027

We compare the entry mode of both categories of 1047297rms as well as

study whether the 1047297rms entered solo or otherwise A non-solo entry

refers to an entry through acquisition or a joint venture (JV) whereas

a solo entry represents the 1047297

rm entering by itselfThere is a small business history literature on MNEsrsquo choice of entry

model (joint ventures vs acquisition vs solo entry but this has not

included the case of India)28 Encarnation does describe the evolution

of joint ventures between multinational 1047297rms and Indian business

houses From 1948 to 1957 the Indian government prohibited foreign

takeovers of existing local 1047297rms and proscribed foreign-owned portfolio

investments India averaged fewer than forty new foreign collaborations

Hill American Business Abroad Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones Entrepre-neurship and Multinationals Global Business and the Making of the Modern World (Chel-tenham 2013) ch 8 Harold van B Cleveland and Thomas F Huertas Citibank 1812ndash1970(Cambridge Mass 1985) Ralph W Hidy and Muriel E Hidy Pioneering in Big Business1882ndash1911 (New York 1955) and Henrietta M Larson Evelyn H Knowlton and Charles SPopple History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) New Horizons 1927 ndash1950(New York 1971)

26 An entry in our sample indicates opening of the Indian subsidiary with a well-de1047297nedmandate to sell manufacture conduct RampD etc An exit in our sample indicates closingdown of the Indian subsidiary andor a visible shutting down of all operations in India

Coding was done by two independent research analysts and validation was done by theauthors in case of disagreement between the analysts The tables here have been condensedplease contact the authors for the full tables with data to 2013

27Pure RampD entry referring to an entry with the only function of the 1047297rm as RampD in India28For example Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 4

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 12

474

475

476

477

478

479

480

481

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484

485

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487

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489

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491

492

493

494

495

496

497

498

499

500

501

502

503

504

505

506

507

508

509

510

511

512

513

514

5152

516

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annually in this period most of them with Indian business houses such

as Tata (which had sixty joint ventures with foreign partners by 1958)

Mahindra and Bangur The years from 1947 to 1957 also witnessed the

takeover of the British colonial managing agencies by the Indian business houses Encarnation also documents a foreign exchange crisis

that affected India in 1957 that led to a reversal of government policy

toward JVs Government regulators began encouraging Indian 1047297rms to

seek foreign equity and local enterprises that secured foreign tie-ups

also had better chances of securing the licenses needed for expansion

Encarnation indicates that JVs with foreign multinationals started dra-

matically increasing from 1958 and hit peak levels during 1964

However JVs with foreign multinationals started declining in the late

1960s and as a result stocks of foreign equity invested in the privatesector began to shrink and reached their lowest levels in 1973 the year

government policy 1047298ipped again with the passage of FERA29 Our analy-

sis is an attempt to augment this narrative

The Fortune 50 1047297rms exhibited a preference towards solo entry

before 1970 (62 percent of entries) However between 1971 and 1990

90 percent of the Fortune 50 entries were either a JV or an acquisition

In the 1990s the Fortune 50 1047297rms increased the percentage of solo entry

to 375 percent FTSE 50 1047297rms were more stable with only a single solo

entry between 1971 and 1990 and post-1991 83 percent of entries wereeither a JV or an acquisition in both periods

The Dynamic Trajectories Framework

Our analysis of selected MNEs reveals important distinctions in the

trajectories followed by British or Anglo-Dutch and American multina-

tional 1047297rms over four decades There are differences in whether or not

they exited India in the 1970s and in how they crafted their local respon-

siveness strategies both in the 1970s and the 1990s We now outline anew ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to show that adopting certain

strategic decisions at the onset of different policy epochs leads to path

dependencies resulting in different long-term trajectories for the focal

1047297rm in the host country The dynamic trajectories framework is based

on the premise of two policy epochs in a host country mdashone unwelcoming

of MNEs (ldquonegative epochrdquo) and the other welcoming of MNEs (ldquopositive

epochrdquo) A focal host country could experience a negative epoch followed

by a positive epoch or vice versa

We argue that an MNE manager in the host country must make twosets of decisions at the onset of each policy epoch The 1047297rst decision is

29Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 60

Multinational Enterprises in India 13

517

518

519

520

521

522

523

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527

528

529

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531

532

533

534

535

536

537

538

539

540

541

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543

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548

549

550

551

552

553

554

555

556

557

5582

559

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whether or not to be present in the host country during either or both

policy epochs Here we assume that the MNE is present in the host

country prior to the start of the 1047297rst epoch If the negative epoch is fol-

lowed by the positive epoch the manager has to decide whether to exitor stay at the onset of the negative epoch Also conditional on exiting

in the negative epoch the manager also has to decide whether or not

to reenter at the onset of the positive epoch We also assume that con-

ditional on staying at the onset of the negative epoch the manager

decides to stay during the positive epoch An MNE thus must face

three possible choices exitreenter exitdo not reenter or staystay30

However if the positive epoch is followed by the negative epoch the

manager has two possible choices stayexit or staystay We assume

that the MNE stays during the positive epochThe second decision set relates to whether or not the manager of the

MNE in the host country modi1047297es the ldquolocal responsiveness strategy rdquo of

the 1047297rm at the onset of each policy epoch and how the manager crafts

changes in that strategy According to business scholars Christopher Bar-

tlett and Sumantra Ghoshal MNEs have to concurrently manage the fol-

lowing three priorities global ef 1047297ciency national responsiveness and

worldwide learning A key strategy element of this three-dimensional

framework is the importance of each foreign subsidiary in managing

the overall MNE strategy Bartlett and Ghoshal call this strategy element ldquolocal responsivenessrdquo or ldquomultinational 1047298exibility rdquo and de1047297ne

a ldquodifferentiated and specialized rolerdquo for each MNE subsidiary31

We build on this construct of local responsiveness and argue that the

MNE in the host country could craft changes in the local responsiveness

strategy by investing in inputs outputs andor host country government

relationships Investments in inputs relate to physical intellectual

and human capitalmdasheg plants plantations trademarks patents and

talent Crafting changes on the output side could include altering the

functional focus of the 1047297

rm (to focus on distribution sales or manufac-turing) choosing new businesses enter changing the product mix for

each business and modifying the local pricing or distribution strategy

for each product Finally investments in host country government

relationships might involve investments in managing government stake-

holders andor crafting negotiation strategies to navigate host country

policy interventions

Figure 1 outlines the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo perspective for a host

country experiencing a negative policy epoch followed by a positive

30Theoretically a fourth option of stayexit is also possible since later exit might be motiv-ated by activities in another geography

31Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal Managing across Borders The Trans-national Solution vol 2 (Boston 1999) 67

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 14

560

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6012

602

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policy epoch from the perspective of a multinational that was in the

country already at the onset of the 1047297rst epoch The horizontal lines in

the 1047297gure represent the three possible dynamic trajectories In addition

for options 1 and 3 at the onset of each epoch the MNE has to decide

whether to maintain or modify its local responsiveness strategy If the

MNE decides to maintain its prior local responsiveness strategy the

MNE manager in the host country does not make any signi1047297cant new

investments in the input side makes no changes to the functionalfocus and product mix and makes no changes in managing government

stakeholders Still if the manager of the MNE in the host country mod-

i1047297es the local responsiveness strategy at the onset of either or both policy

F i g 1 - B W

o n l i n e B W

i n p r i n t

Figure 1 Dynamic trajectories framework This graphic is a representation of the ldquodynamictrajectoriesrdquo framework and depicts the evolution of the policy environment in a focal hostcountry that passes through a ldquonegative epochrdquo followed by a ldquopositive epochrdquo with regard topolicy toward multinationals At the onset of the negative epoch a focal MNC has to decide

whether to exit or stay Conditional on deciding to stay the 1047297

rm has to decide whether ornot to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether or not to modify thesame Modi1047297cation of the local responsiveness strategy could be on the input side (manufac-turing plants plantations patents talent) output side (functional focus product mix pricingdistribution etc) or in managing host country government relationships At the onset of thepositive epoch conditional on exiting earlier the MNC has to decide whether or not to reenterFor both the staystay option and exitreenter option the focal MNC has to decide at the onsetof the positive epoch whether or not to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether to modify the same We also posit that the direction (which levermdashinput output orgovernment relationships) and degree (how much) of change in the local responsiveness strat-egy is conditional on the decision to stayexit at the onset of Epoch 1 and the decision toreenterstay at the onset of Epoch 2

Multinational Enterprises in India 15

603

604

605

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611

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613

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619

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621

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637

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641

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6442

645

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epochs changes could be made on the input side the output side or in

managing government stakeholders

It is also plausible that both the direction and the degree of

change in local responsiveness strategy are endogenous to the decisionof exitingstayingreentering We de1047297ne direction of change as

whether or not the focal MNE focuses on input output or govern-

ment relationships and degree of change as the extent and nature

of change on any of these levers We also argue that the direction

and degree of change MNE depends on the decision to exitstay

reenter As an example in the face of a negative policy epoch followed

by a positive policy epoch an MNE that decides to follow a staystay

strategy might not be able to make drastic changes on the output side

(eg functional focus product mix) for reasons of continuity and may instead focus on investments in the input side (eg human capital

manufacturing plants plantations) However an MNE following an

exitreenter strategy might have fewer concerns regarding continuity

given the passage of time and might be able to make drastic

changes to the output side In that case the MNE might be able to

alter the functional andor product mix in the host country In

addition the need to focus on host country government relationships

especially in a negative epoch might imply a focus on input since it is

related to the creation of local jobs a key lever to engage with govern-ment stakeholders

We now outline four detailed qualitative case studies of these multi-

national 1047297rms to indicate differences in how they reacted to the two

policy epochs in India The four case studies arguably represent extremes

in our samplemdash while the Anglo-Dutch Unilever and British BAT fol-

lowed a well-crafted ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multina-

tionals IBM and Coca-Cola successfully executed an ldquoexitreentry rdquo

strategy32

Further we show that Unilever and BAT adapted to the negativepolicy epoch (represented by the FERA regulation and 1970 patent

law) by continuously investing in the input sidemdashmanufacturing plants

and human capital In contrast IBM and Coca-Cola exited India follow-

ing the FERA regulations of the 1970s subsequently returning with dras-

tically different local responsiveness strategies on the output side

represented by different functional and product mixes

32

The use of outliers in the context of India to outline differences in dynamic trajectories issimilar in principle to the analysis used by Jones and Khanna where they compared the differ-ent trajectories taken by Jardines and Swire in face of Communist intervention in China Geof-frey Jones and Tarun Khanna ldquoBringing History (Back) into International Businessrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006) 453ndash68

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 16

646

647

648

649

650

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661

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665

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686

6872

688

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Unilever in India

The Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever originated as separate

British and Dutch 1047297rms making soap and margarine respectively

Lever Brothers the British company began exporting Sunlight soap

bars to India as early as 1888 Over time Lever Brothers brought

other products and brands to India including Lifebuoy in 189533 In

1917 Lever Brothers acquired partial interest in two other British soap

companies one of which had an of 1047297ce and depots in India Declining

sales between 1918 and 1921 further triggered Lever Brothersrsquo interest

in India as a manufacturing center Other factors included the growing

local Indian production of soap spurred by wartime shortages and the

widespread Swadeshi movement in India which advocated self-suf 1047297-

ciency through use of locally made products In the 1920s Lever Broth-

ers bought a site at Sinduria near Calcutta Unilever (the product of the

amalgamation of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie in 1930) continued

to expand in the country after 1929 The Hindustan Vanaspati Manufac-

turing Company was established in 1931 In 1933 a new company called

Lever Bros (India) Ltd was incorporated in Bombay Subsequently

Unilever set up factories to manufacture soap in Calcutta and Bombay

and vegetable ghee just outside Bombay using the brand name Dalda

Another subsidiary United Traders Limited was formed in 193534

These subsidiaries functioned independently until 1956 when they

merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) which sold 10

percent of its equity to the public the share of public equity was

increased to 14 percent in 196535 The country rsquos planned economy at

the time protected local manufacturers and Unilever 1047298ourished The

company under the in1047298uence of the government also recruited Indian

managers naming P L Tandon chairman in 1961mdashthe 1047297rst instance of

an Indian heading a multinational (see Jaithirth Raorsquos contribution to

this special issue) Hindustan Lever Limited evolved into a consumer

goods company with Unilever as its major stakeholder HLL had been

in the beverages industry since 1903 with its brand Red Label tea In

1972 Unileverrsquos acquisition of Lipton Ltd from the British company

Allied Suppliers included a large and very poorly managed Indian tea

packaging and distribution business which could not be integrated

33 Amar Nayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Devel-oping Country (New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 Sushil Vachani Multinationals in India Strategic Product Choices (Columbia Mo 1992) 12ndash31 D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas

The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash

1965 (Stanford 1978) Vanaspati is vegetable ghee andDalda is a brand34Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 835

ldquoHindustan Unilever Limited Factsheetrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinImagesHUL-Factsheet_tcm114-188694pdf Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 17

689

690

691

692

693

694

695

696

697

698

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701

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704

705

706

707

708

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715

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719

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721

722

723

724

725

726

727

728

729

7302

731

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with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

734

735

736

737

738

739

740

741

742

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744

745

746

747

748

749

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769

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772

7732

774

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1938

FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

800

801

802

803

804

805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

8162

817

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

826

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828

829

830

831

832

833

834

835

836

837

838

839

840

841

842

843

844

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846

847

848

849

850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

892

893

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

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9452

946

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2538

Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

1043

1044

1045

1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

1052

1053

1054

1055

1056

1057

1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

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1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

1082

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1085

1086

1087

1088

1089

1090

1091

1092

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1095

1096

1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2738

of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

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1144

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

1151

1152

1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

1166

1167

1168

1169

1170

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1172

1173

1174

1175

1176

1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

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1183

1184

1185

1186

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1188

1189

1190

1191

1192

1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

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1277

1278

1279

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1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

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1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

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1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

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1360

1361

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1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

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1440

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1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3838

PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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subsequent reentry was in stark contrast to the continued presence in

India of multinationals such as Unilever and British American Tobacco

(BAT)

In this article we develop a historical perspective on the policy regime change related to multinationals in India and describe using

both time series and across-home-country variation the different

reactions of multinational enterprises (MNEs) to the same policy

events We analyze the events through two epochsmdashIndia shutting

down to MNEs in the 1970s and reopening to MNEs in 1991 (ie 1991

onward)mdashand develop insights into how multinationals chart varied

dynamic trajectories during these two epochs We argue that for an

MNE such a change in policy environment represents two sets of

decisions First the MNE had to decide whether to exit or stay in Indiain the 1970s and then whether or not to reenter in the 1990s (conditional

on exiting in the 1970s) Second at the onset of each policy epoch the

MNE had to decide on continuity or change in its local responsiveness

strategy represented by investments in the input side (manufacturing

plants plantations trademarks patents and talent) output side (func-

tional focus product mix pricing distribution etc) and host country

government relationships We also argue that both the direction (ie

what lever the MNE uses to change local responsiveness investment

in physical intellectual or human capital or modi1047297

cations in functionalfocus and product mix) and the degree (ie the extent) of change in local

responsiveness are endogenous to the decision to stayexitenter As an

example if an MNE decides to stay at the onset of a negative policy

epoch it might decide to focus on changing its local responsiveness strat-

egy on the input side and concentrate less on drastically changing the

product or functional mix for reasons of continuity However if the

MNE follows an exitreenter strategy it might be able to drastically

alter its functional and product mix on reentry after several decades

as there are fewer concerns about continuity with the passage of timeInvestments in the input side also generate employmentmdasha lever used

to navigate dif 1047297cult government negotiations

Given these strategic choices to be made at the onset of both policy

epochs MNEs have a choice of decisions leading to possible dynamic

trajectories in the host country We will detail this ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo

framework later We also collect and analyze a unique dataset of all entry

and exit events for Fortune 50 and FTSE 50 1047297rms in India in the period

from 1858 to 2013 and additionally we document four detailed case

studies of Anglo-Dutch British and American MNEs to develop thedynamic trajectories perspective The four case studies developed

using archival and other data gathered from multiple sources such as

LinkedIn arguably represent extremes in our sample While the two

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 2

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

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78

79

80

81

82

83

84

852

86

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European multinationals Unilever and BAT followed a well-crafted

ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multinationals Coca-Cola and

IBM successfully executed an ldquoexitreenterrdquo strategy The study of

extreme differences in strategy is intended to identify large differencesin the adoption of dynamic trajectories We start the analysis with a

description of the policy regime in India prior to 1970

Indian Policy toward MNEs Prior to 1970

Business historians have long studied the history of multinational

1047297rms in India Tirthankar Roy in his article in this special issue of the

Business History Review provides a history of foreign trading 1047297rms in

colonial India He outlines how European trading 1047297rms started inCalcutta as agency houses and attracted Scottish Welsh English

German and French capitalists Some of these 1047297rms moved inland and

focused on indigo processing factories while the rest remained in

Calcutta and conducted three functions related to the indigo trade ship-

ping 1047297nancing and insurance After the Indian mutiny ended and

Crown rule began in 1858 ldquo born-industrialrdquo foreign 1047297rms that had

become industrial after a relatively short period in trading entered

India Examples of such 1047297rms included Andrew Yule in tea jute and

coal McLeod Russell in tea Balmer Lawrie in engineering and coaland Bird Brothers in jute and coal2

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Geoffrey Jones docu-

ments the evolution of India as a destination of inward foreign direct

investment (FDI) over time In 1914 India was ranked eighth (behind

the US Russia Canada Argentina Brazil South Africa and Austria-

Hungary) in terms of inward FDI In 1929 India ranked third only

behind Canada and the United States3 B R Tomlinson provides

several estimates of FDI in India from 1921 to 19604 By 2002 according

to Jonesrsquos estimates India had fallen way behind as a destination forinward FDI with only 04 percent of the world total FDI In his book Dis-

lodging Multinationals Indiarsquo s Strategy in Comparative Perspective

political scientist Dennis Encarnation describes the decline of British

colonial agencies and the evolution of Indian business houses and new

British multinationals in India over time starting with independence

in 1947 He outlines ldquoThe Indianization of Colonial Enterprisesrdquo post-

2

Tirthankar Roy ldquo

Trading Firms in Colonial Indiardquo

Business History Review 88 (Spring2014)3 Geoffrey Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism (Oxford 2005) ch 104 B R Tomlinson ldquoForeign Private Investment in India 1920ndash1950rdquo Modern Asian

Studies (1978) 657 Table 1

Multinational Enterprises in India 3

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

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102

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120

121

122

123

124

125

126

127

1282

129

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19475 Given that the London and Liverpool headquarters of these

agencies were not able to invest overseas Indian business houses

began to invest capital in the British agencies and by mid-1948

Indian businesses held more than 85 percent of the equity in colonialmanaging agencies The takeover of British business interests in India

particularly in Bengal was largely engineered by Marwari business

groups (including the Birla family Juggilal Kamalpat and Surajmull

Nagarmull) Tomlinson provides a detailed account of this shift in own-

ership6 In her classic study of the history of American multinationals

The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise business historian Mira

Wilkins documents that US direct investment in India in 1929 was

$327 million a mere 04 percent of the total US direct investment

abroad ($755 billion)

7

Postindependence the institutional environment for multinational

1047297rms changed quite rapidly In his article ldquoTreatment of Foreign Enter-

prise in Indiardquo legal scholar Matthew Kust writes ldquoforeign enterprise no

longer has its own way as it did when India was under foreign rule rdquo On

April 6 1949 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru released a policy

statement on foreign enterprise in the Constitutional Assembly of India

stating ldquo As a rule the major interest in ownership and effective control

of an undertaking should be in Indian hands Government will not

object to foreign capital having control of a concern for a limitedperiod if it is found to be in the national interestrdquo During the 1047297rst

years of independence foreign enterprise almost never gained majority

ownership of a new industry Kust notes that one ldquonotable exception was

the licensing of three oil re1047297neries to Stanvac Caltex and Burmah-Shell

during the early 1950s where 100 percent foreign ownership was

grantedrdquo8 Majority ownership by foreign enterprise was a rare exception

with only twenty-six of more than four hundred collaboration agree-

ments concluded in 1961 giving the foreign company majority owner-

ship In addition in 1955 the Fourth Amendment to the IndianConstitution removed from the scope of judicial review the adequacy

of compensation upon state acquisition of private property and business

interests After this amendment India nationalized the Kolar gold

mines which had been completely British-owned and the Imperial

Bank of India (later the State Bank of India) and the life insurance

5 Dennis Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals Indiarsquo s Strategy in Comparative Per-spective (Ithaca NY 1989) ch 2

6 B R Tomlinson ldquoColonial Firms and the Decline of Colonialism in Eastern India 1914ndash

47rdquo

Modern Asian Studies (1981) 455ndash

867 Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise American Business Abroad from 1914ndash1970 (Cambridge Mass 1974) 59 Table 34

8Matthew J Kust ldquoTreatment of Foreign Enterprise in Indiardquo Rutgers Law Review 17(1962) 364 354

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 4

130

131

132

133

134

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160

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163

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165

166

167

168

169

170

1712

172

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business which had minority foreign ownership In his book Foreign

Enterprise in India Kust described the policy instruments on industry

classi1047297cation licensing capital controls and taxation employed by the

government of India to protect ldquo

new (domestic) industryrdquo9

In the years leading to 1970 Indiarsquos policy toward multinational

1047297rms was captured in a central planning policy document known as

the ldquoFive-Year Planrdquo The 1047297rst Five-Year Plan (1951ndash1956) outlined

that foreign investment was allowed where the nation needed new pro-

duction lines where special skills not available locally were required

and where the domestic production volume was insuf 1047297cient to meet

demand and there was no expectation that indigenous industry could

expand quickly In 1961 the government also released a list of industries

where foreign investment was particularly welcome noting the gaps inproduction capacity of the nation The list included extremely pro1047297table

industries such as pharmaceuticals aluminum and fertilizers This

policy regime attracted several multinational corporations particularly

pharmaceutical companies to India In 1970 in fact India was home

to forty-six foreign pharmaceutical companies The Hathi Committee

of 1975 noted the evolution of pharmaceutical MNEs setting up manufac-

turing subsidiaries in India These companies were attracted to India

because of its large domestic market mild drug control measures

limited competition and tax concessions The government also sentout invitations to MNEs such as Glaxo General Motors and Ford

Motor to invest in India with an informal suggestion to include local

equity MNE investments increased substantially in the 1957ndash1963

period10

However foreign 1047297rms did face certain constraints in conducting

business in India The Indian currency the rupee was nonconvertible

and high tariffs and import licensing prevented foreign goods from

reaching the market Any business that wanted to operate in India

needed a license and several permits Multiple restrictions required com-panies to go through several government departments before getting

permission to set up shop in India A 1047297rm would have to get the green

1047298ag from up to eighty agencies before it was granted a license to

produce in India Even after getting a license the state interfered in

matters like the nature of the item produced and the quantity and

pricing of the 1047297nished product (in certain industries) The state also pre-

vented laying off workers and closing factories as well as limiting the

9

Matthew J Kust Foreign Enterprise in India Laws and Policies (Chapel Hill 1964)10 Medha Kudaisya The Oxford India Anthology of Business History (Oxford 2011) AmarNayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Developing Country(New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 and Nagesh Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Indus-trial Organization The Case of India (Thousand Oaks Calif 1994) ch 1

Multinational Enterprises in India 5

173

174

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208

209

210

211

212

213

2142

215

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number of licenses it issued in each industry Each industry had a cap on

licenses usually four or 1047297 ve for the whole nation creating a monopolistic

market Investors focused on procuring licenses rather than on improv-

ing their services and products Owing to the limited number of players alicense guaranteed pro1047297ts Thus regulation with extreme controls on

FDI along with a high tariff wall sheltered domestic companies from

overseas competition This policy emerged from the nationrsquos socialist

viewpoint and the prior experience of colonial exploitation but this

monopolistic situation hurt the country rsquos overall infrastructure

1970 India Shuts Down to MNEs

In the early 1970s the Indian government gradually began tighten-

ing the regulatory noose on MNEs operating in the country This shift

was driven by a concerted effort by the Indian state and local 1047297rms to

ldquodislodgerdquo multinationals from India Encarnation outlines a ldquocausal

modelrdquo of how MNEs were dislodged from India In the 1047297rst step local

1047297rms gained 1047297nancial independence and managerial autonomy from

MNEs in the second step Indian 1047297rms began to secure technology

free of foreign capital and in the third step Indian 1047297rms acquired

control of markets previously dominated by MNEs11

From a policy point of view this converged into two new policies

designed to control Indiarsquos economic resources and foreign interests

especially to curb the out1047298ow of capital in the form of earnings Both

of these policy instruments directly affected multinational 1047297rms We

1047297rst examine the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA)

FERA was passed by an act of Parliament in 1973 and came into

effect on January 1 1974 This act consolidated and amended the pre-

vious FERA Act of 1947 FERA rsquos goal was to restrict dealings in foreign

exchange and other securities that could impact the nationrsquos currency

and foreign exchange reserves The act had a provision to cap the

foreign investment in all companies operating in the nation and

foreign companies had to dilute their shareholdings to 40 percent

FERA also vested power in the hands of the Reserve Bank of India

(RBI) to regulate the foreign equity in the companies operating in

India and to ensure that the cap was maintained As a result all compa-

nies came under the direct control of the Reserve Bank of India 12 All

1047297rms operating in India with more than 40 percent foreign equity had

to obtain permission from the RBI to continue operations after

11 Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals12 Harpreet Dusanjh and AS Sidhu ldquoPolicy Framework for Multinational Corporations in

India A Historical Perspectiverdquo Indian Journal of Economics and Business (2010) 527ndash29

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 6

216

217

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2572

258

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January 1 1974 FERA affected already-established foreign companies in

India that had foreign equity stakes exceeding 40 percent and it applied

regardless of a 1047297rmrsquos initial terms and conditions FERA also outlined

that all companies operating in India (with the exception of foreignairline shipping and banking companies) would be incorporated

under the Indian Companies Act which would curb tax-free out1047298ows

of pro1047297ts Additionally the maximum foreign equity percentage stake

differed by industry Violations of FERA would incur criminal charges13

Out of the 881 companies that applied to the RBI only 150 compa-

nies were allowed to keep a higher level of foreign equity than the pre-

scribed cap the others diluted to 1047297t the ambit of FERA Companies

that found the terms unacceptable began to wind up operations in

India Fifty-four companies applied to exit India by 1977ndash

1978 andnine companies applied to exit in 1980ndash198114

1970 Patent Act Spurs Reverse Engineering in Pharmaceuticals

In addition to FERA the Indian government introduced the Patent

Act of 1970 and this policy change had far-ranging implications for both

multinational and domestic 1047297rms particularly in the pharmaceutical

industry The two policy instruments FERA and the new patent act were introduced within a span of three years and represented parallel

attempts to tighten control of MNEs In accordance with Encarnationrsquos

causal model of dislodging MNEs the new patent act intended to level

the playing 1047297eld for Indian 1047297rms in the domain of intellectual property15

As of 1970 multinational companies controlled 68 percent of the

market share in Indiarsquos pharmaceuticals These multinationalsmdash with

the support of the Patent Act of 1911mdashprevented local Indian companies

from manufacturing new drugs The patent law allowed the MNEs a

monopolistic position and they used their stronghold on the market tocharge extremely high prices resulting in little access to medicines for

the Indian masses

The Indian government replaced the Patent Act of 1911 and also

decided to introduce drug price controls through the Drug Price

Control Order of 1970 The Patent Act of 1970 represented a set of

rules that laid out the legal management of intellectual property in

India The act was a keystone in the nationrsquos treatment of intellectual

property

13Kudaisya The Oxford India Anthology of Business History Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Industrial Organization

14 Nayak Multinationals in India15 Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Multinational Enterprises in India 7

259

260

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293

294

295

296

297

298

299

3002

301

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The central piece of the patent law was that it recognized only

process patents and not product patents in the pharmaceutical and agro-

chemical sectors It also reduced the patent period from sixteen years to

seven years in these sectors and to fourteen years in other cases Thisprocess patent regime triggered reverse engineering in the Indian

pharmaceutical sector for drugs patented in other countries Indian com-

panies could now discover alternate processes for manufacturing drugs

that were not patented in India16

In summary from 1970 to 1990 FERA and the Indian Patent Act of

1970 had leveled the playing 1047297eld for Indian 1047297rms with regard to MNEs

FERA gave Indian 1047297rms 1047297nancial and managerial autonomy from

foreigners and the patent act gave Indian 1047297rms an opportunity to

reverse engineer products

1991 India Reopens Doors to MNEs

By the early 1990s India was deep in an economic crisis triggered by

both political and economic factors The two years prior to 1991 had seen

political turmoil with four prime ministers and four 1047297nance ministers

This led to unclear policies and virtual economic paralysis The years

before 1991 saw increased defense expenditures reduced tax revenue

slow growth in the export market and a lack of a coherent budget which brought about an ever-increasing de1047297cit and in1047298ation FERA

was hampering Indiarsquos ability to compete with other countries During

the Persian Gulf War of 1990ndash91 India had purchased oil at an extre-

mely high price and instability in the Middle East affected India as

well Additional problems included an annual rate of in1047298ation of 17

percent an unsustainably large 1047297scal de1047297cit and widespread 1047298ight of

capital The need for economic reform was further accentuated by the

collapse of the Soviet Union a country with which India had had

strong political and economic ties A major concern in 1991 was the unprecedented possibility that

India would default on its external debt something that had not hap-

pened since independence Indiarsquos foreign debt stood at $72 billion

making it the worldrsquos third-largest debtor after Brazil and Mexico This

growth in debt was rapid as the foreign debt of the nation stood at

$205 billion in 1980 In 1991 India had only $11 billion in its hard cur-

rency reserves enough for only two weeks of imports Realizing that it

did not have enough money to pay for its imports and was nearly bank-

rupt India reconsidered its stance on Western in1047298uence The govern-ment entered talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to

16 Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Industrial Organization

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 8

302

303

304

305

306

307

308

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311

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328

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333

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337

338

339

340

341

342

3432

344

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seek emergency aid India needed more than $5 billion from the IMF to

meet its immediate obligations Taking such a huge loan from the IMF

would grant the IMF substantial lobbying power with India as the inter-

national body disbursed loans under ldquo

conditions that often includedaltering policies viewed by the fund as mistaken or counterproductiverdquo17

Among the IMFrsquos demands was a reduction of the budget de1047297cit a

decrease in the licensing requirements for companies opening doors

for foreign companies and liberalizing investment

Though India was traditionally socialist in its policies after indepen-

dence this was not the country rsquos 1047297rst attempt at economic liberalization

A prior attempt in 1966 was reversed in 1967 after which a stronger

socialistic model was adopted The next major attempt was in 1985

driven by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi it came to an end in 1987 Thefour or 1047297 ve licensed producers in each industry were instrumental in

blocking the 1980s reforms18

Spurred by the IMF in 1991 the government of Prime Minister

P V Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh pushed

for structural policy reform These policies included opening the

country to international trade and investment deregulation privatiza-

tion of state-owned entities tax reforms and in1047298ation-controlling

measures The country went through a deregulation makeovermdashone

that encouraged foreign investmentSince 1991 arguably India has sustained the spirit of liberalization

despite changing governments making these reforms more sustainable

This liberalization resulted in Indiarsquos rising GDP growth peaking at 9

percent in 200719 With economic reforms came relaxation of the FDI

norms While the GDP growth of the nation prior to 1990 was a little

under 4 percent on average the GDP growth postreform stood at

between 6 and 7 percent toward the end of the 1990s20

FERA was repealed in 1999 by the government of Prime Minister

Atal Bihari Vajpayee The less stringent Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) replaced it loosening restrictions on foreign exchange and

investment in India FEMA was more aligned to the new economic

17 Bernard Weinraub ldquoEconomic Crisis Forcing Once Self-Reliant India to Seek Aidrdquo New York Times 29 June 1991 available at httpwwwnytimescom19910629worldeconomic-crisis-forcing-once-self-reliant-india-to-seek-aidhtml Web site accessed on 21Oct 2013

18Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson Why Nations Fail The Origins of Power Prosperity and Poverty (New York 2012)

19

Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook India available at httpswwwciagovlibrarypublicationsthe-world-factbookgeosinhtmlEcon Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

20BBC News ldquoIndia The Economyrdquo 3 Dec 1998 available at httpnewsbbccouk2hisouth_asia55427stm Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 9

345

346

347

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349

350

351

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353

354

355

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357

358

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364

365

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384

385

3862

387

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reforms the nation was witnessing FEMA made all violations regarding

foreign exchange civil not criminal offenses making it more investor

friendly FEMA tried to consolidate legislation relating to foreign

exchange in India with an ultimate goal of allowing external trade andpayments and to facilitate the development of a foreign exchange

market in India The reforms also immediately reduced the number of

steps required to procure a license to four or 1047297 ve approvals mainly

environmental Most goods underwent a tariff cut apart from goods in

the consumer sector

Indian Patent Reform Starting 1999

Following FEMA the Indian patent system underwent a number of reforms starting in 1999 triggered when India signed the agreement on

Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) at the

World Trade Organization and joined the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)

Product patents in medicine food and agrochemicals were now

allowed and the patent expiry period was extended to twenty years

similar to that in the US The average time required to get a patent

was reduced from 1047297 ve to three years The patent 1047297ling fee did not

change during this period and remained substantially less compared to

that of the United States Patent and Trademark Of 1047297ce (USPTO) Thepatent system also granted exclusive marketing rights (EMRs) based

on patents granted this enabled multinational 1047297rms with patents to

derive competitive advantage in selling their patented products In the

past twenty years Indian patent law has been amended three timesmdash

in 1999 2002 and 2005mdashto increase compatibility with TRIPs and to

allay MNEsrsquo fears of intellectual property theft

With the Indian patent reforms a lot of MNEsrsquo worries regarding

intellectual property protection seemed to disappear An analysis of

Indian patent 1047297lings shows a steep rise in the total number of patents1047297led in India with an in1047298exion point in 1997 This increase is attributed

to positive expectations about the 1999 reforms From 1995 to 2004

MNEs from fourteen countries 1047297led a total of 8426 patents of which

MNEs from the US 1047297led the most (2477 patents) followed by 1047297rms

from Germany and Switzerland Patent applications by foreign MNEs

in India started increasing further around 2000 and have been increas-

ing ever since The EMR ldquomailboxrdquo provisions and the belief that India

would abide by TRIPS gave MNEs con1047297dence leading to a surge in the

number of applications In contrast Indian entities 1047297led 1486 appli-cations in the same period21 The number of patents 1047297led in India

21 Analysis conducted by researchers

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 10

388

389

390

391

392

393

394

395

396

397

398

399

400

401

402

403

404

405

406

407

408

409

410

411

412

413

414

415

416

417

418

419

420

421

422

423

424

425

426

427

428

4292

430

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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ranged between 2000 and 4000 patents per year from the early 1970s

all the way to 1993 Post-1993 there was a rapid increase in the number

of patent 1047297lings with a spike of around 10000 patents per year in 1997 in

anticipation of the 1999 reforms

22

MNEs Stream into India Analysis of Fortune 50and FTSE 50 MNEs

With the initiation of economic reforms India attracted unprece-

dented foreign direct investment Average annual FDI rose from $100

million in the mid-1980s to around $2 billion in the mid-1990s The

stock of FDI rose from less than $2 billion in 1991 to almost $39

billion in 200423 The World Investment Report (WIR) of 2007 indicatesthat the 1990 inward stock level of FDI was roughly $17 billion the 2000

inward stock was $175 billion and the 2004 inward stock was $387

billion The city of Bangalore became one of the largest magnets of

foreign investment in India in 2001ndash2002 alone a total of 230 MNEs

setupof 1047297ces in Bangalorersquos industrial parks employing 25000 engineers

In this section we analyze unique data that documents every entry

and exit event for each Fortune 50 and FTSE 50 multinational 1047297rm

The entry and exit events were tracked from 1858 to 2013 and multiple

data sources were used including historical narratives of several 1047297rmsSEC company 1047297lings (the complete list of subsidiaries was found in

Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm) and data on company registration

in India from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Govern-

ment of India As the Fortune 50 and the FTSE 50 lists have changed over

time we have compiled data for the lists as of 1991 as well as 2013 In our

primary analyses and in the Appendix we use the Fortune and FTSE lists

from 1991 the year of the IMF-induced reforms

There are several limitations in conducting historical analysis using

currently available primary data Wilkins describes these limitations assometimes introducing ldquo blinders that obscured important past occur-

rencesrdquo24 To circumvent some of these constraints in addition to con-

ducting our own primary research we based our analyses on prior

articles in business history on multinational entry in India25 Appendix

22 Information from Technology Information Forecasting and Assessment Council(TIFAC)

23Chandana Chakraborty and Peter Nunnenkamp ldquoEconomic Reforms FDI and Econ-omic Growth in India A Sector Level Analysisrdquo World Development 36 no 7 (2008)

1192ndash

121224Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Conti-nents new ed with new intro by Mira Wilkins (Cambridge UK 2011) 11

25For example Tomlinson ldquoForeign Private Investment in India 1920ndash1950rdquo Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 A History (Oxford 1993) Wilkins and

Multinational Enterprises in India 11

431

432

433

434

435

436

437

438

439

440

441

442

443

444

445

446

447

448

449

450

451

452

453

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455

456

457

458

459

460

461

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463

464

465

466

467

468

469

470

471

4722

473

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Table 1 documents the data on the entry and exit of Fortune 50 multina-

tional 1047297rms as of 1991 with operations in India over the period 1905ndash

1999 Appendix Table 2 documents the data for the FTSE 50 1047297rms as

of 1991 with operations between 1847 and 1999

26

Analysis of the data in these tables reveals several interesting

insights In comparison to the FTSE 50 Fortune 50 MNEs exhibit

greater number of entries but also greater numbers of exit events

While Fortune 50 1047297rms have a total of forty entry events the FTSE 50

1047297rms only have twenty entry events On the other hand FTSE 50 1047297rms

have a total of two exit events in this period while Fortune 50 1047297rms

have a total of eleven exit events Between 1971 and 1990 Fortune 50

1047297rms have a total of seven exit events while FTSE 50 1047297rms only have

one exit eventIn addition Fortune and FTSE 1047297rms had differences in functional

focus Fortune 50 1047297rms had a more balanced focus in terms of manufac-

turing and salesservices while FTSE 50 1047297rms had a greater focus on

salesservices Also the Fortune 50 1047297rms show a slightly higher concen-

tration on RampD in India compared to the FTSE 5027

We compare the entry mode of both categories of 1047297rms as well as

study whether the 1047297rms entered solo or otherwise A non-solo entry

refers to an entry through acquisition or a joint venture (JV) whereas

a solo entry represents the 1047297

rm entering by itselfThere is a small business history literature on MNEsrsquo choice of entry

model (joint ventures vs acquisition vs solo entry but this has not

included the case of India)28 Encarnation does describe the evolution

of joint ventures between multinational 1047297rms and Indian business

houses From 1948 to 1957 the Indian government prohibited foreign

takeovers of existing local 1047297rms and proscribed foreign-owned portfolio

investments India averaged fewer than forty new foreign collaborations

Hill American Business Abroad Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones Entrepre-neurship and Multinationals Global Business and the Making of the Modern World (Chel-tenham 2013) ch 8 Harold van B Cleveland and Thomas F Huertas Citibank 1812ndash1970(Cambridge Mass 1985) Ralph W Hidy and Muriel E Hidy Pioneering in Big Business1882ndash1911 (New York 1955) and Henrietta M Larson Evelyn H Knowlton and Charles SPopple History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) New Horizons 1927 ndash1950(New York 1971)

26 An entry in our sample indicates opening of the Indian subsidiary with a well-de1047297nedmandate to sell manufacture conduct RampD etc An exit in our sample indicates closingdown of the Indian subsidiary andor a visible shutting down of all operations in India

Coding was done by two independent research analysts and validation was done by theauthors in case of disagreement between the analysts The tables here have been condensedplease contact the authors for the full tables with data to 2013

27Pure RampD entry referring to an entry with the only function of the 1047297rm as RampD in India28For example Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 4

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 12

474

475

476

477

478

479

480

481

482

483

484

485

486

487

488

489

490

491

492

493

494

495

496

497

498

499

500

501

502

503

504

505

506

507

508

509

510

511

512

513

514

5152

516

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annually in this period most of them with Indian business houses such

as Tata (which had sixty joint ventures with foreign partners by 1958)

Mahindra and Bangur The years from 1947 to 1957 also witnessed the

takeover of the British colonial managing agencies by the Indian business houses Encarnation also documents a foreign exchange crisis

that affected India in 1957 that led to a reversal of government policy

toward JVs Government regulators began encouraging Indian 1047297rms to

seek foreign equity and local enterprises that secured foreign tie-ups

also had better chances of securing the licenses needed for expansion

Encarnation indicates that JVs with foreign multinationals started dra-

matically increasing from 1958 and hit peak levels during 1964

However JVs with foreign multinationals started declining in the late

1960s and as a result stocks of foreign equity invested in the privatesector began to shrink and reached their lowest levels in 1973 the year

government policy 1047298ipped again with the passage of FERA29 Our analy-

sis is an attempt to augment this narrative

The Fortune 50 1047297rms exhibited a preference towards solo entry

before 1970 (62 percent of entries) However between 1971 and 1990

90 percent of the Fortune 50 entries were either a JV or an acquisition

In the 1990s the Fortune 50 1047297rms increased the percentage of solo entry

to 375 percent FTSE 50 1047297rms were more stable with only a single solo

entry between 1971 and 1990 and post-1991 83 percent of entries wereeither a JV or an acquisition in both periods

The Dynamic Trajectories Framework

Our analysis of selected MNEs reveals important distinctions in the

trajectories followed by British or Anglo-Dutch and American multina-

tional 1047297rms over four decades There are differences in whether or not

they exited India in the 1970s and in how they crafted their local respon-

siveness strategies both in the 1970s and the 1990s We now outline anew ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to show that adopting certain

strategic decisions at the onset of different policy epochs leads to path

dependencies resulting in different long-term trajectories for the focal

1047297rm in the host country The dynamic trajectories framework is based

on the premise of two policy epochs in a host country mdashone unwelcoming

of MNEs (ldquonegative epochrdquo) and the other welcoming of MNEs (ldquopositive

epochrdquo) A focal host country could experience a negative epoch followed

by a positive epoch or vice versa

We argue that an MNE manager in the host country must make twosets of decisions at the onset of each policy epoch The 1047297rst decision is

29Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 60

Multinational Enterprises in India 13

517

518

519

520

521

522

523

524

525

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528

529

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531

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533

534

535

536

537

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540

541

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543

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547

548

549

550

551

552

553

554

555

556

557

5582

559

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whether or not to be present in the host country during either or both

policy epochs Here we assume that the MNE is present in the host

country prior to the start of the 1047297rst epoch If the negative epoch is fol-

lowed by the positive epoch the manager has to decide whether to exitor stay at the onset of the negative epoch Also conditional on exiting

in the negative epoch the manager also has to decide whether or not

to reenter at the onset of the positive epoch We also assume that con-

ditional on staying at the onset of the negative epoch the manager

decides to stay during the positive epoch An MNE thus must face

three possible choices exitreenter exitdo not reenter or staystay30

However if the positive epoch is followed by the negative epoch the

manager has two possible choices stayexit or staystay We assume

that the MNE stays during the positive epochThe second decision set relates to whether or not the manager of the

MNE in the host country modi1047297es the ldquolocal responsiveness strategy rdquo of

the 1047297rm at the onset of each policy epoch and how the manager crafts

changes in that strategy According to business scholars Christopher Bar-

tlett and Sumantra Ghoshal MNEs have to concurrently manage the fol-

lowing three priorities global ef 1047297ciency national responsiveness and

worldwide learning A key strategy element of this three-dimensional

framework is the importance of each foreign subsidiary in managing

the overall MNE strategy Bartlett and Ghoshal call this strategy element ldquolocal responsivenessrdquo or ldquomultinational 1047298exibility rdquo and de1047297ne

a ldquodifferentiated and specialized rolerdquo for each MNE subsidiary31

We build on this construct of local responsiveness and argue that the

MNE in the host country could craft changes in the local responsiveness

strategy by investing in inputs outputs andor host country government

relationships Investments in inputs relate to physical intellectual

and human capitalmdasheg plants plantations trademarks patents and

talent Crafting changes on the output side could include altering the

functional focus of the 1047297

rm (to focus on distribution sales or manufac-turing) choosing new businesses enter changing the product mix for

each business and modifying the local pricing or distribution strategy

for each product Finally investments in host country government

relationships might involve investments in managing government stake-

holders andor crafting negotiation strategies to navigate host country

policy interventions

Figure 1 outlines the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo perspective for a host

country experiencing a negative policy epoch followed by a positive

30Theoretically a fourth option of stayexit is also possible since later exit might be motiv-ated by activities in another geography

31Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal Managing across Borders The Trans-national Solution vol 2 (Boston 1999) 67

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 14

560

561

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568

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581

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594

595

596

597

598

599

600

6012

602

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policy epoch from the perspective of a multinational that was in the

country already at the onset of the 1047297rst epoch The horizontal lines in

the 1047297gure represent the three possible dynamic trajectories In addition

for options 1 and 3 at the onset of each epoch the MNE has to decide

whether to maintain or modify its local responsiveness strategy If the

MNE decides to maintain its prior local responsiveness strategy the

MNE manager in the host country does not make any signi1047297cant new

investments in the input side makes no changes to the functionalfocus and product mix and makes no changes in managing government

stakeholders Still if the manager of the MNE in the host country mod-

i1047297es the local responsiveness strategy at the onset of either or both policy

F i g 1 - B W

o n l i n e B W

i n p r i n t

Figure 1 Dynamic trajectories framework This graphic is a representation of the ldquodynamictrajectoriesrdquo framework and depicts the evolution of the policy environment in a focal hostcountry that passes through a ldquonegative epochrdquo followed by a ldquopositive epochrdquo with regard topolicy toward multinationals At the onset of the negative epoch a focal MNC has to decide

whether to exit or stay Conditional on deciding to stay the 1047297

rm has to decide whether ornot to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether or not to modify thesame Modi1047297cation of the local responsiveness strategy could be on the input side (manufac-turing plants plantations patents talent) output side (functional focus product mix pricingdistribution etc) or in managing host country government relationships At the onset of thepositive epoch conditional on exiting earlier the MNC has to decide whether or not to reenterFor both the staystay option and exitreenter option the focal MNC has to decide at the onsetof the positive epoch whether or not to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether to modify the same We also posit that the direction (which levermdashinput output orgovernment relationships) and degree (how much) of change in the local responsiveness strat-egy is conditional on the decision to stayexit at the onset of Epoch 1 and the decision toreenterstay at the onset of Epoch 2

Multinational Enterprises in India 15

603

604

605

606

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608

609

610

611

612

613

614

615

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618

619

620

621

622

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624

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628

629

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637

638

639

640

641

642

643

6442

645

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epochs changes could be made on the input side the output side or in

managing government stakeholders

It is also plausible that both the direction and the degree of

change in local responsiveness strategy are endogenous to the decisionof exitingstayingreentering We de1047297ne direction of change as

whether or not the focal MNE focuses on input output or govern-

ment relationships and degree of change as the extent and nature

of change on any of these levers We also argue that the direction

and degree of change MNE depends on the decision to exitstay

reenter As an example in the face of a negative policy epoch followed

by a positive policy epoch an MNE that decides to follow a staystay

strategy might not be able to make drastic changes on the output side

(eg functional focus product mix) for reasons of continuity and may instead focus on investments in the input side (eg human capital

manufacturing plants plantations) However an MNE following an

exitreenter strategy might have fewer concerns regarding continuity

given the passage of time and might be able to make drastic

changes to the output side In that case the MNE might be able to

alter the functional andor product mix in the host country In

addition the need to focus on host country government relationships

especially in a negative epoch might imply a focus on input since it is

related to the creation of local jobs a key lever to engage with govern-ment stakeholders

We now outline four detailed qualitative case studies of these multi-

national 1047297rms to indicate differences in how they reacted to the two

policy epochs in India The four case studies arguably represent extremes

in our samplemdash while the Anglo-Dutch Unilever and British BAT fol-

lowed a well-crafted ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multina-

tionals IBM and Coca-Cola successfully executed an ldquoexitreentry rdquo

strategy32

Further we show that Unilever and BAT adapted to the negativepolicy epoch (represented by the FERA regulation and 1970 patent

law) by continuously investing in the input sidemdashmanufacturing plants

and human capital In contrast IBM and Coca-Cola exited India follow-

ing the FERA regulations of the 1970s subsequently returning with dras-

tically different local responsiveness strategies on the output side

represented by different functional and product mixes

32

The use of outliers in the context of India to outline differences in dynamic trajectories issimilar in principle to the analysis used by Jones and Khanna where they compared the differ-ent trajectories taken by Jardines and Swire in face of Communist intervention in China Geof-frey Jones and Tarun Khanna ldquoBringing History (Back) into International Businessrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006) 453ndash68

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 16

646

647

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6872

688

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Unilever in India

The Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever originated as separate

British and Dutch 1047297rms making soap and margarine respectively

Lever Brothers the British company began exporting Sunlight soap

bars to India as early as 1888 Over time Lever Brothers brought

other products and brands to India including Lifebuoy in 189533 In

1917 Lever Brothers acquired partial interest in two other British soap

companies one of which had an of 1047297ce and depots in India Declining

sales between 1918 and 1921 further triggered Lever Brothersrsquo interest

in India as a manufacturing center Other factors included the growing

local Indian production of soap spurred by wartime shortages and the

widespread Swadeshi movement in India which advocated self-suf 1047297-

ciency through use of locally made products In the 1920s Lever Broth-

ers bought a site at Sinduria near Calcutta Unilever (the product of the

amalgamation of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie in 1930) continued

to expand in the country after 1929 The Hindustan Vanaspati Manufac-

turing Company was established in 1931 In 1933 a new company called

Lever Bros (India) Ltd was incorporated in Bombay Subsequently

Unilever set up factories to manufacture soap in Calcutta and Bombay

and vegetable ghee just outside Bombay using the brand name Dalda

Another subsidiary United Traders Limited was formed in 193534

These subsidiaries functioned independently until 1956 when they

merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) which sold 10

percent of its equity to the public the share of public equity was

increased to 14 percent in 196535 The country rsquos planned economy at

the time protected local manufacturers and Unilever 1047298ourished The

company under the in1047298uence of the government also recruited Indian

managers naming P L Tandon chairman in 1961mdashthe 1047297rst instance of

an Indian heading a multinational (see Jaithirth Raorsquos contribution to

this special issue) Hindustan Lever Limited evolved into a consumer

goods company with Unilever as its major stakeholder HLL had been

in the beverages industry since 1903 with its brand Red Label tea In

1972 Unileverrsquos acquisition of Lipton Ltd from the British company

Allied Suppliers included a large and very poorly managed Indian tea

packaging and distribution business which could not be integrated

33 Amar Nayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Devel-oping Country (New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 Sushil Vachani Multinationals in India Strategic Product Choices (Columbia Mo 1992) 12ndash31 D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas

The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash

1965 (Stanford 1978) Vanaspati is vegetable ghee andDalda is a brand34Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 835

ldquoHindustan Unilever Limited Factsheetrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinImagesHUL-Factsheet_tcm114-188694pdf Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 17

689

690

691

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719

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723

724

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726

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728

729

7302

731

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with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

734

735

736

737

738

739

740

741

742

743

744

745

746

747

748

749

750

751

752

753

754

755

756

757

758

759

760

761

762

763

764

765

766

767

768

769

770

771

772

7732

774

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FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

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796

797

798

799

800

801

802

803

804

805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

8162

817

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

826

827

828

829

830

831

832

833

834

835

836

837

838

839

840

841

842

843

844

845

846

847

848

849

850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

892

893

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2238

headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

909

910

911

912

913

914

915

916

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919

920

921

922

923

924

925

926

927

928

929

930

931

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933

934

935

936

937

938

939

940

941

942

943

944

9452

946

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

1043

1044

1045

1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

1052

1053

1054

1055

1056

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1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

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1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

1082

1083

1084

1085

1086

1087

1088

1089

1090

1091

1092

1093

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1095

1096

1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2738

of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

1151

1152

1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

1166

1167

1168

1169

1170

1171

1172

1173

1174

1175

1176

1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

1182

1183

1184

1185

1186

1187

1188

1189

1190

1191

1192

1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

1318

1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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European multinationals Unilever and BAT followed a well-crafted

ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multinationals Coca-Cola and

IBM successfully executed an ldquoexitreenterrdquo strategy The study of

extreme differences in strategy is intended to identify large differencesin the adoption of dynamic trajectories We start the analysis with a

description of the policy regime in India prior to 1970

Indian Policy toward MNEs Prior to 1970

Business historians have long studied the history of multinational

1047297rms in India Tirthankar Roy in his article in this special issue of the

Business History Review provides a history of foreign trading 1047297rms in

colonial India He outlines how European trading 1047297rms started inCalcutta as agency houses and attracted Scottish Welsh English

German and French capitalists Some of these 1047297rms moved inland and

focused on indigo processing factories while the rest remained in

Calcutta and conducted three functions related to the indigo trade ship-

ping 1047297nancing and insurance After the Indian mutiny ended and

Crown rule began in 1858 ldquo born-industrialrdquo foreign 1047297rms that had

become industrial after a relatively short period in trading entered

India Examples of such 1047297rms included Andrew Yule in tea jute and

coal McLeod Russell in tea Balmer Lawrie in engineering and coaland Bird Brothers in jute and coal2

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Geoffrey Jones docu-

ments the evolution of India as a destination of inward foreign direct

investment (FDI) over time In 1914 India was ranked eighth (behind

the US Russia Canada Argentina Brazil South Africa and Austria-

Hungary) in terms of inward FDI In 1929 India ranked third only

behind Canada and the United States3 B R Tomlinson provides

several estimates of FDI in India from 1921 to 19604 By 2002 according

to Jonesrsquos estimates India had fallen way behind as a destination forinward FDI with only 04 percent of the world total FDI In his book Dis-

lodging Multinationals Indiarsquo s Strategy in Comparative Perspective

political scientist Dennis Encarnation describes the decline of British

colonial agencies and the evolution of Indian business houses and new

British multinationals in India over time starting with independence

in 1947 He outlines ldquoThe Indianization of Colonial Enterprisesrdquo post-

2

Tirthankar Roy ldquo

Trading Firms in Colonial Indiardquo

Business History Review 88 (Spring2014)3 Geoffrey Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism (Oxford 2005) ch 104 B R Tomlinson ldquoForeign Private Investment in India 1920ndash1950rdquo Modern Asian

Studies (1978) 657 Table 1

Multinational Enterprises in India 3

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

126

127

1282

129

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19475 Given that the London and Liverpool headquarters of these

agencies were not able to invest overseas Indian business houses

began to invest capital in the British agencies and by mid-1948

Indian businesses held more than 85 percent of the equity in colonialmanaging agencies The takeover of British business interests in India

particularly in Bengal was largely engineered by Marwari business

groups (including the Birla family Juggilal Kamalpat and Surajmull

Nagarmull) Tomlinson provides a detailed account of this shift in own-

ership6 In her classic study of the history of American multinationals

The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise business historian Mira

Wilkins documents that US direct investment in India in 1929 was

$327 million a mere 04 percent of the total US direct investment

abroad ($755 billion)

7

Postindependence the institutional environment for multinational

1047297rms changed quite rapidly In his article ldquoTreatment of Foreign Enter-

prise in Indiardquo legal scholar Matthew Kust writes ldquoforeign enterprise no

longer has its own way as it did when India was under foreign rule rdquo On

April 6 1949 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru released a policy

statement on foreign enterprise in the Constitutional Assembly of India

stating ldquo As a rule the major interest in ownership and effective control

of an undertaking should be in Indian hands Government will not

object to foreign capital having control of a concern for a limitedperiod if it is found to be in the national interestrdquo During the 1047297rst

years of independence foreign enterprise almost never gained majority

ownership of a new industry Kust notes that one ldquonotable exception was

the licensing of three oil re1047297neries to Stanvac Caltex and Burmah-Shell

during the early 1950s where 100 percent foreign ownership was

grantedrdquo8 Majority ownership by foreign enterprise was a rare exception

with only twenty-six of more than four hundred collaboration agree-

ments concluded in 1961 giving the foreign company majority owner-

ship In addition in 1955 the Fourth Amendment to the IndianConstitution removed from the scope of judicial review the adequacy

of compensation upon state acquisition of private property and business

interests After this amendment India nationalized the Kolar gold

mines which had been completely British-owned and the Imperial

Bank of India (later the State Bank of India) and the life insurance

5 Dennis Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals Indiarsquo s Strategy in Comparative Per-spective (Ithaca NY 1989) ch 2

6 B R Tomlinson ldquoColonial Firms and the Decline of Colonialism in Eastern India 1914ndash

47rdquo

Modern Asian Studies (1981) 455ndash

867 Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise American Business Abroad from 1914ndash1970 (Cambridge Mass 1974) 59 Table 34

8Matthew J Kust ldquoTreatment of Foreign Enterprise in Indiardquo Rutgers Law Review 17(1962) 364 354

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 4

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

138

139

140

141

142

143

144

145

146

147

148

149

150

151

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153

154

155

156

157

158

159

160

161

162

163

164

165

166

167

168

169

170

1712

172

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business which had minority foreign ownership In his book Foreign

Enterprise in India Kust described the policy instruments on industry

classi1047297cation licensing capital controls and taxation employed by the

government of India to protect ldquo

new (domestic) industryrdquo9

In the years leading to 1970 Indiarsquos policy toward multinational

1047297rms was captured in a central planning policy document known as

the ldquoFive-Year Planrdquo The 1047297rst Five-Year Plan (1951ndash1956) outlined

that foreign investment was allowed where the nation needed new pro-

duction lines where special skills not available locally were required

and where the domestic production volume was insuf 1047297cient to meet

demand and there was no expectation that indigenous industry could

expand quickly In 1961 the government also released a list of industries

where foreign investment was particularly welcome noting the gaps inproduction capacity of the nation The list included extremely pro1047297table

industries such as pharmaceuticals aluminum and fertilizers This

policy regime attracted several multinational corporations particularly

pharmaceutical companies to India In 1970 in fact India was home

to forty-six foreign pharmaceutical companies The Hathi Committee

of 1975 noted the evolution of pharmaceutical MNEs setting up manufac-

turing subsidiaries in India These companies were attracted to India

because of its large domestic market mild drug control measures

limited competition and tax concessions The government also sentout invitations to MNEs such as Glaxo General Motors and Ford

Motor to invest in India with an informal suggestion to include local

equity MNE investments increased substantially in the 1957ndash1963

period10

However foreign 1047297rms did face certain constraints in conducting

business in India The Indian currency the rupee was nonconvertible

and high tariffs and import licensing prevented foreign goods from

reaching the market Any business that wanted to operate in India

needed a license and several permits Multiple restrictions required com-panies to go through several government departments before getting

permission to set up shop in India A 1047297rm would have to get the green

1047298ag from up to eighty agencies before it was granted a license to

produce in India Even after getting a license the state interfered in

matters like the nature of the item produced and the quantity and

pricing of the 1047297nished product (in certain industries) The state also pre-

vented laying off workers and closing factories as well as limiting the

9

Matthew J Kust Foreign Enterprise in India Laws and Policies (Chapel Hill 1964)10 Medha Kudaisya The Oxford India Anthology of Business History (Oxford 2011) AmarNayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Developing Country(New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 and Nagesh Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Indus-trial Organization The Case of India (Thousand Oaks Calif 1994) ch 1

Multinational Enterprises in India 5

173

174

175

176

177

178

179

180

181

182

183

184

185

186

187

188

189

190

191

192

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194

195

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197

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199

200

201

202

203

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205

206

207

208

209

210

211

212

213

2142

215

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number of licenses it issued in each industry Each industry had a cap on

licenses usually four or 1047297 ve for the whole nation creating a monopolistic

market Investors focused on procuring licenses rather than on improv-

ing their services and products Owing to the limited number of players alicense guaranteed pro1047297ts Thus regulation with extreme controls on

FDI along with a high tariff wall sheltered domestic companies from

overseas competition This policy emerged from the nationrsquos socialist

viewpoint and the prior experience of colonial exploitation but this

monopolistic situation hurt the country rsquos overall infrastructure

1970 India Shuts Down to MNEs

In the early 1970s the Indian government gradually began tighten-

ing the regulatory noose on MNEs operating in the country This shift

was driven by a concerted effort by the Indian state and local 1047297rms to

ldquodislodgerdquo multinationals from India Encarnation outlines a ldquocausal

modelrdquo of how MNEs were dislodged from India In the 1047297rst step local

1047297rms gained 1047297nancial independence and managerial autonomy from

MNEs in the second step Indian 1047297rms began to secure technology

free of foreign capital and in the third step Indian 1047297rms acquired

control of markets previously dominated by MNEs11

From a policy point of view this converged into two new policies

designed to control Indiarsquos economic resources and foreign interests

especially to curb the out1047298ow of capital in the form of earnings Both

of these policy instruments directly affected multinational 1047297rms We

1047297rst examine the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA)

FERA was passed by an act of Parliament in 1973 and came into

effect on January 1 1974 This act consolidated and amended the pre-

vious FERA Act of 1947 FERA rsquos goal was to restrict dealings in foreign

exchange and other securities that could impact the nationrsquos currency

and foreign exchange reserves The act had a provision to cap the

foreign investment in all companies operating in the nation and

foreign companies had to dilute their shareholdings to 40 percent

FERA also vested power in the hands of the Reserve Bank of India

(RBI) to regulate the foreign equity in the companies operating in

India and to ensure that the cap was maintained As a result all compa-

nies came under the direct control of the Reserve Bank of India 12 All

1047297rms operating in India with more than 40 percent foreign equity had

to obtain permission from the RBI to continue operations after

11 Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals12 Harpreet Dusanjh and AS Sidhu ldquoPolicy Framework for Multinational Corporations in

India A Historical Perspectiverdquo Indian Journal of Economics and Business (2010) 527ndash29

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 6

216

217

218

219

220

221

222

223

224

225

226

227

228

229

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241

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245

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250

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253

254

255

256

2572

258

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January 1 1974 FERA affected already-established foreign companies in

India that had foreign equity stakes exceeding 40 percent and it applied

regardless of a 1047297rmrsquos initial terms and conditions FERA also outlined

that all companies operating in India (with the exception of foreignairline shipping and banking companies) would be incorporated

under the Indian Companies Act which would curb tax-free out1047298ows

of pro1047297ts Additionally the maximum foreign equity percentage stake

differed by industry Violations of FERA would incur criminal charges13

Out of the 881 companies that applied to the RBI only 150 compa-

nies were allowed to keep a higher level of foreign equity than the pre-

scribed cap the others diluted to 1047297t the ambit of FERA Companies

that found the terms unacceptable began to wind up operations in

India Fifty-four companies applied to exit India by 1977ndash

1978 andnine companies applied to exit in 1980ndash198114

1970 Patent Act Spurs Reverse Engineering in Pharmaceuticals

In addition to FERA the Indian government introduced the Patent

Act of 1970 and this policy change had far-ranging implications for both

multinational and domestic 1047297rms particularly in the pharmaceutical

industry The two policy instruments FERA and the new patent act were introduced within a span of three years and represented parallel

attempts to tighten control of MNEs In accordance with Encarnationrsquos

causal model of dislodging MNEs the new patent act intended to level

the playing 1047297eld for Indian 1047297rms in the domain of intellectual property15

As of 1970 multinational companies controlled 68 percent of the

market share in Indiarsquos pharmaceuticals These multinationalsmdash with

the support of the Patent Act of 1911mdashprevented local Indian companies

from manufacturing new drugs The patent law allowed the MNEs a

monopolistic position and they used their stronghold on the market tocharge extremely high prices resulting in little access to medicines for

the Indian masses

The Indian government replaced the Patent Act of 1911 and also

decided to introduce drug price controls through the Drug Price

Control Order of 1970 The Patent Act of 1970 represented a set of

rules that laid out the legal management of intellectual property in

India The act was a keystone in the nationrsquos treatment of intellectual

property

13Kudaisya The Oxford India Anthology of Business History Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Industrial Organization

14 Nayak Multinationals in India15 Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Multinational Enterprises in India 7

259

260

261

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263

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266

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269

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271

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274

275

276

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279

280

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284

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287

288

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291

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293

294

295

296

297

298

299

3002

301

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The central piece of the patent law was that it recognized only

process patents and not product patents in the pharmaceutical and agro-

chemical sectors It also reduced the patent period from sixteen years to

seven years in these sectors and to fourteen years in other cases Thisprocess patent regime triggered reverse engineering in the Indian

pharmaceutical sector for drugs patented in other countries Indian com-

panies could now discover alternate processes for manufacturing drugs

that were not patented in India16

In summary from 1970 to 1990 FERA and the Indian Patent Act of

1970 had leveled the playing 1047297eld for Indian 1047297rms with regard to MNEs

FERA gave Indian 1047297rms 1047297nancial and managerial autonomy from

foreigners and the patent act gave Indian 1047297rms an opportunity to

reverse engineer products

1991 India Reopens Doors to MNEs

By the early 1990s India was deep in an economic crisis triggered by

both political and economic factors The two years prior to 1991 had seen

political turmoil with four prime ministers and four 1047297nance ministers

This led to unclear policies and virtual economic paralysis The years

before 1991 saw increased defense expenditures reduced tax revenue

slow growth in the export market and a lack of a coherent budget which brought about an ever-increasing de1047297cit and in1047298ation FERA

was hampering Indiarsquos ability to compete with other countries During

the Persian Gulf War of 1990ndash91 India had purchased oil at an extre-

mely high price and instability in the Middle East affected India as

well Additional problems included an annual rate of in1047298ation of 17

percent an unsustainably large 1047297scal de1047297cit and widespread 1047298ight of

capital The need for economic reform was further accentuated by the

collapse of the Soviet Union a country with which India had had

strong political and economic ties A major concern in 1991 was the unprecedented possibility that

India would default on its external debt something that had not hap-

pened since independence Indiarsquos foreign debt stood at $72 billion

making it the worldrsquos third-largest debtor after Brazil and Mexico This

growth in debt was rapid as the foreign debt of the nation stood at

$205 billion in 1980 In 1991 India had only $11 billion in its hard cur-

rency reserves enough for only two weeks of imports Realizing that it

did not have enough money to pay for its imports and was nearly bank-

rupt India reconsidered its stance on Western in1047298uence The govern-ment entered talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to

16 Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Industrial Organization

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 8

302

303

304

305

306

307

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328

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341

342

3432

344

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seek emergency aid India needed more than $5 billion from the IMF to

meet its immediate obligations Taking such a huge loan from the IMF

would grant the IMF substantial lobbying power with India as the inter-

national body disbursed loans under ldquo

conditions that often includedaltering policies viewed by the fund as mistaken or counterproductiverdquo17

Among the IMFrsquos demands was a reduction of the budget de1047297cit a

decrease in the licensing requirements for companies opening doors

for foreign companies and liberalizing investment

Though India was traditionally socialist in its policies after indepen-

dence this was not the country rsquos 1047297rst attempt at economic liberalization

A prior attempt in 1966 was reversed in 1967 after which a stronger

socialistic model was adopted The next major attempt was in 1985

driven by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi it came to an end in 1987 Thefour or 1047297 ve licensed producers in each industry were instrumental in

blocking the 1980s reforms18

Spurred by the IMF in 1991 the government of Prime Minister

P V Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh pushed

for structural policy reform These policies included opening the

country to international trade and investment deregulation privatiza-

tion of state-owned entities tax reforms and in1047298ation-controlling

measures The country went through a deregulation makeovermdashone

that encouraged foreign investmentSince 1991 arguably India has sustained the spirit of liberalization

despite changing governments making these reforms more sustainable

This liberalization resulted in Indiarsquos rising GDP growth peaking at 9

percent in 200719 With economic reforms came relaxation of the FDI

norms While the GDP growth of the nation prior to 1990 was a little

under 4 percent on average the GDP growth postreform stood at

between 6 and 7 percent toward the end of the 1990s20

FERA was repealed in 1999 by the government of Prime Minister

Atal Bihari Vajpayee The less stringent Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) replaced it loosening restrictions on foreign exchange and

investment in India FEMA was more aligned to the new economic

17 Bernard Weinraub ldquoEconomic Crisis Forcing Once Self-Reliant India to Seek Aidrdquo New York Times 29 June 1991 available at httpwwwnytimescom19910629worldeconomic-crisis-forcing-once-self-reliant-india-to-seek-aidhtml Web site accessed on 21Oct 2013

18Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson Why Nations Fail The Origins of Power Prosperity and Poverty (New York 2012)

19

Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook India available at httpswwwciagovlibrarypublicationsthe-world-factbookgeosinhtmlEcon Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

20BBC News ldquoIndia The Economyrdquo 3 Dec 1998 available at httpnewsbbccouk2hisouth_asia55427stm Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 9

345

346

347

348

349

350

351

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353

354

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357

358

359

360

361

362

363

364

365

366

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384

385

3862

387

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reforms the nation was witnessing FEMA made all violations regarding

foreign exchange civil not criminal offenses making it more investor

friendly FEMA tried to consolidate legislation relating to foreign

exchange in India with an ultimate goal of allowing external trade andpayments and to facilitate the development of a foreign exchange

market in India The reforms also immediately reduced the number of

steps required to procure a license to four or 1047297 ve approvals mainly

environmental Most goods underwent a tariff cut apart from goods in

the consumer sector

Indian Patent Reform Starting 1999

Following FEMA the Indian patent system underwent a number of reforms starting in 1999 triggered when India signed the agreement on

Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) at the

World Trade Organization and joined the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)

Product patents in medicine food and agrochemicals were now

allowed and the patent expiry period was extended to twenty years

similar to that in the US The average time required to get a patent

was reduced from 1047297 ve to three years The patent 1047297ling fee did not

change during this period and remained substantially less compared to

that of the United States Patent and Trademark Of 1047297ce (USPTO) Thepatent system also granted exclusive marketing rights (EMRs) based

on patents granted this enabled multinational 1047297rms with patents to

derive competitive advantage in selling their patented products In the

past twenty years Indian patent law has been amended three timesmdash

in 1999 2002 and 2005mdashto increase compatibility with TRIPs and to

allay MNEsrsquo fears of intellectual property theft

With the Indian patent reforms a lot of MNEsrsquo worries regarding

intellectual property protection seemed to disappear An analysis of

Indian patent 1047297lings shows a steep rise in the total number of patents1047297led in India with an in1047298exion point in 1997 This increase is attributed

to positive expectations about the 1999 reforms From 1995 to 2004

MNEs from fourteen countries 1047297led a total of 8426 patents of which

MNEs from the US 1047297led the most (2477 patents) followed by 1047297rms

from Germany and Switzerland Patent applications by foreign MNEs

in India started increasing further around 2000 and have been increas-

ing ever since The EMR ldquomailboxrdquo provisions and the belief that India

would abide by TRIPS gave MNEs con1047297dence leading to a surge in the

number of applications In contrast Indian entities 1047297led 1486 appli-cations in the same period21 The number of patents 1047297led in India

21 Analysis conducted by researchers

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 10

388

389

390

391

392

393

394

395

396

397

398

399

400

401

402

403

404

405

406

407

408

409

410

411

412

413

414

415

416

417

418

419

420

421

422

423

424

425

426

427

428

4292

430

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ranged between 2000 and 4000 patents per year from the early 1970s

all the way to 1993 Post-1993 there was a rapid increase in the number

of patent 1047297lings with a spike of around 10000 patents per year in 1997 in

anticipation of the 1999 reforms

22

MNEs Stream into India Analysis of Fortune 50and FTSE 50 MNEs

With the initiation of economic reforms India attracted unprece-

dented foreign direct investment Average annual FDI rose from $100

million in the mid-1980s to around $2 billion in the mid-1990s The

stock of FDI rose from less than $2 billion in 1991 to almost $39

billion in 200423 The World Investment Report (WIR) of 2007 indicatesthat the 1990 inward stock level of FDI was roughly $17 billion the 2000

inward stock was $175 billion and the 2004 inward stock was $387

billion The city of Bangalore became one of the largest magnets of

foreign investment in India in 2001ndash2002 alone a total of 230 MNEs

setupof 1047297ces in Bangalorersquos industrial parks employing 25000 engineers

In this section we analyze unique data that documents every entry

and exit event for each Fortune 50 and FTSE 50 multinational 1047297rm

The entry and exit events were tracked from 1858 to 2013 and multiple

data sources were used including historical narratives of several 1047297rmsSEC company 1047297lings (the complete list of subsidiaries was found in

Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm) and data on company registration

in India from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Govern-

ment of India As the Fortune 50 and the FTSE 50 lists have changed over

time we have compiled data for the lists as of 1991 as well as 2013 In our

primary analyses and in the Appendix we use the Fortune and FTSE lists

from 1991 the year of the IMF-induced reforms

There are several limitations in conducting historical analysis using

currently available primary data Wilkins describes these limitations assometimes introducing ldquo blinders that obscured important past occur-

rencesrdquo24 To circumvent some of these constraints in addition to con-

ducting our own primary research we based our analyses on prior

articles in business history on multinational entry in India25 Appendix

22 Information from Technology Information Forecasting and Assessment Council(TIFAC)

23Chandana Chakraborty and Peter Nunnenkamp ldquoEconomic Reforms FDI and Econ-omic Growth in India A Sector Level Analysisrdquo World Development 36 no 7 (2008)

1192ndash

121224Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Conti-nents new ed with new intro by Mira Wilkins (Cambridge UK 2011) 11

25For example Tomlinson ldquoForeign Private Investment in India 1920ndash1950rdquo Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 A History (Oxford 1993) Wilkins and

Multinational Enterprises in India 11

431

432

433

434

435

436

437

438

439

440

441

442

443

444

445

446

447

448

449

450

451

452

453

454

455

456

457

458

459

460

461

462

463

464

465

466

467

468

469

470

471

4722

473

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Table 1 documents the data on the entry and exit of Fortune 50 multina-

tional 1047297rms as of 1991 with operations in India over the period 1905ndash

1999 Appendix Table 2 documents the data for the FTSE 50 1047297rms as

of 1991 with operations between 1847 and 1999

26

Analysis of the data in these tables reveals several interesting

insights In comparison to the FTSE 50 Fortune 50 MNEs exhibit

greater number of entries but also greater numbers of exit events

While Fortune 50 1047297rms have a total of forty entry events the FTSE 50

1047297rms only have twenty entry events On the other hand FTSE 50 1047297rms

have a total of two exit events in this period while Fortune 50 1047297rms

have a total of eleven exit events Between 1971 and 1990 Fortune 50

1047297rms have a total of seven exit events while FTSE 50 1047297rms only have

one exit eventIn addition Fortune and FTSE 1047297rms had differences in functional

focus Fortune 50 1047297rms had a more balanced focus in terms of manufac-

turing and salesservices while FTSE 50 1047297rms had a greater focus on

salesservices Also the Fortune 50 1047297rms show a slightly higher concen-

tration on RampD in India compared to the FTSE 5027

We compare the entry mode of both categories of 1047297rms as well as

study whether the 1047297rms entered solo or otherwise A non-solo entry

refers to an entry through acquisition or a joint venture (JV) whereas

a solo entry represents the 1047297

rm entering by itselfThere is a small business history literature on MNEsrsquo choice of entry

model (joint ventures vs acquisition vs solo entry but this has not

included the case of India)28 Encarnation does describe the evolution

of joint ventures between multinational 1047297rms and Indian business

houses From 1948 to 1957 the Indian government prohibited foreign

takeovers of existing local 1047297rms and proscribed foreign-owned portfolio

investments India averaged fewer than forty new foreign collaborations

Hill American Business Abroad Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones Entrepre-neurship and Multinationals Global Business and the Making of the Modern World (Chel-tenham 2013) ch 8 Harold van B Cleveland and Thomas F Huertas Citibank 1812ndash1970(Cambridge Mass 1985) Ralph W Hidy and Muriel E Hidy Pioneering in Big Business1882ndash1911 (New York 1955) and Henrietta M Larson Evelyn H Knowlton and Charles SPopple History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) New Horizons 1927 ndash1950(New York 1971)

26 An entry in our sample indicates opening of the Indian subsidiary with a well-de1047297nedmandate to sell manufacture conduct RampD etc An exit in our sample indicates closingdown of the Indian subsidiary andor a visible shutting down of all operations in India

Coding was done by two independent research analysts and validation was done by theauthors in case of disagreement between the analysts The tables here have been condensedplease contact the authors for the full tables with data to 2013

27Pure RampD entry referring to an entry with the only function of the 1047297rm as RampD in India28For example Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 4

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 12

474

475

476

477

478

479

480

481

482

483

484

485

486

487

488

489

490

491

492

493

494

495

496

497

498

499

500

501

502

503

504

505

506

507

508

509

510

511

512

513

514

5152

516

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annually in this period most of them with Indian business houses such

as Tata (which had sixty joint ventures with foreign partners by 1958)

Mahindra and Bangur The years from 1947 to 1957 also witnessed the

takeover of the British colonial managing agencies by the Indian business houses Encarnation also documents a foreign exchange crisis

that affected India in 1957 that led to a reversal of government policy

toward JVs Government regulators began encouraging Indian 1047297rms to

seek foreign equity and local enterprises that secured foreign tie-ups

also had better chances of securing the licenses needed for expansion

Encarnation indicates that JVs with foreign multinationals started dra-

matically increasing from 1958 and hit peak levels during 1964

However JVs with foreign multinationals started declining in the late

1960s and as a result stocks of foreign equity invested in the privatesector began to shrink and reached their lowest levels in 1973 the year

government policy 1047298ipped again with the passage of FERA29 Our analy-

sis is an attempt to augment this narrative

The Fortune 50 1047297rms exhibited a preference towards solo entry

before 1970 (62 percent of entries) However between 1971 and 1990

90 percent of the Fortune 50 entries were either a JV or an acquisition

In the 1990s the Fortune 50 1047297rms increased the percentage of solo entry

to 375 percent FTSE 50 1047297rms were more stable with only a single solo

entry between 1971 and 1990 and post-1991 83 percent of entries wereeither a JV or an acquisition in both periods

The Dynamic Trajectories Framework

Our analysis of selected MNEs reveals important distinctions in the

trajectories followed by British or Anglo-Dutch and American multina-

tional 1047297rms over four decades There are differences in whether or not

they exited India in the 1970s and in how they crafted their local respon-

siveness strategies both in the 1970s and the 1990s We now outline anew ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to show that adopting certain

strategic decisions at the onset of different policy epochs leads to path

dependencies resulting in different long-term trajectories for the focal

1047297rm in the host country The dynamic trajectories framework is based

on the premise of two policy epochs in a host country mdashone unwelcoming

of MNEs (ldquonegative epochrdquo) and the other welcoming of MNEs (ldquopositive

epochrdquo) A focal host country could experience a negative epoch followed

by a positive epoch or vice versa

We argue that an MNE manager in the host country must make twosets of decisions at the onset of each policy epoch The 1047297rst decision is

29Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 60

Multinational Enterprises in India 13

517

518

519

520

521

522

523

524

525

526

527

528

529

530

531

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533

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535

536

537

538

539

540

541

542

543

544

545

546

547

548

549

550

551

552

553

554

555

556

557

5582

559

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whether or not to be present in the host country during either or both

policy epochs Here we assume that the MNE is present in the host

country prior to the start of the 1047297rst epoch If the negative epoch is fol-

lowed by the positive epoch the manager has to decide whether to exitor stay at the onset of the negative epoch Also conditional on exiting

in the negative epoch the manager also has to decide whether or not

to reenter at the onset of the positive epoch We also assume that con-

ditional on staying at the onset of the negative epoch the manager

decides to stay during the positive epoch An MNE thus must face

three possible choices exitreenter exitdo not reenter or staystay30

However if the positive epoch is followed by the negative epoch the

manager has two possible choices stayexit or staystay We assume

that the MNE stays during the positive epochThe second decision set relates to whether or not the manager of the

MNE in the host country modi1047297es the ldquolocal responsiveness strategy rdquo of

the 1047297rm at the onset of each policy epoch and how the manager crafts

changes in that strategy According to business scholars Christopher Bar-

tlett and Sumantra Ghoshal MNEs have to concurrently manage the fol-

lowing three priorities global ef 1047297ciency national responsiveness and

worldwide learning A key strategy element of this three-dimensional

framework is the importance of each foreign subsidiary in managing

the overall MNE strategy Bartlett and Ghoshal call this strategy element ldquolocal responsivenessrdquo or ldquomultinational 1047298exibility rdquo and de1047297ne

a ldquodifferentiated and specialized rolerdquo for each MNE subsidiary31

We build on this construct of local responsiveness and argue that the

MNE in the host country could craft changes in the local responsiveness

strategy by investing in inputs outputs andor host country government

relationships Investments in inputs relate to physical intellectual

and human capitalmdasheg plants plantations trademarks patents and

talent Crafting changes on the output side could include altering the

functional focus of the 1047297

rm (to focus on distribution sales or manufac-turing) choosing new businesses enter changing the product mix for

each business and modifying the local pricing or distribution strategy

for each product Finally investments in host country government

relationships might involve investments in managing government stake-

holders andor crafting negotiation strategies to navigate host country

policy interventions

Figure 1 outlines the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo perspective for a host

country experiencing a negative policy epoch followed by a positive

30Theoretically a fourth option of stayexit is also possible since later exit might be motiv-ated by activities in another geography

31Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal Managing across Borders The Trans-national Solution vol 2 (Boston 1999) 67

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 14

560

561

562

563

564

565

566

567

568

569

570

571

572

573

574

575

576

577

578

579

580

581

582

583

584

585

586

587

588

589

590

591

592

593

594

595

596

597

598

599

600

6012

602

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policy epoch from the perspective of a multinational that was in the

country already at the onset of the 1047297rst epoch The horizontal lines in

the 1047297gure represent the three possible dynamic trajectories In addition

for options 1 and 3 at the onset of each epoch the MNE has to decide

whether to maintain or modify its local responsiveness strategy If the

MNE decides to maintain its prior local responsiveness strategy the

MNE manager in the host country does not make any signi1047297cant new

investments in the input side makes no changes to the functionalfocus and product mix and makes no changes in managing government

stakeholders Still if the manager of the MNE in the host country mod-

i1047297es the local responsiveness strategy at the onset of either or both policy

F i g 1 - B W

o n l i n e B W

i n p r i n t

Figure 1 Dynamic trajectories framework This graphic is a representation of the ldquodynamictrajectoriesrdquo framework and depicts the evolution of the policy environment in a focal hostcountry that passes through a ldquonegative epochrdquo followed by a ldquopositive epochrdquo with regard topolicy toward multinationals At the onset of the negative epoch a focal MNC has to decide

whether to exit or stay Conditional on deciding to stay the 1047297

rm has to decide whether ornot to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether or not to modify thesame Modi1047297cation of the local responsiveness strategy could be on the input side (manufac-turing plants plantations patents talent) output side (functional focus product mix pricingdistribution etc) or in managing host country government relationships At the onset of thepositive epoch conditional on exiting earlier the MNC has to decide whether or not to reenterFor both the staystay option and exitreenter option the focal MNC has to decide at the onsetof the positive epoch whether or not to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether to modify the same We also posit that the direction (which levermdashinput output orgovernment relationships) and degree (how much) of change in the local responsiveness strat-egy is conditional on the decision to stayexit at the onset of Epoch 1 and the decision toreenterstay at the onset of Epoch 2

Multinational Enterprises in India 15

603

604

605

606

607

608

609

610

611

612

613

614

615

616

617

618

619

620

621

622

623

624

625

626

627

628

629

630

631

632

633

634

635

636

637

638

639

640

641

642

643

6442

645

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epochs changes could be made on the input side the output side or in

managing government stakeholders

It is also plausible that both the direction and the degree of

change in local responsiveness strategy are endogenous to the decisionof exitingstayingreentering We de1047297ne direction of change as

whether or not the focal MNE focuses on input output or govern-

ment relationships and degree of change as the extent and nature

of change on any of these levers We also argue that the direction

and degree of change MNE depends on the decision to exitstay

reenter As an example in the face of a negative policy epoch followed

by a positive policy epoch an MNE that decides to follow a staystay

strategy might not be able to make drastic changes on the output side

(eg functional focus product mix) for reasons of continuity and may instead focus on investments in the input side (eg human capital

manufacturing plants plantations) However an MNE following an

exitreenter strategy might have fewer concerns regarding continuity

given the passage of time and might be able to make drastic

changes to the output side In that case the MNE might be able to

alter the functional andor product mix in the host country In

addition the need to focus on host country government relationships

especially in a negative epoch might imply a focus on input since it is

related to the creation of local jobs a key lever to engage with govern-ment stakeholders

We now outline four detailed qualitative case studies of these multi-

national 1047297rms to indicate differences in how they reacted to the two

policy epochs in India The four case studies arguably represent extremes

in our samplemdash while the Anglo-Dutch Unilever and British BAT fol-

lowed a well-crafted ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multina-

tionals IBM and Coca-Cola successfully executed an ldquoexitreentry rdquo

strategy32

Further we show that Unilever and BAT adapted to the negativepolicy epoch (represented by the FERA regulation and 1970 patent

law) by continuously investing in the input sidemdashmanufacturing plants

and human capital In contrast IBM and Coca-Cola exited India follow-

ing the FERA regulations of the 1970s subsequently returning with dras-

tically different local responsiveness strategies on the output side

represented by different functional and product mixes

32

The use of outliers in the context of India to outline differences in dynamic trajectories issimilar in principle to the analysis used by Jones and Khanna where they compared the differ-ent trajectories taken by Jardines and Swire in face of Communist intervention in China Geof-frey Jones and Tarun Khanna ldquoBringing History (Back) into International Businessrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006) 453ndash68

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 16

646

647

648

649

650

651

652

653

654

655

656

657

658

659

660

661

662

663

664

665

666

667

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680

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684

685

686

6872

688

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Unilever in India

The Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever originated as separate

British and Dutch 1047297rms making soap and margarine respectively

Lever Brothers the British company began exporting Sunlight soap

bars to India as early as 1888 Over time Lever Brothers brought

other products and brands to India including Lifebuoy in 189533 In

1917 Lever Brothers acquired partial interest in two other British soap

companies one of which had an of 1047297ce and depots in India Declining

sales between 1918 and 1921 further triggered Lever Brothersrsquo interest

in India as a manufacturing center Other factors included the growing

local Indian production of soap spurred by wartime shortages and the

widespread Swadeshi movement in India which advocated self-suf 1047297-

ciency through use of locally made products In the 1920s Lever Broth-

ers bought a site at Sinduria near Calcutta Unilever (the product of the

amalgamation of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie in 1930) continued

to expand in the country after 1929 The Hindustan Vanaspati Manufac-

turing Company was established in 1931 In 1933 a new company called

Lever Bros (India) Ltd was incorporated in Bombay Subsequently

Unilever set up factories to manufacture soap in Calcutta and Bombay

and vegetable ghee just outside Bombay using the brand name Dalda

Another subsidiary United Traders Limited was formed in 193534

These subsidiaries functioned independently until 1956 when they

merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) which sold 10

percent of its equity to the public the share of public equity was

increased to 14 percent in 196535 The country rsquos planned economy at

the time protected local manufacturers and Unilever 1047298ourished The

company under the in1047298uence of the government also recruited Indian

managers naming P L Tandon chairman in 1961mdashthe 1047297rst instance of

an Indian heading a multinational (see Jaithirth Raorsquos contribution to

this special issue) Hindustan Lever Limited evolved into a consumer

goods company with Unilever as its major stakeholder HLL had been

in the beverages industry since 1903 with its brand Red Label tea In

1972 Unileverrsquos acquisition of Lipton Ltd from the British company

Allied Suppliers included a large and very poorly managed Indian tea

packaging and distribution business which could not be integrated

33 Amar Nayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Devel-oping Country (New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 Sushil Vachani Multinationals in India Strategic Product Choices (Columbia Mo 1992) 12ndash31 D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas

The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash

1965 (Stanford 1978) Vanaspati is vegetable ghee andDalda is a brand34Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 835

ldquoHindustan Unilever Limited Factsheetrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinImagesHUL-Factsheet_tcm114-188694pdf Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 17

689

690

691

692

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696

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723

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729

7302

731

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with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

734

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747

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771

772

7732

774

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FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

800

801

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805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

8162

817

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

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829

830

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835

836

837

838

839

840

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850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

892

893

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

909

910

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912

913

914

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917

918

919

920

921

922

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929

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931

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934

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939

940

941

942

943

944

9452

946

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

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Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

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1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

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1053

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1055

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1058

1059

1060

1061

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1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

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1078

1079

1080

1081

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1089

1090

1091

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1095

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1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

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1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

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1144

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1156

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1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

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1177

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1190

1191

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1193

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1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

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1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

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1226

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1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

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1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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19475 Given that the London and Liverpool headquarters of these

agencies were not able to invest overseas Indian business houses

began to invest capital in the British agencies and by mid-1948

Indian businesses held more than 85 percent of the equity in colonialmanaging agencies The takeover of British business interests in India

particularly in Bengal was largely engineered by Marwari business

groups (including the Birla family Juggilal Kamalpat and Surajmull

Nagarmull) Tomlinson provides a detailed account of this shift in own-

ership6 In her classic study of the history of American multinationals

The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise business historian Mira

Wilkins documents that US direct investment in India in 1929 was

$327 million a mere 04 percent of the total US direct investment

abroad ($755 billion)

7

Postindependence the institutional environment for multinational

1047297rms changed quite rapidly In his article ldquoTreatment of Foreign Enter-

prise in Indiardquo legal scholar Matthew Kust writes ldquoforeign enterprise no

longer has its own way as it did when India was under foreign rule rdquo On

April 6 1949 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru released a policy

statement on foreign enterprise in the Constitutional Assembly of India

stating ldquo As a rule the major interest in ownership and effective control

of an undertaking should be in Indian hands Government will not

object to foreign capital having control of a concern for a limitedperiod if it is found to be in the national interestrdquo During the 1047297rst

years of independence foreign enterprise almost never gained majority

ownership of a new industry Kust notes that one ldquonotable exception was

the licensing of three oil re1047297neries to Stanvac Caltex and Burmah-Shell

during the early 1950s where 100 percent foreign ownership was

grantedrdquo8 Majority ownership by foreign enterprise was a rare exception

with only twenty-six of more than four hundred collaboration agree-

ments concluded in 1961 giving the foreign company majority owner-

ship In addition in 1955 the Fourth Amendment to the IndianConstitution removed from the scope of judicial review the adequacy

of compensation upon state acquisition of private property and business

interests After this amendment India nationalized the Kolar gold

mines which had been completely British-owned and the Imperial

Bank of India (later the State Bank of India) and the life insurance

5 Dennis Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals Indiarsquo s Strategy in Comparative Per-spective (Ithaca NY 1989) ch 2

6 B R Tomlinson ldquoColonial Firms and the Decline of Colonialism in Eastern India 1914ndash

47rdquo

Modern Asian Studies (1981) 455ndash

867 Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise American Business Abroad from 1914ndash1970 (Cambridge Mass 1974) 59 Table 34

8Matthew J Kust ldquoTreatment of Foreign Enterprise in Indiardquo Rutgers Law Review 17(1962) 364 354

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 4

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

138

139

140

141

142

143

144

145

146

147

148

149

150

151

152

153

154

155

156

157

158

159

160

161

162

163

164

165

166

167

168

169

170

1712

172

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business which had minority foreign ownership In his book Foreign

Enterprise in India Kust described the policy instruments on industry

classi1047297cation licensing capital controls and taxation employed by the

government of India to protect ldquo

new (domestic) industryrdquo9

In the years leading to 1970 Indiarsquos policy toward multinational

1047297rms was captured in a central planning policy document known as

the ldquoFive-Year Planrdquo The 1047297rst Five-Year Plan (1951ndash1956) outlined

that foreign investment was allowed where the nation needed new pro-

duction lines where special skills not available locally were required

and where the domestic production volume was insuf 1047297cient to meet

demand and there was no expectation that indigenous industry could

expand quickly In 1961 the government also released a list of industries

where foreign investment was particularly welcome noting the gaps inproduction capacity of the nation The list included extremely pro1047297table

industries such as pharmaceuticals aluminum and fertilizers This

policy regime attracted several multinational corporations particularly

pharmaceutical companies to India In 1970 in fact India was home

to forty-six foreign pharmaceutical companies The Hathi Committee

of 1975 noted the evolution of pharmaceutical MNEs setting up manufac-

turing subsidiaries in India These companies were attracted to India

because of its large domestic market mild drug control measures

limited competition and tax concessions The government also sentout invitations to MNEs such as Glaxo General Motors and Ford

Motor to invest in India with an informal suggestion to include local

equity MNE investments increased substantially in the 1957ndash1963

period10

However foreign 1047297rms did face certain constraints in conducting

business in India The Indian currency the rupee was nonconvertible

and high tariffs and import licensing prevented foreign goods from

reaching the market Any business that wanted to operate in India

needed a license and several permits Multiple restrictions required com-panies to go through several government departments before getting

permission to set up shop in India A 1047297rm would have to get the green

1047298ag from up to eighty agencies before it was granted a license to

produce in India Even after getting a license the state interfered in

matters like the nature of the item produced and the quantity and

pricing of the 1047297nished product (in certain industries) The state also pre-

vented laying off workers and closing factories as well as limiting the

9

Matthew J Kust Foreign Enterprise in India Laws and Policies (Chapel Hill 1964)10 Medha Kudaisya The Oxford India Anthology of Business History (Oxford 2011) AmarNayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Developing Country(New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 and Nagesh Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Indus-trial Organization The Case of India (Thousand Oaks Calif 1994) ch 1

Multinational Enterprises in India 5

173

174

175

176

177

178

179

180

181

182

183

184

185

186

187

188

189

190

191

192

193

194

195

196

197

198

199

200

201

202

203

204

205

206

207

208

209

210

211

212

213

2142

215

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number of licenses it issued in each industry Each industry had a cap on

licenses usually four or 1047297 ve for the whole nation creating a monopolistic

market Investors focused on procuring licenses rather than on improv-

ing their services and products Owing to the limited number of players alicense guaranteed pro1047297ts Thus regulation with extreme controls on

FDI along with a high tariff wall sheltered domestic companies from

overseas competition This policy emerged from the nationrsquos socialist

viewpoint and the prior experience of colonial exploitation but this

monopolistic situation hurt the country rsquos overall infrastructure

1970 India Shuts Down to MNEs

In the early 1970s the Indian government gradually began tighten-

ing the regulatory noose on MNEs operating in the country This shift

was driven by a concerted effort by the Indian state and local 1047297rms to

ldquodislodgerdquo multinationals from India Encarnation outlines a ldquocausal

modelrdquo of how MNEs were dislodged from India In the 1047297rst step local

1047297rms gained 1047297nancial independence and managerial autonomy from

MNEs in the second step Indian 1047297rms began to secure technology

free of foreign capital and in the third step Indian 1047297rms acquired

control of markets previously dominated by MNEs11

From a policy point of view this converged into two new policies

designed to control Indiarsquos economic resources and foreign interests

especially to curb the out1047298ow of capital in the form of earnings Both

of these policy instruments directly affected multinational 1047297rms We

1047297rst examine the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA)

FERA was passed by an act of Parliament in 1973 and came into

effect on January 1 1974 This act consolidated and amended the pre-

vious FERA Act of 1947 FERA rsquos goal was to restrict dealings in foreign

exchange and other securities that could impact the nationrsquos currency

and foreign exchange reserves The act had a provision to cap the

foreign investment in all companies operating in the nation and

foreign companies had to dilute their shareholdings to 40 percent

FERA also vested power in the hands of the Reserve Bank of India

(RBI) to regulate the foreign equity in the companies operating in

India and to ensure that the cap was maintained As a result all compa-

nies came under the direct control of the Reserve Bank of India 12 All

1047297rms operating in India with more than 40 percent foreign equity had

to obtain permission from the RBI to continue operations after

11 Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals12 Harpreet Dusanjh and AS Sidhu ldquoPolicy Framework for Multinational Corporations in

India A Historical Perspectiverdquo Indian Journal of Economics and Business (2010) 527ndash29

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 6

216

217

218

219

220

221

222

223

224

225

226

227

228

229

230

231

232

233

234

235

236

237

238

239

240

241

242

243

244

245

246

247

248

249

250

251

252

253

254

255

256

2572

258

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January 1 1974 FERA affected already-established foreign companies in

India that had foreign equity stakes exceeding 40 percent and it applied

regardless of a 1047297rmrsquos initial terms and conditions FERA also outlined

that all companies operating in India (with the exception of foreignairline shipping and banking companies) would be incorporated

under the Indian Companies Act which would curb tax-free out1047298ows

of pro1047297ts Additionally the maximum foreign equity percentage stake

differed by industry Violations of FERA would incur criminal charges13

Out of the 881 companies that applied to the RBI only 150 compa-

nies were allowed to keep a higher level of foreign equity than the pre-

scribed cap the others diluted to 1047297t the ambit of FERA Companies

that found the terms unacceptable began to wind up operations in

India Fifty-four companies applied to exit India by 1977ndash

1978 andnine companies applied to exit in 1980ndash198114

1970 Patent Act Spurs Reverse Engineering in Pharmaceuticals

In addition to FERA the Indian government introduced the Patent

Act of 1970 and this policy change had far-ranging implications for both

multinational and domestic 1047297rms particularly in the pharmaceutical

industry The two policy instruments FERA and the new patent act were introduced within a span of three years and represented parallel

attempts to tighten control of MNEs In accordance with Encarnationrsquos

causal model of dislodging MNEs the new patent act intended to level

the playing 1047297eld for Indian 1047297rms in the domain of intellectual property15

As of 1970 multinational companies controlled 68 percent of the

market share in Indiarsquos pharmaceuticals These multinationalsmdash with

the support of the Patent Act of 1911mdashprevented local Indian companies

from manufacturing new drugs The patent law allowed the MNEs a

monopolistic position and they used their stronghold on the market tocharge extremely high prices resulting in little access to medicines for

the Indian masses

The Indian government replaced the Patent Act of 1911 and also

decided to introduce drug price controls through the Drug Price

Control Order of 1970 The Patent Act of 1970 represented a set of

rules that laid out the legal management of intellectual property in

India The act was a keystone in the nationrsquos treatment of intellectual

property

13Kudaisya The Oxford India Anthology of Business History Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Industrial Organization

14 Nayak Multinationals in India15 Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Multinational Enterprises in India 7

259

260

261

262

263

264

265

266

267

268

269

270

271

272

273

274

275

276

277

278

279

280

281

282

283

284

285

286

287

288

289

290

291

292

293

294

295

296

297

298

299

3002

301

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The central piece of the patent law was that it recognized only

process patents and not product patents in the pharmaceutical and agro-

chemical sectors It also reduced the patent period from sixteen years to

seven years in these sectors and to fourteen years in other cases Thisprocess patent regime triggered reverse engineering in the Indian

pharmaceutical sector for drugs patented in other countries Indian com-

panies could now discover alternate processes for manufacturing drugs

that were not patented in India16

In summary from 1970 to 1990 FERA and the Indian Patent Act of

1970 had leveled the playing 1047297eld for Indian 1047297rms with regard to MNEs

FERA gave Indian 1047297rms 1047297nancial and managerial autonomy from

foreigners and the patent act gave Indian 1047297rms an opportunity to

reverse engineer products

1991 India Reopens Doors to MNEs

By the early 1990s India was deep in an economic crisis triggered by

both political and economic factors The two years prior to 1991 had seen

political turmoil with four prime ministers and four 1047297nance ministers

This led to unclear policies and virtual economic paralysis The years

before 1991 saw increased defense expenditures reduced tax revenue

slow growth in the export market and a lack of a coherent budget which brought about an ever-increasing de1047297cit and in1047298ation FERA

was hampering Indiarsquos ability to compete with other countries During

the Persian Gulf War of 1990ndash91 India had purchased oil at an extre-

mely high price and instability in the Middle East affected India as

well Additional problems included an annual rate of in1047298ation of 17

percent an unsustainably large 1047297scal de1047297cit and widespread 1047298ight of

capital The need for economic reform was further accentuated by the

collapse of the Soviet Union a country with which India had had

strong political and economic ties A major concern in 1991 was the unprecedented possibility that

India would default on its external debt something that had not hap-

pened since independence Indiarsquos foreign debt stood at $72 billion

making it the worldrsquos third-largest debtor after Brazil and Mexico This

growth in debt was rapid as the foreign debt of the nation stood at

$205 billion in 1980 In 1991 India had only $11 billion in its hard cur-

rency reserves enough for only two weeks of imports Realizing that it

did not have enough money to pay for its imports and was nearly bank-

rupt India reconsidered its stance on Western in1047298uence The govern-ment entered talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to

16 Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Industrial Organization

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 8

302

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seek emergency aid India needed more than $5 billion from the IMF to

meet its immediate obligations Taking such a huge loan from the IMF

would grant the IMF substantial lobbying power with India as the inter-

national body disbursed loans under ldquo

conditions that often includedaltering policies viewed by the fund as mistaken or counterproductiverdquo17

Among the IMFrsquos demands was a reduction of the budget de1047297cit a

decrease in the licensing requirements for companies opening doors

for foreign companies and liberalizing investment

Though India was traditionally socialist in its policies after indepen-

dence this was not the country rsquos 1047297rst attempt at economic liberalization

A prior attempt in 1966 was reversed in 1967 after which a stronger

socialistic model was adopted The next major attempt was in 1985

driven by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi it came to an end in 1987 Thefour or 1047297 ve licensed producers in each industry were instrumental in

blocking the 1980s reforms18

Spurred by the IMF in 1991 the government of Prime Minister

P V Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh pushed

for structural policy reform These policies included opening the

country to international trade and investment deregulation privatiza-

tion of state-owned entities tax reforms and in1047298ation-controlling

measures The country went through a deregulation makeovermdashone

that encouraged foreign investmentSince 1991 arguably India has sustained the spirit of liberalization

despite changing governments making these reforms more sustainable

This liberalization resulted in Indiarsquos rising GDP growth peaking at 9

percent in 200719 With economic reforms came relaxation of the FDI

norms While the GDP growth of the nation prior to 1990 was a little

under 4 percent on average the GDP growth postreform stood at

between 6 and 7 percent toward the end of the 1990s20

FERA was repealed in 1999 by the government of Prime Minister

Atal Bihari Vajpayee The less stringent Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) replaced it loosening restrictions on foreign exchange and

investment in India FEMA was more aligned to the new economic

17 Bernard Weinraub ldquoEconomic Crisis Forcing Once Self-Reliant India to Seek Aidrdquo New York Times 29 June 1991 available at httpwwwnytimescom19910629worldeconomic-crisis-forcing-once-self-reliant-india-to-seek-aidhtml Web site accessed on 21Oct 2013

18Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson Why Nations Fail The Origins of Power Prosperity and Poverty (New York 2012)

19

Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook India available at httpswwwciagovlibrarypublicationsthe-world-factbookgeosinhtmlEcon Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

20BBC News ldquoIndia The Economyrdquo 3 Dec 1998 available at httpnewsbbccouk2hisouth_asia55427stm Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 9

345

346

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349

350

351

352

353

354

355

356

357

358

359

360

361

362

363

364

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reforms the nation was witnessing FEMA made all violations regarding

foreign exchange civil not criminal offenses making it more investor

friendly FEMA tried to consolidate legislation relating to foreign

exchange in India with an ultimate goal of allowing external trade andpayments and to facilitate the development of a foreign exchange

market in India The reforms also immediately reduced the number of

steps required to procure a license to four or 1047297 ve approvals mainly

environmental Most goods underwent a tariff cut apart from goods in

the consumer sector

Indian Patent Reform Starting 1999

Following FEMA the Indian patent system underwent a number of reforms starting in 1999 triggered when India signed the agreement on

Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) at the

World Trade Organization and joined the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)

Product patents in medicine food and agrochemicals were now

allowed and the patent expiry period was extended to twenty years

similar to that in the US The average time required to get a patent

was reduced from 1047297 ve to three years The patent 1047297ling fee did not

change during this period and remained substantially less compared to

that of the United States Patent and Trademark Of 1047297ce (USPTO) Thepatent system also granted exclusive marketing rights (EMRs) based

on patents granted this enabled multinational 1047297rms with patents to

derive competitive advantage in selling their patented products In the

past twenty years Indian patent law has been amended three timesmdash

in 1999 2002 and 2005mdashto increase compatibility with TRIPs and to

allay MNEsrsquo fears of intellectual property theft

With the Indian patent reforms a lot of MNEsrsquo worries regarding

intellectual property protection seemed to disappear An analysis of

Indian patent 1047297lings shows a steep rise in the total number of patents1047297led in India with an in1047298exion point in 1997 This increase is attributed

to positive expectations about the 1999 reforms From 1995 to 2004

MNEs from fourteen countries 1047297led a total of 8426 patents of which

MNEs from the US 1047297led the most (2477 patents) followed by 1047297rms

from Germany and Switzerland Patent applications by foreign MNEs

in India started increasing further around 2000 and have been increas-

ing ever since The EMR ldquomailboxrdquo provisions and the belief that India

would abide by TRIPS gave MNEs con1047297dence leading to a surge in the

number of applications In contrast Indian entities 1047297led 1486 appli-cations in the same period21 The number of patents 1047297led in India

21 Analysis conducted by researchers

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 10

388

389

390

391

392

393

394

395

396

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401

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412

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414

415

416

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418

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420

421

422

423

424

425

426

427

428

4292

430

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ranged between 2000 and 4000 patents per year from the early 1970s

all the way to 1993 Post-1993 there was a rapid increase in the number

of patent 1047297lings with a spike of around 10000 patents per year in 1997 in

anticipation of the 1999 reforms

22

MNEs Stream into India Analysis of Fortune 50and FTSE 50 MNEs

With the initiation of economic reforms India attracted unprece-

dented foreign direct investment Average annual FDI rose from $100

million in the mid-1980s to around $2 billion in the mid-1990s The

stock of FDI rose from less than $2 billion in 1991 to almost $39

billion in 200423 The World Investment Report (WIR) of 2007 indicatesthat the 1990 inward stock level of FDI was roughly $17 billion the 2000

inward stock was $175 billion and the 2004 inward stock was $387

billion The city of Bangalore became one of the largest magnets of

foreign investment in India in 2001ndash2002 alone a total of 230 MNEs

setupof 1047297ces in Bangalorersquos industrial parks employing 25000 engineers

In this section we analyze unique data that documents every entry

and exit event for each Fortune 50 and FTSE 50 multinational 1047297rm

The entry and exit events were tracked from 1858 to 2013 and multiple

data sources were used including historical narratives of several 1047297rmsSEC company 1047297lings (the complete list of subsidiaries was found in

Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm) and data on company registration

in India from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Govern-

ment of India As the Fortune 50 and the FTSE 50 lists have changed over

time we have compiled data for the lists as of 1991 as well as 2013 In our

primary analyses and in the Appendix we use the Fortune and FTSE lists

from 1991 the year of the IMF-induced reforms

There are several limitations in conducting historical analysis using

currently available primary data Wilkins describes these limitations assometimes introducing ldquo blinders that obscured important past occur-

rencesrdquo24 To circumvent some of these constraints in addition to con-

ducting our own primary research we based our analyses on prior

articles in business history on multinational entry in India25 Appendix

22 Information from Technology Information Forecasting and Assessment Council(TIFAC)

23Chandana Chakraborty and Peter Nunnenkamp ldquoEconomic Reforms FDI and Econ-omic Growth in India A Sector Level Analysisrdquo World Development 36 no 7 (2008)

1192ndash

121224Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Conti-nents new ed with new intro by Mira Wilkins (Cambridge UK 2011) 11

25For example Tomlinson ldquoForeign Private Investment in India 1920ndash1950rdquo Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 A History (Oxford 1993) Wilkins and

Multinational Enterprises in India 11

431

432

433

434

435

436

437

438

439

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441

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443

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468

469

470

471

4722

473

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Table 1 documents the data on the entry and exit of Fortune 50 multina-

tional 1047297rms as of 1991 with operations in India over the period 1905ndash

1999 Appendix Table 2 documents the data for the FTSE 50 1047297rms as

of 1991 with operations between 1847 and 1999

26

Analysis of the data in these tables reveals several interesting

insights In comparison to the FTSE 50 Fortune 50 MNEs exhibit

greater number of entries but also greater numbers of exit events

While Fortune 50 1047297rms have a total of forty entry events the FTSE 50

1047297rms only have twenty entry events On the other hand FTSE 50 1047297rms

have a total of two exit events in this period while Fortune 50 1047297rms

have a total of eleven exit events Between 1971 and 1990 Fortune 50

1047297rms have a total of seven exit events while FTSE 50 1047297rms only have

one exit eventIn addition Fortune and FTSE 1047297rms had differences in functional

focus Fortune 50 1047297rms had a more balanced focus in terms of manufac-

turing and salesservices while FTSE 50 1047297rms had a greater focus on

salesservices Also the Fortune 50 1047297rms show a slightly higher concen-

tration on RampD in India compared to the FTSE 5027

We compare the entry mode of both categories of 1047297rms as well as

study whether the 1047297rms entered solo or otherwise A non-solo entry

refers to an entry through acquisition or a joint venture (JV) whereas

a solo entry represents the 1047297

rm entering by itselfThere is a small business history literature on MNEsrsquo choice of entry

model (joint ventures vs acquisition vs solo entry but this has not

included the case of India)28 Encarnation does describe the evolution

of joint ventures between multinational 1047297rms and Indian business

houses From 1948 to 1957 the Indian government prohibited foreign

takeovers of existing local 1047297rms and proscribed foreign-owned portfolio

investments India averaged fewer than forty new foreign collaborations

Hill American Business Abroad Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones Entrepre-neurship and Multinationals Global Business and the Making of the Modern World (Chel-tenham 2013) ch 8 Harold van B Cleveland and Thomas F Huertas Citibank 1812ndash1970(Cambridge Mass 1985) Ralph W Hidy and Muriel E Hidy Pioneering in Big Business1882ndash1911 (New York 1955) and Henrietta M Larson Evelyn H Knowlton and Charles SPopple History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) New Horizons 1927 ndash1950(New York 1971)

26 An entry in our sample indicates opening of the Indian subsidiary with a well-de1047297nedmandate to sell manufacture conduct RampD etc An exit in our sample indicates closingdown of the Indian subsidiary andor a visible shutting down of all operations in India

Coding was done by two independent research analysts and validation was done by theauthors in case of disagreement between the analysts The tables here have been condensedplease contact the authors for the full tables with data to 2013

27Pure RampD entry referring to an entry with the only function of the 1047297rm as RampD in India28For example Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 4

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 12

474

475

476

477

478

479

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491

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493

494

495

496

497

498

499

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508

509

510

511

512

513

514

5152

516

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annually in this period most of them with Indian business houses such

as Tata (which had sixty joint ventures with foreign partners by 1958)

Mahindra and Bangur The years from 1947 to 1957 also witnessed the

takeover of the British colonial managing agencies by the Indian business houses Encarnation also documents a foreign exchange crisis

that affected India in 1957 that led to a reversal of government policy

toward JVs Government regulators began encouraging Indian 1047297rms to

seek foreign equity and local enterprises that secured foreign tie-ups

also had better chances of securing the licenses needed for expansion

Encarnation indicates that JVs with foreign multinationals started dra-

matically increasing from 1958 and hit peak levels during 1964

However JVs with foreign multinationals started declining in the late

1960s and as a result stocks of foreign equity invested in the privatesector began to shrink and reached their lowest levels in 1973 the year

government policy 1047298ipped again with the passage of FERA29 Our analy-

sis is an attempt to augment this narrative

The Fortune 50 1047297rms exhibited a preference towards solo entry

before 1970 (62 percent of entries) However between 1971 and 1990

90 percent of the Fortune 50 entries were either a JV or an acquisition

In the 1990s the Fortune 50 1047297rms increased the percentage of solo entry

to 375 percent FTSE 50 1047297rms were more stable with only a single solo

entry between 1971 and 1990 and post-1991 83 percent of entries wereeither a JV or an acquisition in both periods

The Dynamic Trajectories Framework

Our analysis of selected MNEs reveals important distinctions in the

trajectories followed by British or Anglo-Dutch and American multina-

tional 1047297rms over four decades There are differences in whether or not

they exited India in the 1970s and in how they crafted their local respon-

siveness strategies both in the 1970s and the 1990s We now outline anew ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to show that adopting certain

strategic decisions at the onset of different policy epochs leads to path

dependencies resulting in different long-term trajectories for the focal

1047297rm in the host country The dynamic trajectories framework is based

on the premise of two policy epochs in a host country mdashone unwelcoming

of MNEs (ldquonegative epochrdquo) and the other welcoming of MNEs (ldquopositive

epochrdquo) A focal host country could experience a negative epoch followed

by a positive epoch or vice versa

We argue that an MNE manager in the host country must make twosets of decisions at the onset of each policy epoch The 1047297rst decision is

29Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 60

Multinational Enterprises in India 13

517

518

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541

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551

552

553

554

555

556

557

5582

559

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whether or not to be present in the host country during either or both

policy epochs Here we assume that the MNE is present in the host

country prior to the start of the 1047297rst epoch If the negative epoch is fol-

lowed by the positive epoch the manager has to decide whether to exitor stay at the onset of the negative epoch Also conditional on exiting

in the negative epoch the manager also has to decide whether or not

to reenter at the onset of the positive epoch We also assume that con-

ditional on staying at the onset of the negative epoch the manager

decides to stay during the positive epoch An MNE thus must face

three possible choices exitreenter exitdo not reenter or staystay30

However if the positive epoch is followed by the negative epoch the

manager has two possible choices stayexit or staystay We assume

that the MNE stays during the positive epochThe second decision set relates to whether or not the manager of the

MNE in the host country modi1047297es the ldquolocal responsiveness strategy rdquo of

the 1047297rm at the onset of each policy epoch and how the manager crafts

changes in that strategy According to business scholars Christopher Bar-

tlett and Sumantra Ghoshal MNEs have to concurrently manage the fol-

lowing three priorities global ef 1047297ciency national responsiveness and

worldwide learning A key strategy element of this three-dimensional

framework is the importance of each foreign subsidiary in managing

the overall MNE strategy Bartlett and Ghoshal call this strategy element ldquolocal responsivenessrdquo or ldquomultinational 1047298exibility rdquo and de1047297ne

a ldquodifferentiated and specialized rolerdquo for each MNE subsidiary31

We build on this construct of local responsiveness and argue that the

MNE in the host country could craft changes in the local responsiveness

strategy by investing in inputs outputs andor host country government

relationships Investments in inputs relate to physical intellectual

and human capitalmdasheg plants plantations trademarks patents and

talent Crafting changes on the output side could include altering the

functional focus of the 1047297

rm (to focus on distribution sales or manufac-turing) choosing new businesses enter changing the product mix for

each business and modifying the local pricing or distribution strategy

for each product Finally investments in host country government

relationships might involve investments in managing government stake-

holders andor crafting negotiation strategies to navigate host country

policy interventions

Figure 1 outlines the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo perspective for a host

country experiencing a negative policy epoch followed by a positive

30Theoretically a fourth option of stayexit is also possible since later exit might be motiv-ated by activities in another geography

31Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal Managing across Borders The Trans-national Solution vol 2 (Boston 1999) 67

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 14

560

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6012

602

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policy epoch from the perspective of a multinational that was in the

country already at the onset of the 1047297rst epoch The horizontal lines in

the 1047297gure represent the three possible dynamic trajectories In addition

for options 1 and 3 at the onset of each epoch the MNE has to decide

whether to maintain or modify its local responsiveness strategy If the

MNE decides to maintain its prior local responsiveness strategy the

MNE manager in the host country does not make any signi1047297cant new

investments in the input side makes no changes to the functionalfocus and product mix and makes no changes in managing government

stakeholders Still if the manager of the MNE in the host country mod-

i1047297es the local responsiveness strategy at the onset of either or both policy

F i g 1 - B W

o n l i n e B W

i n p r i n t

Figure 1 Dynamic trajectories framework This graphic is a representation of the ldquodynamictrajectoriesrdquo framework and depicts the evolution of the policy environment in a focal hostcountry that passes through a ldquonegative epochrdquo followed by a ldquopositive epochrdquo with regard topolicy toward multinationals At the onset of the negative epoch a focal MNC has to decide

whether to exit or stay Conditional on deciding to stay the 1047297

rm has to decide whether ornot to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether or not to modify thesame Modi1047297cation of the local responsiveness strategy could be on the input side (manufac-turing plants plantations patents talent) output side (functional focus product mix pricingdistribution etc) or in managing host country government relationships At the onset of thepositive epoch conditional on exiting earlier the MNC has to decide whether or not to reenterFor both the staystay option and exitreenter option the focal MNC has to decide at the onsetof the positive epoch whether or not to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether to modify the same We also posit that the direction (which levermdashinput output orgovernment relationships) and degree (how much) of change in the local responsiveness strat-egy is conditional on the decision to stayexit at the onset of Epoch 1 and the decision toreenterstay at the onset of Epoch 2

Multinational Enterprises in India 15

603

604

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611

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613

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619

620

621

622

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624

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629

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635

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637

638

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640

641

642

643

6442

645

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epochs changes could be made on the input side the output side or in

managing government stakeholders

It is also plausible that both the direction and the degree of

change in local responsiveness strategy are endogenous to the decisionof exitingstayingreentering We de1047297ne direction of change as

whether or not the focal MNE focuses on input output or govern-

ment relationships and degree of change as the extent and nature

of change on any of these levers We also argue that the direction

and degree of change MNE depends on the decision to exitstay

reenter As an example in the face of a negative policy epoch followed

by a positive policy epoch an MNE that decides to follow a staystay

strategy might not be able to make drastic changes on the output side

(eg functional focus product mix) for reasons of continuity and may instead focus on investments in the input side (eg human capital

manufacturing plants plantations) However an MNE following an

exitreenter strategy might have fewer concerns regarding continuity

given the passage of time and might be able to make drastic

changes to the output side In that case the MNE might be able to

alter the functional andor product mix in the host country In

addition the need to focus on host country government relationships

especially in a negative epoch might imply a focus on input since it is

related to the creation of local jobs a key lever to engage with govern-ment stakeholders

We now outline four detailed qualitative case studies of these multi-

national 1047297rms to indicate differences in how they reacted to the two

policy epochs in India The four case studies arguably represent extremes

in our samplemdash while the Anglo-Dutch Unilever and British BAT fol-

lowed a well-crafted ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multina-

tionals IBM and Coca-Cola successfully executed an ldquoexitreentry rdquo

strategy32

Further we show that Unilever and BAT adapted to the negativepolicy epoch (represented by the FERA regulation and 1970 patent

law) by continuously investing in the input sidemdashmanufacturing plants

and human capital In contrast IBM and Coca-Cola exited India follow-

ing the FERA regulations of the 1970s subsequently returning with dras-

tically different local responsiveness strategies on the output side

represented by different functional and product mixes

32

The use of outliers in the context of India to outline differences in dynamic trajectories issimilar in principle to the analysis used by Jones and Khanna where they compared the differ-ent trajectories taken by Jardines and Swire in face of Communist intervention in China Geof-frey Jones and Tarun Khanna ldquoBringing History (Back) into International Businessrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006) 453ndash68

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 16

646

647

648

649

650

651

652

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654

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6872

688

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Unilever in India

The Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever originated as separate

British and Dutch 1047297rms making soap and margarine respectively

Lever Brothers the British company began exporting Sunlight soap

bars to India as early as 1888 Over time Lever Brothers brought

other products and brands to India including Lifebuoy in 189533 In

1917 Lever Brothers acquired partial interest in two other British soap

companies one of which had an of 1047297ce and depots in India Declining

sales between 1918 and 1921 further triggered Lever Brothersrsquo interest

in India as a manufacturing center Other factors included the growing

local Indian production of soap spurred by wartime shortages and the

widespread Swadeshi movement in India which advocated self-suf 1047297-

ciency through use of locally made products In the 1920s Lever Broth-

ers bought a site at Sinduria near Calcutta Unilever (the product of the

amalgamation of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie in 1930) continued

to expand in the country after 1929 The Hindustan Vanaspati Manufac-

turing Company was established in 1931 In 1933 a new company called

Lever Bros (India) Ltd was incorporated in Bombay Subsequently

Unilever set up factories to manufacture soap in Calcutta and Bombay

and vegetable ghee just outside Bombay using the brand name Dalda

Another subsidiary United Traders Limited was formed in 193534

These subsidiaries functioned independently until 1956 when they

merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) which sold 10

percent of its equity to the public the share of public equity was

increased to 14 percent in 196535 The country rsquos planned economy at

the time protected local manufacturers and Unilever 1047298ourished The

company under the in1047298uence of the government also recruited Indian

managers naming P L Tandon chairman in 1961mdashthe 1047297rst instance of

an Indian heading a multinational (see Jaithirth Raorsquos contribution to

this special issue) Hindustan Lever Limited evolved into a consumer

goods company with Unilever as its major stakeholder HLL had been

in the beverages industry since 1903 with its brand Red Label tea In

1972 Unileverrsquos acquisition of Lipton Ltd from the British company

Allied Suppliers included a large and very poorly managed Indian tea

packaging and distribution business which could not be integrated

33 Amar Nayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Devel-oping Country (New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 Sushil Vachani Multinationals in India Strategic Product Choices (Columbia Mo 1992) 12ndash31 D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas

The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash

1965 (Stanford 1978) Vanaspati is vegetable ghee andDalda is a brand34Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 835

ldquoHindustan Unilever Limited Factsheetrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinImagesHUL-Factsheet_tcm114-188694pdf Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 17

689

690

691

692

693

694

695

696

697

698

699

700

701

702

703

704

705

706

707

708

709

710

711

712

713

714

715

716

717

718

719

720

721

722

723

724

725

726

727

728

729

7302

731

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1838

with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

734

735

736

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738

739

740

741

742

743

744

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747

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749

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751

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753

754

755

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757

758

759

760

761

762

763

764

765

766

767

768

769

770

771

772

7732

774

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1938

FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

800

801

802

803

804

805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

8162

817

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

826

827

828

829

830

831

832

833

834

835

836

837

838

839

840

841

842

843

844

845

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847

848

849

850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

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893

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

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913

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919

920

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925

926

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940

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944

9452

946

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2438

by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2538

Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

1043

1044

1045

1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

1052

1053

1054

1055

1056

1057

1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

1064

1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

1082

1083

1084

1085

1086

1087

1088

1089

1090

1091

1092

1093

1094

1095

1096

1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2738

of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

1151

1152

1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

1166

1167

1168

1169

1170

1171

1172

1173

1174

1175

1176

1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

1182

1183

1184

1185

1186

1187

1188

1189

1190

1191

1192

1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

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1275

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1278

1279

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1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

1318

1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

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15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

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business which had minority foreign ownership In his book Foreign

Enterprise in India Kust described the policy instruments on industry

classi1047297cation licensing capital controls and taxation employed by the

government of India to protect ldquo

new (domestic) industryrdquo9

In the years leading to 1970 Indiarsquos policy toward multinational

1047297rms was captured in a central planning policy document known as

the ldquoFive-Year Planrdquo The 1047297rst Five-Year Plan (1951ndash1956) outlined

that foreign investment was allowed where the nation needed new pro-

duction lines where special skills not available locally were required

and where the domestic production volume was insuf 1047297cient to meet

demand and there was no expectation that indigenous industry could

expand quickly In 1961 the government also released a list of industries

where foreign investment was particularly welcome noting the gaps inproduction capacity of the nation The list included extremely pro1047297table

industries such as pharmaceuticals aluminum and fertilizers This

policy regime attracted several multinational corporations particularly

pharmaceutical companies to India In 1970 in fact India was home

to forty-six foreign pharmaceutical companies The Hathi Committee

of 1975 noted the evolution of pharmaceutical MNEs setting up manufac-

turing subsidiaries in India These companies were attracted to India

because of its large domestic market mild drug control measures

limited competition and tax concessions The government also sentout invitations to MNEs such as Glaxo General Motors and Ford

Motor to invest in India with an informal suggestion to include local

equity MNE investments increased substantially in the 1957ndash1963

period10

However foreign 1047297rms did face certain constraints in conducting

business in India The Indian currency the rupee was nonconvertible

and high tariffs and import licensing prevented foreign goods from

reaching the market Any business that wanted to operate in India

needed a license and several permits Multiple restrictions required com-panies to go through several government departments before getting

permission to set up shop in India A 1047297rm would have to get the green

1047298ag from up to eighty agencies before it was granted a license to

produce in India Even after getting a license the state interfered in

matters like the nature of the item produced and the quantity and

pricing of the 1047297nished product (in certain industries) The state also pre-

vented laying off workers and closing factories as well as limiting the

9

Matthew J Kust Foreign Enterprise in India Laws and Policies (Chapel Hill 1964)10 Medha Kudaisya The Oxford India Anthology of Business History (Oxford 2011) AmarNayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Developing Country(New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 and Nagesh Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Indus-trial Organization The Case of India (Thousand Oaks Calif 1994) ch 1

Multinational Enterprises in India 5

173

174

175

176

177

178

179

180

181

182

183

184

185

186

187

188

189

190

191

192

193

194

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197

198

199

200

201

202

203

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205

206

207

208

209

210

211

212

213

2142

215

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number of licenses it issued in each industry Each industry had a cap on

licenses usually four or 1047297 ve for the whole nation creating a monopolistic

market Investors focused on procuring licenses rather than on improv-

ing their services and products Owing to the limited number of players alicense guaranteed pro1047297ts Thus regulation with extreme controls on

FDI along with a high tariff wall sheltered domestic companies from

overseas competition This policy emerged from the nationrsquos socialist

viewpoint and the prior experience of colonial exploitation but this

monopolistic situation hurt the country rsquos overall infrastructure

1970 India Shuts Down to MNEs

In the early 1970s the Indian government gradually began tighten-

ing the regulatory noose on MNEs operating in the country This shift

was driven by a concerted effort by the Indian state and local 1047297rms to

ldquodislodgerdquo multinationals from India Encarnation outlines a ldquocausal

modelrdquo of how MNEs were dislodged from India In the 1047297rst step local

1047297rms gained 1047297nancial independence and managerial autonomy from

MNEs in the second step Indian 1047297rms began to secure technology

free of foreign capital and in the third step Indian 1047297rms acquired

control of markets previously dominated by MNEs11

From a policy point of view this converged into two new policies

designed to control Indiarsquos economic resources and foreign interests

especially to curb the out1047298ow of capital in the form of earnings Both

of these policy instruments directly affected multinational 1047297rms We

1047297rst examine the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA)

FERA was passed by an act of Parliament in 1973 and came into

effect on January 1 1974 This act consolidated and amended the pre-

vious FERA Act of 1947 FERA rsquos goal was to restrict dealings in foreign

exchange and other securities that could impact the nationrsquos currency

and foreign exchange reserves The act had a provision to cap the

foreign investment in all companies operating in the nation and

foreign companies had to dilute their shareholdings to 40 percent

FERA also vested power in the hands of the Reserve Bank of India

(RBI) to regulate the foreign equity in the companies operating in

India and to ensure that the cap was maintained As a result all compa-

nies came under the direct control of the Reserve Bank of India 12 All

1047297rms operating in India with more than 40 percent foreign equity had

to obtain permission from the RBI to continue operations after

11 Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals12 Harpreet Dusanjh and AS Sidhu ldquoPolicy Framework for Multinational Corporations in

India A Historical Perspectiverdquo Indian Journal of Economics and Business (2010) 527ndash29

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 6

216

217

218

219

220

221

222

223

224

225

226

227

228

229

230

231

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233

234

235

236

237

238

239

240

241

242

243

244

245

246

247

248

249

250

251

252

253

254

255

256

2572

258

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January 1 1974 FERA affected already-established foreign companies in

India that had foreign equity stakes exceeding 40 percent and it applied

regardless of a 1047297rmrsquos initial terms and conditions FERA also outlined

that all companies operating in India (with the exception of foreignairline shipping and banking companies) would be incorporated

under the Indian Companies Act which would curb tax-free out1047298ows

of pro1047297ts Additionally the maximum foreign equity percentage stake

differed by industry Violations of FERA would incur criminal charges13

Out of the 881 companies that applied to the RBI only 150 compa-

nies were allowed to keep a higher level of foreign equity than the pre-

scribed cap the others diluted to 1047297t the ambit of FERA Companies

that found the terms unacceptable began to wind up operations in

India Fifty-four companies applied to exit India by 1977ndash

1978 andnine companies applied to exit in 1980ndash198114

1970 Patent Act Spurs Reverse Engineering in Pharmaceuticals

In addition to FERA the Indian government introduced the Patent

Act of 1970 and this policy change had far-ranging implications for both

multinational and domestic 1047297rms particularly in the pharmaceutical

industry The two policy instruments FERA and the new patent act were introduced within a span of three years and represented parallel

attempts to tighten control of MNEs In accordance with Encarnationrsquos

causal model of dislodging MNEs the new patent act intended to level

the playing 1047297eld for Indian 1047297rms in the domain of intellectual property15

As of 1970 multinational companies controlled 68 percent of the

market share in Indiarsquos pharmaceuticals These multinationalsmdash with

the support of the Patent Act of 1911mdashprevented local Indian companies

from manufacturing new drugs The patent law allowed the MNEs a

monopolistic position and they used their stronghold on the market tocharge extremely high prices resulting in little access to medicines for

the Indian masses

The Indian government replaced the Patent Act of 1911 and also

decided to introduce drug price controls through the Drug Price

Control Order of 1970 The Patent Act of 1970 represented a set of

rules that laid out the legal management of intellectual property in

India The act was a keystone in the nationrsquos treatment of intellectual

property

13Kudaisya The Oxford India Anthology of Business History Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Industrial Organization

14 Nayak Multinationals in India15 Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Multinational Enterprises in India 7

259

260

261

262

263

264

265

266

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268

269

270

271

272

273

274

275

276

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278

279

280

281

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283

284

285

286

287

288

289

290

291

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293

294

295

296

297

298

299

3002

301

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The central piece of the patent law was that it recognized only

process patents and not product patents in the pharmaceutical and agro-

chemical sectors It also reduced the patent period from sixteen years to

seven years in these sectors and to fourteen years in other cases Thisprocess patent regime triggered reverse engineering in the Indian

pharmaceutical sector for drugs patented in other countries Indian com-

panies could now discover alternate processes for manufacturing drugs

that were not patented in India16

In summary from 1970 to 1990 FERA and the Indian Patent Act of

1970 had leveled the playing 1047297eld for Indian 1047297rms with regard to MNEs

FERA gave Indian 1047297rms 1047297nancial and managerial autonomy from

foreigners and the patent act gave Indian 1047297rms an opportunity to

reverse engineer products

1991 India Reopens Doors to MNEs

By the early 1990s India was deep in an economic crisis triggered by

both political and economic factors The two years prior to 1991 had seen

political turmoil with four prime ministers and four 1047297nance ministers

This led to unclear policies and virtual economic paralysis The years

before 1991 saw increased defense expenditures reduced tax revenue

slow growth in the export market and a lack of a coherent budget which brought about an ever-increasing de1047297cit and in1047298ation FERA

was hampering Indiarsquos ability to compete with other countries During

the Persian Gulf War of 1990ndash91 India had purchased oil at an extre-

mely high price and instability in the Middle East affected India as

well Additional problems included an annual rate of in1047298ation of 17

percent an unsustainably large 1047297scal de1047297cit and widespread 1047298ight of

capital The need for economic reform was further accentuated by the

collapse of the Soviet Union a country with which India had had

strong political and economic ties A major concern in 1991 was the unprecedented possibility that

India would default on its external debt something that had not hap-

pened since independence Indiarsquos foreign debt stood at $72 billion

making it the worldrsquos third-largest debtor after Brazil and Mexico This

growth in debt was rapid as the foreign debt of the nation stood at

$205 billion in 1980 In 1991 India had only $11 billion in its hard cur-

rency reserves enough for only two weeks of imports Realizing that it

did not have enough money to pay for its imports and was nearly bank-

rupt India reconsidered its stance on Western in1047298uence The govern-ment entered talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to

16 Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Industrial Organization

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 8

302

303

304

305

306

307

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311

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319

320

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323

324

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328

329

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331

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333

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337

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341

342

3432

344

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seek emergency aid India needed more than $5 billion from the IMF to

meet its immediate obligations Taking such a huge loan from the IMF

would grant the IMF substantial lobbying power with India as the inter-

national body disbursed loans under ldquo

conditions that often includedaltering policies viewed by the fund as mistaken or counterproductiverdquo17

Among the IMFrsquos demands was a reduction of the budget de1047297cit a

decrease in the licensing requirements for companies opening doors

for foreign companies and liberalizing investment

Though India was traditionally socialist in its policies after indepen-

dence this was not the country rsquos 1047297rst attempt at economic liberalization

A prior attempt in 1966 was reversed in 1967 after which a stronger

socialistic model was adopted The next major attempt was in 1985

driven by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi it came to an end in 1987 Thefour or 1047297 ve licensed producers in each industry were instrumental in

blocking the 1980s reforms18

Spurred by the IMF in 1991 the government of Prime Minister

P V Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh pushed

for structural policy reform These policies included opening the

country to international trade and investment deregulation privatiza-

tion of state-owned entities tax reforms and in1047298ation-controlling

measures The country went through a deregulation makeovermdashone

that encouraged foreign investmentSince 1991 arguably India has sustained the spirit of liberalization

despite changing governments making these reforms more sustainable

This liberalization resulted in Indiarsquos rising GDP growth peaking at 9

percent in 200719 With economic reforms came relaxation of the FDI

norms While the GDP growth of the nation prior to 1990 was a little

under 4 percent on average the GDP growth postreform stood at

between 6 and 7 percent toward the end of the 1990s20

FERA was repealed in 1999 by the government of Prime Minister

Atal Bihari Vajpayee The less stringent Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) replaced it loosening restrictions on foreign exchange and

investment in India FEMA was more aligned to the new economic

17 Bernard Weinraub ldquoEconomic Crisis Forcing Once Self-Reliant India to Seek Aidrdquo New York Times 29 June 1991 available at httpwwwnytimescom19910629worldeconomic-crisis-forcing-once-self-reliant-india-to-seek-aidhtml Web site accessed on 21Oct 2013

18Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson Why Nations Fail The Origins of Power Prosperity and Poverty (New York 2012)

19

Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook India available at httpswwwciagovlibrarypublicationsthe-world-factbookgeosinhtmlEcon Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

20BBC News ldquoIndia The Economyrdquo 3 Dec 1998 available at httpnewsbbccouk2hisouth_asia55427stm Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 9

345

346

347

348

349

350

351

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353

354

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357

358

359

360

361

362

363

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368

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373

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377

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381

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384

385

3862

387

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reforms the nation was witnessing FEMA made all violations regarding

foreign exchange civil not criminal offenses making it more investor

friendly FEMA tried to consolidate legislation relating to foreign

exchange in India with an ultimate goal of allowing external trade andpayments and to facilitate the development of a foreign exchange

market in India The reforms also immediately reduced the number of

steps required to procure a license to four or 1047297 ve approvals mainly

environmental Most goods underwent a tariff cut apart from goods in

the consumer sector

Indian Patent Reform Starting 1999

Following FEMA the Indian patent system underwent a number of reforms starting in 1999 triggered when India signed the agreement on

Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) at the

World Trade Organization and joined the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)

Product patents in medicine food and agrochemicals were now

allowed and the patent expiry period was extended to twenty years

similar to that in the US The average time required to get a patent

was reduced from 1047297 ve to three years The patent 1047297ling fee did not

change during this period and remained substantially less compared to

that of the United States Patent and Trademark Of 1047297ce (USPTO) Thepatent system also granted exclusive marketing rights (EMRs) based

on patents granted this enabled multinational 1047297rms with patents to

derive competitive advantage in selling their patented products In the

past twenty years Indian patent law has been amended three timesmdash

in 1999 2002 and 2005mdashto increase compatibility with TRIPs and to

allay MNEsrsquo fears of intellectual property theft

With the Indian patent reforms a lot of MNEsrsquo worries regarding

intellectual property protection seemed to disappear An analysis of

Indian patent 1047297lings shows a steep rise in the total number of patents1047297led in India with an in1047298exion point in 1997 This increase is attributed

to positive expectations about the 1999 reforms From 1995 to 2004

MNEs from fourteen countries 1047297led a total of 8426 patents of which

MNEs from the US 1047297led the most (2477 patents) followed by 1047297rms

from Germany and Switzerland Patent applications by foreign MNEs

in India started increasing further around 2000 and have been increas-

ing ever since The EMR ldquomailboxrdquo provisions and the belief that India

would abide by TRIPS gave MNEs con1047297dence leading to a surge in the

number of applications In contrast Indian entities 1047297led 1486 appli-cations in the same period21 The number of patents 1047297led in India

21 Analysis conducted by researchers

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 10

388

389

390

391

392

393

394

395

396

397

398

399

400

401

402

403

404

405

406

407

408

409

410

411

412

413

414

415

416

417

418

419

420

421

422

423

424

425

426

427

428

4292

430

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ranged between 2000 and 4000 patents per year from the early 1970s

all the way to 1993 Post-1993 there was a rapid increase in the number

of patent 1047297lings with a spike of around 10000 patents per year in 1997 in

anticipation of the 1999 reforms

22

MNEs Stream into India Analysis of Fortune 50and FTSE 50 MNEs

With the initiation of economic reforms India attracted unprece-

dented foreign direct investment Average annual FDI rose from $100

million in the mid-1980s to around $2 billion in the mid-1990s The

stock of FDI rose from less than $2 billion in 1991 to almost $39

billion in 200423 The World Investment Report (WIR) of 2007 indicatesthat the 1990 inward stock level of FDI was roughly $17 billion the 2000

inward stock was $175 billion and the 2004 inward stock was $387

billion The city of Bangalore became one of the largest magnets of

foreign investment in India in 2001ndash2002 alone a total of 230 MNEs

setupof 1047297ces in Bangalorersquos industrial parks employing 25000 engineers

In this section we analyze unique data that documents every entry

and exit event for each Fortune 50 and FTSE 50 multinational 1047297rm

The entry and exit events were tracked from 1858 to 2013 and multiple

data sources were used including historical narratives of several 1047297rmsSEC company 1047297lings (the complete list of subsidiaries was found in

Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm) and data on company registration

in India from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Govern-

ment of India As the Fortune 50 and the FTSE 50 lists have changed over

time we have compiled data for the lists as of 1991 as well as 2013 In our

primary analyses and in the Appendix we use the Fortune and FTSE lists

from 1991 the year of the IMF-induced reforms

There are several limitations in conducting historical analysis using

currently available primary data Wilkins describes these limitations assometimes introducing ldquo blinders that obscured important past occur-

rencesrdquo24 To circumvent some of these constraints in addition to con-

ducting our own primary research we based our analyses on prior

articles in business history on multinational entry in India25 Appendix

22 Information from Technology Information Forecasting and Assessment Council(TIFAC)

23Chandana Chakraborty and Peter Nunnenkamp ldquoEconomic Reforms FDI and Econ-omic Growth in India A Sector Level Analysisrdquo World Development 36 no 7 (2008)

1192ndash

121224Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Conti-nents new ed with new intro by Mira Wilkins (Cambridge UK 2011) 11

25For example Tomlinson ldquoForeign Private Investment in India 1920ndash1950rdquo Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 A History (Oxford 1993) Wilkins and

Multinational Enterprises in India 11

431

432

433

434

435

436

437

438

439

440

441

442

443

444

445

446

447

448

449

450

451

452

453

454

455

456

457

458

459

460

461

462

463

464

465

466

467

468

469

470

471

4722

473

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Table 1 documents the data on the entry and exit of Fortune 50 multina-

tional 1047297rms as of 1991 with operations in India over the period 1905ndash

1999 Appendix Table 2 documents the data for the FTSE 50 1047297rms as

of 1991 with operations between 1847 and 1999

26

Analysis of the data in these tables reveals several interesting

insights In comparison to the FTSE 50 Fortune 50 MNEs exhibit

greater number of entries but also greater numbers of exit events

While Fortune 50 1047297rms have a total of forty entry events the FTSE 50

1047297rms only have twenty entry events On the other hand FTSE 50 1047297rms

have a total of two exit events in this period while Fortune 50 1047297rms

have a total of eleven exit events Between 1971 and 1990 Fortune 50

1047297rms have a total of seven exit events while FTSE 50 1047297rms only have

one exit eventIn addition Fortune and FTSE 1047297rms had differences in functional

focus Fortune 50 1047297rms had a more balanced focus in terms of manufac-

turing and salesservices while FTSE 50 1047297rms had a greater focus on

salesservices Also the Fortune 50 1047297rms show a slightly higher concen-

tration on RampD in India compared to the FTSE 5027

We compare the entry mode of both categories of 1047297rms as well as

study whether the 1047297rms entered solo or otherwise A non-solo entry

refers to an entry through acquisition or a joint venture (JV) whereas

a solo entry represents the 1047297

rm entering by itselfThere is a small business history literature on MNEsrsquo choice of entry

model (joint ventures vs acquisition vs solo entry but this has not

included the case of India)28 Encarnation does describe the evolution

of joint ventures between multinational 1047297rms and Indian business

houses From 1948 to 1957 the Indian government prohibited foreign

takeovers of existing local 1047297rms and proscribed foreign-owned portfolio

investments India averaged fewer than forty new foreign collaborations

Hill American Business Abroad Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones Entrepre-neurship and Multinationals Global Business and the Making of the Modern World (Chel-tenham 2013) ch 8 Harold van B Cleveland and Thomas F Huertas Citibank 1812ndash1970(Cambridge Mass 1985) Ralph W Hidy and Muriel E Hidy Pioneering in Big Business1882ndash1911 (New York 1955) and Henrietta M Larson Evelyn H Knowlton and Charles SPopple History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) New Horizons 1927 ndash1950(New York 1971)

26 An entry in our sample indicates opening of the Indian subsidiary with a well-de1047297nedmandate to sell manufacture conduct RampD etc An exit in our sample indicates closingdown of the Indian subsidiary andor a visible shutting down of all operations in India

Coding was done by two independent research analysts and validation was done by theauthors in case of disagreement between the analysts The tables here have been condensedplease contact the authors for the full tables with data to 2013

27Pure RampD entry referring to an entry with the only function of the 1047297rm as RampD in India28For example Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 4

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 12

474

475

476

477

478

479

480

481

482

483

484

485

486

487

488

489

490

491

492

493

494

495

496

497

498

499

500

501

502

503

504

505

506

507

508

509

510

511

512

513

514

5152

516

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annually in this period most of them with Indian business houses such

as Tata (which had sixty joint ventures with foreign partners by 1958)

Mahindra and Bangur The years from 1947 to 1957 also witnessed the

takeover of the British colonial managing agencies by the Indian business houses Encarnation also documents a foreign exchange crisis

that affected India in 1957 that led to a reversal of government policy

toward JVs Government regulators began encouraging Indian 1047297rms to

seek foreign equity and local enterprises that secured foreign tie-ups

also had better chances of securing the licenses needed for expansion

Encarnation indicates that JVs with foreign multinationals started dra-

matically increasing from 1958 and hit peak levels during 1964

However JVs with foreign multinationals started declining in the late

1960s and as a result stocks of foreign equity invested in the privatesector began to shrink and reached their lowest levels in 1973 the year

government policy 1047298ipped again with the passage of FERA29 Our analy-

sis is an attempt to augment this narrative

The Fortune 50 1047297rms exhibited a preference towards solo entry

before 1970 (62 percent of entries) However between 1971 and 1990

90 percent of the Fortune 50 entries were either a JV or an acquisition

In the 1990s the Fortune 50 1047297rms increased the percentage of solo entry

to 375 percent FTSE 50 1047297rms were more stable with only a single solo

entry between 1971 and 1990 and post-1991 83 percent of entries wereeither a JV or an acquisition in both periods

The Dynamic Trajectories Framework

Our analysis of selected MNEs reveals important distinctions in the

trajectories followed by British or Anglo-Dutch and American multina-

tional 1047297rms over four decades There are differences in whether or not

they exited India in the 1970s and in how they crafted their local respon-

siveness strategies both in the 1970s and the 1990s We now outline anew ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to show that adopting certain

strategic decisions at the onset of different policy epochs leads to path

dependencies resulting in different long-term trajectories for the focal

1047297rm in the host country The dynamic trajectories framework is based

on the premise of two policy epochs in a host country mdashone unwelcoming

of MNEs (ldquonegative epochrdquo) and the other welcoming of MNEs (ldquopositive

epochrdquo) A focal host country could experience a negative epoch followed

by a positive epoch or vice versa

We argue that an MNE manager in the host country must make twosets of decisions at the onset of each policy epoch The 1047297rst decision is

29Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 60

Multinational Enterprises in India 13

517

518

519

520

521

522

523

524

525

526

527

528

529

530

531

532

533

534

535

536

537

538

539

540

541

542

543

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545

546

547

548

549

550

551

552

553

554

555

556

557

5582

559

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whether or not to be present in the host country during either or both

policy epochs Here we assume that the MNE is present in the host

country prior to the start of the 1047297rst epoch If the negative epoch is fol-

lowed by the positive epoch the manager has to decide whether to exitor stay at the onset of the negative epoch Also conditional on exiting

in the negative epoch the manager also has to decide whether or not

to reenter at the onset of the positive epoch We also assume that con-

ditional on staying at the onset of the negative epoch the manager

decides to stay during the positive epoch An MNE thus must face

three possible choices exitreenter exitdo not reenter or staystay30

However if the positive epoch is followed by the negative epoch the

manager has two possible choices stayexit or staystay We assume

that the MNE stays during the positive epochThe second decision set relates to whether or not the manager of the

MNE in the host country modi1047297es the ldquolocal responsiveness strategy rdquo of

the 1047297rm at the onset of each policy epoch and how the manager crafts

changes in that strategy According to business scholars Christopher Bar-

tlett and Sumantra Ghoshal MNEs have to concurrently manage the fol-

lowing three priorities global ef 1047297ciency national responsiveness and

worldwide learning A key strategy element of this three-dimensional

framework is the importance of each foreign subsidiary in managing

the overall MNE strategy Bartlett and Ghoshal call this strategy element ldquolocal responsivenessrdquo or ldquomultinational 1047298exibility rdquo and de1047297ne

a ldquodifferentiated and specialized rolerdquo for each MNE subsidiary31

We build on this construct of local responsiveness and argue that the

MNE in the host country could craft changes in the local responsiveness

strategy by investing in inputs outputs andor host country government

relationships Investments in inputs relate to physical intellectual

and human capitalmdasheg plants plantations trademarks patents and

talent Crafting changes on the output side could include altering the

functional focus of the 1047297

rm (to focus on distribution sales or manufac-turing) choosing new businesses enter changing the product mix for

each business and modifying the local pricing or distribution strategy

for each product Finally investments in host country government

relationships might involve investments in managing government stake-

holders andor crafting negotiation strategies to navigate host country

policy interventions

Figure 1 outlines the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo perspective for a host

country experiencing a negative policy epoch followed by a positive

30Theoretically a fourth option of stayexit is also possible since later exit might be motiv-ated by activities in another geography

31Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal Managing across Borders The Trans-national Solution vol 2 (Boston 1999) 67

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 14

560

561

562

563

564

565

566

567

568

569

570

571

572

573

574

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576

577

578

579

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581

582

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584

585

586

587

588

589

590

591

592

593

594

595

596

597

598

599

600

6012

602

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policy epoch from the perspective of a multinational that was in the

country already at the onset of the 1047297rst epoch The horizontal lines in

the 1047297gure represent the three possible dynamic trajectories In addition

for options 1 and 3 at the onset of each epoch the MNE has to decide

whether to maintain or modify its local responsiveness strategy If the

MNE decides to maintain its prior local responsiveness strategy the

MNE manager in the host country does not make any signi1047297cant new

investments in the input side makes no changes to the functionalfocus and product mix and makes no changes in managing government

stakeholders Still if the manager of the MNE in the host country mod-

i1047297es the local responsiveness strategy at the onset of either or both policy

F i g 1 - B W

o n l i n e B W

i n p r i n t

Figure 1 Dynamic trajectories framework This graphic is a representation of the ldquodynamictrajectoriesrdquo framework and depicts the evolution of the policy environment in a focal hostcountry that passes through a ldquonegative epochrdquo followed by a ldquopositive epochrdquo with regard topolicy toward multinationals At the onset of the negative epoch a focal MNC has to decide

whether to exit or stay Conditional on deciding to stay the 1047297

rm has to decide whether ornot to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether or not to modify thesame Modi1047297cation of the local responsiveness strategy could be on the input side (manufac-turing plants plantations patents talent) output side (functional focus product mix pricingdistribution etc) or in managing host country government relationships At the onset of thepositive epoch conditional on exiting earlier the MNC has to decide whether or not to reenterFor both the staystay option and exitreenter option the focal MNC has to decide at the onsetof the positive epoch whether or not to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether to modify the same We also posit that the direction (which levermdashinput output orgovernment relationships) and degree (how much) of change in the local responsiveness strat-egy is conditional on the decision to stayexit at the onset of Epoch 1 and the decision toreenterstay at the onset of Epoch 2

Multinational Enterprises in India 15

603

604

605

606

607

608

609

610

611

612

613

614

615

616

617

618

619

620

621

622

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626

627

628

629

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633

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635

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637

638

639

640

641

642

643

6442

645

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epochs changes could be made on the input side the output side or in

managing government stakeholders

It is also plausible that both the direction and the degree of

change in local responsiveness strategy are endogenous to the decisionof exitingstayingreentering We de1047297ne direction of change as

whether or not the focal MNE focuses on input output or govern-

ment relationships and degree of change as the extent and nature

of change on any of these levers We also argue that the direction

and degree of change MNE depends on the decision to exitstay

reenter As an example in the face of a negative policy epoch followed

by a positive policy epoch an MNE that decides to follow a staystay

strategy might not be able to make drastic changes on the output side

(eg functional focus product mix) for reasons of continuity and may instead focus on investments in the input side (eg human capital

manufacturing plants plantations) However an MNE following an

exitreenter strategy might have fewer concerns regarding continuity

given the passage of time and might be able to make drastic

changes to the output side In that case the MNE might be able to

alter the functional andor product mix in the host country In

addition the need to focus on host country government relationships

especially in a negative epoch might imply a focus on input since it is

related to the creation of local jobs a key lever to engage with govern-ment stakeholders

We now outline four detailed qualitative case studies of these multi-

national 1047297rms to indicate differences in how they reacted to the two

policy epochs in India The four case studies arguably represent extremes

in our samplemdash while the Anglo-Dutch Unilever and British BAT fol-

lowed a well-crafted ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multina-

tionals IBM and Coca-Cola successfully executed an ldquoexitreentry rdquo

strategy32

Further we show that Unilever and BAT adapted to the negativepolicy epoch (represented by the FERA regulation and 1970 patent

law) by continuously investing in the input sidemdashmanufacturing plants

and human capital In contrast IBM and Coca-Cola exited India follow-

ing the FERA regulations of the 1970s subsequently returning with dras-

tically different local responsiveness strategies on the output side

represented by different functional and product mixes

32

The use of outliers in the context of India to outline differences in dynamic trajectories issimilar in principle to the analysis used by Jones and Khanna where they compared the differ-ent trajectories taken by Jardines and Swire in face of Communist intervention in China Geof-frey Jones and Tarun Khanna ldquoBringing History (Back) into International Businessrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006) 453ndash68

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 16

646

647

648

649

650

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663

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6872

688

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Unilever in India

The Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever originated as separate

British and Dutch 1047297rms making soap and margarine respectively

Lever Brothers the British company began exporting Sunlight soap

bars to India as early as 1888 Over time Lever Brothers brought

other products and brands to India including Lifebuoy in 189533 In

1917 Lever Brothers acquired partial interest in two other British soap

companies one of which had an of 1047297ce and depots in India Declining

sales between 1918 and 1921 further triggered Lever Brothersrsquo interest

in India as a manufacturing center Other factors included the growing

local Indian production of soap spurred by wartime shortages and the

widespread Swadeshi movement in India which advocated self-suf 1047297-

ciency through use of locally made products In the 1920s Lever Broth-

ers bought a site at Sinduria near Calcutta Unilever (the product of the

amalgamation of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie in 1930) continued

to expand in the country after 1929 The Hindustan Vanaspati Manufac-

turing Company was established in 1931 In 1933 a new company called

Lever Bros (India) Ltd was incorporated in Bombay Subsequently

Unilever set up factories to manufacture soap in Calcutta and Bombay

and vegetable ghee just outside Bombay using the brand name Dalda

Another subsidiary United Traders Limited was formed in 193534

These subsidiaries functioned independently until 1956 when they

merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) which sold 10

percent of its equity to the public the share of public equity was

increased to 14 percent in 196535 The country rsquos planned economy at

the time protected local manufacturers and Unilever 1047298ourished The

company under the in1047298uence of the government also recruited Indian

managers naming P L Tandon chairman in 1961mdashthe 1047297rst instance of

an Indian heading a multinational (see Jaithirth Raorsquos contribution to

this special issue) Hindustan Lever Limited evolved into a consumer

goods company with Unilever as its major stakeholder HLL had been

in the beverages industry since 1903 with its brand Red Label tea In

1972 Unileverrsquos acquisition of Lipton Ltd from the British company

Allied Suppliers included a large and very poorly managed Indian tea

packaging and distribution business which could not be integrated

33 Amar Nayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Devel-oping Country (New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 Sushil Vachani Multinationals in India Strategic Product Choices (Columbia Mo 1992) 12ndash31 D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas

The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash

1965 (Stanford 1978) Vanaspati is vegetable ghee andDalda is a brand34Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 835

ldquoHindustan Unilever Limited Factsheetrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinImagesHUL-Factsheet_tcm114-188694pdf Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 17

689

690

691

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7302

731

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with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

734

735

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747

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749

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7732

774

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FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

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797

798

799

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807

808

809

810

811

812

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815

8162

817

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

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830

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835

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837

838

839

840

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850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

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883

884

885

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887

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890

891

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893

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

909

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911

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935

936

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940

941

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944

9452

946

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

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954

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956

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970

971

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973

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977

978

979

980

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984

985

986

987

9882

989

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

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1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

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1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

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Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

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1125

1126

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1128

1129

1130

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11592

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

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1177

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1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

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1233

1234

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1239

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1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

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1273

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1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

1318

1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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number of licenses it issued in each industry Each industry had a cap on

licenses usually four or 1047297 ve for the whole nation creating a monopolistic

market Investors focused on procuring licenses rather than on improv-

ing their services and products Owing to the limited number of players alicense guaranteed pro1047297ts Thus regulation with extreme controls on

FDI along with a high tariff wall sheltered domestic companies from

overseas competition This policy emerged from the nationrsquos socialist

viewpoint and the prior experience of colonial exploitation but this

monopolistic situation hurt the country rsquos overall infrastructure

1970 India Shuts Down to MNEs

In the early 1970s the Indian government gradually began tighten-

ing the regulatory noose on MNEs operating in the country This shift

was driven by a concerted effort by the Indian state and local 1047297rms to

ldquodislodgerdquo multinationals from India Encarnation outlines a ldquocausal

modelrdquo of how MNEs were dislodged from India In the 1047297rst step local

1047297rms gained 1047297nancial independence and managerial autonomy from

MNEs in the second step Indian 1047297rms began to secure technology

free of foreign capital and in the third step Indian 1047297rms acquired

control of markets previously dominated by MNEs11

From a policy point of view this converged into two new policies

designed to control Indiarsquos economic resources and foreign interests

especially to curb the out1047298ow of capital in the form of earnings Both

of these policy instruments directly affected multinational 1047297rms We

1047297rst examine the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA)

FERA was passed by an act of Parliament in 1973 and came into

effect on January 1 1974 This act consolidated and amended the pre-

vious FERA Act of 1947 FERA rsquos goal was to restrict dealings in foreign

exchange and other securities that could impact the nationrsquos currency

and foreign exchange reserves The act had a provision to cap the

foreign investment in all companies operating in the nation and

foreign companies had to dilute their shareholdings to 40 percent

FERA also vested power in the hands of the Reserve Bank of India

(RBI) to regulate the foreign equity in the companies operating in

India and to ensure that the cap was maintained As a result all compa-

nies came under the direct control of the Reserve Bank of India 12 All

1047297rms operating in India with more than 40 percent foreign equity had

to obtain permission from the RBI to continue operations after

11 Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals12 Harpreet Dusanjh and AS Sidhu ldquoPolicy Framework for Multinational Corporations in

India A Historical Perspectiverdquo Indian Journal of Economics and Business (2010) 527ndash29

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 6

216

217

218

219

220

221

222

223

224

225

226

227

228

229

230

231

232

233

234

235

236

237

238

239

240

241

242

243

244

245

246

247

248

249

250

251

252

253

254

255

256

2572

258

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January 1 1974 FERA affected already-established foreign companies in

India that had foreign equity stakes exceeding 40 percent and it applied

regardless of a 1047297rmrsquos initial terms and conditions FERA also outlined

that all companies operating in India (with the exception of foreignairline shipping and banking companies) would be incorporated

under the Indian Companies Act which would curb tax-free out1047298ows

of pro1047297ts Additionally the maximum foreign equity percentage stake

differed by industry Violations of FERA would incur criminal charges13

Out of the 881 companies that applied to the RBI only 150 compa-

nies were allowed to keep a higher level of foreign equity than the pre-

scribed cap the others diluted to 1047297t the ambit of FERA Companies

that found the terms unacceptable began to wind up operations in

India Fifty-four companies applied to exit India by 1977ndash

1978 andnine companies applied to exit in 1980ndash198114

1970 Patent Act Spurs Reverse Engineering in Pharmaceuticals

In addition to FERA the Indian government introduced the Patent

Act of 1970 and this policy change had far-ranging implications for both

multinational and domestic 1047297rms particularly in the pharmaceutical

industry The two policy instruments FERA and the new patent act were introduced within a span of three years and represented parallel

attempts to tighten control of MNEs In accordance with Encarnationrsquos

causal model of dislodging MNEs the new patent act intended to level

the playing 1047297eld for Indian 1047297rms in the domain of intellectual property15

As of 1970 multinational companies controlled 68 percent of the

market share in Indiarsquos pharmaceuticals These multinationalsmdash with

the support of the Patent Act of 1911mdashprevented local Indian companies

from manufacturing new drugs The patent law allowed the MNEs a

monopolistic position and they used their stronghold on the market tocharge extremely high prices resulting in little access to medicines for

the Indian masses

The Indian government replaced the Patent Act of 1911 and also

decided to introduce drug price controls through the Drug Price

Control Order of 1970 The Patent Act of 1970 represented a set of

rules that laid out the legal management of intellectual property in

India The act was a keystone in the nationrsquos treatment of intellectual

property

13Kudaisya The Oxford India Anthology of Business History Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Industrial Organization

14 Nayak Multinationals in India15 Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Multinational Enterprises in India 7

259

260

261

262

263

264

265

266

267

268

269

270

271

272

273

274

275

276

277

278

279

280

281

282

283

284

285

286

287

288

289

290

291

292

293

294

295

296

297

298

299

3002

301

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The central piece of the patent law was that it recognized only

process patents and not product patents in the pharmaceutical and agro-

chemical sectors It also reduced the patent period from sixteen years to

seven years in these sectors and to fourteen years in other cases Thisprocess patent regime triggered reverse engineering in the Indian

pharmaceutical sector for drugs patented in other countries Indian com-

panies could now discover alternate processes for manufacturing drugs

that were not patented in India16

In summary from 1970 to 1990 FERA and the Indian Patent Act of

1970 had leveled the playing 1047297eld for Indian 1047297rms with regard to MNEs

FERA gave Indian 1047297rms 1047297nancial and managerial autonomy from

foreigners and the patent act gave Indian 1047297rms an opportunity to

reverse engineer products

1991 India Reopens Doors to MNEs

By the early 1990s India was deep in an economic crisis triggered by

both political and economic factors The two years prior to 1991 had seen

political turmoil with four prime ministers and four 1047297nance ministers

This led to unclear policies and virtual economic paralysis The years

before 1991 saw increased defense expenditures reduced tax revenue

slow growth in the export market and a lack of a coherent budget which brought about an ever-increasing de1047297cit and in1047298ation FERA

was hampering Indiarsquos ability to compete with other countries During

the Persian Gulf War of 1990ndash91 India had purchased oil at an extre-

mely high price and instability in the Middle East affected India as

well Additional problems included an annual rate of in1047298ation of 17

percent an unsustainably large 1047297scal de1047297cit and widespread 1047298ight of

capital The need for economic reform was further accentuated by the

collapse of the Soviet Union a country with which India had had

strong political and economic ties A major concern in 1991 was the unprecedented possibility that

India would default on its external debt something that had not hap-

pened since independence Indiarsquos foreign debt stood at $72 billion

making it the worldrsquos third-largest debtor after Brazil and Mexico This

growth in debt was rapid as the foreign debt of the nation stood at

$205 billion in 1980 In 1991 India had only $11 billion in its hard cur-

rency reserves enough for only two weeks of imports Realizing that it

did not have enough money to pay for its imports and was nearly bank-

rupt India reconsidered its stance on Western in1047298uence The govern-ment entered talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to

16 Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Industrial Organization

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 8

302

303

304

305

306

307

308

309

310

311

312

313

314

315

316

317

318

319

320

321

322

323

324

325

326

327

328

329

330

331

332

333

334

335

336

337

338

339

340

341

342

3432

344

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seek emergency aid India needed more than $5 billion from the IMF to

meet its immediate obligations Taking such a huge loan from the IMF

would grant the IMF substantial lobbying power with India as the inter-

national body disbursed loans under ldquo

conditions that often includedaltering policies viewed by the fund as mistaken or counterproductiverdquo17

Among the IMFrsquos demands was a reduction of the budget de1047297cit a

decrease in the licensing requirements for companies opening doors

for foreign companies and liberalizing investment

Though India was traditionally socialist in its policies after indepen-

dence this was not the country rsquos 1047297rst attempt at economic liberalization

A prior attempt in 1966 was reversed in 1967 after which a stronger

socialistic model was adopted The next major attempt was in 1985

driven by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi it came to an end in 1987 Thefour or 1047297 ve licensed producers in each industry were instrumental in

blocking the 1980s reforms18

Spurred by the IMF in 1991 the government of Prime Minister

P V Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh pushed

for structural policy reform These policies included opening the

country to international trade and investment deregulation privatiza-

tion of state-owned entities tax reforms and in1047298ation-controlling

measures The country went through a deregulation makeovermdashone

that encouraged foreign investmentSince 1991 arguably India has sustained the spirit of liberalization

despite changing governments making these reforms more sustainable

This liberalization resulted in Indiarsquos rising GDP growth peaking at 9

percent in 200719 With economic reforms came relaxation of the FDI

norms While the GDP growth of the nation prior to 1990 was a little

under 4 percent on average the GDP growth postreform stood at

between 6 and 7 percent toward the end of the 1990s20

FERA was repealed in 1999 by the government of Prime Minister

Atal Bihari Vajpayee The less stringent Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) replaced it loosening restrictions on foreign exchange and

investment in India FEMA was more aligned to the new economic

17 Bernard Weinraub ldquoEconomic Crisis Forcing Once Self-Reliant India to Seek Aidrdquo New York Times 29 June 1991 available at httpwwwnytimescom19910629worldeconomic-crisis-forcing-once-self-reliant-india-to-seek-aidhtml Web site accessed on 21Oct 2013

18Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson Why Nations Fail The Origins of Power Prosperity and Poverty (New York 2012)

19

Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook India available at httpswwwciagovlibrarypublicationsthe-world-factbookgeosinhtmlEcon Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

20BBC News ldquoIndia The Economyrdquo 3 Dec 1998 available at httpnewsbbccouk2hisouth_asia55427stm Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 9

345

346

347

348

349

350

351

352

353

354

355

356

357

358

359

360

361

362

363

364

365

366

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368

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370

371

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373

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377

378

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380

381

382

383

384

385

3862

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reforms the nation was witnessing FEMA made all violations regarding

foreign exchange civil not criminal offenses making it more investor

friendly FEMA tried to consolidate legislation relating to foreign

exchange in India with an ultimate goal of allowing external trade andpayments and to facilitate the development of a foreign exchange

market in India The reforms also immediately reduced the number of

steps required to procure a license to four or 1047297 ve approvals mainly

environmental Most goods underwent a tariff cut apart from goods in

the consumer sector

Indian Patent Reform Starting 1999

Following FEMA the Indian patent system underwent a number of reforms starting in 1999 triggered when India signed the agreement on

Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) at the

World Trade Organization and joined the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)

Product patents in medicine food and agrochemicals were now

allowed and the patent expiry period was extended to twenty years

similar to that in the US The average time required to get a patent

was reduced from 1047297 ve to three years The patent 1047297ling fee did not

change during this period and remained substantially less compared to

that of the United States Patent and Trademark Of 1047297ce (USPTO) Thepatent system also granted exclusive marketing rights (EMRs) based

on patents granted this enabled multinational 1047297rms with patents to

derive competitive advantage in selling their patented products In the

past twenty years Indian patent law has been amended three timesmdash

in 1999 2002 and 2005mdashto increase compatibility with TRIPs and to

allay MNEsrsquo fears of intellectual property theft

With the Indian patent reforms a lot of MNEsrsquo worries regarding

intellectual property protection seemed to disappear An analysis of

Indian patent 1047297lings shows a steep rise in the total number of patents1047297led in India with an in1047298exion point in 1997 This increase is attributed

to positive expectations about the 1999 reforms From 1995 to 2004

MNEs from fourteen countries 1047297led a total of 8426 patents of which

MNEs from the US 1047297led the most (2477 patents) followed by 1047297rms

from Germany and Switzerland Patent applications by foreign MNEs

in India started increasing further around 2000 and have been increas-

ing ever since The EMR ldquomailboxrdquo provisions and the belief that India

would abide by TRIPS gave MNEs con1047297dence leading to a surge in the

number of applications In contrast Indian entities 1047297led 1486 appli-cations in the same period21 The number of patents 1047297led in India

21 Analysis conducted by researchers

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 10

388

389

390

391

392

393

394

395

396

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414

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416

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418

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420

421

422

423

424

425

426

427

428

4292

430

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ranged between 2000 and 4000 patents per year from the early 1970s

all the way to 1993 Post-1993 there was a rapid increase in the number

of patent 1047297lings with a spike of around 10000 patents per year in 1997 in

anticipation of the 1999 reforms

22

MNEs Stream into India Analysis of Fortune 50and FTSE 50 MNEs

With the initiation of economic reforms India attracted unprece-

dented foreign direct investment Average annual FDI rose from $100

million in the mid-1980s to around $2 billion in the mid-1990s The

stock of FDI rose from less than $2 billion in 1991 to almost $39

billion in 200423 The World Investment Report (WIR) of 2007 indicatesthat the 1990 inward stock level of FDI was roughly $17 billion the 2000

inward stock was $175 billion and the 2004 inward stock was $387

billion The city of Bangalore became one of the largest magnets of

foreign investment in India in 2001ndash2002 alone a total of 230 MNEs

setupof 1047297ces in Bangalorersquos industrial parks employing 25000 engineers

In this section we analyze unique data that documents every entry

and exit event for each Fortune 50 and FTSE 50 multinational 1047297rm

The entry and exit events were tracked from 1858 to 2013 and multiple

data sources were used including historical narratives of several 1047297rmsSEC company 1047297lings (the complete list of subsidiaries was found in

Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm) and data on company registration

in India from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Govern-

ment of India As the Fortune 50 and the FTSE 50 lists have changed over

time we have compiled data for the lists as of 1991 as well as 2013 In our

primary analyses and in the Appendix we use the Fortune and FTSE lists

from 1991 the year of the IMF-induced reforms

There are several limitations in conducting historical analysis using

currently available primary data Wilkins describes these limitations assometimes introducing ldquo blinders that obscured important past occur-

rencesrdquo24 To circumvent some of these constraints in addition to con-

ducting our own primary research we based our analyses on prior

articles in business history on multinational entry in India25 Appendix

22 Information from Technology Information Forecasting and Assessment Council(TIFAC)

23Chandana Chakraborty and Peter Nunnenkamp ldquoEconomic Reforms FDI and Econ-omic Growth in India A Sector Level Analysisrdquo World Development 36 no 7 (2008)

1192ndash

121224Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Conti-nents new ed with new intro by Mira Wilkins (Cambridge UK 2011) 11

25For example Tomlinson ldquoForeign Private Investment in India 1920ndash1950rdquo Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 A History (Oxford 1993) Wilkins and

Multinational Enterprises in India 11

431

432

433

434

435

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437

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439

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441

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468

469

470

471

4722

473

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Table 1 documents the data on the entry and exit of Fortune 50 multina-

tional 1047297rms as of 1991 with operations in India over the period 1905ndash

1999 Appendix Table 2 documents the data for the FTSE 50 1047297rms as

of 1991 with operations between 1847 and 1999

26

Analysis of the data in these tables reveals several interesting

insights In comparison to the FTSE 50 Fortune 50 MNEs exhibit

greater number of entries but also greater numbers of exit events

While Fortune 50 1047297rms have a total of forty entry events the FTSE 50

1047297rms only have twenty entry events On the other hand FTSE 50 1047297rms

have a total of two exit events in this period while Fortune 50 1047297rms

have a total of eleven exit events Between 1971 and 1990 Fortune 50

1047297rms have a total of seven exit events while FTSE 50 1047297rms only have

one exit eventIn addition Fortune and FTSE 1047297rms had differences in functional

focus Fortune 50 1047297rms had a more balanced focus in terms of manufac-

turing and salesservices while FTSE 50 1047297rms had a greater focus on

salesservices Also the Fortune 50 1047297rms show a slightly higher concen-

tration on RampD in India compared to the FTSE 5027

We compare the entry mode of both categories of 1047297rms as well as

study whether the 1047297rms entered solo or otherwise A non-solo entry

refers to an entry through acquisition or a joint venture (JV) whereas

a solo entry represents the 1047297

rm entering by itselfThere is a small business history literature on MNEsrsquo choice of entry

model (joint ventures vs acquisition vs solo entry but this has not

included the case of India)28 Encarnation does describe the evolution

of joint ventures between multinational 1047297rms and Indian business

houses From 1948 to 1957 the Indian government prohibited foreign

takeovers of existing local 1047297rms and proscribed foreign-owned portfolio

investments India averaged fewer than forty new foreign collaborations

Hill American Business Abroad Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones Entrepre-neurship and Multinationals Global Business and the Making of the Modern World (Chel-tenham 2013) ch 8 Harold van B Cleveland and Thomas F Huertas Citibank 1812ndash1970(Cambridge Mass 1985) Ralph W Hidy and Muriel E Hidy Pioneering in Big Business1882ndash1911 (New York 1955) and Henrietta M Larson Evelyn H Knowlton and Charles SPopple History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) New Horizons 1927 ndash1950(New York 1971)

26 An entry in our sample indicates opening of the Indian subsidiary with a well-de1047297nedmandate to sell manufacture conduct RampD etc An exit in our sample indicates closingdown of the Indian subsidiary andor a visible shutting down of all operations in India

Coding was done by two independent research analysts and validation was done by theauthors in case of disagreement between the analysts The tables here have been condensedplease contact the authors for the full tables with data to 2013

27Pure RampD entry referring to an entry with the only function of the 1047297rm as RampD in India28For example Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 4

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 12

474

475

476

477

478

479

480

481

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484

485

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487

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489

490

491

492

493

494

495

496

497

498

499

500

501

502

503

504

505

506

507

508

509

510

511

512

513

514

5152

516

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annually in this period most of them with Indian business houses such

as Tata (which had sixty joint ventures with foreign partners by 1958)

Mahindra and Bangur The years from 1947 to 1957 also witnessed the

takeover of the British colonial managing agencies by the Indian business houses Encarnation also documents a foreign exchange crisis

that affected India in 1957 that led to a reversal of government policy

toward JVs Government regulators began encouraging Indian 1047297rms to

seek foreign equity and local enterprises that secured foreign tie-ups

also had better chances of securing the licenses needed for expansion

Encarnation indicates that JVs with foreign multinationals started dra-

matically increasing from 1958 and hit peak levels during 1964

However JVs with foreign multinationals started declining in the late

1960s and as a result stocks of foreign equity invested in the privatesector began to shrink and reached their lowest levels in 1973 the year

government policy 1047298ipped again with the passage of FERA29 Our analy-

sis is an attempt to augment this narrative

The Fortune 50 1047297rms exhibited a preference towards solo entry

before 1970 (62 percent of entries) However between 1971 and 1990

90 percent of the Fortune 50 entries were either a JV or an acquisition

In the 1990s the Fortune 50 1047297rms increased the percentage of solo entry

to 375 percent FTSE 50 1047297rms were more stable with only a single solo

entry between 1971 and 1990 and post-1991 83 percent of entries wereeither a JV or an acquisition in both periods

The Dynamic Trajectories Framework

Our analysis of selected MNEs reveals important distinctions in the

trajectories followed by British or Anglo-Dutch and American multina-

tional 1047297rms over four decades There are differences in whether or not

they exited India in the 1970s and in how they crafted their local respon-

siveness strategies both in the 1970s and the 1990s We now outline anew ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to show that adopting certain

strategic decisions at the onset of different policy epochs leads to path

dependencies resulting in different long-term trajectories for the focal

1047297rm in the host country The dynamic trajectories framework is based

on the premise of two policy epochs in a host country mdashone unwelcoming

of MNEs (ldquonegative epochrdquo) and the other welcoming of MNEs (ldquopositive

epochrdquo) A focal host country could experience a negative epoch followed

by a positive epoch or vice versa

We argue that an MNE manager in the host country must make twosets of decisions at the onset of each policy epoch The 1047297rst decision is

29Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 60

Multinational Enterprises in India 13

517

518

519

520

521

522

523

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531

532

533

534

535

536

537

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540

541

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543

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549

550

551

552

553

554

555

556

557

5582

559

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whether or not to be present in the host country during either or both

policy epochs Here we assume that the MNE is present in the host

country prior to the start of the 1047297rst epoch If the negative epoch is fol-

lowed by the positive epoch the manager has to decide whether to exitor stay at the onset of the negative epoch Also conditional on exiting

in the negative epoch the manager also has to decide whether or not

to reenter at the onset of the positive epoch We also assume that con-

ditional on staying at the onset of the negative epoch the manager

decides to stay during the positive epoch An MNE thus must face

three possible choices exitreenter exitdo not reenter or staystay30

However if the positive epoch is followed by the negative epoch the

manager has two possible choices stayexit or staystay We assume

that the MNE stays during the positive epochThe second decision set relates to whether or not the manager of the

MNE in the host country modi1047297es the ldquolocal responsiveness strategy rdquo of

the 1047297rm at the onset of each policy epoch and how the manager crafts

changes in that strategy According to business scholars Christopher Bar-

tlett and Sumantra Ghoshal MNEs have to concurrently manage the fol-

lowing three priorities global ef 1047297ciency national responsiveness and

worldwide learning A key strategy element of this three-dimensional

framework is the importance of each foreign subsidiary in managing

the overall MNE strategy Bartlett and Ghoshal call this strategy element ldquolocal responsivenessrdquo or ldquomultinational 1047298exibility rdquo and de1047297ne

a ldquodifferentiated and specialized rolerdquo for each MNE subsidiary31

We build on this construct of local responsiveness and argue that the

MNE in the host country could craft changes in the local responsiveness

strategy by investing in inputs outputs andor host country government

relationships Investments in inputs relate to physical intellectual

and human capitalmdasheg plants plantations trademarks patents and

talent Crafting changes on the output side could include altering the

functional focus of the 1047297

rm (to focus on distribution sales or manufac-turing) choosing new businesses enter changing the product mix for

each business and modifying the local pricing or distribution strategy

for each product Finally investments in host country government

relationships might involve investments in managing government stake-

holders andor crafting negotiation strategies to navigate host country

policy interventions

Figure 1 outlines the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo perspective for a host

country experiencing a negative policy epoch followed by a positive

30Theoretically a fourth option of stayexit is also possible since later exit might be motiv-ated by activities in another geography

31Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal Managing across Borders The Trans-national Solution vol 2 (Boston 1999) 67

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 14

560

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6012

602

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policy epoch from the perspective of a multinational that was in the

country already at the onset of the 1047297rst epoch The horizontal lines in

the 1047297gure represent the three possible dynamic trajectories In addition

for options 1 and 3 at the onset of each epoch the MNE has to decide

whether to maintain or modify its local responsiveness strategy If the

MNE decides to maintain its prior local responsiveness strategy the

MNE manager in the host country does not make any signi1047297cant new

investments in the input side makes no changes to the functionalfocus and product mix and makes no changes in managing government

stakeholders Still if the manager of the MNE in the host country mod-

i1047297es the local responsiveness strategy at the onset of either or both policy

F i g 1 - B W

o n l i n e B W

i n p r i n t

Figure 1 Dynamic trajectories framework This graphic is a representation of the ldquodynamictrajectoriesrdquo framework and depicts the evolution of the policy environment in a focal hostcountry that passes through a ldquonegative epochrdquo followed by a ldquopositive epochrdquo with regard topolicy toward multinationals At the onset of the negative epoch a focal MNC has to decide

whether to exit or stay Conditional on deciding to stay the 1047297

rm has to decide whether ornot to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether or not to modify thesame Modi1047297cation of the local responsiveness strategy could be on the input side (manufac-turing plants plantations patents talent) output side (functional focus product mix pricingdistribution etc) or in managing host country government relationships At the onset of thepositive epoch conditional on exiting earlier the MNC has to decide whether or not to reenterFor both the staystay option and exitreenter option the focal MNC has to decide at the onsetof the positive epoch whether or not to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether to modify the same We also posit that the direction (which levermdashinput output orgovernment relationships) and degree (how much) of change in the local responsiveness strat-egy is conditional on the decision to stayexit at the onset of Epoch 1 and the decision toreenterstay at the onset of Epoch 2

Multinational Enterprises in India 15

603

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613

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619

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621

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6442

645

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epochs changes could be made on the input side the output side or in

managing government stakeholders

It is also plausible that both the direction and the degree of

change in local responsiveness strategy are endogenous to the decisionof exitingstayingreentering We de1047297ne direction of change as

whether or not the focal MNE focuses on input output or govern-

ment relationships and degree of change as the extent and nature

of change on any of these levers We also argue that the direction

and degree of change MNE depends on the decision to exitstay

reenter As an example in the face of a negative policy epoch followed

by a positive policy epoch an MNE that decides to follow a staystay

strategy might not be able to make drastic changes on the output side

(eg functional focus product mix) for reasons of continuity and may instead focus on investments in the input side (eg human capital

manufacturing plants plantations) However an MNE following an

exitreenter strategy might have fewer concerns regarding continuity

given the passage of time and might be able to make drastic

changes to the output side In that case the MNE might be able to

alter the functional andor product mix in the host country In

addition the need to focus on host country government relationships

especially in a negative epoch might imply a focus on input since it is

related to the creation of local jobs a key lever to engage with govern-ment stakeholders

We now outline four detailed qualitative case studies of these multi-

national 1047297rms to indicate differences in how they reacted to the two

policy epochs in India The four case studies arguably represent extremes

in our samplemdash while the Anglo-Dutch Unilever and British BAT fol-

lowed a well-crafted ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multina-

tionals IBM and Coca-Cola successfully executed an ldquoexitreentry rdquo

strategy32

Further we show that Unilever and BAT adapted to the negativepolicy epoch (represented by the FERA regulation and 1970 patent

law) by continuously investing in the input sidemdashmanufacturing plants

and human capital In contrast IBM and Coca-Cola exited India follow-

ing the FERA regulations of the 1970s subsequently returning with dras-

tically different local responsiveness strategies on the output side

represented by different functional and product mixes

32

The use of outliers in the context of India to outline differences in dynamic trajectories issimilar in principle to the analysis used by Jones and Khanna where they compared the differ-ent trajectories taken by Jardines and Swire in face of Communist intervention in China Geof-frey Jones and Tarun Khanna ldquoBringing History (Back) into International Businessrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006) 453ndash68

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 16

646

647

648

649

650

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6872

688

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Unilever in India

The Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever originated as separate

British and Dutch 1047297rms making soap and margarine respectively

Lever Brothers the British company began exporting Sunlight soap

bars to India as early as 1888 Over time Lever Brothers brought

other products and brands to India including Lifebuoy in 189533 In

1917 Lever Brothers acquired partial interest in two other British soap

companies one of which had an of 1047297ce and depots in India Declining

sales between 1918 and 1921 further triggered Lever Brothersrsquo interest

in India as a manufacturing center Other factors included the growing

local Indian production of soap spurred by wartime shortages and the

widespread Swadeshi movement in India which advocated self-suf 1047297-

ciency through use of locally made products In the 1920s Lever Broth-

ers bought a site at Sinduria near Calcutta Unilever (the product of the

amalgamation of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie in 1930) continued

to expand in the country after 1929 The Hindustan Vanaspati Manufac-

turing Company was established in 1931 In 1933 a new company called

Lever Bros (India) Ltd was incorporated in Bombay Subsequently

Unilever set up factories to manufacture soap in Calcutta and Bombay

and vegetable ghee just outside Bombay using the brand name Dalda

Another subsidiary United Traders Limited was formed in 193534

These subsidiaries functioned independently until 1956 when they

merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) which sold 10

percent of its equity to the public the share of public equity was

increased to 14 percent in 196535 The country rsquos planned economy at

the time protected local manufacturers and Unilever 1047298ourished The

company under the in1047298uence of the government also recruited Indian

managers naming P L Tandon chairman in 1961mdashthe 1047297rst instance of

an Indian heading a multinational (see Jaithirth Raorsquos contribution to

this special issue) Hindustan Lever Limited evolved into a consumer

goods company with Unilever as its major stakeholder HLL had been

in the beverages industry since 1903 with its brand Red Label tea In

1972 Unileverrsquos acquisition of Lipton Ltd from the British company

Allied Suppliers included a large and very poorly managed Indian tea

packaging and distribution business which could not be integrated

33 Amar Nayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Devel-oping Country (New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 Sushil Vachani Multinationals in India Strategic Product Choices (Columbia Mo 1992) 12ndash31 D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas

The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash

1965 (Stanford 1978) Vanaspati is vegetable ghee andDalda is a brand34Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 835

ldquoHindustan Unilever Limited Factsheetrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinImagesHUL-Factsheet_tcm114-188694pdf Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 17

689

690

691

692

693

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697

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719

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723

724

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728

729

7302

731

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with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

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735

736

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769

770

771

772

7732

774

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1938

FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

800

801

802

803

804

805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

8162

817

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2038

company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

826

827

828

829

830

831

832

833

834

835

836

837

838

839

840

841

842

843

844

845

846

847

848

849

850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

892

893

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2238

headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

909

910

911

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913

914

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920

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925

926

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930

931

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940

941

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944

9452

946

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2438

by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2538

Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

1043

1044

1045

1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

1052

1053

1054

1055

1056

1057

1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

1064

1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2638

market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

1082

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1084

1085

1086

1087

1088

1089

1090

1091

1092

1093

1094

1095

1096

1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2738

of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

1151

1152

1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

1166

1167

1168

1169

1170

1171

1172

1173

1174

1175

1176

1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

1182

1183

1184

1185

1186

1187

1188

1189

1190

1191

1192

1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

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1319

1320

1321

1322

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1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3838

PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

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1596

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1600

1601

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1623

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January 1 1974 FERA affected already-established foreign companies in

India that had foreign equity stakes exceeding 40 percent and it applied

regardless of a 1047297rmrsquos initial terms and conditions FERA also outlined

that all companies operating in India (with the exception of foreignairline shipping and banking companies) would be incorporated

under the Indian Companies Act which would curb tax-free out1047298ows

of pro1047297ts Additionally the maximum foreign equity percentage stake

differed by industry Violations of FERA would incur criminal charges13

Out of the 881 companies that applied to the RBI only 150 compa-

nies were allowed to keep a higher level of foreign equity than the pre-

scribed cap the others diluted to 1047297t the ambit of FERA Companies

that found the terms unacceptable began to wind up operations in

India Fifty-four companies applied to exit India by 1977ndash

1978 andnine companies applied to exit in 1980ndash198114

1970 Patent Act Spurs Reverse Engineering in Pharmaceuticals

In addition to FERA the Indian government introduced the Patent

Act of 1970 and this policy change had far-ranging implications for both

multinational and domestic 1047297rms particularly in the pharmaceutical

industry The two policy instruments FERA and the new patent act were introduced within a span of three years and represented parallel

attempts to tighten control of MNEs In accordance with Encarnationrsquos

causal model of dislodging MNEs the new patent act intended to level

the playing 1047297eld for Indian 1047297rms in the domain of intellectual property15

As of 1970 multinational companies controlled 68 percent of the

market share in Indiarsquos pharmaceuticals These multinationalsmdash with

the support of the Patent Act of 1911mdashprevented local Indian companies

from manufacturing new drugs The patent law allowed the MNEs a

monopolistic position and they used their stronghold on the market tocharge extremely high prices resulting in little access to medicines for

the Indian masses

The Indian government replaced the Patent Act of 1911 and also

decided to introduce drug price controls through the Drug Price

Control Order of 1970 The Patent Act of 1970 represented a set of

rules that laid out the legal management of intellectual property in

India The act was a keystone in the nationrsquos treatment of intellectual

property

13Kudaisya The Oxford India Anthology of Business History Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Industrial Organization

14 Nayak Multinationals in India15 Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Multinational Enterprises in India 7

259

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293

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297

298

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The central piece of the patent law was that it recognized only

process patents and not product patents in the pharmaceutical and agro-

chemical sectors It also reduced the patent period from sixteen years to

seven years in these sectors and to fourteen years in other cases Thisprocess patent regime triggered reverse engineering in the Indian

pharmaceutical sector for drugs patented in other countries Indian com-

panies could now discover alternate processes for manufacturing drugs

that were not patented in India16

In summary from 1970 to 1990 FERA and the Indian Patent Act of

1970 had leveled the playing 1047297eld for Indian 1047297rms with regard to MNEs

FERA gave Indian 1047297rms 1047297nancial and managerial autonomy from

foreigners and the patent act gave Indian 1047297rms an opportunity to

reverse engineer products

1991 India Reopens Doors to MNEs

By the early 1990s India was deep in an economic crisis triggered by

both political and economic factors The two years prior to 1991 had seen

political turmoil with four prime ministers and four 1047297nance ministers

This led to unclear policies and virtual economic paralysis The years

before 1991 saw increased defense expenditures reduced tax revenue

slow growth in the export market and a lack of a coherent budget which brought about an ever-increasing de1047297cit and in1047298ation FERA

was hampering Indiarsquos ability to compete with other countries During

the Persian Gulf War of 1990ndash91 India had purchased oil at an extre-

mely high price and instability in the Middle East affected India as

well Additional problems included an annual rate of in1047298ation of 17

percent an unsustainably large 1047297scal de1047297cit and widespread 1047298ight of

capital The need for economic reform was further accentuated by the

collapse of the Soviet Union a country with which India had had

strong political and economic ties A major concern in 1991 was the unprecedented possibility that

India would default on its external debt something that had not hap-

pened since independence Indiarsquos foreign debt stood at $72 billion

making it the worldrsquos third-largest debtor after Brazil and Mexico This

growth in debt was rapid as the foreign debt of the nation stood at

$205 billion in 1980 In 1991 India had only $11 billion in its hard cur-

rency reserves enough for only two weeks of imports Realizing that it

did not have enough money to pay for its imports and was nearly bank-

rupt India reconsidered its stance on Western in1047298uence The govern-ment entered talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to

16 Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Industrial Organization

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 8

302

303

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306

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seek emergency aid India needed more than $5 billion from the IMF to

meet its immediate obligations Taking such a huge loan from the IMF

would grant the IMF substantial lobbying power with India as the inter-

national body disbursed loans under ldquo

conditions that often includedaltering policies viewed by the fund as mistaken or counterproductiverdquo17

Among the IMFrsquos demands was a reduction of the budget de1047297cit a

decrease in the licensing requirements for companies opening doors

for foreign companies and liberalizing investment

Though India was traditionally socialist in its policies after indepen-

dence this was not the country rsquos 1047297rst attempt at economic liberalization

A prior attempt in 1966 was reversed in 1967 after which a stronger

socialistic model was adopted The next major attempt was in 1985

driven by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi it came to an end in 1987 Thefour or 1047297 ve licensed producers in each industry were instrumental in

blocking the 1980s reforms18

Spurred by the IMF in 1991 the government of Prime Minister

P V Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh pushed

for structural policy reform These policies included opening the

country to international trade and investment deregulation privatiza-

tion of state-owned entities tax reforms and in1047298ation-controlling

measures The country went through a deregulation makeovermdashone

that encouraged foreign investmentSince 1991 arguably India has sustained the spirit of liberalization

despite changing governments making these reforms more sustainable

This liberalization resulted in Indiarsquos rising GDP growth peaking at 9

percent in 200719 With economic reforms came relaxation of the FDI

norms While the GDP growth of the nation prior to 1990 was a little

under 4 percent on average the GDP growth postreform stood at

between 6 and 7 percent toward the end of the 1990s20

FERA was repealed in 1999 by the government of Prime Minister

Atal Bihari Vajpayee The less stringent Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) replaced it loosening restrictions on foreign exchange and

investment in India FEMA was more aligned to the new economic

17 Bernard Weinraub ldquoEconomic Crisis Forcing Once Self-Reliant India to Seek Aidrdquo New York Times 29 June 1991 available at httpwwwnytimescom19910629worldeconomic-crisis-forcing-once-self-reliant-india-to-seek-aidhtml Web site accessed on 21Oct 2013

18Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson Why Nations Fail The Origins of Power Prosperity and Poverty (New York 2012)

19

Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook India available at httpswwwciagovlibrarypublicationsthe-world-factbookgeosinhtmlEcon Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

20BBC News ldquoIndia The Economyrdquo 3 Dec 1998 available at httpnewsbbccouk2hisouth_asia55427stm Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 9

345

346

347

348

349

350

351

352

353

354

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357

358

359

360

361

362

363

364

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3862

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reforms the nation was witnessing FEMA made all violations regarding

foreign exchange civil not criminal offenses making it more investor

friendly FEMA tried to consolidate legislation relating to foreign

exchange in India with an ultimate goal of allowing external trade andpayments and to facilitate the development of a foreign exchange

market in India The reforms also immediately reduced the number of

steps required to procure a license to four or 1047297 ve approvals mainly

environmental Most goods underwent a tariff cut apart from goods in

the consumer sector

Indian Patent Reform Starting 1999

Following FEMA the Indian patent system underwent a number of reforms starting in 1999 triggered when India signed the agreement on

Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) at the

World Trade Organization and joined the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)

Product patents in medicine food and agrochemicals were now

allowed and the patent expiry period was extended to twenty years

similar to that in the US The average time required to get a patent

was reduced from 1047297 ve to three years The patent 1047297ling fee did not

change during this period and remained substantially less compared to

that of the United States Patent and Trademark Of 1047297ce (USPTO) Thepatent system also granted exclusive marketing rights (EMRs) based

on patents granted this enabled multinational 1047297rms with patents to

derive competitive advantage in selling their patented products In the

past twenty years Indian patent law has been amended three timesmdash

in 1999 2002 and 2005mdashto increase compatibility with TRIPs and to

allay MNEsrsquo fears of intellectual property theft

With the Indian patent reforms a lot of MNEsrsquo worries regarding

intellectual property protection seemed to disappear An analysis of

Indian patent 1047297lings shows a steep rise in the total number of patents1047297led in India with an in1047298exion point in 1997 This increase is attributed

to positive expectations about the 1999 reforms From 1995 to 2004

MNEs from fourteen countries 1047297led a total of 8426 patents of which

MNEs from the US 1047297led the most (2477 patents) followed by 1047297rms

from Germany and Switzerland Patent applications by foreign MNEs

in India started increasing further around 2000 and have been increas-

ing ever since The EMR ldquomailboxrdquo provisions and the belief that India

would abide by TRIPS gave MNEs con1047297dence leading to a surge in the

number of applications In contrast Indian entities 1047297led 1486 appli-cations in the same period21 The number of patents 1047297led in India

21 Analysis conducted by researchers

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 10

388

389

390

391

392

393

394

395

396

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398

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401

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411

412

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414

415

416

417

418

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420

421

422

423

424

425

426

427

428

4292

430

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ranged between 2000 and 4000 patents per year from the early 1970s

all the way to 1993 Post-1993 there was a rapid increase in the number

of patent 1047297lings with a spike of around 10000 patents per year in 1997 in

anticipation of the 1999 reforms

22

MNEs Stream into India Analysis of Fortune 50and FTSE 50 MNEs

With the initiation of economic reforms India attracted unprece-

dented foreign direct investment Average annual FDI rose from $100

million in the mid-1980s to around $2 billion in the mid-1990s The

stock of FDI rose from less than $2 billion in 1991 to almost $39

billion in 200423 The World Investment Report (WIR) of 2007 indicatesthat the 1990 inward stock level of FDI was roughly $17 billion the 2000

inward stock was $175 billion and the 2004 inward stock was $387

billion The city of Bangalore became one of the largest magnets of

foreign investment in India in 2001ndash2002 alone a total of 230 MNEs

setupof 1047297ces in Bangalorersquos industrial parks employing 25000 engineers

In this section we analyze unique data that documents every entry

and exit event for each Fortune 50 and FTSE 50 multinational 1047297rm

The entry and exit events were tracked from 1858 to 2013 and multiple

data sources were used including historical narratives of several 1047297rmsSEC company 1047297lings (the complete list of subsidiaries was found in

Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm) and data on company registration

in India from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Govern-

ment of India As the Fortune 50 and the FTSE 50 lists have changed over

time we have compiled data for the lists as of 1991 as well as 2013 In our

primary analyses and in the Appendix we use the Fortune and FTSE lists

from 1991 the year of the IMF-induced reforms

There are several limitations in conducting historical analysis using

currently available primary data Wilkins describes these limitations assometimes introducing ldquo blinders that obscured important past occur-

rencesrdquo24 To circumvent some of these constraints in addition to con-

ducting our own primary research we based our analyses on prior

articles in business history on multinational entry in India25 Appendix

22 Information from Technology Information Forecasting and Assessment Council(TIFAC)

23Chandana Chakraborty and Peter Nunnenkamp ldquoEconomic Reforms FDI and Econ-omic Growth in India A Sector Level Analysisrdquo World Development 36 no 7 (2008)

1192ndash

121224Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Conti-nents new ed with new intro by Mira Wilkins (Cambridge UK 2011) 11

25For example Tomlinson ldquoForeign Private Investment in India 1920ndash1950rdquo Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 A History (Oxford 1993) Wilkins and

Multinational Enterprises in India 11

431

432

433

434

435

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437

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4722

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Table 1 documents the data on the entry and exit of Fortune 50 multina-

tional 1047297rms as of 1991 with operations in India over the period 1905ndash

1999 Appendix Table 2 documents the data for the FTSE 50 1047297rms as

of 1991 with operations between 1847 and 1999

26

Analysis of the data in these tables reveals several interesting

insights In comparison to the FTSE 50 Fortune 50 MNEs exhibit

greater number of entries but also greater numbers of exit events

While Fortune 50 1047297rms have a total of forty entry events the FTSE 50

1047297rms only have twenty entry events On the other hand FTSE 50 1047297rms

have a total of two exit events in this period while Fortune 50 1047297rms

have a total of eleven exit events Between 1971 and 1990 Fortune 50

1047297rms have a total of seven exit events while FTSE 50 1047297rms only have

one exit eventIn addition Fortune and FTSE 1047297rms had differences in functional

focus Fortune 50 1047297rms had a more balanced focus in terms of manufac-

turing and salesservices while FTSE 50 1047297rms had a greater focus on

salesservices Also the Fortune 50 1047297rms show a slightly higher concen-

tration on RampD in India compared to the FTSE 5027

We compare the entry mode of both categories of 1047297rms as well as

study whether the 1047297rms entered solo or otherwise A non-solo entry

refers to an entry through acquisition or a joint venture (JV) whereas

a solo entry represents the 1047297

rm entering by itselfThere is a small business history literature on MNEsrsquo choice of entry

model (joint ventures vs acquisition vs solo entry but this has not

included the case of India)28 Encarnation does describe the evolution

of joint ventures between multinational 1047297rms and Indian business

houses From 1948 to 1957 the Indian government prohibited foreign

takeovers of existing local 1047297rms and proscribed foreign-owned portfolio

investments India averaged fewer than forty new foreign collaborations

Hill American Business Abroad Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones Entrepre-neurship and Multinationals Global Business and the Making of the Modern World (Chel-tenham 2013) ch 8 Harold van B Cleveland and Thomas F Huertas Citibank 1812ndash1970(Cambridge Mass 1985) Ralph W Hidy and Muriel E Hidy Pioneering in Big Business1882ndash1911 (New York 1955) and Henrietta M Larson Evelyn H Knowlton and Charles SPopple History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) New Horizons 1927 ndash1950(New York 1971)

26 An entry in our sample indicates opening of the Indian subsidiary with a well-de1047297nedmandate to sell manufacture conduct RampD etc An exit in our sample indicates closingdown of the Indian subsidiary andor a visible shutting down of all operations in India

Coding was done by two independent research analysts and validation was done by theauthors in case of disagreement between the analysts The tables here have been condensedplease contact the authors for the full tables with data to 2013

27Pure RampD entry referring to an entry with the only function of the 1047297rm as RampD in India28For example Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 4

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 12

474

475

476

477

478

479

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491

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493

494

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497

498

499

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501

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508

509

510

511

512

513

514

5152

516

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annually in this period most of them with Indian business houses such

as Tata (which had sixty joint ventures with foreign partners by 1958)

Mahindra and Bangur The years from 1947 to 1957 also witnessed the

takeover of the British colonial managing agencies by the Indian business houses Encarnation also documents a foreign exchange crisis

that affected India in 1957 that led to a reversal of government policy

toward JVs Government regulators began encouraging Indian 1047297rms to

seek foreign equity and local enterprises that secured foreign tie-ups

also had better chances of securing the licenses needed for expansion

Encarnation indicates that JVs with foreign multinationals started dra-

matically increasing from 1958 and hit peak levels during 1964

However JVs with foreign multinationals started declining in the late

1960s and as a result stocks of foreign equity invested in the privatesector began to shrink and reached their lowest levels in 1973 the year

government policy 1047298ipped again with the passage of FERA29 Our analy-

sis is an attempt to augment this narrative

The Fortune 50 1047297rms exhibited a preference towards solo entry

before 1970 (62 percent of entries) However between 1971 and 1990

90 percent of the Fortune 50 entries were either a JV or an acquisition

In the 1990s the Fortune 50 1047297rms increased the percentage of solo entry

to 375 percent FTSE 50 1047297rms were more stable with only a single solo

entry between 1971 and 1990 and post-1991 83 percent of entries wereeither a JV or an acquisition in both periods

The Dynamic Trajectories Framework

Our analysis of selected MNEs reveals important distinctions in the

trajectories followed by British or Anglo-Dutch and American multina-

tional 1047297rms over four decades There are differences in whether or not

they exited India in the 1970s and in how they crafted their local respon-

siveness strategies both in the 1970s and the 1990s We now outline anew ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to show that adopting certain

strategic decisions at the onset of different policy epochs leads to path

dependencies resulting in different long-term trajectories for the focal

1047297rm in the host country The dynamic trajectories framework is based

on the premise of two policy epochs in a host country mdashone unwelcoming

of MNEs (ldquonegative epochrdquo) and the other welcoming of MNEs (ldquopositive

epochrdquo) A focal host country could experience a negative epoch followed

by a positive epoch or vice versa

We argue that an MNE manager in the host country must make twosets of decisions at the onset of each policy epoch The 1047297rst decision is

29Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 60

Multinational Enterprises in India 13

517

518

519

520

521

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523

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527

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529

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531

532

533

534

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537

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540

541

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543

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547

548

549

550

551

552

553

554

555

556

557

5582

559

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whether or not to be present in the host country during either or both

policy epochs Here we assume that the MNE is present in the host

country prior to the start of the 1047297rst epoch If the negative epoch is fol-

lowed by the positive epoch the manager has to decide whether to exitor stay at the onset of the negative epoch Also conditional on exiting

in the negative epoch the manager also has to decide whether or not

to reenter at the onset of the positive epoch We also assume that con-

ditional on staying at the onset of the negative epoch the manager

decides to stay during the positive epoch An MNE thus must face

three possible choices exitreenter exitdo not reenter or staystay30

However if the positive epoch is followed by the negative epoch the

manager has two possible choices stayexit or staystay We assume

that the MNE stays during the positive epochThe second decision set relates to whether or not the manager of the

MNE in the host country modi1047297es the ldquolocal responsiveness strategy rdquo of

the 1047297rm at the onset of each policy epoch and how the manager crafts

changes in that strategy According to business scholars Christopher Bar-

tlett and Sumantra Ghoshal MNEs have to concurrently manage the fol-

lowing three priorities global ef 1047297ciency national responsiveness and

worldwide learning A key strategy element of this three-dimensional

framework is the importance of each foreign subsidiary in managing

the overall MNE strategy Bartlett and Ghoshal call this strategy element ldquolocal responsivenessrdquo or ldquomultinational 1047298exibility rdquo and de1047297ne

a ldquodifferentiated and specialized rolerdquo for each MNE subsidiary31

We build on this construct of local responsiveness and argue that the

MNE in the host country could craft changes in the local responsiveness

strategy by investing in inputs outputs andor host country government

relationships Investments in inputs relate to physical intellectual

and human capitalmdasheg plants plantations trademarks patents and

talent Crafting changes on the output side could include altering the

functional focus of the 1047297

rm (to focus on distribution sales or manufac-turing) choosing new businesses enter changing the product mix for

each business and modifying the local pricing or distribution strategy

for each product Finally investments in host country government

relationships might involve investments in managing government stake-

holders andor crafting negotiation strategies to navigate host country

policy interventions

Figure 1 outlines the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo perspective for a host

country experiencing a negative policy epoch followed by a positive

30Theoretically a fourth option of stayexit is also possible since later exit might be motiv-ated by activities in another geography

31Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal Managing across Borders The Trans-national Solution vol 2 (Boston 1999) 67

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 14

560

561

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6012

602

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policy epoch from the perspective of a multinational that was in the

country already at the onset of the 1047297rst epoch The horizontal lines in

the 1047297gure represent the three possible dynamic trajectories In addition

for options 1 and 3 at the onset of each epoch the MNE has to decide

whether to maintain or modify its local responsiveness strategy If the

MNE decides to maintain its prior local responsiveness strategy the

MNE manager in the host country does not make any signi1047297cant new

investments in the input side makes no changes to the functionalfocus and product mix and makes no changes in managing government

stakeholders Still if the manager of the MNE in the host country mod-

i1047297es the local responsiveness strategy at the onset of either or both policy

F i g 1 - B W

o n l i n e B W

i n p r i n t

Figure 1 Dynamic trajectories framework This graphic is a representation of the ldquodynamictrajectoriesrdquo framework and depicts the evolution of the policy environment in a focal hostcountry that passes through a ldquonegative epochrdquo followed by a ldquopositive epochrdquo with regard topolicy toward multinationals At the onset of the negative epoch a focal MNC has to decide

whether to exit or stay Conditional on deciding to stay the 1047297

rm has to decide whether ornot to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether or not to modify thesame Modi1047297cation of the local responsiveness strategy could be on the input side (manufac-turing plants plantations patents talent) output side (functional focus product mix pricingdistribution etc) or in managing host country government relationships At the onset of thepositive epoch conditional on exiting earlier the MNC has to decide whether or not to reenterFor both the staystay option and exitreenter option the focal MNC has to decide at the onsetof the positive epoch whether or not to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether to modify the same We also posit that the direction (which levermdashinput output orgovernment relationships) and degree (how much) of change in the local responsiveness strat-egy is conditional on the decision to stayexit at the onset of Epoch 1 and the decision toreenterstay at the onset of Epoch 2

Multinational Enterprises in India 15

603

604

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619

620

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629

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635

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637

638

639

640

641

642

643

6442

645

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epochs changes could be made on the input side the output side or in

managing government stakeholders

It is also plausible that both the direction and the degree of

change in local responsiveness strategy are endogenous to the decisionof exitingstayingreentering We de1047297ne direction of change as

whether or not the focal MNE focuses on input output or govern-

ment relationships and degree of change as the extent and nature

of change on any of these levers We also argue that the direction

and degree of change MNE depends on the decision to exitstay

reenter As an example in the face of a negative policy epoch followed

by a positive policy epoch an MNE that decides to follow a staystay

strategy might not be able to make drastic changes on the output side

(eg functional focus product mix) for reasons of continuity and may instead focus on investments in the input side (eg human capital

manufacturing plants plantations) However an MNE following an

exitreenter strategy might have fewer concerns regarding continuity

given the passage of time and might be able to make drastic

changes to the output side In that case the MNE might be able to

alter the functional andor product mix in the host country In

addition the need to focus on host country government relationships

especially in a negative epoch might imply a focus on input since it is

related to the creation of local jobs a key lever to engage with govern-ment stakeholders

We now outline four detailed qualitative case studies of these multi-

national 1047297rms to indicate differences in how they reacted to the two

policy epochs in India The four case studies arguably represent extremes

in our samplemdash while the Anglo-Dutch Unilever and British BAT fol-

lowed a well-crafted ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multina-

tionals IBM and Coca-Cola successfully executed an ldquoexitreentry rdquo

strategy32

Further we show that Unilever and BAT adapted to the negativepolicy epoch (represented by the FERA regulation and 1970 patent

law) by continuously investing in the input sidemdashmanufacturing plants

and human capital In contrast IBM and Coca-Cola exited India follow-

ing the FERA regulations of the 1970s subsequently returning with dras-

tically different local responsiveness strategies on the output side

represented by different functional and product mixes

32

The use of outliers in the context of India to outline differences in dynamic trajectories issimilar in principle to the analysis used by Jones and Khanna where they compared the differ-ent trajectories taken by Jardines and Swire in face of Communist intervention in China Geof-frey Jones and Tarun Khanna ldquoBringing History (Back) into International Businessrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006) 453ndash68

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 16

646

647

648

649

650

651

652

653

654

655

656

657

658

659

660

661

662

663

664

665

666

667

668

669

670

671

672

673

674

675

676

677

678

679

680

681

682

683

684

685

686

6872

688

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1738

Unilever in India

The Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever originated as separate

British and Dutch 1047297rms making soap and margarine respectively

Lever Brothers the British company began exporting Sunlight soap

bars to India as early as 1888 Over time Lever Brothers brought

other products and brands to India including Lifebuoy in 189533 In

1917 Lever Brothers acquired partial interest in two other British soap

companies one of which had an of 1047297ce and depots in India Declining

sales between 1918 and 1921 further triggered Lever Brothersrsquo interest

in India as a manufacturing center Other factors included the growing

local Indian production of soap spurred by wartime shortages and the

widespread Swadeshi movement in India which advocated self-suf 1047297-

ciency through use of locally made products In the 1920s Lever Broth-

ers bought a site at Sinduria near Calcutta Unilever (the product of the

amalgamation of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie in 1930) continued

to expand in the country after 1929 The Hindustan Vanaspati Manufac-

turing Company was established in 1931 In 1933 a new company called

Lever Bros (India) Ltd was incorporated in Bombay Subsequently

Unilever set up factories to manufacture soap in Calcutta and Bombay

and vegetable ghee just outside Bombay using the brand name Dalda

Another subsidiary United Traders Limited was formed in 193534

These subsidiaries functioned independently until 1956 when they

merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) which sold 10

percent of its equity to the public the share of public equity was

increased to 14 percent in 196535 The country rsquos planned economy at

the time protected local manufacturers and Unilever 1047298ourished The

company under the in1047298uence of the government also recruited Indian

managers naming P L Tandon chairman in 1961mdashthe 1047297rst instance of

an Indian heading a multinational (see Jaithirth Raorsquos contribution to

this special issue) Hindustan Lever Limited evolved into a consumer

goods company with Unilever as its major stakeholder HLL had been

in the beverages industry since 1903 with its brand Red Label tea In

1972 Unileverrsquos acquisition of Lipton Ltd from the British company

Allied Suppliers included a large and very poorly managed Indian tea

packaging and distribution business which could not be integrated

33 Amar Nayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Devel-oping Country (New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 Sushil Vachani Multinationals in India Strategic Product Choices (Columbia Mo 1992) 12ndash31 D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas

The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash

1965 (Stanford 1978) Vanaspati is vegetable ghee andDalda is a brand34Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 835

ldquoHindustan Unilever Limited Factsheetrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinImagesHUL-Factsheet_tcm114-188694pdf Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 17

689

690

691

692

693

694

695

696

697

698

699

700

701

702

703

704

705

706

707

708

709

710

711

712

713

714

715

716

717

718

719

720

721

722

723

724

725

726

727

728

729

7302

731

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

734

735

736

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738

739

740

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742

743

744

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746

747

748

749

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754

755

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766

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769

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771

772

7732

774

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1938

FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

800

801

802

803

804

805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

8162

817

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

826

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829

830

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832

833

834

835

836

837

838

839

840

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849

850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

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890

891

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893

894

895

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897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

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913

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919

920

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926

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940

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944

9452

946

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2538

Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

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1058

1059

1060

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1062

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1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

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1088

1089

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1091

1092

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1095

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1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

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1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

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1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

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1186

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1188

1189

1190

1191

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1193

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1195

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1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

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1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

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1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

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1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

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1280

1281

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1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

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1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3438

Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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The central piece of the patent law was that it recognized only

process patents and not product patents in the pharmaceutical and agro-

chemical sectors It also reduced the patent period from sixteen years to

seven years in these sectors and to fourteen years in other cases Thisprocess patent regime triggered reverse engineering in the Indian

pharmaceutical sector for drugs patented in other countries Indian com-

panies could now discover alternate processes for manufacturing drugs

that were not patented in India16

In summary from 1970 to 1990 FERA and the Indian Patent Act of

1970 had leveled the playing 1047297eld for Indian 1047297rms with regard to MNEs

FERA gave Indian 1047297rms 1047297nancial and managerial autonomy from

foreigners and the patent act gave Indian 1047297rms an opportunity to

reverse engineer products

1991 India Reopens Doors to MNEs

By the early 1990s India was deep in an economic crisis triggered by

both political and economic factors The two years prior to 1991 had seen

political turmoil with four prime ministers and four 1047297nance ministers

This led to unclear policies and virtual economic paralysis The years

before 1991 saw increased defense expenditures reduced tax revenue

slow growth in the export market and a lack of a coherent budget which brought about an ever-increasing de1047297cit and in1047298ation FERA

was hampering Indiarsquos ability to compete with other countries During

the Persian Gulf War of 1990ndash91 India had purchased oil at an extre-

mely high price and instability in the Middle East affected India as

well Additional problems included an annual rate of in1047298ation of 17

percent an unsustainably large 1047297scal de1047297cit and widespread 1047298ight of

capital The need for economic reform was further accentuated by the

collapse of the Soviet Union a country with which India had had

strong political and economic ties A major concern in 1991 was the unprecedented possibility that

India would default on its external debt something that had not hap-

pened since independence Indiarsquos foreign debt stood at $72 billion

making it the worldrsquos third-largest debtor after Brazil and Mexico This

growth in debt was rapid as the foreign debt of the nation stood at

$205 billion in 1980 In 1991 India had only $11 billion in its hard cur-

rency reserves enough for only two weeks of imports Realizing that it

did not have enough money to pay for its imports and was nearly bank-

rupt India reconsidered its stance on Western in1047298uence The govern-ment entered talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to

16 Kumar Multinational Enterprises and Industrial Organization

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 8

302

303

304

305

306

307

308

309

310

311

312

313

314

315

316

317

318

319

320

321

322

323

324

325

326

327

328

329

330

331

332

333

334

335

336

337

338

339

340

341

342

3432

344

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seek emergency aid India needed more than $5 billion from the IMF to

meet its immediate obligations Taking such a huge loan from the IMF

would grant the IMF substantial lobbying power with India as the inter-

national body disbursed loans under ldquo

conditions that often includedaltering policies viewed by the fund as mistaken or counterproductiverdquo17

Among the IMFrsquos demands was a reduction of the budget de1047297cit a

decrease in the licensing requirements for companies opening doors

for foreign companies and liberalizing investment

Though India was traditionally socialist in its policies after indepen-

dence this was not the country rsquos 1047297rst attempt at economic liberalization

A prior attempt in 1966 was reversed in 1967 after which a stronger

socialistic model was adopted The next major attempt was in 1985

driven by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi it came to an end in 1987 Thefour or 1047297 ve licensed producers in each industry were instrumental in

blocking the 1980s reforms18

Spurred by the IMF in 1991 the government of Prime Minister

P V Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh pushed

for structural policy reform These policies included opening the

country to international trade and investment deregulation privatiza-

tion of state-owned entities tax reforms and in1047298ation-controlling

measures The country went through a deregulation makeovermdashone

that encouraged foreign investmentSince 1991 arguably India has sustained the spirit of liberalization

despite changing governments making these reforms more sustainable

This liberalization resulted in Indiarsquos rising GDP growth peaking at 9

percent in 200719 With economic reforms came relaxation of the FDI

norms While the GDP growth of the nation prior to 1990 was a little

under 4 percent on average the GDP growth postreform stood at

between 6 and 7 percent toward the end of the 1990s20

FERA was repealed in 1999 by the government of Prime Minister

Atal Bihari Vajpayee The less stringent Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) replaced it loosening restrictions on foreign exchange and

investment in India FEMA was more aligned to the new economic

17 Bernard Weinraub ldquoEconomic Crisis Forcing Once Self-Reliant India to Seek Aidrdquo New York Times 29 June 1991 available at httpwwwnytimescom19910629worldeconomic-crisis-forcing-once-self-reliant-india-to-seek-aidhtml Web site accessed on 21Oct 2013

18Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson Why Nations Fail The Origins of Power Prosperity and Poverty (New York 2012)

19

Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook India available at httpswwwciagovlibrarypublicationsthe-world-factbookgeosinhtmlEcon Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

20BBC News ldquoIndia The Economyrdquo 3 Dec 1998 available at httpnewsbbccouk2hisouth_asia55427stm Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 9

345

346

347

348

349

350

351

352

353

354

355

356

357

358

359

360

361

362

363

364

365

366

367

368

369

370

371

372

373

374

375

376

377

378

379

380

381

382

383

384

385

3862

387

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reforms the nation was witnessing FEMA made all violations regarding

foreign exchange civil not criminal offenses making it more investor

friendly FEMA tried to consolidate legislation relating to foreign

exchange in India with an ultimate goal of allowing external trade andpayments and to facilitate the development of a foreign exchange

market in India The reforms also immediately reduced the number of

steps required to procure a license to four or 1047297 ve approvals mainly

environmental Most goods underwent a tariff cut apart from goods in

the consumer sector

Indian Patent Reform Starting 1999

Following FEMA the Indian patent system underwent a number of reforms starting in 1999 triggered when India signed the agreement on

Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) at the

World Trade Organization and joined the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)

Product patents in medicine food and agrochemicals were now

allowed and the patent expiry period was extended to twenty years

similar to that in the US The average time required to get a patent

was reduced from 1047297 ve to three years The patent 1047297ling fee did not

change during this period and remained substantially less compared to

that of the United States Patent and Trademark Of 1047297ce (USPTO) Thepatent system also granted exclusive marketing rights (EMRs) based

on patents granted this enabled multinational 1047297rms with patents to

derive competitive advantage in selling their patented products In the

past twenty years Indian patent law has been amended three timesmdash

in 1999 2002 and 2005mdashto increase compatibility with TRIPs and to

allay MNEsrsquo fears of intellectual property theft

With the Indian patent reforms a lot of MNEsrsquo worries regarding

intellectual property protection seemed to disappear An analysis of

Indian patent 1047297lings shows a steep rise in the total number of patents1047297led in India with an in1047298exion point in 1997 This increase is attributed

to positive expectations about the 1999 reforms From 1995 to 2004

MNEs from fourteen countries 1047297led a total of 8426 patents of which

MNEs from the US 1047297led the most (2477 patents) followed by 1047297rms

from Germany and Switzerland Patent applications by foreign MNEs

in India started increasing further around 2000 and have been increas-

ing ever since The EMR ldquomailboxrdquo provisions and the belief that India

would abide by TRIPS gave MNEs con1047297dence leading to a surge in the

number of applications In contrast Indian entities 1047297led 1486 appli-cations in the same period21 The number of patents 1047297led in India

21 Analysis conducted by researchers

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 10

388

389

390

391

392

393

394

395

396

397

398

399

400

401

402

403

404

405

406

407

408

409

410

411

412

413

414

415

416

417

418

419

420

421

422

423

424

425

426

427

428

4292

430

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ranged between 2000 and 4000 patents per year from the early 1970s

all the way to 1993 Post-1993 there was a rapid increase in the number

of patent 1047297lings with a spike of around 10000 patents per year in 1997 in

anticipation of the 1999 reforms

22

MNEs Stream into India Analysis of Fortune 50and FTSE 50 MNEs

With the initiation of economic reforms India attracted unprece-

dented foreign direct investment Average annual FDI rose from $100

million in the mid-1980s to around $2 billion in the mid-1990s The

stock of FDI rose from less than $2 billion in 1991 to almost $39

billion in 200423 The World Investment Report (WIR) of 2007 indicatesthat the 1990 inward stock level of FDI was roughly $17 billion the 2000

inward stock was $175 billion and the 2004 inward stock was $387

billion The city of Bangalore became one of the largest magnets of

foreign investment in India in 2001ndash2002 alone a total of 230 MNEs

setupof 1047297ces in Bangalorersquos industrial parks employing 25000 engineers

In this section we analyze unique data that documents every entry

and exit event for each Fortune 50 and FTSE 50 multinational 1047297rm

The entry and exit events were tracked from 1858 to 2013 and multiple

data sources were used including historical narratives of several 1047297rmsSEC company 1047297lings (the complete list of subsidiaries was found in

Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm) and data on company registration

in India from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Govern-

ment of India As the Fortune 50 and the FTSE 50 lists have changed over

time we have compiled data for the lists as of 1991 as well as 2013 In our

primary analyses and in the Appendix we use the Fortune and FTSE lists

from 1991 the year of the IMF-induced reforms

There are several limitations in conducting historical analysis using

currently available primary data Wilkins describes these limitations assometimes introducing ldquo blinders that obscured important past occur-

rencesrdquo24 To circumvent some of these constraints in addition to con-

ducting our own primary research we based our analyses on prior

articles in business history on multinational entry in India25 Appendix

22 Information from Technology Information Forecasting and Assessment Council(TIFAC)

23Chandana Chakraborty and Peter Nunnenkamp ldquoEconomic Reforms FDI and Econ-omic Growth in India A Sector Level Analysisrdquo World Development 36 no 7 (2008)

1192ndash

121224Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Conti-nents new ed with new intro by Mira Wilkins (Cambridge UK 2011) 11

25For example Tomlinson ldquoForeign Private Investment in India 1920ndash1950rdquo Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 A History (Oxford 1993) Wilkins and

Multinational Enterprises in India 11

431

432

433

434

435

436

437

438

439

440

441

442

443

444

445

446

447

448

449

450

451

452

453

454

455

456

457

458

459

460

461

462

463

464

465

466

467

468

469

470

471

4722

473

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Table 1 documents the data on the entry and exit of Fortune 50 multina-

tional 1047297rms as of 1991 with operations in India over the period 1905ndash

1999 Appendix Table 2 documents the data for the FTSE 50 1047297rms as

of 1991 with operations between 1847 and 1999

26

Analysis of the data in these tables reveals several interesting

insights In comparison to the FTSE 50 Fortune 50 MNEs exhibit

greater number of entries but also greater numbers of exit events

While Fortune 50 1047297rms have a total of forty entry events the FTSE 50

1047297rms only have twenty entry events On the other hand FTSE 50 1047297rms

have a total of two exit events in this period while Fortune 50 1047297rms

have a total of eleven exit events Between 1971 and 1990 Fortune 50

1047297rms have a total of seven exit events while FTSE 50 1047297rms only have

one exit eventIn addition Fortune and FTSE 1047297rms had differences in functional

focus Fortune 50 1047297rms had a more balanced focus in terms of manufac-

turing and salesservices while FTSE 50 1047297rms had a greater focus on

salesservices Also the Fortune 50 1047297rms show a slightly higher concen-

tration on RampD in India compared to the FTSE 5027

We compare the entry mode of both categories of 1047297rms as well as

study whether the 1047297rms entered solo or otherwise A non-solo entry

refers to an entry through acquisition or a joint venture (JV) whereas

a solo entry represents the 1047297

rm entering by itselfThere is a small business history literature on MNEsrsquo choice of entry

model (joint ventures vs acquisition vs solo entry but this has not

included the case of India)28 Encarnation does describe the evolution

of joint ventures between multinational 1047297rms and Indian business

houses From 1948 to 1957 the Indian government prohibited foreign

takeovers of existing local 1047297rms and proscribed foreign-owned portfolio

investments India averaged fewer than forty new foreign collaborations

Hill American Business Abroad Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones Entrepre-neurship and Multinationals Global Business and the Making of the Modern World (Chel-tenham 2013) ch 8 Harold van B Cleveland and Thomas F Huertas Citibank 1812ndash1970(Cambridge Mass 1985) Ralph W Hidy and Muriel E Hidy Pioneering in Big Business1882ndash1911 (New York 1955) and Henrietta M Larson Evelyn H Knowlton and Charles SPopple History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) New Horizons 1927 ndash1950(New York 1971)

26 An entry in our sample indicates opening of the Indian subsidiary with a well-de1047297nedmandate to sell manufacture conduct RampD etc An exit in our sample indicates closingdown of the Indian subsidiary andor a visible shutting down of all operations in India

Coding was done by two independent research analysts and validation was done by theauthors in case of disagreement between the analysts The tables here have been condensedplease contact the authors for the full tables with data to 2013

27Pure RampD entry referring to an entry with the only function of the 1047297rm as RampD in India28For example Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 4

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 12

474

475

476

477

478

479

480

481

482

483

484

485

486

487

488

489

490

491

492

493

494

495

496

497

498

499

500

501

502

503

504

505

506

507

508

509

510

511

512

513

514

5152

516

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annually in this period most of them with Indian business houses such

as Tata (which had sixty joint ventures with foreign partners by 1958)

Mahindra and Bangur The years from 1947 to 1957 also witnessed the

takeover of the British colonial managing agencies by the Indian business houses Encarnation also documents a foreign exchange crisis

that affected India in 1957 that led to a reversal of government policy

toward JVs Government regulators began encouraging Indian 1047297rms to

seek foreign equity and local enterprises that secured foreign tie-ups

also had better chances of securing the licenses needed for expansion

Encarnation indicates that JVs with foreign multinationals started dra-

matically increasing from 1958 and hit peak levels during 1964

However JVs with foreign multinationals started declining in the late

1960s and as a result stocks of foreign equity invested in the privatesector began to shrink and reached their lowest levels in 1973 the year

government policy 1047298ipped again with the passage of FERA29 Our analy-

sis is an attempt to augment this narrative

The Fortune 50 1047297rms exhibited a preference towards solo entry

before 1970 (62 percent of entries) However between 1971 and 1990

90 percent of the Fortune 50 entries were either a JV or an acquisition

In the 1990s the Fortune 50 1047297rms increased the percentage of solo entry

to 375 percent FTSE 50 1047297rms were more stable with only a single solo

entry between 1971 and 1990 and post-1991 83 percent of entries wereeither a JV or an acquisition in both periods

The Dynamic Trajectories Framework

Our analysis of selected MNEs reveals important distinctions in the

trajectories followed by British or Anglo-Dutch and American multina-

tional 1047297rms over four decades There are differences in whether or not

they exited India in the 1970s and in how they crafted their local respon-

siveness strategies both in the 1970s and the 1990s We now outline anew ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to show that adopting certain

strategic decisions at the onset of different policy epochs leads to path

dependencies resulting in different long-term trajectories for the focal

1047297rm in the host country The dynamic trajectories framework is based

on the premise of two policy epochs in a host country mdashone unwelcoming

of MNEs (ldquonegative epochrdquo) and the other welcoming of MNEs (ldquopositive

epochrdquo) A focal host country could experience a negative epoch followed

by a positive epoch or vice versa

We argue that an MNE manager in the host country must make twosets of decisions at the onset of each policy epoch The 1047297rst decision is

29Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 60

Multinational Enterprises in India 13

517

518

519

520

521

522

523

524

525

526

527

528

529

530

531

532

533

534

535

536

537

538

539

540

541

542

543

544

545

546

547

548

549

550

551

552

553

554

555

556

557

5582

559

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whether or not to be present in the host country during either or both

policy epochs Here we assume that the MNE is present in the host

country prior to the start of the 1047297rst epoch If the negative epoch is fol-

lowed by the positive epoch the manager has to decide whether to exitor stay at the onset of the negative epoch Also conditional on exiting

in the negative epoch the manager also has to decide whether or not

to reenter at the onset of the positive epoch We also assume that con-

ditional on staying at the onset of the negative epoch the manager

decides to stay during the positive epoch An MNE thus must face

three possible choices exitreenter exitdo not reenter or staystay30

However if the positive epoch is followed by the negative epoch the

manager has two possible choices stayexit or staystay We assume

that the MNE stays during the positive epochThe second decision set relates to whether or not the manager of the

MNE in the host country modi1047297es the ldquolocal responsiveness strategy rdquo of

the 1047297rm at the onset of each policy epoch and how the manager crafts

changes in that strategy According to business scholars Christopher Bar-

tlett and Sumantra Ghoshal MNEs have to concurrently manage the fol-

lowing three priorities global ef 1047297ciency national responsiveness and

worldwide learning A key strategy element of this three-dimensional

framework is the importance of each foreign subsidiary in managing

the overall MNE strategy Bartlett and Ghoshal call this strategy element ldquolocal responsivenessrdquo or ldquomultinational 1047298exibility rdquo and de1047297ne

a ldquodifferentiated and specialized rolerdquo for each MNE subsidiary31

We build on this construct of local responsiveness and argue that the

MNE in the host country could craft changes in the local responsiveness

strategy by investing in inputs outputs andor host country government

relationships Investments in inputs relate to physical intellectual

and human capitalmdasheg plants plantations trademarks patents and

talent Crafting changes on the output side could include altering the

functional focus of the 1047297

rm (to focus on distribution sales or manufac-turing) choosing new businesses enter changing the product mix for

each business and modifying the local pricing or distribution strategy

for each product Finally investments in host country government

relationships might involve investments in managing government stake-

holders andor crafting negotiation strategies to navigate host country

policy interventions

Figure 1 outlines the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo perspective for a host

country experiencing a negative policy epoch followed by a positive

30Theoretically a fourth option of stayexit is also possible since later exit might be motiv-ated by activities in another geography

31Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal Managing across Borders The Trans-national Solution vol 2 (Boston 1999) 67

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 14

560

561

562

563

564

565

566

567

568

569

570

571

572

573

574

575

576

577

578

579

580

581

582

583

584

585

586

587

588

589

590

591

592

593

594

595

596

597

598

599

600

6012

602

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policy epoch from the perspective of a multinational that was in the

country already at the onset of the 1047297rst epoch The horizontal lines in

the 1047297gure represent the three possible dynamic trajectories In addition

for options 1 and 3 at the onset of each epoch the MNE has to decide

whether to maintain or modify its local responsiveness strategy If the

MNE decides to maintain its prior local responsiveness strategy the

MNE manager in the host country does not make any signi1047297cant new

investments in the input side makes no changes to the functionalfocus and product mix and makes no changes in managing government

stakeholders Still if the manager of the MNE in the host country mod-

i1047297es the local responsiveness strategy at the onset of either or both policy

F i g 1 - B W

o n l i n e B W

i n p r i n t

Figure 1 Dynamic trajectories framework This graphic is a representation of the ldquodynamictrajectoriesrdquo framework and depicts the evolution of the policy environment in a focal hostcountry that passes through a ldquonegative epochrdquo followed by a ldquopositive epochrdquo with regard topolicy toward multinationals At the onset of the negative epoch a focal MNC has to decide

whether to exit or stay Conditional on deciding to stay the 1047297

rm has to decide whether ornot to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether or not to modify thesame Modi1047297cation of the local responsiveness strategy could be on the input side (manufac-turing plants plantations patents talent) output side (functional focus product mix pricingdistribution etc) or in managing host country government relationships At the onset of thepositive epoch conditional on exiting earlier the MNC has to decide whether or not to reenterFor both the staystay option and exitreenter option the focal MNC has to decide at the onsetof the positive epoch whether or not to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether to modify the same We also posit that the direction (which levermdashinput output orgovernment relationships) and degree (how much) of change in the local responsiveness strat-egy is conditional on the decision to stayexit at the onset of Epoch 1 and the decision toreenterstay at the onset of Epoch 2

Multinational Enterprises in India 15

603

604

605

606

607

608

609

610

611

612

613

614

615

616

617

618

619

620

621

622

623

624

625

626

627

628

629

630

631

632

633

634

635

636

637

638

639

640

641

642

643

6442

645

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epochs changes could be made on the input side the output side or in

managing government stakeholders

It is also plausible that both the direction and the degree of

change in local responsiveness strategy are endogenous to the decisionof exitingstayingreentering We de1047297ne direction of change as

whether or not the focal MNE focuses on input output or govern-

ment relationships and degree of change as the extent and nature

of change on any of these levers We also argue that the direction

and degree of change MNE depends on the decision to exitstay

reenter As an example in the face of a negative policy epoch followed

by a positive policy epoch an MNE that decides to follow a staystay

strategy might not be able to make drastic changes on the output side

(eg functional focus product mix) for reasons of continuity and may instead focus on investments in the input side (eg human capital

manufacturing plants plantations) However an MNE following an

exitreenter strategy might have fewer concerns regarding continuity

given the passage of time and might be able to make drastic

changes to the output side In that case the MNE might be able to

alter the functional andor product mix in the host country In

addition the need to focus on host country government relationships

especially in a negative epoch might imply a focus on input since it is

related to the creation of local jobs a key lever to engage with govern-ment stakeholders

We now outline four detailed qualitative case studies of these multi-

national 1047297rms to indicate differences in how they reacted to the two

policy epochs in India The four case studies arguably represent extremes

in our samplemdash while the Anglo-Dutch Unilever and British BAT fol-

lowed a well-crafted ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multina-

tionals IBM and Coca-Cola successfully executed an ldquoexitreentry rdquo

strategy32

Further we show that Unilever and BAT adapted to the negativepolicy epoch (represented by the FERA regulation and 1970 patent

law) by continuously investing in the input sidemdashmanufacturing plants

and human capital In contrast IBM and Coca-Cola exited India follow-

ing the FERA regulations of the 1970s subsequently returning with dras-

tically different local responsiveness strategies on the output side

represented by different functional and product mixes

32

The use of outliers in the context of India to outline differences in dynamic trajectories issimilar in principle to the analysis used by Jones and Khanna where they compared the differ-ent trajectories taken by Jardines and Swire in face of Communist intervention in China Geof-frey Jones and Tarun Khanna ldquoBringing History (Back) into International Businessrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006) 453ndash68

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 16

646

647

648

649

650

651

652

653

654

655

656

657

658

659

660

661

662

663

664

665

666

667

668

669

670

671

672

673

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675

676

677

678

679

680

681

682

683

684

685

686

6872

688

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Unilever in India

The Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever originated as separate

British and Dutch 1047297rms making soap and margarine respectively

Lever Brothers the British company began exporting Sunlight soap

bars to India as early as 1888 Over time Lever Brothers brought

other products and brands to India including Lifebuoy in 189533 In

1917 Lever Brothers acquired partial interest in two other British soap

companies one of which had an of 1047297ce and depots in India Declining

sales between 1918 and 1921 further triggered Lever Brothersrsquo interest

in India as a manufacturing center Other factors included the growing

local Indian production of soap spurred by wartime shortages and the

widespread Swadeshi movement in India which advocated self-suf 1047297-

ciency through use of locally made products In the 1920s Lever Broth-

ers bought a site at Sinduria near Calcutta Unilever (the product of the

amalgamation of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie in 1930) continued

to expand in the country after 1929 The Hindustan Vanaspati Manufac-

turing Company was established in 1931 In 1933 a new company called

Lever Bros (India) Ltd was incorporated in Bombay Subsequently

Unilever set up factories to manufacture soap in Calcutta and Bombay

and vegetable ghee just outside Bombay using the brand name Dalda

Another subsidiary United Traders Limited was formed in 193534

These subsidiaries functioned independently until 1956 when they

merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) which sold 10

percent of its equity to the public the share of public equity was

increased to 14 percent in 196535 The country rsquos planned economy at

the time protected local manufacturers and Unilever 1047298ourished The

company under the in1047298uence of the government also recruited Indian

managers naming P L Tandon chairman in 1961mdashthe 1047297rst instance of

an Indian heading a multinational (see Jaithirth Raorsquos contribution to

this special issue) Hindustan Lever Limited evolved into a consumer

goods company with Unilever as its major stakeholder HLL had been

in the beverages industry since 1903 with its brand Red Label tea In

1972 Unileverrsquos acquisition of Lipton Ltd from the British company

Allied Suppliers included a large and very poorly managed Indian tea

packaging and distribution business which could not be integrated

33 Amar Nayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Devel-oping Country (New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 Sushil Vachani Multinationals in India Strategic Product Choices (Columbia Mo 1992) 12ndash31 D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas

The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash

1965 (Stanford 1978) Vanaspati is vegetable ghee andDalda is a brand34Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 835

ldquoHindustan Unilever Limited Factsheetrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinImagesHUL-Factsheet_tcm114-188694pdf Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 17

689

690

691

692

693

694

695

696

697

698

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700

701

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703

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715

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719

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721

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723

724

725

726

727

728

729

7302

731

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with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

734

735

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747

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749

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768

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770

771

772

7732

774

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FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

800

801

802

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805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

8162

817

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

826

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829

830

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833

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835

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837

838

839

840

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850

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852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

892

893

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

909

910

911

912

913

914

915

916

917

918

919

920

921

922

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924

925

926

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929

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931

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933

934

935

936

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939

940

941

942

943

944

9452

946

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

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Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

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1045

1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

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1053

1054

1055

1056

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1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

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1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

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1084

1085

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1087

1088

1089

1090

1091

1092

1093

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1095

1096

1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

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1149

1150

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1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

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1177

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1190

1191

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1193

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1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

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1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

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1306

1307

1308

1309

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1313

1314

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1321

1322

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1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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seek emergency aid India needed more than $5 billion from the IMF to

meet its immediate obligations Taking such a huge loan from the IMF

would grant the IMF substantial lobbying power with India as the inter-

national body disbursed loans under ldquo

conditions that often includedaltering policies viewed by the fund as mistaken or counterproductiverdquo17

Among the IMFrsquos demands was a reduction of the budget de1047297cit a

decrease in the licensing requirements for companies opening doors

for foreign companies and liberalizing investment

Though India was traditionally socialist in its policies after indepen-

dence this was not the country rsquos 1047297rst attempt at economic liberalization

A prior attempt in 1966 was reversed in 1967 after which a stronger

socialistic model was adopted The next major attempt was in 1985

driven by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi it came to an end in 1987 Thefour or 1047297 ve licensed producers in each industry were instrumental in

blocking the 1980s reforms18

Spurred by the IMF in 1991 the government of Prime Minister

P V Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh pushed

for structural policy reform These policies included opening the

country to international trade and investment deregulation privatiza-

tion of state-owned entities tax reforms and in1047298ation-controlling

measures The country went through a deregulation makeovermdashone

that encouraged foreign investmentSince 1991 arguably India has sustained the spirit of liberalization

despite changing governments making these reforms more sustainable

This liberalization resulted in Indiarsquos rising GDP growth peaking at 9

percent in 200719 With economic reforms came relaxation of the FDI

norms While the GDP growth of the nation prior to 1990 was a little

under 4 percent on average the GDP growth postreform stood at

between 6 and 7 percent toward the end of the 1990s20

FERA was repealed in 1999 by the government of Prime Minister

Atal Bihari Vajpayee The less stringent Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) replaced it loosening restrictions on foreign exchange and

investment in India FEMA was more aligned to the new economic

17 Bernard Weinraub ldquoEconomic Crisis Forcing Once Self-Reliant India to Seek Aidrdquo New York Times 29 June 1991 available at httpwwwnytimescom19910629worldeconomic-crisis-forcing-once-self-reliant-india-to-seek-aidhtml Web site accessed on 21Oct 2013

18Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson Why Nations Fail The Origins of Power Prosperity and Poverty (New York 2012)

19

Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook India available at httpswwwciagovlibrarypublicationsthe-world-factbookgeosinhtmlEcon Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

20BBC News ldquoIndia The Economyrdquo 3 Dec 1998 available at httpnewsbbccouk2hisouth_asia55427stm Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 9

345

346

347

348

349

350

351

352

353

354

355

356

357

358

359

360

361

362

363

364

365

366

367

368

369

370

371

372

373

374

375

376

377

378

379

380

381

382

383

384

385

3862

387

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reforms the nation was witnessing FEMA made all violations regarding

foreign exchange civil not criminal offenses making it more investor

friendly FEMA tried to consolidate legislation relating to foreign

exchange in India with an ultimate goal of allowing external trade andpayments and to facilitate the development of a foreign exchange

market in India The reforms also immediately reduced the number of

steps required to procure a license to four or 1047297 ve approvals mainly

environmental Most goods underwent a tariff cut apart from goods in

the consumer sector

Indian Patent Reform Starting 1999

Following FEMA the Indian patent system underwent a number of reforms starting in 1999 triggered when India signed the agreement on

Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) at the

World Trade Organization and joined the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)

Product patents in medicine food and agrochemicals were now

allowed and the patent expiry period was extended to twenty years

similar to that in the US The average time required to get a patent

was reduced from 1047297 ve to three years The patent 1047297ling fee did not

change during this period and remained substantially less compared to

that of the United States Patent and Trademark Of 1047297ce (USPTO) Thepatent system also granted exclusive marketing rights (EMRs) based

on patents granted this enabled multinational 1047297rms with patents to

derive competitive advantage in selling their patented products In the

past twenty years Indian patent law has been amended three timesmdash

in 1999 2002 and 2005mdashto increase compatibility with TRIPs and to

allay MNEsrsquo fears of intellectual property theft

With the Indian patent reforms a lot of MNEsrsquo worries regarding

intellectual property protection seemed to disappear An analysis of

Indian patent 1047297lings shows a steep rise in the total number of patents1047297led in India with an in1047298exion point in 1997 This increase is attributed

to positive expectations about the 1999 reforms From 1995 to 2004

MNEs from fourteen countries 1047297led a total of 8426 patents of which

MNEs from the US 1047297led the most (2477 patents) followed by 1047297rms

from Germany and Switzerland Patent applications by foreign MNEs

in India started increasing further around 2000 and have been increas-

ing ever since The EMR ldquomailboxrdquo provisions and the belief that India

would abide by TRIPS gave MNEs con1047297dence leading to a surge in the

number of applications In contrast Indian entities 1047297led 1486 appli-cations in the same period21 The number of patents 1047297led in India

21 Analysis conducted by researchers

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 10

388

389

390

391

392

393

394

395

396

397

398

399

400

401

402

403

404

405

406

407

408

409

410

411

412

413

414

415

416

417

418

419

420

421

422

423

424

425

426

427

428

4292

430

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ranged between 2000 and 4000 patents per year from the early 1970s

all the way to 1993 Post-1993 there was a rapid increase in the number

of patent 1047297lings with a spike of around 10000 patents per year in 1997 in

anticipation of the 1999 reforms

22

MNEs Stream into India Analysis of Fortune 50and FTSE 50 MNEs

With the initiation of economic reforms India attracted unprece-

dented foreign direct investment Average annual FDI rose from $100

million in the mid-1980s to around $2 billion in the mid-1990s The

stock of FDI rose from less than $2 billion in 1991 to almost $39

billion in 200423 The World Investment Report (WIR) of 2007 indicatesthat the 1990 inward stock level of FDI was roughly $17 billion the 2000

inward stock was $175 billion and the 2004 inward stock was $387

billion The city of Bangalore became one of the largest magnets of

foreign investment in India in 2001ndash2002 alone a total of 230 MNEs

setupof 1047297ces in Bangalorersquos industrial parks employing 25000 engineers

In this section we analyze unique data that documents every entry

and exit event for each Fortune 50 and FTSE 50 multinational 1047297rm

The entry and exit events were tracked from 1858 to 2013 and multiple

data sources were used including historical narratives of several 1047297rmsSEC company 1047297lings (the complete list of subsidiaries was found in

Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm) and data on company registration

in India from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Govern-

ment of India As the Fortune 50 and the FTSE 50 lists have changed over

time we have compiled data for the lists as of 1991 as well as 2013 In our

primary analyses and in the Appendix we use the Fortune and FTSE lists

from 1991 the year of the IMF-induced reforms

There are several limitations in conducting historical analysis using

currently available primary data Wilkins describes these limitations assometimes introducing ldquo blinders that obscured important past occur-

rencesrdquo24 To circumvent some of these constraints in addition to con-

ducting our own primary research we based our analyses on prior

articles in business history on multinational entry in India25 Appendix

22 Information from Technology Information Forecasting and Assessment Council(TIFAC)

23Chandana Chakraborty and Peter Nunnenkamp ldquoEconomic Reforms FDI and Econ-omic Growth in India A Sector Level Analysisrdquo World Development 36 no 7 (2008)

1192ndash

121224Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Conti-nents new ed with new intro by Mira Wilkins (Cambridge UK 2011) 11

25For example Tomlinson ldquoForeign Private Investment in India 1920ndash1950rdquo Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 A History (Oxford 1993) Wilkins and

Multinational Enterprises in India 11

431

432

433

434

435

436

437

438

439

440

441

442

443

444

445

446

447

448

449

450

451

452

453

454

455

456

457

458

459

460

461

462

463

464

465

466

467

468

469

470

471

4722

473

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Table 1 documents the data on the entry and exit of Fortune 50 multina-

tional 1047297rms as of 1991 with operations in India over the period 1905ndash

1999 Appendix Table 2 documents the data for the FTSE 50 1047297rms as

of 1991 with operations between 1847 and 1999

26

Analysis of the data in these tables reveals several interesting

insights In comparison to the FTSE 50 Fortune 50 MNEs exhibit

greater number of entries but also greater numbers of exit events

While Fortune 50 1047297rms have a total of forty entry events the FTSE 50

1047297rms only have twenty entry events On the other hand FTSE 50 1047297rms

have a total of two exit events in this period while Fortune 50 1047297rms

have a total of eleven exit events Between 1971 and 1990 Fortune 50

1047297rms have a total of seven exit events while FTSE 50 1047297rms only have

one exit eventIn addition Fortune and FTSE 1047297rms had differences in functional

focus Fortune 50 1047297rms had a more balanced focus in terms of manufac-

turing and salesservices while FTSE 50 1047297rms had a greater focus on

salesservices Also the Fortune 50 1047297rms show a slightly higher concen-

tration on RampD in India compared to the FTSE 5027

We compare the entry mode of both categories of 1047297rms as well as

study whether the 1047297rms entered solo or otherwise A non-solo entry

refers to an entry through acquisition or a joint venture (JV) whereas

a solo entry represents the 1047297

rm entering by itselfThere is a small business history literature on MNEsrsquo choice of entry

model (joint ventures vs acquisition vs solo entry but this has not

included the case of India)28 Encarnation does describe the evolution

of joint ventures between multinational 1047297rms and Indian business

houses From 1948 to 1957 the Indian government prohibited foreign

takeovers of existing local 1047297rms and proscribed foreign-owned portfolio

investments India averaged fewer than forty new foreign collaborations

Hill American Business Abroad Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones Entrepre-neurship and Multinationals Global Business and the Making of the Modern World (Chel-tenham 2013) ch 8 Harold van B Cleveland and Thomas F Huertas Citibank 1812ndash1970(Cambridge Mass 1985) Ralph W Hidy and Muriel E Hidy Pioneering in Big Business1882ndash1911 (New York 1955) and Henrietta M Larson Evelyn H Knowlton and Charles SPopple History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) New Horizons 1927 ndash1950(New York 1971)

26 An entry in our sample indicates opening of the Indian subsidiary with a well-de1047297nedmandate to sell manufacture conduct RampD etc An exit in our sample indicates closingdown of the Indian subsidiary andor a visible shutting down of all operations in India

Coding was done by two independent research analysts and validation was done by theauthors in case of disagreement between the analysts The tables here have been condensedplease contact the authors for the full tables with data to 2013

27Pure RampD entry referring to an entry with the only function of the 1047297rm as RampD in India28For example Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 4

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 12

474

475

476

477

478

479

480

481

482

483

484

485

486

487

488

489

490

491

492

493

494

495

496

497

498

499

500

501

502

503

504

505

506

507

508

509

510

511

512

513

514

5152

516

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annually in this period most of them with Indian business houses such

as Tata (which had sixty joint ventures with foreign partners by 1958)

Mahindra and Bangur The years from 1947 to 1957 also witnessed the

takeover of the British colonial managing agencies by the Indian business houses Encarnation also documents a foreign exchange crisis

that affected India in 1957 that led to a reversal of government policy

toward JVs Government regulators began encouraging Indian 1047297rms to

seek foreign equity and local enterprises that secured foreign tie-ups

also had better chances of securing the licenses needed for expansion

Encarnation indicates that JVs with foreign multinationals started dra-

matically increasing from 1958 and hit peak levels during 1964

However JVs with foreign multinationals started declining in the late

1960s and as a result stocks of foreign equity invested in the privatesector began to shrink and reached their lowest levels in 1973 the year

government policy 1047298ipped again with the passage of FERA29 Our analy-

sis is an attempt to augment this narrative

The Fortune 50 1047297rms exhibited a preference towards solo entry

before 1970 (62 percent of entries) However between 1971 and 1990

90 percent of the Fortune 50 entries were either a JV or an acquisition

In the 1990s the Fortune 50 1047297rms increased the percentage of solo entry

to 375 percent FTSE 50 1047297rms were more stable with only a single solo

entry between 1971 and 1990 and post-1991 83 percent of entries wereeither a JV or an acquisition in both periods

The Dynamic Trajectories Framework

Our analysis of selected MNEs reveals important distinctions in the

trajectories followed by British or Anglo-Dutch and American multina-

tional 1047297rms over four decades There are differences in whether or not

they exited India in the 1970s and in how they crafted their local respon-

siveness strategies both in the 1970s and the 1990s We now outline anew ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to show that adopting certain

strategic decisions at the onset of different policy epochs leads to path

dependencies resulting in different long-term trajectories for the focal

1047297rm in the host country The dynamic trajectories framework is based

on the premise of two policy epochs in a host country mdashone unwelcoming

of MNEs (ldquonegative epochrdquo) and the other welcoming of MNEs (ldquopositive

epochrdquo) A focal host country could experience a negative epoch followed

by a positive epoch or vice versa

We argue that an MNE manager in the host country must make twosets of decisions at the onset of each policy epoch The 1047297rst decision is

29Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 60

Multinational Enterprises in India 13

517

518

519

520

521

522

523

524

525

526

527

528

529

530

531

532

533

534

535

536

537

538

539

540

541

542

543

544

545

546

547

548

549

550

551

552

553

554

555

556

557

5582

559

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whether or not to be present in the host country during either or both

policy epochs Here we assume that the MNE is present in the host

country prior to the start of the 1047297rst epoch If the negative epoch is fol-

lowed by the positive epoch the manager has to decide whether to exitor stay at the onset of the negative epoch Also conditional on exiting

in the negative epoch the manager also has to decide whether or not

to reenter at the onset of the positive epoch We also assume that con-

ditional on staying at the onset of the negative epoch the manager

decides to stay during the positive epoch An MNE thus must face

three possible choices exitreenter exitdo not reenter or staystay30

However if the positive epoch is followed by the negative epoch the

manager has two possible choices stayexit or staystay We assume

that the MNE stays during the positive epochThe second decision set relates to whether or not the manager of the

MNE in the host country modi1047297es the ldquolocal responsiveness strategy rdquo of

the 1047297rm at the onset of each policy epoch and how the manager crafts

changes in that strategy According to business scholars Christopher Bar-

tlett and Sumantra Ghoshal MNEs have to concurrently manage the fol-

lowing three priorities global ef 1047297ciency national responsiveness and

worldwide learning A key strategy element of this three-dimensional

framework is the importance of each foreign subsidiary in managing

the overall MNE strategy Bartlett and Ghoshal call this strategy element ldquolocal responsivenessrdquo or ldquomultinational 1047298exibility rdquo and de1047297ne

a ldquodifferentiated and specialized rolerdquo for each MNE subsidiary31

We build on this construct of local responsiveness and argue that the

MNE in the host country could craft changes in the local responsiveness

strategy by investing in inputs outputs andor host country government

relationships Investments in inputs relate to physical intellectual

and human capitalmdasheg plants plantations trademarks patents and

talent Crafting changes on the output side could include altering the

functional focus of the 1047297

rm (to focus on distribution sales or manufac-turing) choosing new businesses enter changing the product mix for

each business and modifying the local pricing or distribution strategy

for each product Finally investments in host country government

relationships might involve investments in managing government stake-

holders andor crafting negotiation strategies to navigate host country

policy interventions

Figure 1 outlines the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo perspective for a host

country experiencing a negative policy epoch followed by a positive

30Theoretically a fourth option of stayexit is also possible since later exit might be motiv-ated by activities in another geography

31Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal Managing across Borders The Trans-national Solution vol 2 (Boston 1999) 67

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 14

560

561

562

563

564

565

566

567

568

569

570

571

572

573

574

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576

577

578

579

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581

582

583

584

585

586

587

588

589

590

591

592

593

594

595

596

597

598

599

600

6012

602

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policy epoch from the perspective of a multinational that was in the

country already at the onset of the 1047297rst epoch The horizontal lines in

the 1047297gure represent the three possible dynamic trajectories In addition

for options 1 and 3 at the onset of each epoch the MNE has to decide

whether to maintain or modify its local responsiveness strategy If the

MNE decides to maintain its prior local responsiveness strategy the

MNE manager in the host country does not make any signi1047297cant new

investments in the input side makes no changes to the functionalfocus and product mix and makes no changes in managing government

stakeholders Still if the manager of the MNE in the host country mod-

i1047297es the local responsiveness strategy at the onset of either or both policy

F i g 1 - B W

o n l i n e B W

i n p r i n t

Figure 1 Dynamic trajectories framework This graphic is a representation of the ldquodynamictrajectoriesrdquo framework and depicts the evolution of the policy environment in a focal hostcountry that passes through a ldquonegative epochrdquo followed by a ldquopositive epochrdquo with regard topolicy toward multinationals At the onset of the negative epoch a focal MNC has to decide

whether to exit or stay Conditional on deciding to stay the 1047297

rm has to decide whether ornot to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether or not to modify thesame Modi1047297cation of the local responsiveness strategy could be on the input side (manufac-turing plants plantations patents talent) output side (functional focus product mix pricingdistribution etc) or in managing host country government relationships At the onset of thepositive epoch conditional on exiting earlier the MNC has to decide whether or not to reenterFor both the staystay option and exitreenter option the focal MNC has to decide at the onsetof the positive epoch whether or not to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether to modify the same We also posit that the direction (which levermdashinput output orgovernment relationships) and degree (how much) of change in the local responsiveness strat-egy is conditional on the decision to stayexit at the onset of Epoch 1 and the decision toreenterstay at the onset of Epoch 2

Multinational Enterprises in India 15

603

604

605

606

607

608

609

610

611

612

613

614

615

616

617

618

619

620

621

622

623

624

625

626

627

628

629

630

631

632

633

634

635

636

637

638

639

640

641

642

643

6442

645

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epochs changes could be made on the input side the output side or in

managing government stakeholders

It is also plausible that both the direction and the degree of

change in local responsiveness strategy are endogenous to the decisionof exitingstayingreentering We de1047297ne direction of change as

whether or not the focal MNE focuses on input output or govern-

ment relationships and degree of change as the extent and nature

of change on any of these levers We also argue that the direction

and degree of change MNE depends on the decision to exitstay

reenter As an example in the face of a negative policy epoch followed

by a positive policy epoch an MNE that decides to follow a staystay

strategy might not be able to make drastic changes on the output side

(eg functional focus product mix) for reasons of continuity and may instead focus on investments in the input side (eg human capital

manufacturing plants plantations) However an MNE following an

exitreenter strategy might have fewer concerns regarding continuity

given the passage of time and might be able to make drastic

changes to the output side In that case the MNE might be able to

alter the functional andor product mix in the host country In

addition the need to focus on host country government relationships

especially in a negative epoch might imply a focus on input since it is

related to the creation of local jobs a key lever to engage with govern-ment stakeholders

We now outline four detailed qualitative case studies of these multi-

national 1047297rms to indicate differences in how they reacted to the two

policy epochs in India The four case studies arguably represent extremes

in our samplemdash while the Anglo-Dutch Unilever and British BAT fol-

lowed a well-crafted ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multina-

tionals IBM and Coca-Cola successfully executed an ldquoexitreentry rdquo

strategy32

Further we show that Unilever and BAT adapted to the negativepolicy epoch (represented by the FERA regulation and 1970 patent

law) by continuously investing in the input sidemdashmanufacturing plants

and human capital In contrast IBM and Coca-Cola exited India follow-

ing the FERA regulations of the 1970s subsequently returning with dras-

tically different local responsiveness strategies on the output side

represented by different functional and product mixes

32

The use of outliers in the context of India to outline differences in dynamic trajectories issimilar in principle to the analysis used by Jones and Khanna where they compared the differ-ent trajectories taken by Jardines and Swire in face of Communist intervention in China Geof-frey Jones and Tarun Khanna ldquoBringing History (Back) into International Businessrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006) 453ndash68

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 16

646

647

648

649

650

651

652

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654

655

656

657

658

659

660

661

662

663

664

665

666

667

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680

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684

685

686

6872

688

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Unilever in India

The Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever originated as separate

British and Dutch 1047297rms making soap and margarine respectively

Lever Brothers the British company began exporting Sunlight soap

bars to India as early as 1888 Over time Lever Brothers brought

other products and brands to India including Lifebuoy in 189533 In

1917 Lever Brothers acquired partial interest in two other British soap

companies one of which had an of 1047297ce and depots in India Declining

sales between 1918 and 1921 further triggered Lever Brothersrsquo interest

in India as a manufacturing center Other factors included the growing

local Indian production of soap spurred by wartime shortages and the

widespread Swadeshi movement in India which advocated self-suf 1047297-

ciency through use of locally made products In the 1920s Lever Broth-

ers bought a site at Sinduria near Calcutta Unilever (the product of the

amalgamation of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie in 1930) continued

to expand in the country after 1929 The Hindustan Vanaspati Manufac-

turing Company was established in 1931 In 1933 a new company called

Lever Bros (India) Ltd was incorporated in Bombay Subsequently

Unilever set up factories to manufacture soap in Calcutta and Bombay

and vegetable ghee just outside Bombay using the brand name Dalda

Another subsidiary United Traders Limited was formed in 193534

These subsidiaries functioned independently until 1956 when they

merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) which sold 10

percent of its equity to the public the share of public equity was

increased to 14 percent in 196535 The country rsquos planned economy at

the time protected local manufacturers and Unilever 1047298ourished The

company under the in1047298uence of the government also recruited Indian

managers naming P L Tandon chairman in 1961mdashthe 1047297rst instance of

an Indian heading a multinational (see Jaithirth Raorsquos contribution to

this special issue) Hindustan Lever Limited evolved into a consumer

goods company with Unilever as its major stakeholder HLL had been

in the beverages industry since 1903 with its brand Red Label tea In

1972 Unileverrsquos acquisition of Lipton Ltd from the British company

Allied Suppliers included a large and very poorly managed Indian tea

packaging and distribution business which could not be integrated

33 Amar Nayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Devel-oping Country (New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 Sushil Vachani Multinationals in India Strategic Product Choices (Columbia Mo 1992) 12ndash31 D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas

The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash

1965 (Stanford 1978) Vanaspati is vegetable ghee andDalda is a brand34Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 835

ldquoHindustan Unilever Limited Factsheetrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinImagesHUL-Factsheet_tcm114-188694pdf Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 17

689

690

691

692

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729

7302

731

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with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

734

735

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772

7732

774

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FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

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806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

8162

817

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

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829

830

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835

836

837

838

839

840

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850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

892

893

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

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910

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912

913

914

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917

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919

920

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922

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929

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939

940

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943

944

9452

946

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

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Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

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1042

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1047

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1051

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1067

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1072

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

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1079

1080

1081

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1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

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1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

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1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

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11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

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1177

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1190

1191

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1193

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1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

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1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

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1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

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1300

1301

1302

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1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

1318

1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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reforms the nation was witnessing FEMA made all violations regarding

foreign exchange civil not criminal offenses making it more investor

friendly FEMA tried to consolidate legislation relating to foreign

exchange in India with an ultimate goal of allowing external trade andpayments and to facilitate the development of a foreign exchange

market in India The reforms also immediately reduced the number of

steps required to procure a license to four or 1047297 ve approvals mainly

environmental Most goods underwent a tariff cut apart from goods in

the consumer sector

Indian Patent Reform Starting 1999

Following FEMA the Indian patent system underwent a number of reforms starting in 1999 triggered when India signed the agreement on

Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) at the

World Trade Organization and joined the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)

Product patents in medicine food and agrochemicals were now

allowed and the patent expiry period was extended to twenty years

similar to that in the US The average time required to get a patent

was reduced from 1047297 ve to three years The patent 1047297ling fee did not

change during this period and remained substantially less compared to

that of the United States Patent and Trademark Of 1047297ce (USPTO) Thepatent system also granted exclusive marketing rights (EMRs) based

on patents granted this enabled multinational 1047297rms with patents to

derive competitive advantage in selling their patented products In the

past twenty years Indian patent law has been amended three timesmdash

in 1999 2002 and 2005mdashto increase compatibility with TRIPs and to

allay MNEsrsquo fears of intellectual property theft

With the Indian patent reforms a lot of MNEsrsquo worries regarding

intellectual property protection seemed to disappear An analysis of

Indian patent 1047297lings shows a steep rise in the total number of patents1047297led in India with an in1047298exion point in 1997 This increase is attributed

to positive expectations about the 1999 reforms From 1995 to 2004

MNEs from fourteen countries 1047297led a total of 8426 patents of which

MNEs from the US 1047297led the most (2477 patents) followed by 1047297rms

from Germany and Switzerland Patent applications by foreign MNEs

in India started increasing further around 2000 and have been increas-

ing ever since The EMR ldquomailboxrdquo provisions and the belief that India

would abide by TRIPS gave MNEs con1047297dence leading to a surge in the

number of applications In contrast Indian entities 1047297led 1486 appli-cations in the same period21 The number of patents 1047297led in India

21 Analysis conducted by researchers

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 10

388

389

390

391

392

393

394

395

396

397

398

399

400

401

402

403

404

405

406

407

408

409

410

411

412

413

414

415

416

417

418

419

420

421

422

423

424

425

426

427

428

4292

430

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ranged between 2000 and 4000 patents per year from the early 1970s

all the way to 1993 Post-1993 there was a rapid increase in the number

of patent 1047297lings with a spike of around 10000 patents per year in 1997 in

anticipation of the 1999 reforms

22

MNEs Stream into India Analysis of Fortune 50and FTSE 50 MNEs

With the initiation of economic reforms India attracted unprece-

dented foreign direct investment Average annual FDI rose from $100

million in the mid-1980s to around $2 billion in the mid-1990s The

stock of FDI rose from less than $2 billion in 1991 to almost $39

billion in 200423 The World Investment Report (WIR) of 2007 indicatesthat the 1990 inward stock level of FDI was roughly $17 billion the 2000

inward stock was $175 billion and the 2004 inward stock was $387

billion The city of Bangalore became one of the largest magnets of

foreign investment in India in 2001ndash2002 alone a total of 230 MNEs

setupof 1047297ces in Bangalorersquos industrial parks employing 25000 engineers

In this section we analyze unique data that documents every entry

and exit event for each Fortune 50 and FTSE 50 multinational 1047297rm

The entry and exit events were tracked from 1858 to 2013 and multiple

data sources were used including historical narratives of several 1047297rmsSEC company 1047297lings (the complete list of subsidiaries was found in

Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm) and data on company registration

in India from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Govern-

ment of India As the Fortune 50 and the FTSE 50 lists have changed over

time we have compiled data for the lists as of 1991 as well as 2013 In our

primary analyses and in the Appendix we use the Fortune and FTSE lists

from 1991 the year of the IMF-induced reforms

There are several limitations in conducting historical analysis using

currently available primary data Wilkins describes these limitations assometimes introducing ldquo blinders that obscured important past occur-

rencesrdquo24 To circumvent some of these constraints in addition to con-

ducting our own primary research we based our analyses on prior

articles in business history on multinational entry in India25 Appendix

22 Information from Technology Information Forecasting and Assessment Council(TIFAC)

23Chandana Chakraborty and Peter Nunnenkamp ldquoEconomic Reforms FDI and Econ-omic Growth in India A Sector Level Analysisrdquo World Development 36 no 7 (2008)

1192ndash

121224Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Conti-nents new ed with new intro by Mira Wilkins (Cambridge UK 2011) 11

25For example Tomlinson ldquoForeign Private Investment in India 1920ndash1950rdquo Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 A History (Oxford 1993) Wilkins and

Multinational Enterprises in India 11

431

432

433

434

435

436

437

438

439

440

441

442

443

444

445

446

447

448

449

450

451

452

453

454

455

456

457

458

459

460

461

462

463

464

465

466

467

468

469

470

471

4722

473

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Table 1 documents the data on the entry and exit of Fortune 50 multina-

tional 1047297rms as of 1991 with operations in India over the period 1905ndash

1999 Appendix Table 2 documents the data for the FTSE 50 1047297rms as

of 1991 with operations between 1847 and 1999

26

Analysis of the data in these tables reveals several interesting

insights In comparison to the FTSE 50 Fortune 50 MNEs exhibit

greater number of entries but also greater numbers of exit events

While Fortune 50 1047297rms have a total of forty entry events the FTSE 50

1047297rms only have twenty entry events On the other hand FTSE 50 1047297rms

have a total of two exit events in this period while Fortune 50 1047297rms

have a total of eleven exit events Between 1971 and 1990 Fortune 50

1047297rms have a total of seven exit events while FTSE 50 1047297rms only have

one exit eventIn addition Fortune and FTSE 1047297rms had differences in functional

focus Fortune 50 1047297rms had a more balanced focus in terms of manufac-

turing and salesservices while FTSE 50 1047297rms had a greater focus on

salesservices Also the Fortune 50 1047297rms show a slightly higher concen-

tration on RampD in India compared to the FTSE 5027

We compare the entry mode of both categories of 1047297rms as well as

study whether the 1047297rms entered solo or otherwise A non-solo entry

refers to an entry through acquisition or a joint venture (JV) whereas

a solo entry represents the 1047297

rm entering by itselfThere is a small business history literature on MNEsrsquo choice of entry

model (joint ventures vs acquisition vs solo entry but this has not

included the case of India)28 Encarnation does describe the evolution

of joint ventures between multinational 1047297rms and Indian business

houses From 1948 to 1957 the Indian government prohibited foreign

takeovers of existing local 1047297rms and proscribed foreign-owned portfolio

investments India averaged fewer than forty new foreign collaborations

Hill American Business Abroad Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones Entrepre-neurship and Multinationals Global Business and the Making of the Modern World (Chel-tenham 2013) ch 8 Harold van B Cleveland and Thomas F Huertas Citibank 1812ndash1970(Cambridge Mass 1985) Ralph W Hidy and Muriel E Hidy Pioneering in Big Business1882ndash1911 (New York 1955) and Henrietta M Larson Evelyn H Knowlton and Charles SPopple History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) New Horizons 1927 ndash1950(New York 1971)

26 An entry in our sample indicates opening of the Indian subsidiary with a well-de1047297nedmandate to sell manufacture conduct RampD etc An exit in our sample indicates closingdown of the Indian subsidiary andor a visible shutting down of all operations in India

Coding was done by two independent research analysts and validation was done by theauthors in case of disagreement between the analysts The tables here have been condensedplease contact the authors for the full tables with data to 2013

27Pure RampD entry referring to an entry with the only function of the 1047297rm as RampD in India28For example Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 4

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 12

474

475

476

477

478

479

480

481

482

483

484

485

486

487

488

489

490

491

492

493

494

495

496

497

498

499

500

501

502

503

504

505

506

507

508

509

510

511

512

513

514

5152

516

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annually in this period most of them with Indian business houses such

as Tata (which had sixty joint ventures with foreign partners by 1958)

Mahindra and Bangur The years from 1947 to 1957 also witnessed the

takeover of the British colonial managing agencies by the Indian business houses Encarnation also documents a foreign exchange crisis

that affected India in 1957 that led to a reversal of government policy

toward JVs Government regulators began encouraging Indian 1047297rms to

seek foreign equity and local enterprises that secured foreign tie-ups

also had better chances of securing the licenses needed for expansion

Encarnation indicates that JVs with foreign multinationals started dra-

matically increasing from 1958 and hit peak levels during 1964

However JVs with foreign multinationals started declining in the late

1960s and as a result stocks of foreign equity invested in the privatesector began to shrink and reached their lowest levels in 1973 the year

government policy 1047298ipped again with the passage of FERA29 Our analy-

sis is an attempt to augment this narrative

The Fortune 50 1047297rms exhibited a preference towards solo entry

before 1970 (62 percent of entries) However between 1971 and 1990

90 percent of the Fortune 50 entries were either a JV or an acquisition

In the 1990s the Fortune 50 1047297rms increased the percentage of solo entry

to 375 percent FTSE 50 1047297rms were more stable with only a single solo

entry between 1971 and 1990 and post-1991 83 percent of entries wereeither a JV or an acquisition in both periods

The Dynamic Trajectories Framework

Our analysis of selected MNEs reveals important distinctions in the

trajectories followed by British or Anglo-Dutch and American multina-

tional 1047297rms over four decades There are differences in whether or not

they exited India in the 1970s and in how they crafted their local respon-

siveness strategies both in the 1970s and the 1990s We now outline anew ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to show that adopting certain

strategic decisions at the onset of different policy epochs leads to path

dependencies resulting in different long-term trajectories for the focal

1047297rm in the host country The dynamic trajectories framework is based

on the premise of two policy epochs in a host country mdashone unwelcoming

of MNEs (ldquonegative epochrdquo) and the other welcoming of MNEs (ldquopositive

epochrdquo) A focal host country could experience a negative epoch followed

by a positive epoch or vice versa

We argue that an MNE manager in the host country must make twosets of decisions at the onset of each policy epoch The 1047297rst decision is

29Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 60

Multinational Enterprises in India 13

517

518

519

520

521

522

523

524

525

526

527

528

529

530

531

532

533

534

535

536

537

538

539

540

541

542

543

544

545

546

547

548

549

550

551

552

553

554

555

556

557

5582

559

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whether or not to be present in the host country during either or both

policy epochs Here we assume that the MNE is present in the host

country prior to the start of the 1047297rst epoch If the negative epoch is fol-

lowed by the positive epoch the manager has to decide whether to exitor stay at the onset of the negative epoch Also conditional on exiting

in the negative epoch the manager also has to decide whether or not

to reenter at the onset of the positive epoch We also assume that con-

ditional on staying at the onset of the negative epoch the manager

decides to stay during the positive epoch An MNE thus must face

three possible choices exitreenter exitdo not reenter or staystay30

However if the positive epoch is followed by the negative epoch the

manager has two possible choices stayexit or staystay We assume

that the MNE stays during the positive epochThe second decision set relates to whether or not the manager of the

MNE in the host country modi1047297es the ldquolocal responsiveness strategy rdquo of

the 1047297rm at the onset of each policy epoch and how the manager crafts

changes in that strategy According to business scholars Christopher Bar-

tlett and Sumantra Ghoshal MNEs have to concurrently manage the fol-

lowing three priorities global ef 1047297ciency national responsiveness and

worldwide learning A key strategy element of this three-dimensional

framework is the importance of each foreign subsidiary in managing

the overall MNE strategy Bartlett and Ghoshal call this strategy element ldquolocal responsivenessrdquo or ldquomultinational 1047298exibility rdquo and de1047297ne

a ldquodifferentiated and specialized rolerdquo for each MNE subsidiary31

We build on this construct of local responsiveness and argue that the

MNE in the host country could craft changes in the local responsiveness

strategy by investing in inputs outputs andor host country government

relationships Investments in inputs relate to physical intellectual

and human capitalmdasheg plants plantations trademarks patents and

talent Crafting changes on the output side could include altering the

functional focus of the 1047297

rm (to focus on distribution sales or manufac-turing) choosing new businesses enter changing the product mix for

each business and modifying the local pricing or distribution strategy

for each product Finally investments in host country government

relationships might involve investments in managing government stake-

holders andor crafting negotiation strategies to navigate host country

policy interventions

Figure 1 outlines the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo perspective for a host

country experiencing a negative policy epoch followed by a positive

30Theoretically a fourth option of stayexit is also possible since later exit might be motiv-ated by activities in another geography

31Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal Managing across Borders The Trans-national Solution vol 2 (Boston 1999) 67

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 14

560

561

562

563

564

565

566

567

568

569

570

571

572

573

574

575

576

577

578

579

580

581

582

583

584

585

586

587

588

589

590

591

592

593

594

595

596

597

598

599

600

6012

602

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policy epoch from the perspective of a multinational that was in the

country already at the onset of the 1047297rst epoch The horizontal lines in

the 1047297gure represent the three possible dynamic trajectories In addition

for options 1 and 3 at the onset of each epoch the MNE has to decide

whether to maintain or modify its local responsiveness strategy If the

MNE decides to maintain its prior local responsiveness strategy the

MNE manager in the host country does not make any signi1047297cant new

investments in the input side makes no changes to the functionalfocus and product mix and makes no changes in managing government

stakeholders Still if the manager of the MNE in the host country mod-

i1047297es the local responsiveness strategy at the onset of either or both policy

F i g 1 - B W

o n l i n e B W

i n p r i n t

Figure 1 Dynamic trajectories framework This graphic is a representation of the ldquodynamictrajectoriesrdquo framework and depicts the evolution of the policy environment in a focal hostcountry that passes through a ldquonegative epochrdquo followed by a ldquopositive epochrdquo with regard topolicy toward multinationals At the onset of the negative epoch a focal MNC has to decide

whether to exit or stay Conditional on deciding to stay the 1047297

rm has to decide whether ornot to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether or not to modify thesame Modi1047297cation of the local responsiveness strategy could be on the input side (manufac-turing plants plantations patents talent) output side (functional focus product mix pricingdistribution etc) or in managing host country government relationships At the onset of thepositive epoch conditional on exiting earlier the MNC has to decide whether or not to reenterFor both the staystay option and exitreenter option the focal MNC has to decide at the onsetof the positive epoch whether or not to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether to modify the same We also posit that the direction (which levermdashinput output orgovernment relationships) and degree (how much) of change in the local responsiveness strat-egy is conditional on the decision to stayexit at the onset of Epoch 1 and the decision toreenterstay at the onset of Epoch 2

Multinational Enterprises in India 15

603

604

605

606

607

608

609

610

611

612

613

614

615

616

617

618

619

620

621

622

623

624

625

626

627

628

629

630

631

632

633

634

635

636

637

638

639

640

641

642

643

6442

645

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epochs changes could be made on the input side the output side or in

managing government stakeholders

It is also plausible that both the direction and the degree of

change in local responsiveness strategy are endogenous to the decisionof exitingstayingreentering We de1047297ne direction of change as

whether or not the focal MNE focuses on input output or govern-

ment relationships and degree of change as the extent and nature

of change on any of these levers We also argue that the direction

and degree of change MNE depends on the decision to exitstay

reenter As an example in the face of a negative policy epoch followed

by a positive policy epoch an MNE that decides to follow a staystay

strategy might not be able to make drastic changes on the output side

(eg functional focus product mix) for reasons of continuity and may instead focus on investments in the input side (eg human capital

manufacturing plants plantations) However an MNE following an

exitreenter strategy might have fewer concerns regarding continuity

given the passage of time and might be able to make drastic

changes to the output side In that case the MNE might be able to

alter the functional andor product mix in the host country In

addition the need to focus on host country government relationships

especially in a negative epoch might imply a focus on input since it is

related to the creation of local jobs a key lever to engage with govern-ment stakeholders

We now outline four detailed qualitative case studies of these multi-

national 1047297rms to indicate differences in how they reacted to the two

policy epochs in India The four case studies arguably represent extremes

in our samplemdash while the Anglo-Dutch Unilever and British BAT fol-

lowed a well-crafted ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multina-

tionals IBM and Coca-Cola successfully executed an ldquoexitreentry rdquo

strategy32

Further we show that Unilever and BAT adapted to the negativepolicy epoch (represented by the FERA regulation and 1970 patent

law) by continuously investing in the input sidemdashmanufacturing plants

and human capital In contrast IBM and Coca-Cola exited India follow-

ing the FERA regulations of the 1970s subsequently returning with dras-

tically different local responsiveness strategies on the output side

represented by different functional and product mixes

32

The use of outliers in the context of India to outline differences in dynamic trajectories issimilar in principle to the analysis used by Jones and Khanna where they compared the differ-ent trajectories taken by Jardines and Swire in face of Communist intervention in China Geof-frey Jones and Tarun Khanna ldquoBringing History (Back) into International Businessrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006) 453ndash68

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 16

646

647

648

649

650

651

652

653

654

655

656

657

658

659

660

661

662

663

664

665

666

667

668

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670

671

672

673

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675

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678

679

680

681

682

683

684

685

686

6872

688

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Unilever in India

The Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever originated as separate

British and Dutch 1047297rms making soap and margarine respectively

Lever Brothers the British company began exporting Sunlight soap

bars to India as early as 1888 Over time Lever Brothers brought

other products and brands to India including Lifebuoy in 189533 In

1917 Lever Brothers acquired partial interest in two other British soap

companies one of which had an of 1047297ce and depots in India Declining

sales between 1918 and 1921 further triggered Lever Brothersrsquo interest

in India as a manufacturing center Other factors included the growing

local Indian production of soap spurred by wartime shortages and the

widespread Swadeshi movement in India which advocated self-suf 1047297-

ciency through use of locally made products In the 1920s Lever Broth-

ers bought a site at Sinduria near Calcutta Unilever (the product of the

amalgamation of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie in 1930) continued

to expand in the country after 1929 The Hindustan Vanaspati Manufac-

turing Company was established in 1931 In 1933 a new company called

Lever Bros (India) Ltd was incorporated in Bombay Subsequently

Unilever set up factories to manufacture soap in Calcutta and Bombay

and vegetable ghee just outside Bombay using the brand name Dalda

Another subsidiary United Traders Limited was formed in 193534

These subsidiaries functioned independently until 1956 when they

merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) which sold 10

percent of its equity to the public the share of public equity was

increased to 14 percent in 196535 The country rsquos planned economy at

the time protected local manufacturers and Unilever 1047298ourished The

company under the in1047298uence of the government also recruited Indian

managers naming P L Tandon chairman in 1961mdashthe 1047297rst instance of

an Indian heading a multinational (see Jaithirth Raorsquos contribution to

this special issue) Hindustan Lever Limited evolved into a consumer

goods company with Unilever as its major stakeholder HLL had been

in the beverages industry since 1903 with its brand Red Label tea In

1972 Unileverrsquos acquisition of Lipton Ltd from the British company

Allied Suppliers included a large and very poorly managed Indian tea

packaging and distribution business which could not be integrated

33 Amar Nayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Devel-oping Country (New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 Sushil Vachani Multinationals in India Strategic Product Choices (Columbia Mo 1992) 12ndash31 D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas

The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash

1965 (Stanford 1978) Vanaspati is vegetable ghee andDalda is a brand34Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 835

ldquoHindustan Unilever Limited Factsheetrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinImagesHUL-Factsheet_tcm114-188694pdf Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 17

689

690

691

692

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696

697

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723

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728

729

7302

731

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with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

734

735

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770

771

772

7732

774

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FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

800

801

802

803

804

805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

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814

815

8162

817

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

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830

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835

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837

838

839

840

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850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

892

893

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

909

910

911

912

913

914

915

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917

918

919

920

921

922

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924

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926

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929

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931

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934

935

936

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939

940

941

942

943

944

9452

946

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

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Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

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1045

1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

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1053

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1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

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1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

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1088

1089

1090

1091

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1095

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1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

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1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

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1144

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1156

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1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

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1177

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1190

1191

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1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

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1215

1216

1217

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1220

1221

1222

1223

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1226

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1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

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1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

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1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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ranged between 2000 and 4000 patents per year from the early 1970s

all the way to 1993 Post-1993 there was a rapid increase in the number

of patent 1047297lings with a spike of around 10000 patents per year in 1997 in

anticipation of the 1999 reforms

22

MNEs Stream into India Analysis of Fortune 50and FTSE 50 MNEs

With the initiation of economic reforms India attracted unprece-

dented foreign direct investment Average annual FDI rose from $100

million in the mid-1980s to around $2 billion in the mid-1990s The

stock of FDI rose from less than $2 billion in 1991 to almost $39

billion in 200423 The World Investment Report (WIR) of 2007 indicatesthat the 1990 inward stock level of FDI was roughly $17 billion the 2000

inward stock was $175 billion and the 2004 inward stock was $387

billion The city of Bangalore became one of the largest magnets of

foreign investment in India in 2001ndash2002 alone a total of 230 MNEs

setupof 1047297ces in Bangalorersquos industrial parks employing 25000 engineers

In this section we analyze unique data that documents every entry

and exit event for each Fortune 50 and FTSE 50 multinational 1047297rm

The entry and exit events were tracked from 1858 to 2013 and multiple

data sources were used including historical narratives of several 1047297rmsSEC company 1047297lings (the complete list of subsidiaries was found in

Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm) and data on company registration

in India from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Govern-

ment of India As the Fortune 50 and the FTSE 50 lists have changed over

time we have compiled data for the lists as of 1991 as well as 2013 In our

primary analyses and in the Appendix we use the Fortune and FTSE lists

from 1991 the year of the IMF-induced reforms

There are several limitations in conducting historical analysis using

currently available primary data Wilkins describes these limitations assometimes introducing ldquo blinders that obscured important past occur-

rencesrdquo24 To circumvent some of these constraints in addition to con-

ducting our own primary research we based our analyses on prior

articles in business history on multinational entry in India25 Appendix

22 Information from Technology Information Forecasting and Assessment Council(TIFAC)

23Chandana Chakraborty and Peter Nunnenkamp ldquoEconomic Reforms FDI and Econ-omic Growth in India A Sector Level Analysisrdquo World Development 36 no 7 (2008)

1192ndash

121224Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Conti-nents new ed with new intro by Mira Wilkins (Cambridge UK 2011) 11

25For example Tomlinson ldquoForeign Private Investment in India 1920ndash1950rdquo Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 A History (Oxford 1993) Wilkins and

Multinational Enterprises in India 11

431

432

433

434

435

436

437

438

439

440

441

442

443

444

445

446

447

448

449

450

451

452

453

454

455

456

457

458

459

460

461

462

463

464

465

466

467

468

469

470

471

4722

473

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Table 1 documents the data on the entry and exit of Fortune 50 multina-

tional 1047297rms as of 1991 with operations in India over the period 1905ndash

1999 Appendix Table 2 documents the data for the FTSE 50 1047297rms as

of 1991 with operations between 1847 and 1999

26

Analysis of the data in these tables reveals several interesting

insights In comparison to the FTSE 50 Fortune 50 MNEs exhibit

greater number of entries but also greater numbers of exit events

While Fortune 50 1047297rms have a total of forty entry events the FTSE 50

1047297rms only have twenty entry events On the other hand FTSE 50 1047297rms

have a total of two exit events in this period while Fortune 50 1047297rms

have a total of eleven exit events Between 1971 and 1990 Fortune 50

1047297rms have a total of seven exit events while FTSE 50 1047297rms only have

one exit eventIn addition Fortune and FTSE 1047297rms had differences in functional

focus Fortune 50 1047297rms had a more balanced focus in terms of manufac-

turing and salesservices while FTSE 50 1047297rms had a greater focus on

salesservices Also the Fortune 50 1047297rms show a slightly higher concen-

tration on RampD in India compared to the FTSE 5027

We compare the entry mode of both categories of 1047297rms as well as

study whether the 1047297rms entered solo or otherwise A non-solo entry

refers to an entry through acquisition or a joint venture (JV) whereas

a solo entry represents the 1047297

rm entering by itselfThere is a small business history literature on MNEsrsquo choice of entry

model (joint ventures vs acquisition vs solo entry but this has not

included the case of India)28 Encarnation does describe the evolution

of joint ventures between multinational 1047297rms and Indian business

houses From 1948 to 1957 the Indian government prohibited foreign

takeovers of existing local 1047297rms and proscribed foreign-owned portfolio

investments India averaged fewer than forty new foreign collaborations

Hill American Business Abroad Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones Entrepre-neurship and Multinationals Global Business and the Making of the Modern World (Chel-tenham 2013) ch 8 Harold van B Cleveland and Thomas F Huertas Citibank 1812ndash1970(Cambridge Mass 1985) Ralph W Hidy and Muriel E Hidy Pioneering in Big Business1882ndash1911 (New York 1955) and Henrietta M Larson Evelyn H Knowlton and Charles SPopple History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) New Horizons 1927 ndash1950(New York 1971)

26 An entry in our sample indicates opening of the Indian subsidiary with a well-de1047297nedmandate to sell manufacture conduct RampD etc An exit in our sample indicates closingdown of the Indian subsidiary andor a visible shutting down of all operations in India

Coding was done by two independent research analysts and validation was done by theauthors in case of disagreement between the analysts The tables here have been condensedplease contact the authors for the full tables with data to 2013

27Pure RampD entry referring to an entry with the only function of the 1047297rm as RampD in India28For example Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 4

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 12

474

475

476

477

478

479

480

481

482

483

484

485

486

487

488

489

490

491

492

493

494

495

496

497

498

499

500

501

502

503

504

505

506

507

508

509

510

511

512

513

514

5152

516

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annually in this period most of them with Indian business houses such

as Tata (which had sixty joint ventures with foreign partners by 1958)

Mahindra and Bangur The years from 1947 to 1957 also witnessed the

takeover of the British colonial managing agencies by the Indian business houses Encarnation also documents a foreign exchange crisis

that affected India in 1957 that led to a reversal of government policy

toward JVs Government regulators began encouraging Indian 1047297rms to

seek foreign equity and local enterprises that secured foreign tie-ups

also had better chances of securing the licenses needed for expansion

Encarnation indicates that JVs with foreign multinationals started dra-

matically increasing from 1958 and hit peak levels during 1964

However JVs with foreign multinationals started declining in the late

1960s and as a result stocks of foreign equity invested in the privatesector began to shrink and reached their lowest levels in 1973 the year

government policy 1047298ipped again with the passage of FERA29 Our analy-

sis is an attempt to augment this narrative

The Fortune 50 1047297rms exhibited a preference towards solo entry

before 1970 (62 percent of entries) However between 1971 and 1990

90 percent of the Fortune 50 entries were either a JV or an acquisition

In the 1990s the Fortune 50 1047297rms increased the percentage of solo entry

to 375 percent FTSE 50 1047297rms were more stable with only a single solo

entry between 1971 and 1990 and post-1991 83 percent of entries wereeither a JV or an acquisition in both periods

The Dynamic Trajectories Framework

Our analysis of selected MNEs reveals important distinctions in the

trajectories followed by British or Anglo-Dutch and American multina-

tional 1047297rms over four decades There are differences in whether or not

they exited India in the 1970s and in how they crafted their local respon-

siveness strategies both in the 1970s and the 1990s We now outline anew ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to show that adopting certain

strategic decisions at the onset of different policy epochs leads to path

dependencies resulting in different long-term trajectories for the focal

1047297rm in the host country The dynamic trajectories framework is based

on the premise of two policy epochs in a host country mdashone unwelcoming

of MNEs (ldquonegative epochrdquo) and the other welcoming of MNEs (ldquopositive

epochrdquo) A focal host country could experience a negative epoch followed

by a positive epoch or vice versa

We argue that an MNE manager in the host country must make twosets of decisions at the onset of each policy epoch The 1047297rst decision is

29Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 60

Multinational Enterprises in India 13

517

518

519

520

521

522

523

524

525

526

527

528

529

530

531

532

533

534

535

536

537

538

539

540

541

542

543

544

545

546

547

548

549

550

551

552

553

554

555

556

557

5582

559

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whether or not to be present in the host country during either or both

policy epochs Here we assume that the MNE is present in the host

country prior to the start of the 1047297rst epoch If the negative epoch is fol-

lowed by the positive epoch the manager has to decide whether to exitor stay at the onset of the negative epoch Also conditional on exiting

in the negative epoch the manager also has to decide whether or not

to reenter at the onset of the positive epoch We also assume that con-

ditional on staying at the onset of the negative epoch the manager

decides to stay during the positive epoch An MNE thus must face

three possible choices exitreenter exitdo not reenter or staystay30

However if the positive epoch is followed by the negative epoch the

manager has two possible choices stayexit or staystay We assume

that the MNE stays during the positive epochThe second decision set relates to whether or not the manager of the

MNE in the host country modi1047297es the ldquolocal responsiveness strategy rdquo of

the 1047297rm at the onset of each policy epoch and how the manager crafts

changes in that strategy According to business scholars Christopher Bar-

tlett and Sumantra Ghoshal MNEs have to concurrently manage the fol-

lowing three priorities global ef 1047297ciency national responsiveness and

worldwide learning A key strategy element of this three-dimensional

framework is the importance of each foreign subsidiary in managing

the overall MNE strategy Bartlett and Ghoshal call this strategy element ldquolocal responsivenessrdquo or ldquomultinational 1047298exibility rdquo and de1047297ne

a ldquodifferentiated and specialized rolerdquo for each MNE subsidiary31

We build on this construct of local responsiveness and argue that the

MNE in the host country could craft changes in the local responsiveness

strategy by investing in inputs outputs andor host country government

relationships Investments in inputs relate to physical intellectual

and human capitalmdasheg plants plantations trademarks patents and

talent Crafting changes on the output side could include altering the

functional focus of the 1047297

rm (to focus on distribution sales or manufac-turing) choosing new businesses enter changing the product mix for

each business and modifying the local pricing or distribution strategy

for each product Finally investments in host country government

relationships might involve investments in managing government stake-

holders andor crafting negotiation strategies to navigate host country

policy interventions

Figure 1 outlines the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo perspective for a host

country experiencing a negative policy epoch followed by a positive

30Theoretically a fourth option of stayexit is also possible since later exit might be motiv-ated by activities in another geography

31Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal Managing across Borders The Trans-national Solution vol 2 (Boston 1999) 67

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 14

560

561

562

563

564

565

566

567

568

569

570

571

572

573

574

575

576

577

578

579

580

581

582

583

584

585

586

587

588

589

590

591

592

593

594

595

596

597

598

599

600

6012

602

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policy epoch from the perspective of a multinational that was in the

country already at the onset of the 1047297rst epoch The horizontal lines in

the 1047297gure represent the three possible dynamic trajectories In addition

for options 1 and 3 at the onset of each epoch the MNE has to decide

whether to maintain or modify its local responsiveness strategy If the

MNE decides to maintain its prior local responsiveness strategy the

MNE manager in the host country does not make any signi1047297cant new

investments in the input side makes no changes to the functionalfocus and product mix and makes no changes in managing government

stakeholders Still if the manager of the MNE in the host country mod-

i1047297es the local responsiveness strategy at the onset of either or both policy

F i g 1 - B W

o n l i n e B W

i n p r i n t

Figure 1 Dynamic trajectories framework This graphic is a representation of the ldquodynamictrajectoriesrdquo framework and depicts the evolution of the policy environment in a focal hostcountry that passes through a ldquonegative epochrdquo followed by a ldquopositive epochrdquo with regard topolicy toward multinationals At the onset of the negative epoch a focal MNC has to decide

whether to exit or stay Conditional on deciding to stay the 1047297

rm has to decide whether ornot to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether or not to modify thesame Modi1047297cation of the local responsiveness strategy could be on the input side (manufac-turing plants plantations patents talent) output side (functional focus product mix pricingdistribution etc) or in managing host country government relationships At the onset of thepositive epoch conditional on exiting earlier the MNC has to decide whether or not to reenterFor both the staystay option and exitreenter option the focal MNC has to decide at the onsetof the positive epoch whether or not to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether to modify the same We also posit that the direction (which levermdashinput output orgovernment relationships) and degree (how much) of change in the local responsiveness strat-egy is conditional on the decision to stayexit at the onset of Epoch 1 and the decision toreenterstay at the onset of Epoch 2

Multinational Enterprises in India 15

603

604

605

606

607

608

609

610

611

612

613

614

615

616

617

618

619

620

621

622

623

624

625

626

627

628

629

630

631

632

633

634

635

636

637

638

639

640

641

642

643

6442

645

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epochs changes could be made on the input side the output side or in

managing government stakeholders

It is also plausible that both the direction and the degree of

change in local responsiveness strategy are endogenous to the decisionof exitingstayingreentering We de1047297ne direction of change as

whether or not the focal MNE focuses on input output or govern-

ment relationships and degree of change as the extent and nature

of change on any of these levers We also argue that the direction

and degree of change MNE depends on the decision to exitstay

reenter As an example in the face of a negative policy epoch followed

by a positive policy epoch an MNE that decides to follow a staystay

strategy might not be able to make drastic changes on the output side

(eg functional focus product mix) for reasons of continuity and may instead focus on investments in the input side (eg human capital

manufacturing plants plantations) However an MNE following an

exitreenter strategy might have fewer concerns regarding continuity

given the passage of time and might be able to make drastic

changes to the output side In that case the MNE might be able to

alter the functional andor product mix in the host country In

addition the need to focus on host country government relationships

especially in a negative epoch might imply a focus on input since it is

related to the creation of local jobs a key lever to engage with govern-ment stakeholders

We now outline four detailed qualitative case studies of these multi-

national 1047297rms to indicate differences in how they reacted to the two

policy epochs in India The four case studies arguably represent extremes

in our samplemdash while the Anglo-Dutch Unilever and British BAT fol-

lowed a well-crafted ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multina-

tionals IBM and Coca-Cola successfully executed an ldquoexitreentry rdquo

strategy32

Further we show that Unilever and BAT adapted to the negativepolicy epoch (represented by the FERA regulation and 1970 patent

law) by continuously investing in the input sidemdashmanufacturing plants

and human capital In contrast IBM and Coca-Cola exited India follow-

ing the FERA regulations of the 1970s subsequently returning with dras-

tically different local responsiveness strategies on the output side

represented by different functional and product mixes

32

The use of outliers in the context of India to outline differences in dynamic trajectories issimilar in principle to the analysis used by Jones and Khanna where they compared the differ-ent trajectories taken by Jardines and Swire in face of Communist intervention in China Geof-frey Jones and Tarun Khanna ldquoBringing History (Back) into International Businessrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006) 453ndash68

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 16

646

647

648

649

650

651

652

653

654

655

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657

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663

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665

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667

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671

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675

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680

681

682

683

684

685

686

6872

688

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Unilever in India

The Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever originated as separate

British and Dutch 1047297rms making soap and margarine respectively

Lever Brothers the British company began exporting Sunlight soap

bars to India as early as 1888 Over time Lever Brothers brought

other products and brands to India including Lifebuoy in 189533 In

1917 Lever Brothers acquired partial interest in two other British soap

companies one of which had an of 1047297ce and depots in India Declining

sales between 1918 and 1921 further triggered Lever Brothersrsquo interest

in India as a manufacturing center Other factors included the growing

local Indian production of soap spurred by wartime shortages and the

widespread Swadeshi movement in India which advocated self-suf 1047297-

ciency through use of locally made products In the 1920s Lever Broth-

ers bought a site at Sinduria near Calcutta Unilever (the product of the

amalgamation of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie in 1930) continued

to expand in the country after 1929 The Hindustan Vanaspati Manufac-

turing Company was established in 1931 In 1933 a new company called

Lever Bros (India) Ltd was incorporated in Bombay Subsequently

Unilever set up factories to manufacture soap in Calcutta and Bombay

and vegetable ghee just outside Bombay using the brand name Dalda

Another subsidiary United Traders Limited was formed in 193534

These subsidiaries functioned independently until 1956 when they

merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) which sold 10

percent of its equity to the public the share of public equity was

increased to 14 percent in 196535 The country rsquos planned economy at

the time protected local manufacturers and Unilever 1047298ourished The

company under the in1047298uence of the government also recruited Indian

managers naming P L Tandon chairman in 1961mdashthe 1047297rst instance of

an Indian heading a multinational (see Jaithirth Raorsquos contribution to

this special issue) Hindustan Lever Limited evolved into a consumer

goods company with Unilever as its major stakeholder HLL had been

in the beverages industry since 1903 with its brand Red Label tea In

1972 Unileverrsquos acquisition of Lipton Ltd from the British company

Allied Suppliers included a large and very poorly managed Indian tea

packaging and distribution business which could not be integrated

33 Amar Nayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Devel-oping Country (New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 Sushil Vachani Multinationals in India Strategic Product Choices (Columbia Mo 1992) 12ndash31 D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas

The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash

1965 (Stanford 1978) Vanaspati is vegetable ghee andDalda is a brand34Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 835

ldquoHindustan Unilever Limited Factsheetrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinImagesHUL-Factsheet_tcm114-188694pdf Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 17

689

690

691

692

693

694

695

696

697

698

699

700

701

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703

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705

706

707

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719

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723

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726

727

728

729

7302

731

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with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

734

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7732

774

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FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

800

801

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805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

8162

817

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

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830

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833

834

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836

837

838

839

840

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854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

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888

889

890

891

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893

894

895

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897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

909

910

911

912

913

914

915

916

917

918

919

920

921

922

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924

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926

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928

929

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931

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934

935

936

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939

940

941

942

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944

9452

946

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

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959

960

961

962

963

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966

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970

971

972

973

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975

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977

978

979

980

981

982

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984

985

986

987

9882

989

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

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Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

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1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

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1053

1054

1055

1056

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1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

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1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

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1084

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1087

1088

1089

1090

1091

1092

1093

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1095

1096

1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

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1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

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1167

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1169

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1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

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1188

1189

1190

1191

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1193

1194

1195

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1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

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1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

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1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

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1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

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1597

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1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

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1612

1613

1614

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1617

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1622

1623

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Table 1 documents the data on the entry and exit of Fortune 50 multina-

tional 1047297rms as of 1991 with operations in India over the period 1905ndash

1999 Appendix Table 2 documents the data for the FTSE 50 1047297rms as

of 1991 with operations between 1847 and 1999

26

Analysis of the data in these tables reveals several interesting

insights In comparison to the FTSE 50 Fortune 50 MNEs exhibit

greater number of entries but also greater numbers of exit events

While Fortune 50 1047297rms have a total of forty entry events the FTSE 50

1047297rms only have twenty entry events On the other hand FTSE 50 1047297rms

have a total of two exit events in this period while Fortune 50 1047297rms

have a total of eleven exit events Between 1971 and 1990 Fortune 50

1047297rms have a total of seven exit events while FTSE 50 1047297rms only have

one exit eventIn addition Fortune and FTSE 1047297rms had differences in functional

focus Fortune 50 1047297rms had a more balanced focus in terms of manufac-

turing and salesservices while FTSE 50 1047297rms had a greater focus on

salesservices Also the Fortune 50 1047297rms show a slightly higher concen-

tration on RampD in India compared to the FTSE 5027

We compare the entry mode of both categories of 1047297rms as well as

study whether the 1047297rms entered solo or otherwise A non-solo entry

refers to an entry through acquisition or a joint venture (JV) whereas

a solo entry represents the 1047297

rm entering by itselfThere is a small business history literature on MNEsrsquo choice of entry

model (joint ventures vs acquisition vs solo entry but this has not

included the case of India)28 Encarnation does describe the evolution

of joint ventures between multinational 1047297rms and Indian business

houses From 1948 to 1957 the Indian government prohibited foreign

takeovers of existing local 1047297rms and proscribed foreign-owned portfolio

investments India averaged fewer than forty new foreign collaborations

Hill American Business Abroad Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones Entrepre-neurship and Multinationals Global Business and the Making of the Modern World (Chel-tenham 2013) ch 8 Harold van B Cleveland and Thomas F Huertas Citibank 1812ndash1970(Cambridge Mass 1985) Ralph W Hidy and Muriel E Hidy Pioneering in Big Business1882ndash1911 (New York 1955) and Henrietta M Larson Evelyn H Knowlton and Charles SPopple History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) New Horizons 1927 ndash1950(New York 1971)

26 An entry in our sample indicates opening of the Indian subsidiary with a well-de1047297nedmandate to sell manufacture conduct RampD etc An exit in our sample indicates closingdown of the Indian subsidiary andor a visible shutting down of all operations in India

Coding was done by two independent research analysts and validation was done by theauthors in case of disagreement between the analysts The tables here have been condensedplease contact the authors for the full tables with data to 2013

27Pure RampD entry referring to an entry with the only function of the 1047297rm as RampD in India28For example Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 4

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 12

474

475

476

477

478

479

480

481

482

483

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485

486

487

488

489

490

491

492

493

494

495

496

497

498

499

500

501

502

503

504

505

506

507

508

509

510

511

512

513

514

5152

516

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annually in this period most of them with Indian business houses such

as Tata (which had sixty joint ventures with foreign partners by 1958)

Mahindra and Bangur The years from 1947 to 1957 also witnessed the

takeover of the British colonial managing agencies by the Indian business houses Encarnation also documents a foreign exchange crisis

that affected India in 1957 that led to a reversal of government policy

toward JVs Government regulators began encouraging Indian 1047297rms to

seek foreign equity and local enterprises that secured foreign tie-ups

also had better chances of securing the licenses needed for expansion

Encarnation indicates that JVs with foreign multinationals started dra-

matically increasing from 1958 and hit peak levels during 1964

However JVs with foreign multinationals started declining in the late

1960s and as a result stocks of foreign equity invested in the privatesector began to shrink and reached their lowest levels in 1973 the year

government policy 1047298ipped again with the passage of FERA29 Our analy-

sis is an attempt to augment this narrative

The Fortune 50 1047297rms exhibited a preference towards solo entry

before 1970 (62 percent of entries) However between 1971 and 1990

90 percent of the Fortune 50 entries were either a JV or an acquisition

In the 1990s the Fortune 50 1047297rms increased the percentage of solo entry

to 375 percent FTSE 50 1047297rms were more stable with only a single solo

entry between 1971 and 1990 and post-1991 83 percent of entries wereeither a JV or an acquisition in both periods

The Dynamic Trajectories Framework

Our analysis of selected MNEs reveals important distinctions in the

trajectories followed by British or Anglo-Dutch and American multina-

tional 1047297rms over four decades There are differences in whether or not

they exited India in the 1970s and in how they crafted their local respon-

siveness strategies both in the 1970s and the 1990s We now outline anew ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to show that adopting certain

strategic decisions at the onset of different policy epochs leads to path

dependencies resulting in different long-term trajectories for the focal

1047297rm in the host country The dynamic trajectories framework is based

on the premise of two policy epochs in a host country mdashone unwelcoming

of MNEs (ldquonegative epochrdquo) and the other welcoming of MNEs (ldquopositive

epochrdquo) A focal host country could experience a negative epoch followed

by a positive epoch or vice versa

We argue that an MNE manager in the host country must make twosets of decisions at the onset of each policy epoch The 1047297rst decision is

29Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 60

Multinational Enterprises in India 13

517

518

519

520

521

522

523

524

525

526

527

528

529

530

531

532

533

534

535

536

537

538

539

540

541

542

543

544

545

546

547

548

549

550

551

552

553

554

555

556

557

5582

559

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whether or not to be present in the host country during either or both

policy epochs Here we assume that the MNE is present in the host

country prior to the start of the 1047297rst epoch If the negative epoch is fol-

lowed by the positive epoch the manager has to decide whether to exitor stay at the onset of the negative epoch Also conditional on exiting

in the negative epoch the manager also has to decide whether or not

to reenter at the onset of the positive epoch We also assume that con-

ditional on staying at the onset of the negative epoch the manager

decides to stay during the positive epoch An MNE thus must face

three possible choices exitreenter exitdo not reenter or staystay30

However if the positive epoch is followed by the negative epoch the

manager has two possible choices stayexit or staystay We assume

that the MNE stays during the positive epochThe second decision set relates to whether or not the manager of the

MNE in the host country modi1047297es the ldquolocal responsiveness strategy rdquo of

the 1047297rm at the onset of each policy epoch and how the manager crafts

changes in that strategy According to business scholars Christopher Bar-

tlett and Sumantra Ghoshal MNEs have to concurrently manage the fol-

lowing three priorities global ef 1047297ciency national responsiveness and

worldwide learning A key strategy element of this three-dimensional

framework is the importance of each foreign subsidiary in managing

the overall MNE strategy Bartlett and Ghoshal call this strategy element ldquolocal responsivenessrdquo or ldquomultinational 1047298exibility rdquo and de1047297ne

a ldquodifferentiated and specialized rolerdquo for each MNE subsidiary31

We build on this construct of local responsiveness and argue that the

MNE in the host country could craft changes in the local responsiveness

strategy by investing in inputs outputs andor host country government

relationships Investments in inputs relate to physical intellectual

and human capitalmdasheg plants plantations trademarks patents and

talent Crafting changes on the output side could include altering the

functional focus of the 1047297

rm (to focus on distribution sales or manufac-turing) choosing new businesses enter changing the product mix for

each business and modifying the local pricing or distribution strategy

for each product Finally investments in host country government

relationships might involve investments in managing government stake-

holders andor crafting negotiation strategies to navigate host country

policy interventions

Figure 1 outlines the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo perspective for a host

country experiencing a negative policy epoch followed by a positive

30Theoretically a fourth option of stayexit is also possible since later exit might be motiv-ated by activities in another geography

31Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal Managing across Borders The Trans-national Solution vol 2 (Boston 1999) 67

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 14

560

561

562

563

564

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566

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568

569

570

571

572

573

574

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577

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581

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584

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586

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589

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591

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593

594

595

596

597

598

599

600

6012

602

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policy epoch from the perspective of a multinational that was in the

country already at the onset of the 1047297rst epoch The horizontal lines in

the 1047297gure represent the three possible dynamic trajectories In addition

for options 1 and 3 at the onset of each epoch the MNE has to decide

whether to maintain or modify its local responsiveness strategy If the

MNE decides to maintain its prior local responsiveness strategy the

MNE manager in the host country does not make any signi1047297cant new

investments in the input side makes no changes to the functionalfocus and product mix and makes no changes in managing government

stakeholders Still if the manager of the MNE in the host country mod-

i1047297es the local responsiveness strategy at the onset of either or both policy

F i g 1 - B W

o n l i n e B W

i n p r i n t

Figure 1 Dynamic trajectories framework This graphic is a representation of the ldquodynamictrajectoriesrdquo framework and depicts the evolution of the policy environment in a focal hostcountry that passes through a ldquonegative epochrdquo followed by a ldquopositive epochrdquo with regard topolicy toward multinationals At the onset of the negative epoch a focal MNC has to decide

whether to exit or stay Conditional on deciding to stay the 1047297

rm has to decide whether ornot to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether or not to modify thesame Modi1047297cation of the local responsiveness strategy could be on the input side (manufac-turing plants plantations patents talent) output side (functional focus product mix pricingdistribution etc) or in managing host country government relationships At the onset of thepositive epoch conditional on exiting earlier the MNC has to decide whether or not to reenterFor both the staystay option and exitreenter option the focal MNC has to decide at the onsetof the positive epoch whether or not to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether to modify the same We also posit that the direction (which levermdashinput output orgovernment relationships) and degree (how much) of change in the local responsiveness strat-egy is conditional on the decision to stayexit at the onset of Epoch 1 and the decision toreenterstay at the onset of Epoch 2

Multinational Enterprises in India 15

603

604

605

606

607

608

609

610

611

612

613

614

615

616

617

618

619

620

621

622

623

624

625

626

627

628

629

630

631

632

633

634

635

636

637

638

639

640

641

642

643

6442

645

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epochs changes could be made on the input side the output side or in

managing government stakeholders

It is also plausible that both the direction and the degree of

change in local responsiveness strategy are endogenous to the decisionof exitingstayingreentering We de1047297ne direction of change as

whether or not the focal MNE focuses on input output or govern-

ment relationships and degree of change as the extent and nature

of change on any of these levers We also argue that the direction

and degree of change MNE depends on the decision to exitstay

reenter As an example in the face of a negative policy epoch followed

by a positive policy epoch an MNE that decides to follow a staystay

strategy might not be able to make drastic changes on the output side

(eg functional focus product mix) for reasons of continuity and may instead focus on investments in the input side (eg human capital

manufacturing plants plantations) However an MNE following an

exitreenter strategy might have fewer concerns regarding continuity

given the passage of time and might be able to make drastic

changes to the output side In that case the MNE might be able to

alter the functional andor product mix in the host country In

addition the need to focus on host country government relationships

especially in a negative epoch might imply a focus on input since it is

related to the creation of local jobs a key lever to engage with govern-ment stakeholders

We now outline four detailed qualitative case studies of these multi-

national 1047297rms to indicate differences in how they reacted to the two

policy epochs in India The four case studies arguably represent extremes

in our samplemdash while the Anglo-Dutch Unilever and British BAT fol-

lowed a well-crafted ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multina-

tionals IBM and Coca-Cola successfully executed an ldquoexitreentry rdquo

strategy32

Further we show that Unilever and BAT adapted to the negativepolicy epoch (represented by the FERA regulation and 1970 patent

law) by continuously investing in the input sidemdashmanufacturing plants

and human capital In contrast IBM and Coca-Cola exited India follow-

ing the FERA regulations of the 1970s subsequently returning with dras-

tically different local responsiveness strategies on the output side

represented by different functional and product mixes

32

The use of outliers in the context of India to outline differences in dynamic trajectories issimilar in principle to the analysis used by Jones and Khanna where they compared the differ-ent trajectories taken by Jardines and Swire in face of Communist intervention in China Geof-frey Jones and Tarun Khanna ldquoBringing History (Back) into International Businessrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006) 453ndash68

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 16

646

647

648

649

650

651

652

653

654

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658

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661

662

663

664

665

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667

668

669

670

671

672

673

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675

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679

680

681

682

683

684

685

686

6872

688

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Unilever in India

The Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever originated as separate

British and Dutch 1047297rms making soap and margarine respectively

Lever Brothers the British company began exporting Sunlight soap

bars to India as early as 1888 Over time Lever Brothers brought

other products and brands to India including Lifebuoy in 189533 In

1917 Lever Brothers acquired partial interest in two other British soap

companies one of which had an of 1047297ce and depots in India Declining

sales between 1918 and 1921 further triggered Lever Brothersrsquo interest

in India as a manufacturing center Other factors included the growing

local Indian production of soap spurred by wartime shortages and the

widespread Swadeshi movement in India which advocated self-suf 1047297-

ciency through use of locally made products In the 1920s Lever Broth-

ers bought a site at Sinduria near Calcutta Unilever (the product of the

amalgamation of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie in 1930) continued

to expand in the country after 1929 The Hindustan Vanaspati Manufac-

turing Company was established in 1931 In 1933 a new company called

Lever Bros (India) Ltd was incorporated in Bombay Subsequently

Unilever set up factories to manufacture soap in Calcutta and Bombay

and vegetable ghee just outside Bombay using the brand name Dalda

Another subsidiary United Traders Limited was formed in 193534

These subsidiaries functioned independently until 1956 when they

merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) which sold 10

percent of its equity to the public the share of public equity was

increased to 14 percent in 196535 The country rsquos planned economy at

the time protected local manufacturers and Unilever 1047298ourished The

company under the in1047298uence of the government also recruited Indian

managers naming P L Tandon chairman in 1961mdashthe 1047297rst instance of

an Indian heading a multinational (see Jaithirth Raorsquos contribution to

this special issue) Hindustan Lever Limited evolved into a consumer

goods company with Unilever as its major stakeholder HLL had been

in the beverages industry since 1903 with its brand Red Label tea In

1972 Unileverrsquos acquisition of Lipton Ltd from the British company

Allied Suppliers included a large and very poorly managed Indian tea

packaging and distribution business which could not be integrated

33 Amar Nayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Devel-oping Country (New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 Sushil Vachani Multinationals in India Strategic Product Choices (Columbia Mo 1992) 12ndash31 D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas

The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash

1965 (Stanford 1978) Vanaspati is vegetable ghee andDalda is a brand34Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 835

ldquoHindustan Unilever Limited Factsheetrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinImagesHUL-Factsheet_tcm114-188694pdf Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 17

689

690

691

692

693

694

695

696

697

698

699

700

701

702

703

704

705

706

707

708

709

710

711

712

713

714

715

716

717

718

719

720

721

722

723

724

725

726

727

728

729

7302

731

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with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

734

735

736

737

738

739

740

741

742

743

744

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746

747

748

749

750

751

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753

754

755

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757

758

759

760

761

762

763

764

765

766

767

768

769

770

771

772

7732

774

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1938

FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

800

801

802

803

804

805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

8162

817

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

826

827

828

829

830

831

832

833

834

835

836

837

838

839

840

841

842

843

844

845

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847

848

849

850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

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893

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

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913

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919

920

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926

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940

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9452

946

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2538

Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

1043

1044

1045

1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

1052

1053

1054

1055

1056

1057

1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

1064

1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

1082

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1084

1085

1086

1087

1088

1089

1090

1091

1092

1093

1094

1095

1096

1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2738

of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

1151

1152

1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

1166

1167

1168

1169

1170

1171

1172

1173

1174

1175

1176

1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

1182

1183

1184

1185

1186

1187

1188

1189

1190

1191

1192

1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

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1281

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1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

1318

1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

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1549

1550

1551

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15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

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annually in this period most of them with Indian business houses such

as Tata (which had sixty joint ventures with foreign partners by 1958)

Mahindra and Bangur The years from 1947 to 1957 also witnessed the

takeover of the British colonial managing agencies by the Indian business houses Encarnation also documents a foreign exchange crisis

that affected India in 1957 that led to a reversal of government policy

toward JVs Government regulators began encouraging Indian 1047297rms to

seek foreign equity and local enterprises that secured foreign tie-ups

also had better chances of securing the licenses needed for expansion

Encarnation indicates that JVs with foreign multinationals started dra-

matically increasing from 1958 and hit peak levels during 1964

However JVs with foreign multinationals started declining in the late

1960s and as a result stocks of foreign equity invested in the privatesector began to shrink and reached their lowest levels in 1973 the year

government policy 1047298ipped again with the passage of FERA29 Our analy-

sis is an attempt to augment this narrative

The Fortune 50 1047297rms exhibited a preference towards solo entry

before 1970 (62 percent of entries) However between 1971 and 1990

90 percent of the Fortune 50 entries were either a JV or an acquisition

In the 1990s the Fortune 50 1047297rms increased the percentage of solo entry

to 375 percent FTSE 50 1047297rms were more stable with only a single solo

entry between 1971 and 1990 and post-1991 83 percent of entries wereeither a JV or an acquisition in both periods

The Dynamic Trajectories Framework

Our analysis of selected MNEs reveals important distinctions in the

trajectories followed by British or Anglo-Dutch and American multina-

tional 1047297rms over four decades There are differences in whether or not

they exited India in the 1970s and in how they crafted their local respon-

siveness strategies both in the 1970s and the 1990s We now outline anew ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to show that adopting certain

strategic decisions at the onset of different policy epochs leads to path

dependencies resulting in different long-term trajectories for the focal

1047297rm in the host country The dynamic trajectories framework is based

on the premise of two policy epochs in a host country mdashone unwelcoming

of MNEs (ldquonegative epochrdquo) and the other welcoming of MNEs (ldquopositive

epochrdquo) A focal host country could experience a negative epoch followed

by a positive epoch or vice versa

We argue that an MNE manager in the host country must make twosets of decisions at the onset of each policy epoch The 1047297rst decision is

29Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 60

Multinational Enterprises in India 13

517

518

519

520

521

522

523

524

525

526

527

528

529

530

531

532

533

534

535

536

537

538

539

540

541

542

543

544

545

546

547

548

549

550

551

552

553

554

555

556

557

5582

559

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whether or not to be present in the host country during either or both

policy epochs Here we assume that the MNE is present in the host

country prior to the start of the 1047297rst epoch If the negative epoch is fol-

lowed by the positive epoch the manager has to decide whether to exitor stay at the onset of the negative epoch Also conditional on exiting

in the negative epoch the manager also has to decide whether or not

to reenter at the onset of the positive epoch We also assume that con-

ditional on staying at the onset of the negative epoch the manager

decides to stay during the positive epoch An MNE thus must face

three possible choices exitreenter exitdo not reenter or staystay30

However if the positive epoch is followed by the negative epoch the

manager has two possible choices stayexit or staystay We assume

that the MNE stays during the positive epochThe second decision set relates to whether or not the manager of the

MNE in the host country modi1047297es the ldquolocal responsiveness strategy rdquo of

the 1047297rm at the onset of each policy epoch and how the manager crafts

changes in that strategy According to business scholars Christopher Bar-

tlett and Sumantra Ghoshal MNEs have to concurrently manage the fol-

lowing three priorities global ef 1047297ciency national responsiveness and

worldwide learning A key strategy element of this three-dimensional

framework is the importance of each foreign subsidiary in managing

the overall MNE strategy Bartlett and Ghoshal call this strategy element ldquolocal responsivenessrdquo or ldquomultinational 1047298exibility rdquo and de1047297ne

a ldquodifferentiated and specialized rolerdquo for each MNE subsidiary31

We build on this construct of local responsiveness and argue that the

MNE in the host country could craft changes in the local responsiveness

strategy by investing in inputs outputs andor host country government

relationships Investments in inputs relate to physical intellectual

and human capitalmdasheg plants plantations trademarks patents and

talent Crafting changes on the output side could include altering the

functional focus of the 1047297

rm (to focus on distribution sales or manufac-turing) choosing new businesses enter changing the product mix for

each business and modifying the local pricing or distribution strategy

for each product Finally investments in host country government

relationships might involve investments in managing government stake-

holders andor crafting negotiation strategies to navigate host country

policy interventions

Figure 1 outlines the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo perspective for a host

country experiencing a negative policy epoch followed by a positive

30Theoretically a fourth option of stayexit is also possible since later exit might be motiv-ated by activities in another geography

31Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal Managing across Borders The Trans-national Solution vol 2 (Boston 1999) 67

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 14

560

561

562

563

564

565

566

567

568

569

570

571

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573

574

575

576

577

578

579

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581

582

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584

585

586

587

588

589

590

591

592

593

594

595

596

597

598

599

600

6012

602

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policy epoch from the perspective of a multinational that was in the

country already at the onset of the 1047297rst epoch The horizontal lines in

the 1047297gure represent the three possible dynamic trajectories In addition

for options 1 and 3 at the onset of each epoch the MNE has to decide

whether to maintain or modify its local responsiveness strategy If the

MNE decides to maintain its prior local responsiveness strategy the

MNE manager in the host country does not make any signi1047297cant new

investments in the input side makes no changes to the functionalfocus and product mix and makes no changes in managing government

stakeholders Still if the manager of the MNE in the host country mod-

i1047297es the local responsiveness strategy at the onset of either or both policy

F i g 1 - B W

o n l i n e B W

i n p r i n t

Figure 1 Dynamic trajectories framework This graphic is a representation of the ldquodynamictrajectoriesrdquo framework and depicts the evolution of the policy environment in a focal hostcountry that passes through a ldquonegative epochrdquo followed by a ldquopositive epochrdquo with regard topolicy toward multinationals At the onset of the negative epoch a focal MNC has to decide

whether to exit or stay Conditional on deciding to stay the 1047297

rm has to decide whether ornot to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether or not to modify thesame Modi1047297cation of the local responsiveness strategy could be on the input side (manufac-turing plants plantations patents talent) output side (functional focus product mix pricingdistribution etc) or in managing host country government relationships At the onset of thepositive epoch conditional on exiting earlier the MNC has to decide whether or not to reenterFor both the staystay option and exitreenter option the focal MNC has to decide at the onsetof the positive epoch whether or not to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether to modify the same We also posit that the direction (which levermdashinput output orgovernment relationships) and degree (how much) of change in the local responsiveness strat-egy is conditional on the decision to stayexit at the onset of Epoch 1 and the decision toreenterstay at the onset of Epoch 2

Multinational Enterprises in India 15

603

604

605

606

607

608

609

610

611

612

613

614

615

616

617

618

619

620

621

622

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624

625

626

627

628

629

630

631

632

633

634

635

636

637

638

639

640

641

642

643

6442

645

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epochs changes could be made on the input side the output side or in

managing government stakeholders

It is also plausible that both the direction and the degree of

change in local responsiveness strategy are endogenous to the decisionof exitingstayingreentering We de1047297ne direction of change as

whether or not the focal MNE focuses on input output or govern-

ment relationships and degree of change as the extent and nature

of change on any of these levers We also argue that the direction

and degree of change MNE depends on the decision to exitstay

reenter As an example in the face of a negative policy epoch followed

by a positive policy epoch an MNE that decides to follow a staystay

strategy might not be able to make drastic changes on the output side

(eg functional focus product mix) for reasons of continuity and may instead focus on investments in the input side (eg human capital

manufacturing plants plantations) However an MNE following an

exitreenter strategy might have fewer concerns regarding continuity

given the passage of time and might be able to make drastic

changes to the output side In that case the MNE might be able to

alter the functional andor product mix in the host country In

addition the need to focus on host country government relationships

especially in a negative epoch might imply a focus on input since it is

related to the creation of local jobs a key lever to engage with govern-ment stakeholders

We now outline four detailed qualitative case studies of these multi-

national 1047297rms to indicate differences in how they reacted to the two

policy epochs in India The four case studies arguably represent extremes

in our samplemdash while the Anglo-Dutch Unilever and British BAT fol-

lowed a well-crafted ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multina-

tionals IBM and Coca-Cola successfully executed an ldquoexitreentry rdquo

strategy32

Further we show that Unilever and BAT adapted to the negativepolicy epoch (represented by the FERA regulation and 1970 patent

law) by continuously investing in the input sidemdashmanufacturing plants

and human capital In contrast IBM and Coca-Cola exited India follow-

ing the FERA regulations of the 1970s subsequently returning with dras-

tically different local responsiveness strategies on the output side

represented by different functional and product mixes

32

The use of outliers in the context of India to outline differences in dynamic trajectories issimilar in principle to the analysis used by Jones and Khanna where they compared the differ-ent trajectories taken by Jardines and Swire in face of Communist intervention in China Geof-frey Jones and Tarun Khanna ldquoBringing History (Back) into International Businessrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006) 453ndash68

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 16

646

647

648

649

650

651

652

653

654

655

656

657

658

659

660

661

662

663

664

665

666

667

668

669

670

671

672

673

674

675

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678

679

680

681

682

683

684

685

686

6872

688

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Unilever in India

The Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever originated as separate

British and Dutch 1047297rms making soap and margarine respectively

Lever Brothers the British company began exporting Sunlight soap

bars to India as early as 1888 Over time Lever Brothers brought

other products and brands to India including Lifebuoy in 189533 In

1917 Lever Brothers acquired partial interest in two other British soap

companies one of which had an of 1047297ce and depots in India Declining

sales between 1918 and 1921 further triggered Lever Brothersrsquo interest

in India as a manufacturing center Other factors included the growing

local Indian production of soap spurred by wartime shortages and the

widespread Swadeshi movement in India which advocated self-suf 1047297-

ciency through use of locally made products In the 1920s Lever Broth-

ers bought a site at Sinduria near Calcutta Unilever (the product of the

amalgamation of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie in 1930) continued

to expand in the country after 1929 The Hindustan Vanaspati Manufac-

turing Company was established in 1931 In 1933 a new company called

Lever Bros (India) Ltd was incorporated in Bombay Subsequently

Unilever set up factories to manufacture soap in Calcutta and Bombay

and vegetable ghee just outside Bombay using the brand name Dalda

Another subsidiary United Traders Limited was formed in 193534

These subsidiaries functioned independently until 1956 when they

merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) which sold 10

percent of its equity to the public the share of public equity was

increased to 14 percent in 196535 The country rsquos planned economy at

the time protected local manufacturers and Unilever 1047298ourished The

company under the in1047298uence of the government also recruited Indian

managers naming P L Tandon chairman in 1961mdashthe 1047297rst instance of

an Indian heading a multinational (see Jaithirth Raorsquos contribution to

this special issue) Hindustan Lever Limited evolved into a consumer

goods company with Unilever as its major stakeholder HLL had been

in the beverages industry since 1903 with its brand Red Label tea In

1972 Unileverrsquos acquisition of Lipton Ltd from the British company

Allied Suppliers included a large and very poorly managed Indian tea

packaging and distribution business which could not be integrated

33 Amar Nayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Devel-oping Country (New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 Sushil Vachani Multinationals in India Strategic Product Choices (Columbia Mo 1992) 12ndash31 D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas

The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash

1965 (Stanford 1978) Vanaspati is vegetable ghee andDalda is a brand34Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 835

ldquoHindustan Unilever Limited Factsheetrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinImagesHUL-Factsheet_tcm114-188694pdf Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 17

689

690

691

692

693

694

695

696

697

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729

7302

731

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with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

734

735

736

737

738

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740

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742

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744

745

746

747

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749

750

751

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753

754

755

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757

758

759

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763

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765

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767

768

769

770

771

772

7732

774

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1938

FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

800

801

802

803

804

805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

8162

817

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

826

827

828

829

830

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832

833

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835

836

837

838

839

840

841

842

843

844

845

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847

848

849

850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

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890

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892

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896

897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

909

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926

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940

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944

9452

946

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

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951

952

953

954

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956

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971

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978

979

980

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987

9882

989

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

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1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

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1016

1017

1018

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1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

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1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

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Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

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1046

1047

1048

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1051

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1053

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1067

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1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

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1101

1102

1103

1104

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1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

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1139

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1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

1166

1167

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1175

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1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

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1184

1185

1186

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1188

1189

1190

1191

1192

1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

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1216

1217

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1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

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1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

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1295

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1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

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1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

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1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

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1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

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1360

1361

1362

1363

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1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

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1419

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1428

1429

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1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

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1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

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1446

1447

1448

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1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

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1600

1601

1602

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1623

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whether or not to be present in the host country during either or both

policy epochs Here we assume that the MNE is present in the host

country prior to the start of the 1047297rst epoch If the negative epoch is fol-

lowed by the positive epoch the manager has to decide whether to exitor stay at the onset of the negative epoch Also conditional on exiting

in the negative epoch the manager also has to decide whether or not

to reenter at the onset of the positive epoch We also assume that con-

ditional on staying at the onset of the negative epoch the manager

decides to stay during the positive epoch An MNE thus must face

three possible choices exitreenter exitdo not reenter or staystay30

However if the positive epoch is followed by the negative epoch the

manager has two possible choices stayexit or staystay We assume

that the MNE stays during the positive epochThe second decision set relates to whether or not the manager of the

MNE in the host country modi1047297es the ldquolocal responsiveness strategy rdquo of

the 1047297rm at the onset of each policy epoch and how the manager crafts

changes in that strategy According to business scholars Christopher Bar-

tlett and Sumantra Ghoshal MNEs have to concurrently manage the fol-

lowing three priorities global ef 1047297ciency national responsiveness and

worldwide learning A key strategy element of this three-dimensional

framework is the importance of each foreign subsidiary in managing

the overall MNE strategy Bartlett and Ghoshal call this strategy element ldquolocal responsivenessrdquo or ldquomultinational 1047298exibility rdquo and de1047297ne

a ldquodifferentiated and specialized rolerdquo for each MNE subsidiary31

We build on this construct of local responsiveness and argue that the

MNE in the host country could craft changes in the local responsiveness

strategy by investing in inputs outputs andor host country government

relationships Investments in inputs relate to physical intellectual

and human capitalmdasheg plants plantations trademarks patents and

talent Crafting changes on the output side could include altering the

functional focus of the 1047297

rm (to focus on distribution sales or manufac-turing) choosing new businesses enter changing the product mix for

each business and modifying the local pricing or distribution strategy

for each product Finally investments in host country government

relationships might involve investments in managing government stake-

holders andor crafting negotiation strategies to navigate host country

policy interventions

Figure 1 outlines the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo perspective for a host

country experiencing a negative policy epoch followed by a positive

30Theoretically a fourth option of stayexit is also possible since later exit might be motiv-ated by activities in another geography

31Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal Managing across Borders The Trans-national Solution vol 2 (Boston 1999) 67

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 14

560

561

562

563

564

565

566

567

568

569

570

571

572

573

574

575

576

577

578

579

580

581

582

583

584

585

586

587

588

589

590

591

592

593

594

595

596

597

598

599

600

6012

602

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policy epoch from the perspective of a multinational that was in the

country already at the onset of the 1047297rst epoch The horizontal lines in

the 1047297gure represent the three possible dynamic trajectories In addition

for options 1 and 3 at the onset of each epoch the MNE has to decide

whether to maintain or modify its local responsiveness strategy If the

MNE decides to maintain its prior local responsiveness strategy the

MNE manager in the host country does not make any signi1047297cant new

investments in the input side makes no changes to the functionalfocus and product mix and makes no changes in managing government

stakeholders Still if the manager of the MNE in the host country mod-

i1047297es the local responsiveness strategy at the onset of either or both policy

F i g 1 - B W

o n l i n e B W

i n p r i n t

Figure 1 Dynamic trajectories framework This graphic is a representation of the ldquodynamictrajectoriesrdquo framework and depicts the evolution of the policy environment in a focal hostcountry that passes through a ldquonegative epochrdquo followed by a ldquopositive epochrdquo with regard topolicy toward multinationals At the onset of the negative epoch a focal MNC has to decide

whether to exit or stay Conditional on deciding to stay the 1047297

rm has to decide whether ornot to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether or not to modify thesame Modi1047297cation of the local responsiveness strategy could be on the input side (manufac-turing plants plantations patents talent) output side (functional focus product mix pricingdistribution etc) or in managing host country government relationships At the onset of thepositive epoch conditional on exiting earlier the MNC has to decide whether or not to reenterFor both the staystay option and exitreenter option the focal MNC has to decide at the onsetof the positive epoch whether or not to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether to modify the same We also posit that the direction (which levermdashinput output orgovernment relationships) and degree (how much) of change in the local responsiveness strat-egy is conditional on the decision to stayexit at the onset of Epoch 1 and the decision toreenterstay at the onset of Epoch 2

Multinational Enterprises in India 15

603

604

605

606

607

608

609

610

611

612

613

614

615

616

617

618

619

620

621

622

623

624

625

626

627

628

629

630

631

632

633

634

635

636

637

638

639

640

641

642

643

6442

645

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epochs changes could be made on the input side the output side or in

managing government stakeholders

It is also plausible that both the direction and the degree of

change in local responsiveness strategy are endogenous to the decisionof exitingstayingreentering We de1047297ne direction of change as

whether or not the focal MNE focuses on input output or govern-

ment relationships and degree of change as the extent and nature

of change on any of these levers We also argue that the direction

and degree of change MNE depends on the decision to exitstay

reenter As an example in the face of a negative policy epoch followed

by a positive policy epoch an MNE that decides to follow a staystay

strategy might not be able to make drastic changes on the output side

(eg functional focus product mix) for reasons of continuity and may instead focus on investments in the input side (eg human capital

manufacturing plants plantations) However an MNE following an

exitreenter strategy might have fewer concerns regarding continuity

given the passage of time and might be able to make drastic

changes to the output side In that case the MNE might be able to

alter the functional andor product mix in the host country In

addition the need to focus on host country government relationships

especially in a negative epoch might imply a focus on input since it is

related to the creation of local jobs a key lever to engage with govern-ment stakeholders

We now outline four detailed qualitative case studies of these multi-

national 1047297rms to indicate differences in how they reacted to the two

policy epochs in India The four case studies arguably represent extremes

in our samplemdash while the Anglo-Dutch Unilever and British BAT fol-

lowed a well-crafted ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multina-

tionals IBM and Coca-Cola successfully executed an ldquoexitreentry rdquo

strategy32

Further we show that Unilever and BAT adapted to the negativepolicy epoch (represented by the FERA regulation and 1970 patent

law) by continuously investing in the input sidemdashmanufacturing plants

and human capital In contrast IBM and Coca-Cola exited India follow-

ing the FERA regulations of the 1970s subsequently returning with dras-

tically different local responsiveness strategies on the output side

represented by different functional and product mixes

32

The use of outliers in the context of India to outline differences in dynamic trajectories issimilar in principle to the analysis used by Jones and Khanna where they compared the differ-ent trajectories taken by Jardines and Swire in face of Communist intervention in China Geof-frey Jones and Tarun Khanna ldquoBringing History (Back) into International Businessrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006) 453ndash68

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 16

646

647

648

649

650

651

652

653

654

655

656

657

658

659

660

661

662

663

664

665

666

667

668

669

670

671

672

673

674

675

676

677

678

679

680

681

682

683

684

685

686

6872

688

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1738

Unilever in India

The Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever originated as separate

British and Dutch 1047297rms making soap and margarine respectively

Lever Brothers the British company began exporting Sunlight soap

bars to India as early as 1888 Over time Lever Brothers brought

other products and brands to India including Lifebuoy in 189533 In

1917 Lever Brothers acquired partial interest in two other British soap

companies one of which had an of 1047297ce and depots in India Declining

sales between 1918 and 1921 further triggered Lever Brothersrsquo interest

in India as a manufacturing center Other factors included the growing

local Indian production of soap spurred by wartime shortages and the

widespread Swadeshi movement in India which advocated self-suf 1047297-

ciency through use of locally made products In the 1920s Lever Broth-

ers bought a site at Sinduria near Calcutta Unilever (the product of the

amalgamation of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie in 1930) continued

to expand in the country after 1929 The Hindustan Vanaspati Manufac-

turing Company was established in 1931 In 1933 a new company called

Lever Bros (India) Ltd was incorporated in Bombay Subsequently

Unilever set up factories to manufacture soap in Calcutta and Bombay

and vegetable ghee just outside Bombay using the brand name Dalda

Another subsidiary United Traders Limited was formed in 193534

These subsidiaries functioned independently until 1956 when they

merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) which sold 10

percent of its equity to the public the share of public equity was

increased to 14 percent in 196535 The country rsquos planned economy at

the time protected local manufacturers and Unilever 1047298ourished The

company under the in1047298uence of the government also recruited Indian

managers naming P L Tandon chairman in 1961mdashthe 1047297rst instance of

an Indian heading a multinational (see Jaithirth Raorsquos contribution to

this special issue) Hindustan Lever Limited evolved into a consumer

goods company with Unilever as its major stakeholder HLL had been

in the beverages industry since 1903 with its brand Red Label tea In

1972 Unileverrsquos acquisition of Lipton Ltd from the British company

Allied Suppliers included a large and very poorly managed Indian tea

packaging and distribution business which could not be integrated

33 Amar Nayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Devel-oping Country (New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 Sushil Vachani Multinationals in India Strategic Product Choices (Columbia Mo 1992) 12ndash31 D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas

The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash

1965 (Stanford 1978) Vanaspati is vegetable ghee andDalda is a brand34Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 835

ldquoHindustan Unilever Limited Factsheetrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinImagesHUL-Factsheet_tcm114-188694pdf Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 17

689

690

691

692

693

694

695

696

697

698

699

700

701

702

703

704

705

706

707

708

709

710

711

712

713

714

715

716

717

718

719

720

721

722

723

724

725

726

727

728

729

7302

731

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

734

735

736

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738

739

740

741

742

743

744

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746

747

748

749

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754

755

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764

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766

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769

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771

772

7732

774

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1938

FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

800

801

802

803

804

805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

8162

817

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

826

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828

829

830

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832

833

834

835

836

837

838

839

840

841

842

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849

850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

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890

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893

894

895

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897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

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919

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940

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944

9452

946

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2538

Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

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1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

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1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

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1088

1089

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1091

1092

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1095

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1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

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1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

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1167

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1169

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1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

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1186

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1188

1189

1190

1191

1192

1193

1194

1195

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1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

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1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

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1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

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1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

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1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

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1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3438

Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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policy epoch from the perspective of a multinational that was in the

country already at the onset of the 1047297rst epoch The horizontal lines in

the 1047297gure represent the three possible dynamic trajectories In addition

for options 1 and 3 at the onset of each epoch the MNE has to decide

whether to maintain or modify its local responsiveness strategy If the

MNE decides to maintain its prior local responsiveness strategy the

MNE manager in the host country does not make any signi1047297cant new

investments in the input side makes no changes to the functionalfocus and product mix and makes no changes in managing government

stakeholders Still if the manager of the MNE in the host country mod-

i1047297es the local responsiveness strategy at the onset of either or both policy

F i g 1 - B W

o n l i n e B W

i n p r i n t

Figure 1 Dynamic trajectories framework This graphic is a representation of the ldquodynamictrajectoriesrdquo framework and depicts the evolution of the policy environment in a focal hostcountry that passes through a ldquonegative epochrdquo followed by a ldquopositive epochrdquo with regard topolicy toward multinationals At the onset of the negative epoch a focal MNC has to decide

whether to exit or stay Conditional on deciding to stay the 1047297

rm has to decide whether ornot to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether or not to modify thesame Modi1047297cation of the local responsiveness strategy could be on the input side (manufac-turing plants plantations patents talent) output side (functional focus product mix pricingdistribution etc) or in managing host country government relationships At the onset of thepositive epoch conditional on exiting earlier the MNC has to decide whether or not to reenterFor both the staystay option and exitreenter option the focal MNC has to decide at the onsetof the positive epoch whether or not to maintain the prior local responsiveness strategy or whether to modify the same We also posit that the direction (which levermdashinput output orgovernment relationships) and degree (how much) of change in the local responsiveness strat-egy is conditional on the decision to stayexit at the onset of Epoch 1 and the decision toreenterstay at the onset of Epoch 2

Multinational Enterprises in India 15

603

604

605

606

607

608

609

610

611

612

613

614

615

616

617

618

619

620

621

622

623

624

625

626

627

628

629

630

631

632

633

634

635

636

637

638

639

640

641

642

643

6442

645

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epochs changes could be made on the input side the output side or in

managing government stakeholders

It is also plausible that both the direction and the degree of

change in local responsiveness strategy are endogenous to the decisionof exitingstayingreentering We de1047297ne direction of change as

whether or not the focal MNE focuses on input output or govern-

ment relationships and degree of change as the extent and nature

of change on any of these levers We also argue that the direction

and degree of change MNE depends on the decision to exitstay

reenter As an example in the face of a negative policy epoch followed

by a positive policy epoch an MNE that decides to follow a staystay

strategy might not be able to make drastic changes on the output side

(eg functional focus product mix) for reasons of continuity and may instead focus on investments in the input side (eg human capital

manufacturing plants plantations) However an MNE following an

exitreenter strategy might have fewer concerns regarding continuity

given the passage of time and might be able to make drastic

changes to the output side In that case the MNE might be able to

alter the functional andor product mix in the host country In

addition the need to focus on host country government relationships

especially in a negative epoch might imply a focus on input since it is

related to the creation of local jobs a key lever to engage with govern-ment stakeholders

We now outline four detailed qualitative case studies of these multi-

national 1047297rms to indicate differences in how they reacted to the two

policy epochs in India The four case studies arguably represent extremes

in our samplemdash while the Anglo-Dutch Unilever and British BAT fol-

lowed a well-crafted ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multina-

tionals IBM and Coca-Cola successfully executed an ldquoexitreentry rdquo

strategy32

Further we show that Unilever and BAT adapted to the negativepolicy epoch (represented by the FERA regulation and 1970 patent

law) by continuously investing in the input sidemdashmanufacturing plants

and human capital In contrast IBM and Coca-Cola exited India follow-

ing the FERA regulations of the 1970s subsequently returning with dras-

tically different local responsiveness strategies on the output side

represented by different functional and product mixes

32

The use of outliers in the context of India to outline differences in dynamic trajectories issimilar in principle to the analysis used by Jones and Khanna where they compared the differ-ent trajectories taken by Jardines and Swire in face of Communist intervention in China Geof-frey Jones and Tarun Khanna ldquoBringing History (Back) into International Businessrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006) 453ndash68

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 16

646

647

648

649

650

651

652

653

654

655

656

657

658

659

660

661

662

663

664

665

666

667

668

669

670

671

672

673

674

675

676

677

678

679

680

681

682

683

684

685

686

6872

688

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Unilever in India

The Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever originated as separate

British and Dutch 1047297rms making soap and margarine respectively

Lever Brothers the British company began exporting Sunlight soap

bars to India as early as 1888 Over time Lever Brothers brought

other products and brands to India including Lifebuoy in 189533 In

1917 Lever Brothers acquired partial interest in two other British soap

companies one of which had an of 1047297ce and depots in India Declining

sales between 1918 and 1921 further triggered Lever Brothersrsquo interest

in India as a manufacturing center Other factors included the growing

local Indian production of soap spurred by wartime shortages and the

widespread Swadeshi movement in India which advocated self-suf 1047297-

ciency through use of locally made products In the 1920s Lever Broth-

ers bought a site at Sinduria near Calcutta Unilever (the product of the

amalgamation of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie in 1930) continued

to expand in the country after 1929 The Hindustan Vanaspati Manufac-

turing Company was established in 1931 In 1933 a new company called

Lever Bros (India) Ltd was incorporated in Bombay Subsequently

Unilever set up factories to manufacture soap in Calcutta and Bombay

and vegetable ghee just outside Bombay using the brand name Dalda

Another subsidiary United Traders Limited was formed in 193534

These subsidiaries functioned independently until 1956 when they

merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) which sold 10

percent of its equity to the public the share of public equity was

increased to 14 percent in 196535 The country rsquos planned economy at

the time protected local manufacturers and Unilever 1047298ourished The

company under the in1047298uence of the government also recruited Indian

managers naming P L Tandon chairman in 1961mdashthe 1047297rst instance of

an Indian heading a multinational (see Jaithirth Raorsquos contribution to

this special issue) Hindustan Lever Limited evolved into a consumer

goods company with Unilever as its major stakeholder HLL had been

in the beverages industry since 1903 with its brand Red Label tea In

1972 Unileverrsquos acquisition of Lipton Ltd from the British company

Allied Suppliers included a large and very poorly managed Indian tea

packaging and distribution business which could not be integrated

33 Amar Nayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Devel-oping Country (New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 Sushil Vachani Multinationals in India Strategic Product Choices (Columbia Mo 1992) 12ndash31 D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas

The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash

1965 (Stanford 1978) Vanaspati is vegetable ghee andDalda is a brand34Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 835

ldquoHindustan Unilever Limited Factsheetrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinImagesHUL-Factsheet_tcm114-188694pdf Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 17

689

690

691

692

693

694

695

696

697

698

699

700

701

702

703

704

705

706

707

708

709

710

711

712

713

714

715

716

717

718

719

720

721

722

723

724

725

726

727

728

729

7302

731

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with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

734

735

736

737

738

739

740

741

742

743

744

745

746

747

748

749

750

751

752

753

754

755

756

757

758

759

760

761

762

763

764

765

766

767

768

769

770

771

772

7732

774

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1938

FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

800

801

802

803

804

805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

8162

817

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

826

827

828

829

830

831

832

833

834

835

836

837

838

839

840

841

842

843

844

845

846

847

848

849

850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

892

893

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

909

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911

912

913

914

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919

920

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922

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925

926

927

928

929

930

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934

935

936

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938

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940

941

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944

9452

946

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

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951

952

953

954

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956

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970

971

972

973

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977

978

979

980

981

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984

985

986

987

9882

989

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

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1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

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1016

1017

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1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

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1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

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Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

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1046

1047

1048

1049

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1051

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1053

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1067

1068

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1070

1071

1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

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1101

1102

1103

1104

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1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

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1139

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1153

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1155

1156

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1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

1166

1167

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1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

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1184

1185

1186

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1188

1189

1190

1191

1192

1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

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1219

1220

1221

1222

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1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

1318

1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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epochs changes could be made on the input side the output side or in

managing government stakeholders

It is also plausible that both the direction and the degree of

change in local responsiveness strategy are endogenous to the decisionof exitingstayingreentering We de1047297ne direction of change as

whether or not the focal MNE focuses on input output or govern-

ment relationships and degree of change as the extent and nature

of change on any of these levers We also argue that the direction

and degree of change MNE depends on the decision to exitstay

reenter As an example in the face of a negative policy epoch followed

by a positive policy epoch an MNE that decides to follow a staystay

strategy might not be able to make drastic changes on the output side

(eg functional focus product mix) for reasons of continuity and may instead focus on investments in the input side (eg human capital

manufacturing plants plantations) However an MNE following an

exitreenter strategy might have fewer concerns regarding continuity

given the passage of time and might be able to make drastic

changes to the output side In that case the MNE might be able to

alter the functional andor product mix in the host country In

addition the need to focus on host country government relationships

especially in a negative epoch might imply a focus on input since it is

related to the creation of local jobs a key lever to engage with govern-ment stakeholders

We now outline four detailed qualitative case studies of these multi-

national 1047297rms to indicate differences in how they reacted to the two

policy epochs in India The four case studies arguably represent extremes

in our samplemdash while the Anglo-Dutch Unilever and British BAT fol-

lowed a well-crafted ldquostaystay rdquo strategy the two American multina-

tionals IBM and Coca-Cola successfully executed an ldquoexitreentry rdquo

strategy32

Further we show that Unilever and BAT adapted to the negativepolicy epoch (represented by the FERA regulation and 1970 patent

law) by continuously investing in the input sidemdashmanufacturing plants

and human capital In contrast IBM and Coca-Cola exited India follow-

ing the FERA regulations of the 1970s subsequently returning with dras-

tically different local responsiveness strategies on the output side

represented by different functional and product mixes

32

The use of outliers in the context of India to outline differences in dynamic trajectories issimilar in principle to the analysis used by Jones and Khanna where they compared the differ-ent trajectories taken by Jardines and Swire in face of Communist intervention in China Geof-frey Jones and Tarun Khanna ldquoBringing History (Back) into International Businessrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006) 453ndash68

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 16

646

647

648

649

650

651

652

653

654

655

656

657

658

659

660

661

662

663

664

665

666

667

668

669

670

671

672

673

674

675

676

677

678

679

680

681

682

683

684

685

686

6872

688

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1738

Unilever in India

The Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever originated as separate

British and Dutch 1047297rms making soap and margarine respectively

Lever Brothers the British company began exporting Sunlight soap

bars to India as early as 1888 Over time Lever Brothers brought

other products and brands to India including Lifebuoy in 189533 In

1917 Lever Brothers acquired partial interest in two other British soap

companies one of which had an of 1047297ce and depots in India Declining

sales between 1918 and 1921 further triggered Lever Brothersrsquo interest

in India as a manufacturing center Other factors included the growing

local Indian production of soap spurred by wartime shortages and the

widespread Swadeshi movement in India which advocated self-suf 1047297-

ciency through use of locally made products In the 1920s Lever Broth-

ers bought a site at Sinduria near Calcutta Unilever (the product of the

amalgamation of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie in 1930) continued

to expand in the country after 1929 The Hindustan Vanaspati Manufac-

turing Company was established in 1931 In 1933 a new company called

Lever Bros (India) Ltd was incorporated in Bombay Subsequently

Unilever set up factories to manufacture soap in Calcutta and Bombay

and vegetable ghee just outside Bombay using the brand name Dalda

Another subsidiary United Traders Limited was formed in 193534

These subsidiaries functioned independently until 1956 when they

merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) which sold 10

percent of its equity to the public the share of public equity was

increased to 14 percent in 196535 The country rsquos planned economy at

the time protected local manufacturers and Unilever 1047298ourished The

company under the in1047298uence of the government also recruited Indian

managers naming P L Tandon chairman in 1961mdashthe 1047297rst instance of

an Indian heading a multinational (see Jaithirth Raorsquos contribution to

this special issue) Hindustan Lever Limited evolved into a consumer

goods company with Unilever as its major stakeholder HLL had been

in the beverages industry since 1903 with its brand Red Label tea In

1972 Unileverrsquos acquisition of Lipton Ltd from the British company

Allied Suppliers included a large and very poorly managed Indian tea

packaging and distribution business which could not be integrated

33 Amar Nayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Devel-oping Country (New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 Sushil Vachani Multinationals in India Strategic Product Choices (Columbia Mo 1992) 12ndash31 D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas

The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash

1965 (Stanford 1978) Vanaspati is vegetable ghee andDalda is a brand34Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 835

ldquoHindustan Unilever Limited Factsheetrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinImagesHUL-Factsheet_tcm114-188694pdf Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 17

689

690

691

692

693

694

695

696

697

698

699

700

701

702

703

704

705

706

707

708

709

710

711

712

713

714

715

716

717

718

719

720

721

722

723

724

725

726

727

728

729

7302

731

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with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

734

735

736

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738

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740

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769

770

771

772

7732

774

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1938

FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

800

801

802

803

804

805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

8162

817

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2038

company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

826

827

828

829

830

831

832

833

834

835

836

837

838

839

840

841

842

843

844

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847

848

849

850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

892

893

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

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926

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940

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944

9452

946

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2538

Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

1043

1044

1045

1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

1052

1053

1054

1055

1056

1057

1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

1064

1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2638

market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

1082

1083

1084

1085

1086

1087

1088

1089

1090

1091

1092

1093

1094

1095

1096

1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2738

of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

1151

1152

1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

1166

1167

1168

1169

1170

1171

1172

1173

1174

1175

1176

1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

1182

1183

1184

1185

1186

1187

1188

1189

1190

1191

1192

1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

1318

1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1738

Unilever in India

The Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever originated as separate

British and Dutch 1047297rms making soap and margarine respectively

Lever Brothers the British company began exporting Sunlight soap

bars to India as early as 1888 Over time Lever Brothers brought

other products and brands to India including Lifebuoy in 189533 In

1917 Lever Brothers acquired partial interest in two other British soap

companies one of which had an of 1047297ce and depots in India Declining

sales between 1918 and 1921 further triggered Lever Brothersrsquo interest

in India as a manufacturing center Other factors included the growing

local Indian production of soap spurred by wartime shortages and the

widespread Swadeshi movement in India which advocated self-suf 1047297-

ciency through use of locally made products In the 1920s Lever Broth-

ers bought a site at Sinduria near Calcutta Unilever (the product of the

amalgamation of Lever Brothers and Margarine Unie in 1930) continued

to expand in the country after 1929 The Hindustan Vanaspati Manufac-

turing Company was established in 1931 In 1933 a new company called

Lever Bros (India) Ltd was incorporated in Bombay Subsequently

Unilever set up factories to manufacture soap in Calcutta and Bombay

and vegetable ghee just outside Bombay using the brand name Dalda

Another subsidiary United Traders Limited was formed in 193534

These subsidiaries functioned independently until 1956 when they

merged to form Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) which sold 10

percent of its equity to the public the share of public equity was

increased to 14 percent in 196535 The country rsquos planned economy at

the time protected local manufacturers and Unilever 1047298ourished The

company under the in1047298uence of the government also recruited Indian

managers naming P L Tandon chairman in 1961mdashthe 1047297rst instance of

an Indian heading a multinational (see Jaithirth Raorsquos contribution to

this special issue) Hindustan Lever Limited evolved into a consumer

goods company with Unilever as its major stakeholder HLL had been

in the beverages industry since 1903 with its brand Red Label tea In

1972 Unileverrsquos acquisition of Lipton Ltd from the British company

Allied Suppliers included a large and very poorly managed Indian tea

packaging and distribution business which could not be integrated

33 Amar Nayak Multinationals in India FDI and Complementation Strategy in a Devel-oping Country (New York 2008) chs 2 4 and 5 Sushil Vachani Multinationals in India Strategic Product Choices (Columbia Mo 1992) 12ndash31 D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas

The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash

1965 (Stanford 1978) Vanaspati is vegetable ghee andDalda is a brand34Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals ch 835

ldquoHindustan Unilever Limited Factsheetrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinImagesHUL-Factsheet_tcm114-188694pdf Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 17

689

690

691

692

693

694

695

696

697

698

699

700

701

702

703

704

705

706

707

708

709

710

711

712

713

714

715

716

717

718

719

720

721

722

723

724

725

726

727

728

729

7302

731

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with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

734

735

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772

7732

774

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1938

FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

800

801

802

803

804

805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

8162

817

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

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858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

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888

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890

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898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

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940

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9452

946

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

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959

960

961

962

963

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970

971

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973

974

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976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2538

Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

1043

1044

1045

1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

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1053

1054

1055

1056

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1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

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1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

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1087

1088

1089

1090

1091

1092

1093

1094

1095

1096

1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

1151

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1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

1166

1167

1168

1169

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1174

1175

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1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

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1183

1184

1185

1186

1187

1188

1189

1190

1191

1192

1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

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1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

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1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

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1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

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1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

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1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3438

Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3538

Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3738

I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3838

PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

Page 18: Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1838

with HLL The Indian business was reconstituted as a separate company

Lipton Tea (India) Limited in 1977 with 60 percent local

shareholding36

When the Indian economy tightened in the 1970s HLL chose to stay in India As Jones documents Unilever disliked the tightening of the

economy and it feared the loss of intellectual property but ldquoUnilever

became a master at delaying tactics using its extensive contacts and

goodwill to modify regulations and generally bargaining with govern-

mentsrdquo37 The 1970 price controls dented the pro1047297tability of HLL By

1971 the vanaspati business was unpro1047297table and HLL decided to with-

draw in 1972 However HLL rsquos synthetic detergents were not regulated

and remained pro1047297table From 1972 to 1974 HLL negotiated with the

government to shelter itself from price controls An agreement wasreached that if large manufacturers released a toilet soap product for

the poor at a controlled price the price control on other soaps would

be lifted Later in 1975 vanaspati came out of the price control regime

and the Dalda brand was reestablished

With FERA came the need for most companies to bring foreign

shareholding down to 40 percent which was unacceptable to Unilever

HLL tried to retain 74 percent the permitted amount for core or technol-

ogy companies After negotiations foreign entities were allowed to hold

ldquo51 percent of the equity provided that 60 percent of its turnover was inthe core or high technology sectors and that it exported 10 percent of its

productionrdquo38

To meet these criteria HLL increased exports especially soaps and

detergents to the Soviet Union Gradually the company began exporting

more until it became Indiarsquos second largest private sector exporter by the

early 1980s HLL also tried to argue that manufacturing its soap with

nonedible oils was a sophisticated technology but the government did

not agree

In 1977 the newly elected government mandated that Unilever godown to the speci1047297ed 40 percent foreign ownership by 1979 With no

way out HLL began delaying and stalling asking to reduce the share-

holding in two stagesmdashthe 1047297rst stage to 51 percent in 1978 which was

implemented With yet another new government taking over in 1980

the second stage was delayed and in 1981 the government permitted

Unilever to maintain majority holding

In Dislodging Multinationals Encarnation describes Unileverrsquos

1047297nancial engineering strategy to overcome the constraints imposed by

36Jones Entrepreneurship and Multinationals 17837 Ibid 16838 Ibid 177

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 18

732

733

734

735

736

737

738

739

740

741

742

743

744

745

746

747

748

749

750

751

752

753

754

755

756

757

758

759

760

761

762

763

764

765

766

767

768

769

770

771

772

7732

774

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1938

FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

800

801

802

803

804

805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

8162

817

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

826

827

828

829

830

831

832

833

834

835

836

837

838

839

840

841

842

843

844

845

846

847

848

849

850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2138

factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

892

893

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

909

910

911

912

913

914

915

916

917

918

919

920

921

922

923

924

925

926

927

928

929

930

931

932

933

934

935

936

937

938

939

940

941

942

943

944

9452

946

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2338

multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2438

by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

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Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

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1043

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1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

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1053

1054

1055

1056

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1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

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1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

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1084

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1087

1088

1089

1090

1091

1092

1093

1094

1095

1096

1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

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1149

1150

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1153

1154

1155

1156

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1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

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1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

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1188

1189

1190

1191

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1193

1194

1195

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1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

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1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

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1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

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1312

1313

1314

1315

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1317

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1320

1321

1322

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1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 1938

FERA To comply with the requirements of ldquomaximum foreign equityrdquoUnilever issued fresh equity to Indian investors and dispersed this

equity sale among many individual shareholders each with a small

holding ldquo

In 1980 for example more than 89000 Indians held 47percent of Hindustan Leverrsquos stock while Unilever held the remaining

block of sharesrdquo39 This ensured that Unilever had unchallenged man-

agerial control over its Indian operations

Around this time HLL also started making signi1047297cant investments

in a key inputmdashmanagerial talent HLL initiated several management

development programs and attracted the best students from the

premier Indian Institutes of Management The company continues to

be an attractive employer today AC Nielsen rated it the best employer

of choice for business school graduates of the class of 2013 Arguablythe 1047297rmrsquos talent management programs have contributed to the

growth of the broader managerial labor market in India Company

alumni have taken more than four hundred CEO positions (including

many within Unilever)40 The company rsquos name changed in June 2007

from Hindustan Lever Limited to Hindustan Unilever Limited (hereafter

HUL for the years following 2007)

To analyze the impact that the 1047297rmrsquos talent development program

had on the broader Indian managerial labor market we collected and

analyzed the attrition patterns of 751 HUL alumni who have since been working in senior management positions in other 1047297rms in India

The highest fraction of HUL alumni were working at other 1047297rms in the

fast-moving consumer goods or FMCG industry (278 percent) HUL

alumni have also moved to telecommunications (178 percent) infor-

mation technology (16 percent) food and beverages (15 percent) phar-

maceuticals (64 percent) management consulting (46 percent)

banking (42 percent) and retail (42 percent)

Through the 1970s and 1980s Unilever modi1047297ed its local respon-

siveness strategy by making signi1047297

cant investments in the input sidemdash

predominantly in talent management programs and manufacturing

capabilities It also successfully negotiated with successive Indian gov-

ernments and modi1047297ed its product mix based on the prevailing policy

environment

Post-1991 the company went on a merger-and-acquisition spree

merging with Tata Oil Mills Company (TOMCO) in 1993 and forming

the equal stake joint venture Lakme Limited with another Tata

39

Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 7140 Vinod Mahanta ldquoLicense to Lead Hindustan Unileverrsquos Incredible Talent GroomingMachineryrdquo Economic Times 20 Apr 2012 available at httparticleseconomictimesindia-timescom2012-04-20news31374112_1_hul-managers-hul-ceo-nitin-paranjpe-leverites Website accessed on 22 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 19

775

776

777

778

779

780

781

782

783

784

785

786

787

788

789

790

791

792

793

794

795

796

797

798

799

800

801

802

803

804

805

806

807

808

809

810

811

812

813

814

815

8162

817

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

826

827

828

829

830

831

832

833

834

835

836

837

838

839

840

841

842

843

844

845

846

847

848

849

850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

892

893

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

909

910

911

912

913

914

915

916

917

918

919

920

921

922

923

924

925

926

927

928

929

930

931

932

933

934

935

936

937

938

939

940

941

942

943

944

9452

946

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

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Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

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1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

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1053

1054

1055

1056

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1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

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1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

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1084

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1087

1088

1089

1090

1091

1092

1093

1094

1095

1096

1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

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1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

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1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

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1186

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1188

1189

1190

1191

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1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

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1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

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1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

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1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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company Lakme Unilever Limited in 1996 In 1998 Lakme Limited

sold its brands and divested its 50 percent stake to HLL HLL also

expanded geographically and set up a subsidiary in Nepal Unilever

Nepal Limited (UNL) In early 2000 the government awarded 74percent equity in Modern Foods to HLL mdashan instance of the government

divesting its equity in state-owned entities In 2002 HLL acquired the

governmentrsquos remaining stake in Modern Foods41

In the second policy epoch the company again modi1047297ed its local

responsiveness strategy by making signi1047297cant investments in inputs by

acquiring manufacturing plants it also made additional investments

on the output side by acquiring brands such as Lakme and Modern

Foods Through both periods the organization has remained focused

on manufacturing marketing and talent management Sales grew from around US$33 million 1991 to around US$793 million in 2000

showing a compound annual growth rate of close to 40 percent42 As

of 2013 HUL sells more than thirty-1047297 ve brands in more than twenty cat-

egories in Indiamdashldquosoaps detergents shampoos skin care toothpastes

deodorants cosmetics tea coffee packaged foods ice cream and

water puri1047297ersrdquo43 It employs more than 16000 employees and has

annual sales of more than US$11 billion HUL still operates as a subsidi-

ary of Unilever which has a 52 percent shareholding44 Arguably HUL is

one of the ldquo

most localrdquo

MNEs operating in India

British American Tobacco (BAT) in India

American Tobacco Company (ATC) formed in the year 1890 from

the merger of several tobacco 1047297rms Looking to expand its geographies

ATC moved out of the US to countries like India and China only to run

into competition from British cigarette manufacturers ATC therefore

acquired British 1047297rm Odgen Tobacco Co As a countermeasure the

British players rallied to form the Imperial Tobacco Co Ltd ATC andthe Imperial Tobacco Company entered into a price war Both companies

took a beating to resolve matters they decided to pull out of each otherrsquos

domestic markets in 1902 For entry into foreign markets they collec-

tively formed the British American Tobacco Company (BAT) with ATC

owning a majority stake of 67 percent While initially BAT relied on

41 Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoOur Historyrdquo available at httpwwwhulcoinaboutusourhistory Web site accessed on 22 July 2013

42ldquoNitin Paranjpe of Hindustan Unilever Remaining lsquoRelevant and Contemporary rsquo to

Indian Consumersrdquo

KnowledgeWharton 21 Oct 2010 available at httpknowledge whartonupenneduindiaarticlecfmarticleid=4536 Web site accessed on 26 July 201343Hindustan Unilever Limited ldquoIntroduction to HULrdquo httpwwwhulcoinaboutus

introductiontohul Web site accessed on 22 and 24 July 201344 Ibid

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 20

818

819

820

821

822

823

824

825

826

827

828

829

830

831

832

833

834

835

836

837

838

839

840

841

842

843

844

845

846

847

848

849

850

851

852

853

854

855

856

857

858

8592

860

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

892

893

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

909

910

911

912

913

914

915

916

917

918

919

920

921

922

923

924

925

926

927

928

929

930

931

932

933

934

935

936

937

938

939

940

941

942

943

944

9452

946

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2338

multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

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Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

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1048

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1051

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1054

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1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

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1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

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1088

1089

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1091

1092

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1095

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1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

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1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

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1167

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1169

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1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

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1183

1184

1185

1186

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1188

1189

1190

1191

1192

1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

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1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

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1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

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1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

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1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3438

Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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factories in the US and the UK for supplying cigarettes to foreign

markets the company gradually transitioned to manufacturing the ciga-

rettes locally or in nearby nations for all its export markets45

Prior to the formation of BAT ATC had made its 1047297

rst foray intoIndia marketing its products through an agency called George Atherton

amp Co which was based in Calcutta ATC had previously set up distri-

bution facilities centered outside of Calcutta which were strengthened

after the formation of BAT to cover all of India The volume of imported

cigarettes doubled from 1901 to 1905 The India operations which were

initially a branch of BAT were upgraded to a subsidiary called BAT Co

(India) registered in London in 1905

BATrsquos operations in India transitioned from marketing imported

cigarettes to manufacturing cigarettes locally and to even processingleaf that was locally grown46

The boycott movement in India acted as an impetus for the company

to set up manufacturing operations In 1910 BAT Co registered a wholly

owned subsidiary in Calcutta the Imperial Tobacco Co of India (ITC)

which went on to become the main subsidiary for BAT in India Within

a month ITC had an issued capital of Rs 3 million and had taken over

BAT Corsquos interests not only in India but in Aden and Burma as well

ITC had the selling and distribution rights for all BAT products in

India which BAT Co had previously held The increasing tariffs ontobacco imports acted as the catalyst for BAT to look to procure leaves

locally BAT Co therefore set up the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development

Co (ILTD) in 1912 as a subsidiary That year the company began build-

ing a manufacturing plant in Bangalore to better utilize the southern

tobacco-growing region of Guntur in which ILTD had of 1047297ces ILTD

grew rapidly exporting leaf to Britain in the 1920s Soon the Guntur

headquarters shifted to Chirala with a buying center located close to

the railway station In 1922 a factory for redrying leaves was also estab-

lished there47

Thus BAT had three branches in Indiamdash

the PeninsularTobacco Company looking after the manufacturing ITC as its selling

wing and ILTD responsible for local leaf procurement By 1921 ITCrsquos

issued capital was raised from Rs 3 million to Rs 416 million and

Peninsular and ILTD were brought under the direct control of ITC

Furthermore as the company grew it shifted of 1047297ces to Virginia House

in Calcutta which was modeled after BAT Corsquos Millbank UK

45 Howard Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry BAT

1902ndash

27rdquo

Business History 31 no 1 (1989)46Cox ldquoGrowth and Ownership in the International Tobacco Industry rdquo Howard Cox ldquoTheGlobal Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945rdquo in BAT in India (Oxford 2000) 202ndash37 and Nayak Multinationals in India

47 Cox ldquoThe Global Cigaretterdquo

Multinational Enterprises in India 21

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

892

893

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

9022

903

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

905

906

907

908

909

910

911

912

913

914

915

916

917

918

919

920

921

922

923

924

925

926

927

928

929

930

931

932

933

934

935

936

937

938

939

940

941

942

943

944

9452

946

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2438

by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

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Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

1043

1044

1045

1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

1052

1053

1054

1055

1056

1057

1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

1064

1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

1082

1083

1084

1085

1086

1087

1088

1089

1090

1091

1092

1093

1094

1095

1096

1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2738

of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

1151

1152

1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

1166

1167

1168

1169

1170

1171

1172

1173

1174

1175

1176

1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

1182

1183

1184

1185

1186

1187

1188

1189

1190

1191

1192

1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

1318

1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3838

PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

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1588

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headquarters During this period corporate restructuring resulted in all

branches except ITC reregistering in the Isle of Man UK48

In the 1920s ITC boomed with sales of cigarettes rising from 35

billion to 88 billion per annum A wide sales and marketing network was set up utilizing local along with British salesmen operating out of

1047297 ve depots in India A distribution network was set up in parallel with

supplies shipped out of the depots Indian salesmen understood the

domestic market ITC appealed to sellers by promising to take back

unsold or old stock a bene1047297t that local brands were not offering Over

this ITC also changed credit from unsecured to secured which greatly

bene1047297ted wholesalers

By 1923 ITCrsquos had factories in Monghyr Bangalore and Saharan-

pur The Monghyr factory had its own printing facilities as well Overthe years the company went through multiple restructurings changing

its name to India Tobacco Company Limited in 1970 and then to ITC

Limited in 1974 By 1975 the tobacco leaf business came under ILTD

while all the other businessesmdashincluding the factories printing sales

and marketing hotels and exportsmdash were under ITC Limited At the

time BAT had a 60 percent holding in ITC Limited While ITC

Limited owed its origin to BAT BAT gradually pulled out its own man-

agement personnel who numbered only seven by 1972 This increase

in the percentage of Indians in the management of the company helped the 1047297rm establish deep relationships with stakeholders in the

Indian government and was a driver in the 1047297rmrsquos name change Its

name again changed to ITC Limited in 2001

While other MNEs resented FERA rsquos regulatory requirement for

equity dilution BAT accepted it In fact BAT began diluting its Indian

equity rights starting in 1954 taking it down to 75 percent in 1969 60

percent in 1974 to the required cap of 40 percent in 1976 The dilution

freed up equity for institutional investors and private Indian investors

Amar Nayak discusses most MNEsrsquo attempts to maintain or increasetheir shareholdings in the 1970s in contrast BAT sought local investors

in contrast to MNEs like IBM General Motors and Ford Motors

However there were some management disputes between BAT and

ITC in the 1990s leading to an inquiry into whether ITC violated

FERA which led to arrests of some top executives of ITC The case

was settled in 199749

In the pre-FERA years the government mandated that foreign 1047297rms

generate employment reduce imports through substitutions by local

products increase exports and invest in core industries While some

48 Ibid49Nayak Multinationals in India

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 22

904

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906

907

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

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952

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970

971

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978

979

980

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987

9882

989

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

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1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

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1013

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1016

1017

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1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

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1028

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10312

1032

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Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

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1111

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1117

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

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1139

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1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

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1177

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1179

1180

1181

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1188

1189

1190

1191

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1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

1318

1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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multinationals left India in the 1970s BAT continued to invest in man-

ufacturing and negotiated with key government decision makers ITC

commenced growing and processing tobacco leaves in the country

thus generating large-scale employment in the farm sector Accordingto Encarnation ldquoThe company embarked on this strategy of lsquophased

Indianizationrsquo after it had realized in the late 1960s that the government

was unlikely to grant majority foreign ownership to a subsidiary in an

industry (tobacco) that remained closely tied to agriculture required

little new technology or large capital investments and had miniscule

prospects for exportsrdquo50

To further secure the goodwill of the government ITC invested

heavily in corporate social responsibility initiatives as well In 1990

ITC began to export agricultural commodities in 2000 it commencedits famous e-Choupal initiative The e-Choupal model which supplied

computers with internet access to rural areas helped farmers more effec-

tively participate in the supply chain process

As of 2013 the company is one of the leading FMCG companies in

India and its product portfolio comprises food personal care cigarettes

branded apparel education and stationery products incense sticks

hotels paperboard agribusiness information technology and more51

It has successfully built and acquired leading brands in the FMCG

apparel and hospitality industriesIn summary the 1047297rm responded to the passing of the two policy

epochs by making investments in manufacturing plants and farming

by hiring Indian managers and by investing in government relation-

ships In the second epoch the 1047297rm also made investments in the

output side by creating new brands

Coca-Cola in India

Wilkins documents that in the early 1920s Coca-Colarsquos French bot-

tling plant recorded substantial losses and had to be abandoned This led

Coca-Cola to turn to the policy of licensing bottling plants overseas

rather than direct investment Up until 1977 Coca-Cola employed the

same strategy of licensing bottling plants in India and was the leading

soft drink brand in India 1047298ourishing under the government of Indira

Gandhi Coca-Cola was the 1047297rst multinational soft drink brand in

India having entered in 1956 Prior to that the market was dominated

50Encarnation Dislodging Multinationals 69ndash7051 ITC ldquoHistory and Evolutionrdquo available at httpwwwitcportalcomabout-itcpro1047297le

history-and-evolutionaspx Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 23

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

985

986

987

9882

989

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2438

by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

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Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

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1045

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1048

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1051

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1054

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1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

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1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

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1088

1089

1090

1091

1092

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1095

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1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

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1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

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1167

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1169

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1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

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1183

1184

1185

1186

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1188

1189

1190

1191

1192

1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

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1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

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1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

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1278

1279

1280

1281

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1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

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1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3438

Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

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1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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by domestic brands like Limca In India Coca-Cola was incorporated as a

ldquo branchrdquo of a consumer goods company52

But the passage of FERA and the Indian Patent Act of 1970 had a

negative effect on Coca-Cola FERA required that Coca-Cola convert its branch into an Indian company that would divest 60 percent of its

stake to Indian investors The company was given two years to achieve

this result The patent act imposed another condition on the company

mdashCoca-Cola would have to share its drink rsquos secret formula nicknamed

ldquo7Xrdquo Coca-Cola refused to do this so it exited India in 1977

Coca-Colarsquos departure opened the beverage playing 1047297eld in India

Local companies began to produce their own soft drinks and began

vying for the vacuum that Coca-Cola had left behind The 1047297rst player

was Pure Drinks which launched Campa-Cola and by the end of the1970s Campa-Cola was the only cola soft drink in the Indian market

Following suit Parle a major competitor launched Thums Up in

1980 it remains a popular drink in India today Parle dominated the

Indian soft drink market after Coca-Colarsquos exit with a 70 percent

market share in 1990

Despite the new regulations Pepsi another multinational 1047297rm sub-

sequently tried to enter the Indian market The 1047297rst attempt at entry was

in May 1985 when PepsiCo partnered with the RPG Group to form Agro

Product Export Limited It planned to import the cola concentrate andsell soft drinks under the Pepsi brand while exporting juice concentrate

from the state of Punjab Since the foreign name of Pepsi was to be used

and the cola concentrate was being imported the government rejected

the proposal The second attempt was through promises of investing

$15 million in Punjab for the development of agricultural research

centers and various processing units The investment would create

jobs and improve the agricultural processing business in Punjab Weigh-

ing the bene1047297ts the government agreed in 1988 PepsiCo entered India

as Lehar PepsiCoca-Cola 1047297nally returned to India in 1993 after the economic

reforms of 1991 By then Pepsi dominated the market and Coca-Cola

was at an initial disadvantage Coca-Cola went on to invest $1 billion

in India from 1993 to 200353

52 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise August W Giebelhaus ldquoThe Pausethat Refreshed the World The Evolution of Coca-Colarsquos Global Marketing Strategyrdquo in Adding

Value Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink ed Geoffrey Jones and Nicholas J Morgan(London 1994)53

ldquoCoca-Cola and Pepsi in Indian Marketrdquo CoolAvenuescom 27 May 2010 available athttpwwwcoolavenuescommarketing-zonecoca-cola-and-pepsi-in-indian-marketpage=01 Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 24

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

10312

1032

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Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

1043

1044

1045

1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

1052

1053

1054

1055

1056

1057

1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

1064

1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

1082

1083

1084

1085

1086

1087

1088

1089

1090

1091

1092

1093

1094

1095

1096

1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

1151

1152

1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

1166

1167

1168

1169

1170

1171

1172

1173

1174

1175

1176

1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

1182

1183

1184

1185

1186

1187

1188

1189

1190

1191

1192

1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

1318

1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

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1588

1589

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1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

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1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

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1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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Upon reentry Coca-Cola modi1047297ed its local responsiveness strategy

by making signi1047297cant investments on the output side and by drastically

modifying its product mix The company acquired popular Indian

brands introduced several of its mainstream global brands in Indiaand conducted local RampD to come up with new products to cater to

Indian consumers The passage of time between exit and reentry

allowed Coca-Cola to signi1047297cantly modify its product mix and position

itself as a diversi1047297ed beverage company with both global and Indian

brands

When Coca-Cola returned to India in the 1990s it acquired the local

soft drink brands Limca Thums Up Maaza Citra and Gold Spot from

Parle Agro Coca-Cola then employed different strategies with each of

the brands The company decided to continue to promote Thums UpLimca and Maaza However the orange-1047298avored Gold Spot was in

direct competition with Fanta a product in its existing global product

portfolio and Coca-Cola decided to withdraw Gold Spot from the

market even though it was popular in the Indian market at the time

Coca-Cola Fanta Sprite Burn and Minute Maid are among the

company rsquos popular international brands that have been introduced in

India In some cases the company has employed local responsiveness

in product design and packaging As an example Georgia Gold is not

sold as a canned product in India in contrast to other locations Indiais also one of the few countries where Coca-Cola sells bottled water

under the Kinley brand

Coca-Cola has also conducted local RampD and has created new pro-

ducts for the Indian market Minute Maid Nimbu Fresh 1047297rst launched

in South India in January 2010 is an important product launched for

India The drink was developed exclusively for the Indian consumer

and competes directly with Pepsirsquos Nimbooz Coca-Cola also developed

a nutritional beverage called Vitingo to address the issue of iron

de1047297

ciency and iron de1047297

ciency anemia in India Vitingo is a low-cost bev-erage powder containing iron folic acid vitamin A vitamin C and zinc

In summary upon reentry Coca-Cola has made investments to the

output side (brands) and in order to do so has made investments to

the input side (RampD)

IBM in India

Prime Minister Nehru facilitated IBMrsquos entry into India in 1951 Thecompany had a strong run for nearly two decades before it got into a con-

1047298ict with the government The company enjoyed a market share of

80 percent in India and as IBM had control over which products to

Multinational Enterprises in India 25

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

1043

1044

1045

1046

1047

1048

1049

1050

1051

1052

1053

1054

1055

1056

1057

1058

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

1064

1065

1066

1067

1068

1069

1070

1071

1072

1073

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

1082

1083

1084

1085

1086

1087

1088

1089

1090

1091

1092

1093

1094

1095

1096

1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

1151

1152

1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

1166

1167

1168

1169

1170

1171

1172

1173

1174

1175

1176

1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

1182

1183

1184

1185

1186

1187

1188

1189

1190

1191

1192

1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

1318

1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

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1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

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1600

1601

1602

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1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

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1610

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1613

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market to India the company essentially controlled the development of

the computing industry in the country

IBM would bring old machines to India and refurbish them then

lease them to the government at in1047298

ated rates Vikram Sarabhai whoheaded the government Electronics Committee intervened IBM

defended its practice stating that it was trying to meet the nation rsquos

policy of gradual growth However the Indian government argued that

IBMrsquos prevailing system of lease and maintenance restricted the devel-

opment of engineering and programming skills for end users After the

Indian central government established the Department of Electronics

(DoE) in the 1960s the DoE wanted to control the development of the

computer hardware industry and it initiated a parliamentary investi-

gation into the functioning of IBM Additionally IBM got into FERA-related trouble According to

FERA guidelines given IBMrsquos industry the company had to reduce its

equity ownership to 26 percent which the company did not accept As

it did not comply with FERA IBM was asked to exit India in 1977

According to Anant Negandhi and Aspy Palia ldquototal remittable

pro1047297ts at the time of phasing out its operations in 1977 were approxi-

mately $10 millionrdquo54 The performance of the company in India was

not exceptional and this was partly attributed to assets sold at less

than book value and a high rate of effective taxation (80 to 85 percent)However IBM did not completely sever its ties with India after

departure In 1980 it secured its 1047297rst customer after exitingmdashCMC

which had been set up to maintain IBMrsquos computers in India IBM

sent a proposal to the DoE to set up a software development and training

institute in 1986 while in 1989 it supplied a major system to the Aero-

nautical Development Agency55 IBM had changed its business model

and was doing business as an offshore entity with only a few local

employees

IBM reentered the country in 1992 through a joint venture with theTata Group Both the Tata Group and IBM Corporation enjoyed an equal

stake in the joint venture which was called Tata Information Systems

Ltd In 1997 IBM Global Services was launched as a separate company

that offered a wide spectrum of IT services including software develop-

ment hardware design and networking services56 In parallel the name

54 Anant R Negandhi and Aspy P Palia ldquoThe Changing Multinational Corporation A Nation Statersquos RelationshipmdashThe Case of IBM in Indiardquo Asia-Paci 1047297c Journal of Management 6 no 1 (1988) 15ndash38

55

Dinesh C Sharma ldquo

Rise Fall and Rise of IBM in Indiardquo

Business Today 17 June 2011available at httpbusinesstodayintodayinstoryibm-india-george-fernandes-history-in-india116367html Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

56 IBM ldquoIBM India Milestonesrdquo available at httpwww-07ibmcomincareershistoryhtml Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 26

1075

1076

1077

1078

1079

1080

1081

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1092

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1095

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1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

11162

1117

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of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

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1144

1145

1146

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1153

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1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

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1177

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1190

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1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

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1221

1222

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1225

1226

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1228

1229

1230

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1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

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1239

1240

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1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

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1258

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1260

1261

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1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

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1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

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1306

1307

1308

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1313

1314

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1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

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1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3438

Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 2738

of the joint venture was changed from Tata Information Systems Ltd to

Tata IBM Ltd

While IBMrsquos initial operations were based in Bangalore the

company expanded and set up the IBM India Research Laboratory inNew Delhi In 1999 Tata divested its stake in IBM and following

approval by the government IBM India Limited was launched IBM

India Limited was completely owned by IBM Corporation except for a

1 percent token holding Tata retained The Tata Group also withdrew

from IBM Global Services (in which it had had a 10 percent stake)

IBM India Limited was a combination of IBM Global Services and

Tata IBM Ltd

Tata IBM Ltd was initially responsible for the marketing and

support of IBM products in India while IBM Global Services offeredIT services Estimates are that Tata IBM had $165 million in sales in

1999 and that IBM Global Services had $85 million in sales57 The

details of the transaction were not made public by mutual agreement

between IBM and Tata and the move was in accordance with IBMrsquos

global strategy of operating through wholly owned subsidiaries Since

then the company has been expanding across India with centers in

major cities like Gurgaon Pune and Pondicherry it has also been

expanding its offerings within the broad domain of software services

IBMrsquos recent growth in India has been rapid The company

rsquos Indian workforce outnumbers its employees in the US While IBM had less

than 10000 employees in India in 2002 this sharply increased to

more than 120000 employees in 2011 As of 2010 IBM was the

second-largest private sector employer in India falling short of only

Tata Consultancy Services While the Indian workforce was continuously

expanding the US workforce was shrinking declining from 121000 in

2007 to 105000 in 2009 IBM also made signi1047297cant RampD investments

in India focused on the Indian domestic market By 2012 IBMrsquos

revenue in India was close to $3 billion IBM also had six delivery centers in India In 2009 IBM India spearheaded a research project

with a focus on analytics to help telecom service providers and e-retailers

with customer acquisitions and service The project involved scientists in

the IBM Research Labs in India and Israel who examined customer

trends IBM Research India is the pioneer in the social network analysis

for the company

Local 1047297rms Infosys and TCS pioneered the Indian software delivery

model and it can be argued that IBM was borrowing their model when it

57ldquoTata Pulls Out of IBM Indian Joint Venturerdquo Computer Business Review 03 June 1999

available at httpwwwcbronlinecomnewstata_pulls_out_of_ibm_indian_joint_venture Web site accessed on 26 July 2013

Multinational Enterprises in India 27

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

1134

1135

1136

1137

1138

1139

1140

1141

1142

1143

1144

1145

1146

1147

1148

1149

1150

1151

1152

1153

1154

1155

1156

1157

1158

11592

1160

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

1166

1167

1168

1169

1170

1171

1172

1173

1174

1175

1176

1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

1182

1183

1184

1185

1186

1187

1188

1189

1190

1191

1192

1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

1318

1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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set up its global services in 1997 IBM bought PricewaterhouseCooperrsquos

global consultancy business and paid $308 million for the Indian arm

of the company It also courted twelve of the thirteen individual share-

holders of the consulting practice of PwC India converting them toIBM India employees58

IBM signi1047297cantly modi1047297ed its focus on the output side by changing

both its product mix and functional focus While IBM prior to 1977 was

focused on hardware and government sales post-1991 the 1047297rm made a

drastic change by abandoning its focus on hardware and by establishing

a strong presence in the services and offshore software delivery model

To do this IBM made investments in the input side by acquiring RampD

resources and talent from entities such as PwC

Conclusion

Over the past several decades a rich literature has emerged on mul-

tinational 1047297rms and their relationships with host countries On the one

hand scholars such as Raymond Vernon and Richard Caves describe a

con1047298ict-prone relationship between the host country and the MNE On

the other hand Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller depict

cooperation and dependency between the host country and the multina-

tional 1047297rm Christopher A Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal outline theor-etical approaches as to how MNEs should balance between the twin

priorities of global integration and local responsiveness in the countries

to which they expand In the context of India Encarnation offers a causal

model and empirical evidence of how MNEs were dislodged by the state

and local 1047297rms59

In this article we develop the ldquodynamic trajectoriesrdquo framework to

describe how MNE strategy evolves over time to different policy

epochs in a focal host country For a host country transitioning from a

negative policy environment toward MNEs to a positive environment(or vice versa) the dynamic trajectories perspective is hinged on at

least two sets of salient and inter-related decisions that MNEs have to

make at the onset of each policy epoch 1) whether to stay exit or

58Prasenjit Bhattacharya and Sanjeev Sharma ldquoIBM Paid $31mn for PwC Indiardquo Econ-omic Times 26 Mar 2003 available at httparticleseconomictimesindiatimescom2003-03-26news27550412_1_pwc-india-ibm-shares-samuel-palmisano Web site accessed on26 July 2013

59Raymond Vernon ldquoSovereignty at Bay The Multinational Spread of US Enterprisesrdquo

International Executive 13 no 4 (1971) 1ndash

3 Richard E Caves ldquo

Research on InternationalBusiness Problems and Prospectsrdquo Journal of International Business Studies 29 no 1(1998) 5ndash19 Richard J Barnet and Ronald E Muumlller Global Reach The Power of the Multi-national Corporations (New York 1974) Bartlett and Ghoshal Managing across BordersEncarnation Dislodging Multinationals

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 28

1161

1162

1163

1164

1165

1166

1167

1168

1169

1170

1171

1172

1173

1174

1175

1176

1177

1178

1179

1180

1181

1182

1183

1184

1185

1186

1187

1188

1189

1190

1191

1192

1193

1194

1195

1196

1197

1198

1199

1200

1201

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

1318

1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3438

Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3538

Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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enter the host country and 2) whether to embrace continuity or change

with regard to a local responsiveness strategy Our model of dynamic tra-

jectories is related to the dynamic capabilities framework in the strategy

literature

60

This framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealthcreation and capture by private enterprise 1047297rms operating in environ-

ments of rapid technological change The dynamic capabilities frame-

work builds on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and

combining) shaped by the 1047297rmrsquos asset positions and the evolution

path(s) it has adopted or inherited The strategy authors also state that

the importance of path dependencies is ampli1047297ed where conditions of

increasing returns exist However this framework does not explicitly

study the evolution of MNE strategy in host countries over time

We collected unique primary data of entryexit by Fortune 50 andFTSE 50 1047297rms in India and augmented the same using existing historical

narratives of multinationals in India Using this combination of primary

data and existing historical narratives we develop four in-depth case

studies of 1047297rms with stark differences in dynamic trajectories to

outline how Anglo-Dutch and British multinationals differed from

American MNEs in how they reacted to changes in the policy regime

in India61

As India shut down to MNEs in the 1970s and opened up to MNEs in

1991 American MNEs such as IBM and Coca-Cola followed an exitreenter strategy In contrast Unilever and BAT followed a staystay

strategy There were also important differences in how the MNEs

altered their local responsiveness strategy over time As outlined in the

case studies in the face of a negative policy environment Unilever and

BAT made investments in the input side (manufacturing plants

human capital brands) and followed a negotiatebuy time strategy to

deal with hostile policy makers Unilever and BAT also sustained their

functional focus on manufacturing In contrast IBM started with a

sales-only model and a focus on hardware prior to exiting uponreentry though it altered its functional focus and emphasized RampD

and service delivery It also embraced software services instead of

60 David J Teece Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen ldquoDynamic Capabilities and Strategic Man-agementrdquo Strategic Management Journal 18 no 7 (1997) 509ndash33

61 Our focus on contrasting Anglo-DutchBritish and American multinationals in India is inthe spirit of prior work by business historians in the context of India Mira Wilkins provides aninteresting narrative of how British and American multinationals had con1047298icting strategies inIndia in the late 1920s In 1929 American amp Foreign Power acquired a 50 percent stake in the

Tata Hydroelectric Agencies Ltd of Bombay and tried to make an investment in the CalcuttaElectric Supply Corporation ldquoa move that was blocked by British oppositionrdquo Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 134 In 1947 following Indiarsquos independence and fol-lowing pressure from the Indian government ldquo American amp Foreign Power Company relin-quished control of its Indian propertiesrdquo (p 302)

Multinational Enterprises in India 29

1203

1204

1205

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

1211

1212

1213

1214

1215

1216

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

1222

1223

1224

1225

1226

1227

1228

1229

1230

1231

1232

1233

1234

1235

1236

1237

1238

1239

1240

1241

1242

1243

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

1318

1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3538

Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3638

Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3838

PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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hardware as its product mix focus Coca-Cola had concerns about intel-

lectual property theft at the time of exit upon reentry given the new

patent regime it introduced its leading global brands in India and

additionally conducted local RampD and created new local brands tocater to the Indian consumer

Our theoretical model has limitations The model places dispropor-

tionate weight on the two speci1047297c episodes of policy in driving decisions

by multinational 1047297rms in entering a host country and as an example

does not focus on entry decisions at the onset of the negative policy

shock In the case of India between 1981 and 1990 eleven US 1047297rms

entered the Indian economy compared to one 1047297rm from the UK Not

only is this the main point of divergence in the historical patterns of

British (or Anglo-Dutch) and American 1047297

rmsrsquo investment decisions(which otherwise track each other quite closely) but it is also a feature

that the dynamic trajectories framework does not study in detail

In this article we have attempted to provide only a broad outline of

the dynamic trajectories framework much future work is needed to

further develop this perspective For instance it is not clear ex ante

whether exiting or staying (in the face of a negative policy regime) and

entering or not (in the face of a positive policy regime) is optimal for

an MNE facing rapid policy change in a host country For example for

a host country transitioning from a negative to a positive policy environ-ment a staystay strategy could be better in developing host country

relationships and in securing concessions from the host government in

the long run however an exitreentry strategy could help employ

scarce 1047297rm resources on the most pro1047297table opportunities anywhere in

the 1047297rm Future work needs to develop this analysis both from the per-

spective of the MNE shareholder and the perspective of the host

country stakeholder There is opportunity for future research to study

the performance implications of the exitreenter strategy compared to

the staystay strategy from both the view of the internal shareholderand from the view of the host country stakeholder62

Future research also has an opportunity to ldquounpack rdquo the antecedents

of what drives different MNEs to follow these different dynamic trajec-

tories For instance we need to study whether the apparent correlation

between these decisions and the home country nationality of the 1047297rm

is a correlation endogenous to other 1047297rmmanagerial-level variables or

62 We conducted very preliminary analysis using stock prices for Hindustan Unilever in

India This analysis indicates that while both HUL and the parent Unilever outperformedtheir relative stock market indices from 1990 to 2013 HUL disproportionately outperformedthe parent Unilever on that measure from 1993 to 2007 This indicates that the Unilever Indiastrategy of staystay was paying rich dividends for the1047297rm even compared to the performanceof the global parent

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 30

1245

1246

1247

1248

1249

1250

1251

1252

1253

1254

1255

1256

1257

1258

1259

1260

1261

1262

1263

1264

1265

1266

1267

1268

1269

1270

1271

1272

1273

1274

1275

1276

1277

1278

1279

1280

1281

1282

1283

1284

1285

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whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

1318

1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

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countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

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Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

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Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

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httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3638

Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

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I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3838

PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3138

whether there is a deeper causal story related to the home country of the

MNE andor historical ties between the home country and host country

This article makes a contribution to the theoretical literature in

business history and international business by providing a synthesizingframework that takes into account the element of time and how MNE

trajectories in host countries evolve over time The element of time has

been long considered in prior work by business historians describing

the evolution of the multinational 1047297rm In The Maturing of Multina-

tional Enterprise Wilkins describes ldquothree stagesrdquo of multinational

growth in host countries In the 1047297rst stage (ldquoinitial monocentric relation-

shiprdquo) new and distinct foreign units are established or acquired by the

parent company ldquoradiating from the parent companyrdquo In stage two the

foreign units develop their ldquo

own separate historiesrdquo

and take on largerfunctions introducing new products and sometime acquiring other

1047297rms Over time the initial monocentric structure is replaced with a

ldquopolycentric industrial relationship with heterogeneous foreign centers

having varied trading administrative and corporate relationshipsrdquo

with the parent In the third stage foreign subsidiaries of the multina-

tional 1047297rm raise money from where available often have foreign share-

holders recruit managerial talent in various nations and trade among

themselves often ignoring the parent in constructing intersubsidiary

trade deals To quote Wilkins ldquo

the simple polycentric industrial struc-ture is shatteredrdquo and restructuring happens on a ldquo worldwide basis

related to product geographic area a combination of bothrdquo63

Wilkins also writes extensively on how the evolution of the American

multinational 1047297rm has been in1047298uenced by events external to their own

operations (eg the two World Wars the Spanish Civil War the

Korean War the Vietnam War) and by American foreign policy From

the perspective of host countries Wilkins writes ldquonationalism social-

ism and communism have had profound impact on the path taken by

US international businessesrdquo64

These statements implicitly documentthat the ldquopathrdquo charted by multinational 1047297rms in host countries is in1047298u-

enced by events in the host country home country and beyond In this

article we attempt to formalize this path dependency of multinational

1047297rm evolution in the host country by presenting our dynamic trajectories

synthesizing framework

In Multinationals and Global Capitalism Jones states that the mul-

tinational investment in a host country does not always lead to long term

bene1047297ts for the host country To quote Jones ldquosince the nineteenth

century they [multinationals] have transferred resources between

63 Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise 417ndash2164 Ibid 439

Multinational Enterprises in India 31

1287

1288

1289

1290

1291

1292

1293

1294

1295

1296

1297

1298

1299

1300

1301

1302

1303

1304

1305

1306

1307

1308

1309

1310

1311

1312

1313

1314

1315

1316

1317

1318

1319

1320

1321

1322

1323

1324

1325

1326

1327

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3238

countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3338

Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3438

Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3538

Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3638

Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3738

I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3838

PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3238

countries however there have been strict limits to the transforming

power of multinationals the knowledge transfers arising from the

huge FDI in developing countries during the 1047297rst global economy were

limited by the enclavist nature of many investments and by the reluc-tance to train local workforcesrdquo65 In Multinational Enterprises and

the Global Economy economists John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan

provide a four-part framework of multinational investment in a host

country Implicit in this framework is the passage of time In the 1047297rst

phase the MNE engages in exports and foreign sourcing in the

second phase the MNE makes investments in marketing and distri-

bution in the third phase the MNE initiates ldquoforeign production of

intermediate goods and servicesrdquo in the fourth phase the MNE

ldquodeepens

rdquo and

ldquo widens

rdquo this value added network and in the

1047297fth and1047297nal phase this leads to the creation of the ldquointegrated network

multinationalrdquo66

In summary though business historians and international business

scholars have long considered the element of time in the analysis of

MNEs in host countries we provide a synthesizing framework that cap-

tures several of the assumptions that have been more implicit in the lit-

erature Our historical analysis of BritishAnglo-Dutch and American

MNEs in India provides evidence to the existence of different dynamic

trajectories followed by MNEs in response to changes in the hostcountry policy environment and future work will have to explore per-

formance implications of following different trajectories

65 Jones Multinationals and Global Capitalism 28366John H Dunning and Sarianna M Lundan Multinational Enterprises and the Global

Economy 2nd ed (Cheltenham 2008)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 32

1329

1330

1331

1332

1333

1334

1335

1336

1337

1338

1339

1340

1341

1342

1343

1344

1345

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350

1351

1352

1353

1354

1355

1356

1357

1358

1359

1360

1361

1362

1363

1364

1365

1366

1367

1368

1369

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3338

Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3438

Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3538

Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3638

Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3738

I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3838

PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3338

Appendix

Table 1Fortune 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India

before and after Reform

Firm Name Year

Exit or

Entry

Entry

Mode Function

General Motors 1928 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1994 Entry JV

Exxon Mobil 1933 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1994 Entry Sales and

Manufacturing

Ford Motor 1926 Entry Solo Sales Manufacturing

1954 Exit

1995 Entry JV

International Business

Machines

1951 Entry Solo Sales Services

1977 Exit1992 Entry JV Sales Services RampD

General Electric 1930 Entry Solo Sales

DuPont 1994 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Chevron 1937 Entry JV Marketing Sales

Amoco 1965 Entry JV Manufacturing

1985 Exit

Procter amp Gamble 1985 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

United Technologies 1976 Entry Acquisition Sales Manufacturing

RampD

Dow Chemical 1957 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Eastman Kodak 1913 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

1973 Exit

Xerox 1983 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

PepsiCo 1956 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

1961 Exit

1988 Entry JV

ConAgra Foods 1997 Entry JV Sales

Tenneco Automotive 1995 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Nabisco Group

Holdings

1982 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1989 Exit

Continued

Multinational Enterprises in India 33

1371

1372

1373

1374

1375

1376

1377

1378

1379

1380

1381

1382

1383

1384

1385

1386

1387

1388

1389

1390

1391

1392

1393

1394

1395

1396

1397

1398

1399

1400

1401

1402

1403

1404

1405

1406

1407

1408

1409

1410

1411

14122

1413

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3438

Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3538

Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3638

Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3738

I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3838

PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3438

Table 1

Continued

Firm Name Year Exit or Entry

Entry Mode Function

Hewlett-Packard 1989 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Digital Equipment 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Services

3M 1988 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Rockwell Automation 1991 Entry NA Sales Services

Honeywell Intl 1988 Entry JV Manufacturing

Sara Lee 1995 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

Caterpillar 1988 Entry JV Sales

Goodyear Tire amp Rubber 1961 Entry JV Manufacturing

Johnson amp Johnson 1957 Entry NA Manufacturing Sales

Motorola 1989 Entry NA

Alcoa 1998 Entry NA Sales

Bristol-Myers Squibb 1989 Entry Acquisition Manufacturing Sales

1996 Exit

2004 Entry Solo RampD

Coca-Cola 1956 Entry Franchise Manufacturing Sales

1977 Exit

1993 Entry Solo

Mobil 1905 Entry Solo Sales

1974 Exit

1993 Entry Manufacturing Sales

Texaco 1911 Entry Solo Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the Fortune 50 1047297rms Toidentify the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of Fortune 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of theIMF-led reform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The datasources include SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in

India collected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of Indiaand Web searches We also used the following additional sources Laura Bloodgood Competi-tive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India US International Trade Commission1 July 2007 Suseela Yesudian Innovation in India The Future of Offshoring (New York2012) Upendra Kachru Strategic Management Concepts and Cases (New Delhi 2005)Pratap Subramanyam Investment Banking (New Delhi 2007) Mira Wilkins and Frank E Hill American Business Abroad Ford on Six Continents (Detroit 1964) Mira WilkinsInterview with C Thomas Bombay 10 Sept 1953 Mira Wilkins 1047297les Miami Florida sup-plemented by Mira Wilkins The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge Mass1974) We could not1047297nd any entryexit data for the following1047297rms Unisys General DynamicsUnocal Sunoco McDonnell Douglas Atlantic Rich1047297eld Marathon Oil Occidental Petroleum Altria Group Chrysler

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 34

1414

1415

1416

1417

1418

1419

1420

1421

1422

1423

1424

1425

1426

1427

1428

1429

1430

1431

1432

1433

1434

1435

1436

1437

1438

1439

1440

1441

1442

1443

1444

1445

1446

1447

1448

1449

1450

1451

1452

1453

1454

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3538

Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3638

Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3738

I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3838

PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

Page 35: Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3538

Table 2

FTSE 50 Multinational Firmsrsquo Entry into or Exit from India before and after Reform

Firm Name Year Entry or Exit Entry Mode Function

Royal Dutch Shell 1894 Entry Solo Sales

1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

GlaxoSmithKline 1925 Entry Solo Sales

British American

Tobacco

1908 Entry Solo Manufacturing Sales

Willis Corroon 1997 Entry JV Services

Tate amp Lyle 1997 Entry NA

Rio Tinto Group 1930 Entry NA Standard Chartered 1858 Entry Solo Services

BG Group 1995 Entry JV Sales Manufacturing

Services

Inchcape 1847 Entry NA Sales

Barclays 1959 Entry Acquisition Services

1969 Exit

1989 Entry Solo

Lloyds 1923 Entry Acquisition Services

1984 Exit

Unilever 1917 Entry Acquisition Sales

Prudential 1923 Entry Services

1998 Entry JV

BT Group 1995 Entry NA Sales

Rolls-Royce Group 1991 Entry NA Services

BAE Systems 1993 Entry JV Manufacturing Sales

RampD

Reed Elsevier NA Entry Solo Services Sales

NA = Not Available

Notes This table lists details of entry and exit events in India for the FTSE 501047297rms To identify

the 1047297rms in the sample we used the list of FTSE 50 1047297rms as of 1991 the year of the IMF-ledreform To collate this table we used primary data from multiple sources The data sourcesinclude SEC Form 10-K Exhibit 21 for each 1047297rm data on company registration in Indiacollected by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Government of India and Web searches We also used the following additional sources Howard Cox The Global Cigarette Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco 1880ndash1945 (Oxford 2000)202ndash37 Geoffrey Jones British Multinational Banking 1830ndash1990 (Oxford 1993)D K Fieldhouse Unilever Overseas The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895 ndash1965 (StanfordCalif 1978) Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah Barclays The Business of Banking 1690ndash

1996 (Cambridge 2001) J Forbes Munro Maritime Enterprise and Empire Sir William Mackinnon and His Business Network 1823ndash1893 (Woodbridge UK 2003) and JoostJonker and J L van Zanden A History of Royal Dutch Shell Vol 1 From Challenger to

Joint Industry Leader 1890ndash1939 (Oxford 2007) We could not 1047297nd any entryexit datafor the following 1047297rms Eurotunnel Scottish Power Northern Foods Thames Water Power-Gen Wiggins Teape Appleton North West Water Severn Trent British Insulated CallenderrsquosCables (BICC) Lonrho Scottish amp Newcastle Enterprise Oil Williams Holdings RMC GroupLucas Industries Abbey National Lasmo British Steel Hillsdown Holdings British AirwaysRothmans International Argyll Group or BAA (Now Heathrow Airport Holdings)

Multinational Enterprises in India 35

1456

1457

1458

1459

1460

1461

1462

1463

1464

1465

1466

1467

1468

1469

1470

1471

1472

1473

1474

1475

1476

1477

1478

1479

1480

1481

1482

1483

1484

1485

1486

1487

1488

1489

1490

1491

1492

1493

1494

1495

1496

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3638

Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3738

I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3838

PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

Page 36: Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3638

Table 3Comparison of Dynamic Trajectories Unilever BAT IBM

Epoch 1 1970ndash1990

MNE Nationality

Stay

Exit

Enter

Direction of

Change in Local

Responsiveness

Details of Change

in Local

Responsiveness

StayExit

Enter

Ch

R

Unilever Anglo-Dutch Stay Input side Managerial talent

development pro-grams manufactur-

ing capabilities

Stay Inp

s

BAT British Stay Input side Manufacturing capa-

bilities captive

farming planta-

tions brands

Indian managerial

talent

Stay Inp

s

Coca-Cola

American Exit NA NA Re-enter Ous

1 5 1 1

1 5 1 2

1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4

1 5 1 5

1 5 1 6

1 5 1 7

1 5 1 8

1 5 1 9

1 5 2 0

1 5 21

1 5 22

1 5 2 3

1 5 2 4

1 5 2 5

1 5 2 6

1 5 2 7

1 5 2 8

1 5 2 9

1 5 3 0

1 5 31

1 5 32

1 5 3 3

1 5 3 4

1 5 3 5

1 5 3 6

1 5 3 7

1 5 3 8

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3738

I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3838

PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

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8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3738

I B M

A m e r i c a n

E x i t

N A

N A

R e - e n t e r

O u t

p u t a n d i n p u t

s i

d e

D r a s t i c s w i t c h i n f u n c -

t i o n a l f o c u

s f r o m

s e l l i n g h a r

d w a r e t o

R amp D a n d t

h e o f f s h o r e

s o f t w a r e d

e v e l o p m e n t

m o d e l a c q

u i s i t i o n o f

P w C c o n s u l t a n c y

b u s i n e s s a

n d I n d i a n

t a l e n t

Multinational Enterprises in India 37

1540

1541

1542

1543

1544

1545

1546

1547

1548

1549

1550

1551

1552

1553

1554

1555

1556

1557

1558

1559

1560

1561

1562

1563

1564

1565

1566

1567

1568

1569

1570

1571

1572

1573

1574

1575

1576

1577

1578

1579

1580

15812

1582

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3838

PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623

Page 38: Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

8192019 Charting Dynamic Trajectories 2014 f07bc6b5 Cb08 4657 8970 08ea4ba53d1e

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullcharting-dynamic-trajectories-2014-f07bc6b5-cb08-4657-8970-08ea4ba53d1e 3838

PRITHWIRAJ CHOUDHURY is assistant professor at Harvard Business

School His research is focused on innovation in emerging markets especially on the management of human capital within multinational RampD centers He

has also studied innovation by state owned entities in emerging markets and

has an ongoing project on the patenting of herbal medicine by multinational

1047297rms In 2010 he was awarded the Haynes Prize by the Academy of Inter-

national Business and recognized as the most promising scholar under the

age of forty in the 1047297eld of International Business

TARUN KHANNA is Jorge Paulo Lemann Professor at Harvard Business

School and Director of Harvard University rsquos South Asia Institute An expert on

emerging markets he writes extensively in economic strategy and manage-ment journals is an occasional newspaper columnist and was recently

elected a Fellow of the Academy of International Business and a Young

Global Leader by the World Economic Forum He is the author of Billions of

Entrepreneurs How China and India are Reshaping their Futures and

Yours (Harvard Business Press 2008) and coauthor of Winning in Emerging

Markets A Roadmap for Strategy and Execution (Harvard Business Press

2010)

Prithwiraj Choudhury and Tarun Khanna 38

1583

1584

1585

1586

1587

1588

1589

1590

1591

1592

1593

1594

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601

1602

1603

1604

1605

1606

1607

1608

1609

1610

1611

1612

1613

1614

1615

1616

1617

1618

1619

1620

1621

1622

1623