china as a factor in the collapse of the soviet empire

8/3/2019 China as a Factor in the Collapse of the Soviet Empire

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China as a Factor in the Collapse of the Soviet EmpireAuthor(s): Nancy Bernkopf TuckerSource: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 110, No. 4 (Winter, 1995-1996), pp. 501-518Published by: The Academy of Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2151881

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Chinaas a Factor n the Collapseof the SovietEmpire

NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKEROn 15May 1989, Soviet CommunistPartyGeneralSecretaryMik-hailGorbachevrrivedn Beijing o normalize elations etween he SovietUnionand the People'sRepublicof China PRC).This was to havebeen thecrowningachievement f Deng Xiaoping's areer-a reflectionof his accomplishmentsngeopoliticsanddomesticreform.Havingbroughtprosperityo the countryside,a degreeof modernizationo thecities, and heightenednternationaltandingothe nation,he looked forward o celebratingMoscow'scapitulation n the so-called hreeobstacles:Afghanistan,Cambodia, nd he northern order-a capitu-lation hatmadeSino-Soviet approchementossibleand hatGorbachev'sourneyto Beijingaptly symbolized.For China, the cold war epoch was ending;theyearsof external hreatwereover.But waitingfor the Soviet leader in TiananmenSquarewere thousandsofprotestersurgingdemocracyand moral reformation pon China'sgovernment.Theyappealed o Gorbachevor help, they humiliatedDeng in his hourof tri-umph,and finally they were crushedby the tanksof the People'sLiberationArmy PLA). China teppedback rom he futurehatwouldsoonembraceRussia

andEasternEurope, shunningparticipationn the liberating ventsthat sweptmostof therestof the communistworld n 1989. Ironically,afterhavingcontrib-utedovertheyearsmodestlybutcontinuallyo Sovietdifficulties ndafterhavinginstituted eformsthatrevealedthe roadto possible salvation or communisminEurope, n June1989the Chinesedemonstratedow notto deal with heforcesunleashedby reform.

Political Science Quarterly Volume 110 Number 4 1995-96 501

NANCY BERNKOPFTUCKERis professorof historyat GeorgetownUniversityand in the George-town University School of Foreign Service. Her most recent books are Taiwan,Hong Kongand theUnitedStates, 1945-1992; UncertainFriendships;andthe co-editedvolumeto which she also contrib-uted, LyndonJohnson Confronts he World.She is currentlya fellow at the UnitedStates InstituteofPeace in Washington,D.C.


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502 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

To understandChina'srole in the collapse of the Soviet empire requiresconsideration f threefactors: he Chinesesecurity hreat,the economicchal-lenge, and theTiananmenmodel of politicalrepression. n none of these areascould the China factor be consideredprimary.U.S. militaryspendingunderJimmyCarterand RonaldReagan fueled Soviet determinationo invest in amultioceannavy and to expandICBMcapabilities.Similarly, n both EasternEuropeand the Soviet Union, experimentationwith reformantedatedChina'sinnovations.Finally,neither mpulses owardbrutality orresistanceo it neededto be learned romthe Chinese.Nevertheless, n the complexenvironmenthatproduced he collapse of the Soviet empire,theproblemsand challengesposedby the People'sRepublic ughtnotto be ignored f acomprehensive ndnuancedunderstandingf these events is to be reached.

THEGEOPOLITICALIMENSIONThe Chinesemenace to Soviet securityand Moscow'sintimidation f Beijingwere both the longest standingand clearest problemsbetween the two states.Their engthy ommonborderandSovietfearof a two-frontwarmade tvirtuallyinevitable.When the UnitedStatesandChinabegannormalizationn theearly1970s, apprehensions mongthe menin the Kremlinmounted.

ConcernamongSoviet leaders stretchedback to the earliestdays of theChinesecivil war. They preferreda weakdependentneighbor o a strongonewith tsownagenda,and heyentertained nunderlyingacial earof the volatilebarbarianordes nthe east-a fearthathadcharacterized ussianregimes ongbefore the adventof communism.JosephStalinopposedMao Zedong'seffortto unify China;his successorssought ointmilitary acilitiesandtriedto punishMao for ideological nnovation.During he ChineseCulturalRevolution 1966-1976), Sovietanxiety rose in response o China'snstabilityand fanaticism.'The Sino-Sovietsplit, whichbecamepublic n the 1960s, madeclearnotonlythatmonolithic ommunismwasanillusionbutthatbipolaritywasaninadequateorganizingprinciple or the internationalystem.The Chinesedecisionto seeksupportagainst he Soviet menacefromtheir erstwhileenemiesin Washingtonconfirmed hatthe cold warwas no longera strugglebetweencommunism ndcapitalism.U.S.-China rapprochementorced Moscow to takedefense of itsAsian borderseriouslyat the same time as Washington,althoughaugmentingits militaryprowess,could stopworryingabout an Asian threat.The need todevote ever largerportionsof Sovietgrossnationalproduct GNP)to weaponsprocurementntensified conomicweakness.ForMoscow,deteriorationf living

' Murray D. Zinoman, "Soviet Security Policy Toward China: The Limits of Change," PacificRegional Security (Washington,DC: National Defense University Press, 1988), 59-60, 62; SewerynBialer, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict: The Soviet Dimension" n Donald Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy inEast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 109; 0. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov,Soviet-ChineseRelations, 1945-1970 (Bloomington:IndianaUniversity Press, 1975), 291-322.


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CHINA AND COLLAPSE OF SOVIET EMPIRE | 503

standards,f infrastructure,ndeven of life expectancy ecessitated turn owardreformandabandonmentf the cold war. Thus he Sino-Sovietsplithad mplica-tions for the global balanceof power that rangedfar beyond the substanceofdisagreements etweenMoscow and Beijing.PrecipitatingChina'sdecisionto seek rapprochement ith the UnitedStateswas its fearof a Soviet invasion.In the mid-1960stroopconcentrationsscalatedalong the Sino-Sovietboundary.Tensionsheightened n 1968, when LeonidBrezhnev sedforcetosmashCzechoslovakia'sragueSpring,claimingMoscowhad heright, ndeed he obligation, o intervenen communist ountries orestoreorderandpreserve ocialism.Chinese eaders awSoviet ntrusion s "fascistbanditry"nd fearedtheirborderclashes would lead to war.2European eportsthat Moscowcontemplated trikesagainstChinesenuclear acilities stimulatedalarm.3U.S. Secretaryof State William Rogers estimatedduring the Nixonadministrationhat he Russians ouldseize a largeportionof the north ncludingBeijing.4To China'srelief, in spiteof past hostility,the UnitedStates provedunwilling o tolerateSoviet aggressionagainst he PRC.Moscowsharplydenounced he anti-Soviet hrustof theSino-American c-cord reachednShanghain February1972.5LeonidBrezhnevhadhimselfbeenlooking o negotiationswith Washingtono reduceburgeoningmilitary xpendi-turesand secure tradein foodstuffsand technology.Even after Shanghai,hebelievedthatif the United States understoodhatit had the optionof dealingwith Russia nsteadof China, heSovietUnion"would emain he UnitedStates'primary ndpreferred dversary-partner."6he UnitedStatescapitalized n So-viet anxiety o get a summitanda strategic rms imitation reaty n 1972,despiteescalationof theVietnamWar. In June1973,BrezhnevwarnedRichardNixonnot to negotiatea U.S.-Chinamilitaryaccord,andin June1974 he offeredthepresidentan allianceagainst he PRC.7

2 ThomasM. Gottlieb,ChineseForeignPolicy Factionalismand the OriginsoftheStrategicTriangle,RandR-1902-NA, 1977, 115-118; Roger Glenn Brown, "ChinesePolitics and American Policy: ANew Look at the Triangle,"Foreign Policy 23 (Summer 1976): 3-23; ThomasRobinson, "The Sino-Soviet BorderDispute,"AmericanPolitical Science Review 66 (December 1972): 1175-1202; Borisovand Koloskov, Soviet-Chinese Relations, 219-25, 239-42, 322-28.

3Bernard Gwertzman,"A Chinese Youth Writes to Soviet," New YorkTimes, 28 August 1969;Hedrick Smith, "U.S. Doubts Soviet Will Bomb China,"New YorkTimes, 29 August 1969; ArkadyShevchenko,Breakingwith Moscow (New York: Knopf, 1985), 164-66; HarryGelman, The SovietFar East Buildup and Soviet Risk-TakingAgainst China, Rand R-2943-AF, August 1982, 29-48.

4 BenjaminWelles, "RogersTerms Czechoslovakia GrimReminder,'"New YorkTimes, 21 August1969; Langer, "Soviet Military Power in Asia" in Zagoria, Soviet Policy, 272.

s Georgi Arbatov, The System (New York: Times Books, 1992), 180-82; Chi Su, "U.S.-ChinaRelations: Soviet Views and Policies," Asian Survey, 23 (May 1983): 560-61; Seweryn Bialer, "TheSoviet Union and the West: Security and Foreign Policy"in Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum,eds.,Gorbachev'sRussia and AmericanForeign Policy (Boulder,CO: Westview, 1988), 473.

6 Robert Legvold, "The 26th Party Congress and Soviet Foreign Policy" in Seweryn Bialer andThaneGustafson, ed., Russia at the Crossroads (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1981), 160.

7 WilliamHyland, MortalRivals (New York: RandomHouse, 1987), 11,60,63-64; RichardNixon,RN (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 1030; John Newhouse, Cold Dawn (New York: Holt,Rinehart& Winston, 1973), 188-89.


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Moscow, however, lost the competition or Washington's avor. Not onlydidNixon rebuffa possiblealliance,Washington eganto contemplatemilitarycooperationwithChina.Americanshoped oforce ever greatermilitary xpendi-tureson the Soviets, createdeploymentproblems or the Red Army, constrainSoviet expansion,andprecludeSino-Soviet reconciliation.8Rapprochementorked.Moscow felt constrainedurthero increaseborderdeployments,which had climbedfrom fifteendivisions n 1965 to forty-four n1972 and to fifty in 1982, complemented y one quarter f the Soviet air force.As much as one-seventhof all Soviet militaryresourcesfueledthe Far Eastexpansion.Brezhnev'snitialdecision o investheavily n conventional s well as nuclearcapabilities adcomein 1965, beforeSino-American ooperation. tconstituteda return o a tradition hat saw moreas better, but also reflectedmaneuveringto assuremilitary upport gainstrivalssuch as Alexi Kosyginand NikolaiPod-gornyy, as well as to respond o the growing U.S. commitmentn Vietnam.9Most urgent,however, was offsetting hebreakdownn efforts at reconciliationwiththeChinese.Vigorous rontier efensecharacteristicf a belief n"asymmet-ricalsecurity"necessitated verawingChineseforces.0 Moscow also launchedthe ill-fatedand costly Baikal-Amurailwayproject o expeditedevelopment fthe SovietFar East-an effort thatneednot have involvedan entirelynew railline well northof thefrontierhad officials not wanted o protect t fromBeijing.WithrapprochementetweenWashington nd Beijing, Sovietleaders acedthe specterof American orcesjoinedwiththoseof JapanandChina. This ledthemdramaticallyo increasedeployment f intermediate uclearmissiles;mod-ernizethe Pacificfleet; andupgraderoops,communications, ndfortifications.In 1978 Moscow createdan independent heatercommand n the region con-firminghepermanencyf itsexpensivenewdefenseposture.GeorgiA. Arbatov,director f the U.S.A. andCanadanstitutewarned hat f Chinawere"tobecomesome sortof military llyto theWest .. there s noplacefordetente.""Analystshavearguedpersuasivelyhat earof Chinese-Americanollusion n Afghanistancontributedo, althought did notdetermine, heSoviet decisionto invadethat

8 BanningN. Garrettand Bonnie S. Glaser, "From Nixon to Reagan: China'sChanging Role inAmericanStrategy"nKennethA. Oye, RobertJ. Lieber, and DonaldRothchild,eds., Eagle Resurgent?(Boston:Little, Brown, 1987), 256-63.9 Bialer, "The Soviet Union" in Bialer and Mandelbaum,Gorbachev'sRussia, 461-62.10 HarryGelman, TheBrezhnevPolitburoand theDecline ofDetente(Ithaca,NY: CornellUniversityPress, 1984), 38-41, 80-81, 94; RajanMenon, Soviet Power and the Third World New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1986), 99." Avigdor Haselkorn, "Impactof Sino-JapaneseTreaty on the Soviet Security Strategy,"AsianSurvey19 (June 1979):561, 565; JonathanPollack, "Chinaand the GlobalStrategicBalance"n HarryHarding,ed., China'sForeignRelations n the 1980s (New Haven:Yale UniversityPress, 1984), 164;BanningGarrettandBonnie Glaser, Warand Peace (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1984),14.


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country n 1979, beginninga war which would furtherdrain he USSR as wellas burydetente.2Here thenwas the fulfillment f the classic Russianmilitarynightmare-thepossibilityof a two front war-made particularly rightfulby AmericanandJapanesewillingness o arm the Chinesehordes.'3And not only would Moscowhave to expandand diversifymilitarycapabilities, he United Stateswould beable to focus its attention n Europe eaving Asia to China.In 1970 the Nixonadministrationmade public its reconfigurationf strategicplans, eliminatingbudgets or fighting imultaneouslyn Europeand Asia. The Soviets plaintivelywarned he unwittingAmericans hatChinawouldtry"tocause a clash betweenthe U.S. andthe USSR, in orderto dominate he world after a nuclearconflictwhich... wouldreduceAmericaandEurope o asheswhile sparing .. millionsof Chinese."'4Thegrowth n Sovietmilitary owerduring he 1970sdidnotpromote ationalsecurity.Paradoxically,tbrought ogethera powerful oalitionof forcesagainstan isolatedSovietgovernmentwhosemilitaryachievements,while substantial,cloakedprecipitousconomicdecline.Addedburdens romwarinAfghanistan,commitmentso CubaandVietnamas well as a resurgentarms race with theUnitedStatesmade Soviet overextensiondebilitating. nsteadof reflectinggen-uinepreeminence,militarizationn the Soviet model seemedto Deng Xiaopingto conflict with modernization ndprosperity.As he remarked o Germanex-ChancellorHelmutSchmidt,"oneof the reasonswhythe Sovieteconomysuffersfromparalysis s thatthe Russiansspendtoo muchmoneyon the military."'5By 1982 Moscow had recognized hat its policies had createda hazardousanti-Soviet lignment.Assumptionshat t couldsustaind6tentewith the UnitedStateswhileprojecting ower ntothe ThirdWorldhadprovenwildlyinaccurate.Moscow's onviction hat urvivaldictated noffensivepostureproved ncompat-ible withWashington'siew of detenteas superseding ompetition.With10-15percentof GNP goingto the military,Soviet leadersfoundtheystill couldnotintimidatehe UnitedStates,Japan, r China.6InMarch1982,therefore,Brezhnev

12 RaymondGarthoff,Detente and Confrontation Washington,DC: Brookings, 1985), 921-22,esp. n99.

13 MarshalN. Ogarkov, Kommunist, uly 1981, Joint PublicationResearch Service (JPRS) 79074PREX 7.21/11:981, 25 September 1981, 90; A. Gromyko, Kommunist,January 1981, JPRS 78106PREX 7.13:78106, 18 May 1981, 16.14 GarrettandGlaser, Warand Peace, 28; Philip Taubman,"U.S. and ChinaForgingCloserTies,"New YorkTimes, 8 December 1980, Serge Schmemann,"RussianScorns Chinese as 'Agents'of U.S.,"

19 June 1981, and BernardNositer, "BrzezinskiPraises White House,"2 July 1981.Is ThomasBernstein,"DomesticPolitics" n StevenGoldstein, ed., ChinaBriefing, 1984 (Boulder,

CO: Westview, 1985), 9; Samuel S. Kim, "Chinaand the Third World: In Search of a Peace andDevelopment Line" n Kim, ed., China and the World Boulder,CO:Westview, 1989), 169; BanningGarrettand Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Estimates of the U.S.-Soviet Balance of Power," Paper #33,1988, 28, Wilson Center, Washington,DC.16 AlexanderNagorny, Sergei Tsyplakov, and UsmanUsmanov, "The PRC: The First Decade ofthePolicyof Reforms," nternationalAffairs1(January1989): 29; Alexei G. Arbatov,"ArmsLimitation


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took the major step of acceptingthe legitimacy of Chinese socialism, whichremoveda major ideologicalbarrier o reconciliation.'7 ubsequent ow-levelexchanges n science, education,culture,and trade stabilizedcontacts."8Then under Mikhail Gorbachev he pace accelerated.His "new politicalthinking" ecognizedthat the correlationof forces was no longer workingtoMoscow'sadvantageand that the new situation avoredeconomic cooperationover military oercion.To cut militarybudgetsandreassign unds othe domesticsphere,Gorbachevought o end thecold war, improverelationswiththe UnitedStates,andminimize hreatsof nuclearwar.At the sametime, if costs weretobe reducedand securityenhanced, t appeared mperative o eliminateregionalconflicts.19Thus,according o SovietanalystAlexanderLukin,"an mprovementinrelationswithChinawasindispensableo the successof Gorbachev's olicy."20Among other initiatives,Gorbachev's peechat Vladivostok n July 1986 sug-gested concessionson two of the threeobstaclesto Sino-Soviet reconciliation:reductionof forces along the borderandwithdrawal rom Afghanistan.Military oncernson the SovietAsianborderproduced profound lterationin Moscow'sview of its place in the worldandthepossiblefruitsof its foreignpolicy. BeginningwiththeSino-Sovietrift,Chinahadbeenperceivedas athreat,complicatingdefense planningandescalatingdefensespending.Reconciliationwith the UnitedStatesrenderedChinastill moredangerous.ButthepolicythatequippedSoviet Asia for war alienatedpeople in the Pacific area, isolatedMoscow, andstrengthenedPRC-U.S.-Japanese ies. The Soviet Union founditself less, not moresecure.The timehadcome to rethink ts strategicposture.

CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORMIftheborderproblemwithChinagave mpetusothereconfigurationf Moscow'ssecuritystructure,heeconomicchallengearising romthe East also hada roleinhastening hange nthe Sovietempire.Chinaembarked ponseriouseconomicand the Situation ntheAsian-Pacific and IndianOcean Regions,"Asian Surgery24 (November1984):1110.

1" M. S. Ukraintsev M. S. Kapitsal,"USSR'sCooperationwithAsian Socialist Countries,Kampu-chea,"Far EasternAffairs 1 (January-March1986), JPRS-UFE-003, 18 June 1986; Chi Su, "SovietChina-Watchers' nfluenceon Soviet ChinaPolicy," Journal of NortheastAsian Studies2 (December1983): 44; KennethLieberthal, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s, Rand R-2342-NA, 1978.

18Carol Hamrin, Chinaand the Challenge of the Future(Boulder,CO: Westview, 1990), 93 and84-90; John W. Garver, "The 'New Type' of Sino-Soviet Relations,"Asian Survey29 (December1989): 1137.'9 HasegawaTsuyoshi, "Gorbachev, he New Thinking of Soviet Foreign-SecurityPolicy andthe

Military:Recent Trends andImplications" nd KimuraHiroshi,"Gorbachev'sNew Thinking'andtheAsian-Pacific Region"in Peter Juviler and Kimura, eds., Gorbachev'sReforms (New York: AldineDe Gruyter, 1988), 115-47, 149; StephenM. Meyer, "Sourcesand Prospectsof Gorbachev'sNewPolitical Thinking on Security,"Asian Survey 13 (Fall 1988): 128, 142.1 AlexanderLukin,"TheInitialSoviet Reactionto the Events in Chinain 1989 and the Prospectsfor Sino-Soviet Relations,"ChinaQuarterly125 (March 1991): 120.


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reform n 1978. Facilitated n partby the increased onfidence ollowing fromSino-American approchement,he new orderaltered he domestic conomyandexpanded ommercial ies with the West. In subsequent ears, it revolutionizedagricultural roduction nd raised he level of ruralprosperity ignificantly.Al-though ndustrial hangescame more slowly, the production f consumergoodsincreasedmarkedlyand the living standardsn cities also improved.These ad-vancessometimes nspired ndgenerally ncouraged eforms n the SovietUnionandEasternEurope,where heexistingsystem ncreasingly ppeared nworkableand the leadership ncompetent.ParticularlyChina'sability to attract oreigninvestment mbodied essons for capital-and technology-starvedovernments.Enthusiasm or reform along Chinese lines did not develop rapidly. TheSovietsdisparagedDeng Xiaoping's arly efforts, denouncinghe new policiesas an rresponsiblelight romsocialism.Commentariesuggested hat heSovietsassumedandhoped hatChina's ffortswouldfail.21dentifying hemas a threat,0. B. Rakhmanin f theCommunistPartyof theSovietUnion(CPSU)LiaisonDepartment, mongthe mostinfluentialandhard-lineof the long-termChina-watchers,charged hat thechangesaimedat strengthening eijing'santi-Sovietpolicy.22ManySoviet leaderscould not imagine hatMoscow could learnfroma backwardtate whosepreviouseconomic nnovations, uch as the GreatLeapForward,hadbeen so catastrophic.Othersresistedanything hatmight mproveSino-Sovietrelations."Onebecomesaccustomedo a quarrel," ovieteconomistLev Deliusin observed."Onecan makea profitoutof it, and that'swhy somepeoplewereinterestednot in resolvingdifferences,but in rousing hemto newheights."23 o the extent that Beijing'sprogramreceived serious attention, hefocus invariablyseemed to be its shortcomingsor inequities.Commentatorsstressed orruption,nflation, nequality, ndthe deteriorationf publicworks.24Those interested n Soviet applications elt constrained o silence or to air ideassurreptitiouslyn obscurepublications. deologicalcurbsfinallyeased withthe1982deathsof LeonidBrezhnevandparty deologicalpuristMikhailSuslov.25

Beginningwiththe accessionof YuriAndropov,discussionsof Chinesere-formsbecamemoreobjectiveand informative.Andropov sserted hatMoscowmust"take hefraternal ountries'xperiencentoaccount."26vendeputy oreign21 Gilbert Rozman, "Moscow'sChina-watchersn the Post-MaoEra: The Responseto a ChangingChina," China Quarterly94 (June 1983): 236-37.22 Chi Su, "Soviet China-Watchers," 2-43.2 Lev Petrovich Deliusin, 'The People's Republicof China:The Domestic Policy InfluenceonForeign Policy Activities" paper delivered at Conferenceon Chinese and East Asian Implications or

American Policy, 1991), 8.24 MarshallI. Goldman, Gorbachev'sChallenge:Economic Reform n theAge of High Technology(New York: Norton, 1987), 200-201.2 Rozman, The ChineseDebate, 370; Gilbert Rozman, "Stages n the Reformand DismantlingofSocialism in China and the Soviet Union" n Rozman, et al., ed., DismantlingCommunismBaltimore;

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 40; Gilbert Rozman,A Mirror or Socialism (Princeton,NJ:Princeton University Press, 1985), 43-44.

26 Gelman, 7he BrezhnevPolitburo, 256 n18.


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ministerM.S. Kapitsa,ordinarily n inflexiblecritic of the Chinese, saw fit tocall attention o important evelopmentsn the PRC in 1982. Missions o ChinabyAleksandr ovin,an nfluential olumnistorIzvestiya,n 1983,andby DeputyPrimeMinistervanArkhipov,n 1984, appear o haveencouragedheleadershipto study China. By mid-1985 the Instituteof the Far East, a researchgroupclosely tied to the ForeignMinistry,begana dispassionatemonthly eature nits journalon economic reforms n China.And also during 1985, the CentralCommittee f theCPSUestablishedts ownoffice to evaluate heChinesereformprogram.27Economic hange,however,stalledunderAndropov.Thegovernment rovedunable o galvanize he population, liminate orruption, r increase ither ndus-trialor agricultural utput,andseemedequallyunable o acknowledgehatthesystemrequired undamentalransformation.ncontrast o eitherChinaor EastEurope,entrenchednterests ndtraditionsmaintained tightgriponthe institu-tionsthatgoverned conomicperformance nd heimaginationf a publicwhichwould have to respond o new departures.The rootsof such immobility n acenturies-old uthoritarian ussianpoliticalculture hatemphasizedhierarchy,deference,and oyaltymadethepreservationf communist entralism ar morelogicalthan nnovation.28 otonly were Andropov's wn mildly iberal nclina-tionsthwarted,buthis regimeactually ought o restore deologicalconformityamongthe intelligentsia.By the timeMikhailGorbachevookcontrol nMarch1985, the mpossibilityof justmuddling hroughhadbecomepainfullyapparent.Theimpetus o reformcame froma combination f dire domesticcircumstances,hethorough iscred-itingof theStalinist rowthmodel, he exhaustiontemmingromwar nAfghani-stan,andtheemergenceof a generation f leadersreceptive o a policyofperes-troikaor restructuring.29As Gorbachev's overnmentmoved towardreform, it beganto look morecarefullyboth atdomesticprecursors, speciallyLenin'sNew EconomicPolicy(NEP), and at whathadbegunelsewhere,particularlyn Hungaryand China.Significantpublicdiscussion of the Chineseexperienceawaited Gorbachev'sFebruary 986 call at theCPSU's27thCongress,whichhe thenreiteratednhisimportantVladivostok peechin July.30

27 Lowell Dittmer, Sino-SovietNormalizationand Its IntemationalImplications,1945-1990 (Se-attle: University of WashingtonPress, 1992), 291 n30, 292 n53.28 Archie Brown, "Ideology and Political Culture" n Seweryn Bialer, ed. Politics, Society, andNationalityInside Gorbachev'sRussia (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), 19; KonstantinV. PleshakovandDimitryV. Furman,"China ndtheSoviet Union:CommonandSpecific Featuresof theirSociopolit-ical and Ideological Development,"Mirovaya Ekonomika MezhdunarodnyyeOtnosheniya12 (De-cember 1989):JPRS-UWE-90-004,2 April 1990.2 Charles Gati, TheBloc ThatFailed (Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 1990), 107-08;Shigeki Hakamadaand GilbertRozman, "The Soviet Union and China: Coping with Modernity"nRozman,Dismantling, 160.3 SheilaFitzpatrick,"The Sources of Changein Soviet History:State, Society, and theEntrepre-neurialTradition" n Bialerand Mandelbaum,Gorbachev'sRussia, 52-53; MartinMalia, TheSoviet


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Soviet economists ookingforwaysto invigoratea stagnant conomybeganto see in "China ur mainforeignreform aboratory."No longer criticizing heChineseprogramas heresy, they recognized hat what had been happeningnChina couldbe "vitally mportantor us." As Evgenii Konovalov,head of theChinadepartmentttheFarEastInstitute, sserted,"wenow look at theirreformsas if it were ourpersonalbusiness."3" nd Arbatov,who alongwith running heU.S.A./Canada nstitute ervedas a CentralCommitteemember ndgovernmentspokesman,observedthat since "we were becoming ncreasinglynterested nthe problem of reform . .. successful reforms in China . . . made that country'sagendaa factor n our internalpolitics."32Accordingto the Wall StreetJournal a "broad pectrumof Soviet China-watchersare saying openlythat the economic pathtakenby the Chineseplaysa role-in fact a centralrole-in determininghe policiesof Mr. Gorbachev she strivesto stir his own nation romits economictorpor."33ndeed,AlexanderLukin ubsequentlyndictedSovietofficialsandscholars orpurveying one-sidedpositive"nformationn the late 1980sso as to "givethe Sovietgovernmenthatextrapushneededfor theadoptionof similarmeasures."34conomistsat manyof the majorresearch nstitutesvied for the opportunity o travelto China.InJuly 1987, even formerForeignMinisterAndreiGromyko,noted for his longstandingndifferenceoAsia,attested o Moscow's nterestnChina'smoderniza-tionprogram.35Opinionremaineddivided as to the relevanceof Chinese reformsfor theSoviet Union. Some Soviet analystscontended hat China had little to teachthe Soviet Union'smore advanced ndustrialeconomy. Contrasts n politicalenvironmentndthestrength f bureaucratictructures lso seemedto interferewithapplyingessons.Whereas heSoviet leadership ppeared reparedo grantmore extensivepolitical freedoms,it hadto contendwith a bureaucraticastethatat eighteenmillion was muchlarger,hadbeenin existencefarlonger,andhadnotbeendestabilized s hadthecomparable roupof administratorsn Chinaduringthe CulturalRevolution.Chinaalso benefitedfromthe largesseof theoverseas Chinesecommunityandthe entrepreneurialavenof HongKongforwhichno Soviet parallels xisted.Furthermore, ritics insisted hatDeng'swill-Tragedy New York: Free Press, 1994), 456; Stephen M. Young, "Gorbachev'sAsian Policy: Balanc-ing the New and the Old," Asian Survey 28 (March 1988): 323.

31 MarkD'Anastasio,"Soviets Now Hail China as a Source of Ideas for Reviving Socialism," WallStreet Journal, 18 September 1987.

32 Arbatov, 7he System, 103.33 D'Anastasio, "Soviets Now Hail China," Wall Street Journal, 18 September1987. On influence

of instituteanalysts, see Chi Su, "SovietChina-Watchers," 5-49; John J. Stephan,"Asia n the SovietConception"n Zagoria, Soviet Policy, 30-31.

3 Lukin, "The Initial Soviet Reaction," 124.35 Author's interview with Vladilen Vorontsov, editor-in-chief Far Eastern Affairs, Washington,

DC, February 1991; "For he FurtherDevelopment of Soviet-PRC Relations,"Pravda, 15 July 1987,Foreign BroadcastInformationService (FBIS)-Sov-InternationalAffairs-China, 15 July 1987, B1.


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5 10 I POLMCAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

ingnessto slash militarybudgetsanddemobilizea millionsoldierscould not becopied by Moscow withits defense commitments.At bottom,historianMartinMaliaargues"Stalinhad been a 'success,' n ... creatinga mammoth ndustrialplant and building a superpower; Mao had been a failure.... Gorbachev thushadto liquidatemuchof whathis countryregarded s its glory; Deng only hadto overcomepoliciesthatmostin his countrywanted o be rid of."36Those attractedo theChinesereformexperiment mphasizedheextraordi-nary ransformationf the agriculturalectorand the lessons to be learned romDeng'sdaringdecisionto eliminate ollectivization.LeonidAbalkin,directorofthe Instituteof Economicsand a close aide to Gorbachev,averreda "specialinterest"n "thefast and successfuldevelopmentof agriculture hroughbroadapplication f thefamily-responsibilityystem."37at'ianaZaslavskaia, n eco-nomic sociologist, publicizedthe efficacy of Chinese rural reforms for landmanagement ndcropselection n theofficialgovernment ndpartyorgans zves-tiyaandPravda.38 edor Burlatsky imilarlypraised he responsibility ystem'sabilityto doubleproduction.Editorof the popularweekly Literaturnaia azetaandTV personality s well as adviserto AndropovandGorbachev,Burlatskystressed o hislargeaudiencedecentralizedmanagementf enterprises, rivatiza-tion, and attraction f foreigncapitalandtechnology.InNovyimiras earlyas1982Burlatskyused Chinesereforms"asa blueprintor changes n the Sovieteconomy."His readinesso considerChinesereformas instructive,havingoncebeena harshcriticof China, renderedhis views even moreinfluential.39Food shortages nddistributionroblemsunderminedome of the resistancetoexperimentationnthe SovietUnion.Chinese xpertsonrural hange ncludingMinisterof AgricultureHeKangandmembers f ZhaoZiyang's tructural ead-justmenthink ankreceived nvitationso lecture ntheUSSR.40In 1987 Acade-micianOleg Bogomolovof the Instituteof Economicsof the World SocialistSystem raveledoChina oexaminereformpolicies. Uponhisreturn,hepressedthe CentralCommittee o adoptelementsof the Chineseapproach.4' nprivate

Malia, The Soviet Tragedy, 454.37 D'Anastasio, "Soviets Now Hail China,"WallStreetJournal, 18 September 1987, 8; MichaelKaser, "Soviet Restructuring n Relationship o the Chinese Reform," in Stanislaw Gomulka,Yong-Chool Ha, and Cae-One Kim, eds., Economic Reforms n the Socialist World Armonk,NY: M. E.Sharpe, 1989), 100.38 Pravda, 25 October 1984, and Izvestiya, 1 June 1985; E. A. Hewett, Reforming the SovietEconomy(Washington, DC: Brookings, 1988), 276.3 Fedor Burlatsky, "Interregnum, r a Chronicle of the Times of Deng Xiaoping,"Novyi mir 4(April1982), JPRS 80807, PREX7.21/5:1250, 13 May 1982, USSRReport,57-83; and"ConversationsAbout Economic Reforms in China," Literaturnaiagazeta, 11 June 1986, 14, FBIS Ill, USSR-InternationalAffairs-China, 18 June1986;B1-9; RolfH. W. Theen, "Reform:Perspectives, Problemsand Prospects"n Jane Shapiro Zacek, ed., The GorbachevGeneration(New York: Paragon,1989),256; ShimotomaiNobuo, "TheReformMovement:Power, Ideology, and Intellectuals"n JuvilerandKimura,Gorbachev'sReforms, 73.4 Hamrin, Challenge of the Future, 34-35, 231, 234." Ronald D. Asmus, J. F. Brown, and KeithCrane, Soviet Foreign Policy and the Revolutionsof1989 in Eastern Europe, RandR-3903-USDP, 1991, 6nl0; InternationalAffairs 10 (October 1988):39.


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consultationswith Gorbachev,he stressed he usefulnessof China's xperienceto the USSR.Gorbachev,however, provedexceedinglycautious. Bogomolov found thatdespitehis early specializationn agriculture r perhaps ecauseof his familiaritywithpeasant bilitiesandattitudes,Gorbachev pproached ural xperimentationwarily. He consideredRussia's griculturalobbymoreformidablehananythingfacedby Chinesereformers.42 iven thatSoviet agriculture, n striking ontrastto China's,basedproduction n large-scalemechanization, onservatives rguedthata return o family armswouldbe uneconomical.WhereasChinesepeasantsnoverwhelming umberswelcomed heresponsibilities f independent roduction,the Sovietsclungdesperately o guaranteed ations,assigned asks, security,andpredictability.43 oreover, arming nthe USSR nvolvedonly 20 percentof thepopulation s a resultof Stalin's uccessfulurbanization,o thateven werepublicpressure o grow in the countryside n favor of change,it would not constitutethe spur to reformthat it hadin China." Nor, indeed, would ruralprosperitygive a vast proportion f the populacea stakein changeas it haddoneamongthe Chinese.Gorbachev's esitationmayalso have beenfosteredby developments uringthe Brezhnev years. Confrontedby production hortfalls,Brezhnev investedheavily n agriculture utrefused o introduce eform.In thePolitburo,GennadiyVoronovcalled for the returnof decision making o small teams and paymentaccording o output.ButBrezhnev ollowedhisharshly onservative ideV. A.Golikov,whoupheld ollectivizationndwarned gainst acrificing ightpoliticalcommand.45Gorbachev,ikeBrezhnev, nstinctivelyought reater entralization,aunchingperestroika with efforts to reinforce inefficient existing structures, in contrastto Chinawhere hekeytoprogresshadbeen ntensifying ecentralizationnherentin theeconomy. Gorbachev,however,worriedabout oss of controlandregion-alism. Givenpoliticaloppositionandthe absenceof a natural uralconstituency,he preferredpiecemealefforts such as modest landleasing programs nspired

42 OlegBogomolovinterviewwith the author,21 March1991; Bogomolov, "TheWorldof Socialismon the Roadof Restructuring,"Kommunist 4 (November 1987), JPRS-UKO-88-003,2 February1988,61-68; Anders Aslund, Gorbachev'sStruggle or EconomicReform(Ithaca,NY: Cornell UniversityPress 1989), 100, 179-80; Jerry F. Hough, "Changes n Soviet Elite Composition" n Bialer andGustafson,Crossroads, 43; RobertF. Miller, "The Soviet Economy: Problemsand Solutions in theGorbachevView"in R. F. Miller, J. H. Miller, andT. H. Rigby, eds., Gorbachevat the Helm (NewYork: CroomHelm, 1986), 125; TsuneakiSato, "EconomicReforms in Chinain Lightof Soviet andEasternEuropeanExperiences"n Kinya Niiseki, ed., TheSoviet Unionin Transition Boulder,CO:Westview, 1987), 91.

43 MargaretShapiro, "HardTimes on the Farm," WashingtonPost, 20 February1994.4 PadmaDesai, Perestroika n Perspective (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1989), 36-

37, 105; Goldman, Gorbachev'sChallenge, 190-200.4S Gelman, The BrezhnevPolitburo, 239-40 n24.


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by Lenin'sNEPas well as by China.46He assertedhis "intentiono see to it thatthe entire agrarian ector, takesthis path,"but in 1987 complainedof theinadequatepreadof the contract ystem.47 oviet reformwould, instead,comein the industrial ector.Specialeconomiczones and ointventures imilarly enerated uarded nthu-siasm. Soviet writers earedpossibleaggravation f regionalandethnicdispari-ties. Some economistsand officials who visited PRC zones rejected hemasakin onineteenth-centuryreatyportconcessions.Furthermore,hey questionedwhetherarge-scale oreign nvestment nd technology ransferwouldbe facili-tated.Nevertheless,China'sburgeoning conomy, especiallythe abundance fconsumergoods, promotedpositivereviews. The Sovietjournal Far EasternAffairsheraldedMoscow'sdecision o trythe oint-venture oncept nthesummerof 1986. Burlatskyn Literaturnaiaazeta suggestedmore seriousexaminationof the specialzone model. And IvanIvanov,deputychairman f the StateCom-mittee orForeignEconomicRelations, onfirmed fforts o adoptbothmodels.48As Konovalov noted, "Ourofficials are being much more selective. . .. Still,we can'thelp admirewhat they havedone in China."49Chinese reformalso encouragedEastEuropeans, rom whom the Chineseinturn earned boutmodifications f socialism.Similar xchangeshadoccurredinthe 1950s whenBulgaria, orinstance,adoptedanill-fatedgreat eapforwardstrategyat thebehestof domesticplannersnicknamed theChinese."50ontactsbetweenBeijingand EasternEuroperesumednthe 1970s after a fallow periodfollowingtheshattering f the communistbloc. Having"noreason o vilify thePRC other than . . . to manifest solidarity with the Kremlin," they now sawChinaas a counterweighto Soviet pressure.5'

46Seweryn Bialer, "Gorbachev'sProgramof Change: Sources, Significance, Prospects" n Bialerand Mandelbaum,Gorbachev'sRussia, 294; Nicholas Lardy, "China:Sustaining Development"andTsuyoshiHasegawa, "TheConnectionBetweenPoliticalandEconomicReform nCommunistRegimes"in Rozman, ed., Dismantling, 78-79, 220-23.

47 HerbertJ. Ellison,"Perestroika ndthe New Economic Policy (1921-1928): The Uses of History"in Mel Gurtov, ed., The Transformation f Socialism (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), 30; Kaser,"Soviet Restructuring," 00.48 Aslund, Gorbachev'sStruggle, 141, 183; V. Portyakovand S. Stepanov,"China'sSpecialEco-nomic Zones," Far EasternAffairs 2 (1986), cited in Goldman, Gorbachev'sChallenge, 216; FedorBurlatsky,"Internationalanorama,"4May 1986, FBISIII, USSR-International ffairs-China,15May1986, B1-3; FedorBurlatsky,Literaturnaia azeta 24 (June 1986): 14; J. RichardWalsh,"DevelopingSocialisminthe Soviet Union and China"n CharlesBukowskiandWalsh, eds., Glasnost,Perestroika,and the Socialist Community New York: Praeger, 1990), 52.4' D'Anastasio, "SovietsNow Hail China,"Wall Street Journal, 18 September 1987, 8.s J. F. Brown, EasternEuropeand CommunistRule (Durham, NC: Duke UniversityPress, 1988),321.s' VladimirSobell, "TheReconciliationBetweenChinaand EasternEurope,"WashingtonQuarterly10 (Spring 1987): 100; Charles Gati, "The Soviet Stake in EasternEurope" n Bialer and Gustafson,Crossroads, 183-84; DavidA. Andelman,"China'sBalkanStrategy," nternationalSecurity4 (Winter1979/1980): 60-79.


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The reestablishmentf links made tpossiblefor analysts o exploreparallelreformprograms.The Chinese nitially ocusedon Yugoslavia, hen brieflyonRomania,and inallywithmore ntensity n Hungary.There,beginning n 1968,JanosKadar'sNew EconomicMechanism ad nstitutionalized arket ocialism,allowing small-scalecooperativeproduction nd a degree of independence nsettingprices.GrowingHungarianndustrial utput,foreign rade, and generalprosperity ttracted RCattention.A reviewof the 1977-1981periodby analystNinaHalpern uggestedhat"no erious tudyof EastEuropeaneforms ppeareduntil afterthe decisionto carryout reforms n China."But thereafter trategiesfor implementation ereborrowed.52 1984 delegationof ChineseeconomistsvisitingHungary oncludedhatalthoughocal practices ouldnotbe "indiscrimi-natelycopied" iventhe differences n context,culture,andscale,useful essonscould be learned. The work of Hungarian anos Kornaion enterprise eform,for one, becamewidely disseminated, nd as earlyas 1981Polisheconomist0.Sik helpedto persuadeBeijingto establisha PriceResearchCenterundertheStateCouncil. Negative examplesalso proved mportant, s when the directorof theInstitute f Economicsat the ChineseAcademyof Social Sciences, DongFureng,rejectedhe ideaof workerownershipbecauseof discouraging evelop-mentsin Yugoslavia.s3During he mid-1980s, EasternEuropean eadersand economistsmade nu-merous rips oChina o discussagriculturaleformandspecialeconomiczones.Polish politicalscientistJerzyWiatrsaw Chinese nfluenceas one of the threemaincatalysts or reformalongsideeconomiccrisis and Moscow'ssupport orchange.Innovationsnjointventure egislation n Poland,Hungary,andYugo-slavia drewon Chinesemodels and tradeburgeoned.54The resultof these nteractions rovedmixed. Some EasternEuropeans ameto conclude hatChinawassimply oo alientoimitate.Others elebrated lementsof Chinesereforms.Whilethe East Germans ocusedon the socialist natureofChina's lans,theHungariansmphasizedmutual ommitmentomarketmecha-nisms.Chineseeclecticism ntaking deasfromvariousEastEuropeanconomicmodels invited ncompatibilityndincoherence.Theremay alsohave been politicalpenalties.Hungarian arty eaderKarolyGroszand ChinesePremierZhaoZiyangechoedeach others'words n calls forthoroughgoing hange."Itwas,"BritishanalystGeraldSegalobserved:

52 Nina P. Halpern,"Learning rom Abroad:Chinese Views of the East EuropeanEconomicExperi-ence, January 1977-June 1981,"Modem China 11 (January1985): 103.

53 Robert C. Hsu, Economic Theoriesin China, 1979-1988 (Cambridge, England:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1991), 23-24, 74, 87-88.

5 Ming Chen,"Sino-EastEuropeanRelations" n Hao Yufanand HuanGuocang, eds., TheChineseViewof the World New York: Pantheon,1989), 269; FBIS-EEU-89-080,BULGARIA, 27 April 1989,13; Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Economic and Political Reforms in Socialist Countriesof Eastern Europe:AComparativeAnalysis" n Gomulka et al., Economic Reforns, 123; Marcin Sar, "The EvolutionofCentripetalFraternalism:The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,"Annals of the AmericanAcademy(September 1985): 103.


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this kind of mutuallyreinforcingdialogue. . . as well as specific visits and bor-rowings,whichChinesehard-liners robably ad nmindwhentheycriticizedZhaoZiyang'sschool after June 1989 for being over-influenced y an EasternEuropealready uborned y the West. It was also the basisfor some EastEuropeanntellec-tuals' eelings of regret,almostguilt, afterJune 1989 abouthavingurgedon Chinaideasof reformwhichproved o be too advanced."Perestroika n the Soviet Union andin EasternEuropebenefited rom theimpetusgiven by China o thereformistatmospheren thesocialistworld,evenwhen the particular etailsof Deng'sachievements ppeared rrelevant.Gorba-chevmayhavemoved ahead n politicalreformmorevigorously haneconomicreform.He experimented ith ndustrialnnovationmoreoftenthanagricultural,because of his more formidableproblems n buildinga constituency nd over-coming Russia's ommunist egacy. But China'sbold program,which so clearlydemonstratedhe advantages f changeandmodernization, erved as a usefulstimulus.56Moreover, Chinaprovideda handyvehicle for relativelyrisk-freecriticismof the Soviet system for those who might otherwisehave been con-strained o remainsilent. As a State Department nalyst observed, "if Chinahadn't xistedtheywould have had to invent it."57

TIANANMENIn 1989 Chinamade ts finalcontributiono shaping hewayinwhichthe Sovietempirecollapsed, the destruction f the Chinesedemocracymovementat Tia-nanmenSquare n Beijing. The event proved inspirationalo the people andinhibiting or political eadersconfronting heir own surge towarddemocracy.The roots of the crisis at Tiananmen ould be found in the reformprogramlaunchedby Dengand his allies in 1978. By eliminatinghe communesystem,attacking lassdiscrimination, ermitting rbanization,bsorbing oreigntech-nology, andcondoning consumer ulture, he governmentransformedociety.It did notprovide for comparable oliticalchange but did encouragea degreeof intellectual ndependence.Deng understoodhat o emancipateChina romCulturalRevolutiondisillu-sionment,radicalMaoismwould have to be repudiated.He urgedhis peopleinstead o "seek ruth rom acts." n1980he initiated modesteffort o overcomebureaucratism,o revitalize ow-level electionsand People'sCongresses,and tomake the pressmore responsive o the public.58Studentswere encouraged o

ss GeraldSegal, "ForeignEconomicPolicy"in Segal, et al., Opennessand ForeignPolicy Reformin CommunistStates (New York: Routledge, 1992), 33-36.S6 Letter from Lev PetrovichDeliusin to author,March 1991.S' Author'snterviewwithWayneLimberg, StateDepartmentntelligenceandResearchStaff,Winter1991; Rozman, "Moscow'sChina-watchers," 38.58 Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986);Rozman,"Stages,"42.


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studyabroaduntil upwardof 40,000 couldbe found n the UnitedStatesalone.Scholarsbeganto examine ongtabooissues in Chinesehistory.Glasnostor openness n China,however, stoppedshortof even the limitedpolitical diversity and freedoms of expression given Soviet citizens. China'sleaders condemnedcalls for pluralismand democracyas "spiritual ollution"from the West. In 1978-1979, in 1983-1984, and again in 1986-1987, writersandprotesterswere silencedor arrestedand sentenced o prisonterms.The dissatisfaction nderlyinghe 1989demonstrationsouldnotbeso easilyeliminated.Popularangerover inflation, ob insecurity,and corruption xacer-bated frustrationwith the lack of political rights. When on 15 April formerGeneralSecretaryof the CCPHu Yaobangsuddenlydied, students eized theopportunityo celebratethe liberal policies for which he had allegedly beenpurged n 1987. The criticismof surviving eaderscould notbe missed. Theirresponse,disparaginghe studentsas hoodlums,fed the protest.Demonstrationsndeven the Mayhungerstrikemighthavepassedquietly,but for the visit of Mikhail Gorbachev.News media from aroundthe worldconvergedon Beijingto mark this historicreconciliation.What the televisioncamerasactuallybroadcastwere picturesof a tentcity in the mainsquareandpopulardemands or politicalchangeto accompanyeconomicreorganization.Theyrecordedntellectuals,ournalists,workers,partycadres,andeven soldiersjoiningthe recurrentmarches.Tomanyobservers romabroad,butmoresignifi-cantly to many Chinese, the throngsin the streets impedingarmy efforts toenforcemartial awwerereminiscent f andconsciouslypatterned pondemon-stratorswho used "people'spower" o oust FerdinandMarcosin 1986 in thePhilippines.Themessagehadresonancen EasternEurope.During he 1980s, economicandpoliticalliberalization ad advanced,however haltingly,in HungaryandPoland. This had been encouragedby Gorbachev,hoping to reinvigorate hesocialistworld by integratinghe Sovietbloc into a "commonEuropean ome."But Gorbachev rovednaivein thinkinghatreformscouldbe gradual s severeeconomicdeclineprovokedwidespread issatisfaction.nthe midstof growingagitation n EasternEurope, protestsin Beijing proved inspirational.Youngpeople stageda "solidaritytrike" t the PRCEmbassyn Hungary"toshow thatfromBeijing, via Warsaw o Budapest, he same processesare takingplace."The East Germanoppositionasserted ater that"it was the recentdemocracymovement n Chinathatprovokedour determination nd actionagainstSta-linism."59Internationalttention elped o sustain heChinesemovement ndmagnifiedpressures pongovernmenteaders.So toodid tsincreasingly ationalcopeandthe involvement f workers.Butby the endof May,exhausted nddisappointeddemonstratorsegan oscatter.A smallgroupmounted ne finalgesture,erecting

59 FBIS-EEU-89-101, 26 May 1989, 24; FBIS-CHI-89-237, InternationalAffairs, 12 December1989, 6-7; FBIS-EEU-89-107, 6 June 1989, 10-11; FBIS-EEU-89-108, 7 June 1989, 57.


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a Goddessof DemocracyoppositeTiananmen. t was too much. On the nightof 3-4 June,leadersordered he PLA to clear the square.In the ensuingmelee,severalhundred narmed eoplediedamid rightened oldiersandburninganks.The Beijing Springended in blood and chaos.Outside of China, the repressionof Tiananmen ngendereddismay. Thetopplingof regimes nEasternEurope hatdefined he remainingmonthsof 1989started ronicallywith elections on 4 June that broughtSolidarity o power inPoland.60Among those seeking to overturnSoviet-imposedpolitical systems,images of the Chinesepeople seeking freedom and facing ruthlessrepressionevokedempathy or the victimsand fear andloathing or the brutalcommunistleadership.6'In Moscow, too, observerswere aghast.Reformers nd Chinaspecialistsatthe Academyof Sciences ookedoninhorror nddeclaredhat hecrackdownwasevidence of a lesserdegree of socialdevelopment.62 emonstratorshroughoutMoscowcondemnedBeijing'seaders.At the firstCongressof People'sDeputies,AndreiSakharovurgedthatthe USSRrecall its ambassador.Gorbachev ook amore cautious ine, voicingconcernaboutthe bloodshedbut notcensuring heperpetrators. tillhe worried hateventsin Chinamightundermine erestroikaandglasnostand counseledgreater lexibility hroughouthe communistbloc.63Violencehad ended he PragueSpring n 1968,martial aw engulfedPoland

in 1981, and some advocatedusingforce to quelldissentin 1989. The CzechnewspaperRude Pravo declaredofficial support or aggrievedBeijingleaderswho had shown exemplarypatience. In East Germany,Egon Krenz, deputyState Councilchairman,stressedthat students n Chinahad been puppetsofa counterrevolutionaryaction. The authoritiesn Beijinghad had no choice;suppression adbeen ustified.And even asprotestorsnsisted hata"Tiananmensolution"wouldnot workinGermany,ErichHonecker,generalsecretary f theCentralCommitteeof the SocialistWorker'sPartyandchairmanof the GDRStateCouncil, applaudedDeng'stactics.65

60 SharonWolchik, "Central nd EasternEurope n Transition"n YoungC. Kimand GastonSigur,eds., Asia and the Decline of Communism New Brunswick,NJ: Transaction, 1992), 53-56.

61 Ivo Banac, ed., Eastern Europein Revolution(Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 1992), 2.62 The authorwas in Moscow duringthe Tiananmenmassacre. See also Pleshakovand Furman,

"Chinaand the Soviet Union," 48.63 FBIS-SOV-89-141,InternationalAffairs, 25 July 1989, 9; Lukin, "TheInitial Soviet Reaction,"

121-25; Garver, "The 'New Type,'" 1147-48.4 J. F. Brown, Surge to Freedom(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 282; "Demonstra-

tions in Krakow," TrybunaLudu, 8 June 1989, FBIS-EEU-89-111, POLAND, 12 June 1989, 12;FBIS-EEU-89-109,8 June 1989, 22.

65 FBIS-EEU-89-110, GDR, 9 June 1989, 32; FBIS-EEU-89-112, GDR, 13 June 1989, 28; FBIS-EEU-89-120,GDR, 23 June 1989, 37; FBIS-EEU-89-122,GDR, 27 June 1989, 32-33; FBIS-CHI-89-235, InternationalAffairs, 8 December 1989, 9; FBIS-CHI-89-237,InternationalAffairs, 12December1989, 7; Brown, Surge, 282; NormanM. Naimark,"'Ichwill hier raus':Emigrationand the Collapseof the GermanDemocratic Republic," n Banac, Eastern Europe, 82.


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Infact,Honeckerntendedoapply heChinesemodel nLeipzigon9 October1989. During he tense days of early October,a CCPdelegationheadedby YaoYilin, vice premierand Poliburo tanding ommitteemember,appearedn EastGermanyo mark hestate's ortiethanniversary.Notonlywas he quick o drawparallelswithTiananmen,Yao assuredHoneckerof "support"or using similarpolicies to protectthe GDR. In the end, Honeckerreconsidered, earing thatsoldiers andpolice in Leipzigwould refuseto shoot, but his threats o followChina's xamplecontributedo the subsequent all of the regime.-In Romania,Nicolae Ceausescudid use Chinese methods. But unlike thePLA, whose commandersDeng hadrallied o his side, Ceausescu'sroops oinedtheprotest.According o the Yugoslavnews agencyTanjug,wordof Ceausescu'sexecutionpromptedChina'seadershipo puttheir security orceson alert lestthe swiftlyflowing currentsof changecarrythem away too.67Gorbachev'slexibilityin contrast o Chinese rigidityreflected his sobercalculations f power relations.Gorbachev ecognized hatby attemptingotalcontroloveritsallies,MoscowhaddrivenChina ntobitteropposition.Sotoo, inthe mid-1980s nEasternEurope,he saw the USSRconfrontedwithan explosivesituation,which f left untended ould overwhelm ieswithMoscowandcreateachainof hostilegovernments.Gorbachev hose, instead, oacknowledgeocialistpluralism,renounce he BrezhnevDoctrine,promoteglasnostandperestroika,andfinally acquiesce n destruction f theBerlinWall andthe WarsawPact.Paradoxically, eijing awGorbachev s responsibleorthecollapseofcom-munism hroughout asternEuropeandcondemnedhis reformsas a betrayal fsocialism.AlthoughChinasustained tate-to-state elations hatpromisedeco-nomic benefits, Chinese eadersconsideredGorbachev counterrevolutionary.Moreover,Sovietswho were determined o fight liberalization urned o theChinesefor support"trying o use 'the China card'to persuade heirboss todiscontinueerestroika nd oput heSoviethouse norder."68nlywhenamoreradicalBoris Yeltsin emergedas a contender or powerdid Beijing reevaluateGorbachev nddeemhima fit leaderonceagain, althoughwithreservationshatwould become apparentduringthe August 1991 coup in Moscow. Althoughofficiallynot interfering,Beijing quietlycheeredon the plotters, condemningthemonlylaterforhavingbeen faint-heartedather han ortrying o overthrowGorbachev.69

6 JohnW. Garver,"China,GermanReunification,and the Five Principlesof Peaceful Coexistence,"Journal of East Asian Affairs 6 (Winter/Spring1994): 161-63; Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall(Washington, DC: Brookings, 1993), 111-13; Naimark, "'Ichwill hier raus,'"90-91.

67 Claudia Rosett, "ThePowderkeg that is China," Wall StreetJournal, 28 December 1989.6 JohnW. Garver,"TheChineseCommunistPartyand the Collapseof Soviet Communism,"China

Quarterly133 (March 1993): 3-5; Gerald Segal, "Chinaand the Disintegrationof the Soviet Union,"Asian Survey 32 (September 1992): 848-68.

6 Gao Di, Talk on 30 August 1991, China Quarterly130 (June 1992): 487.


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THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND SOVIET COLLAPSEGiventhe uncertainbenefitsfor Chinaof the new worldorder,it is ironicthatChina's ole inending he coldwar andbringingabout he collapseof SovietandEasternEuropean ommunismwas an important,f indirect,one. The perceivedstrategic hreatChina posed to Soviet security,especiallywhencoupledwithU.S. power,encouragedmilitary xpenditureshathelped o cripple heeconomy.The Soviets were compelled to realize eventually hat they did not have theresources o fight all the forces arrayedagainst hem. Instead,they moved todiminishcold war confrontationnd regional nstability.China's conomicreforms lsoexpeditedmovement owardanew order.TheboldchangesoftheearlyDengera,ifpartial,nevertheless rovided nspirationorSoviets and EastEuropeans.Deng madeit possiblefor reformers o criticizeproblemsand recommend olicies while pretendingo discussBeijing's hoices.Finally, the Chinesedemocracymovementhelpedto createanenvironmentin which the citizens of othercommunistcountriesdared to aspire to a newpoliticalorder.ThattheChinese hemselves uccumbed o a brutally epressiveregimedidnotstem hetideelsewhere. ndeed, hecost in bloodoftheTiananmenmassacremadeclearto observers n EasternEuropeandthe SovietUnionthatviolentsolutionsmust not be widely applied.China,having ervedasoneofthecatalystsnshaping differentnternationalsystem, abruptly etreatedearingan uncharteduture.As its response o thecollapseof communismn Europeandthe Soviet Unionmadeclear, China'sleadersand muchof its citizenrypreferred o combineeconomicadvanceswithpoliticalstability.But the ambivalencewith whichtheChinese hemselvesviewtheirroleinexpediting hange economicandpolitical inthecommunistworldshould not prevent ess passionately ommittedobservers romexamining heChinafactor n thecollapseof the Sovietempire.

* I would like to thank A. Doak Barnett,Carol Hamrin, Gilbert Rozman, Banning N. Garrett,Bonnie S. Glaser, He Di, and WarrenI. Cohen for giving of their time and expertise in an effort to

china as a factor in the collapse of the soviet empire

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