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Chemical Process Safety. Runaway Reactions. Two CSB Videos: Review. Reactive Hazards ( 31 July 2007 ) Runaway: Explosion at T2 Laboratories (19 Dec 2007; video: 22 Sep 2009 ). “167 serious uncontrolled reactions with 108 deaths from 1980 – 2001”. Two CSB Videos: Review. Reactive Hazards: - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Chemical Process Safety

1

Chemical Process SafetyRunaway Reactions

Page 2: Chemical Process Safety

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Two CSB Videos: Review

1. Reactive Hazards (31 July 2007)2. Runaway: Explosion at T2 Laboratories (19 Dec

2007; video: 22 Sep 2009)

“167 serious uncontrolled reactions with 108 deaths

from 1980 – 2001”

Page 3: Chemical Process Safety

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Two CSB Videos: Review

1. Reactive Hazards:a) What do you remember about the video?b) Lessons “learned”

Page 4: Chemical Process Safety

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Two CSB Videos: Review1. Reactive Hazards:

a) 1984 Bhopal• CSB formed & established chemical process

safetyb) Synthron: butyl acrylate (solvents: toluene, cyclohexane)• 1500 gal reactor• HE was used to condense solvent vapors & cool

exothermic reaction• Batch size increased• HE couldn’t remove enough heatc) BP Amoco: HP nylon• Polymerization reactor bypass to 750 gal waste

tank• Overfilled waste tank; no PI or vent • Secondary decomposition reactiond) MFG Chemical: allyl alcohol vapor release• 30 gal test reactor (3rd test significant heat

generation)• Production in 4000 gal reactor (SA/vol ratio: HE

inadequate)e) 1st Chemical Corporation: mono-nitro toluene (MNT)• 145’ distillation tower; MNT left in reboiler• Leaking steam valve• Heated to 450 oF – decomposition reaction

Page 5: Chemical Process Safety

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Two CSB Videos: Review

1. Reactive Hazards:a) What do you remember about the video?b) Lessons “learned”

Page 6: Chemical Process Safety

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Two CSB Videos: Review2. Runaway: Explosion at T2 Laboratories:

a) What do you remember about the video?b) Lessons “learned”

Producing a gasoline additive:methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MCMT)

Reactor

Page 7: Chemical Process Safety

7

Two CSB Videos: T2 LaboratoriesBrief overview of process steps

• Added to reactor– sodium metal in mineral oil– methylcyclopentadiene dimer– diethylene glycol dimethyl ether (diglyme)

• close the vessel• set pressure to 3.45 bar and heating oil temp to 182.2 C• heating melted sodium that reacted with

methylcyclopentadiene forming sodium methylcyclopentadiene, hydrogen, and heat

• Hydrogen gas was generated• when mix reached 100°C, agitation was shut off• at 150°C hot oil flow stopped• at 180°C cooling was initiated with water admitted

to the reactor jacket. • maintain temperature from the exothermic reaction

via water evaporation.

Page 8: Chemical Process Safety

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Two CSB Videos: T2 Laboratories

175th batch exploded

Former Reactor Site

Page 9: Chemical Process Safety

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Figure 2. Control room.*

* From CSB final report; Sep 2009.

Page 10: Chemical Process Safety

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Figure 4. Injury and business locations.*

* From CSB final report; Sep 2009.

Page 11: Chemical Process Safety

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Figure 5. Portion of the 3-inch-thick reactor.*

* From CSB final report; Sep 2009.

Page 12: Chemical Process Safety

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Figure 4. Injury and business locations.*

* From CSB final report; Sep 2009.

Page 13: Chemical Process Safety

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Two CSB Videos: T2 LaboratoriesCSB Investigation

Runaway exothermic reaction

• Occurred during the first metalation step of the process

• An uncontrollable rise in temperature and resultant pressure lead to the burst of the reactor

• Upon bursting, contents ignited in air• Creating an explosion equivalent of 635 kg (1420 lb)

of TNT exploding from a single point

Page 14: Chemical Process Safety

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Two CSB Videos: T2 LaboratoriesCSB Investigation

Possible causes for the explosion

Investigation considered:– cross-contamination of the reactor– contamination of raw materials– wrong concentration of raw materials– local concentration of chemical within the reactor– application of excessive heat– insufficient cooling

Page 15: Chemical Process Safety

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“The CSB determined insufficient cooling to be the only credible cause for this incident, which is consistent with witness statements that the process operator reported a cooling problem shortly before the explosion. The T2 cooling water system lacked design redundancy, making it susceptible to single-point failures including

• water supply valve failing closed or partially closed.• water drain valve failing open or partially open.• failure of the pneumatic system used to open and close the

water valves.• blockage or partial blockage in the water supply piping.• faulty temperature indication.• mineral scale buildup in the cooling system.

Interviews with employees indicated that T2 ran cooling system components to failure and did not perform preventive maintenance.

* From CSB final report; Sep 2009.

Page 16: Chemical Process Safety

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Two CSB Videos: Review

2. Runaway: Explosion at T2 Laboratories:a) What do you remember about the video?b) Lessons “learned”

• “T2 did not recognize the runaway reaction hazard associated with the MCMT it was producing.”

Contributing causes:1. “The cooling system employed by T2 was

susceptible to single point failures due to a lack of design redundancy.

2. The MCMT reactor relief system was incapable of relieving the pressure from a runaway reaction.”

Page 17: Chemical Process Safety

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Two CSB Videos: T2 Observations

• Scaled up from 1 liter to 9300 liter directly• Batch 42 the recipe was increased by 1/3

(testing?)• Periodically experienced problems with cooling• No “backup” cooling system• Used city water supply (minerals?)• Did not recognize and control reactive hazards• No evidence found by CSB that T2 performed a

recommended HAZOP.• There was a need for reactive chemistry testing.

Page 18: Chemical Process Safety

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CSB Testing on T2 RecipeCSB testing completed with a VSP2 (Vent Sizing Package 2)Adiabatic Calorimeter (116 ml

test cell)

* From CSB final report; Sep 2009.

reaction 1 exotherm

diglyme decomposition

Page 19: Chemical Process Safety

19* From CSB final report; Sep 2009.

Page 20: Chemical Process Safety

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Follow-up Topics

• Key Findings of CSB investigation:• Cooling discussion• Overpressure• Runaway reactors • Hazard analysis

Page 21: Chemical Process Safety

21* From CSB final report; Sep 2009.

• A second exothermic reaction occurred

• This reaction became uncontrollable around 200°C

• The reaction was the uncontrolled decomposition of diglyme (the solvent used)

• Probably catalyzed by the presence of sodium.

• By the time the rupture disk opened (28.6 bar)

• It was too late• If the rupture disk had opened at 6.2

bar, then no explosion would have occurred

Page 22: Chemical Process Safety

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Over pressure Wave Profile, 1 Psi=0.07 bar

psi0.017 Bar

0.14 Bar

0.017 Bar1.7 Bar

* From CSB & SACHE module by R. Willey, 2012.

Page 23: Chemical Process Safety

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Combustion Behavior – Most Hydrocarbons

Slide courtesy of Reed Welker.

Smoke and fire are very visible!

Page 24: Chemical Process Safety

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Combustion Behavior – Carbon Disulfide

Slide courtesy of Reed Welker.No smoke and fire, but heat release rate just as high.

Page 25: Chemical Process Safety

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Combustion Behavior – Methane

Methane burns mostly within vessel, flame shoots out of vessel.

Page 26: Chemical Process Safety

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Combustion Behavior – Dusts

Much of the dust burns outside of the chamber.

Page 27: Chemical Process Safety

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Definitions - 1

LFL: Lower Flammability LimitBelow LFL, mixture will not burn, it is too lean.

UFL: Upper Flammability LimitAbove UFL, mixture will not burn, it is too

rich.

Defined only for gas mixtures in air.UNITS:

Page 28: Chemical Process Safety

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Definitions - 2

Flash Point: Temperature above which a liquid produces enough vapor to form an ignitable mixture with air.

Defined only for liquids at 1 atm. pressure.

Auto-Ignition Temperature (AIT): Temperature above which adequate energy is available in the environment to provide an ignition source.

Page 29: Chemical Process Safety

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Definitions - 3

Limiting Oxygen Concentration (LOC): Oxygen concentration below which combustion is not possible, with any fuel mixture. Expressed as volume % oxygen.

Also called: Minimum Oxygen ConcentrationMax. Safe Oxygen Conc. Others

Page 30: Chemical Process Safety

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Explosion: A very sudden release of energy resulting in a shock or pressure wave.Shock, Blast or pressure wave: Pressure wave that causes damage.Deflagration: Reaction wave speed < speed of sound.Detonation: Reaction wave speed > speed of sound.Speed of sound in air: 344 m/s, 1129 ft/s at ambient T, P.Deflagrations are the case with explosions involving flammable materials.

Definitions - 4

Page 31: Chemical Process Safety

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Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE): Smallest energy to initiate combustion.

• Higher for dusts & aerosols than for gases• Many HC gases have MIE ~ 0.25 mJ

Auto-oxidation: slow oxidation and evolution of heat can raise T and lead to combustion. i.e. liquids with low volatility.Adiabatic compression: of a gas generates heat, increases temperature, and can lead to autoignition.Ignition sources: usually numerous and difficult to eliminate. Objective is to identify and eliminate, but not to solely rely on this step to eliminate combustion risk. (Table 6-5; Crowl)

Definitions - 5

Page 32: Chemical Process Safety

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Typical Values - 1LFL UFL

Methane: 5.3% 15%Propane: 2.2% 9.5%Butane: 1.9% 8.5%Hydrogen: 4.0% 75%

See Appendix B

Flash Point Temp. (deg C)Methanol: 12.2Benzene: -11.1Gasoline: -43

Page 33: Chemical Process Safety

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Typical Values - 2

AIT (deg. C)Methane: 632Methanol: 574Toluene: 810

LOC (Vol. % Oxygen)Methane: 12%Ethane: 11%Hydrogen: 5%

Great variability in reported AIT values! Use lowest value.

Appendix B

Table 6-2

Page 34: Chemical Process Safety

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Flammability Relationships

Figure 6-2

Page 35: Chemical Process Safety

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Aerosol Flammability

Too rich

Too lean

M. Sam Mannan, Texas A&M, Mary Kay O’Conner Process Safety Center

Page 36: Chemical Process Safety

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Minimum Ignition Energies

What: Energy required to ignite a flammable mixture.Typical Values: (wide variation expected)

Vapors:Dusts:

Dependent on test device --> not a reliable design parameter.Static spark that you can feel: about mJ

Lightning: about 500 megajoules

Table 6-4Or ~ 500,000,000,000 mJ

Page 37: Chemical Process Safety

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Minimum Ignition Energies

Page 38: Chemical Process Safety

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Ignition Sources of Major Fires

Page 39: Chemical Process Safety

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Experimental Determination - Flashpoint

Cleveland Open Cup Method.Closed cup produces a better result - reduces drafts across cup.

Figure 6-3

Page 40: Chemical Process Safety

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Experimental Determination - Flashpoint

Page 41: Chemical Process Safety

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Setaflash Flashpoint Device

Page 42: Chemical Process Safety

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Setaflash Flashpoint Device – Close-up

Page 43: Chemical Process Safety

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Setaflash Flashpoint Device – Close-up

Window

Page 44: Chemical Process Safety

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Setaflash Flashpoint Device – Close-up

Page 45: Chemical Process Safety

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Auto-Ignition Temperature (AIT) Device

Page 46: Chemical Process Safety

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Auto-Ignition Temperature (AIT) Device

Page 47: Chemical Process Safety

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0

2

4

6

8

10

0 2 4 6 8 10

Fuel Concentration in air (vol%)

Max

imum

Exp

losi

onP

ress

ure

(bar

g)

LFL UFL

Run experiment at different fuel compositions with air:

Experimental Determination - LFL, UFL

Need a criteria to define limit - use 1 psia pressure increase. Other criteria are used - with different results!

Flammability limits are an empirical artifact of experiment!

See Figure 6-5

Page 48: Chemical Process Safety

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Experimental Determination: P versus t

0

2

4

6

8

10

0 50 100 150 200 250

Time (ms)

Pres

sure

(bar

-abs

) Pmax

(dP/dt)max

PITI

Ignitor

Final experimental result:

Page 49: Chemical Process Safety

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Experimental Apparatus

Page 50: Chemical Process Safety

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Experimental Determination - LFL, UFL

Page 51: Chemical Process Safety

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Flammability Limit Behavior -1

As temperature increases:UFL increases, LFL decreases--> Flammability range increases

25 251000.75 25 25P

Tc c

CLFL LFL T LFL TH H

2575.025

T

HUFLUFL

cT

:: kcal/mole, heat of combustion

o

c

T CH

Approx. for many hydrocarbons

Equations 6-4, 6-5

Page 52: Chemical Process Safety

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Flammability Limit Behavior -2

As pressure increases: UFL increasesLFL mostly unaffected

)1(log*6.20 PUFLUFLP

P is pressure in mega-Pascals, absolute

Pressure and temperature effects on flammability limits is poorly understood – estimation methods are poor.

No theoretical basis for this yet!

Page 53: Chemical Process Safety

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Flammability Limits of MixturesLe Chatelier Rule (1891)

n

i i

imix

LFLy

LFL

1

1

n

i i

imix

UFLy

UFL

1

1

yi on a combustible basis only

n is the number of combustible speciesAssumptions: 1) Product heat capacities constant2) No. of moles of gas constant3) Combustion kinetics of pure species unchanged4) Adiabatic temperature rise the same for all species

Details provided in Process Safety Progress, Summer 2000.

Page 54: Chemical Process Safety

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Flammability Limits - Le Chatelier

LeChatelier’s rule shows that the LFL can be approximated by:

*

100p

c

C TLFLh

Where Cp is the product heat capacity, is the adiabatic temperature rise, and is the heat of combustion. 1200 K is frequently used as the adiabatic temperature rise at the flammability limit.A similar expressions is written for the UFL.

*Tch

Page 55: Chemical Process Safety

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Flammability Limits of Mixtures

From this equation, a plot of the flammability limit vs. 1/(Heat of Combustion) should yield a straight line if Le Chatelier’s rule is valid. If this is done, one finds that:Le Chatelier’s rule works better at the lower flammability limit than the upper flammability limit.Assumptions are more valid at LFL.

*

100p

c

C TLFLh

Page 56: Chemical Process Safety

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Lower Flammability Limit and Heat of Combustion

LFLN Comp. = 5327.4[1/hc]R2 = 0.9478

LFLHC Comp. = 4569.1[1/hc]R2 = 0.8849

LFLOxy. Comp. = 5030.7[1/hc]R2 = 0.9338

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

0.0000 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 0.0008 0.0010 0.0012 0.0014

1/hc [kJ/mole]-1

LFL

[Vol

% F

uel i

n ai

r]

Hydrocarbons

Oxygen Compounds

Nitrogen Compounds

Sulfur Compounds

Linear (NitrogenCompounds)Linear (Hydrocarbons)

Linear (OxygenCompounds)

Page 57: Chemical Process Safety

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Upper Flammability Limit and Heat of Combustion

0

20

40

60

80

100

0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.0021/(-hc) [kJ/mol]-1

UFL

[vol

. % fu

el in

air

]

HydrocarbonsOxygen CompoundsNitrogen CompoundsSulfur Compounds

Page 58: Chemical Process Safety

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Estimating FlammabilityJones equation where

the stoichiometric concentration, Cst, is vol% fuel in fuel plus air.

From the general combustion equation,

CmHxOy + zO2 = mCO2 + x/2 H2O

It follows that z = m + x/4 – y/2, where z has the units of moles O2/mole fuelTherefore,

The Jones equation can now be converted to

LFL = 0.55Cst UFL = 3.50Cst

21.01

100

21.011

100

1

1001002

zfuelmolesOmoles

fuelmolesairmoles

Xairmolesfuelmoles

fuelmolesCst

138.219.176.4)100(50.3

yxmUFL

138.219.176.4)100(55.0

yxmLFL

Page 59: Chemical Process Safety

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Estimating Flammability

Suzuki and Koide correlation

where:LFL and UFL are the lower and upper flammability limits (vol% fuel in air), respectively, and

is the heat of combustion for the fuel (in 103 kJ/mol)

NOTE that the accuracy of this and Jones methods are modest.

5.23567.030.6 2 cc HHUFL

80.10538.0569.042.3 2

ccc

HHH

LFL

∆Hc

Page 60: Chemical Process Safety

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LOC limiting oxygen conc. [vol% O2]

Typically 8 - 10%

Estimating LOC

(1)Fuel + (z) Oxygen --> Products

• Concentration required to generate enough energy to propagate flame

• Reduce O2 concentration below LOC to prevent the fire/explosion • If data for LOC is not available, estimate using the stoichiometry of the

combustion process and the LFLFor example, the stoichiometry for butane:

The LFL for butane is 1.9% by volume, therefore from stoichiometry

By substitution, we obtain,

OHCOOHC 222104 545.6

fuelmolesOmolesLFL

fuelmolesOmoles

molestotalfuelmolesLOC 22

22 %4.12

0.15.69.1 Ovol

fuelmolesOmoles

molestotalfuelmolesLOC

Page 61: Chemical Process Safety

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LOC’s for Various Substances

Page 62: Chemical Process Safety

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Flammability Diagram

20 40 60 80 100

Nitrogen0

100

20

40

60

80

Oxyg

en

100

80

60

40

20

0

Fuel

Stoichiom etric line

FlammabilityZone

LFL

UFL

MOC

A

Upper limit inpure oxygen

Lower limit inpure oxygen

Air Line

Page 63: Chemical Process Safety

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Flammability Diagram

Useful for:• Determining if a mixture is flammable.• Required for control and prevention of flammable

mixtures

Problems:• Only limited experimental data available.• Depends on chemical species.• Function of temperature and pressure.

Flammability diagram can be approximated.

Page 64: Chemical Process Safety

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Flammability Diagram

(1) Fuel + (z) Oxygen ---> Products

Fuel

Oxyg

en

Nitrogen

0

1000

1001000

Flammable

UFL

LFL

Stoichiometric100*

1

zz

CH4 + 2 O2 --> Products

z = 2

*1001zz

Page 65: Chemical Process Safety

65

Drawing an Approximate Diagram

1. Draw LFL and UFL on air line (%Fuel in air).2. Draw stoichiometric line from combustion equation.3. Plot intersection of LOC with stoichiometric line.4. Draw LFL and UFL in pure oxygen, if known (% fuel in pure oxygen).5. Connect the dots to get approximate diagram.

Page 66: Chemical Process Safety

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ExampleMethane: LFL: 5.3% fuel in air UFL: 15% fuel in air LOC: 12% oxygenCH4 + 2 O2 --> CO2 + 2 H2O

--> z = 2

7.66100*32100*

1

zz

Pure Oxygen: LFL: 5.1% fuel in oxygen UFL: 61% fuel in oxygen

% oxygen

Page 67: Chemical Process Safety

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Flammability Diagram - Example

FuelOx

ygen

Nitrogen 0

1000

1001000

66.7% O2 Stoichiometric UFL = 15% fuel

LFL = 5.3% fuel

LOC = 12% oxygen

61% Methane

5.1% Methane

Page 68: Chemical Process Safety

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Flammability Zone

00

0

100100

20

20

40

40

40 60

60

60

80

Methane

Nitrogen80

80

20

100

Oxyg

en

Stoichiometric Line

Air Line

Non-FlammableFlammableTransition Boundary

Page 69: Chemical Process Safety

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Flammability Zone

00

0

100100

20

20

40

40

40 60

60

60

80

Nitrogen80

80

20

100

Oxyg

en Air Line

Ethylene

Stoichiometric Line

Transition BoundaryFlammableNon-Flammable

Page 70: Chemical Process Safety

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Removal of Vessel from Service

Page 71: Chemical Process Safety

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Explosions - Definitions

Explosion: A very sudden release of energy resulting in a shock or pressure wave.Shock, Blast or pressure wave: Pressure wave that causes damage.Deflagration: Reaction wave speed < speed of sound.Detonation: Reaction wave speed > speed of sound.Speed of sound in air: 344 m/s, 1129 ft/s at ambient T, P.Deflagrations are the case with explosions involving flammable materials.

Page 72: Chemical Process Safety

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Explosions

• Rapid release of energy • Damage due to dissipation of energy in the form of

pressure wave, projectiles, sound, radiation, etc• Reaction front moves out from ignition source

preceded by shock wave or pressure front. Once combustible material consumed, reaction front terminates, but pressure wave continues.

• Shock wave (results from abrupt pressure change) and is associated with highly explosive materials

• Most damage due to blast wave (shock / pressure wave followed by wind)

Page 73: Chemical Process Safety

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Detonations

• Energy releases short, < 1 ms, associated with abrupt rise in P

• Shock and reaction front > speed of sound• Reaction front provides energy to shock wave and

drives it at sonic or greater speeds • P of shock wave: ~ 10 - 100 atm.

Page 74: Chemical Process Safety

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Deflagrations

• Energy release longer than detonation ~ 0.3 s, • Pressure front = speed of sound; reaction front

behind at < speed of sound• Mechanism: turbulent diffusion, mass transfer

limited• P of wave: ~ a few atmospheres• Can evolve, especially in pipes but not open spaces,

to a detonation due to adiabatic compression and heating leading to pressure rise

Page 75: Chemical Process Safety

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Comparison of Behavior

Reacted gases

Unreacted gases

Deflagration:

Detonation:

Pressure WaveReaction / Flame Front

Ignition

Ignition

Reaction front moves at less than speed of sound.Pressure wave moves away from reaction front at speed of sound.

Reaction front moves greater than speed of sound.Pressure wave is slightly ahead of reaction front moving at same speed.

X

X

Page 76: Chemical Process Safety

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Comparison of Behavior

Reacted gases

Unreacted gases

Deflagration:

Detonation:

Pressure WaveReaction / Flame Front

Ignition

Ignition

P

Distance

P

Distance

Shock Front

Page 77: Chemical Process Safety

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Comparison of Behavior

Detonation

Deflagration

Localized DamageNo wall thinningLots of pieces

Damage all overWall thinningA few pieces

Page 78: Chemical Process Safety

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Confined ExplosionsOccurs in process or building. Almost all of the thermodynamic energy ends up in the pressure wave.

Cubic Law:

Ki Deflagration index (bar-m/s) G gasSt dust (Staub)

Deflagration index:Measure of explosion robustness, higher value means more robust.Depends on experimental conditions.Not a fundamental property.

dPdt

maxV1/3 KG

dPdt

maxV1/3 KSt

Page 79: Chemical Process Safety

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Deflagration Indexes

Page 80: Chemical Process Safety

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Deflagration Indexes

Page 81: Chemical Process Safety

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Data: Max. P and KG

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180

Pres

sure

(psi

a) .

Pres

sure

(bar

) .

Time (ms)

Stable Combustion Pressure

P = 7.6 bar

t = 24 ms

KG = V1/3 [dP/dt]maxKG = (0.02m3)1/3(316.7 bar/sec)

Page 82: Chemical Process Safety

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Damage Estimates from Overpressure

Table 6-9; Crowl

Page 83: Chemical Process Safety

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Dust Explosions

• Finely divided combustible solids dispersed in air encounter an ignition source

• Examples: flour milling, grain storage, coal mining, etc• Initial dust explosion produces secondary explosions• Conditions for explosion: a) particles < certain size for ignition & propagation b) particle loading between certain limits

c) dispersion in air fairly uniform for propagation

Page 84: Chemical Process Safety

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Occur in the open. Only 2 to 10% of thermodynamic energy ends up in pressure wave. Use for this class:

Unconfined Explosions

Prevention

VCE: Vapor Cloud Explosion- sudden release flammable vapor- dispersion and mixing with air- ignition vapor cloud Flixborough

- smaller inventories- milder process conditions- incipient leak detection- automated block valves

Page 85: Chemical Process Safety

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BLEVEBLEVE: Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion

- Release large amount of superheated liquid after vessel rupture (e.g. fire)

• BLEVE: Explosive vaporization of a liquid at a temperature above its normal boiling point caused by container rupture. Ex: from external fire

• If liquid is flammable, a VCE can result• Boiling liquid can behave as rocket fuel, propelling vessel

fragments• Fraction of liquid vaporized from Chapter 4, To > Tb

Page 86: Chemical Process Safety

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BLEVE

Liquid

Vapor

Vessel with liquid stored below its normal boiling pointBelow liquid level –

Above liquid level –

Effects: Blast + thermal

Page 88: Chemical Process Safety

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Mechanical Explosions

Rupture of vessel containing an inert gas at high pressure.

PP

PPTRW E

Ege 1ln

Where: We is the energy of explosion, P is abs. gas pressure in vessel, PE is abs. ambient pressure, T is abs. temperature.

Max. Mechanical Energy

Eqn. 6-31

Page 89: Chemical Process Safety

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Batch Reactor Explosion Consequences

Page 90: Chemical Process Safety

90

Overpressures

Blast Origin

Blast wavePI

PI

Side-on Overpressure

Direct-on Overpressure

Page 91: Chemical Process Safety

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Pres

sure

Distance from explosion origin

Ambient pressure

Peak overpressure

Shock front

Direction of movementExplosionorigin

P

P

o

a

Peak Side-on Overpressures

Page 92: Chemical Process Safety

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Peak Side-on OverpressuresO

verp

ress

ure

Distance

t

t

t

t

tt

1

2

3

4

5

6

Explosion Origin

Direction of movement

Page 93: Chemical Process Safety

93

Consequences of Explosions: Table 6-9

Peak Side-on Overpressure(psig) Consequence

0.03 Large glass panes shatter0.15 Typical glass failure0.7 Minor house damage1.0 Partial house demolition3 Steel frame building distorted> 15 100% fatalities

3 psig: Hazard zone for fatalities due to structure collapse.

P

Distance

Page 94: Chemical Process Safety

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P

Distance

Page 95: Chemical Process Safety

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TNT Equivalency Method

Scaled distance 3/1TNT

e mrz

a

os p

pp

Page 96: Chemical Process Safety

96

P

Distance

Page 97: Chemical Process Safety

97

TNT Equivalency for VCEs

Where: mTNT is the equivalent mass of TNT

is the explosion efficiencym is the total mass of fuelEc is the heat of combustion

ETNT is the heat of combustion for TNT

(1120 cal/gm = 4686 kJ/kg = 2016 BTU/lb)

TNTofmassEnergyFuelinEnergyTotalmTNT /

TNT

c

EmE

Page 98: Chemical Process Safety

98

TNT Equiv. - Explosion Efficiency

TNT

cTNT E

mEm

1 for confined explosion0.02 to 0.10 for unconfined explosion

Use a default value of unless other information is available.

Page 99: Chemical Process Safety

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Other Methods

Other methods are based on degree of congestion or confinement. Basis is that confinement leads to turbulence which increases the burning velocity.

• TNO Multi-Energy Model (see pages 271-274)

• Baker - Strehlow ModelBoth produce essentially the same answer.Need much more information, i.e. confinement info.

Page 100: Chemical Process Safety

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TNT Equivalency Procedure

1. Determine total mass of fuel involved.2. Estimate explosion efficiency.3. Look up energy of explosion (See Appendix B in text).4. Apply Equation 6-24 to determine mTNT.

5. Determine scaled distance.6. Use Figure 6-23 or Equation 6-23 to determine overpressure.7. Use Table 6-9 to estimate damage.

Problem: Determine consequences at a specified location from an explosion.

3/1TNTmrz

Page 101: Chemical Process Safety

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TNT Equivalency Procedure

The problem with the application of this approach to exploding vapor is that:

Overpressure curve developed from detonation data, i.e. TNT, and flammable vapor explodes as a deflagration.

The TNT method applied to vapor explosions tends to underpredict overpressures at some distance from the explosion, and over-predicts the overpressures near the explosion.

P

Distance

P

Distance

Shock Front

DetonationDeflagration

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ExampleDetermine the energy of explosion for 1 lb of n-butane? What is the TNT equivalent? Use an explosion efficiency of 2%.

02.0,exp

142,1158100021.646

21.646)1.4()636.54(5)26.94(4

542

13

10422tanRePr

222104

efficiencyanhaslosiontheBut

gcal

ggmoleX

kcalcalX

gmolekcalGor

gmolekcalGGG

OHCOOHC

HCOHCOtsac

of

oducts

of

Page 103: Chemical Process Safety

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Example

TNTkgTNTg

TNTgcalcalm

callblbg

gcalG

TNT

available

093.033.901120

169,101

169,10102.0*1*454*142,11

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Example

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 350

1

10

100

1 lb n-butane overpressure vs distance

r (distance from explosion) [m]

Po (o

verp

ress

ure)

[psi]

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TWA - 800: July 17, 1996

Page 106: Chemical Process Safety

106

TWA - 800: July 17, 1996

Page 107: Chemical Process Safety

107

Example

Determine equivalent TNT mass for TWA 800 explosion.Assume: 18,000 gallon fuel tank, P = 12.9 psia, T = 120 F, Concentration of fuel = 1%, Energy of explosion for jet fuel = 18,850 BTU/lb, M = 160.Mass of fuel in vapor:

3

3 o o

(12.9 psia)(18,000 gal)(0.1337 ft / gal)(10.731 psia ft / lb-mole R)(580 R)

= 4.99 lb-moles total

totalg

PVnR T

Page 108: Chemical Process Safety

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Example

(1)(7.98 lb)(18,850 BTU/lb)2076 BTU/lb TNT

= 74 lb of TNT

cTNT

TNT

mEmE

Moles of fuel = (0.01)(4.99 lb-moles) = 0.0499 lb-moles = 7.98 lb of fuel

Assume 100% efficiency (confined explosion).

Page 109: Chemical Process Safety

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Questions?

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Flammability Diagram - 3

Air line always extends

FROM: Fuel: 0%, Oxygen: 21% Nitrogen: 79%

TO: Fuel: 100%, Oxygen: 0%, Nitrogen: 0%

Equation for this line:

Fuel = -(100/79) Nitrogen + 100

Page 111: Chemical Process Safety

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Fuel/Air ExplosiveCBU-72 / BLU-73/B Fuel/Air Explosive (FAE)The the 550-pound CBU-72 cluster bomb contains three submunitions known as fuel/air explosive (FAE). The submunitions weigh approximately 100 pounds and contain 75 pounds of ethylene oxide with air-burst fuzing set for 30 feet. An aerosol cloud approximately 60 feet in diameter and 8 feet thick is created and ignited by an embedded detonator to produce an explosion. This cluster munition is effective against minefields, armored vehicles, aircraft parked in the open, and bunkers. During Desert Storm the Marine Corps dropped all 254 CBU-72s, primarily from A-6Es, against mine fields and personnel in trenches. Some secondary explosions were noted when it was used as a mine clearer; however, FAE was primarily useful as a psychological weapon. Second-generation FAE weapons were developed from the FAE I type devices (CBU-55/72) used in Vietnam.