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ForewordGeneral employment of toxic munitions in World War I made it necessaryfor the United States as a belligerant to protect its soldiers against gas attack,and to furnish means for conducting gas warfare. The postwar revulsion againstthe use of gas in no way guaranteed that it would not be used in another war;and to maintain readiness for gas warfare, Congress therefore authorized the

retention of the Chemical Warfare Service as a small but important part of theArmy organization.Between world wars, officers of the Chemical Warfare Service anticipatedthat in another conflict the Service would again be principally concerned withgas warfare, and they concentrated on defense and retaliation against it. Thealmost equal preparedness of the United States and other nations for gas warfareacted during World War II as the principal deterrent to the uses of gas. That itwas no t used has obscured the very large and vital effort that preparations for gaswarfare required at home and overseas. This effort involved large numbers ofAmerican scientists and the American chemical industry as well as the ChemicalWarfare Service, and served no t only the Army but also the other armed forcesof the United States and those of Allied nations. And in World War II theChemical Warfare Service and its civilian collaborators came up with some newmajor weapons, notably the 4.2-inch mortar, generators for large-area smokescreening, flame throwers, and incendiary and flame bombs. The Service acquiredin addition an entirely new mission, that of preparing the nation against thehazards of biological attack. In fulfilling its responsibilities the Chemical War-fare Service during the war compiled a record of achievement that readers of thissubseries both in and out of the Army, will find instructive.Washington, D. C.7 March 1958 R. W. STEPHENSMaj. Gen., U. S. A.Chief of Military History

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The AuthorsDr. Leo P. Brophy holds an A.B. degree from Franklin and Marshall Collegeand M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in history from Fordham University. After teachinghistory and sociology at Fordham and Seton Hall Universities, he joined the

staff of the Chemical Corps Historical Office in 1945. He has specialized inadministrative and logistic history. Since 1953 Dr. Brophy has served as Chiefof the Chemical Corps Historical Office.Col. George B. Fisher, a graduate of the Industrial College of the ArmedForces, was commissioned in the National Army during World War I andreceived a Regular Army commission in 1920. As a Chemical Warfare Serviceofficer from 1929 until his retirement in 1947, he held a number of importanttraining and administrative posts, including tours as Chief of the TrainingDivision, Office of the Chief, CWS; Assistant Commandant of the ChemicalWarfare School; director of Army civil defense schools in World War II; andChemical Officer, Third United States Army in Europe. From 1951 until hisdeath in 1956 he served as a consultant in the Chemical Corps Historical Office.


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PrefaceThis is the first of three volumes devoted to the activities of the ChemicalWarfare Service in World War II. Part One of the present volume traces theorganization and administration of the Chemical Warfare Service from its

origins in World War I up through World War II. Part Two deals with trainingof military personnel for offensive and defensive chemical warfare in the sameperiod.Even more than other elements of the Army, the Chemical Warfare Service(designated Chemical Corps after World War II) felt the effects of thegovernment's restrictions on personnel and funds in the years between the twoworld wars. This was partly the aftermath of international efforts to outlaw gaswarfare an d partly the result of antipathy to that type of warfare on the partof various high government officials. Certain members of the War DepartmentGeneral Staff, including at times the Chief of Staff himself, were opposed to gaswarfare. Consequently the Chemical Warfare Service was considered as moreor less a necessary nuisance.

The movement toward general national preparedness that got under way inthe late 1930's led to an increase in the stock levels of certain chemical warfareitems. Included in 1938 Educational Order legislation providing for a build-upof a limited number of Army items was the gas mask. Later legislation and WarDepartment directives enabled the Chemical Warfare Service to make stillfurther preparations for gas warfare, offensive and defensive. These activities,continued throughout the war years, helped to deter the enemy from initiatinggas warfare. During World War II, in addition to discharging its responsibilityfor gas warfare, the Chemical Warfare Service carried out a number of otherchemical warfare missions for which it had little or no preparation in the prewaryears. The service was also assigned a biological warfare mission.Although any of the three volumes on the Chemical Warfare Service can beread as an entity, the first seven chapters of the present work will serve toilluminate the remainder of the CWS story. Against the background providedby Part One, the account of specific functions such as military training (coveredin Part Two of this volume), research, procurement, and supply (covered in thesecond v olum e), and chemical warfare activities in the oversea theaters of opera-tions (covered in the third volume) will emerge in clearer perspective.A further word of explanation with regard to Part One may be of assistanceto the reader. The aim here is to discuss developments in organization and


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administration primarily as they affected the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service,and his immediate staff and secondarily as they affected the commanders ofChemical Warfare Service field installations. Since these developments in almostall instances had their origin at a level higher than that of the Chief of theChemical Warfare Service, pertinent background information on policy at thehigher level is included.Dr. Leo P. Brophy is responsible for Part One. He has been assisted in theresearch and writing on Chapters IV and V by Mr. Herbert G. Wing, formerlyof the Historical Staff, Chemical Corps. The late Col. George J. B. Fisher,USA, was primarily responsible for Part Two. Colonel Fisher was taken illbefore he was able to complete the research and writing of this portion of thevolume. His work was taken up and completed by the staff of the HistoricalOffice. Dr. Brophy wrote the section in Chapter XIII on the training of chemicalmortar battalions, and the section in Chapter XVI on the training of the Armyin the use of flame, smoke, and incendiaries. Dr. Brooks E. Kleber and Mr. DaleBirdsell assisted in the research of these and other chapters in Part Two.

The authors of this volume were greatly aided in their research by the com-petent staff of the Departmental Records Branch, Office of The Adjutant Gen-eral, particularly Mrs. Caroline Moore; by Mr. R. W. Krauskopf of the staff ofthe National Archives; by Mr. Roger W. Squier, Office of the Comptroller ofthe Army; and by Mr. Michael D. Wertheimer, Office of the Deputy Chief ofStaff for Personnel, Department of the Army. Mrs. Alice E. Moss supervisedthe typing of the manuscript.

The authors are indebted to the many veterans of the Chemical Warfare Servicewho through interviews and otherwise aided them in writing the volume. Amongthese were several whose assistance was most helpful: Maj. Gen. William N.Porter, Maj. Gen. Alden H. Waitt, Maj. Gen. Charles E. Loucks, Brig. Gen.Henry M. Black, Col. Harry A. Kuhn, Lt. Col. Selig J. Levitan, and Col. Ray-mond L. Abel.In the Office of the Chief of Military History, Lt. Col. Leo J. Meyer, DeputyChief Historian, and his successor, Dr. Stetson Conn, rendered valuable assistance.Final editing was accomplished by Mr. David Jaff, senior editor, assisted byMrs. Helen Whittington, copy editor. Mrs. Norma Sherris selected the photo-graphs.Washington, D. C.2 April 1958 LEO P. BROPHY

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ContentsPART ONE

Administrative DevelopmentChapter PageI. ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE . . . . 3

Gas Warfare Organization, American Expeditionary Forces . . 5Centralizing Chemical Warfare Activities . . . . . . . . 8T h e Chemical Warfare Service, National Army . . . . . .11

I I . T H E YEARS BETWEEN T H E WARS . . . . . . . . . 1 8T h e Issue o f Gas Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8T h e War Department and Gas Warfare . . . . . . . . 22Carrying Out the Peacetime Mission: 1920-39 . . . . . . 24Relations With Other Elements o f Armed Forces . . . . . . 34Industrial Mobilization Gets Under Way . . . . . . . . 36Research and Development: A Change in Outlook . . . . . 37Limited Emphasis on Chemical Warfare Service Training . . . 38Organizational Developments: 1940-41 . . . . . . . . 3 9Development of the Chemical Warfare Service Mission in the

Emergency Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3III. CRYSTALLIZING THE WARTIME MISSION . . . . . . 49

T h e Study o f January 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49T h e Concern of Mr. McCloy . . . . . . . . . . . . 52T h e Porter Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4T h e Gas Mission Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

IV. THE UNITED STATES CHEMICAL W ARFARE COMMITTEE . 63Mission a n d Functions of the Committee . . . . . . . . 6 5Activities a n d Accomplishments . . . . . . . . . . . 7 0The Question o f Initiating G a s Warfare . . . . . . . . 86Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8

V . THE CHIEF'S OFFICE DURING WORLD WAR II . . . . 91Early Wartime Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . 94Developments, May 1943-October 1945 . . . . . . . . 101

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Chapter PageVI. FIELD ORGANIZATION OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARESERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 1 0

T h e Procurement Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 1 0T h e Chemical Warfare Center . . . . . . . . . . . . 117T h e Arsenals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 0T h e Depots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 2Training Installations and Facilities . . . . . . . . . . 125Research and Development Facilities . . . . . . . . . 132Testing Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 4Biological Warfare Installations . . . . . . . . . . . 1 38

VII. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 2Procurement and Assignment of Officers . . . . . . . . 142Procurement and Utilization of Enlisted Personnel . . . . . 149Negro Military Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 0Women's Army Corps Personnel in the Chemical Warfare Service 152T h e Expanding Civilian Rolls . . . . . . . . . . . . 154Administration From Washington . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 9Installation Management of Civilian Personnel . . . . . . 162Training Civilian Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 3Utilization o f Employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 7Guarding the Worker's Life and Health . . . . . . . . 182

PART TWOMilitary Training

VIII. MILITARY TRAINING RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CHEM-ICAL WARFARE SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . 187

Prewar Training of Chemical Warfare Service Personnel ... 188Training of Other Branches . . . . . . . . . . . . 191Chemical Warfare School . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 4Training Situation in 1939 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 96

IX. PARTIAL MOBILIZATION: 1939-41 . . . . . . . . . 1 99Chemical Troops in the Emergency Period . . . . . . . . 199T h e Question of Combat Functions . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 1Chemical Service Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 5Activation o f Ground Service Units . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 8Plans for Air Service Units . . . . . . . . . . . . 209Replacement Training at Edgewood Arsenal . . . . . . . 210Replacement Training Programs . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 3Conduct of Replacement Training . . . . . . . . . . 215

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Chapter PageGas Defense Training: 1939-1941 . . . . . . . . . . 217Chemical Warfare Training of Ground Forces . . . . . . 219Army Air Forces Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 2School Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 4Instruction o f Reserve Officers . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 5

X . T H E CIVILIAN DEFENSE MISSION . . . . . . . . . 2 2 9CWS Prewar Interest in Civilian Defense . . . . . . . . 229Preparation of Instructional Material . . . . . . . . . 2 32School Training a t Edgewood Arsenal . . . . . . . . . 236W a r Department Civilian Protection Schools . . . . . . . 241Miscellaneous Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 5Supervision of War Department Civilian Protection Schools . . 247

X I . OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 1Volume o f Wartime Publications . . . . . . . . . . . 25 1Setting Up the Publications Program . . . . . . . . . 252T h e Pattern of Military Publications . . . . . . . . . . 256T h e Preparation of Manuals . . . . . . . . . . . . 258Speeding Up the Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

XII. REPLACEMENT TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 5T h e Upswing in RTC Requirements . . . . . . . . . . 267R T C Curriculum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 4Training Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 9Officer Pools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 2Supervisory Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 4Movement of Trainees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 7Curtailment of the Program . . . . . . . . . . . . 289

XIII. TRAINING O F CHEMICAL UNITS . . . . . . . . . . 294T h e Building of Military Organizations . . . . . . . . 294CWS Participation in Unit Training . . . . . . . . . . 297Unit Training at Camp Sibert . . . . . . . . . . . . 312Chemical Service Unit Training in Retrospect . . . . . . . 336

XIV. THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SCHOOL . . . . . . . . 339Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 9Training of CWS Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . 342Training of Other Arms and Services . . . . . . . . . 346Academic Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 1Western Chemical Warfare School . . . . . . . . . . 353Other Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 5Accomplishment of School Training . . . . . . . . . . 357

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Chapter PageX V . OFFICER CANDIDATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361OC S Role in Officer Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . 361Capacity Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 3Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 6Selection o f Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 7Staff and Faculty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369Training Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 2T h e Problem of Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374

XVI. CHEMICAL WARFARE TRAINING OF THE ARMY ... 382Antigas Training of Air and Ground Units . . . . . . . 382Changes in War Department Policy . . . . . . . . . . 384Revival of Antigas Training . . . . . . . . . . . . 385Service-Wide Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 8Shortcomings in Antigas Training . . . . . . . . . . 390Flame, Smoke, a n d Incendiaries . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 3

Appendix PageA. Total Chemical Warfare Service Military Personnel Strength, 31December 1941-31 December 1945 . . . . . . . . . 398

B. Chemical Warfare Service Personnel Strength, Overseas, 30 April1942-31 December 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 0

C. Chemical Warfare Service Negro Personnel Strength, Worldwide,30 April 1942-31 December 1945 . . . . . . . . . . 402

D. Office of the Chief, CWS Officer Personnel Strength, August 1939-December 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 4E. Key Personnel Office of Chief, Chemical Warfare Service . . . 406F. Chemical Warfare School, Detailed Program, Replacement Center

Officer's Course . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 9G. Hq. Sixth Corps Area, Training Memorandum No. 13, 4 December

1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 1H. Chemical Warfare Service, Unit Data, World War II . . . . 422

1. Chemical Mortar Battalions2. Chemical M ortar Companies3. Chem ical Smoke Generator Battalions4. Chemical Smoke Generator Companies5. Chemical Companies, Air Operations6. Chemical Depot Companies (Aviation)7. Chemical Maintenance Companies (Aviation)8. Chemical Depot Companies and Chemical Base Depot Com-

panies9. Chemical Maintenance Companies

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Appendix Page10. Chemical Decontamination Companies11. Chemical Processing Companies12. Chemical Service Battalions13. Chemical Composite Service and General Service Companies14. Chemical Composite and Service Platoons and Detachments15. Chemical Laboratory Companies16 . Chemical Com posite Battalions

I. War Department Chemical Warfare Training Directive, 15 June1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 2

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 5GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 9INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 8

TablesNo. Page1. Congressional Appropriations for CWS, 1922-46 . . . . . . . 252 . Military Strength of the CWS, 1918-46 . . . . . . . . . . 263. Chemical Warfare Service Civilian Personnel Strength, November

1918-December 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 74. 1942 Proposed Modification in CWS Troop Basis . . . . . . . 585. CWS Troop Basis, as of 13 August 1942 . . . . . . . . . 596. Actual Strength of Civilian Employees (Filled Positions), 31 December

1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 57. Peak Civilian Personnel Figures at Principal CWS Installations During

World W a r I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 38. Chemical Warfare School Courses, School Year 1937-38 . . . . 1959. Chemical Warfare Service Units Active During World War II (As

o f dates indicated) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 610. Shipment of RTC Trainees, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland . . . . 26911. Wartime Training of CWS Service Units . . . . . . . . . 31212. Provisional Organization, CWS UTC, February 1943 . . . . . . 31713. Enlisted Specialists in Each Chemical Service Type Company, World

W a r I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 114. Enlisted Specialist Schooling Utilized in CWS Unit Training . . . 33215. Graduates of the Chemical Warfare School, Edgewood Arsenal, Mary-land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 716. Hours of Scheduled Instructions, CWS OCS . . . . . . . . . 375

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ChartsNo. Page

1. Organization, Office, Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, Washington,D.C., as o f 6 July 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0

2. Organization of the Chemical Warfare Service, as of August 1940 . 413. Organization, Office, Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, as of 2September 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4

4. Organization of the Army Service Forces, as of 30 June 1943 . 935. Office, Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, as of 26 August 1943 . . 1026. Chicago Procurement District, Chemical Warfare Service, as of 15

August 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 67. Chemical Warfare Center, as of 1 0 Ma y 1942 . . . . . . . 1 1 88. Schematic Diagram, Chemical Warfare Supply, as of 6 December 1944 1249. Edgewood Arsenal, M aryl and: Eastern Chemical Warfare Depot, as of2 0 April 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 6

10. Distribution of CWS Military Personnel, as of 30 June 1944 . . . . 14711. Chemical Warfare Service Officer Strength and OCS Graduations: May

1940-July 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 2

MapNo. Page1. Chemical Warfare Service Field Installations, World War II . . . 112

IllustrationsPage

Maj. Gen. William N . Porter . . . . . . . . . . . . . FrontispieceStokes Trench Mortar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Maj. Gen. William L . Sibert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2Chemical Plants, Edgewood Arsenal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3Chemical Warfare Service Chiefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 94.2-Inch Chemical Mortar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6C W S Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 21-TonChemical Containers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1H C M 1 Smoke Pots in Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1Laying Smoke Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6


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PageBrig. Gen. Rollo C . Ditto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 3Brig. Gen. Alden H . Wait t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 3Brig. Gen. Ray L. Avery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 9Brig. Gen. Haig Shekerjian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 8Brig. Gen. E . F . Bullene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 9Maj. Gen. Dwight F . Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 5Women at Pine Bluff Arsenal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 5Basic Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 2G a s Training f o r Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 3Troops o f 3 d Chemical Mortar Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 6White Phosphorus From 4.2-Inch Mortars . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 7R T C Classroom Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 1Mayor Fiorello H. La Guard ia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 0Gas Defense Training fo r Civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 4Demonstrat ion i n Decontamination Procedures . . . . . . . . . 2 3 8Chemical Warfare Troops Undergoing Training . . . . . . . . . 2 7 3Army Maneuvers, Louisiana, 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 1Flame Thrower Demonstration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 9Unit Training a t Camp Sibert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 2Women Leaving CWS Gas Chamber . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387M9 Chemical Detector K i t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393Medium Tank Equipped With Flame Thrower . . . . . . . . . 395

Illustrations are from Department of Defense files.

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PART ONEADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT


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CHAPTER I

Origins of the ChemicalWarfare Service

The Chemical Warfare Service (CWS)came into being during an eraof unprecedented change in the technology of war.1 The introduction of gaswarfare by Germany in April 1915 presented new problems of militarytechniques with which none of the Allied Powers was then prepared to cope.In the United States the War Department by the fall of 1915 began to showan interest in providing troops with protection against gas and assignedresponsibility for the design and development of respirators to the MedicalDepartment. In carrying out his responsibilities, The Surgeon General de-tailed certain Medical officers to the British and French Armies as observers,and these officers sent back periodic reports which included information ongas defense.2 The Army took no steps to supply the troops with masks orto prepare fo r offensive gas warfare unti l the first part of 1917.

It was not the War Department but a civilian branch of the governmentthat took the first step in preparation for the employment of toxic agents.Early in 1917 the Secretary of the Interior surveyed his department to deter-mine how it might contribute to the national defense and decided that th eBureau of Mines, which, since its establishment in 1910, had been investigat-ing poisonous gases in mines, might be utilized in assisting the Army andNavy in developing a gas war program. On 8 February, Van H. Manning,the director of the Bureau of Mines wrote to the chairman of the MilitaryCommittee of the National Research Council (NRC) offering the bureau's

1 The Chemical Warfare Service was designated the Chemical Corps by Public Law 607, 79thCongress, on 2 Augus t 1946. See the Bibliographical Note at the end of this volume for thelocation of sources cited in footnotes .2 The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War: XIV, Medical

Aspects of Gas Warfare (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1926), 27, hereaf ter cited asMedical Aspects of Gas Warfare.


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4 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICEservices.3 Formal action on the recommendation was taken on 3 April 1917,when the Military Committee of NRC appointed a subcommittee on noxiousgases, to "carry on investigations into noxious gases, generation, and antidotefor same, for war purposes." 4 Under the chairmanship of the director ofthe Bureau of Mines, the subcommittee included Ordnance an d Medicalofficers from both Army an d Navy as well as two members of the ChemicalCommittee of the National Research Council. The work of this group pro-vided the genesis of the chemical warfare research effort of the United Statesin World War I.

The War Department's early lack of serious concern about the new typeof warfare might be attributed to the fact that the effectiveness of a gasattack with the agents then in use was waning by 1917 because of theefficiency of antigas protection. It was not until the German Army in July1917 began the use of dichloroethyl sulfide, the so-called mustard gas, asa liquid toxic filler for projectiles that the War Department began to giveserious consideration to preparations for gas warfare. Mustard gas was per-sistent, it proved to be a high casualty producer, and it considerably widenedthe scope of chemical warfare. 5

As the gas warfare needs of U.S. troops in France became known inWashington they were referred to the War Department bureau to whicheach seemed to relate. The basic requirement was a gas mask; this item,because of its prophylactic na ture, was assigned to the Medical Departmentfor procurement and distribution. Training of individuals in use of the maskthen became a Medical responsibility. 6 The War Department assigned theresponsibility for the manufacture and filling of gas shells to the OrdnanceDepartment, which erected a new arsenal for this purpose at Edgewood,Maryland.7 Engineer troops were selected for the projection of chemical

3 (1) Van H. Manning, War Gas Investigations, Dept. of Interior Bull. 178-A (Washington:Government Printing Office, 1919). (2 ) Memo by G. S. Rice, Bureau of Mines, regarding earlyhistory of mask and gas investigations for the Army, 9 Jan 18. RG 7, NA.4 Rcd of Mtg. Mil Com NRC, 3 Apr 17. RG 70, NA.5 (1) John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War (New York: Frederick A. Stokes,1931), I, 166-67. (2 ) Amos A. Fries an d Clarence J. West, Chemical Warfare (New York:McGraw-Hill, 1921), p. 151.6 In September 1917, a Gas Defense Service, Sanitary Corps, Medical Department, wasactivated. This service, in which a group of forty-five chemists was commissioned, was placed incharge of training. In Apri l 1918 the officers of the Gas Defense Service were transferred to theCorps of Engineers. See Report of the Director of Chemical Warfare Service, 1919, pp. 43-49.Hereafter cited as Rpt of CWS, with appropriate year.7 For detailed account of the building of Edgewood Arsenal, see Benedict Crowell, America's

Munitions, 1917-1918 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), pp. 395-409.


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ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 5agents, and a regiment of gas and flame troops, to be known as the30th Engineers, was authorized.8 Supplying gas alarms became a function ofSignal Corps.9 An agency for solving technical problems was at hand in thesubcommittee on noxious gases mentioned above. In September 1917 thiscommittee established a research and experiment station, financed by theWar and Navy Departments and operated by the Bureau of Mines, atAmerican University on the outskirts of Washington, D.C.10 The Bureau ofMines also supervised research activities on war gases at many universitiesand industrial laboratories throughout the country as well as at laboratoriesof other government agencies.

Gas Warfare Organization, American Expeditionary ForcesThe problems of gas warfare administration were in the meantime

receiving serious consideration in the theater of operations under the urgencyof an active gas warfare situation. A board of officers was appointed toplan a gas warfare organization for the American Expeditionary Forces(AEF) on 18 June 1917, a few days after General John J. Pershing'sarrival in France.11 The board analyzed the gas warfare establishments ofthe British, French, and German Armies and considered the recommenda-tions of Dr. George A. Hulett of Princeton University, who had spent sometime in England and France studying the use of gas in war. Following theboard's recommendation, General Pershing decided to centralize the han-dling of all gas warfare matters under an independent agency. He reportedhis scheme of organization to Washington on 4 August 1917, recommendingthat a similar consolidation be adopted by the War Department.12

Two weeks later General Pershing assigned Lt. Col. Amos A. Fries, anEngineer officer who had served under him in the Philippines in 1905, as

8(1) WD GO 108, 15 Aug 17. (2) History of 1st Gas Regiment, Pt. I, p. 1. MS, n.d.9 Rpt of CWS, 1919, p. 3.10 Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare, pp. 35-36.11Memo, Lt Col John McA. Palmer, C Opns Sec, Hq AEF, for CofS AEF, 30 July 17, sub:Gas and Flame Serv, Offensive and Defensive. Copy of this memo appears as Appendix II inHistory of Chemical Warfare Service, American Expeditionary Forces, a seventy-one-page detailed

account of organization and adm inistration, together with sixty-five supporting appendixes, whichis apparently the official history written shortly after World War I. H-12 and H-13. This ishereafter cited as History of CWS, AEF.12(1) Ltr, CinC AEF to TAG, 4 Aug 17, sub: Cml or Gas Serv. (2) James G. Harbord, TheAmerican Army in France (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1936), p. 128. Ma j. Gen. JamesG. Harbord states that details of proposed organization were sent to War Department on 28 July.


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6 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICEEngineer in Charge of Gas.13 As such Fries became the chief of the GasService, AEF, when it was officially established on 3 September 1917.14The following day Fries was raised to the rank of colonel and placed incommand of the 30th Engineers, the gas and flame regiment.15 He at onceset up headquarters at Chaumont, where he would be in close touch withthe General Headquarters (GHQ) of the American Expeditionary Forces.The AEF order which established the Gas Service specified that the chiefof the service would be "charged with the organization of the personnel, thesupply of material and the conduct of the entire Gas Service, both Offensiveand Defensive, including instruction." The first task confronting Fries wasthat of securing suitable officer personnel. Even before the Gas Servicewas officially established he had obtained the services of two Medical De-partment officers, Col. James R. Church, who had been observing the effectsof gas on French troops, and Capt. Walter M. Boothby, who had been givena similar assignment with the British. Colonel Church headed the MedicalSection of the Gas Service until December 1917 when he was succeeded byCol. Harry L. Gilchrist.16 The Medical Section was responsible for trainingand instructing Medical officers and other personnel in the treatment of gascasualties, as well as for the inspection of methods and facilities for the careof gassed cases.17From the other branches of the Army, including Engineers, Ordnance,Cavalry, and Infantry, Fries obtained some two hundred officers who, al-though they were assigned to the Gas Service, continued to hold commissionsin their respective branches. These officers, as well as the enlisted menwho were transferred to the Gas Service, were given a course of instructionin gas defense at the I Corps Gas School, which was activated on 15 October1917.18 The same month an Army Gas School, with courses in both defensive

13Cablegram (Pershing) 111-S, Paris, France, 18 Aug 17, Par. 19. WD Cables, P series,A.E.F. files, NA .14(1) Interv, CmlHO with Maj Gen Amos A. Fries, USA (Ret.), 4 Aug 55. (2) Copy ofAEF GO 31, 3 Sep 17. All AEF general orders cited in this chapter appear in Historical Division,Department of the Army, UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR: 1917-1919, XVI,General Orders, G.H.Q., A.E.F. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948).15 Historical Division, Department of the Army, UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLDWAR: 1917-1919, XV, Reports of Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F., Staff Sections and Services(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), 291, hereafter cited as Reports of Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F., Staff Sections and Services.16 (1) History of CWS, AEF, pp. 7-8. (2) Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare, pp. 39-50. (3)Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, p. 114.17Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare, pp. 67-73.18 (1) AEF GO 45, 8 Oct 17. (2) Schedule, I Corps Gas School AEF. History of CWS, AEF,App. 13.


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ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 7

STOKES TRENCH M O R T A R , used by special gas troops of AEF, World War I.Picture taken in CWS training area, Chaumont, France, 1918.

and offensive gas warfare, was started at Langres.19 Later three othertraining schools were established.The most serious problem which faced Fries when he became chief ofthe Gas Service, aside from the task of obtaining personnel, was that ofproviding for a supply of gas masks and other protective equipment forAmerican troops. Just prior to Fries's appointment the British, upon requestof Captain Boothby, had tested twenty thousand gas masks received fromthe United States and had found them entirely unsuitable for use on thebattlefield.20 Fries knew that he would have to look for other sources ofsupply and took immediate steps to purchase British masks, or box respira-tors, as they were called, and French M2 masks.21 Second in importance tosupplying the Army with masks was the task of equipping special gas troopswith such weapons as cylinders, mortars, and projectors for the dispersion

19 (1) AEF GO 46, 10 Oct 17. (2) Schedule of Instruction, AEF Army Gas School. Historyof CWS,AEF, App. 15.20 Amos A. Fries, History of Chemical Warfare Service in France, p. 4. MS.21AEF General Order 53, 3 November 1917, made the Gas Service responsible fo r supplyingall division, corps, an d army ga s officers with antigas supplies.


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8 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICEof agents. Fries also made arrangements to purchase these items from theBritish, and it was well that he did, fo r none were received from th e UnitedStates until just before the close of the war.22

Colonel Fries was fortunate in securing the services of a very competentofficer, Maj. Robert W. Crawford, whom he put in charge of procurementand supply activities in the Gas Service early in September 1917.TheProcurement and Supply Division, as Crawford's unit came to be known,not only handled the purchase of matriel but also drew up plans for andsupervised the construction of three separate gas depots in the First ArmyArea and four in the Second Army Area. These depots were placed inoperation in October 1918 under depot officers who were on the staffs ofthe respective army gas officers.23 Crawford also drew up plans fo r construc-tion of phosgene-manufacturing plants, shell-filling plants, and a gas-maskrepair plant. The proposed construction of phosgene and shell-filling plantsin France was given up after Colonel Fries had studied the matter in detailand made a recommendation to that effect to General Pershing. The chiefreason for abandoning those projects was the inability to obtain sufficientchlorine in France.24 But the plan fo r building the mask repair plant wascarried to completion, and in November 1917 four officers and no enlistedmen of the Medical Department arrived from the United States to operatethis plant.25In addition to personnel, training, and procurement and supply respon-sibilities, the Gas Service, AEF, had definite technical responsibilities. Incarrying out the latter responsibilities, General Fries' headquarters workedclosely with the War Department.

Centralizing Chemical Warfare ActivitiesThe start of centralizing chemical warfare activities within the WarDepartment dates from October 1917, when an Office of Gas Service wasset up, with Col. Charles L. Potter, an Engineer officer, as director. Thismove was an attempt to satisfy the need for an agency in Washingtonwhich would know everything that was going on with regard to chemicalwarfare both at home and abroad. The Gas Service was to be the "co-

22 Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, p. 78.23 History of CWS, AEF, p. 48.24 Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, p. 104.25 Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare, p. 30.


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ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 9ordinating agent" between the various bureaus and laboratories engaged ingas warfare activities, and all communications from abroad dealing withgas warfare were to be routed to that office. Provision was made for threeassistants to the director of the new service, one from the Ordnance Depart-ment, another from the Medical Department, and a third from a newlycreated Chemical Service Section of the National Army, established underthe same directive that established the Gas Service.26 The Chemical ServiceSection was to consist of forty-seven commissioned and ninety-five enlistedpersonnel.

The Chemical Service Section, National Army, was created to fill arequest of General Pershing, repeated five times between 26 September and9 December 1917, for a chemical laboratory, complete with equipment andpersonnel, to investigate gases and powders.27 Professor William H. Walkerof the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was commissioned alieutenant colonel and made chief of the Chemical Service Section. Walkerset out to recruit qualified personnel for a laboratory unit for overseas duty.In January 1918 the first members of this unit, consisting of about twenty-five officers and ten men,under the command of Col. Raymond F. Bacon,arrived in Puteaux, near Paris, where Colonel Fries had set up a laboratory.Here the scientists in uniform conducted experiments on gases until theclose of the war.To satisfy the need for testing gas shells and fuzes andconducting other gas warfare experimentation, a test field was set up nearChaumont. This field was named Hanlon Field in September 1918 in honorof 2d Lt. Joseph T. Hanlon, the first Chemical Warfare officer to be killedin action.28A development in connection with gas research in the theater was theinter-Allied gas conferences for the exchange of scientific information.Three such conferences were held during the warin September 1917,March 1918, and October 1918. From the point of view of the Americanscientists the last was the most satisfactory, because by that time theAmericans felt they had come to know as much about gas as their Europeanco-workers. At this conference for the first time sa t representatives from the

26 Memo, CofS for TAG, 16 Oct 17, sub: Gas Serv of Army. CWS 322.095/101-140. Thesection of this directive dealing with the establ ishment of the Chemical Service Section, NationalArmy, also appears in War Department General Order 139, 1 November 1917.27Pershing's five cables are repeated verbatim in Memo, Col Potter, Dir Gas Serv, for CofSUSA, 28 Dec 17. CWS 322.095/141-200.28 (1) History of CWS, AEF,pp. 18-19, 56-57. (2) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, Ch.IV. (3) Reports of Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F., Staff Sections an d Services, pp . 300-302.


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10 THE CHEMICAL WA RFARE SERVICElaboratories in the United States, including Professors Elmer P. Kohler andWarren K. Lewis.29

Inter-Allied co-operation in the theater was not confined to research butextended to supply as well. At the suggestion of Winston S. Churchill, theInter-Allied Commission fo r Chemical Warfare Supply was set up in May1918.30 Between May and November this commission, on which sat repre-sentatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, held sixmeetings. By the time of the armistice the commission was said to be"gradually assuming the position of a board of directors, regulating pro-duction and distribution in accordance with existing needs." 31

While the Chemical Service Section, National Army, was assisting thetheater on the research program, Colonel Walker's headquarters was alsotaking steps to co-ordinate gas research activities in the United States. ByJanuary 1918 the number of troops doing research under the guidance ofthe Bureau of Mines at the American University Experiment Station andvarious other laboratories had risen to over two hundred officers and morethan five hundred enlisted men. These were under th e jurisdiction of variouselements of the ArmyOrdnance, Engineers, Signal, Sanitary Corps of theMedical Department, and the Chemical Service Section, National Army.Efficient administration demanded that these troops be placed under oneArmy agency. On 10 January Colonel Potter, chief of the Gas Service,recommended to the Chief of Staff that they be included in the ChemicalService Section. This request was favorably considered and on 15 Februarythe authorized strength of the Chemical Service Section was raised to 227officers and 525 enlisted men.32

In addition to its research activities, the Chemical Service Section, fromearly 1918 until the end of the war, was called on more and more by theOrdnance Department for recommendations on the manufacture of gases atEdgewood Arsenal. Thus, while the purpose behind the Chemical ServiceSection was to co-ordinate without integrating and without disturbing func-tions of the statutory bureaus of the War Department, it was becomingevident that the system was developing serious defects. What was needed was

29 History of CWS, AEF, p. 52.30 (1) Pershing, My Experience in the World War, I, 357. (2) History of CWS, AEF, p. 27.31 History of CWS, AEF, p. 28.32 Marston T. Bogert and William H. Walker, History of the Chemical Service Section, Apps.C and D. This seven-page manuscript account, exclusive of appendixes, was written in 1919.H-131.


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ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 11a greater degree of administrative centralization. Two additional factorswere working toward this end. The large and growing number of scientistsengaged in research in gas warfare was insisting on recognition. And therewas increasing pressure by various officials for a responsible gas warfareorganization within the zone of interior to parallel the one in the theater ofoperations.

The Chemical Warfare Service, National ArmyIn the spring of 1918 separate proposals were made both in the United

States and in France to establish a gas corps. On 17 April Lt. Col. MarstonT. Bogert, who had succeeded Colonel Walker as chief of the ChemicalService Section, recommended to the Chief of Staff that the section bereplaced by a "chemical corps" which would be on a "basis more nearly likethat occupied by the Engineering and Medical branches of the Army." 33In this way,Bogert contended, chemists in the Army would be under theguidance and control of chemists. This suggestion was not favorably con-sidered.34 On 1 May Colonel Fries recommended to General Pershing thata gas corps be established in the AEF.Fries gave as his chief reason thevery compelling fact that for the past year the enemy had been using gasas an essential part of every offensive and that the Gas Service, AEF, simplydid not have the necessary administrative power to prosecute an effective gasprogram.35 Pershing was favorably impressed by Fries's argument and on 3June he cabled to the Chief of Staff in the United States requesting that agas corps be activated.36 This request, like Bogert's was not favorably con-sidered. While it took no action on setting up a separate chemical or gascorps, the War Department did take definite steps in the spring of 1918 toestablish a more strongly centralized organization for gas warfare. Whatwas especially needed at that time was a "name" officer of rank and per-sonality who could overcome obstacles and break log jams. This proved tobe Maj. Gen.William L. Sibert, one of the builders of the Panama Canal

33 Memo, Bogert, Cml Serv Sec NA, for CofS USA, 17 Apr 18, sub: Cm l Serv Sec Pers.Bogert and Walker, History of the Chemical Service Section, App. C 1.34 1st Ind,6 May 18, to memo cited Note 33 above. Bogert and Walker, Hist of the ChemicalService Section, App. C 3.35 Ltr, C Gas Serv AEF to CinC AEF (Through: CG SOS), 1 May 18, sub: Reorganizationof Gas Serv. History of CWS, AEF, App. 37.

36 Cable 1240-S, CG AEF to CofS USA, 3 Jun 18. History of CWS, AEF, App. 38.


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12 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM L. SIBERT, firstChief of the Chemical Warfare Serv-ice, June 1918-February 1920.

and lately commander of the 1stDivision in France. Appointmentof Sibert as director of the GasService on 11 May 1918 was quicklyfollowed by a number of adminis-trative changes in line with thetrend toward integration of chemi-cal warfare functions which hadbeen evident for some time.37 On25 June 1918 the President trans-ferred the control experimentalstation at American Universityfrom the Bureau of Mines to theWar Department.38 Three dayslater the War Department formallyestablished the Chemical WarfareService, National Army, and sweep-ingly specified the transfer to thenew organization of all facilitiesand functions applying to toxicchemicals.39In World War I the United States had to rely on its allies, particularlythe British, for chemical munitions. This situation was rapidly being cor-

rected late in 1918.Manufacturing facilities in the Astoria section of NewYork City were by then capable of meeting all the requirements for protec-tive equipment, and the production of toxic agents at the Edgewood Arsenalplants was totaling 675 tons per week.40 Responsibility for the production ofdefensive items was put in the Gas Defense Production Division, CWS,headed by Col. Bradley Dewey, while supervision of toxics was placed in theGas Offense Production Division, of which Col. William H. Walker waschief. Technical activities were divided between two divisions, a ResearchDivision, headed by Col.George A. Burrell, and a Development Division,

37 Colonel Potter was succeeded as Chief, Gas Service, on 30 January 1918 by Mr. ArthurHudson Marks who served only a few days. Colonel Walker was Acting Chief, Gas Service, fromthat time until Sibert's appointment on 11 May. See Rpt of CWS, 1918, p. 5.38 Executive Order 2894, 25 Jun 18.39 WD GO 62, 28 Jun 18.40 Crowell, America's Munitions, pp. 407-09, 426-27.


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ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 13

CHEMICAL PLANTS, EDGEWOOD ARSENAL. By 1918, toxic agents totaling 675tons per week were being manufactured here.

headed by Col. Frank M. Dorsey. To test gas munitions the War Departmentestablished a proving ground at Lakehurst, New Jersey, and adjoining thisproving ground activated a training camp for gas troops, Camp Kendrick,under the Training Division. All activities connected with the medical aspectsof gas warfare were placed in a Medical Division, headed by Col. WilliamJ. L. Lyster.41The very day that the CWS was formally established, the War Depart-ment cabled Pershing informing him of the creation of the CWS andrequesting him to cable back the names of the officers to be transferred tothe new service as well as the numbers and grades of officers and men re-quired in France.42 The transfer of troops to the new service in the theaterwas made official on 16 July when an authorized strength of 916 officersand 7,264 enlisted men was approved for the Overseas Division, CWS,which was to be headed by a brigadier general.43 Colonel Fries was there-upon raised to that rank. Later, the War Department, anticipating an in-

41 Rpts of CWS, 1918 and 1919.42 Cable 1622-R, McCain to Pershing, 28 Jun 18. History of CWS, AEF, App. 39.43 Cable 1724-R, McCain to Pershing, 16 Jul 18. History of CWS, AEF, App. 41.


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14 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICEcrease in the use of gas, authorized two additional gas regiments. This actionraised the authorized strength of the Overseas Division to 1,315 officers and17,205 enlisted men.44 Because of the sudden collapse of the enemy nothingapproximating that strength was ever attained, and as of 11 November 1918the actual number of officers and men in the Overseas Division totaled 630and 2,800 respectively. This compared with actual strength of the entireCWS on that date of 1,680 officers and 18,838 enlisted men.45

General Fries's headquarters, like the office of General Sibert, wasorganized along functional lines. Since the theater naturally placed greateremphasis on actual employment of gas on the battlefield, two divisions wereset up for that purpose, an Offense Division and a Defense Division. Otherdivisions of the CWS, AEF, were: Procurement and Supply, Technical,Medical, and Intelligence.With the establishment of the CWS the gas and flame regiment (the30th Engineers) became the 1st Gas Regiment. The regiment had beenactivated in August 1917 under Maj. Earl J. Atkisson at Camp AmericanUniversity, Washington. In January 1918 the first two companies, A and B,arrived in France, where, through an arrangement between Fries and Maj.Gen. C. H. Foulkes of the British Army, they were given intensive trainingby the British Special Brigade, a gas brigade. Following this training theyaccompanied the British on actual gas operations on the field of battle.When two other companies arrived in France in March the officers and menof Companies A and B assisted in training the new arrivals. The facilitiesof the five gas schools in France were also utilized in training these andsubsequent gas troops arriving from the United States.46

Troops of the 1st Gas Regiment were employed in operations on theWestern Front during the summer and fall of 1918. Their biggest engage-ment was in the Meuse-Argonne offensive in which six companies of theregiment saw action. In this campaign gas troops expended some 489 Stokesmortar gas shells, 130 Livens projector gas drums, 206 Livens projectordrums filled with high explosives, and over 2,800 smoke and thermitebombs.47After the close of hostilities the War Department made a rapid start indemobilizing CWS troops and facilities. By June 1919 the troop strength of

44 Cable 2027-R, Harris to Pershing, 7 Oct 18. History of CWS, AEF, App. 60.45 Rpt of CWS, 1919, pp. 14-15.46(1) James Thayer Addison, The Story of the First Gas Regiment (Boston and New York:Houghton Mifflin, 1919), Ch. III. (2) Maj. Gen. C. H. Foulkes, Gas, Th e Story of the Gas

Brigade (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1934), p. 298.47 History of CWS, AEF, p. 67.


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ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 15the CWS had been reduced to 328 officers and 261 enlisted men, the govern-ment gas-mask factory in New York had been demobilized, 670 contractshad been adjusted, over a million dollars worth of surplus property hadbeen disposed of, and the plants at Edgewood and Lakehurst were beingput on a peacetime basis.48 The majority of government-owned chemicalplants throughout the country were yet to be sold or transferred to othergovernment bureaus; that was a task which would run well into the followingyear.49

The War Department general order establishing the Chemical WarfareService had provided that it would continue until six months after thetermination of hostilities or until the general order itself was amended,modified, or rescinded. An act of Congress of 11 July 1919 extended the lifeof the CWS until 30 June 1920.50 On 28 November 1919 the War Depart-ment defined the CWS peacetime mission as follows:

(a) The maintenance of a competent body of chemical warfare specialists withfacilities fo r continuous research and experimentation.(b) The maintenance of records.(c ) Provision fo r keeping in touch with civilian agencies for chemical researchand chemical industries capable of being converted for the production of wartimematerial.(d) The maintenance of such existing Government plants as may be decidednecessary.(e) The continuous training of the Army in chemical warfare.(f) The maintenance of a supply of chemical warfare material sufficient to meetthe initial requirements of the Army in time of war.51

Congress meanwhile began to study changes needed in military organiza-tion in the light of recent war experiences. Since the establishment of theSignal Corps in 1860 there had been no additions to the War Departmenttechnical services.52 One of the questions now to be decided was, whatshould be done about Chemical Warfare? This matter was examined care-fully by the military affairs committees of the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives.The recommendations of the officials of the War Department varied.Some suggested that the wartime CWS be abolished and its work appor-

48 Rpt of CWS, 1919, pp. 15, 51.49 Rpt of CWS, 1920, p. 15.50 (1) General Order No. 62, 28 June 1918. (2) 41 Stat. 104.51 Rpt of CWS, 1920, p. 5.52 12 Stat. 50.


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16 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICEtioned among the older established services. Others felt that the CWS shouldbe retained. Newton D. Baker, the Secretary of War, believed that peace-time activities in this field would be principally in research and development,duties which the Corps of Engineers could handle.53 The Chief of Staff,General Peyton C. March, who abhorred gas warfare, also felt that theCorps of Engineers should be given responsibility for preparations for gaswarfare, which in peacetime should be restricted to its defensive aspects.54General Pershing, like most older line officers, disliked the idea of usingtoxic gas but he was not adamant on the subject; in fact, he was ratherinclined toward retaining the Chemical Warfare Service as a separatedepartment.55

The first powerful voice raised in support of an independent chemicalservice in the Army was that of Benedict Crowell, the Assistant Secretaryof War and the man principally responsible for the success of the munitionsprogram of 1917-18. Crowell, who had been educated as a chemist andbelieved that future warfare would depend largely on the work of men ofscience, strongly urged that the wartime CWS organization be madepermanent.56 This view of course was echoed by the two officers mostclosely identified with gas warfare in World War I, Sibert and Fries. Frieswas particularly active. Less than two weeks after the close of hostilities hehad obtained General Pershing's approval for his return to the United Statesin order to work for a permanent CWS.57 He was a personal friend of boththe chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Senator GeorgeE. Chamberlain of Oregon, and the chairman of the House Committee onMilitary Affairs, Representative Julius Kahn of California. Fries lost noopportunity in conveying to those gentlemen his strong conviction of theneed for a permanent chemical bureau in the Army.58

53 S. Com. on Military Affairs, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings on S. 2715, A Bill To Re-organize and Increase the Efficiency of the United States Army, and for Other Purposes, 19Aug. 19.54 (1) H. Com. on Military Affairs, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings on H. Res. 8287, A BillTo Reorganize and Increase the Efficiency of the United States Army, and for Other Purposes,5 Sep 19, I, 53-54. (2) Peyton C. Marsh, Th e Nation at War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday-Doran, 1932), pp. 333-36.55 H. Com. on Military Affairs, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings on H. Res. 8287, A Bill ToReorganize and Increase the Efficiency of the United States Army, and for Other Purposes, 1 Nov19, I, 1507-08.56 H. Com. on Military Affairs, 66th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., Hearings on H. Res. 8287, ABill To Reorganize and Increase the Efficiency of the United States Army, and for Other Purposes,9 Jan 20, II, 1804-05.

57 Fries, History of CWS in France.58 Fries interv, 4 Aug 55.


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ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 17Establishment of a chemical service as a permanent bureau of the WarDepartment was also strongly advocated by leading chemical scientists and

industrialists, who had come to regard the existence of such a service as arecognition of the growing importance of chemistry in the national econ-omy.59 The desire to assist these groups doubtless helped influence the de-cision of Congress in 1920 to write into its revision of the National DefenseAct of 1916a new section starting with the words: "There is hereby createda Chemical Warfare Service." 60

The purpose of the wartime Chemical Warfare Service had been tohandle all matters relating to toxic agents and ammunition together withgas defense material. Incendiaries and smokes had not been mentioned inthe wartime charter of the Chemical Warfare Service although before theend of the war it had actually done considerable work on both these items.This fact is reflected in the wording of the revised National Defense Act,which accordingly enlarged the CWS field. Thus was completed the shift inemphasis from the "gas" service of 1917 to the "chemical" service of 1920.The function of the new branch included the development, procurement,and supply of "all smoke and incendiary materials, all toxic gases, and allgas defense appliances." These duties were further extended to include "thesupervision of the training of the Army in chemical warfare, both offensiveand defensive . . . ; the organization, equipment, training, and operation ofspecial gas troops, and such other duties as the President may from time totime prescribe." 61 The Chemical Warfare Service therefore took on service-wide training functions, together with responsibility for combatant troops,in addition to technical supply duties. For this work the National DefenseAct authorized a chief of the service with the rank of brigadier general, onehundred officers, and twelve hundred enlisted men.

The Chemical Warfare Service was a product of the changing technologyof war. Only reluctantly did the War Department provide for its activation.Many years would elapse before the new organization would be fullyaccepted in the military family. In fact, it would require the experience ofa second world war to convince the War Department of the real need for aseparate chemical service.

59 See statement of Charles H. Herty, editor of the Journal of Industrial and EngineeringChemistry, in S. Com. on Military Affairs, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings on S. 2715, A Bill ToReorganize and Increase the Efficiency of the United States Army, and for Other Purposes, p. 408.60 Public La w 242,66th Cong., Sec.12a.War Department Bulletin 25, 9 June 1920, reproducesSection 12a in toto.61Ibid.


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CHAPTER II

The Years Between the WarsThe Issue of Gas Warfare

Announcement of the creation of the Chemical Warfare Service in 1920as a branch of the permanent Military Establishment presumably settled anissue that had been discussed heatedly and at length. Actually, debate overfunctions of the CWS was to continue for many years. This perennial con-troversy had its roots in two spheres. One was the policy of the UnitedStates on gas warfare. The other was the reaction within the War Depart-ment itself to gas warfare.

For centuries the use of poisons for military purposes has been generallydisavowed by civilized nations.1 But not until the end of the nineteenthcentury, when the science of chemistry had advanced to a point where theuse of toxics in warfare was being seriously considered, was the questionraised as to whether toxics loaded into ammunition should be consideredpoisonous. Discussion of this point was listed on the agenda of an inter-national conference, which, upon the initiative of the Russians, met at TheHague during the summer of 1899.The proposal offered for consideration at the meeting would have boundthe contracting powers to agree "to abstain from the use of projectiles, thesole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases." 2In instructions to the American delegates before they left to attend this con-ference, Secretary of State John Hay had stated, "The expediency of restrain-ing the inventive genius of our people in the direction of devising meansof defense is by no means clear . . . the delegates are therefore enjoinednot to give the weight of their influence to the promotion of projects the

1 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 1625,trans. Francis W. Kelsey (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1925), III, 651-52.2 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, Pamphlet 8,The Hague Declaration (IV, 2) of 1899 Concerning Asphyxiating Gases (Washington: TheEndowment, 1915).


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THE YEARS BETWEEN THE WARS 19realization of which is so uncertain." 3 The United States therefore did notsubscribe to the antigas agreement, although a number of nations did.4

The refusal of the United States to participate in formal measures tooutlaw the employment of toxic chemicals was not based on lack of sympathywith the purposes of the proposal. It was the result, rather, of unwillingnessto act in the uncertain light of what was then only a nebulous possibility.Moreover, since The Hague antigas declaration specifically outlawed onlyprojectiles, its phrasing could be interpreted as a stimulus to the devising ofother means of dissemination. Because of this loophole the German attackat Ypres in April 1915, when chlorine gas was released from chargedcylinders, did not violate the letter of The Hague declaration.5

The Hague antigas declaration was a casualty of the Ypres attack eventhough it did not specifically apply. Both the Central and Allied Powersdeveloped and used toxics which were disseminated by a number of means,including projectiles, throughout the war.The spirit of The Hague declara-tion lived, however, to become a part of the effective Allied antigas prop-aganda weapon which in the period between the wars was to stimulatewidespread public indignation against the "barbaric" and "inhuman" em-ployment of toxics by the enemy.6

After the war there was wide reaction against use of gas in futuremilitary conflicts. The peace treaties signed by the Central Powers all con-tained the clause, "the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and allanalogous liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufactureand importation are strictly forbidden." 7 This wording presumably appliedonly to the defeated states. Subsequent agreements between the Allies andother powers were needed to insure universal prohibition of gas warfare.The policy of the United States in the matter of toxic chemicals wasclearly expressed at the Conference on the Limitation of Armament whichmet in Washington in 1921.This question was one considered earlier by asubcommittee on land warfare of which General Pershing was chairman.

3 Ltr, Secy State to Hon.Andrew D. White et al., 18 Apr 1899, in Special Missions, Depart-ment of State, Vol. IV, October 15, 1886-June 20, 1906. NA.4 The Hague antigas agreement was signed and ratified by twenty-five powers.5 Cyrus Bernstein, "The Law of Chemical Warfare," The George Washington Law Review,

X (June 1942) , 889-915. Portions of this article were reproduced in Chemical Warfare Bulletin,XXVIII (October 1942), 174-86.6 For details on antigas propaganda, see: James M. Read, Atrocity Propaganda: 1914-1919(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), pp. 6, 95-99; an d Horace C. Peterson, Propagandafor War (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939), p. 63.7 Green H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law (Washington: Dept. of State, 1943), p.

269.


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20 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICEPershing's group recommended that "chemical warfare should be abolishedamong nations as abhorrent to civilization." 8 Another report submitted atthis time by the General Board of the Navy stated that it was believed "tobe sound policy to prohibit gas warfare in every form and against everyobjective." 9 Both of these reports were considered by, and no doubt stronglyinfluenced, the U.S.delegation at the Washington arms conference informulating its proposal to prohibit the use of poison gas in war.

The U.S. proposal, incorporated as Article 5 in the Washington armsconference treaty covering the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases inWar, first pointed out that the employment of toxic war gases had beencondemned by world opinion and prohibited in numerous existing treaties.It then announced that the contracting parties, "to the end that this prohibi-tion shall be universally accepted as a part of international law bindingalike the conscience and practice of nations, declare their assent to suchprohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between themselves and invite allother civilized nations to adhere thereto." 10 The treaty was never ratified byFrance, one of the principal signatories, and therefore never came intoeffect.11 It remains the only antigas convention the ratification of which theU.S. Senate has ever approved.The proposition of outlawing gas warfare was revived at a conferenceheld in 1925 at Geneva to consider regulating the international traffic inarms. Here the U.S. delegation introduced and obtained general agreementto what has been called the Geneva Gas Protocol. This instrument, afterreiterating a general condemnation of the use of toxic agents in war,declared that the contracting parties had agreed to prohibit the use of suchmaterials in the future and had further agreed "to extend this prohibitionto the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and ... to be bound asbetween themselves according to the terms of this declaration." 12 Althoughthe U.S. delegation signed this protocol, the Senate refused to ratify it.A cross section of opinion in the United States on the military usefulnessof gas warfare and the prospects of preventing its employment by inter-

8 Quoted by Sen. William E. Borah (R.,Idaho) in Congressional Record, Vol. 68, Pt. I, p.140. 9 Ibid., p. 143.10 U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,1922 (Washington: Dept. of State, 1938), I, 276, hereafter cited as Dept. of State, Foreign Rela-tions of the United States.11 The other signatories were Great Britain, the United States, Italy, and Japan. France failedto sign this treaty because of the fact that it also greatly restricted submarine warfare.12 Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1925 (Washington: Dept. of State,1940), I, 89-90.


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THE YEARS BETWEEN THE WARS 21national agreement was brought out in Senate debates on the ratificationof the Geneva Gas Protocol.13 Some leading military figures were quoted asexpressing agreement with eliminating gas as a weapon of war.Considerableopposition to ratification came from civilian groups, especially veterans'organizations. Despite the fact that the Senate did not approve it, theprotocol was supported in principle by the executive departments of theU.S. Government. By the time World War II began, the Geneva Gas Protocolwas adhered to by forty-two nations and was the most generally acceptedexpression of international opinion relating to the use of toxic agents in war.The influence of national policy and of international agreements in limit-ing employment of toxic agents in war was of obvious concern to the WarDepartment. This matter was clarified by Secretary of State Frank B. Kelloggon 7 December 1926 in a letter supporting continued military preparationsin this field:

All governments recognize that it is incumbent upon them to be fully preparedas regards chemical warfare, an d especially as regards defense against it , irrespectiveof any partial or general international agreements looking to the prohibition of theactual use of such warfare. I have never seen any proposal seriously advanced by anygovernment to provide that national preparation for the use of and for defenseagainst chemical warfare, if such warfare should be used by an enemy contrary totreaty agreements, should be abolished or curtailed in the slightest.14In agreement with this statement was the joint Army-Navy policy on chemicalwarfare which in 1934was framed in these words:

The United States will make all necessary preparations for the use of chemicalwarfare from the outbreak of war.The use of chemical warfare, including the use oftoxic agents, from the inception of hostilities, is authorized, subject to such restrictionsor prohibitions as may be contained in any duly ratified international convention orconventions, which at that time may be binding upon the United States and theenemy's state or states.15

All Presidents whose administrations spanned the interwar years soughtto eliminate gas as a military weapon. Herbert Hoover and Franklin D.Roosevelt, who saw eye to eye on this issue, were particularly outspoken.President Hoover steadily urged elimination before the disarmament de-liberations that took place while he was in office. By the time of PresidentRoosevelt's inauguration the prospect of effective agreement among nationson the curtailment of armaments appeared to have vanished. In line, possibly,

13 Congressional Record, Vol.68, Pt. I, pp. 141-54, 226-29, 363-68.14 Ibid., p. 366.15 Ltr, Jt Plng Com to JB, 17 Oct 34, sub: Use of Cml Agents. JB 325, Ser 542.


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22 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICEwith this trend, Congress in 1937 passed a bill (S. 1284) to change thedesignation of the Chemical Warfare Service to Chemical Corps.16 This thePresident promptly vetoed. The reasons given in the Roosevelt veto messageclearly expressed the White House attitude and, ipso facto, that of the U.S.Government:

It has been and is the policy of this Government to do everything in its powerto outlaw the use of chemicals in warfare. Such use is inhuman and contrary to whatmodern civilization should stand for.I am doing everything in my power to discourage the use of gases and otherchemicals in any war between nations. While, unfortunately, the defensive necessitiesof the United States call fo r study of the use of chemicals in warfare, I do not wantthe Government of the United States to do anything to aggrandize or make permanentany special bureau of the Army or the Navy engaged in these studies. I hope the timewill come when the Chemical Warfare Service can be entirely abolished.To dignify this Service by calling it the "Chemical Corps" is, in my judgment,contrary to a sound public policy.17

The War Department and Gas WarfareBeginning in 1921 and continuing until 1941, the mission of the ChemicalWarfare Service was the subject of almost continuous debate by the WarDepartment General Staff (WDGS). During these years there was scarcely

a time when the CWS felt that it enjoyed undisputed membership on theWar Department team. Hence a great deal of energy was continually ex-pended by the CWS in defending its statutory position. This fact had con-siderable bearing on the development of the new service.The questions most frequently raised by the War Department were:Could the Chemical Warfare Service be eliminated and its duties distributedamong other services? Could the Chemical Warfare Service be relieved ofcombat functions and its activities limited to technical and supply duties andto defensive training?

In 1924 the WDGS phrased a sentence which, constantly repeated inlater years, came to be generally accepted as a statement of policy and aguide to the activities of the CWS: "Our peacetime preparations in chemicalwarfare will be based on opposing effectively any enemy employing chemicalweapons."18

16 This change, as already indicated, was eventually effected by Public Law 607, 79th Congress,2 August 1946.17Copy in CWS 011/1-20.18Ltr, TAG to C CWS, 7 Jan 24, sub:CWS's Functions. AG 321.94 (1-2-24) (Misc.) M-C.


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THE YEARS BETWEEN THE WARS 23This statement was based on a War Department policy announcement

which had attempted to clarify preceding general orders and other instruc-tions relating to the establishment of the Chemical Warfare Service, par-ticularly in the light of current developments toward international limitationof armaments. It had the merit of clearly stating an obviously desirableobjective, yet the means to be followed to this end proved to be subject towidely varying interpretations. Some of the difficulties being encounteredwere brought to the attention of the War Department by the Chief, CWS(Maj. Gen. Amos A. Fries), in 1926, when some liberalizing of existingpolicy as to offensive means was proposed.19 The staff study of CWS func-tions which followed carefully reviewed all the preceding actions andpointed to still further investigations that needed to be made but did notlead to immediate change in standing instructions.20

The War Department by this time had definitely veered away fromplanning the type of positional warfare characteristic of the campaigns inFrance in 1917 and 1918and with which large-scale gas operations stagedby chemical troops seemed intimately associated. Consequently, the existenceof special gas troops was increasingly challenged, and the employment ofgas by branches other than the CWS was increasingly favored by the staff.The CWS view was that gas had important uses in a war of movement as wellas in static operations and that technical considerations necessitated the em-ployment of special gas troops in either situation. These differing attitudeswere never wholly reconciled, although at times the General Staff view ap-pears to have been maintained somewhat less resolutely than that of theChemical Warfare Service.The mission of the Chemical Warfare Service with respect to its principalpreoccupation, gas warfare, was therefore somewhat complex. Primarily theCWS was expected to provide insurance fo r American military forces againstthe shock of sudden gas attack. Hand in hand with this mission went re-sponsibility fo r maintaining a state of readiness fo r quick retaliation. Thesetw o constituted explicit responsibilities. In a broader sense, an implicit func-tion of the CWS was to provide military support for a national policy, thatof dissuading others from resorting to the gas weapon. This was accom-plished, as matters turned out, more by the strength of U.S. preparednessfor toxic warfare than by the cogency of political agreements.

19 (1) Ltr, C CWS to TAG, 9 Jun 26, sub:Functions of CWS. AG 321.94. (2) Public Law457, signed 24 February 1925, raised the rank of the Chief, CWS, from brigadier general tomajor general.20 Memo, ACofS G-3 for CofS, 5 Nov 26, sub: CWS Functions. AG 321.94, Sec. 1, Functionsof CWS.


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24 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICECarrying Out the Peacetime Mission: 1920-39

To supplement the National Defense Act statement of CWS functionsthe War Department spelled them out in more detailed fashion via a seriesof general orders issued in 1920and 1921.On 28 August 1920,for example,it defined the specific duties of the Chemical Warfare Service and theOrdnance Department with regard to the investigation, development, pro-curement, and supply of munitions: Ordnance retained the responsibility forthe design, procurement, and supply of chemical shells, grenades, andbombs; the CWS was to fill them with gas, smoke, or incendiary agents.Later it defined the relationship of the CWS to the corps areas and, stilllater, outlined the storage an d issue responsibilities and specified that thechemical warfare training of the Army be along both offensive and defensivelines.21The signing by the U.S. delegation at the Washington arms conferenceof the proposal to outlaw gas warfare led the War Department in mid-1922to modify its policy on the functions of the CWS.22 The General Staffrescinded provisions of several general orders and promulgated two newgeneral orders which suspended all work on toxic agents and restrictedCWS activities in gas warfare to purely defensive measures.23 Although theWar Department eventually modified these directives, the change in policywhich they represented was to exert a retarding influence on the CWS formany years.For a decade and a half after the close of World War I appropriationsfor national defense were decidedly limited.24 This was the era when thegovernment and a good man y citizens held high hopes for the early elimina-tion of armed conflicts. It was the U.S. Government that initiated the callfor the Washington conference of 1921-22, and it was an American Sec-retary of State who was coauthor of the Pact of Paris of 27 August 1928,aimed at outlawing war as an instrument of national policy (the so-calledKellogg-Briand agreement). During the 1920's the President and theCongress were insisting on economy in all branches of the national govern-

21 WD GO 75, 23 Dec 20; WD GO 76, 28 Dec 20; WD GO 2, 14 Jan 21; WD GO 21, 21May 21; WD GO 42, 17 Aug 21; WD GO 54, 28 Aug 1920.22 As indicated above, although the U.S. delegation signed this treaty and the U.S. Senateapproved its ratification, the treaty never became operative.23 WD GO 24, 10 Jun 22, and WD GO 26, 17 Jun 22.24Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, UNITED STATESARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington: 1950) (hereafter cited as Prewar Plans), Ch II.


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THE YEARS BETWEEN THE WARS 25TABLE 1CONGRESSIONAL A P P R O P R I A T I O N S FOR CWS, 1922-46

a1922 was the first year for which funds were appropria ted directly for the CWS. From 1918 to 1922 fu n d s for the CWSwere t ransferred from, or included in , other appropria t ions .

b This low figure is due to the fact that sufficient funds were appropria ted in the previous fiscal year to take care of CWSneeds in 1945.

cSu rp lu s Appropriation Rescission Acts (P.L. 301, 8 Feb 46 and P.L. 391, 27 May 46) rescinded $1,024,351,000 of unex-pended CWS appropr i a t i ons for the years 1942-1946.

d This appropr i a t i on was made only two and one-half months before V-J Day (2 Sep 1945) and none of these funds wereever expended.

Source: Budge t of the United States, transmitted to Congress by the President.

ment. Following the stock-market crash of 1929 and the resultant depression,economy in the use of government funds became more of a watchword thanever.If the Military Establishment as a whole felt the effects of the trendtoward economy, the Chemical Warfare Service felt it in even greater degree.Since the necessity for a separate organization to supervise chemical warfare

functions was seriously questioned by some of the highest ranking officersin the General Staff, the War Department was not prone to be oversolicitousfor the welfare of the new service. The meager resources of the CWS untilmid-1940 in terms of appropriations and personnel strength are indicated inTables 1, 2, and 3. A glance at Table 2 will disclose that the quota of 101officers and 1,200 enlisted men provided for in the National Defense Actof 1920 was not filled until after the close of fiscal year 1940.Peacetime Organization

Within the confines of limited appropriations and personnel, theChemical Warfare Service carried out its restricted peacetime mission. Ad-


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26 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICETABLE 2MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE CWS, 1918-46a

aFor detailed figures on CWS military personnel strength in World War II see AppendixesA and B.b Figures represent total strength reported as CWS by all commands and theaters. Officers of other branches or without

branch assignments may have been serving with the CWS, but the number is judged not to be of significant size. IncludesR e g u l a r Army, Reserve, Army of the U.S., and National Guard officers on active duty (except trainees) under the juris-diction of the Chief, CWS.

cncludes enlisted men reported as CWS.d Figures as of 11 November 1918.

e Figures as of 30 June from 1919 to 1946.Source: Figures from 1918 to 1921 were taken from the annual report of the Chief, CWS, to the Secretary of War. Figures

1922-1941 from Tables, Actual Strength of the Military Personnel of the Army, A n n u a l Reports of the Secretary of War tothe President, 1922-41. Figures 1942-46 from draft table, Total Male Strength of the Army by Arm or Service, preparedby Statistics Br, Program Review an d Analysis Div, Off, Comptroller of the Army.

ministratively, the CWS was a supply service of the Army, responsible tothe War Department General Staff and to the Office of the Assistant Sec-retary of War for procurement and procurement planning activities. TheChief, CWS, was of course responsible for the organization and administra-tion of his own service. In 1920 he set up an organization consisting of fivedivisions: Procurement and Supply, Technical, Medical, Industrial Relations(later called Procurement Planning), and Plans, Training, and Operations.25Except for the elimination of the Medical Division in 1932, this organizationremained substantially unchanged throughout the peacetime period. From

25 Rpt of CWS, 1921.


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THE YEARS BETWEEN TH E WARS 27TABLE 3 C H E M I C A L WARFARE SE RVICE CIVILIAN P E R S O N N E L STRENGTH,

N O V E M B E R 1918-DECEMBER 1945

aFor breakdown in this period seeTable 6 where totals vary slightly, probably reflecting a later adjustment.Source: Figures 1918-1931 compiled from reports, "Civ Pers Strength," prepared by the Office of the Assistant and Chief

Clerk to the SW. Figures 1939-1945 compiled from Office of the Comptroller, Dept of the Army, Statistics Br (Squier/Penta-gon 2B673) f ro m: (1) "Monthly Rpt of Pers Activities," WDAGO; (2) "Monthly Rpt of Authorizations and Strength forPers Opera t i ng the Z of I Establishment," WDGS Contl Symbol SM-P2-39; (3) "Monthly Rpt of Pers Author i za t i ons andStrengths for Establishments in Area of District of Columbia and Arlington County, Va.," WDMB Form 114, WDGSSM-P2-40; (4) d ra f t reports of War Dept Monthly Strength in Statistics Br, Program Review and Analysis Div, Office ofthe Comptroller of the Army.

1920 until 1938 a dozen officers and a score of civilians constituted the entirepersonnel of the Chief 's office.26Each of the Chiefs made his own special contribution to the develop-ment of the Chemical Warfare Service. General Sibert devoted his maturejudgment to the task of organizing the new service in World War I, andhe had much to do with marshaling the sentiment which finally prevailedin 1920, when the decision was taken to make the emergency CWS organiza-tion a permanent element of the Army. General Fries, during his long

26 The Chief 's office was located in the Munitions Building in Washington, D.C.


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28 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICEtenure as Chief (1920-29), continuously displayed the aggressive capabilitythat had made him conspicuously successful as head of the AEF Gas Service.He withstood all opposition from without while he molded the CWS intoits ultimate peacetime form. During the next four years Maj. Gen. HarryL. Gilchrist brought to the Office of the Chief (OC) the prestige of aninternationally know n authority on gas casualties. A medical officer, he con-tinued to emphasize, as had his predecessors, the scientific aspects of chemicalwarfare. Gilchrist's successor, Maj. Gen. Claude E. Brigham, an artillery-man, had executive and command experience which gave him a thoroughinsight into the strength and weakness of the Chemical Warfare Service asit existed in the middle 1930's. It was during Brigham's tour that the pros-pect of another major war began to take shape, and it became his responsi-bility to initiate a more vigorous preparedness program. To Maj. Gen.Walter C. Baker, who served from May 1937 to April 1941, fell the task ofcarrying out and extending this preparedness program into the emergencyperiod.Assisting the Chief, CWS, were an Advisory Committee of fifteen civilianauthorities in chemistry and chemical engineering, a CWS Technical Com-mittee, and a Chemical Warfare Board. The Advisory Committee, which wasunofficial in capacity, was set up in the American Chemical Society in 1920.The members of the committee met periodically with CWS scientists andadm inistrators to discuss policies and problems of research and development.The CWS Technical C ommittee, also set up in 1920, came into existence asthe result of a need for co-ordination among interested branches of thearmed forces in the development and standardization of chemical warfareitems.27 On the Technical Committee sat representatives of CWS and of thefollowing: Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, Infantry, Air Corps, Cavalry,General Staff, National Guard Bureau, and the Assistant Secretaries of theWar and Navy Departments. The Chemical Warfare Board was establishedat Edgewood Arsenal in 1923 to study and co-ordinate technical develop-ments with tactical doctrine and methods.28Research, development, training, manufacturing, and storage functionswere centered at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland. There in 1920 a functionaltype of organization was set up consisting of the following units: the

27 OC CWS SO 74, 31 Mar 20.28 OC CWS SO 19, 21 May 23. For details on the Chemical Warfare Board, see Leo P. Brophy,Wyndham D. Miles, and Rexmond C. Cochrane, The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratoryto Field, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
http://lab.pdf/http://lab.pdf/


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CH E M ICA L W A R F A R E SERVICE CHIEFS, February 1920-April 1941. Top left,Maj. Gen. Amos A. Fries, 1920-29; right, Maj. Gen. Walter C. Baker,1937-41; bottom left, Maj. Gen. Harry L. Gilchrist, 1929-33; right, Maj.Gen. Claude E. Brigham, 1933-37.


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30 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICEChemical Division and the Mechanical Division, each of which was engagedin research and development activities; the Plants Division, which wasresponsible for manufacturing; th e Property Division, to which supplyresponsibilities were delegated; the Chemical Warfare School; and CWStroops.29 Later a Safety and Inspection Division and a Medical ResearchDivision were activated.

From a managerial standpoint the 1920's were a period of trial anderror at Edgewood, when certain administrative procedures were inaugu-rated which later had to be modified. For example, be

chenical warfare service organizing for war

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