CHEMICAL CORPS: BREAK GLASS IN CASE OF WAR

A MONOGRAPH BY

Major David L. Wilcox Chemical Corps

School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff

College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

First Term AY 97-98

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SC;HOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Maior David L. Wilcox

Title of Monograph: Chemical Corps: Break Glass in Case of War

Approved by:

Monograph Director

F e c t o r , School of Advanced 1-

Military Studies

& J- Director, Graduate Degree

Philip J. ~rookbs, Ph.D. Program

Accepted this 18th Day of December 1997

CHEMICAL CORPS: BREAK GLASS I N CASE O F WAR by Major David L. Wilcox, USA, 40 pages.

The t h r ea t o r use of chemical weapons i s a l i k e l y condition of fu tu re warfare - including the ea r l y s tages of war, t o d i s rup t operat ions and l o g i s t i c s . We a r e l i v ing i n an age i n which po t en t i a l adversaries , who lack t he means t o confront the U.S Army i n a conventional con f l i c t , may reach f o r chemical weapons t o countervai l our technological and operat ional advantages. To meet t h i s challenge, Army forces must be properly t r a ined and equipped t o operate e f f ec t i ve ly and decis ively i n t he face of chemical weapon a t tacks . Brigade performances i n chemical defense operat ions i s t he focus of t h i s monograph. These operations a r e t o defend agains t and, i f used, manage the a f t e r e f f e c t of a chemical a t tack .

I n s p i t e of tremendous l e g i s l a t i v e support given t o chemical readiness throughout the Armed Services i n recent Government Accounting Office and Quadrennial Defense Review repor ts and t h e National Defense Strategy, U S Army Brigades a r e i n su f f i c i en t l y t r a i ned t o operate on a chemically contaminated b a t t l e f i e l d .

Chemical weapons have had a negative impact on Army operat ions s ince t h e i r f i r s t use i n WWI. Today so ld ie r s su f f e r from the same lack of t r a i n ing a s those i n WWI. Brigades en te r i n t o a mission t o t a l l y unprepared f o r what may l i e ahead. Intel l igence-gathering a s s e t s a r e not poised t o include enemy ind ica to r s about chemical weapons. Decontamination operations a r e af ter thought operations and therefore a r e unsuccessful. This leaves t he question, "Could Brigades conduct chemical defense operat ions i f t h e i r l i v e s depended on i t ? " The answer i s no.

Table Contents

I. Introduct ion. ........................................ 1 - 11. H i s t o r i c a l Perspective. ..................................... 4 -

A. Chemical Warfare on t h e Modern B a t t l e f i e l d : WWI. ........... 4

B. Since W W I . ............................................... 11 C. Af te r World War 11. ...................................... 12

D. Desert Shie ld and Desert Storm. .......................... 15 III .Todayrs S t r a t e g i c Importance: Why Train. ................... 17

I V . Chemical Training Scenarios and Unit Performance - a t t h e National Training Center. ........................... 20

V. Conclusion. ................................................ 38 - V I . End Notes. ................................................ 4 1 -

VII.Bibliography ............................................... 46

I. Introduction. - The military legacy for the twentieth century will be the

development of weapons that destroy on a imposing scale. The first

of these, chemical weapons, was significantly employed on the

battlefield for the first time in World War I (1914-18). Invisible

clouds of poisonous gases, released to envelop large numbers of

troops simultaneously, without warning, caused more than a million

casualties. The slow and excruciating action of the poisons, which

absorb through the skin or inhaled through the lungs, horrified

the public because it caused unnecessary suffering of the victims.

Since World War I, chemical weapons have been used

sporadically throughout the century in smaller wars, mainly

against poorly equipped opponents that lacked protective

equipment. New and more toxic varieties, including nerve gases

matured during World War 11, but for reasons unrelated to the

Geneva Protocol they were not employed at that time. And along

with chemical weapons came the development of sophisticated means

of delivering the toxic chemicals, such as bombs, missiles and

special aircraft.

Although the traditional chemical warfare threat posed by the

former Soviet Union has diminished with the USSR's breakup, the

vulnerability that chemical warfare (CW) will be used has

increased. The proliferation of CW agents is well known and

documented. Two major factors behind this explosive rate of spread

for chemical weapons are opportunity and cost. The opportunity to

acquire or develop CW agents has probably never been more

elevated. The technology is well established and the skills needed

are the same as required for commercial pesticide production or

operations requiring fermentation. Equipment for production is

readily available and supplied on the open market. Compared to the

cost for similar capability offered by nuclear or conventional

forces, the price tag for these weapons is quite low.

U.S. Army troops, regardless of rank or branch, must be

prepared to survive on a contaminated battlefield. The threat or

use of chemical weapons is a likely condition of future warfare -

including the early stages of war, to disrupt operations and

logistics. We are living in an age in which potential adversaries,

who lack the means to confront the U.S Army in a conventional

conflict, may reach for chemical weapons to countervail our

technological and operational advantages. To meet this challenge,

Army forces must be properly trained and equipped to operate

effectively and decisively in the face of chemical weapon attacks.

This requires that the Army improve its capabilities to locate and

destroy chemical weapons, preferably before they can be used, and

defend against and manage the consequences of chemical weapons if

they are used. Chemical defense operations are the focus of this

monograph. These operations are to defend against and, if used,

manage the aftereffect of a chemical attack.

The consequences of chemical weapons used on the battlefield

have not been a factor for the U.S. Army since World War I.

However, t h e hypothesis t h a t enemy fo rces could use them has

played a major r o l e i n t h e army's chemical de te r ren t program,

reaching down t o t h e lowest l eve l , t h e indiv idual s o l d i e r . The

US Army can not r e l y upon t h e nuclear and conventional r e t a l i a t i o n

t h r e a t t o prevent t h e use of chemical weapons by an adversary i n

f u t u r e wars. The r e t a l i a t i o n t h r e a t was t h e perceived reason t h a t

I r a q d i d not use chemical weapons i n t h e Persian Gulf War. In t h e

case of Third World r ad ica l s , chemical weapons could be t h e

weapons of choice t o l e v e l t h e playing f i e l d .

I n s p i t e of tremendous l e g i s l a t i v e support given t o chemical

readiness throughout t h e Armed Services i n recent Government

Accounting Off ice and Quadrennial Defense Review repor t s and t h e

National Defense Strategy, US Army Brigades a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t l y

t r a i n e d t o opera te on a chemically .contaminated b a t t l e f i e l d . In

f a c t , chemical defense t r a i n i n g i s not a high p r i o r i t y a t any

l e v e l of command except i n t h e Chemical Corps. Recent Government

Accounting Off ice r epor t s d i d ind ica te t h a t de f i c i enc ies i n

readiness t h a t e x i s t e d p r i o r t o and during t h e Gulf War a r e s t i l l

i n exis tence today. Routinely, u n i t s perform poorly i n a

contaminated environment a t t h e National Training Center, t h e

Army's premier t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t y . A s a r e s u l t , t h e US Army

remains vulnerable t o chemical a t t a c k s and may s u s t a i n s i g n i f i c a n t

chemical warfare l o s s e s on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d of t h e fu tu re .

The purpose of t h i s monograph is t o examine army doc t r ine and

t a c t i c s a s executed i n t r a i n i n g scenarios a t t h e National Training

Center. Using h i s t o r i c a l and f i e l d t r a i n i n g exe rc i se da ta , t h i s

monograph w i l l examine t h e US Army's t a c t i c a l a b i l i t i e s t o

success fu l ly accomplish i t s mission on a contaminated b a t t l e f i e l d .

Quest ions t o be answered: Are t h e NTC scenarios s e t t i n g t h e proper

chemical warfare condi t ions f o r u n i t s t o be successfu l i f faced

with chemical weapons on t h e f u t u r e b a t t l e f i e l d ? A r e u n i t s t r a i n e d

and ready t o operate i n a contaminated environment, and i f not

what a r e t h e t r a i n i n g de f i c i enc ies? Fina l ly , t h i s monograph w i l l

make recommendations t o remedy t r a i n i n g de f i c i enc ies , when

de f i c i enc ies e x i s t .

The p r i n c i p l e s of chemical defense operat ions, s p e c i f i c a l l y ,

contamination avoidance, pro tec t ion , and decontamination w i l l be

t h e c r i t e r i a used t o evalua te un i t s ' t r a i n i n g readiness a t t h e

National Training Center during t a c t i c a l scenarios .

Before answering t h e question: Can U.S. Army Brigades opera te

t a c t i c a l l y on a chemically contaminated b a t t l e f i e l d ? This

monograph w i l l explore t h e need t o have such a capab i l i ty . Using

p a s t h i s t o r i c a l m i l i t a r y uses of chemical weapons and t h e i r

e f fec t iveness on u n i t s t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e need f o r such a

c a p a b i l i t y o r i f indeed t h e need e x i s t .

11. Historical Perspective. -

A. Chemical Warfare on t h e Modern B a t t l e f i e l d : W W I .

H i s t o r i c a l l y , chemical warfare has ex i s t ed and been used on t h e

b a t t l e f i e l d from 4 3 1 B.C through t h e 20th Century. It can be t r a c e d a s

f a r back a s t h e Peloponesian War. For example, t h e Spartans used wood,

s a t u r a t e d with p i t c h and s u l f u r , t o c r e a t e a poisonous and su f foca t ing

4

gas during t h e i r s i eges of Platea and Peliurn. The attempt f a i l e d due t o

unsuitable weather conditions. However, a successful attempt was made

1 f i v e years l a t e r using t h e same procedure. Its most recent uses a r e i n

1988, during the war between I ran and I raq and, possibly, t h e Persian

Gulf War, 1991.~ But, World War I would be t h e f i r s t major c o n f l i c t

involving massive use of chemicals a s a weapon.

The F i r s t World War caused dramatic changes t o land warfare. The

a i rp lane debuted a s an e f f e c t i v e observation and f i g h t i n g a s s e t . Tanks

added speed, mobility, and armored offensive vehic les on t h e ground.

And f o r t h e f i r s t time, on a l a rge sca le , chemical weapons were used,

adding t o t h e already in tens i fy ing "fog of war" on the modern

b a t t l e f i e l d .

During World War I, on the western f ron t , a s talemate developed

between German and A l l i e d Forces; n e i t h e r side was ab le t o break

through t h e other 's f r o n t l i n e forces . A checlanate defense ensued,

s t a t i c t rench warfare character ized t h e Western Front. Mass offensive

s t r a t e g i e s dominated t h e t a c t i c s f o r both sides a t t h e beginning of t h e

war. Neither side envisioned t h e need f o r large-scale i n d u s t r i a l

preparat ion f o r war. The b e l l i g e r e n t s bel ieved t h a t t h e i n i t i a l

s tockpi les of weapons and ammunitions would be enough f o r t h i s b r i e f

war. They d i d not see a lengthened war.

The Germans conducted a series of a t t acks and counterat tacks i n

order t o break the f r o n t l i n e of t h e B r i t i s h and French defenses. Their

attempts f a i l e d . When a stalemate developed, t h e German high command

se ized

Al l ied

the opportunity t o use chlor ine gas along t h e f r o n t l i n e s of t h e

defense. The use of chemicals of fered a means of overcoming t h e

stalemate, c lear ing the trenches and res tor ing German momentum t o t h e

campaign. 3

So on 22 Apri l 1915, near Ypres Belgium, German forces applied

l e t h a l gas i n massive quan t i t i es a s pa r t of t h e i r t a c t i c a l plan.' Along

a five-mile f ront , German forces placed cylinder f i l l e d chlorine tanks. - When the Germans had the r i gh t weather conditions, winds blowing e a s t

C

t o west, they released the gas. The gas a t t ack surprised the French

forces and they were unprepared. Two French divisions, seeing the

unexplained cloud coming toward them, panicked and f led , leaving a

five-mile gap i n t he All ied defense. The Gemans estimated 15,000

casual t ies , including 5,000 deaths. 5

These losses, along with t he shock and panic resu l t ing from the

surpr i se introduction of a new weapon, could have been a serious blow

t o t he ~ l l i e s . ~ The success of t he gas a t t ack was a surpr i se t o t he '

Germans. German commanders looked upon the plan with l i b e r a l consent,

t h e i r plan did not include a reserve t o exploi t the success. Therefore,

All ied forces w e r e able t o reconsolidate and reinforced the gap during

7 the night with a reserve force. However, t he use of poisonous gas had

proved what chemical warfare could do t o unprepared so ld ie rs . This

f i r s t use of poisonous gas by t he Germans t r iggered t he race between

a l l warring powers t o fu r ther develop t h i s new use of chemical warfare.

Their emphasis was t o mature t he use of chemical warfare through t h e i r

t a c t i c a l employment and technological advances.

The All ied forces used t he lessons learned from t h i s gas a t t ack a t

Ypres t o fu r ther t h e i r own t a c t i c a l use of chemical warfare and

defensive measures against t he use of chemicals by the Germans. Within

days of the event i n Ypres, Belgium, the Al l ied forces developed a

crude gas mask t o be used by t h e so ld i e r s f o r protect ion against

chemical vapors. The masks were chemically impregnated gauze pads

which enhanced t he f i l t r a t i o n of poisonous gases. Although e f f ec t i ve

agains t known chemical agents a t t he time, the mask was uncomfortable

t o wear and made so ld i e r t a sks twice as hard t o execute. By the end of

1916, a l l warring powers had chemical weapons and reasonably e f f ec t i ve

gas masks against t h e i r use. 8

When the U.S. entered t h e war i n 1917, it d id so t o t a l l y unprepared

f o r chemical warfare. The information being sen t back by U.S.

observers of t he war was being censored by t he Al l ied commands. The

A l l i e s were i n t e r e s t ed i n ge t t i ng t he U . S . committed t o t h e war and

only allowed information t h a t would enhance t h a t goal t o reach the U.S .

The U.S. War Department had l i t t l e information about chemical warfare.

With l i t t l e information, they d id not se r ious ly view the t h r e a t t h a t

chemical warfare purposed. Therefore, the U.S. had l i t t l e information

a s t o t h e extent chemical weapons were being used on t he b a t t l e f i e l d .

Chemical warfare was not mentioned i n a study about World War I

published by t he U.S. Army War College i n t he sumrner of 1915. An

updated version was published i n t h e f a l l of t he same year, surveying

t he development i n weapons, equipment, and force s t ruc tu r ing , but

again, chemical warfare was not mentioned. Consequently, t h e U.S. Army

entered the war without a doct r ine , protec t ive equipment o r an adequate

t r a i n ing program f o r chemical warfare. And, i n i t i a l l y , U .S . forces

depended on t he Allies f o r t r a i n i n g and equipment. 9

Once committed to the war, the U.S. Army created the Gas Warfare

Service to solve training and equipment issues. As advance elements

for the American Expeditionary Force, Major General John J. Pershing

and his staff saw the importance chemical weapons played on the

European battlefield. They pressed the War Department for immediate

action to establish a force to focus on the challenges of this new

weapon.10 The Gas Warfare Service focused on the development of

tactics, training soldiers, and defensive equipment to countermeasure

the use of chemical weapons by the Germans. At this point in the war,

each Allied force had its own internal agency working chemical weapons

issues.

The use of chemical weapons increased as the war progressed. Both

sides, German and Allied, made a determined exertion to develop new

agents and tactics that would overcome the other's countermeasures.

Chemical weapons consisted of two types, persistent and nonpersistent

Nonpersistent agents would be used minutes before an attack so that it

dissipated prior to their units arrival. Using this technique,

attacking soldiers were able to fight unimpeded by cumbersome

protective masks while forcing the opponent to wear such items.

Persistent agents were used to protect the flank of an advancing unit,

or to deny key terrain to the enemy, or on a specific unit to deny them

freedom of maneuver.

The Germans held the technological advantage and they were the first . to produce mustard gas, a persistent agent, which remained in the area

for days. Mustard gas had a delaying action that caused blistering and

skin irritation, and if left untreated caused death. The gas mask,

alone, provided little protection and so German and Allied forces

developed protective clothing to guard against the effects of mustard

gas.

The Allies would take a year after the first mustard attack in July

1917 by the Germans to duplicate the same agent. The German tactical

employment of mustard gas called for its use while in the defense

against attacking Allied forces. Additionally, common to both sides,

mustard gas attacks were used against logistic elements, artillery

batteries, and repositioning routes of reserve forces.

By 1918, it was apparent to the belligerents that chemical warfare

was an extremely versatile weapon, manageable to almost any situation. 11

The overall use of chemical weapons stressed surprise, to catch the

enemy off guard and unprotected. Chemical weapons provided commandersf

flexibility in their plans. It was apparent that chemical warfare had

three central characteristics: it was extremely versatile weapon,

tractable to almost any tactical situation; the logistic requirements

complicated the battlefield; and its employment demanded unprecedented

refinement of individual and unit training. 12

Earlier in the war, the tactical and delivery methods of chemical

warfare varied to some degree between the Allies and Germans. German

chemical warfare doctrine and direction came primarily from the

scientist who developed the gases. While the Allied doctrine came from

the military. This difference gave Germany a significant lead in

chemical warfare because of their familiarity with the capabilities and

13 characteristics of gas. However, these variations became less

noticeable during the latter stages of the war. The Allies combined

.the e f f o r t s of t h e m i l i t a r y and s c i e n t i f i c communities f o r f u r t h e r

development of chemical warfare. By November 1918, a l l warring powers

were using s imi la r t a c t i c a l employment doct r ine , de l ive ry systems, and

chemical agents. 14

These t a c t i c a l uses of chemical warfare were made poss ib le by t h e

advancement i n a r t i l l e r y de l ive ry systems. Although the French were

t h e f i r s t t o develop a r t i l l e r y de l ivered chemical munitions, t h e

Germans, having t h e technology advantage, were a b l e t o e x p l o i t t h i s new

technology. German L t . Col. George Bruchmuller, considered an a r t i l l e r y

genius because of h i s success on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , developed t a c t i c a l

doct r ine focused on she l l ing high payoff targets.15 A r t i l l e r y b a t t e r i e s

would f i r e l a r g e concentrat ions of chemical gases a t a known o r

suspected enemy loca t ion and, a f t e r a period of t i m e , r e - f i r e t h e same

mission.

I n summary, throughout t h e war, t h e r e was a t a c t i c a l and

technological race between t h e warring powers t o develop t h e use of

chemical weapons. I n World War I, chemical weapons were not decis ive i n

t h e outcome of the war. They, however, were e f f e c t i v e f o r a number of

m i l i t a r y purposes, namely, t e r r a i n denia l , i s o l a t i o n of reserve forces,

and d is rupt ion of l o g i s t i c a l routes .

WWI showed t h a t well-protected s o l d i e r s had l e s s e r casua l ty r a t e s

than those whose protec t ion was poor. Although, well-protected

s o l d i e r s su f fe red c a s u a l t i e s due t o inadequate warning and report ing,

poor t r a i n i n g and d i sc ip l ine . The use of o r f e a r of use, chemical

weapons degraded morale, by enforcing t h e need f o r constant a l e r t n e s s

and the prolonged adoption of p ro tec t ive measures. Thus, chemical

weapons had an important psychological e f f ec t . It created uncer ta in ty

i n the so ld i e r and added t o t he f ea r and s t r e s s of the bat t le f ie ld .16

A s t he war progressed, chemical weapons were used more and more a s

each s i de learned b e t t e r ways t o t a c t i c a l l y employ them and improved

t h e a r t i l l e r y del ivery systems. For the c i v i l i a n decision-makers and

mi l i t a ry leaders , chemical weapons received no less favorable react ion

than any o the r newly introduced weapons of the war.

B. Since W W I .

P r io r t o World War 11, I t a l y used chemical weapons i n t h e i r

war with Ethiopia, and Japan i n t h e i r war with China. The

Ethiopian and Chinese nat ions d id not possess t he necessary

p ro tec t ive equipment t o guard agains t the e f f e c t s of chemical

warfare, nor t he a b i l i t y t o respond i n kind. Subsequently, both

s i de s suffered heavy and unnecessary casua l t i e s . Ethiopia reported

15,000 chemical c ausa l i t i e s , including an inconclusive number of

c i v i l i a n s who were in ten t iona l ly targeted.'' Japan continued t o

use chemical weapons agains t the Chinese achieving minor t a c t i c a l

successes u n t i l 1945.

After t h e wide spread use of chemical warfare i n World War I,

t he r e was concern by a l l nat ions involved i n World War I1 t h a t

h i s t o ry would repeat i t s e l f . World War I1 i s s i gn i f i c an t because

it serves a s an example of a con f l i c t i n which t h e be l l i ge r en t s

were preparing and planning t o use chemical weapons, ye t ref ra ined

from employing them. Although, Germany used poisonous gases

extensively i n t h e i r concentration camps where mi l l ions died. Both

s ide s considered t he concept of employing chemical weapons

important enough t o d ive r t resources [ c i v i l i a n labor, research and

development, manufacture and s torage] .

Most nat ions involved i n WWII had s tockp i les of chemical

weapons. Only Germany had t h e advantage of a new c l a s s of

chemicals ca l l ed nerve agent. The new nerve agent, Sarin, was

discovered by D r . Gerard Schrader i n 1936, and l e d t o t he

development of a more l e t h a l agent, ~abun ." By 1944, Germany

accumulated mass quan t i t i e s of chemical agents and s tockpi led

2,000 tons i n a r t i l l e r y s h e l l s and another 10,000 tons i n bombs. 19

The r e t a l i a t i o n response was t he main reason ne i the r s i d e used

chemical weapons during World War 11. In 1942, President Roosevelt

of the United S ta tes warned t h a t h i s Allies would make ' the

f u l l e s t r e t a l i a t i o n ' i f Japan and Germany fought with the a i d of

gas. *' H i s warning was e f fec t ive .

Germany b u i l t up her s tockpi le of chemical weapons by war's

end, but r es t ra ined from using it f o r f e a r of r e t a l i a t i o n on

German t e r r i t o r y . Additionally, Adolph H i t l e r ' s exposure t o t ox i c

gas during W W I a s a p r iva te may have been a contr ibuting f ac to r t o

Germany's reluctance t o use chemical agents during WWII. For the

same reason, r e t a l i a t i o n , Japan stopped using chemical weapons

agains t t h e Chinese.

C. After World War 11.

Following World War 11, Egypt was t he f i r s t nat ion t o use

chemical weapons. During the c i v i l war i n Yemen, from 1963 u n t i l

1967, Egypt used chemical weapons from the former Soviet Union.

There were at least 40 incidents and the number of casualties was

revealed to be 400 dead and 900 seriously wounded.21 Egypt used

aircraft to drop nerve gas on military targets throughout Yemen.

Although chemical weapons were not totally decisive, Egypt did

gain a tactical advantage by using them.

In Vietnam, the US Army used tear gas in order to drive

22 Vietnamese fighters out of underground tunnels. In addition, the

US Army sprayed a chemical defoliant on the jungles in Vietnam in

order to kill the cover and concealment used by enemy forces.

Agent Orange was the code name for the herbicide developed for the

military, primarily for use in tropical climates. Although the

genesis of the product goes back to the 19401s, serious testing

for military applications did not begin until the early 1960's.

The product was tested in Vietnam in the early 19601s, and brought

into ever widening use during the height of the war (1967-68),

though it's use was diminished and eventually discontinued in

1971. The morality, legality, and medical pathology of the U. S.

use of chemicals in Vietnam remain a matter of continuing debate. 23

The United Nations has documented use of chemical weapons in

24 several Third World countries. In 1975, the National Freedom Army

of Laos and North Vietnamese forces used chemical weapons against

the opposition and villagers who supported them. In Cambodia, the

Vietnamese used chemical weapons against the Khymer Rouge.

Significantly, in both cases, chemical weapons were used not only

against military targets, but also against civilian populations.

The 1980,s have produced the most widespread use of chemical

weapons s ince 1918. The bes t known use of chemical weapons i n t he

l a t e 2oth Century i s the war between I ran and I raq , beginning i n

1980. I r aq was known t o use chemical weapons t o gain t he t a c t i c a l

advantage. I r a q i use of chemical weapons was d i rec ted agains t two

main t a rge t s : I ran ' s army and Kurdish c i v i l i a n s a s punishment f o r

t h e i r support of the Iranians.

Early i n t h e war, I r an had se ized i n i t i a t i v e through a s e r i e s

of offensive operations. I r aq used chemical weapons as a means t o

regain l o s t t e r r i t o r y , pa r t i cu la r ly , when I ran hard pressed

defending forces . I raq ' s use of chemical weapons was responsible

25 f o r around 10,000 I ranian casua l t i e s . Additionally, I r aq used

pe r s i s t en t agent i n the defense and f o r f lank protect ion, while

nonpersis tent agents were used i n t h e a t t ack . However, t h e i r use

d i d not br ing t he end of t he war sooner nor make a s i gn i f i c an t

impact during t h e course of t he con f l i c t .

I r aq demonstrated t h a t chemical weapons have a b a t t l e f i e l d

u t i l i t y , e i t h e r complementing the t a c t i c a l e f f e c t s of conventional

weapons o r forc ing an enemy i n t o a degraded operat ional posture.

Those e f f e c t s were s imi la r t o W W I . Soldiers had t o wear hindering

p ro tec t ive equipment. And, t he I ranians experienced d i f f i c u l t y i n

command and control procedures.

I r aq has encouraged t h e p ro l i f e r a t i on of chemical weapons, a s

well a s o the r weapons of mass des t ruct ion , within t he Middle East

and Far East countr ies . By demonstrating t h a t a na t ion can develop

and deploy these weapons i n defiance of in te rna t iona l disapproval

and with no regard f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. 26 Subsequently, o the r

countr ies w i l l a s sess t h e p o t e n t i a l of chemical warfare f o r t h e i r

own use. Due p a r t l y t o t h e weak i n t e r n a t i o n a l response t o I raq ' s

repeated breaches of t h e Geneva Protocol.

C. Desert Shie ld and Desert Storm.

While t h e I ran / I r a q War is a r a t h e r d u l l memory i n the minds

of many. The invasion of t h e sovereign s t a t e of Kuwait by I r a q i

t roops i n 1990 brought world a t t e n t i o n t o the p o t e n t i a l use of

chemical weapons on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . While U.S. Mil i ta ry doct r ine

requi res t r a i n i n g of t roops i n the a rea of chemical defense,

Desert Shie ld / Storm brought t o l i f e t h e t r u e f e a r behind the

agents involved.

" I raq had developed a s u b s t a n t i a l chemical weapon capab i l i ty

including research f a c i l i t i e s ; s tockp i l e s of chemical weapon

munitions; a v a r i e t y of de l ivery systems; and the doct r ine and

t r a i n i n g t o employ in tegra ted chemical weapons and conventional

f i r e s . "27 Already, I r a q had demonstrated i t s wil l ingness t o use

chemical weapons i n t h e i r war with I ran . Why would t h i s war be any

d i f f e r e n t ?

With t h e threatened use of chemical weapons by t h e Iraq 's , US

forces underwent extensive chemical defense t r a in ing . Chemical

defense t r a i n i n g was conducted a t every echelon, from individual

su rv iva l s k i l l s t o large-scale u n i t sustainment operation^.^^ These

same s k i l l s t h a t required immediate a t t e n t i o n f o r t r a i n i n g t o

ensure every s o l d i e r was a b l e t o perform, a r e t h e same s k i l l s t h a t

were found t o be lacking i n un i t t r a in ing programs before and

a f t e r t he war. Only with the perceived th r ea t of chemical weapons

on the b a t t l e f i e l d d id commanders provide t he necessary resources

and conduct the t r a in ing required. Much of t he t ra in ing w a s

conducted i n Saudi Arabia with troops already within s t r i k i n g

distances of Iraq 's chemical weapons munitions, much l i k e t he

un i t s enter ing WWI.

After the war, published repor ts have contradicted t he

readiness of un i t s and individuals t o operate e f fec t ive ly i n

chemically contaminated environment. One such report s t a t ed t h a t

despi te some def ic iencies t h a t overa l l commanders and troops had

confidence i n the a b i l i t y t o survive chemical weapon attacks and

continue operations.29 While t he other repor t s t a t e d j u s t t he

opposite: shortcomings i n equipment, t r a in ing and medical were

l i k e l y t o r e su l t i n needless casua l t i es and degradation i n war-

f ight ing capab i l i t i e s . 30

For some unknown reason, t he I raq i ' s did not use chemical

weapons during t he Persian Gulf War. Perhaps they d id not use

them because the weather conditions were not r i gh t . O r , I r a q i

commanders f a i l e d t o implement the chemical weapons plan. Maybe,

t he implied t h r ea t of r e t a l i a t i o n by t he United S ta tes was enough

t o discourage t h e i r use. But, c lea r ly , it was within I r aq i ' s

capab i l i ty t o use chemical weapons j u s t a s they a r e within t he

capab i l i t i e s of others.

Could US Army so ld ie rs survived i f chemical weapons were used

during t he war? Perhaps, but t he l o s s of l i v e s and psychological

impact on t h e remaining force would have had a devas ta t ing e f f e c t .

This e f f e c t would have taken an extremely long time t o recover

from and impacted on t h e current operation.31 The " w i l l " of the

American people would t r u l y have been t e s t e d .

m. Today's Strategic Importance: Why Train. - "Strategy i s one of the most important t o o l s of p o l i t i c s , and

even i n peacetime p o l i t i c a l ca lcu la t ions must t o a g r e a t ex tent be

based on t h e m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s of f r i e n d l y and h o s t i l e

na t ions . 32 The na t iona l s e c u r i t y concerns of t h e United S ta te s

have undergone s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n t h e years s ince t h e

d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e Soviet Union. The f a l l of t h e former Soviet

Union t h a t brought t h e end of t h e Cold War e r a and t h e advent of

t h e "New World Order" has a l t e r e d t h e b a t t l e f i e l d ca lculus and

lowered t h e threshold f o r chemical employment.

"Pa r t i cu la r ly ominous is t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s t a t e s now working

t h e hardes t t o develop chemical weapons a re , f o r t h e most p a r t ,

loca ted i n unstable regions of t h e world where b i t t e r and

unresolved r i v a l r i e s have erupted i n t o war i n t h e recent p a s t and

hold t h e prospect of doing s o again. Thus it seems poss ib le t h a t

t h e world w i l l s ee more chemical weapons used i n regional

c o n f l i c t s than i n any o the r time i n h is tory ." 33

A s p a r t of t h e annual repor t ing by t h e Department of Defense

t o Congress, t h e US Army is required t o r epor t on t h e s t a t u s of

nuclear, b io logica l , and chemical t r a in ing . The repor t summarizes

t h e readiness s t a t u s of t h e force and t h e measures being taken t o

provide realistic training in exercises. 34 This report to Congress

is directly linked to our National Security Strategy and the

Military Strategy.

The 1997 National Security Strategy implies that weapons of

mass destruction, including chemical weapons, pose the one of the

greatest threat to global security. 35 And, deterrence, through

nonproliferation initiatives, is one of the ingredients needed to

reduce the threat posed by nations possessing weapons of mass

destruction - chemical weapons. The goal of deterrence is to

maintain peace and stability by convincing potential adversaries

that the cost of aggression, or in this case the use of chemical

weapons, would significantly exceed any possible gain.

Additionally, chemical defense training and readiness are critical

elements of deterrence. That is, Brigades must be trained,

equipped, and demonstrate the ability to survive, fight, and win

in a contaminated environment.

Now that the world is more complex and integrated than at any

pervious time in history, a solid deterrence policy has increasing

importance. "The growing global interdependence means that events

throughout the world impact on the United States with increasing

frequency."36 Currently 24 countries have been confirmed to have,

or are suspected to have, chemical weapons.

The future threat is more complicated now than during the Cold

War era. Adversaries in regional conflicts, and even non-state

players will have limited chemical stockpiles and capabilities. 37

Many of these adversaries possess the required technical expertise

and delivery means necessary to threaten rivals at great

distances.

Implications from a political-military perspective is that,

of those states pursing a chemical weapon and missile programs, a

significant number pose direct threats to stability in vital

regions where the US has long standing security commitments and

the forward presence of its forces.38 These areas include the

Middle East, where countries are known to have used chemical

weapons in this century, and North Korea with its ballistic

missile program.

Many of these states view chemical weapons as combat

multipliers. That chemical weapons are effective deterrent weapons

against regional aggression and also a proven offensive weapon as

Brigadier VK Nair of the Indian Army hints at the use of

chemical weapons as a preferred technique to defeat the US

military.40 This implies that the key for success is the

exploitation at the strategic and operational levels of the

tactical use of chemical weapons.

Chemical weapons, including nuclear and biological weapons,

are no longer seen as a weapon of last resort, but rather a weapon

of choice. They can be used at any time during a conflict for

political and psychological, as well as military, purposes. As

such, US Army Brigades could find themselves confronting an

adversary willing to use chemical weapons to asymmetrically skew

the battlefield.

. A brigade's v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o a chemical a t t a c k c o n s t i t u t e s a

c r i t i c a l disadvantage, exp lo i t a t ion of which would jeopardize t h e

opera t ional and s t r a t e g i c objec t ives of t h e o v e r a l l operat ion.

The use of chemical weapons can demoralize an opponent, inducing

f e a r and anxiety, thereby complicating t h e command and cont ro l

process. Thus permit an adversary t h e opportunity t o achieve

t a c t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c v i c t o r i e s . That i s why brigades must

conduct t h e i r wartime t a s k s with zea l and be a b l e t o do them, i f

necessary, i n a contaminated environment.

IV. Chemical Training Scenarios and Unit Performance - at the National Training Center.

The National Training Center (NTC) i s located approximately 37

miles nor theas t of Barstow, Ca l i fo rn ia i n t h e High Mojave Desert

midway between Las Vegas, Nevada and Los Angeles, Cal i fornia . The

NTC mission i s t o provide tough, r e a l i s t i c combined arms t r a i n i n g

a t t h e Brigade l e v e l using both l i v e f i r e and opposing forces .

The National Training Center has a computer-driven, l i v e - f i r e

complex with soph i s t i ca ted t a rge t ry , a ful l - t ime opposing force, a

s tate-of- the-art instrumentat ion system t h a t monitors t r a i n i n g

b a t t l e s , and a ful l - t ime team of combat t r a i n e r s who observe and

4 1 con t ro l u n i t s during exerc ises . Today, it i s considered t o be

t h e premier t r a i n i n g s i te of t h e U.S. Army: i ts purpose i s t o

take t h e t roops a s c lose t o t h e edge of war a s t h e technology of

s imulat ion and the r i g o r s of t h e environment w i l l allow.

Brigades go to the National training Center (NTC) to train and

execute their wartime tasks in full-scale field exercises. They

have the opportunity to demonstrate their abilities under the most

realistic conditions, short of actual war. All aspects of combat

arms operations are available to the brigades. 'Combined arms

warfare is the simultaneous application of combat, combat support,

and combat service support toward a common goal. "42

Under combined warfare conditions, Brigades have the

opportunity to evaluate their execution of doctrine, tactical

techniques, and procedures, and their Mission Essential Task List.

The higher headquarters of the brigades, in conjunction with

headquarters at the NTC, develop the scenarios. These scenarios

range from force projection operations, operations other than war,

and, offensive and defensive operations executed against an

opposing force. These wide ranges of possible scenarios allow the

brigades to examine their performance conducted during the

operation.

This portion of the monograph will examine the performance of

units using two scenarios in a simulated chemical contaminated

environment. Using the three principles of chemical operations and

doctrine, the monograph will identify shortfalls in planning,

preparation, and execution by units. The principles of chemical

operations are avoidance, protection, and decontamination. 43

Brigades operate at the tactical level of war. They conduct

tactical missions consisting of battles and engagements to

accomplish military objectives as outlined by the next higher

4 4 headquarters. Performance of these t a c t i c a l missions under

chemical warfare conditions a r e poor, it shows a d i r e c t

co r re la t ion t o a un i t ' s i n a b i l i t y t o conduct and sus ta in

operat ions.

Chemical warfare serves severa l purposes - t e r r a i n denia l ,

in tegra ted with obstacles, shape t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , harassment,

a t t r i t i o n , exhaust morale and weaken the opponentfs ef fec t iveness .

The enemy can use any one of these separa te ly o r i n concert with

one another t o achieve t h e des i red e f f e c t s upon an opposing force.

Used aga ins t inadequately protected and untrained so ld ie r s ,

chemical warfare can cause a l a rge number of casua l t i e s , a s t he

experience i n WWI demonstrated.

When chemicals a r e introduced on t he NTC b a t t l e f i e l d , u n i t s

experience degradation i n mission accomplishment or , a l together ,

mission . f a i lu re . The e f f e c t s of chemical weapons cause d is rupt ion

of operat ions through t he individual and un i t performance

degradation caused by donning of p ro tec t ive equipment, adapting

p ro tec t ive measures and added burden t o leader t a sks .

A t t h e NTC, a Brigade conducting a de l ibe ra te a t t ack agains t a

defending enemy encountered the e f f e c t s f i r s t hand. A b a t t a l i o n

t a sk force was moving along an a x i s of advance t o conduct a

breaching operation, a nonpersis tant chemical agent was used on

t h e lead element. Although t he in te l l igence and chemical o f f i c e r s

predic ted nonpersis tent chemical agent a t tacks , ne i the r t he lead

element nor t he brigade took the necessary precautions of

avoidance and protect ion.

Furthermore, t h e Fox vehic les were posi t ioned a t t h e b a t t a l i o n

t a s k force ' s operat ion post . F i r s t introduced t o the U.S. Army i n

t h e Persian Gulf War, the fox vehicle is a s e l f contained NBC

reconnaissance vehic le capable of a wide v a r i e t y of NBC missions,

one of which i s detec t ing chemical agents. Thus, not prepared f o r

t h e nonpersis tent agent, t h e Brigade suffered heavy casua l t i e s ,

impaired synchronization of t h e brigade operation, diminished

a g i l i t y and tempo, and disrupted b a t t l e command.

Understanding what happened and why it happened goes back t o

t h e beginning of t h e scenario. The brigade received t h e mission

from t h e d iv i s ion t o conduct a de l ibe ra te a t t a c k agains t a

defending enemy. Once they understood the mission a s l a i d out i n

t h e order, the m i l i t a r y decision-making process (MDMP) t akes

over. 45

The MDMP i s a s ingle , es tabl i shed, and proven a n a l y t i c a l

process. It i s an adaptat ion of the Army's a n a l y t i c a l approach t o

problem solving and a s s i s t s t h e commander and s t a f f i n developing

est imates and a plan. The MDMP i s a seven-step process requi r ing

c e r t a i n ac t ions by the commander and s t a f f o f f i c e r s . 46 The brigade

conducts the i n i t i a l process a s long a s t i m e w i l l allow, r e f in ing

t h e products a s they go along.

For t h e scenario above, l e t s examine only those ac t ions required t o

predica te and manage t h e enemy's use of nonpersis tent agent a s they

r e l a t e t o the MDMP. Understanding t h e enemy's doct r ine of chemical

warfare i n a defensive posture is c r i t i c a l i n predic t ing when and where

they w i l l use it, t h e t h r e a t . B a t t l e f i e l d success depends l a r g e l y on

the ability of the Brigade to see the battlefield. They must identify

how the enemy is using the ground to minimize the risk of surprise.

The Brigade does this by the intelligence preparation of the

battlefield (IPB). The IPB process achieves success when all available

intelligence-gathering assets are focused to obtain well-chosen and

47 specifically tasked priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). The

commander, intelligence officer (S2) and chemical officer use the

information for development of the IPB.

IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the

threat and environment in a specific geographic area. It is

conducted prior to and during the conunandts initial planning for

an operation. Also, it is conducted during an operation and well

into the next. 48 The entire staff uses the IPB to assist in the

identification and to answer the commanderts priority intelligence

requirements (PIR). IPB begins in the mission analysis phase of

the MDMP and continuous throughout the operation.

Chemical IPB plays a key role in two ways. First, a clear

picture of the threat allows the commander to make informed

decisions about when and where protective measures need to be in

placed. Second, the data is used to develop the chemical

reconnaissance and surveillance plan. The chemical reconnaissance

and surveillance plan is not a separate plan from the S2's plan,

but an integrated part. Avoidance is a key element of the

principles of chemical operations.

The S2 and chemical officer determined the enemy would use

nonpersistent agent at the breach site against lead elements

conducting the breach. This information went into the operations

order and disseminated among the units. No analysis was done to

determine what impact if any, or the actions required by the unit

or individuals, if they encountered nonpersistent chemical agents

at the breach site.

While only the lead elements of the task force entered into

the nonpersistent agent, the loss of momentum for the Brigade

attack was devastating. The brigade operations halted for over 30

minutes in order to determine what actions needed to be taken.

The task force suffered casualties because soldiers were not in

protective clothing. Command and control was momentarily disrupted

because leaders and soldiers had to stop what they were doing and

put on their mask. And, talking through a mask voice miter makes

passing instructions more difficult to understand.

The Brigade violated two principles of chemical operations,

avoidance and protection. Avoidance measures were not discussed

prior to mission execution. The Brigade commander did not give

guidance for chemical defense operations in his guidance prior to

executing the MDMP process. Therefore, a plan was not developed.

Additionally, individuals or units did not employ or enforce

protective measures.

Once the Brigade determined the chemical agent type,

nonpersistent, and assessed the casualties, they continued the

attack. But, momentum and tempo was lost and the Brigade conducted

a piecemeal attack. The massing of combat power at the decisive

point was unachievable and the enemy won the battle.

Applying tactics is "the art and science of employing

available means to win battles and engagements. Tactics is

battlefield problem solving..."49 The Brigade tested its ability to

apply tactics on the battlefield and failed. In this particular

scenario, once the Brigade resolved the requirement about the

enemy's use of chemical weapons. The S2 and chemical officer

deduce a plan to answer the requirement.

The plan encompasses the enemy's possible employment of

chemical weapons and where they are likely to use them. With this,

a template is made of possible chemical target locations and

placed on the S2's enemy situational template A situational

template is a graphic portrayal of the enemy's course of action.

These templated areas become named areas of interest (NAIs).

Simply stated, if something happens in these areas the brigade

commander wants to know about it.

The NAI demands an asset be dedicated to overwatch the area at

the prescribed time the event is expected. An ideal mission for

the Fox vehicle. The Fox vehicle travels alongside the lead

element. Placing the Fox vehicle in the right position to give an

accurate assessment if nonpersistent agent is used.

Planning and preparation is key for implementing avoidance and

protective measures. The brigade S2 and chemical officer

determine where the enemy is most likely to use nonpersistent

chemical agent. Then, concepts for avoidance are considered and

planned. If avoiding the area is not an option, the plan

minimizes the contact units encounter with the area. These

concepts are part of the course of action, fully developed during

the wargaming secession for the brigade.

A course of action assigns responsibilities for actions during

the execution of the operation. It defines who, what, when, where

and why. The how is usually determined by the responsible unit for

that action. Wargaming is an attempt to visualize the flow of a

battle. This process relies on a doctrinal foundation, tactical

judgement, and experience. 50

During this process, the S2 and chemical officer refine their

method of answering where the enemy will use nonpersistent agent.

And how the Brigade will overcome the enemy's efforts to halt the

deliberate attack. The chemical officer is refining the chemical

vulnerability analysis completed earlier in the process. Knowing

that the Fox vehicle must travel with the lead element, placing it

in the position to provide the Brigade with avoidance and

protective measures.

The fox vehicle is able to obtain an instantaneous read of the

chemical agent. Additionally, drivers in the lead element wear

their protective mask. This allows the lead elements sufficient

reaction time for protection measures. Applying this technique

ensures the formation maintains speed and flexibility during

movement. The brigade retains the freedom of maneuver and up-

tempo. These techniques are incorporated in training exercises for

such an event as a reaction to the enemy's use of nonpersistent

agent.

The techniques are discussed and developed during the

wargaming session. The chemical officer provides the expertise

for placing the Fox vehicle with the lead element. The information

is included in the reconnaissance and surveillance plan of the

Brigade. The wearing of mask by the drivers is part of the Mission

Oriented Protective Posture analysis conducted' during mission

analysis.51 This information goes into the order and rehearsed at

the rehearsal.

The plan to overcome the enemy's use of nonpersistent agent is

confirmed during the wargame. The key to success relies on

information dissemination and rehearsals. Rehearsing key combat

actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation

and to translate the tactical plan into a visual impression. 52

These visual impressions give units an orientation of the actions

required to negate the enemy's use of nonpersistent agent.

The necessary steps for contamination avoidance and protection

are completed during the planning and preparation phases of the

operation. Everyone in the Brigade understands the actions

required counteracting the enemy's use of nonpersistent agent

against the lead elements of the task force. Leaders ensure

individuals at the execution level are prepared for the reaction

to nonpersistent agent.

The brigade begins the mission with drivers in mask only

posture. The S2 and chemical officer monitor intelligence reports

of the enemy's activities with regard to the use of chemical

weapons. They use the reconnaissance and surveillance plan

discussed earlier for this type of monitoring.

The lead elements approach enemy obstacles, the breach site.

The enemy uses nonpersistent agent against them. The Fox vehicle

is able to obtain a quick read that the cloud burst is

nonpersistent agent and relays the information. Vehicles are

continuing to move because the drivers are wearing the protective

mask. Soldiers not in mask have the reaction time to do so without

becoming a chemical casualty. The Brigade is now in a position to

continue the operation unimpeded, maintaining momentum and tempo.

The reaction to the use of nonpersistent agent is one of many

complex tasks that a brigade encounters during an operation with

an uncooperative enemy. Overcoming this task begins with a

thorough understanding of the mission, enemy threat and

capabilities, meticulous IPB, and, capabilities and limitations of

organic assets. Applying the necessary doctrinal knowledge,

tactical experience, and judgment to the operation, the Brigade

defeats the enemy's use of nonpersistent agent.

In a similar scenario, another unit experiences the use of

persistent chemical agent by the enemy. The enemy used a

persistent agent along the purposed axis of advance of a battalion

size task force. Although information was available that described

the contaminated area, the battalion task force entered the area

The Brigade lost a complete Task Force of combat power and

logistic elements. The Brigade was unable to continue the mission.

During the Situational Template (SITEMP) development, the S2

templated possible enemy persistent chemical strike locations. These

locations became NAIs that supported the Brigades commander's PIR: He

wanted to know when and where the enemy would use persistent chemicals

to shape the battlefield. The S2 developed a Recon and Surveillance

(R&S) plan to answer the chemical NAIs and the remaining requirements

of the PIRs. The R&S plan did not include the FOX as an observer or

active participant in answering the chemical PIRs. The S2 tasked units

without the knowledge or capability for chemical reconnaissance.

Meanwhile, the chemical officer developed the NBC annex and assigned

missions to the chemical assets. The chemical NAIs, nominated in the

NBC annex, did not match those listed in the S2's R&S plan. An

indication that the chemical officer and S2 had not coordinated nor

deconflicted their predictions. Additionally, the FOX was not given a

clear mission that contained a task and purpose. In other words, the

chemical officer nor chemical company commander developed a plan in

conjunction with the S2's R&S plan to answer the PIR. The annex had the

FOX moving with the trail Task Force and responding to artillery

strikes that might contain chemical agents.

The S2 and chemical officer conducted their planning

separately, no coordination or parallel planning was done to

overwatch the chemical NAIs. Up to the time the first vehicle

entered the contaminated area, the Brigade had the necessary

information to possibly avoid the area. An analysis of the

information was not conducted, allowing the Task Force to blindly

enter the contaminated area. The following information was

avai lable t o t he Brigade s t a f f p r i o r t o t he lead Task Force

enter ing the pe r s i s t en t chemical s t r i k e area:

092204: IEW in te rcep t s MSG / Special Munitions Fired a t NK435090.

100014: Enemy a r t i l l e r y f i r ed , 600 rds a t NK407096 / Q37 de tec t s /

MSG sent t o DS Arty Bn.

100250: Ba t t l e Staf f (night s h i f t ) suggest poss ib le P-Chem s t r i k e

(XO, B I C , and IEWSO).

100337: IEW in te rcep t s message / spec ia l munitions f i r e d

NK445095.

100345: FSO o f f e r s e a r l y 437 in te rcep t / 600 rds a t NK407096

(Ba t t l e s t a f f decides not t o pos t wants t o confirm).

100547: IEW in te rcep t s message / spec ia l munitions f i r e d a t

NK3908.

100700: Spot repor t received / chemical s t r i k e a t NK400097.

100703: F i r s t vehicle en te r s pe r s i s t en t chemical agent (no

react ion by crew).

100705: Task Force commander ask Brigade TOC f o r any

possible chemical agent locat ions: none given.

The r e s u l t s were 78 veh ic le s and 176 personnel

contaminated. 53

Avoidable, maybe, i f t h e chemical o f f i c e r , i n concert with t he

S2, had developed theor ies on the enemy's employment of chemical

weapons. From t h a t , N A I s a r e developed f o r inclusion i n t o t he R&S

plan. The R&S plan is developed t o answer t he Brigade commander's

P I R s . The chemical N A I s a r e pa r t of t h a t plan.

The R&S planning for chemical NAIs require detail plans and can be

broken down into two parts; getting the asset(s) to the observation

post and the actions required by the asset(s) and units if a persistent

chemical agent is found. The chemical officer and S2 decide early in

the R&S planning whom will confirm or deny the NAI.

R&S planning considerations, by the chemical officer, are command

and control, routes to and from the NAI, recon technique, security,

marking procedures, and reporting channel. The technique listed below

is one way to conduct R&S planning - OP selection:

Step 1: You have identified the requirement for an op. This

selection is done during the R&S planning or

identified during wargaming.

Step 2: Conduct terrain analysis for observation point location.

Step 3: Allocate the asset needed based on the mission to be

performed.

Step 4: Select the OP site based on the terrain analysis,

the mission, capabilities and limitations of the

asset.

Step 5: Plan the insertion; routes, control points, hide

positions, etc.

Step 6: Make necessary coordination; clear passage through

friendly forces, deconflict terrain, establish controlled

fire zones around OP site (Force Protection).

Step 7: Support the insertion/operation. Plan and coordinate

indirect fires, IEW support, medical support, extraction,

security, and resupply.

Step 8: Execution.

The second part of this plan is the requirements to mark the area

and provide a bypass route if necessary. This part of the plan is

based on the commanderrs guidance and intent for fighting dirty, the

scheme of maneuver, and the terrain. Included in the chemical officer's

plan are the procedures for doing this and they are understood

throughout the Brigade. Again, rehearsals are key for this to be

successful.

A technique is the use of two military police (MPs) teams to escort

the chemical reconnaissance team. The MPs provide additional security

for the chemical reconnaissance team. Furthermore, they provide traffic

control points (TCPs) as part of the marking procedures to guide units

around the contaminated area. The key to this success was that the FOX

crew immediately found the edges of the contamination and adequately

marked the area. Pickets with VS-17 panels were used in this desert

environment for marking. The current method of marking contaminated

areas is not satisfactory for a desert environment. Furthermore, this

technique was rehearsed and understood at the brigade through company

team level.

The Brigade could have avoided the contaminated area and the

logistical intensive decontamination operation that followed.

Decontamination (decon) is the third element of chemical operations.

Decon is conducted when a unit's avoidance measures fail and the unit

becomes contaminated or the commander plans to fight contaminated if

units become contaminated. There are three levels of decontamination

operations : immediate, operational, and thorough. 54 In this scenario,

.the Brigade performed immediate and thorough decontamination

operations.

The first, immediate decon had minor success. The individual

soldiers who preformed the immediate deconning were able to return

to their units. While, the others became chemically contaminated

casualties. The thorough decontamination operation requirements

overwhelmed the Brigade.

As with the avoidance and protection principles,

decontamination operations are planned as part of the MDMP

process. The Brigade commander issues guidance as part of his

initial guidance before the mission analysis concerning the

requirements for decontamination operations. The Brigade chemical

officer and chemical company commander develop the plan for

covering the Brigade's area of operation. This implies that

decontamination sites are planned throughout depth and width of

the Brigadefs sector, whether for defensive or offensive missions.

The sites are selected.based upon type of mission, templated

strikes, terrain, type of decon operation, road network,

availability of water and decon assets. Typically, a Brigade has

a decon platoon in direct support for a particular mission. The

decon platoon is capable of performing operational and thorough

decontamination operations. Once the sites are chosen, link-up

points are establish to support the sites. Link-up points are

easily recognizable areas where the contaminated unit can report

to the decon platoon leader and receive instructions about the

decon operations. This is critical to prevent the spread of

contamination and ensures the contaminated u n i t occupies t he decon

s i te cor rec t ly .

Limiting t he spread of a pe r s i s t en t agent i s a d i f f i c u l t task.

I f not done correc t ly , it requires a decontamination operation a l l

i t s own. Terrain decon i s a l so time consuming, resource in tens ive

and can cause addi t ional vehicles and personnel t o become

contaminated. Brigade chemical o f f i c e r s , along with the Logist ics

o f f i c e r ( S 4 ) , designate a road network spec i f i c a l l y f o r

contaminated vehicles . This i s included i n t h e decon plan, placed

i n t he order and rehearsed a t a l l l eve l s .

The decon platoon requires addi t ional equipment and personnel

t o a s s i s t i n the decontamination operation. Engineer support

provides a s s e t s f o r digging sumps and drainage trenches t o control

contaminated runoff t o prevent f u r t he r spread of contamination.

Medical personnel render medical treatment t o in jured contaminated

so ld i e r s . Injured contaminated so ld ie r s require decontamination

before medical treatment i s rendered. This procedure is r a r e ly

evaluated a t the NTC. Why, because un i t s a r e not prepared o r

t r a i ned i n t he proper procedures and lack t h e necessary treatment

k i t s . Along with engineer and medical support, addi t ional

l o g i s t i c s a r e required.

A decon operation needs an extensive water resource f o r

resupply. Logist ics un i t s w i l l have t o supply t h a t capab i l i ty i f

a water source i s not located near t he decon locat ion. For

example, i n t he scenario above, the re were 78 vehicles requir ing

decontamination. Assuming a l l t h e vehicles were t rucks, t h e decon

platoon would need 35,100 ga l lons of water t o do a d e t a i l e d

equipment decontamination. 55

I n t h i s scenario, t h e Brigade was not prepared t o conduct t h i s

type of an operat ion. Although decon operat ions were planned. It

d i d not have t h e l e v e l of planning and coordinat ion required t o

perform such an in tens ive decon operat ion a s t h i s . Contaminated

u n i t s , coming from a l l d i r ec t ions , showed up a t t h e a c t u a l decon

s i t e not t h e link-up po in t . Spreading contamination throughout

t h e b a t t l e a rea .

The decon platoon has roughly a 5,000 ga l lon water hauling

capab i l i ty , assuming a water tanker i s a t tached t o t h e platoon f o r

decon missions. With t h i s amount of water, t h e platoon can decon

roughly 12 vehic les before water resupply i s necessary.

Addit ional ly, t h e operat ion ran longer than a n t i c i p a t e d and t h e

decon platoon was not prepared t o conduct decon opera t ions i n t h e

dark. The Brigade had t o h a l t operat ions because of t h e i r lack of

prepara t ion f o r such a resource in tens ive operat ion.

These two scenar ios a r e t r a i n i n g exe rc i ses only. I f they were

a c t u a l events faced by Army Brigades, t h e e f f e c t s would have

devas ta ted t h e u n i t s . The operat ions would have c o s t t h e l i v e s of

s o l d i e r s and t h e l o s s of equipment. The e n t i r e opera t ions would

be i n jeopardy f o r t h e higher headquarters.

Chemical defense operat ions demand t h e same l e v e l of planning,

prepara t ion , and execution a s any o the r operat ion. Chemical

a t t a c k s could a n n i h i l a t e e n t i r e u n i t s o r have a devas ta t ing

psychological e f f e c t t h a t renders s o l d i e r s i n e f f e c t i v e .

The need t o simultaneously guard aga ins t vu lne rab i l i ty of a chemical

a t t a c k and t o conduct a conventional operat ion w i l l impose

contradictory pressures on a brigade commander's a b i l i t y t o plan fu tu re

operat ions. Such dual concerns might prevent quick, dec is ive

engagements i n t h e fu ture . Instead, Brigades may be forced t o f i g h t

more a t the low-intensity warfare l e v e l o r t o engage i n a conventional

b a t t l e of a t t r i t i o n while avoiding presenting t h e enemy with the

opportunity f o r a knockout blow del ivered by t h e i r chemical weapons.

Brigades t r a i n i n g a t t h e NTC a r e cont inual ly challenged t o overcome

t h i s problem, a chemical a t t a c k i n conjunction with an operation. More

times than not , Brigades f a i l t o a n t i c i p a t e t h e chemical a t t a c k and i t s

impact on t h e i r operation. The r e s u l t s a r e devastat ing t o the u n i t s .

The Brigades execute highly and l a r g e l y avoidable t a c t i c a l

r i s k by f a i l i n g t o mount i n t e l l i g e n c e operat ions commensurate with

t h e scope and tempo of t h e i r maneuver forces. Violat ing the f i r s t

p r i n c i p l e of chemical defense operat ions, avoidance. The Brigade

S2 and Chemical Off icer f a i l t o develop a thorough co l l ec t ion plan

t h a t includes a l l the a s s e t s ava i l ab le t o t h e u n i t t o confirm o r

deny the presence of chemical agent. The lack of understanding t h e

c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e a s s e t s ava i l ab le cont r ibute t o t h i s problem.

Furthermore, Brigades f a i l t o understand the scope of t h e i r

operat ions with regards t o p ro tec t ion and decontamination.

Leaders bel ieved t h a t i f everyone has a p ro tec t ive s u i t and mask,

a l l i s ok. Often s o l d i e r s became chemical c a s u a l t i e s because they

d i d not know how t o properly wear the s u i t o r were missing items.

Decontamination operations are not appropriately planned or

resourced.

The lack of emphasis placed on chemical defense training was

consummated by the Brigade's poor performance under chemical

warfare conditions. Chemical defense operations were not

incorporated into the plan. Chemical defense planning,

preparation, and execution require extensive forethought and

application into the overall Brigade mission by the entire staff.

More often than not, Brigades training at the NTC fail to

accomplish this high level of visualization and planning.

V. Conclusion. - The NTC is the "measuring stick" for determining if Brigades

are ready to go to war and operate under the most austere

conditions. The Brigades conduct several different types of

scenarios, under various constraints, one of which is chemical

warfare. Overcoming chemical warfare is a challenge under any

condition. Brigades faced with this challenge fail. When used by

the enemy, chemical weapons impact on the synchronization of the

entire mission, disrupting tempo, command and control, and causes

a high casualty rate. The result is mission failure.

Why is it that Brigades fail to overcome the enemy's use of

chemical weapons at the NTC? Chemical doctrine and techniques are

adequate to support overcoming chemical weapon use, if applied.

Doctrine dictates effective procedures to use when applying

chemical defense principles. When chemical defense principles are

appl ied t o o the r d o c t r i n a l p r i n c i p l e s , they improve t h e Brigade's

chances f o r success . Chemical weapons have had a negat ive impact on Army operat ions

s ince t h e i r f i r s t use i n W W I . Today s o l d i e r s s u f f e r from t h e same

l ack of t r a i n i n g a s those i n W W I . However, un l ike t h e s o l d i e r s of

World War I, exce l l en t equipment and doc t r ine e x i s t s t o f a c i l i t a t e

necessary t r a i n i n g t o surv ive and win i n a contaminated

environment.

Brigades e n t e r i n t o a mission t o t a l l y unprepared f o r what may

l i e ahead. In te l l igence-ga ther ing a s s e t s a r e not poised t o

include enemy i n d i c a t o r s about chemical weapons. Decontamination

operat ions a r e a f t e r though t opera t ions and t h e r e f o r e a r e

unsuccessful. This l eaves t h e quest ion, "Could Brigades conduct

chemical defense opera t ions i f t h e i r l i v e s depended on i t ? " The

answer i s no.

Some m i l i t a r y t h e o r i s t s suggest t h a t "mi l i t a ry i n s t i t u t i o n s

f a i l because they f a i l t o l e a r n from p a s t experience. Mi l i t a ry

i n s t i t u t i o n s f a i l because they f a i l t o a n t i c i p a t e t h e fu tu re .

And, m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s f a i l because they f a i l t o adapt t o t h e

fu tu re . "56 Implying U. S. Army u n i t s f a i l t o adapt lessons learned

from previous experiences. W W I u n i t s f a i l e d t o adapt t o t h e

increas ing use of chemical weapons. Even i n Desert Storm,

s o l d i e r s r l ack of t r a i n i n g and understanding of t h e chemical

defense p r i n c i p l e s handicapped t h e Army u n i t s . Throughout i t s f

use i n t h e 2oth century, chemical weapons have posed an increas ing

t h r e a t t o t h e unprepared.

Whether t he t h r e a t of chemical weapons use i s perceived o r

r e a l , Brigades must t r a i n and be ready t o perform t h e i r missions

i n a chemically contaminated b a t t l e f i e l d . Not a r i s k t he U . S . Army

can a f fo rd t o take. Combat maneuver centers , l i k e the NTC, a r e

i d e a l s e t t i n g s f o r Brigades t o hone t h e i r s k i l l s i n chemical

defense. Leaders a t a l l l e v e l s must place t he same emphasis on

chemical defense t r a i n ing a s they do fo r a l l o ther t r a i n ing

requirements. This s t ep i s t he f i r s t s t ep i n a s o l i d chemical

deterrence e f f o r t .

Adversaries a r e l e s s l i k e l y t o employ chemical weapons i f

t h e i r opponents a r e a s equally prepared t o defend agains t t h e i r

use. The prevalence of a good chemical defense favors compliance

with a chemical disarmament t r e a t y by making chemical weapons l e s s

m i l i t a ry useful . 57 The more e f f ec t i ve t h e defense an adversary

faces, t he more large-scale and therefore more e a s i l y detec table

a r e t h e preparat ions t he would-be v io l a to r is forced t o make i n

order t o achieve a m i l i t a r i l y s i gn i f i c an t advantage. Should

v io la t ions nevertheless occur, a s t rong chemical defense renders

chemical use much less dangerous. 58

Therefore, t he current s t a t u s , t he Brigade's i n a b i l i t y t o

operate on a contaminated b a t t l e f i e l d requires re-evaluation of

i t s current s t a t e of a f f a i r s . Currently around t he world a

formidable foe i s preparing f o r a fu tu re con f l i c t and is

considering the use of chemical weapons t o l e v e l t he playing

f i e l d .

VI. End N o t e s . - 1 Robb, Russell , and Paul V. Graham, E a r l y History o f C h e m i c a l , S m o k e , F l a m e , a n d B i o l o g i c a l W e a p o n s , - American On Line, Nov, 1996

2 There is an ongoing debate i n the m i l i t a r y and congress concerning t h e employment of chemical weapons during the Persian Gulf War. Currently t h e f i n a l answer cannot be reached. Through current research mater ia l , t h e author w i l l not claim one o r the o ther .

Valerie , Adams, C h e m i c a l W a r f a r e , C h e m i c a l D i s a r m a m e n t , (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990) 27.

4 United S ta tes . Department of Defense. Report o f C h e m i c a l W a r f a r e R e v i e w C o m m i s s i o n . , Washington: 1995, 10.

Brooks E . Keller and Dale Birdse l l , T h e C h e m i c a l W a r f a r e Service: C h e m i c a l s In C o m b a t , (Washington, D. C. : Center Of Mi l i t a ry History, 1990) 5.

7 Charles E . , Hel ler , MAJ(P) , USAR, C h e m i c a l W a r f a r e i n World War I : T h e A m e r i c a n E x p e r i e n c e , 191 7-1 91 8, Leavenworth Papers, Combat Studies I n s t i t u t e , U.S Army Command and General S ta f f College, FT Leavenworth, Kansas, 1984. 9

United S ta tes . Department of Defense. Report o f C h e m i c a l W a r f a r e R e v i e w C o m m i s s i o n , Washington: 1995, l l

Heller , 36,

Kel ler and Bi rdse l l , 16 .

Donald W . , Bailey, P o i s o n o u s G a s a n d the A m e r i c a n E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e s on World W a r One: Is I t S t i l l 1918? (SAMS Monograph, US Army Command and General S ta f f College, 1992), 13. The Germans, lacking s u f f i c i e n t manpower, gassed the 28th and 77th Divisions t r y i n g t o cross t h e Vesle River. This technique ha l t ed t h e American d iv i s ions . Once they regrouped, t h e American d iv i s ions a t tacked across t h e r i v e r . Only t o f ind t h a t the Germans had r e t r e a t e d and l e f t the ground sa tu ra ted with chemicals t h a t d id not allow t h e d iv i s ions t h e opportunity t o pursue.

Fredr ic J., Brown, C h e m i c a l W a r f a r e A Study i n R e s t r a i n t s , (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968) 33

13 A., Hadley, LTC, C . , Beasley, MAJ, Bortner, T., Burns, J. Chalkley, L. "The Ba t t l e of Montfaucon" (Fort Leavenworth Kansas: Combat Studies I n s i t i t u t e , 1984), 19

1 4 Heller, 24.

Ib id . P. 21

l6 Adams, 9.

17 Fredrick J., Vogel, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Strategic Implications For The United States, 8 January 1997.

18 Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form o f Killing: The Secret Story o f Chemical and Biological Warfare, (New York: H a l l and Wong, 1982), 53

19 Ib id . , 62

20 Geoffrey, Blainey The Causes o f War, Third Edition ( N e w York: The Free Press, 1988) 279.

21 Almquist and Wiskel1,The Problem o f Chemical and Biological Warfare. Sipre, Vol. 1 (Stockholm: Humanties Press, l 9 7 l ) , 159.

22 US Army Fie ld Manual 8-285, NAVMED P-5041, AFM 160-11. Treatment o f Chemical Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Washington: Department of t he Army, Navy, and A i r Force, 28 February 1990. 8-1. The United S t a t e s does not consider t e a r gas, a l s o known a s CS, a s a chemical weapon. [Tlhey a r e c l a s s i f i e d a s r i o t contro l agents and used pr imar i ly i n t r a in ing and i n r i o t control . Although under c e r t a i n condit ions and with p r e s iden t i a l approval, r i o t contro l agents can be used i n combat.

23 Rodney J., McEllroy Briefing Book on Chemical Weapons, Boston: Council f o r a Livable World Education Fund, October 1989.

24 Alleged Chemical Use, UN Chronicle. 20 (February 1983) . 50.

25 Adams, 88.

26 Edward M . , Spiers, Chemical Weaponry, A Continuing Challenge, (New York: S t . Martinr s P r e s s , 1989) 125.

27 Department of Defense, Conduct o f the Persian Gulf War, Final Report t o Congress, Apri l 1992, P. 4-2.

28 Ib id . P. Q-3

29 Ib id . P. Q-10.

3 0 United s t a t e s General Accounting Office, Report t o Congressional Requestors, Chemical and Biological Defense, Emphasis Remains Insuf f ic ien t t o Resolve Continuing Problems, March 1996, 2.

31 A conclusion reached by t h e author. Af ter conducting research f o r t h i s monograph much of t h e evidence suggest t h e same.

32 Aleksandr A. , Svechin, STRATEGY, ed. Kent D. Lee (Minneapolis, Minnesota: East View Publicat ions, 1992), 45

33 Richard A., Jackson, Colonel, Nuclear, Biological , and Chemical Defense i n t h e 21St Century, Center f o r S t r a t e g i c Leadership, U. S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA., 4 .

34 This repor t i s required by Public Law 103-160, The FY94 National Defense Authorization A c t and i s included i n t h e Department of Defense Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Defense Annual Report t o Congress, March 1997.

35 The National Secur i ty S t ra t egy For A New Century, The White House. May 1997. 6.

36 William J., Perry, Honorable, Report o f the Secre tary o f Defense t o the President and the Congress, U.S . Government P r in t ing Office, Wash. D.C., February 1995, 1.

37 Jackson, 3 .

38 Robert G . , Joseph, Regional Implicat ions of NBC P r o l i f e r a t i o n , J o i n t Forces Quar ter ly , Autumn 1995,66.

39 Ronald, Smothers, U. S. Seizes 2 Georgia Men With T i e s t o Parami l i ta ry Groups, (The N e w York Times, 27 Apri l 1996), 9.

40 V K. Nair, Brigadier , War i n the G u l f , Lessons Learned f o r t h e Third World, ( N e w Delhi: Lancer In te rna t iona l , 1991), Throughout t h e book, Brig. Nair suggest t h a t you use chemical and b io log ica l weapons t o de fea t t h e US m i l i t a r y . The reason f o r t h e i r use i s t h a t t h e US m i l i t a r y i s not t r a i n e d t o r e a c t and t h e r e f o r e you can c r i p p l e t h e i r forces and e x p l o i t t h e success t o your advantage.

41 This information was taken form t h e Fort Irwin home page a v a i l a b l e on t h e i n t e r n e t a t

42 U. S. Army, F ie ld Manual, 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D. C. : Department of t h e Army, 1 4 June 1993) 2-3.

4 3 U. S . Army, F ie ld Manual, 3-100, Chemical @era t ions , P r inc ip les and Fundamentals, (Washington: Department of t h e Army, Marine Corps, 8 May 1996), 1-10. Avoidance is t h e app l i ca t ion of pass ive and a c t i v e defensive measures; camouflage and concealment, d ispers ion , recon, de tec t ion , warning, and l i m i t a t i o n of contamination spread. Protec t ion involves hardening of pos i t ions , app l i ca t ion of MOPP, and ind iv idua l and u n i t ac t ion before, during, and a f t e r an a t t ack . Decontamination enhances

.survivability once an individual or unit is contaminated with chemical agent. Also, it is resource intensive.

4 4 U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 6-3.

4 5 U.S. Army, Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Werations, (Washington D.C. : Department of the Army, 31 May 1997) 5-1.

46 Ibid, 5-3

47 U.S. Army, Field Manual 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Werations, (Washington D.C. : Department of the Army, 28 February 1991) 2-1.

4 8 U. S . Army, Field Manual 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield , (Washington D.C. : Department of the Army, 8 July 1994) 1-1.

4 9 U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, werations, 6-3

50 U. S. A m y , Field Manual, 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, 5-16.

U. S. Army, Field Manual, 3-7, NBC Field Handbook, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 29 September 1994) 3-5. MOPP analysis determines the appropriate level of protective overgarments during operations. The analysis is an estimate of enemy's threat from chemical weapons and the type of operation the unit is performing. It is a management tool for commanders. They can adjust the amount worn based upon the threat.

52 U.S. Army, Field Manual, 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, G-1.

53 Notes from the author's assignment as an Observer/Controller at the NTC.

54 U. S . Army, Field Manual, 3-5, NBC Decontamination, (Washington: Department of the Army, Marine Corps, 17 November 1993)' 1-3. Immediate decontamination by individual soldiers is the process to minimize casualties by deconning the skin, personal wipedown, and operator's spraydown. Equipment is provided to the soldier for this process. Operational decon consist of vehicle washdown and MOPP gear exchange. This process allows a unit to fight longer and sustain its mission while contaminated. Thorough decon is a process to reduce the contamination of a unit to negligible risk. It is time consuming and requires extensive logistical support, such as water, manpower, and equipment.

55 Ibid, 10-6. The water figures were determined from the table in the manual. Using 200 and 250 as planning factors for vehicles.

56 James, J., Schneider, Ph. D. , What i f We fight Tonight, Advanced Military Education for the XXIst Century. (Association of advanced Operational S tudies NET CALL, Volume 11, Number 2 Fal l - Winter 1994-95) 3 . Cohen E l l i o t and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes, (New York: Free Press, 1990) passim. In h i s a r t ic le , D r Scheinder summarized one theme as out l ined by E l l i o t and Gooch.

57 Matthew, Meselson, Ph. D . , The Role o f Chemical Defense i n Chemical Warfare, Chemical Deterrence, and Chemical Disarmamentry, (Adapted from t h e Keynote address t o the Six th Annual S c i e n t i f i c Conference on Chemical Defense Research, U.S. Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center, Edgewood A r e a , Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 13-16 November 1990), 1.

58 Ibid, 1, 2.

VII. Bibliography. - Adams, Valerie. C h e m i c a l W a r f a r e , C h e m i c a l D i s a r m a m e n t . Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1990.

Almquist and Wis kellLThe P r o b l e m o f C h e m i c a l a n d B i o l o g i c a l W a r f a r e . S i p r e , Vol . 1. Humanties Press, Stockholm, 1971).

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