chemistry and diplomacy: science education and science

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Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 1 Chemistry and Diplomacy: Science Education and Science Communication in Disarmament Jonathan E. Forman Science Policy Adviser, Office of Strategy and Policy Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [email protected] Figure 1: Online resources available from www.opcw.org and OPCW social media accounts; this figure is interactive with hyperlinks to the indicated materials and information. Science for Diplomats Chemical Weapons Convention S&T Monitor Science & Technology Resources Social Media Resources for Students and Teachers Fact Sheets Scientific Advisory Board The Hague Ethical Guidelines OPCW Today /opcw @opcw @opcw_st /opcw /opcwonline /opcwonline /opcw Capacity Building Programmes Director-General Speeches Speeches

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Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 1

Chemistry and Diplomacy: Science Education and Science Communication in

Disarmament

Jonathan E. Forman

Science Policy Adviser, Office of Strategy and Policy

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

[email protected]

Figure 1: Online resources available from www.opcw.org and OPCW social media accounts; this figure is

interactive with hyperlinks to the indicated materials and information.

Science for Diplomats

Chemical Weapons Convention

S&T Monitor

Science & Technology Resources

Social Media

Resources for Students and Teachers

Fact Sheets

Scientific Advisory Board

The Hague Ethical Guidelines

OPCW Today

/opcw

@opcw

@opcw_st /opcw /opcwonline

/opcwonline /opcw

Capacity Building Programmes

Director-General Speeches Speeches

Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 2

Abstract

Science plays a critical role in international disarmament policy and diplomacy; it informs negotiation of

international agreements and underpins the key provisions that define the mechanisms of treaty

implementation. From an outside view, the world of international disarmament appears to be driven by

diplomats and policy makers, not scientific experts; yet, to be effective, disarmament treaties require a

sound science and policymaker partnership. Such a partnership must overcome challenges to

communication and trust (much like the partnerships between States Parties to international treaties),

begging the question, how can this work? It requires clear science communication and engagement

between the two perspectives – scientists providing analytical thinking and technical assessments to policy

makers, who in turn provide global perspectives on the role and need for science in their work.

Exemplifying the need for scientific (and specifically chemistry) expertise in diplomacy is the Chemical

Weapons Convention (CWC), an international disarmament treaty that completely prohibits an entire class

of weapons of mass destruction. The implementing body for the CWC, the Organisation for the Prohibition

of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), bridges the gap between policy makers and scientific experts through its

Scientific Advisory Board and a variety of science communication initiatives. Such initiatives include

“Science for Diplomats” briefings and informal science and technology newsletters that are both accessible

to non-technical audiences and provide useful links to informative technical publications. We describe here

the role of science in disarmament and look at some of the materials and resources made available to

scientific and diplomatic communities alike through the OPCW website (Figure 1).

Introduction

History is rich with examples of “game-changing” scientific discoveries with both positive and

negative societal and political impact. Science brings forward beneficial changes to the way we

live and work; technological advances provide opportunities for economic development; and in a

world concerned about sustainability, climate change, and supporting a planet with more than

seven billion human inhabitants - advice requiring inputs from scientific experts, has never been

more important. Studying science on its own, however, may not be enough to prepare an

individual to effectively bring their scientific expertise into the realm of policy and world affairs

– an effort that requires understanding and awareness of policy needs and consequences of

science, and the ability to effectively communicate science to decision makers (whose

educational backgrounds and experience are likely to lie outside of scientific disciplines).1

Looking across the broad spectrum of policy and diplomacy with strong scientific dimensions,

international efforts for the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) nicely

highlight the critical need for scientific expertise in an international political endeavor.

Disarmament provides examples of the intersection of science and diplomacy that might prompt

science students to explore how the subject they study finds its way into global initiatives.

Disarmament lends itself to introducing students to the intricacies and nuances of effectively

informing and communicating science to decision makers; people who must balance a complex

set of technical and non-technical inputs in their work (and students will inadvertently be

exposed to similar circumstances in their post-educational work experiences, regardless of the

sector in which they build professional careers). In this regard, the Chemical Weapons

Convention (CWC),2 an international disarmament treaty banning chemical weapons, could

serve as a subject matter example; perhaps inspiring chemistry students to consider using their

scientific training to bring technical insight into the realm of policy and diplomacy.

Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 3

The Chemical Weapons Convention and the OPCW

Opened for signature in 1993, the CWC entered into force on April 29, 1997, with eighty-seven

States Parties (The nations supporting the treaty); today there are 192 States Parties, the most

recent being Angola, as of 16 October 2015 (see Figure 2). Along with the CWC, there are two

other widely recognized (and in-force) international treaties regulating disarmament and

nonproliferation of WMDs, these being the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons (NPT, 191 States Parties)3 and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC, 173

States Parties).4

Figure 2: States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. As of 16 October 2015, four states remain not

party to the CWC: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Israel (signed, but not ratified) and South Sudan.

The CWC was designed to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction by

prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, or use of

chemical weapons by States Parties; all under strict international verification. The States Parties

are obligated to enforce this prohibition within their jurisdiction, including destroying chemical

weapon stockpiles that they possess. Implementation revolves around a verification regime,

agreed to by the States Parties, that allows international chemical weapons inspectors to verify

the destruction of military stockpiles and to inspect chemical production facilities (including

commercial facilities) meeting certain criteria within their territories. Can you imagine

international chemical weapons inspectors visiting the very same commercial chemical

production facilities where some of today’s chemistry students might ultimately find

employment? This actually happens, with the consent of the governments of the territories

where such facilities are located, across the States Parties. In 2014 nearly 3000 days of chemical

weapons inspector time was spent visiting industrial facilities!5 The Organization for the

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the recipient of the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize "for its

extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons",6 oversees this verification mechanism as the

implementing body for the CWC.

Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 4

There are four areas of focus in CWC implementation as illustrated in Figure 3: destruction of

chemical weapons; non-proliferation and the prevention of re-emergence of chemical weapons

(this includes verification activities such as declarations, inspections and investigations);

capacity building and training in assistance and protection; and promoting international

cooperation in the peaceful use of chemistry for economic and technological development

(implemented through a series of capacity building programmes7). All of these focal areas

require that the science of chemistry be an integral part of treaty implementation. A requirement

that demands the OPCW interact with the greater chemistry community; place priority on

education and engagement to raise awareness of its work and the contributions both from and to

science in chemical disarmament; and a requirement for scientific experts within the OPCW to

effectively engage policy makers on technical subject matter.

Figure 3: Areas of focus for the OPCW in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Science and the CWC

Treaties like the CWC, the NPT and the BWC are underpinned by science and technology.

Scientific principles directly inform definitions of classes and categories of weapons; as well as

the governing mechanisms and verification of compliance, inspection, and assistance and

protection. Science likewise played a key role in treaty negotiation, providing a technical basis

on which to build policy. Furthermore, technical experts are necessary to define methods of

Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 5

disarmament and oversight, and to provide scientific recommendations for technical aspects of

cooperative agreements and assistance measures. Despite this basis in science, science and

disarmament are often seen to be in opposition. From a security perspective, scientific and

technological advancement generates concerns about “dual-use”;8 concerns that can overshadow

the consideration of potential benefits. Multidisciplinary scientific development (a common and

beneficial practice amongst scientists) has led to concerns of potential challenges to treaty

implementation policies which might be based on traditional viewpoints of what does or does not

fall under a specific scientific discipline (e.g., the “convergence” of chemistry and biology9).

Even scientific collaborations, which when focused on peaceful uses of chemistry support the

norms of treaty implementation (see Figure 3), generate security concerns due to proliferation of

technical knowledge with misuse potential. With scientific and technological developments

occurring at a pace that leaves laws, regulations, and treaties lagging behind,10 there will almost

certainly continue to be tensions between science and disarmament related security perspectives.

In the world of chemical weapons disarmament, such tensions (and the potential for distrust of

science) are further fueled by recent reports of the use of chemical agents in Syria and Iraq; the

commemoration of the first large scale use of chemicals weapons, one-hundred years ago in

World War One11 (under the supervision of chemist and Nobel Laureate Fritz Haber12); the

legacy of old and abandoned chemical weapons from long gone military programmes;13

reminders of how the first nerve agents were developed from research on pesticides,14 and how

the first chemotherapy agents were discovered by examining the victims of mustard agent

exposure15 (in this case, perhaps an example of a reverse dual-use discovery).

On the other hand, for a science based treaty that promotes scientific cooperation to build trust

between States Parties (“science diplomacy”), scientific development and practices also provide

opportunities to adopt new methods for and support the norms of treaty implementation.16 Given

these considerations and science-security tensions, how does a disarmament focused

organization effectively use science advice and engage scientists?

To ensure the availability of scientific advice, CWC Article VIII explicitly states that there is a

need to “review scientific and technological developments that could affect the operation of this

Convention”.17 The OPCW addresses this need through its Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), an

independent body of twenty-five scientific experts nominated by States Parties and appointed by

the Director-General, to render specialized advice on science and technology (see Figure 4).18

The SAB meets once to twice a year and has held twenty-two meetings since 1998, the most

recent in June 2015.

The technical experts of the SAB are called upon to provide advice to policy makers. Reports of

the SAB meetings (the most recent from June 201520) are written in a manner that makes their

proceedings accessible and understandable to these policy makers; while at the same time, the

considerations and questions addressed by the SAB require researching and compiling

substantive scientific information and evaluating scientific conclusions (recent examples include

reports on medical treatments for blister and nerve agent exposure,21, 22 fact-sheets on the toxins

ricin23 and saxitoxin24, and advice on chemicals that meet the definition of a riot control agent25).

Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 6

Figure 4: The OPCW Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) in 2015.19

Ultimately, the effectiveness of the SAB lies in its ability to communicate – to take complex

scientific information and present it to policy makers clearly enough to inform their policy

decisions. Likewise, when policy makers need sound technical advice, they need to ask sound

Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 7

technical questions of the SAB. To help facilitate this communication, the chairperson of the

SAB holds briefings to States Parties,26 where technical recommendations and findings of the

SAB can be explained and discussed.

In effect, the ability to translate scientific and technical conclusions into information that can be

used to inform and guide policy is the most critical aspect of providing science advice.27

Examples of this translation in the context of the CWC can be found in the SABs report on

developments of science and technology to a Review Conference of the CWC held in 201328 and

the response to this report from the OPCW Director-General.29

Education and Engagement

Reports from the SAB30 and documents related to their work31 are readily available. Reviewing

such materials, however, might suggest a highly specialized Board and conversation; with

perhaps little accessibility or familiarity to the subject matter for those outside CWC circles (this

is really no different from a diplomat reading a paper in a peer-reviewed scientific journal).

Such materials, while informative in regard to the scientific issues of relevance to the OPCW,

may not be ideal for engaging broader communities of scientists and non-scientists alike. To

facilitate awareness raising about chemical disarmament and chemical safety and security issues

into broader communities, the OPCW engages in social media and makes a number of

publications available through its website, www.opcw.org (see Figure 1). The OPCWs efforts in

education and outreach have been further supported through advice and activities from an SAB

working group that met from 2012 to 2014.32

Just as other international organisations, along with governments and world leaders have

embraced social media (especially Twitter)33, 34 for engaging with the wider world (and one

another) – the OPCW maintains a social media presence through which it provide updates on its

work, makes available informational (and educational) materials and engages with its

stakeholders and the general public. OPCW social media accounts are provided in Figure 1.

To further support awareness raising activities, OPCW produces publications intended to be

accessible to broader audiences (Figure 5). Three of these publications may hold interest to

those who study and teach chemistry.

The first is a series of Fact Sheets that cover historical, procedural, and some technical

aspects of the work of the OPCW (top of Figure 5).35

The second, the OPCW Today (bottom of Figure 5) is an in-house periodical with articles

contributed by OPCW staff and outside experts.36 The August 2014 edition is notable as

the first issue of OPCW Today to be dedicated to science and technology,37 containing

articles that highlight science in the work of the OPCW and technical papers that include a

review of the chemistry of chemical weapon destruction38 and the chemistry used in the

analysis of blood samples to detect exposure to nerve agents.39

Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 8

Figure 5: Examples of OPCW publications: (Top) Fact Sheets35, (Middle) Science and Technology Monitor40, and

(Bottom) OPCW Today36.

Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 9

The third of these publications is the OPCW Science and Technology Monitor (middle of

Figure 5),40 a science focused newsletter. The Monitor started as an intern project to

report on new scientific developments; it has since become a sort of platform for science

communication – providing links and references to technical reports and papers,

highlighting descriptive materials accessible to those who may not be subject matter

experts, looking at broad and intersecting areas of science and technology, and presenting

material in a sometimes humorous fashion to generate interest in science. The OPCW

Science and Technology Monitor mailing list includes scientists, social scientists, staff

members of governmental agencies and ministries, diplomats and policy makers from

across the States Parties of the CWC. If one considers that answers to the “S&T Puzzle”

feature of the newsletter have been submitted by both scientists and policy makers, the

newsletter has informally facilitated scientist-policy maker engagement!

The OPCW website hosts other links to resources for students and teachers interested in CWC

relevant topics.41 These include: e-learning modules about the OPCW and online training tools

for those involved in CWC related activities (specifically declarations and industry

inspections);42 materials from a 2014 conference on education for peace that brought together

stakeholders to discuss best practices for raising awareness on disarmament and non-

proliferation issues in educational institutions; 43 and, the Fires Project,44 a series of short films

exploring personnel stories with chemical weapons related dimensions. Fires stories include the

ethical dilemma raised by the use of one’s chemistry training to produce weapons (e.g. Fritz

Haber)45 and the story of a man who as a child survived a 1988 mustard agent attack in

Halabja46.

The OPCW supports projects by science educators, a recent example being the IUPAC Multiple

Uses of Chemicals Project.47 The “Multiple Uses of Chemicals” is an interactive online tool that

explores the beneficial uses, misuses, and abuses of multi-use chemicals, both historically and

presently; the website is designed to be informative for students, educators and policymakers.48

Outreach activities of the OPCW are further strengthened through public engagement by staff

members. Such engagements cover a diversity of audiences and interests across many sectors of

society. For those interested in how the OPCW raises awareness about chemical disarmament,

non-proliferation and the role of science when communicating beyond scientific and diplomatic

communities; speeches and statements publicly delivered by the OPCW Director-General are

available online.49 Figure 6 is a visualization of the Director-General’s words and provides a

high level glimpse at the topics addressed in these public venues.

Science for Diplomats (and Diplomacy for Scientists)

The education and engagement resources thus far presented, offer information about the CWC,

the OPCW, and pertinent issues in the field of chemical disarmament. Effective science and

policy maker engagement, however, needs more than reference materials; it requires building

trust and forming “partnerships”. When effective, scientists would support policy decisions with

analytical thinking and technical insights; while policy makers would provide guidance on where

scientific research, inputs, and applications are best suited to help solve global problems.

Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 10

The first step is learning to communicate. A scientific approach to a problem might start from

making an observation then forming a hypothesis, followed by asking questions (running

experiments). As those of us trained in science realize, the answer that comes from an

experiment often has a bit of uncertainty associated with it, and this is good because it allows us

to ask new (and perhaps more interesting) questions. In the world of policy makers, answers to

questions are desired (answers that are not themselves question) and uncertainty can bring down

political careers! Combine these different approaches to problem solving with the science-

security tensions previously mentioned and productive engagement can become difficult.

Figure 6: The words of the OPCW Director-General. This word cloud, highlighting the common thematic words

within the speeches, is the compilation of 22 public speeches delivered from 22 January to 10 October 2015 to

audiences that span many sectors of society.49

Policy makers seen by scientists as “science literate” serve to help reduce science-security

tensions, this requires good and clear science communication. To help promote science literacy

and to compliment other science communication tools, the OPCW initiated a series of “Science

for Diplomats” briefings in 2014. These briefings are held as lunch time events during meetings

of the States Parties and have covered topics that include: CWC relevant chemical50 and

biomedical51 analysis, biobased chemical production methods,52 unintended by-products from

chemical processes,53 medical countermeasures to chemical agents54 and the technical aspects of

the algorithm used to select chemical facilities for CWC inspections55. While such briefings are

not in-depth science lectures, they serve an important purpose by “de-mystifying” science and

creating a link between science and the world of the policy makers. This is especially relevant

when considering how to take forward advice and recommendations from the SAB. Additional

briefings on science and CWC implementation are provided to meetings of National Authorities

of States Parties and new diplomats assigned to CWC delegations.56 Presentations from the

Science for Diplomats and related briefings are available online.57 This material might lend

itself for use as introductory or supplementary information to a chemistry lecture.

Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 11

Figure 7: A poster illustrating the mechanism of action of organophosphorus nerve agents and some of the types of

medical countermeasures used to mitigate these effects.61 This poster is one of a number of technical graphics

available from the Science and Technology section of the OPCW website.62

From a policy maker’s viewpoint and in light of science-security tensions, scientists who are

seen as aware of the potential for misuse of science and who promote responsible practices to

prevent such misuse can help to build trust. In this regard, the topic of codes of conduct and

Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 12

ethics for scientists as a way to promote responsible science is often raised.58 In support of

ethical practices in chemistry relevant to the CWC, a group of chemistry practitioners recently

drafted “The Hague Ethical Guidelines”,59 a set of elements that provide CWC relevant inputs to

complement the many already existing codes from chemistry relevant organisations.60

Science for scientists

For those interested in more in-depth scientific and technical aspects of the work of the OPCW,

the Science and Technology section of www.opcw.org hosts science resources in the form of

presentations and posters.61 Figure 7, a poster explaining the mechanism of action of

organophosphorus nerve agents and medical countermeasures against them, is one example;62 a

collection of similar graphics is available online and new documents are regularly added to the

site.63

Concluding Thoughts

There is a clear need to engage those with scientific and technical expertise to address issues of

global importance. As forward looking and robust policies in any sector rely on sound technical

inputs, it is valuable to explore ways to inform students about the intersection of science with

world events and decision makers. While many examples can be found to meet these needs,

disarmament treaties, in particular the CWC, can provide examples from chemistry to help make

such connections. In this regard, Figure 1 is an interactive map to a variety of resources from the

OPCW that may provide opportunities to discuss disarmament issues with chemistry dimensions.

Spring 2016 presents another opportunity to discuss the CWC, the OPCW and the role of

chemistry in global events. The OPCW, the IUPAC Committee on Chemistry Education (CCE)

and the ACS CHED Committee on Computers in Chemical Education (CCCE) are offering a

Spring 2016 ConfChem online conference on “Chemistry, Disarmament and Education”, to start

on 6 May 2016. Papers will highlight examples from the CWC in the teaching of chemistry;

describe the analytical chemistry of chemical weapons inspection and how it is used for decision

making; examine definitions of toxicity; explore the chemistry of riot control agents; consider

how simple sensors can be used to teach concepts in analytical chemistry and facilitate

international collaborations; and discuss responsible science and ethical considerations in

chemistry. This is an open access virtual colloquium and all are welcome. Further information

is available from the ConfChem homepage.64

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to acknowledge colleagues in the OPCW Office of Strategy and Policy (OSP) and other divisions

across the OPCW for support and guidance in navigating the world of science and policy. Many of the graphical

materials described in this paper were prepared by a talented international group of interns who the author has had

the pleasure of working with: Edoxie Allier-Gagneur (France), Wesam Alwan (Iraq), Wardah Amir (United States

of America), Lisa Bergstrom (United States of America), Natalie Childress (United States of America), Amaury

Crucy (France), Thomas Cummings (United Kingdom), Thomas Faria (Brazil), Amir Imani (Iran), Beatrice Maneshi

(United States of America), Grace Massey (United Kingdom), Johannes Niemeier (Germany), and Inam Siraj

(Bangladesh).

Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 13

References

1. While not an OPCW resource, those interested in science advice to policy makers and governments can

obtain useful information and resources from the International Network for Government Science Advice;

http://www.globalscienceadvice.org/.

2. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons

and on their Destruction; Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, available at

https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/.

3. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs,

http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml.

4. The Biological Weapons Convention: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and

Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction; United Nations

Office for Disarmament Affairs, http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio.

5. Annual reports of OPCW activities available at: https://www.opcw.org/documents-reports/annual-reports/.

6. See also http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2013/opcw-facts.html.

7. In this regard, OPCW offers a number of capacity building programmes for science in developing

countries; more information is available at:

https://www.opcw.org/our-work/international-cooperation/capacity-building-programmes/.

8. “Dual-use” describes science and technology developed or used for civilian purposes that has the potential

for military application or can contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

9. Convergence of Chemistry and Biology: Report of the Scientific Advisory Board’s Temporary Working

Group; Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, June 2014,

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/TWG_Scientific_Advsiory_Group_Final_Report.pdf.

10. Jim Whitman, “The Challenge to Deliberative Systems of Technological Systems Convergence,”

Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 20, no. 4 (December 2007): 329–342.

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13511610701760747?journalCode=ciej20.

11. Sarah Everts, “When Chemicals Became Weapons of War,” Chemical and Engineering News 93, no. 8 (23

February 2015): 9-21. http://chemicalweapons.cenmag.org/when-chemicals-became-weapons-of-war/.

12. Sarah Everts, “Who was the father of chemical weapons?”, Chemical and Engineering News 93, no. 8 (23

February 2015): 18-23. http://chemicalweapons.cenmag.org/who-was-the-father-of-chemical-weapons/.

13. Debora MacKenzie, “Gas! Gas! Gas!”, New Scientist 228, no. 3044 (24 October 2015): 34–37.

14. Försvarets forskningsanstalt, A FOA briefing book on chemical weapons: threat, effects and protection,

Sundbyberg 1992.

15. Sarah Hazell, Mustard gas – from the Great War to frontline chemotherapy, Cancer Research UK Science

Blog, 27 August 2014.

http://scienceblog.cancerresearchuk.org/2014/08/27/mustard-gas-from-the-great-war-to-frontline-

chemotherapy/.

16. Beatrice Maneshi, Jonathan E. Forman, “The Intersection of Science and Chemical Disarmament,” Science

& Diplomacy, Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 2015),

http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2015/intersection-of-science-and-chemicaldisarmament.

Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 14

17. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons

and on their Destruction; Article VIII, Part B, Paragraph 21(h), Organisation for the Prohibition of

Chemical Weapons, www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-viii-the-organization.

18. Additional information about the OPCW SAB is available at:

https://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/subsidiary-bodies/scientific-advisory-board/.

19. This figure is available as an infographic from:

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/SAB_Infographic.pdf.

20. Available at: https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/sab-22-01_e_.pdf.

21. Response to the Director-General’s Request to the Scientific Advisory Board to Provide Further Advice on

Assistance and Protection, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 29 April 2014,

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/sab-21-wp07_e_.pdf.

22. Response to the Director-General’s Request to the Scientific Advisory Board to Provide Further Advice on

Assistance and Protection, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 10 June 2015,

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/sab-22-wp02_e_.pdf.

23. “Ricin Fact Sheet”, organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 28 February 2014,

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/sab-21-wp05_e_.pdf.

24. “Saxitoxin Fact Sheet”, organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 28 February 2014,

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/sab-21-wp04_e_.pdf.

25. Declaration of Riot-Control Agents: Advice from the Scientific Advisory Board; Organisation for the

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 1 May 2014,

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/S_series/2014/en/s-1177-2014_e_.pdf.

26. The most recent Briefing by the SAB Chair, from 7 October 2015 is available at:

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/TIMPERLEY_EC-

80_Briefing_States__7_October_2015__FINAL.pdf.

27. For a useful perspective on science advice to governments, see: Peter Gluckman, “The art of science advice

to government”, Nature 507 (13 March 2014): 163–165 doi:10.1038/507163a,

http://www.nature.com/news/policy-the-art-of-science-advice-to-government-1.14838.

28. Report of the Scientific Advisory Board on Developments in Science and Technology for the Third Special

Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons;

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 29 October 2012,

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/CSP/RC-3/en/rc3dg01_e_.pdf.

29. Director-General’s Response to the Report of the Scientific Advisory Board on Developments in Science

and Technology for the Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the

Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention; Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,

31 January 2013, https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/CSP/RC-3/en/rc3dg02_e_.pdf.

30. https://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/subsidiary-bodies/scientific-advisory-board/documents/reports/.

31. https://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/subsidiary-bodies/scientific-advisory-board/documents/related-

documents/.

Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 15

32. Education and Engagement: Promoting a Culture of Responsible Chemistry; Organisation for the

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, November 2014, https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/Education_and_Engagement-v2.pdf.

33. “How do International Organisations Tweet in 2015?”, http://twiplomacy.com/blog/how-do-international-

organisations-tweet-2015/. Mentioned in this article is the communication on Twitter from the Nobel Prize

Committee on 11 October 2013 – the announcement that OPCW had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

34. “Twiplomacy Study 2015”, http://www.twiplomacy.com/blog/twiplomacy-study-2015/.

35. Available at: https://www.opcw.org/documents-reports/fact-sheets/.

36. Available at: https://www.opcw.org/documents-reports/opcw-today/.

37. OPCW Today: Science and Technology, Issue 3, no. 1 (August 2014);

http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/OPCW_Today/OPCW_Today_-_Vol_3_No_1.pdf.

38. Roberto Martínez Álvarez, “The Chemistry of Destruction”, OPCW Today: Science and Technology, Issue

3, no. 1 (August 2014): 10 - 13.

39. “Conducting Analysis of Biomedical Samples to Assess Exposure to Organophosphorus Nerve Agents”,

OPCW Today: Science and Technology, Issue 3, no. 1 (August 2014): 18 - 21.

40. Current and past issues of the OPCW Science and Technology Monitor are available at:

https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/science-technology/science-technology-monitor/. To be added to

the mailing list, sign up at the link above or email [email protected].

41. See https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/education/.

42. Information on how to get access to OPCW e-learning tools can be found at:

https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/education/e-learning/.

43. Education for Peace: New Pathways for Securing Chemical Disarmament; conference held from 22 – 23

September 2014, https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/education/education-for-peace/.

44. The Fires Project, http://www.thefiresproject.com/.

45. Fires: A Teachers Mission; https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/education/fires/. The link includes

materials for a classroom lesson related to Fritz Haber and the ethics of applying the knowledge of

chemistry to warfare.

46. Ich Liebe Dich, http://www.thefiresproject.com/ich-liebe-dich.html#sthash.7quEmaz9.dpbs.

47. Peter Mahaffy, Joseph Zondervan, Alastair Hay, Daniel Feakes, Jonathan Forman; “Multiple Uses of

Chemicals IUPAC and OPCW Working Toward Responsible Science”; Chemistry International 36 (2014):

9-13. DOI:10.1515/ci-2014-0508; see also DOI:10.1515/ci-2014-0509 and DOI:10.1515/ci-2014-0510.

48. Multiple Uses of Chemicals. http://multiple.kcvs.ca/site/index.html.

49. See: https://www.opcw.org/documents-reports/speeches-statements/speeches-statements-by-the-director-

general/.

Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 16

50. “Chemical Analysis in the Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention”, Science for Diplomats 9

July 2014,

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/Science_Technology/Diplomats_Programme/S_T_VER_Gregg.pd

f.

51. “Conducting Analysis of Biomedical Samples to Assess Exposure to Organophosphorus Nerve Agents”,

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/Science_Technology/Diplomats_Programme/S_T_Biomed_Analy

sis_Poster.pdf.

52. “The Science of the Bioeconomy”, Science for Diplomats, 5 December 2014,

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/Science_Technology/Diplomats_Programme/S_T_Bioeconomy_

Gebhardt.pdf

53. “Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals as captive intermediates and unintended by-products”, Science for Diplomats,

17 March 2015,

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/CSP/C-18/en/TIMPERLEY_Science_for_Diplomats.pdf.

54. “The Science of Medical Countermeasures”, Science for Diplomats, 8 July 2015,

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/Science_Technology/Diplomats_Programme/The_Science_of_Me

dical_Countermeasures_8_July_2015.pdf.

55. “Data Analytics and the CWC: An Introduction to OCPF Site Selection Methodology”, Science for

Diplomats, 8 July 2015,

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/Science_Technology/Diplomats_Programme/Introduction_Site_S

election.pdf.

56. “The Impact of Science and Technology on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention”,

15th Workshop for Diplomatic Personnel Involved in the Work of the OPCW, 30 September 2015,

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/Science_Technology/Diplomats_Programme/20150929-

Diplomats_Induction-S_T_Discussion.pdf.

57. See: https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/science-technology/science-for-diplomats/.

58. For example:

https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/science-technology/the-hague-ethical-guidelines/background-

information/.

59. The Hague Ethical Guidelines. https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/science-technology/the-hague-

ethical-guidelines/.

60. An analysis of existing codes performed as a part of the workshop that drafted The Hague Ethical

Guidelines, identified 142 existing codes of conduct and ethics relevant to chemistry – the list included

only English language documents and was by no means comprehensive. More information can be found in

the workshop report (the compiled set of codes are available on request, email [email protected]).

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/Hague_Ethical_Guidelines_2nd_Workshop_Report.pdf

61. Science and technology Special Section of the OPCW website. https://www.opcw.org/special-

sections/science-technology/.

62. “Organophosphorus (OP) Nerve Agents and their Countermeasures”,

https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/Science_Technology/Organophosphorus__OP__Nerve_Agents_a

nd_Countermeasures.pdf

63. Science and technology Resources, https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/science-technology/science-

technology-resources/.

Fall 2015 ACS CHED CCCE Newsletter 17

64. http://confchem.ccce.divched.org/2016SpringConfChem.