chemical response plan good

WMD and All Hazards Response

Jack Pittman

Director, Public Health Preparedness

Leon CHD and NFRDSTF

Heather Lake

Preparedness Coordinator

Division of Environmental Health


Training Objectives:

• Be aware of the effects of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other hazardous releases

• Understand types of expected WMD casualt ies

• Understand impact of a HAZMAT or WMD event on public health and the environment

• Understand principles of agent identif ication using the Emergency Response Guide

• Understand levels of personal protection

• Recognize requirements for evacuation, shelter in place, decontamination, isolat ion, or quarantine


Weapons of Mass Destruction:

BNICE

Biological, Nuclear, Incendiary, Chemical, Explosive

CBRNE

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive


Explosive and Incendiary Threats:

Favorite Terrorist weapon

• Mass casualty trauma:

- Crushing

- Fragmentation

- Burns

• Relatively cheap

• High visibil i ty

• High terror


Chemical Threats:

Industrial chemicals

Chemical warfare agents


Chemical Threats:

Industrial chemicals

FBI: Most Likely chemical terrorism event -- A Deliberate Industrial Chemical Release

-- Rail

-- Road

-- Fixed Facil i ty

-- Pipeline


Chemical Threats:

Accidental industrial chemical releases

Rail:

According to the Federal Railroad Administrat ion, there were 14,264 rail accidents in 2002 -- 59 in Florida. 704 involved cars carrying HAZMAT in the US with 13 HAZMAT accidents in Florida.

In 1978, an Atlanta & St Andrews Bay Railway train derailed near Youngstown, Florida. Chlorine gas, released from a derailed car, ki l led 8 persons and injured 138 downwind of the accident site.


Chemical Threats:

Accidental industrial chemical releases

Fixed Facil i ty:

In 1984, a release of methyl isocyanate in Bhopal, India kil led 3,800 persons; 40 suffered permanent total disabil i ty; and 2,680, who l ived as far as 25 miles downwind, were partially disabled.

Pipeline:

In May 2003, > 50 tons of anhydrous ammonia escaped after someone tapped into a pipeline in Brandon, FL. The leak sent noxious fumes into a subdivision, shutt ing down two schools.


Chemical Threats:

Response

Except for the criminal investigation, a deliberate release of an industrial chemical would be handled as a HAZMAT event in the same way as an accidental release.

Depending on the characterist ics of the chemical, met condit ions, etc., the event may require rapid evacuations and decontamination.

First responders should be aware that terrorists may plant secondary explosives or booby traps around the scene of a chemical release incident.


Chemical Threats:

Response Recognition

Isolation

Protection

Notif ication


Chemical Threats Response

Recognit ion The US Department of Transportat ion (DOT) is responsible for coordinating the national safety program for transport of hazardous materials and for accident response. DOT publishes the Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG) that provides info on identif ication of hazards, public safety, emergency response, and init ial isolat ion and protective actions for over 3000 industrial chemicals.



Recognit ion – Clue 1 Occupancy and Location

• Fixed facil i t ies -- specif ic occupancy or general area (e.g., an industrial park)

• Hazardous materials transportation modes– Rail, air, marine, highway and pipeline

• Drug lab considerations



Recognit ion – Clue 2 Container Shape and Size

• Classif ications Fixed, portable, or in transport• Pressure

– Non-pressurized, low or high pressure• Vapor Pressure and Storage

– The higher the pressure, the greater the potential for catastrophic failure

• See ERG pages 18-19



Recognit ion – Clue 3 Placards and Labels

• Placards have l imitat ions– Not always required– The 1000 pound rule

• Nine Hazard Classes subdivided into divisions. ERG Page 13

• Placards and labels used for transport are based on DOT Hazard Class. ERG Pages 16-17


Chemical Threats ResponseRecognit ion – Clue 4 Shipping Papers (ERG inside

cover)MODE CALLED LOCATION

Rail Waybill andCosist

With crew

Highway Bill of Ladding Driver / on seator door pocket

Air Airbill Pilot

Pipeline Marker At cross withother mode oftransport



Recognit ion – Clue 4 Facil i ty Documents

Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS)• Required by the Federal Hazard Communication

Standard and Florida Right-to-Know Law• Provide: general information ingredients,

physical and chemical characterist ics, f ire and explosion hazards, reactivity data, health hazards and toxicology, precautions for safe handling, f irst aid, control and clean up measures, transportat ion data, disposal data, and label data.

Emergency Response Plans (ERP)Emergency Action Plans (EAP)



Recognit ion – Clue 5 Markings and Colors

• Container colors are not standardized• National Fire Protection Associat ion 704 Diamond• Military markings


NFPA 704 Diamond



Recognit ion – Clue 6 Human Senses

SMELLSIGHTSOUNDTOUCHTASTE


Chemical Threats

Response

Recognition

Isolation

Protection

Notif ication



Isolation

Contain the immediate hazard

• Explosion

• Fire

• Contamination

See ERG Yellow, Blue, and Green Sections



This is a Test

Match the chemical with its ID number?

3065

2015

1005

What are Hazards associated with each?


Chemical Threats

Response

Recognition

Isolation

Protection

Notif ication



Protection

Self

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) -- OSHA 29CFR.1910.120

Others

Downwind Hazard -- ERG Green Pages

• Evacuate

• Shelter-in-place

• Decontamination



Protection: Self

Portals of Entry

• Respiratory System

• Eyes

• Skin

• Ingestion System



Protection: Personal Protective Equipment

Level A

Best Respiratory and skin protection.

Posit ive pressure SCBA, fully encapsulated chemical protective suit.

For unknown skin absorptive material and high splash hazards.




Level B

High level respiratory protection but less for skin protection.Posit ive pressure SCBA, hooded chemical resist ive clothing.

For areas less than 19.5% Oxygen, unidentif ied gas and vapor and low skin hazard.




Level C

Modest skin protection.

Full or half hooded APR, hooded chemical resist ive clothing.

For no skin hazards, no unknowns, and suff icient oxygen.




Level D

No respiratory or skin protection needed.

Ordinary work uniform.

May include coveralls, reinforced-toe boots, and safety helmet.


Infectious Disease

Personal Protective Equipment• Airborne precautions

– Part icles < 5 μM– Remain suspended in air, can be dispersed by air currents

• Recommendation: Fitted respirators meeting NIOSH N95 or better



Protection

Self

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Others

Downwind Hazard ERG Green Pages

• Evacuate

• Shelter-in-place

• Decontamination



Protection Others

Downwind Hazard ERG Green Pages

Met Condit ions:

Lapse

Cool/Warm

Inversion

Warm/Cool

Neutral

Cool/Cool



Protection

This is a Test

What is the DWHD for:

Methyliodide

1005

Chlorine

Compare small/ large/day/night



DecontaminationThe Hot Zone, also called the Exclusion Zone, ful ly encloses the Incident site -- the immediate scene of the terrorist event.

The hot zone wil l extend downwind depending on the level of vapor hazard.

All personnel must be in PPE.



Decontamination

The Warm Zone, also called the Contamination Reduction Zone, is located upwind and preferably up gradient from the Hot Zone. Rescue, decon, and medical personnel are located here and al l must be in PPE.

A tr iage point is located near the Hot Zone exit control point for rapid assessment and further disposit ion of contaminated casualties.



Decontamination

The Cold Zone, also known as the Support Zone, is located upwind and up gradient from the Warm Zone. All persons working in the Cold Zone should have respirators available in the event of a wind shift that would put them at risk for downwind vapor inhalation.

A second tr iage point and a medical aid station may be set up here to further evaluate casualties for on-site treatment or immediate evacuation to a fully capable medical faci l i ty.


Contagious Disease: Isolat ion Rooms

• Patients housed in rooms under negative pressure

• At least 6 to12 air changes/hour• Air not re-circulated to other rooms


Chemical Threats

Response

Recognition

Isolation

Protection

Notif ication



Notif ication (Also See ERG page 384)

Who ya gonna call?

• All major chemical releases must be reported to the State Warning Point 800-320-0519. Suspected chemical terrorism events, must also be reported to the FBI.

• The National Response Center maintains a one-stop point of contact site and hotl ine number 800-424-8802 for reporting oil and chemical spil ls -- to include chemical or biological terrorism releases.

• CHEMTREC established by the chemical industry as a public service hotl ine 800-424-9300 for f ire f ighters, law enforcement and other emergency responders to obtain information about emergency incidents involving toxic chemicals and hazardous materials.


Chemical Threats:

Commercial and industrial chemicals

Chemical warfare agents


Chemical Threats: Chemical Warfare AgentsClassif ications:

Choking/Asphyxiat ion

• Phosgene

Blister/Vesicants

• Mustards, Lewisite, Phosgene oxime

Blood/Cytochrome oxidase inhibitors

• Hydrogen Cyanide, Cyanogen chloride

Nerve/acetylcholine esterace inhibitors

• Sarin, Soman, Tabun, VX


Chemical Threats: Chemical Warfare AgentsSarin (2810)

Mil itary Designation GB

Physical State Liquid at 25 o C/77o F

Odor/color None/colorless l iquid

Symptoms Onset Seconds to minutes. If lethal dose is absorbed, symptoms can progress to death in 15 minutes.

Vapor Toxicit ies in mg-min/m 3 LCt50 100 ICt50 75

Skin Absorption LD50 1700 mg

Eye Injury (Miosis) in mg-min/m 3 MCt50 3


Chemical Threats: Chemical Warfare AgentsVX (2810)

Mil itary Designation VX

Physical State Liquid at 25 o C/77o F

Odor/color none/colorless to amber l iquid

Symptoms Onset Seconds to minutes. If lethal dose is absorbed, symptoms can progress to death in 15 minutes or less.

Vapor Toxicit ies in mg-min/m 3 LCt50 50 ICt50 35

Skin Absorption Toxicit ies Skin LD50 10 mg

Eye Injury (Miosis) MCt50in mg-min/m3 < 1


Chemical Threats: Chemical Warfare AgentsSarin (2810)

Medical Management. Depending on the dissemination method and the dose received, casualties may require decon, administering of antidotes, venti lation, and supportive care.

There are three therapeutic drugs used to treat nerve agent exposure: atropine, pralidoxime chloride (2-PAMCl), and anti-convulsive drugs such as diazepam.

In cases of severe nerve agent exposure, venti lation has been required for up to three hours.

Long term supportive care wil l be required for those with prolonged central nervous system effects.


Chemical Threats: Chemical Warfare AgentsSarin

Protection Because nerve agents can cause casualties from exposure to both vapors and l iquid contact, ful l respiratory and non-permeable outer garment protection is required (Level A – Level B).

Decontamination Nerve agents hydrolyze under conditions of high pH. Hot soapy water solutions can be effective in removing agent from skin, but complete hydrolysis occurs over t ime and run-off from decon waters may sti l l contain sufficient agent to cause casualties among unprotected people.

Skin decontamination is not needed for those who have only been exposed to vapor only; however, clothing should be removed because it may outgas trapped vapor.


Chemical Threats: Case Study

Tokyo Subway Attack

After numerous failed attempts to disseminate anthrax spores and botulinum toxin, in and around Tokyo, on March 20, 1995, members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult, led by Shoko Asahara succeeded in releasing sarin in 5 trains running on three major subway l ines converging in downtown Tokyo.

More than 5,500 people were affected. There were 641 casualties result ing from sarin inhalation that required medical treatment and 12 deaths.



Tokyo Subway Attack



Tokyo Subway Attack

The Tokyo Fire Department transported 688 victims to area hospitals. The remainder of the victims were transported by police vehicle, taxicabs, or self-evacuated to hospitals on their own.

The nearest medical faci l i ty in central Tokyo was St. Luke’s International Hospital which treated 641 casualties on the morning of the attack with 349 follow-up cases seen during the next week.



Tokyo Subway Attack

The first EMS request was made at 8:09 a.m. Tokyo Fire Department sent 340 units and a total of 1,364 personnel to 16 stations.

There was no attempt to establish decontamination.

About 10% of the responding personnel (a total of 135) were among the injured after direct or indirect sarin exposure.



Tokyo Subway Attack

There were 5 patients in crit ical condition. 3 arr ived with cardiopulmonary arrest; 2 were unconscious went into respiratory arrest soon after arrival.

Three were successfully resuscitated. One patient did not respond to cardiopulmonary resuscitation and died.

A second patient was resuscitated but died on day 28 after the attack due to irreversible brain damage.

The other 10 deaths occurred at the attack scene. Those who died included two station employees who had tr ied to remove the bags of sarin.


Chemical Threats: Case StudyTokyo Subway Attack

106 casualties (43 men and 63 women, including 4 who were pregnant) were tr iaged into the moderate severity category and hospitalized for overnight observation.

Many complained of headache; dyspnea, nausea, vomiting, muscle weakness, coughing, agitation, and fasciculation.

Hospitalized patients were treated init ial ly with 2 mg of intravenous atropine sulfate and 2 g of pralidoxime chloride after the agent was confirmed as sarin. Intravenous diazepam was administered for fasciculation.

The remaining 531 casualties had mainly with eye problems (miosis). They were treated with intravenous atropine sulfate, observed for six hours and released if no other symptoms developed.



Tokyo Subway Attack

One month after the attack, St. Luke's mailed questionnaires to 610 of those they treated. Of those responding nearly 60% reported post traumatic stress disorders. Many sought the services of psychiatrists to relieve their psychological symptoms.

•32% of the victims harbored phobias related to using the subway.

•29% reported insomnia.

•16% sti l l had flashbacks of scenes they witnessed on the day of the attack.

•16% reported depression.

•10% reported vivid nightmares.



Tokyo Subway Attack – Lessons Learned

1. Attack Effectiveness. Although the sarin was not pure or concentrated and the dissemination method was crude, it created a mass casualty event.

2. Init ial ly, there was no control possible at the scene. Many of those affected self-evacuated to area hospitals. Some with mild symptoms chose not to seek medical attention.

3. Although Tokyo-area hospitals had emergency and disaster plans because of the high incidents of earthquakes, they were unprepared for a mass casualty incident where al l victims were exposed to the same toxic substance.



Tokyo Subway Attack – Lessons Learned

4. There was no attempt by on scene responders to alert the hospital or communicate investigation results.

5. There was no attempt to decontaminate victims either at the scene or at the hospital. Although the major threat from sarin is vapor inhalation, some of the victims apparently contacted the l iquid sarin or had pockets of vapor trapped in their outer clothing. Over 10% of f irst responders and 20% of the St. Luke's staff who treated victims developed nerve agent symptoms that included miosis, ocular pain, headache, sore throat, dyspnea, nausea, dizziness, and nose pain.

5. Mass psychogenic i l lness and post traumatic stress are factors that must be considered in the treatment of weapons of mass destruction attacks in addition to the treatment of physical symptoms.


Chemical Threats

Questions?

Issues?

Discussion?

Jack Pittman

Director,

Public Health Preparedness

Leon CHD and NFRDSTF

Heather Lake

Division of Environmental Health

Bioterror Threat

Bioterror Threat

Why Bioterror is an attractive option?

• Spectrum of effects

Dial an outcome – mild to lethal

Contagion vs. contamination

• Covert Ops

• Extremely high terror and psychological consequences

Bioterror Threat

Emerging DiseasesIs mother nature the ult imate bioterrorist?

• HIV/AIDS

• WNV

• EEE

• SARS

• Monkeypox

• Malaria

• Antibiotic resistance

• Pandemic Flu

• Unknown unknowns

Bioterror Threat

Bioterror Defense

• Education and training

• Intell igence

• Surveil lance

• Vaccination

• Isolation and quarantine

• Stockpile

• Responsive logistics

• Research

Bioterror Threat

Questions?

Issues?

Discussion?

chemical response plan good

Engineering

massdestruction wmd

hazards responseexplosive

incendiary threats

wmd eventon public health

chemical release incident

chemical terrorism event

industrial chemicalsfbi

hazmat event