china da and cp v2 - berkeley 2013

8/13/2019 China DA and CP v2 - Berkeley 2013

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/china-da-and-cp-v2-berkeley-2013 1/61

China DA + CP 2.0

Use this evidence to supplement your existing China DA file – We especiallyliked the new uniqueness card and the new Taiwan impact scenario (which is

not dependent on growth). If you’re looking for a new approach to the

hege/china debate on case, check out the ‘peaceful bomb’ section (basically it

says that China is peaceful now but that the plan makes them hegemonic and

militaristic). Finally, there is also a CP (which doesn’t solve the US advantages

but might be useful against some of the new affs).

Go GOATs!!!



UNIQUENESS



New 1NC Card

China influence and engagement is rising now thanks to US disinterest.Mallén, 6/28 (Patricia covers Latin America for the International Business Times. Patricia holds

two BAs from Universidad Complutense de Madrid and an MA in International Reporting fromCUNY Graduate School of Journalism. “Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does

That Mean For The US?” June 28 2013, http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-

relations-china-what-does-mean-us-1317981#, A_Yu)

As if to confirm the declining hegemony of the United States as the ruling global superpower, China is gaining influence in

its hemispheric "backyard," Secretary of State John Kerry's unintentionally insulting designation for Latin America. China has

had its sights on Latin America for the past decade and is now positioning itself as a competitive

trade partner in the region. The populous, rapidly developing Asian nation covets oil, soybeans and gold, of which Latin

America has plenty, and has been slowly but steadily increasing its presence and its trade with several

countries there. The U.S., whose history of blocking outside political influence in Latin America going back to the Monroe

Doctrine, has been directing its attention elsewhere, as Michael Cerna of the China Research Center observed. “[The

U.S.'] attention of late has been focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, and Latin America fell lower and lower on America’s list of

priorities. China has been all too willing to fill any void,” Cerna said. Between 2000 and 2009, China increased

its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent, from $13 billion at the beginning of the 21st century to more

than $120 billion nine years later. Latin American exports to China reached $41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total

exports. China’s share of the region’s trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by 2009, the number had jumped to 12 percent. As

impressive as that growth is, the numbers still pale in comparison to the U.S.' stats in its commercial relationship with Latin America.

The U.S. still holds more than half of the total trade, adding up to $560 billion in 2008. Notably, though, America’s trade

participation in Latin America has remained static, while China is closing the gap more and more

each year -- having already surpassed the U.S. in some countries, including powerhouse Brazil. Concomitant with this burgeoning

interest from the Far East, Latin America is undergoing an economic rebirth. After decades of devastating economic crises, the

region is experiencing unprecedented growth: On average, annual GDP growth for Latin American countries will be 3.7 percent this

year, according to United Nations estimates, almost double the average for the rest of the world. That has prompted several

countries to form quasi-governmental entities to further promote the progress of the region. One such entity is the recently formed

Pacific Alliance. Born with the specific goal of increasing relations with Asia, its members include Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Peru,

which together represent half of the region’s total exports and 35 percent of its GDP. In a meeting in Colombian capital

Bogotá last month, the Pacific Alliance signed an agreement to open its member countries' economies to

Asian markets; the U.S., despite an invitation, did not attend .

http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-china-what-does-mean-us-1317981







China Influence Up

China’s involvement in Latin American is growing at a fast rate.

Wang 5/1 Ping is a professor of economics at the Washington University in St. Louis. “The

Impacts of China s Peaceful Influence on U.S.-Mexican Relations. A Triangular Perspective” Chinaand the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas May 1 2013)

In this context, China’s rapid growth has had significant impacts on the countries of Latin America,

both positive and negative. China has become a key trading partner for many Latin American countries and has played an

increasingly important role in both Latin American imports and exports. In 2010, the trade volume between China

and Latin America and the Caribbean reached unprecedented levels. As the Economic Commission for

Latin America and the Caribbean ECLAC) assessed in a recent report, “The exports to China grew by 51% in 2010 ,

almost double the rate of the region’s total and the interregional export growth. Its imports from China grew by 48%,

15 and 20 percentage points higher than the growth of imports from the United States and the European Union, respectively”

(ECLAC 2011:14). Latin American exports to China increased at a rate five times faster than that of

its exports to the world overall from 2006 to 2010. Among the Latin American countries, Brazil, Chile, Mexico,

Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru are China’s major trade partners. Peru and Mercosur countries except Paraguay) are constantly expanding exports to China.

China influence increasing.Fleischman ‘12 (Luis, Ask The Experts: China's Global Rise “Does China represent an economic

and political threat to the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere?” January 11, 2012,

http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3254 )

President Barack Obama forged a new policy of reengagement with Asia on his recent trip to the region—sending a clear message

that the U.S. intends to check China’s geostrategic ambitions if they threaten neighbors. While the Chinese government

resents the U.S. presence in what it considers its neighborhood, it is dramatically increasing influence in ours. In

2008, the Chinese government issued a white paper on Latin America outlining its objectives of strengthening economic, political

and military ties in the region. In the past decade China has increased its investment in Latin America by

400 percent. This includes massive purchases of raw materials and commodities, free trade as well as technological and space

cooperation. China has been a major force fueling the economic prosperity in much of Latin

America and has effectively replaced the U.S. as Brazil’s main trading partner. This economic omnipresence

provides China not only with profits but also with considerable political influence. We know from

government publications and actions that the Chinese believe their economic power must be backed by military as well as strategic

engagement with key partners. As a result, China has a 50-year lease that gives them control over both ends of the Panama Canal,

and has established a presence in a number of strategic sites throughout the continent, including

the Bahamas, Cuba and Ecuador. China has also strengthened ties with Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and

his regional allies in the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América—Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos (ALBA),

Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua. These countries are openly hostile to the U.S. and seek to weaken its influence in the region. As a

result, the ALBA countries have dismantled key U.S. military bases and have invited China in.

http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3254





LINKS



L – Generic

Lack of US economic engagement spurs China’s growth.

Erikson & Chen, ‘7 (Daniel is a Senior Associate of US Policy at the Inter-American Dialogue.

Janice is a degree candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. “China, Taiwan, andthe Battle for Latin America,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 31:2, Summer 2007, pg. 71)

China’s economic engagement with Latin America responds to the requirements of a booming

Chinese economy that has been growing at nearly 10 percent per year for the past quarter century. The economic

figures are impressive: in the past six years, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown

more than six-fold, at a pace of some 60 percent a year, to an estimated $60 billion in 2006. China has become a

major consumer of food, mineral, and other primary products from Latin America, benefiting

principally the commodity-producing countries of South America-particularly Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile. Chinese investment

in Latin America remains relatively small at some $6.5 billion through 2004, but that amount represents half of China's foreign

investment overseas.9 China's Xinhua News agency reported that Chinese trade with the Caribbean ex- ceeded $2 billion in 2004, a

40 percent increase from the previous year.10 China has promised to increase its investments in Latin

America to $100 billion by 2014, although government officials have since backed away from that pledge and several

proposed investments are already showing signs of falling short in Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere. For their part, LatinAmericans are intrigued by the idea of China as a potential partner for trade and investment. As

a rising superpower without a colonial or "imperialist" history in the Western Hemisphere,

China is in many ways more politically attractive than either the United States or the European Union,

especially for politicians confronted with constituen- cies that are increasingly anti-American and skeptical of Western intentions.

12 Nevertheless, most analysts recognize that Latin America's embrace of China-to the extent that this has actually

occurred-is intimately linked to its perception of neglect and disinterest from the United States. Nervousness about Chinas rise runs deeper among the smaller economies such as those of Central America, which do not enjoy

Brazil's or Argentina's abundance in export commodities and are inclined to view the competition posed by the endless supply of

cheap Chinese labor as a menace to their nascent manufacturing sectors. But even as China seeks to reassure the

United States that its interests in South America are purely economic, Beijing has begun

enlisting regional powers like Mexico to aid its effort to woo Central American diplomats. Pressure

is also being placed on Paraguay by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, its partners in the South American Common Market (Mercosur),which places certain constraints on member states' bilateral foreign policy prerogatives. Despite its avowals to Washington, China

appears to be using its economic might as a means to achieve the patently political objective

of stripping Taiwan of its democratic allies in the Western Hemisphere.

Non-US involvement key to China.Keck & Nye Jr. ’11 Zachary Keck, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Research Interns at CNAS, “China’s

Growing Influence in America’s Backyard: The Trends Policymakers Should be Watching,”

January 19, http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2011/01/china-s-growing-influence-

america-s-backyard-trends-policymakers-shoul)

Beijing has used the same tactics to penetrate LATAM markets as it has elsewhere: relying on

extensive loans and investments, as well as access to China’s domestic markets. According to official

PRC data, in 2006, 25 percent of China’s foreign direct investment was in LATAM though it dropped significantly in 2007 only to rise

again after the global financial crisis). Recently, more of this investment has gone into areas that benefit the recipients, going

towards modernizing infrastructure and building hospitals. Still, China has shown itself willing to build prestige

projects for the local regimes. Moreover, much of this money also ends up going to the Chinese

companies and laborers now employed in these countries. So while China runs a sizable trade deficit with

many countries in the region, certain indigenous industries still suffer tremendously. In the past, China has mostly

http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2011/01/china-s-growing-influence-america-s-backyard-trends-policymakers-shoul







developed its relationships in the region through bilateral treaties. As has been the case

elsewhere, however, China has been more open to operating through multilateral institutions in

recent years. For instance, in the past few years it has participated in the Organization of American states (OAS) and the Inter-

American Development Bank (IADB). S imilarly, as is the case in Africa, the Middle East, and other regions, China has also

been its usual opportunist self in LATAM. This has manifested itself in a number of ways. One is exploiting

western unease with unstable anti-American regimes. In the Southern Hemisphere, this mostly relates to China’s

growing relationship with Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela. Not only has it sought to purchase Venezuelan oil resources, but it has also

taken to selling the erratic Chavez increasingly sophisticated military technology. America’s apparent indifference to

this development has seeming emboldened the two countries to pursue greater ties. China has

also taken advantage of the drop in Western investment in the region brought on by the global

financial crisis. China has sought to fill the void left by fleeing western businesses, governments,

and institutions. Worldwide, China has loaned more money to developing countries in the past two years than the World Bank.

This lending has been especially pronounced in LATAM. To give just one example, in 2008, the Inter-American Bank approved11.2

billion dollars in financing; in 2009 China loaned 10 billion dollars in just one deal with Brazil’s national oil company.

China’s influence growing because of the lack of engagement in Latin America.Mahbubani ‘8 (Kishore is the Dean and Professor of Public Policy at the Lee Kuan Yew School of

Public Policy, National University of Singapore. “Smart Power, Chinese Style.” American Interest,March/April, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=406

The Western media fails to appreciate the nature and depth of Chinese geopolitical acumen. There is a considerable

amount of alarmist reporting in the Western media about new Chinese initiatives in Latin America and

Africa, the former a zone traditionally well outside of Chinese influence. Most of these reports suggest that China has become yet

another rapacious great power out to dispossess the poor, defenseless natives of their precious raw materials. No Western

commentary dares to suggest the truth: China’s entry into these regions is driven not by short-term

opportunism, but by a careful calculation that in the smaller, interdependent world we are

moving toward, China will inevitably have more concentrated dealings with these regions. It’s part of China’s fifty-year plan. In

the Western Hemisphere, China is taking advantage of the failure of half-hearted market reforms and

Washington’s unwillingness enthusiastically to pursue genuine “good neighbor” relations in

Latin America. China’s flexibility contrasts with more rigid U.S. approaches, as noted by Stephen Johnson of the Heritage

Foundation: Obtaining any kind of assistance from the United States requires compliance on a battery of restrictions, including

observing human rights, protecting the environment, promising not to send U.S. military personnel to the International Criminal

Court (ICC), not assisting current or former terrorists, and not using U.S.-provided equipment for any other than its stated purpose.

American commitments also depend on legislative approval and can be reversed if the mood in the U.S. Congress shifts. China, on

the other hand, can bargain on the spot without a lot of caveats.55. “Balancing China’s Growing Influence in Latin America”, Heritage

Foundation No. 1888, October 24, 2005.

Chinese dominance is expanding in the region – Latin American countries are

turning away from the U.S.Cerna ‘11 Michael Cerna, graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw

State University, Kennesaw, GA, April 15, 2011. “China's Growing Presence in Latin America:

Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region.” China Research Center.

http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-

chinese-presence-in-the-region/With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different sectors, there is seemingly room for each side to grow; which implies that, in fact, trade with Latin America is

not a zero-sum game. China presents an alternative to the United States, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. The U.S. is much more diversified than China at the moment and

therefore does not need to enter into direct competition. However, as China responds to calls from Brazil and diversifies its

investments, there is increasing worry that China is going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region.

These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful political

http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=406






consequences – primarily, providing Latin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to

the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a

less democratic alternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem. The third BRICS summit in

April provided more insight into the potential consequences of China’s growing place in Latin America via its relations with Brazil. One proposal to emerge from the

summit of the five nations (Brazil, India, China, Russia and South Africa) was a broad-based international reserve currency system

providing stability and certainty. The idea was to set up a new exchange rate mechanism that would bypass the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency of

the world. In addition, banks of the five BRICS nations agreed to establish mutual credit lines in their local currencies, not in U.S. currency. While the chances of such a proposal

gaining support are debatable, it sets a clear example of a possible shift in power away from the U.S. and

toward a more global organization, one that is arguably anchored by China. If China becomes a

preferred partner in Latin America, it will show that U.S. dominance around the globe also is at

risk. Conclusion So what does China’s growing place in the region mean for the future? Depending on whom this question is posed to, there are two probable answers. The

first is that China’s intensifying relations with Latin America offer a clear sign of the end of U.S. dominance in the region, and in a greater sense, the entire world. There is enough

evidence to show that the tides have changed in favor of China. The other answer is that it means nothing. The U.S. is obviously still the more dominant power in the region, and

Chinese presence will eventually subside, again leaving the United States as the region’s premier partner. The real answer probab ly falls somewhere in the middle. Is China the

preferred partner for Latin America? At this point, the definitive answer is no. However, the United States should not take its place in the region for granted. There is

clear evidence of an increasingly symbiotic relationship with China throughout Latin America.

While the U.S. is the most dominant trade partner to the region as a whole, it is losing ground in

key countries, namely Brazil, which is blossoming on the world stage and is emerging as the clear leader in the region. Increasing trade and investment can be

beneficial for all, but the power that China can derive from its growing economic influence could bring increased political and ideological influence that the U.S. might find

unnerving. China already has replaced the U.S. as the largest trading partner for Brazil and Chile, andis on pace to do the same in Peru and Venezuela. At the very least, this should cause the U.S. to pay more attention to its southern

neighbors and take steps to make sure that China only benefits economically and not politically at the expense of the U.S. The world will be watching. As it stands, the

Chinese are not broadening their relations with the region in a way that directly competes with

the United States. China is strictly concerned with commodities, including oil. U.S. President Barack Obama

recently signed an agreement with Brazil’s Petrobras that will allow the oil company to drill in the Gulf of Mexico. This symbolic move could cause

tensions to increase as the world’s two largest oil consumers battle over rights to Brazilian oil. In

that regard, the competition may go beyond a race to Latin commodities and move into the

realm of fighting for political influence. It is odd to think that the United States would need to compete for hemispheric dominance with a

country on the other side of the globe, but China’s actions and increasing integration into the region tell us that such a scenario may one day arise. Given the proximity and

importance of Latin America to the United States, this region could be the symbolic battle that best measures the continued hegemony of the U.S. versus China.



L – Cuba

Economic engagement key to Sino-Cuban relations.Hearn, ‘9 (Adrian, Ph.D., is a Research Fellow at the University of Sydney and at the University

of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim. “China’s Relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study ofContrasts,” Pacific Rim Report No. 52, January 2009, www.pacificrim.usfca.edu)

Sino-Cuban relations appear destined to expand, underwritten by economic collaboration in

science, education, industrial manufacturing, and natural resource exploration. Chen Jiagui, Vice-President of the

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, recently argued that political affinities between the two countries bind

them together in the common goal of developing the ‘Third World’: In the contemporary process of globalization, how

can the world’s countries and nations decide their own destiny and propel themselves along a development path that achieves their

unique interests? The spirit of José Martí of not submitting oneself to tyranny, and to persist in the struggle against a supposed

‘determined destiny’, resonates with the ideological objective of the Third World to achieve its own development Chen 2003:27-

28). Conclusion Except for the notable exception of the oil sector, Mexico generally operates according to free market principles; by

contrast, despite the gradual broadening of spaces for private entrepreneurship under Raúl Castro, Cuba remains a state-

run economy. These distinct approaches to economic governance have produced different

strategies for engaging with China, which for its part, has demonstrated an unorthodox capacity toengage with both state-managed and market-oriented systems.



L – Mexico

Economic engagement draws Mexico closer to the US.Valencia ’13 (Robert – contributing writer for Global Voices Online, New York-based political

analyst, “U.S. and Latin America – Economic Cooperation Without Militarization?”www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/05/20/us-and-latin-america-economic-cooperation-without-

militarization)

In May, President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica and vowed to strengthen economic ties with these two countries and

the rest of Latin America. He pledged to expand renewable energy development and education initiatives in recognition of the

joined fates of the United States and Latin America. This approach to Latin America is refreshing, but its impact on the ongoing War

on Drugs remains to be seen. Undoubtedly, the United States bears much of the responsibility for the failed campaign, but the

Obama administration has seen that some Latin American countries are taking their own lead in

tackling the drug trade and are increasingly relying less on Washington. The Obama

administration, for its part, has realized that shifting the legendary treatment of Latin America

as the U.S.’ “backyard” to an economic approach would draw Latin America closer to

Washington, especially given the fact that Latin American leaders like Mexico’s Enrique Peña Nieto and Brazilian

President Dilma Rouseff want to be considered trade partners and not U.S. subordinates.

http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/05/20/us-and-latin-america-economic-cooperation-without-militarization






INTERNALS



Zero-Sum

Influence is zero-sum in Latin America.Malik ‘6 (Mohan, PhD in International Relations, "China's Growing Involvement in Latin

America," June 12, uyghuramerican.org/old/articles/300/1/[email protected])

First and foremost is the Chinese strategic objective of limiting U.S. dominance worldwide. The

world's rising superpower, China, has long viewed the world's reigning superpower, the United States, as its major global strategic

rival that needs to be contained and balanced. Notwithstanding Beijing's rhetoric of "peace and development," China's strategic

posture is based on the realist paradigm of "comprehensive national power" with which it seeks to defend its interests and

intimidate, aggrandize, and support the enemies of its enemies. Faced with a dramatic expansion of U.S. military power ("hard

power") all around China's periphery after the September 11 attacks, Beijing responded by unveiling its "soft power" strategy in the

form of a diplomatic "charm offensive," the notion of "China's peaceful rise," and laid greater emphasis on multilateralism and

economic integration. As per the August 2002 central leadership's decision to bring about a shift in the "international correlation of

forces," Beijing also stepped up its drive to gather as many friends and allies as possible to form a countervailing coalition to the

United States without antagonizing Washington for fear of jeopardizing access to the U.S. market, capital and technology. Put

simply, Beijing's strategic objective of expanding its influence is to be achieved under the rubric of strengthening economic

interdependence and globalization so as to avoid provoking Washington. Despite Beijing's repeated assurances to

U.S. officials that it intends to stay out of political and military affairs in Latin America, Africa and

other resource-rich regions with significant Chinese investments, China is quietly throwing its weight behind those

countries in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America that seek to counter the United States

and its policies. Beijing's growing role in Latin America has also coincided with elections that have brought populists and leftists

to power in Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia. In particular, Brazil, Cuba, and Venezuela have made

no secret of their game plan to play "the China card" to offset U.S. influence and trade

dominance. In most country cases, when the U.S. withdraws or is negligent militarily, politically or

economically, the Chinese move in. Thus, Beijing's courting of those Latin American leaders who

are at loggerheads with Washington (such as Lula da Silva of Brazil, Castro of Cuba, Chavez of Venezuela, Toledo of

Peru, and Morales of Bolivia) could be seen as part of Beijing's "containment through surrogates"

strategy with its roots in the classic strategic principle of "make the barbarians fight while you watch from the mountain top" (zuo

shan guan hu dou). This strategy has the additional benefit of plausible deniability. It certainly fits into the "vacuum-filling" pattern

of past Chinese behavior in North Korea, Pakistan, Myanmar, Cambodia, Sudan, Iran, Nigeria, Nepal, and Zimbabwe. Many interpretBeijing's growing presence in Latin America as a "tit-for-tat" response to the U.S. presence in China's own backyard. In fact, courting

the strategically-located, resource-rich but isolated and turbulent countries run by authoritarian leaders and fishing in troubled

waters, while simultaneously chanting the mantra of "non-interference in domestic affairs" and "peace and development," have

long been key characteristics of Chinese foreign policy. In the case of Latin America, China's moves come at a

time when leaders from Mexico to Argentina seem increasingly disillusioned with a United

States pre-occupied with the Middle East, and bent on tightening border controls closer to

home. As chairman of the House International Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Congressman Dan Burton

noted: "Weak legal systems, lax enforcement of labor standards and an immature institutionalization of the respect for human rights

are fertile ground for Beijing's agenda and China is definitely exploiting this opening."



IMPACTS



# – Taiwan Module

a. China engagement key to diplomatically isolating Taiwan.Ellis ’11 (R. Evans is an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for

Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. “Chinese Soft Power in LatinAmerica: A Case Study,” JFQ, Issue 60, 1st Quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-

soft-power-latin-america.html)

Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan. For the PRC, the government of Taiwan represents an important

issue of political legitimacy and internal security. Currently, 12 of the 23 nations in the world that

diplomatically recognize the government of Taiwan are found in Latin America and the Caribbean. Although

the People's Republic of China does not publicly threaten to block investment in or loans to countries that do not recognize the PRC,

China repeatedly emphasizes the issue in its public diplomacy in the region, and makes such

investments and market access difficult for those countries that do not recognize it, while

simultaneously nurturing expectations regarding the opport-unities that diplomatically

recognizing the PRC could bring. When Costa Rica changed its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in May

2007, for example, it received an aid package that included an $83 million soccer stadium, the purchase of $300 million ingovernment bonds, various highway, public works, and aid projects, and a $1 billion joint venture to expand the country's petroleum

refinery, as well as PRC aid in facilitating access to Chinese markets by traditional Costa Rican products such as coffee. In part, such

Chinese generosity was directed toward the other countries in the region that still recognized

Taiwan in order to demonstrate the types of benefits that could be made available if they too

were to change their diplomatic posture.13

b. Peaceful unification of Taiwan depends on China’s economic leverage and

growing diplomatic recognition – the alternative is military intervention and

nuclear war.Lee ‘ 13 (Dennis, Harvard International Review, “A Narrowing Strait” Global Security Notebook,

January 28, 2013, http://hir.harvard.edu/a-narrowing-strait)

Since the 1970s, the cross-straits relationship has swung drastically in China’s favor. Not only has the Chinese economy boomed

since the opening of its markets, but the United States has started to abandon Taiwan militarily as well.

Now inferior in both economic and military strength, Taiwan can only hope for continued de-facto

independence. At present, the hopes for remaining separate are dwindling. With China gaining

prominence in Asia and the global stage, Taiwan may not have a choice in the matter. Cultural differences

present the greatest challenge to the Chinese assimilation of Taiwan. The distinctiveness of Taiwanese culture has already become

quite evident since the Kuomintang escaped to the island decades ago. During his presidency, Chen Shui-bian argued frequently that

the Taiwanese culture had evolved to be ethnically different and that, in consequence, Taiwan deserves independence. While this

argument is unlikely to hold in China at the present, as time passes, it will inevitably become reality. However, the current Chinese

strategy almost completely ignores this barrier. China is preparing Taiwanese society for assimilation. Economically, the Chinese are

promoting an increase in Taiwanese investment and trade. By offering a profitable economic future, the People’s Republic of China

(PRC) is luring Taiwanese businessmen and entrepreneurs to the mainland. This has led to integration of some Taiwanese into

Chinese society. Not only does this change the Chinese perception of Taiwan, but it also affects the Taiwanese perception of China.

Opening the two societies to each other makes reunification easier and the Chinese hope to

eventually reach a point where unification is smooth for both sides. Economic leverage on

politics is also powerful. The strength of Chinese influence and intervention in Taiwanese

politics increases substantially from this economic integration. While it is possible for the reverse to happen,

where Taiwanese influence is exerted on the Chinese political apparatus, the fact that China has a fairly closed, one-party

government makes this rather unlikely. On the contrary, the Taiwanese government is much more prone to

lobbying, and, as a result, can be subject to more leverage from mainland China. This completely

http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html



http://hir.harvard.edu/a-narrowing-strait







lopsided trade relationship can, and likely will, be used to China’s favor. Yet despite the potential political

and economic connections, the social differences between China and Taiwan may simply be too drastic to reconcile. Taiwan’s

democratic way of government is something that the Taiwanese people hold on to rather dearly. It is high unlikely, if not impossible,

for the Taiwanese to give that up, even in the event of an all-out military conflict. The Chinese solution to this problem may be one

that is not a new concept in the country and would call for a “one state, two systems” approach. Currently in the PRC, both Hong

Kong and Macau are Special Administrative Regions with local rule, differing judicial systems, and influential local governments.

Inner Mongolia goes further as an autonomous region of China granted a greater degree of self-rule. This “two systems” doctrine

has fallen out of favor in Taiwan recently due to opposition of its current implementation in China, but also represents a potentialpath to unification. All this begs the question of what would occur if Taiwan were to refuse China’s

call for unification. Many Taiwanese believe that their rejection of reunification, by a possible declaration of

independence, would trigger Chinese military aggression across the Taiwan Strait. The military hostility

between both countries is not new. Throughout the conflict, Taiwan has relied on its own military, as well as that of the United

States, as a deterrent to Chinese aggression. On the other hand, China has used its military might to ward off any declarations of

independence on the part of Taiwan. This impasse has changed as of late since the current pact between the United States and

Taiwan does not commit the United States to defend Taiwan. One would assume that in the event of military

aggression, the United States would hesitate to entering a military conflict with a fellow

nuclear power. Recent technological investments in the Chinese military only heighten the

stakes of the conflict and make Taiwanese-Mainland reunification a certainty in China, with the

only uncertainty being the question of whether military conflict will prove necessary to the

realization of this goal. If China continues to push for unification, unification will most likely

occur. Taiwanese resistance is weak without foreign assistance and Taiwan is overpowered

economically and militarily. Foreign intervention is fickle and varies with each US administration, public support, and other

international factors, thus making both US intervention and Taiwanese independence highly unlikely.



-- Taiwan Ext

China influence stops Taiwan recognition.Erikson & Chen, ‘7 (Daniel is a Senior Associate of US Policy at the Inter-American Dialogue.

Janice is a degree candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. “China, Taiwan, andthe Battle for Latin America,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 31:2, Summer 2007, pg. 71)

When longtime Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega triumphed in Nicaragua's presidential election in November 2006, the shockwaves

from his historic victory extended to China and Taiwan. Leaders in the two rival East Asian capitals knew that, in 1985, a much

younger Ortega had swept into the presidency and unceremoniously broke relations with Taipei in favor of an a lliance with the

People's Republic of China (PRC). Though Nicaragua's formal diplomatic ties to China ended abruptly when Ortega was voted out of

office in 1990, his return to power now represents a fresh opportunity for Beijing to usurp one of Taiwan's precious remaining allies.

The re-establishment of a Chinese embassy in Managua could potentially serve as a valuable

beachhead for China to facilitate diplomatic inroads into Central American countries that are

friendly to Taiwan, thereby making Beijing's dream of enforcing global recognition of the "One

China" policy one step closer to reality. While increasing economic and political ties between China

and Latin America have attracted significant attention from U.S. policymakers in the past few years, the extent

to which Beijing's foreign policy is shaped by its desire to isolate Taiwan internationally is oftenoverlooked. Yet, this crucial dimension of Chinese foreign policy is indispensable to a full understanding of China's rising influence in

the global system, and its possible repercussions for U.S. national interests. Today, in some of the most remote corners of the

world, a fierce contest for diplomatic recognition and political influence is being fought between

Taiwan and the PRC. In particular, Latin America has emerged as the crucial battleground where a dozen

struggling nations, mainly in Central America and the Caribbean, have become ensnared in the cross-strait dispute. The

strategically significant "swing states" among them face growing pressures to abandon their

longstanding relationships with Taiwan in favor of cementing diplomatic ties with China .

Meanwhile, officials in Washington have yet to fully consider the possible implications for U.S. policy of this intensifying

competition in their own backyard.

LA support key to Taiwan recognition.Erikson & Chen, ‘7 (Daniel is a Senior Associate of US Policy at the Inter-American Dialogue.

Janice is a degree candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. “China, Taiwan, and

the Battle for Latin America,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 31:2, Summer 2007, pg. 71)

At first blush, the diplomatic whims of Latin America appear to be a world away from such

exotic concerns as the decades-long conflict simmering in the Taiwan Strait. The dispute over Taiwan's

sovereignty stems from Chinas claim that the island, where the nationalist government of the Republic of China (ROC) fled in 1949

after losing a lengthy civil war against the Communist Party, is rightly a province of the PRC that must be "reunited" with the

mainland, by force if necessary. During the Cold War the Republic of China on Taiwan was viewed as a satellite of the United States

and a key link in the chain of islands stretching from South Korea to Singapore, which was central to the American containment

strategy against the spread of communist influence in the Pacific. The United States thus contributed substantial infusions of capital

and technology that proved in- strumental to Taiwan's successful economic development. Though President Jimmy Carter

normalized relations with Beijing in 1979 and closed the American embassy in Taipei, the U.S. Congress simultaneously approved the

Taiwan Relations Act requiring the United States to provide the island with the ability to defend itself against mainland China. In the

post-Cold War context, American officials and military analysts consider the Taiwan Strait a major

flashpoint for regional and global security, a view reinforced by Chinas rapid military expansion over the past decade

and the more than 800 missiles that it has deployed in the 100-mile strait separating Taiwan from the mainland. In addition to its

campaign of military intimidation, Beijing has pursued a sustained policy of isolating Taiwan

diplomatically, most often by promising large sums of aid to the rapidly dwindling ranks of the latter's allies. Beijing

rigorously promotes its "One China" policy, which means that non-recognition of the Taiwanese

government is a prerequisite for con- ducting formal diplomatic relations with the PRC-in effect



forcing other governments to choose between Beijing and Taipei. Currently there are only 25 countries in

the world that officially recognize Taiwan; more than half of these are located in the Western Hemisphere.1 Although each of

the 13 Latin American countries involved in this geopolitical chess match have little individual

clout, together they make up the most significant group of states caught in the cross-strait tug-

of-war.

Economic engagement improves economic stability and resolves the Taiwan

conflict.Forman & Moreira, ‘9 (Johanna & Susana are Senior Associates of the Americas Program at

CSIS. “Taiwan-China Balancing Act in Latin America,” Mar 10, 2009,

http://csis.org/publication/taiwan-china-balancing-act-latin-america)

The Taiwan-China struggle in Latin America and the Caribbean will be solved either by an

improvement in cross-strait relations or by the economy. As China’s economy and trade flows

expand and Taiwan’s decline, the gravitational pull of the mainland has grown stronger.

Taiwan’s Latin American allies, it seems, are driven by economic imperatives in their dealings with Beijing

and Taipei. For small and poor countries, the struggle between China and Taiwan provides an importantsource of much needed resources, especially when infrastructure projects have fallen out of favor among Western

donors. It has become a particularly attractive proposition because diplomatic relations with one partner do not preclude efforts to

attract investment and boost economic trade with the other.22 For larger economies, however, China’s growing

importance as a source of imports and as a (potential) buyer of products, especially coffee, sugar, and

soybeans, makes the normalization of relations with the PRC increasingly irresistible.

Chinese soft power could peacefully unify Taiwan and ChinaDr. He ‘8 (Dr. Li He is a visiting senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National

University of Singapore. “CHINA’S GROWING INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA: CHALLENGES AND

OPPORTUNITIES.”EAI Background Brief No. 411. Published, Oct 30, 2008) – HyeongMoney

The Chinese are eyeing Latin America as a new expansion destination for trade and investment. Prior to the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Beijing had neither the opportunity nor the incentive for involvement in Latin America. For

China, Latin America was too remote geographically and the new regime in Beijing was too domestically preoccupied. In 1960, Cuba

under Fidel Castro became the first Latin American country to recognize the PRC People’s Republic of China); however, through

much of the 1960s, except for Cuba, trade and cultural exchanges between China and Latin America were virtually nonexistent. Prior

to the market-oriented reform launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, Chinese presence in Latin America was marginal. Politically,

China needs Latin America's support and cooperation in playing a pivotal role in the

international arena. At present, of the 33 independent countries in Latin America and the

Caribbean, China has official diplomatic relations with 21, while the remaining 12 nations

maintain relations with Taiwan. China hopes its growing presence in the region will encourage the

remaining supporters of Taiwan to abandon Taipei in favor of the mainland and push Taiwan

towards peaceful reunification.

China wants the recognition specifically in Latin AmericaDr. He ‘8 (Dr. Li He is a visiting senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National

University of Singapore. “CHINA’S GROWING INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA: CHALLENGES AND

OPPORTUNITIES.”EAI Background Brief No. 411. Published, Oct 30, 2008) – HyeongMoney

http://csis.org/publication/taiwan-china-balancing-act-latin-america





While China’s strategic agenda with Latin America is driven primarily by economic interests,

reunifying Taiwan with the mainland is the key tenet of China's Latin American strategy. Fearing

Taiwan’s push for international recognition will lead to its declaration of independence, Beijing

is determined to contain Taiwan in every corner of the world, especially in Central America and

the Caribbean, the stronghold of Taiwan. At present, Taiwan maintains formal diplomatic relations with

23 countries. Of those 23 states, 12 of them are located in Latin America and the Caribbean.



-- Taiwan Impact

Taiwan war would escalate causing extinctionHunkovic ‘9 [Lee. Prof Military Studies @ American Military University. “The Chinese-

Taiwanese Conflict – Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan, and the UnitedStates of America” www.lampmethod.com, 2009]

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear

conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by

such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they

were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global

economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able

to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and

begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India,

which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain

the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few

countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and

United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries

will not be considered in this study.

Taiwan war is the most probable scenario for global nuclear war.Lowther, ’13 William, Staff reporter in Washington, Citing a CSIS Report, “Taiwan could spark

nuclear war: report,” Taipei Times, Mar 16, 2013,

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211 , A_Yu)

TICKING TIMEBOMB: The CSIS report says that neither China nor the US can fully control developments that could ignite a Taiwan crisis and lead to nuclear conflict Taiwan

is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a

new academic report concludes. “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tensionand conflict between the US and China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the

report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s

independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s

defense. “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008,

the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities

and persistent political disagreements,” the report says. In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard

Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.” The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor

Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis. “This is a classic recipe for surprise,

miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own. The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is

the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, becausethe fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and

the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.” Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations,

the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict

between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US. The danger posed by

flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says. “Although Beijing and

Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between

the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,” the report says.

For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party. To make things

worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that

escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor,could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says. Although

conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.” The report

http://www.lampmethod.com/


http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211






says: “With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals,

such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”



# - Growth



China Growth Uniqueness

China growth stable now.Xinhua News, 5/29 “China's economic growth to remain stable: Moody's” 2013

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-05/29/content_16541936.htm

BEIJING - China's economy will see stable yearly growth of 7 to 8 percent through 2017 without

any collapse, Moody's Investors Service said on Tuesday. The renowned US bond credit rating agency said

at an annual credit risk conference that China's new leadership is advancing the country's

reform and rebalancing at a measured pace, which can tamp down asset bubbles and prevent a

boom-bust cycle. China's consumer price index, a main gauge of inflation, will also remain low to moderate, and asset

inflation in land and housing prices are contained, according to Moody's. The agency kept China's rating at Aa3, but cut the country's

credit outlook to stable from positive in April, citing concerns about its opaque local government debt, fast bank lending growth and

stalled economic reforms. Tom Byrne, senior vice president of Moody's sovereign group, said China's fundamentals are

underpinned by its robust economic growth and strong central government finances .

China’s economic growth is close to brink, but reforms are coming–they are still

above the rate they need to maintain stability.Wassener, 5/29 (Bettina Wassener is a staff writer for NY Times, she holds a BSc in International

Relations and was a former analyst for a political and security consultancy, “I.M.F., Predicting Slower

Growth for China, Urges Overhauls,” NY Times,

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/30/business/global/imf-predicting-slower-growth-for-china-urges-

overhauls.html?_r=0, A_Yu)

The International Monetary Fund trimmed its growth forecast for China on Wednesday, flagged concerns

about the rapid expansion in lending in the country’s vast economy and urged a “decisive” push for overhauls that it argues w ould put the economy on

the path toward sustainable growth. The lowered forecast — the I.M.F. shaved a quarter of a percentage point off its previous projection for 8 percent

growth in China, to 7.75 percent — was the latest in a string of similar reductions by analysts in recent weeks. And although the new

projection remains higher than the Chinese government’s target of 7.5 percent growth, the I.M.F.’s

revision and comments underlined the challenges facing policy makers as they try to revamp the Chinese economy, the world’s second-largest, after

that of the United States. Chinese government data for the first quarter of the year showed that the pace of economic growth had slowed to 7.7

percent — markedly below what most analysts had expected. Economic indicators for April and May also have been lackluster. In the short term ,

recent credit expansion, combined with a mild pickup in the global economy, is expected to lift China’s growth rate

in the second half of this year, the I.M.F. said, after concluding an annual review of the Chinese economy. But in the longer

term, major efforts are needed to rebalance the economy and address problems like soaring income inequality and environmental degradation, which

built up in the headlong expansion of the past few decades. The rapid growth in credit in recent years also has emerged as a major source of concern

among analysts, who worry that the accumulation of debt brings substantial risks, including asset price bubbles and potentially destabilizing defaults.

The I.M.F. added its voice to the chorus of warnings about the so-called shadow-banking system — lending outside the regulated banking system,

which has been growing rapidly in the past few years. The growth in credit, the I.M.F. said, “raises concerns about the qua lity of investment and its

impact on repayment capacity, especially since a fast-growing share of credit is flowing through less-well supervised parts of the financial system.”

Growth, it added, has become “too dependent on the continued expansion of inves tment, much of it by the property sector and local governments

whose financial position is being affected as a result.” Policy makers in Beijing are well aware of these issues and

are aiming to bring about more balanced, higher-quality growth that will improve living

standards and household incomes. The I.M.F. said it was “reassured” by the authorities’ focus

on the financial sector and fiscal overhauls, adding that “reining in total social financing growth

is a priority and will require further tightening of prudential oversight.” Such policies may slow activity in the short

term, the I.M.F. said, but they would do so “in a way that supports the transition to a more

sustainable growth path.”



http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/30/business/global/imf-predicting-slower-growth-for-china-urges-overhauls.html?_r=0







# - Soft Power

Chinese influence is key to effective Asian regionalism – locks in stabilityZheng ‘9 [Denise. Program Coordinator for CSIS Public Policy. “China’s Use of Softpower in the

Developing World” 2009http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090305_mcgiffert_chinesesoftpower_web.pdf ]

China realizes the primacy of establishing good relations with its periphery for regional

economic and security stability. It aims to acquire soft power by resolving border disputes,

which in some cases have involved Chinese territorial concessions. China actively participates in

or has assumed leadership roles in the creation of regional organizations for economic and

security cooperation, including the East Asian Summit, the Asian Development Bank, the

Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and ASEAN. It has contracted numerous large-scale

infrastructure projects to build roads, bridges, pipelines, and power-generating facilities,

particularly in Southeast Asia and Central Asian countries formerly part of the Soviet Union.

Especially in Southeast Asia, China wields power in the region through its skillful diplomacy, the

region s admiration of China as a model for development, and by emphasizing shared Asian

values. Southeast Asia is arguably the region where China's soft power is strongest. The

assistance that China offered in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, when the United

States was missing in action, has played a significant role in the transformation of the region's

attitude toward China. The depth of China's trade, investment, and aid relationships with

countries on its periphery grants China significant influence in Asia.

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090305_mcgiffert_chinesesoftpower_web.pdf

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090305_mcgiffert_chinesesoftpower_web.pdf



# - CCP

Economic decline destabilizes the CCP – internal dissentDavies, ‘10 [Iwan, MA candidate -- Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International

Studies, “Does the Financial Crisis Threaten Democracy?” SAIS Review Vol 30 No 1. Spring 2010Ebsco]

On the other hand, the crisis could result in a fourth wave forward for democracy, particularly in the cases of

Russia, Iran, and China. These countries have so far been able to resist the global political trend towards democracy while

becoming integrated in the global economy. But as global commodity prices fall, the crisis could foster a

move towards genuine democracy in these countries, threatening the survival of Russian “delegated

democracy,” Iranian theocracy, and Chinese authoritarianism. These countries have experienced

phenomenal growth driven by rising commodity prices (Russia and Iran) or trade fuelled by an artificially low exchange rate

(China). A severe recession could “tip the balance” of political legitimacy. Devoid of significant

economic growth, these regimes may face growing domestic calls for increased democratic

accountability. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, falling commodity prices and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s perceived

economic mismanagement have already angered citizens. In China’s case, double-digit growth in the past

decade slowed to only 6.8 percent in the final quarter of the year.3 Energy exports have fuelled the Russian

boom, but if oil remains below $80 per barrel (the minimum price of oil as calculated by the Russian government to maintain its

budget), Russian citizens may begin questioning their lack of civil liberties or an electoral system that maintains the status quo. As

markets begin to stabilize, the immediate threat to these regimes appears to be diminishing. Nevertheless, understanding the

impact of the crisis on such countries can help us understand the impact that future crises may

have on governments whose legitimacy depends on economic growth.

Economic contractions de-stabilize the CCP – growth is key to their legitimacyAbebe et al ’10 [Dan – Prof Law @ U of C Law. “International Agreements, Internal

Heterogeneity, and Climate Change: The “Two Chinas” Problem” The Virginia Journal of Intl Law,

Vol 50. Winter 2010 ln]

First, since the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist ideology that served as the basis for the party's authority, the CCP

has adopted economic growth as the central justification for its one-party rule. The CCP has pegged its

political future to a type of "performance legitimacy" n12 - it governs because it can provide

faster growth and higher standards of living than any alternative form of central authority. In Eastern China, the CCP's approach

has been a nearly unqualified success. Special coastal economic zones, favorable banking policies, and massive decentralization of

government have combined to spur blistering economic growth. Western China, however, has been left starkly behind:

per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in Western China is less than half of what it is in Eastern China. The result has been

rising income inequality, social instability, and dramatic divisions between East and West, rural and city, and peasants and

urban residents, along with the creation of a roaming underclass of Western Chinese seeking work in the coastal cities. n13 Worse

still, these social schisms coincide with ethnic and religious fault lines: Western China is home to

many ethnic minority groups that harbor substantial animosity toward CCP rule. Poorer

conditions in the West have created the political environment for the emergence of separatist

movements. Brisk economic growth in Western China has thus become a political imperative for

the CCP, and the CCP has [*330] prioritized it accordingly. China is likely to balk at any international agreement that might imperil

this growth. Second, as a result of its growth-driven delegation of power, the CCP suffers from a

surprising (for such a centralized government) erosion of state capacity: the provinces often

ignore the central government's directives, frequently without meaningful consequences . n14 The

political structure of the CCP and the institutional structure of China's government are sometimes overlapping or redundant and, in

many places, lack effective vertical or horizontal accountability. The environmental regulatory agencies are often subordinate to the



very agencies they are intended to regulate. Province-level CCP officials are often evaluated (both locally and in Beijing) by their

ability to produce high levels of economic growth, not their commitment to environmental protection. Although the CCP has

recently tried to recentralize power and rationalize the governance structure, n15 the center's capacity to enforce environmental

regulations on the provinces is much weaker than in a typical industrialized state. The existing structural relationship between the

provinces and Beijing often results in a chronic inability on the part of the CCP to provide public goods like environmental protection,

an inability it will not be able to reverse without incurring substantial costs. Finally, there is reason to believe that the vast majority

of economic and scientific projections have substantially underestimated China's future carbon emissions by failing to account for

heterogeneity among provinces. Eastern China is already highly industrialized and reasonably wealthy; there is every reason to

expect that it will begin to move towards cleaner technologies and shift economic production away from industry and towardsservices (which are generally less energy and carbon-intensive). n16 Western China, by contrast, is poorer and more agrarian, and

the typical development pattern for such an area involves a shift towards greater industrialization and higher per capita energy

consumption (and carbon production). Indeed, this is precisely the direction in which Western China is moving. n17 Every

quantitative forecast of Chinese emissions - save for two important exceptions - uses only national-level data, a methodological

weakness that can wash out distinctions between East and West. Of the [*331] two studies that employ sub-national data, one

projects higher emissions than any of the national-level studies; the other projects much higher emissions than any other study. n18

We read this as suggesting that Chinese carbon emissions over the forthcoming several decades may be significantly greater than

the standard models have anticipated, with correspondingly higher costs to China from any agreement to curb carbon emissions. In

light of the importance of economic growth to the CCP, the internal structure of Chinese governance, and the need to develop

Western China, the prospects for China choosing to join such an agreement in the immediate future seem slim. This Article proceeds

in four parts. Part I focuses on the general importance of economic growth to the CCP, the distribution of growth within China, and

the social and economic difficulties generated by the CCP's hyper-growth policies. Part II analyzes the CCP's internal environmental

enforcement capacity and argues that China would encounter substantial domestic challenges in implementing a climate accord,

even if it chooses to sign one. Part III critiques the assumptions underlying quantitative forecasts of Chinese carbon emissions and

suggests that future emissions may exceed conventional projections by substantial margins. Part IV canvasses extant potentialframeworks for an international climate change agreement and argues that they are likely to be unsuitable to one or more of the

relevant parties. Our conclusion is a pessimistic one: it will be difficult to convince China to join a meaningful international climate

agreement in the near future under the best of circumstances. The Two Chinas, coupled with China's internal political dynamics,

present circumstances that are hardly ideal. I. The Chinese Growth Imperative Modern China has reinvented itself on a

foundation of kudzu-like economic growth. Where Marxism once served as the unifying national ideology, the

CCP has substituted wealth generation and prosperity as the touchstones of the regime and

suggested that the Chinese people judge the legitimacy of CCP rule by the increases in their own

standards of living. Economic growth in China has been spectacular, but it has also been highly uneven. Eastern, coastal

provinces have become wealthy, while central and western provinces have lagged far behind. In effect, there is no longer simply

"China." There is now Eastern China, which is urban, industrialized, and relatively prosperous, and Western China, [*332] which is

rural, agrarian, and relatively poor. This divergence in economic outcomes - a divergence that in places coincides with pre-existing

ethnic and religious fault lines - poses a serious threat to social stability within China. n19 In response, the CCP has begun an aptly

named "Western Development Program" in an attempt to prioritize economic growth, encourage national integration, and curb

nationalist unrest in Western provinces. Accordingly, the governing regime will be reluctant to join a climate agreement that mightcontribute to greater instability by stunting crucial economic development in Western China. A. Foundations of CCP Rule: Economic

Growth Since 1949, China has been governed by the autocratic CCP, dominated by Chairman Mao's conception of Marxism and

designed to bring "socialist glory" to China while preserving party rule. After the Cultural Revolution and Mao's death in 1976,

however, the CCP, led by Deng Xiaoping, began to move away from the Marxist ideological foundation that served as the

legitimating discursive force for CCP authority. n20 Concerned with increasing levels of apathy toward communism and questions

about its efficacy as the governing regime, n21 the CCP turned to two new sources of authority and legitimacy to galvanize support

among the populace and strengthen its hold on power. The first of these was a new Chinese nationalism. The second was an

emphasis on continued economic growth - a type of "performance legitimacy" n22 - as a benchmark and measure of the regime's

success. From the late 1970s until the suppression of student-led democratic protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989, Deng and the

CCP moved slowly toward a reform of China's centralized economic policies and internal governance structure. Deng and some of

the reformers began to argue that the Chinese people wanted a higher standard of living, technological dynamism, and economic

efficiency, not more ideology and excessive bureaucracy. To be economically successful, they argued, China needed the CCP's one-

party rule to ensure stability and regain international prestige. In the words of one scholar, "in the most fundamental sense ...

China's economic reform strategy has been guided by a strategic [*333] vision at the top of the political system. This vision links

China's security, global influence, and domestic stability to the state of its economy." n23 Sustained economic growth is

paramount for the continuation of the CCP, the maintenance of China's territorial integrity, and the pursuit of

China's national interests in international politics. n24 The CCP's reform strategy has been marked by incremental opening of the

domestic economy, beginning with agriculture in the late 1970s and continuing through China's accession to the World Trade

Organization (WTO) in 2001. n25 During the 1980s, the CCP delegated a significant amount of authority from the central

government to the provinces and cities, freeing local actors - province and city-level officials - to develop policies that encouraged

economic growth independent of the center. n26 After a temporary delay in reforms after Tiananmen Square, the 1990s saw the

CCP commit to the creation of a market system, the privatization of some state-owned enterprises, and the development of the

private sector. At the turn of the century, the CCP began to embrace private entrepreneurs and "retreat from economic

administration to economic regulation as the core economic function of government." n27 From a national perspective, the CCP's

economic reforms are an unqualified success. Fueled by these reforms, the Chinese economy has produced tremendous economic



growth and a rapidly improving standard of living for many of China's citizens (in addition to severe consequences for the

environment). Between 1978 and 2000, "overall per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in constant yuan roughly quadrupled." n28

Today, China has the world's second largest economy by purchasing power parity, surpassing Japan, India, and Germany. n29 It has

the world's largest foreign capital reserves. n30 It enjoys a trade surplus of [*334] $ 163.3 billion with the United States. n31 It is a

leading destination for foreign direct investment, n32 and has become more integrated into the world economy through its

membership in the WTO. By almost every economic measure, the CCP's economic policies and drive for modernization have

produced tremendous aggregate gains for China and its citizens. The CCP's policies have also created a consumer society in the

formerly Marxist China. From telephones to televisions, newspapers to the internet, and automobiles to overseas travel, the CCP has

brought to the Chinese people access to information, goods, and technology that were unimaginable during the Maoist era. n33

The CCP's economic policies have reduced the role of the state in the affairs of daily life, leaving

ordinary citizens more free to engage in social and economic activities. In so doing, the CCP has

reinforced the norm that prioritizing hyper-growth polices and ensuring economic development

are the party's overriding responsibilities. China is hardly unique in favoring continued economic growth; there are

few nations on earth that are not attempting to grow their economies and produce wealth for their citizens. In China, however,

economic growth is not merely a matter of policy. Growth, particularly in certain geographic regions, is

viewed by the CCP as a political imperative, integral to the regime's survival. As subsequent discussion

will demonstrate, this focus on economic growth s ignificantly impacts the CCP's incentives to curb environmental degradation and

reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Stalled Chinese growth causes CCP lashoutShirk, ‘7. director of the University of California system-wide Institute on Global Conflict and

Cooperation and Ho Miu Lam professor of China and Pacific Relations at IR/PS and Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs (Susan, Fragile China, pg

3).

As China’s leaders well know, the greatest political risk lying ahead of them is the possibility of an

economic crash that throws millions of workers out of their jobs or sends millions of depositors to withdraw their savings from

the shaky banking system. A massive environmental or public health disaster could also trigger regime collapse,

especially if people’s lives are endangered by a media cover-up imposed by Party authorities. Nationwide rebellion

becomes a real possibility when large numbers of people are upset about the same issue at

the same time. Another dangerous scenario is a domestic or international crisis in which the

CCP leaders feel compelled to lash out against Japan, Taiwan, or the United States because from

their point of view not lashing out might endanger Party rule.”



PEACEFUL RISE BOMB



L – Hege/Unilateralism

Plan reverses more cooperative and diffuse engagement – that hurts current US

interests by triggering hegemonic competition.

Valenzuela ’12 (Arturo, founding director of the Center for Latin American Studies atGeorgetown University and former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere

Affairs ,“Is the United States Losing Influence in Latin America?” Latin America Advisor,

December 17, 2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3179)

As the administration prepares for its second term and evaluates how it should proceed in the hemisphere, Bill McIlhenny's piece is

of singular importance. A curious cacophony of voices have argued that the United States has lost

influence in a region that it once dominated, to the detriment of vital U.S. interests. Behind

these arguments is a woeful lack of understanding of the extraordinary changes that have taken

place in Latin America over the last quarter century . A continent once plagued by

authoritarianism and coup d'états is gradually consolidating democratic stability. A continent that

invented stagflation successfully implemented macro-economic stabilization and structural adjustment policies

while adopting innovative policies to reduce extreme poverty, largely insulating the region from the worldfinancial crisis and ushering in an era of export-led growth. The United States, which played a

key role in encouraging these trends, is now benefitting from them, both in terms of greater

security and increased economic opportunities. To advance its interests in this new context, the United

States must avoid reverting to the hegemonic presumptions of the past-and seek to consolidate genuine

partnerships based on shared interests. This means addressing in a cooperative fashion the challenges such as those posed by

assaults on democratic governance or drug-fueled criminal violence while seeking constructive approaches to ensuring sustainable

development. But it also means encouraging the enormous opportunities that U.S. investors and exporters have in Latin America.

Neither the United States government nor the private sector is neglecting a continent vital to U.S. interests.

http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3179





L – Oil/Energy

Relying on global oil imports ensure interdependence and a peaceful China.Ziegler ‘6 (Charles E. Ziegler is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the

University of Louisville, and Director of the Institute for Democracy and Development. “THEENERGY FACTOR IN CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2006.

http://louisville.edu/democracydevelopment/research/current-publications/the-energy-factor-

in-china2019s-foreign-policy.html)

Unless China’s economy experiences a dramatic meltdown, the country will continue to consuming increasing amounts of energy.

The International Energy Agency estimates that by 2020 China’s share of primary energy demand will increase to sixteen percent,

while its share of population shrinks to nineteen percent.[8] Beijing is promoting the exploration of new oil and gas fields within the

PRC, but specialists agree that imports will constitute an increasing share of the country’s energy consumption. China’s energy needs

may heighten the potential for competition and conflict with other oil importing nations, most notably the United States and Japan.

Conversely, China’s vulnerability as an energy importer could lead toward greater cooperation and

integration within multilateral institutions. In this paper I suggest that (a. China’s rapidly growing

energy demands mesh closely with broader foreign policy goals of promoting a stable

international environment conducive to economic development. Cooperative approaches willtherefore prove more likely than competitive ones, at least in the near future; b. The major actors in China’s

energy policy are largely in accord on the goal of developing reliable sources of imported oil, although differences of emphasis

between domestic development and foreign imports can be discerned; (c. The principle of non-interference in other

countries’ internal affairs confers an advantage in China search for reliable energy suppliers, while

Western industrial democracies, most notably the U.S., often find their stated policies at odds with authoritarian, repressive oil

producers. ENERGY AND DIPLOMACY China’s limited supplies of oil and natural gas have played an important

role in broadening that country’s interests beyond the East Asian region.[16] China’s state-run oil

companies, supported by the government, have pursued a strategy of buying energy properties around the world in an attempt to

secure oil and gas supplies. Chinese foreign policy has focused on developing bilateral ties with important selected countries, but it is

increasingly willing to work through multilateral institutions with other oil consuming nations. As a major energy consumer and

importer, China shares America’s goals of ensuring reliable energy supplies at moderate supplies. Of course, Beijing is competing

with the United States and other energy importers for these finite resources. Moreover, China’s pursuit of energy security frequently

clashes with U.S. national security interests, as Beijing courts oil-rich countries regarded as pariahs by Washington, such as Sudan,

Venezuela, Burma, and Iran. Liberal theories of international relations would predict that growing

interdependence should motivate Chinese leaders to eschew military instruments of statecraft

in favor of diplomacy, markets, and participation in international organizations. The realist perspective

would place more emphasis on how China’s growing energy dependence generates insecurity. Realism would predict an inclination

to develop military forces capable of defending the vital sea lanes of communication, particularly the Strait of Malacca, through

which 80 percent of the country’s oil imports transit. Other evidence supporting the realist approach would inc lude a demonstrated

willingness to intervene militarily in oil supplying countries. However, China as yet has shown little inclination to

task its modernizing military with ensuring energy supplies . This may be simply a nod to reality, since the PRC

is far from being able to challenge the United States globally, or it may be a rational calculus that non-military

means are more cost-effective and present a greater likelihood of success than using armed

forces. Evidence from Chinese activities around the world suggests that Beijing is utilizing political, diplomatic and

economic levers to secure long-term energy supplies from a wide range of sources.

Global oil dependence ensures a peaceful and cooperative China – closing off

oil access in Latin America makes them insecure and aggressive in their own

region.Ziegler ‘6 (Charles E. Ziegler is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the

University of Louisville, and Director of the Institute for Democracy and Development. “THE

http://louisville.edu/democracydevelopment/research/current-publications/the-energy-factor-in-china2019s-foreign-policy.html






ENERGY FACTOR IN CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2006.

http://louisville.edu/democracydevelopment/research/current-publications/the-energy-factor-

in-china2019s-foreign-policy.html)

The evidence presented in this article suggests that China’s foreign policy on energy security is accurately

described by the liberal perspective on international relations. China, at least at this point in time, has

pursued a cooperative path in the energy field. Beijing is critical of the United States over its Middle East policies,

but Chinese leaders appear willing to work together to keep energy producing regions quiet and

stable. And China is actively cooperating with other importing nations through various multilateral forums. In line with liberal

theory, energy dependence appears to have exerted a moderating influence on Chinese foreign

policy, leading Beijing toward cooperative strategies. This does not preclude the possibility that military force

could become a viable option in securing energy supplies. But at present, the Chinese military does not have the projection

capabilities that would allow it to intervene militarily in oil producing states, or to protect the vital shipping routes in the South

Pacific. Securing reliable and diversified energy supplies is central to China’s security today, and the

need will become even more pressing in coming decades. As a net energy importer, China has a stake in the stability of neighboring

oil and gas producing regions, which China’s leaders perceive as linked to domestic economic growth rates and societal quiescence.

As a major oil consuming nation, China has shared interests with other major oil and gas importing nations, such as the United

States, Japan, South Korea, and members of the European Union. These include securing stable and diversified supplies, maintaining

stable and moderate prices, and protecting the transportation routes through which oil and natural gas flow. The driving elements in

China’s foreign policy since the Deng era have been continued modernization and development of the economy, a focus on theregions bordering China, and promoting nationalism as the leading ideological current.[59] China’s foreign policy is concerned above

all with preserving national sovereignty and national security.[60] Economic development and maintaining domestic stability are a

high priority of the regime, and readily available supplies of energy are critical to keep economic growth rates at their recent high

levels, as well as to provide the capabilities needed to strengthen China’s international role and preserve the country’s historic

boundaries that is, to prevent Taiwan’s independence). The country’s national interests are increasingly difficult to protect, as

China’s growing dependence on imported oil and gas make it more vulnerable to the vagaries of the international energy market

and global instability. China’s energy requirements constitute one significant factor driving Beijing to

move beyond regionalism; China is indeed becoming a global power. This study suggests that energy

demands have caused China’s business elites and government officials to move beyond a regional focus on the Asia-

Pacific, developing joint ventures and acquiring properties in Central Asia, Africa and Latin America. Politics and economics are

still mixed in China’s unique brand of capitalism, so it is difficult to separate the interests of China’s petroleum firms from those of

the Chinese state. In many instances, as in Western capitalist countries, government officials have close ties to the oil industry, and

their goals mesh closely with those of business. China’s emergence as a global energy actor has had a major impact on the world

economy, and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. Energy policy in China, as in the United States, is focused onincreasing supply rather than curtailing demand through conservation, mass transportation, and alternative technologies. China’s

foreign energy policy is critically important to economic development, and sustained economic

growth is vital to maintain social stability. Chinese officials are positioning their country, economically and politically,

to meet its rapidly growing energy needs in the coming decades. Energy dependence, in turn, constitutes a

powerful incentive for a constructive, cooperative Chinese foreign policy.







Containment Bad Impact

Trying to contain China in Latin America threatens and emboldens them –

causes great power war from miscalculation and nationalism.

Thakur, ’13 (Professor Ramesh Thakur is director of the Center for Nuclear Nonproliferationand Disarmament, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University. “Turning

China into an enemy,” Feb 7, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/02/07/ )

What to many Westerners is a new world disorder appears to many non-Western observers as a

shifting global order. Where the sun never set on the British empire in the 19th century, it is rising once again in the east in

this century. Pax Britannica was built on territorial control through legal colonialism that allowed Britain to extract, process, move

and use or sell ownership of vast natural resources around the globe. Pax Americana was built on control of resources through

market access-guaranteeing regimes that ensured a worldwide flow of capital, goods and technology to underpin U.S. prosperity and

security. By building global markets, not a global empire, Washington escaped legal responsibility for the security and welfare of its

neocolonial dependents. It succeeded by convincing others that “global public goods” were dependent on, if not synonymous with,

the order guaranteed by U.S. dominance. As China expands its power and influence by buying goods and

access and underwriting and building infrastructure in Asia, Africa and Latin America to cement

geopolitical ties, boost trade and create energy corridors, it seems indifferent to the importance ofconflating regional and global public goods with Chinese national interests. Against that backdrop, as

legacy disputes are dusted off the history shelf by an increasingly assertive China, four propositions are worth

recording. First, unlike the European powers, China has no historical, philosophical or literary tradition

or discourse of acting as a great power in a system of great powers. Rather, its inheritance is that of the

Middle Kingdom with tributaries accepting its suzerainty and paying tribute in return for not being attacked. For the first time

in history, China is a truly global power. Both Beijing and the rest of the world are having to adjust to this dramatic

new reality. Previously, a triumphalist West had written the rules and made all the big decisions on the international economy, trade

and security. Western ideas gained global ascendancy not because they were intrinsically superior but because they were backed by

bombers, battleship and aircraft carriers. Today there is a significant economic, geopolitical and even moral

rebalancing in train in global norms, institutions and practices. Second, also for the first time in

history, two bilateral relationships are experiencing relative geopolitical rise and decline

simultaneously: China-U.S. globally, and India-China in Asia. Washington has been more generous in adjusting

to China’s rise compared to Beijing’s tardiness in accommodating India’s rising profile. Third, historically China has been

a continental power. Now its maritime interests and activities are growing. As China fills out as a

major power, uncontested U.S. primacy will become increasingly unsustainable. Equally, however, a

U.S. withdrawal from the region would be destabilizing. Fourth, for China, matters of status and identity trump

calculations of economic gain and pain. We may believe that the growing integration and interdependence of China

with the global economy makes armed conflict too costly, and that the Pacific military balance is weighted so heavily toward the

United States that Beijing would not be foolish enough to challenge Washington. What if China believes that the costs

to Washington would be so high that the U.S. would back down? Along many such

misperceptions and miscalculations do the bloody rivers of human history flow into the ocean of

oblivion for once-great powers. It would be foolish to underestimate the power of raw politics

to inflame nationalist passions to the point of a destructive conflagration. During this critical

transition, conflict will turn to war if China’s legitimate aspirations are thwarted and its interests

attacked, particularly in the context of two centuries of slights, injustices and humiliations inflicted on it by the West and Japan.

But equally, the stage will be set for conflict down the line if the opposite posture of appeasement is adopted. The rise in tensions

over disputed claims to islands and rocky outcrops in the South China Sea has the potential to impact adversely on Australia’s

interests. As argued by professor Michael Wesley, more than half of Australia’s trade passes through these seas; any outbreak of

armed conflict to Australia’s north would destabilize its strategic region; and any restrictions on the U.S. naval presence and

movements would degrade the Pacific strategic balance to Australia’s net disadvantage. How should Australia respond? According to

former ambassador to China Geoff Raby, Australia’s 2009 defense white paper “was read and understood by media in both Australia

and China as being about the ‘China threat’. ” Some believe that in Chinese eyes, Canberra has joined the U.S. in a de facto

containment strategy as indicated by public statements in both capitals, the U.S. pivot to Asia, the decision to station a new

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/02/07/






contingent of U.S. marines in Darwin, and the buildup of military links with India by both. Others counter that China’s rapid military

modernization and assertive behavior pose a direct challenge to the U.S. and allies that requires a robust response. A third group is

skeptical of the quality of China’s military and believes that the U.S. and allies will retain a significant edge well into the foreseeable

future. It is premature to accommodate to the realities of China’s power, although it would be dangerously provocative to develop

an indigenous military capability to challenge China around Australia’s approaches. A policy of containment could

become self-fulfilling by provoking China’s hostility. Former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser has voiced concern

that under the rhetorical rubric of a strategic pivot to Asia, with Australian complicity-cum-collusion, the U.S. risks turning

China into an enemy that Australia does not need and China does not want to be.



A2: Hege Turns

No impact to Chinese investment in Latin America – only seeking economic

engagement, not military

Wu, 13. Chunsi Wu. Is executive director of the Institute of International Strategy Studies andresearch fellow at the Center for American Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies

(SIIS). Her research interests include Chinese- U.S. relations, Chinese foreign strategy, and arms

control and regional security in Asia. “China and the New Triangular Relationships in the

Americas. China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations.” Center for Latin American Studies.

5/17/13

Secondly, although the U.S. pays close attention to China’s engagement with Latin American countries, it knows that China does not really

have the capability to challenge the position of the United States on the Ameri- can continent. It

is true that Chinese-Latin American relations have developed rapidly over the past ten years, especially in

regards to three aspects: Firstly, China has established connections with the entire American continent, not only developing economic relations with

the major powers in the region, but also strengthening its cooperation with many medium-sized countries as well as regional organizations. Some

countries in the region, however, do not maintain diplomatic relations with Mainland China, and do with Taiwan. Secondly, Chi na has begun to pursue

universal cooperation with Latin American nations, with more and more dimensions emerging in its various relationships including tourism, cultural

exchange, security issues, climate change, etc. Thirdly, topics of interest between China and Latin American countries have gone beyond the bilateraland regional levels, with these nations exchanging views on the world order and global affairs. Thus, China believes that its

relationship with Latin America has “strategic importance.”2 Certain Chinese scholars have pointed out that the

Chinese-Latin American relationship has exhibited unprecedented growth in the new century

(Zheng and Sun 2009). China’s increasing reinforcement of its relationship with Latin American countries,

however, does not imply any intention to enter into geopolitical competition with the United

States. Economic development is the primary goal of China’s cooperation with Latin American countries. Indeed, China wants to expand its

exchange with Latin American countries to include other areas such as education, culture, politics, security, etc., given China’s be - lief that one-

dimensional relationships are both unhealthy and unsustainable. Chinese-Latin American economic cooperation needs to be both complemented and

supported by diplomacy in other areas. Therefore, from the Chinese perspective, developing comprehensive relationships

with Latin American countries has little to do with strategic or military competition. In fact, China’s

engagement with Latin American countries in the realm of security is quite limited, compared

with their other economic and political partnerships. The Chinese military has just begun to interact with its Latin

American counterparts. There have been no regular or institutional arrangements between the Chinese and Latin American militaries, let alone any

joint actions between them. Thus, the reality of the Chinese-Latin American military relationship is not that it has been developing too much or too

quickly. On the contrary, the question becomes how this facet of the relationship can catch up with the rapid growth observed in other areas. What this

implies is that China is not pursuing strategic competition with the United States in Latin America. If the

U.S. is to be concerned about anything, it should be the potentially catalytic effects o n Latin American economic growth caused by China’s presence in

the region.



No China Threat

China is dependent on the U.S.

Deudney and Ikenberry ’09 (Daniel and G. John, Deudney is a professor of political science at John Hopkins University

and Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and a Global Eminence

Scholar at Kyung Hee University. “The Myth of the Autocratic Revival: Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail” Foreign Affairs Volume 88Issue 1 January/February 2009)- Elizabeth The fact that these autocracies are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their

international interests that point toward integration and accommodation in the future. The

domestic viability of these regimes hinges on their ability to sustain high economic growth rates,

which in turn is crucially dependent on international trade and investment; today's autocracies may be

illiberal, but they remain fundamentally dependent on a liberal international capitalist system. It is not surprising that China

made major domestic changes in order to join the WTO or that Russia is seeking to do so now.

The dependence of autocratic capitalist states on foreign trade and investment means that they

have a fundamental interest in maintaining an open, rule-based economic system . (Although these

autocratic states do pursue bilateral trade and investment deals, particularly in energy and raw materials, this does not obviate their

more basic dependence on and commitment to the WTO order.) In the case of China, because of its extensive dependence on

industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies in importing states. Given their position inthis system, which so serves their interests, the autocratic states are unlikely to become champions of an

alternative global or regional economic order, let alone spoilers intent on seriously damaging

the existing one.

Even if China becomes the top country, they won’t be the hegemon

Ikenberry ’08 (G. John is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at

Princeton University and a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University. “The Rise of China

and the Future of the West” Foreign Affairs Volume 87 Issue 1 January/February 2008)-

Elizabeth

Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented

world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written

that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists

go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try

to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other

states in the system--especially the declining hegemon--will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these

developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama

of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and

leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-

World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered

world order. That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching

hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces

an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just

face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-

based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war amonggreat powers unlikely--eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems

defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy

to join.

The United States is interested in helping the whole world succeed. Zakaria ’08 Fareed is the editor of Newsweek International. “Wanted: A New Grand Strategy” Newsweek page 31 December 8

2008)- Elizabeth



At the broadest level, the objective of the United States should be to stabilize the current global order

and to create mechanisms through which change—the rise of new powers, economic turmoil,

the challenge of subnational groups like Al Qaeda—can be accommodated without overturning

the international order. Why? The world as it is organized today powerfully serves America's interests and ideals. The

greater the openness of the global system, the better the prospects for trade, commerce, contact, pluralism and liberty. Any

strategy that is likely to succeed in today's world will be one that has the active support and

participation of many countries. Consider the financial crisis, which several Western governments initially tried to

handle on their own. They seemed to forget about globalization—and nothing is more globalized than capital. Belatedly recognizing

this, leaders held the G20 meeting in Washington. This was a good first step (though just a first step). Without a

coordinated approach, efforts to patch up the system will fail.



CHINA CP



1NC

Text: The People’s Republic of China should substantially increase its economic

engagement towards ______________________________.

The CP competes and solves the case – China offers a unique model of

economic engagement.Hsiang ‘9 (Antonio C. Hsiang, Associate Professor at Chihlee Institute of Technology in Taiwan

China Rising in Latin America: More Opportunities than Challenges” Journal of Emerging

Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Volume 1 issue 1 November 2009)-Karla

Because “many Latin American countries no longer look to Washington leadership,” the so- called

Washington Consensus “has lost traction”.28 As a global rising power, China offers an alternative model

for Latin America’s development. Even though China has been hurt by the 2008 financial crisis, “its economic and

financial powers have been strengthened relative to those of the West. China’s global influence

will thus increase, and Beijing will be able to undertake political and economic initiatives to increase it further.” 29 In fact,

“Washington seemed to adopt a Chinese-style solution to its escalating financial problems: greater state intervention to restrict the

movement of capital.”30 Thus, Beijing’s emergence as a global economic power is seen throughout

Latin America as offering an alternative from the Washington Consensus model for economic

development. The “Beijing Consensus” is the brainchild of Joshua Cooper Ramo, a former senior editor and foreign editor of

Time magazine and later a partner at Kissinger Associates, the consulting firm of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

According to Ramo, the Beijing Consensus has three features. The first is a commitment to innovation and

constant experimentation in reforms. The second, a rejection of per capita GDP as the only measure of progress, as

sustainability and equality also count. And the third, a commitment to self- determination. Less developed countries

should therefore ensure their own financial integrity and keep great powers in check. 31 The Beijing Consensus has

evolved to describe a plethora of alternative plans for economic development in the

underdeveloped world. Ramo argues that China and India, who “most pointedly” ignored the World Bank and the IMF-

championed Washington Consensus, “now have records that speak for themselves.” 32 Consequently, the so-called the“Beijing Consensus” has been attracting attention in Latin America because of “China’s distinctive

development model, . . . [which] posits far more state intervention in the economy and a greater

concern with political stability and strong government to guide the development process.” 33

The CP solves better because there are comparative benefits to China.Dr. Hsiang ‘9 (Antonio C. is an Associate Professor Chihlee Institute of Technology, Taiwan.

“China Rising in Latin America: More Opportunities than Challenges” Journal of Emerging

Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Volume 1 Issue 1 November 2009)- HyeongMoney

It is no accident that in March 2007, during the Inter-American Development Bank’s annual¶ meeting in Guatemala, the Bank’sPresident Luis Alberto Moreno signed an agreement of ¶ understanding with Zhou Xiaochuan, the head of the People’s Bank of

China, to formalize¶ talks over Beijing’s request to become a member. In November 2008, China became the¶ third Asian nation to

join the bank, after South Korea and Japan. Even former U.S.¶ Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson asserts, “China obviously is a big

player, a global¶ economic player, and that’s obviously a good thing for Latin America¶ World Bank economists

report that the rise of China and India is bestowing substantive net benefits on Latin America

through higher commodity prices, cheaper industrial inputs, and growing capital inflows.

Moreover, if Latin American governments adopt appropriate¶ investment and trade strategies, including negotiating bilateral free-

trade agreements, Latin American exporters should be able to successfully penetrate the burgeoning



Asian commercial markets and better integrate themselves into Asian-linked global production

networks. No wonder economists from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and¶ Development (OECD), generally

concur with their World Bank counterparts that “as seen¶ through the Latin American lens, China is closer to heaven

than hell.”37¶ Facing China’s new role in the Western Hemisphere, For most of Latin America, with the main exceptions of

Mexico and Central America,¶ China has been an engine for export growth, allowing exporters to

diversify away from traditional markets in the north. Beyond the fact that the region’s exports to China are¶

concentrated on commodity products, the issue remains that China’s economic and political¶ rise should be a wake-up call for more

reforms in the region.



2NC Solvency – Generic

CP solves the case and avoids the turns – Latin America prefers China and their

model of development ensures better stability.

Mallén, 6/28 (Patricia covers Latin America for the International Business Times. Patricia holdstwo BAs from Universidad Complutense de Madrid and an MA in International Reporting from

CUNY Graduate School of Journalism. “Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does

That Mean For The US?” June 28 2013, http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-

relations-china-what-does-mean-us-1317981#)

Though a recent trip to the region by Vice President Joe Biden seems to run counter to the Pacific Alliance snub, China’s President Xi

Jinping has also visited recently, and likewise met with Latin American leaders, illustrating how the two global powers are

going after the same prize. Biden traveled to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil in May, with the last leg of his trip

coinciding with the beginning of Xi’s in Trinidad, before jumping to Costa Rica and Mexico. Both leaders met with several Latin

American presidents and discussed trade and cooperation. The outcomes of their trips were very different, however. Xi’s trip

was the first visit from a Chinese official to the region in almost a decade. Trinidad and Tobago’s main

newspaper, Newsday, called the visit a “historic occasion” and a “visit from China to a good friend.” Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar said she was committed to boosting relations with China and accepted an invitation to Beijing for November of this year. In

Costa Rica, Xi signed a $400 million loan to build a cross-country road and reaffirmed relations with its main ally in the region. Costa

Rica is the only country in Latin America that sides with China in the mainland-Taiwanese dispute and does not recognize the island

as a nation. Even more significant was Xi’s visit to Mexico. President Enrique Peña Nieto welcomed his Chinese

counterpart, whom he had visited in Beijing in April, and made his intentions clear: Mexico wants closer trade relations

with China, with whom it has a gap of $45 billion in export and import - - an important development considering that Mexico is,

for now, America's biggest trade partner in the world. Biden’s visit was not as successful. His meeting in Trinidad

and Tobago was called “brutal and tense” by Persad-Bissessar, and Colombian journalist Andrés Oppenheimer deemed

the trip a sympathy visit after Secretary John Kerry called Latin America “Washington’s backyard” in a much-berated slip last April.

While Biden had pleasant meetings in Rio and Bogotá, no agreements were signed during his trip. Perhaps the biggest development

in China’s investment in the area is the recent decision by the Nicaraguan congress to allow a Chinese company to build a canal

through the country. Although still in the proposal stages, the project would bring profound change to the geopolitics of the region --

and even the world. If built, the canal could significantly affect commerce through the Panama Canal, which, though it is now part of

Panama's domain, was built by the U.S. and remains a symbol of the nation's historical dominance in the region. Thatdominance is in decline. After decades of uncontested U.S. influence in the region, some Latin

American leaders have started making decidedly anti-American policies. The most notable was the late

Venezuelan Comandante Hugo Chávez, who was very vocal about his disdain for the U.S., but he is far from the only one. Bolivia's

President Evo Morales, for instance, kicked out USAID after Kerry's verbal slip, and has gone so far as to ban Coca-Cola from the

country. But now it's Ecuador bumping heads with its northern neighbor, mostly in regard to Ecuador granting entry to NSA-secrets

leaker Edward Snowden. President Rafael Correa openly said that they would welcome the whistle-blower because he was a "free

man," no matter what the U.S. said. Disagreements between the governments have led to the cancellation of a special trade

agreement, which Ecuador has called "an instrument of blackmail." Beyond the lack of understanding with its former main trade

partner, why is Latin America so smitten with China? Kevin Gallagher, a professor of international

relations at Boston University, says China speaks to the region’s newfound confidence. “China is

offering attractive deals to Latin American economies while the United States continues to

lecture and dictate,” Gallagher wrote for The Globalist. “For too long, the United States has relied on a rather

imperial mechanism, just telling Latin America what it needs,” he added. “Compare that to China’s approach: Itoffers Latin America what it wants.” Gallagher argued that the U.S.’ biggest offer to Latin America is the Trans-Pacific

Partnership, which offers access to the U.S. market on three conditions: deregulate financial markets, adopt intellectual property

provisions that give preferences to U.S. firms, and allow U.S. firms to sue governments for violating any of its conditions. China, on

the other hand, has been providing more financing to Latin America than the World Bank, the Inter-American

Development Bank and the U.S. Export-Import Bank combined since 2003, with no previous conditions and very few strings

attached. “Latin America is very sensitive to any notions of conditionality due to painful past experiences with the IMF and the

World Bank,” Gallagher said. “China makes sure that its policy is not based on conditionalities.” Gallagher said the U.S. should awake

from its past slumber and stop taking Latin America for granted. Shlomo Ben-Ami, vice president of the Toledo International








Center for Peace and former Israeli foreign minister, takes a different stance. He argues that China's advancement in

the region does not automatically equate with American loss of preeminence. U.S. exports to Latin

America continue to rise (by 94 percent over the past six years), as do imports (87 percent in the same period), and America

continues to be the biggest foreign investor in the area.

Chinese trade agreements would solve each of the topic countriesHearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H., research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Sydney. He has conducted

research in Cuba (three years) and China (ten months), and is currently undertaking a study of Chinese engagement with Latin

America. Author of multiple books on Cuba, China, and Latin America. Pacific Rim Report No. 52, January 2009 “China’s Relations

with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts” http://usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)

Some scholars believe that a coordinated multilateral approach to China will improve outcomes

for Latin American countries. As Enrique Dussel Peters and Jorge Katz (2006) have argued, a region-based

bilateral dialogue with China could integrate the booming resource industry into a broader,

more sustainable development plan. The foundations for such a process already exist in

common markets such as MERCOSUR, in which China holds consultant status. Its members (Argentina, Brazil,

Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela) have demonstrated a commitment to defending the integrity of MERCOSUR, and although

Paraguay’s continuing support for Taiwan has been an obstacle, Chinese investments in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela

have created favorable conditions for a MERCOSUR-China FTA. The prospect for greater bilateral cooperation

is strengthened by the fact that all three of these countries have used support from China to increase their bargaining power with

the United States and to oppose the U.S.-backed Free Trade Area of the Americas. Indeed, Venezuela’s 2005 accession to

MERCOSUR may further this objective as Hugo Chávez builds linkages with the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA)

network (Antigua, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and Venezuela) and its associated ‘People’s Trade

Agreement’ TCP). Mexico is well positioned to engage Central and South American countries to

stimulate dialogue about the capacity of multilateral collaboration to promote regional interests

vis-à-vis China. Membership in NAFTA should not stand in Mexico’s path toward simultaneously

developing alternative economic partnerships. As Chile has shown through the concurrent development of FTAs

with Canada, China, Mexico, Korea, the United States, MERCOSUR, and the European Union, multiple agreements can consolidate

overseas business networks and secure broader access to foreign markets. The emergence of China represents more than a

temporary problem for Mexico; rather, it raises the historically enduring challenge of developing balanced

and sustainable international economic relations. The threats associated with this challenge include, but extendbeyond, specific cases of ineffective enforcement of customs regulations, unscrupulous profiteering from tariff loopholes, and even

the encompassing problem of competition for a place in the consumer markets of the Americas. Indeed, the threats extend to the

global scale in the form of economically and environmentally unsustainable development strategies based on natural resource

exports. To overcome the most impending of these threats Mexico could tighten domestic policing of illicit commerce and build

knowledge of the emerging Chinese market in order to identify niche areas and develop appropriate strategies for filling them.

Tortillas and cement are a good start, but there are significant opportunities to expand existing sales of specialized electronics and

auto parts, synthetic fibers, steel and plastic products, beer, and a range of other items. Opportunities also exist to develop

production chains based on assembly of Chinese manufactured components in Mexico, and subsequent export throughout the

NAFTA zone, though this would require careful legal preparation. Expanded production of automobiles, heavy industrial equipment,

and computing equipment would benefit from Mexico’s geographic proximity to the United States, sophisticated logistical

infrastructure, high levels of human capital in technological development, and access to U.S. and Canadian markets. Refined

educational exchange programs that more strongly encourage face-to-face dialogue with Chinese counterparts and industry

professionals would deepen opportunities for collaboration. Indeed, Venezuelan scholarship programs in China (mainly in the oil and

space satellite industries) demonstrate that the prospects for long-term professional partnerships are enhanced when students are

exposed to—and tested on—a broad base of technical, linguistic, and cultural experience. Mexican educational initiatives in China

such as those of the Tecnológico de Monterrey have shown that strategic industrial targeting and flexibility in program design haveproduced positive outcomes. At the most encompassing level, the emergence of China raises questions about the long-term viability

of development models based on bilateral free trade, particularly in natural resources. Multilateral blocs such as ASEAN, the EU, and

MERCOSUR, have shown a historical capacity to represent the interests of member countries through improved harmonization of

trade policies. These organizations have historically structured themselves to leverage benefits from trade with the United States,

providing them with a solid basis for adaptation to the emergence of China. The 21st century may turn out to be the century of

regional trade accords, and a vigorous exploration of new partnerships will only benefit Mexico. Regional integration has

also become more important for Cuba, which together with Venezuela and Bolivia, has

advanced the People’s Trade Agreement TCP) under the auspices of ALBA. It is worth noting that ALBA’s

preference for exchange and bartering of resources (material and human) through state-administrated programs rather than free



market commerce is an approach accommodated by China’s economic policy. Indeed, even as it pursues integration into the

capitalist world market as a WTO member, China often pays for Latin American natural resources with trade credits, construction

equipment, infrastructure upgrading, and technical training rather than hard currency (Robles 2005). China has not openly

endorsed ALBA, but its willingness to develop commercial relations within the framework of

state-to-state cooperation is an important dimension of its engagement with Latin America. For

Cuba this has meant the consolidation of ‘South-South cooperation’ through collaboration in education, food security, biomedicine

(particularly cancer and blood pressure research), solar energy, light industry, and tourism. Intensifying engagement with China has

also produced challenges for Cuba, where prior experience with the United States and the Soviet Union has generated acute political

sensitivity about excessive foreign influence. Elsewhere I have discussed the key political and economic factors shaping

contemporary Sino-Cuban relations (Hearn forthcoming); rather than repeat this discussion, the next section draws primarily on

ethnographic data gathered in Beijing and Havana to discuss how the Cuban state has incorporated China into its administrative

priorities.



Comparative Solvency – Generic

Latin American countries want China over US.Hakim ‘6 (Peter Hakim is the President of the Inter-American Dialogue. “Is Washington Losing

Latin America?” Foreign Affairs, Volume 85 Issue 1, January/February 2006, A_Yu)

China's interest in Latin America is significant and expanding. The region has become a vital

source of raw materials and foodstuffs for China. In the past six years, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown

more than sixfold, or by nearly 60 percent a year. Beijing also faces a major political challenge in the region: of the 26 countries that recognize Taiwan,

12 are in Latin America or the Caribbean. China is intent on reducing that number through aggressive d iplomacy and increased trade, aid, and

investment. Bush administration officials have watched China's growing commercial and political engagement in the region closely. Chinese

President Hu Jintao traveled to Latin America twice in the past two years, spending a total of 16 days there. He received a warm

welcome in the five Latin American countries he visited, the concessions the host governments offered him (such as

the quick granting of "market economy status" to China), and the enormous expectations his presence created of major Chinese investments in roads,

ports, and other infrastructure. Hu's ¶ trips have been reciprocated by a long series of visits to China by Latin American heads of state, economic

officials, and corporate leaders. Many people in Latin America look to China as an economic and political

alternative to U.S. hegemony. Although officials in some of these countries are concerned that China, with its lower

manufacturing costs, will cut into their sales, profits, and investment, others (mainly South America's ¶ food- and mineral-producing nations) largely

see China as a major potential partner for new trade and investment. Brazilian ¶ leaders, including President

Lula, have said ¶ they want to establish a strategic relationship with Beijing that might involve ¶ trade in high-tech products, mutual support ¶ in

international organizations, and scientific ¶ and cultural collaboration. Interestingly, the ¶ recent advances of China (and I ndia as ¶ well) have

prompted some Latin Americans ¶ to examine their own economic and political ¶ development, producing a new wave of self criticism about the

region's stumbling ¶ performance in recent years and intense ¶ discussion about what can be learned from ¶ the success of some Asian countries. ¶ It

is too early to predict what China's longer term influence on Latin America will be. ¶ Chinese trade with Latin A merica, for ¶ instance, may be

expanding rapidly, but it ¶ still amounts to less than ten percent of U.S. ¶ trade with the region. Some of the Latin ¶ American c ountries that were the

most ¶ eager to forge strong links with China are ¶ now having second thoughts. At the time of ¶ Hu's November 2004 visit, Argentina and ¶ Brazil

forecast huge increases in Chinese ¶ investment in both countries. Less than a ¶ year later, the two governments ¶ acknowledged that China's actions

had ¶ fallen short of their expectations and said ¶ they were now eager to stem escalating ¶ C hinese imports. Brazil's foreign minister, ¶ Celso Amorim,

complained that their ¶ "expectations were greater. ... Investment is ¶ coming slowly." In fact, it has barely come at ¶ all.

China offers an alternative to the status quo of the US

Cheong ‘8 Ching Cheong, a senior journalist for The Straits Times in Singapore “Rising of

Beijing Consensus?” China Daily page 9 October 28, 2008)-KarlaRamo asserts that the Beijing Consensus represents opposition to the status quo represented by US

hegemony. This perhaps explains why China is gaining ground worldwide at the expense of the US, as

no one seems comfortable with a world with just one superpower.¶ A Chinese scholar, drawing lessons from the financial crisis,

has added beef to Ramo's concept. According to Professor Huang Weidong of the China University of Science and Technology,

the current crisis was caused by the US' huge current account deficit, financed as it was by

booming Asian and oil-rich countries.¶ With both US households and government in the red, the US has

become the world's largest debtor economy. China, Japan and other holders of US treasury bills footed the bill for its

imprudence.¶ According to Huang, China can keep itself intact by drawing seven lessons from the crisis.

The more salient ones include upholding self-reliance as the foundation of economic growth; de-

emphasizing trade and capital account surpluses; re-focusing on the real side of the economy

such as the production of basic necessities; increasing income and employment; and fueling

growth via technological advancement and domestic consumption.¶ Huang is not alone in theseprescriptions. Akira Kojima, a senior fellow at the Japan Center for Economic Research, too has urged Japan "to slow or reduce

exports to the US and to expand its domestic demand".¶ If China manages to emerge from the current financial

crisis relatively unscathed, the Beijing Consensus might well find favor among developing

countries as an alternative approach to economic growth.



A2: Solvency Deficits

China engagement helps Latin American growth- Aff concerns are myths

Hsaing ‘9(Antonio C. Hsiang, Associate Professor at Chihlee Institute of Technology in Taiwan

China Rising in Latin America: More Opportunities than Challenges” Journal of EmergingKnowledge on Emerging Markets, Volume 1 issue 1 November 2009)-Karla

The fact is that “China and India’s growth has not been a zero-sum game for LAC [Latin American and

Caribbean], but the potential benefits are not being fully realized. It is crucial that LAC countries

take advantage of the growing presence of China and India in world markets by adopting offensive

strategies that facilitate both the participation of LAC firms in global production networks and their commercial presence in the two Asian

economies’markets.” 39 Since formally becoming a member of the Inter-American Development Bank in

2009, China has already contributed $350 million to sustain regional development. Comparisons of

export structure are based on the assumption that similar export structures will suggest the highest potential for competition.40 An OECD study

found: “In general terms …. there is no trade competition between China and Latin America. . . .

[Moreover] this trade competition is even decreasing rather than increasing over the recent period of time. Not

surprisingly, countries that export mainly commodities face lower competition . . . Paraguay, Venezuela, Bolivia and Panama are those exhibiting

the lowest figures among 34 selected economies, i.e. those are the countries that suffer less from Chinese trade competition. Brazil could be

considered as an intermediate case between Mexico and Venezuela.” 41 ¶ Facing China’s new role in the Western Hemisphere, Latin Americangovernment[s] need to boost general competitiveness by lowering country-cost factors and emphasizing policies that promote innovation that favor

the companies of tomorrow. Investment in infrastructure that maximizes export comparative advantages and facilitates deeper and faster regional

trade and business integration should be a priority, together with funding and support of education and research institutions assimilating the needs

and demands of the markets. 42 ¶ For most of Latin America, with the main exceptions of Mexico and Central America, China has

been an engine for export growth, allowing exporters to diversify away from traditional

markets in the north. Beyond the fact that the region’s exports to China are concentrated on commodity products, the issue remains that

China’s economic and political rise should be a wake-up call for more reforms in the region.

China engagement is beneficial to Latin America (A2 China bad for LAC)Dr. Hsiang ‘9 (Antonio C. is an Associate Professor Chihlee Institute of Technology, Taiwan.

“China Rising in Latin America: More Opportunities than Challenges” Journal of Emerging

Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Volume 1 Issue 1 November 2009).- HyeongMoney

A closer look at three common perceptions of China’s impact on emerging markets can¶ help

clarify whether or not Latin American countries can benefit from the ongoing shifting¶ power

equation in the world economy.” Myth I: The main source of China’s competitive¶ advantage is

cheap labor. Reality: Low labor costs in China are significant but the wide¶ availability of capital,

coupled with very high productivity growth levels, are equally¶ important in explaining China’s

hard-to-beat competitiveness. Myth II: China has a¶ negative impact on FDI flows to other

emerging markets. Reality: Most Latin American¶ economies do not compete for the same type

of FDI that China receives and China’s¶ investments in Latin America are only the beginning of a

trend that offers many¶ opportunities for the region. Myth III: China’s rise benefits commodity

exporting countries¶ and adversely affects light- manufacturing exporting nations. Reality:

China’s rise offers¶ opportunities in keeping and sustaining a manufacturing sector. The fact isthat “China and India’s growth has not been a zero-sum game for LAC [Latin¶ American and

Caribbean], but the potential benefits are not being fully realized. It is crucial¶ that LAC countries

take advantage of the growing presence of China and India in world¶ markets by adopting

offensive strategies that facilitate both the participation of LAC firms¶ in global production

networks and their commercial presence in the two Asian economies’ markets.”39 Since

formally becoming a member of the Inter-American Development Bank¶ in 2009, China has

already contributed $350 million to sustain regional development.¶ Comparisons of export



structure are based on the assumption that similar export structures¶ will suggest the highest

potential for competition.40 An OECD study found: “In general¶ terms …. there is no trade

competition between China and Latin America. . . . [Moreover] ¶ this trade competition is even

decreasing rather than increasing over the recent period of ¶ time. Not surprisingly, countries

that export mainly commodities face lower competition . . .¶ Paraguay, Venezuela, Bolivia and

Panama are those exhibiting the lowest figures among 34 ¶ selected economies, i.e. those are the

countries that suffer less from Chinese trade¶ competition. Brazil could be considered as an

intermediate case between Mexico and¶ Venezuela.” 41¶ Facing China’s new role in the Western

Hemisphere, Latin American government[s] need¶ to boost general competitiveness by lowering

country-cost factors and emphasizing policies¶ that promote innovation that favor the

companies of tomorrow. Investment in infrastructure¶ that maximizes export comparative

advantages and facilitates deeper and faster regional¶ trade and business integration should be

a priority, together with funding and support of ¶ education and research institutions assimilating

the needs and demands of the markets.42¶ For most of Latin America, with the main exceptions

of Mexico and Central America,¶ China has been an engine for export growth, allowing exporters

to diversify away from¶ traditional markets in the north. Beyond the fact that the region’s

exports to China are¶ concentrated on commodity products, the issue remains that China’s

economic and political¶ rise should be a wake-up call for more reforms in the region.



Solvency – LA Growth

a. Trade flow and constructive development aid.Hsiang ‘9 (Antonio C. Hsiang, Associate Professor at Chihlee Institute of Technology in Taiwan

China Rising in Latin America: More Opportunities than Challenges” Journal of EmergingKnowledge on Emerging Markets, Volume 1 issue 1 November 2009)-Karla Latin America is now a key region for Chinese foreign policy. However, China has maintained a low profile and

avoided antagonizing the United States in the region. It is exaggerated to accuse Beijing of

challenging Washington’s “Monroe Doctrine” for three main reasons. First, both sides find the trade relationship to

be largely beneficial. Thus, the relation between China and Latin America is characterized far more by

expanding trade flows and business connections than by establishing traditional military or

political ties. Such an approach would further allow China to side-step Washington’s Monroe Doctrine by pro-actively diffusing

any allegations of a Chinese challenge to Washington’s traditional sphere of influence. China supports its trade-oriented

goals by behaving as a “responsible stake-holder” in Latin America. Compare with Russia’s “security and

military-technical cooperation” with Latin American countries, China’s engagements, from sending peace-

keeping force to Haiti to donating aid to Cuba, have been far more constructive. China’s

purchase of regional commodities has also been the main factor for Latin America’s economic

growth in the last decade. In sum, “the expansion of China … seems to be pulling and crowding in growth in the Latin

American region.”53 ¶ Second, China stands to gain tremendous international prestige by offering an attractive alternative model for

Latin American economic development. Beijing’s emergence means that the Washington Consensus is possibly on the wane. As

China formally became a member of Inter-American Development Bank in 2009, Beijing now can contribute more to

Latin America’s development and thus aid global recovery. ¶ Third, Latin American is now the proving

ground for a “diplomatic truce” between China and Taiwan. Responding to President Ma Ying- jeou’s diplomacy of “modus vivendi,”

Beijing allowed Lien Chan, Taiwan’s former vice-President, to attend the APEC 2008 in Peru. So long as the “one China” principle

remains the political basis for Beijing’s relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries. China is content to share some of the

spotlight with Taiwan, while reaping the multitudinous benefits of improved relationships. The benefits extend beyond

China and Taiwan, as the more stable the political relation between Beijing and Taipei, the more

economic opportunity will be afforded Latin America and the United States.

b. Makes Latin American countries believe in themselves.

Feinberg ’07 (Richard is a professor of international political economy at the Graduate School of International Relations and

Pacific Studies at University of California San Diego. “Latin America and the Caribbean's Response to the Growth of China and India:

Overview of Research Findings and Policy Implications/Angel or Devil? China's Trade Impact on Latin American Emerging Markets”

Foreign Affairs Volume 86 Issue 1 January/February 2007)- Elizabeth

Economists from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) generally concur with their World Bank

counterparts: as seen through the Latin American lens, China is closer to heaven than hell. Even if

China’s export surge and export surplus are "short-term" problems, in the long term Chinese imports will catch up,

easing pressure on other developing economies. Nevertheless, the OECD study warns, Chinese manufacturing

wages are a mere quarter of the Latin American average, and the Chinese labor market is endlessly abundant. To compete, Latin

America (especially Mexico and Central America) should take advantage of its geographic proximity to the world's largest import

market, for the relative costs of trade can be more important than relative tariff rates. For example, an important complement to

the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) would be the construction of the long-awaited Panama-Puebla highway.

Happily, capital-rich China and Japan may themselves supply financing for such large infrastructure projects. Another upside

to the rise of East Asia is the positive "cognitive effect": Latin Americans recognize the success of

"pragmatic," export-driven economies.



c. China will be an import market for LA products.

Dr. Arruda ‘6 (Carlos Arruda, a professor of innovation and competitiveness at Fundação Dom

Cabral in Brazil, member of the board of trustees of Unicon “Can Latin American Countries Win

in the World Trade Stakes?” The Latin American Competitiveness Review 2006, 2006) -Karla According to an Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) study published in 2005, China has become an important

import and export market for Latin America over the past 20 years. Latin American countries have addressed thegrowing import challenge to their domestic production with a number of defensive measures designed to keep China’s products out.

However, today, these policies are aligned with efforts to forge closer economic ties with China so as to benefit from ever-growing

Chinese demand. Although Latin American exports to China still consist largely of raw materials and

commodities—the Brazilian mining company Cia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) exported 36 million

tons of iron ore to China in 2005, and Chinese demand for CVRD iron ore is predicted to rise to

50 million tons by 2007, representing 35 percent of global demand for iron ore—China may

gradually start absorbing other types of products, from agro-industrial to other manufactured

goods. At the multilateral level, the IADB study highlights that direct competition between China and Latin America, in particular

Mexico, has intensified due to their increasingly similar export baskets, especially in various manufacturing industries. In view of

China’s expansion of its international production and export base, however, the challenge to Latin American manufacturers may

increasingly be felt across the board. In particular, the global textile and apparel sector is expected to undergo changes that are

likely to enhance China’s standing relative to Mexican and Central American exporters. Beyond low-skill intensive manufactures,

China’s leap to production and export of higher value-added manufactured goods means that Latin American countries aiming toexport the same goods will face a higher competitive threshold of entry into the global marketplace.

Chinese competition in Latin America is not harmful

Blazquez, et. Al ’06 (Jorge Blázquez-Lidoy, Javier Rodríguez and Javier Santiso, “Angel Or

Devil? China’s Trade Impact On Latin American Emerging Markets” OECD Development Center,

June 2006)-KarlaThe results are quite interesting. Figures are relatively low for all Latin American economies except Mexico. In general terms, the

results suggest that there is no trade competition between China and Latin America . As shown in Appendix I,

this trade competition is even decreasing rather than increasing over the recent period of time .

Not surprisingly, countries that export mainly commodities face lower competition. This is an expected result since China is a net

importer of raw materials. Paraguay, Venezuela Bolivia and Panama are those that exhibit the lowest figures among 34selected economies, i.e. those are the countries that suffer less from Chinese trade competition. Brazil could be considered as an

intermediate case between Mexico and Venezuela. When we compare Latin America to other emerging countries, and particularly

those located in Asia, we observe that Chinese competition is not a problem in general terms. Thus, we might

conclude that there are few, if any, short-term trade costs for Latin America, if any, from the trade

point of view. In fact, most Latin American countries are witnessing a tremendous increase in

their exports to China. Over the past years, China has, for example, become Brazil's fastest-growing export market,

purchasing 80 per cent more from Brazil in 2003 than in 2002. Bilateral trade has more than quadrupled over the past four years.

Five commodities — soybeans, iron ore, steel, soy oil and wood — accounted for 75 per cent of Brazil's exports to China last year.

China bought 6.2 per cent of Brazil's $73 billion of exports in 2003, up from a level of 1.4 per cent in 1999. Some big Brazilian

companies such as Aracruz, Latin America's largest wood pulp maker, had more than doubled its sales to China in the past two years

to 12 per cent of the company's exports16. Another issue for Brazil is in dynamic terms. China will continue to expand its exports

over the next decades, gaining market share in third markets in new products. From this perspective, as underlined by Brazilian

economists (Paiva de Abreu, 2005), some Brazilian sectors such as iron and steel products might be affected by Chinese competition

in the medium term. In a more long-term perspective, the automobile industry may also become an issue.



Solvency – Cuba

China’s involvement helps develop Cuba’s economy and reduces necessity of

the US embargo

Nash ’13 (Paul Nash, 24 May 2013, “How the Chinese are Helping to Transform Cuba, Again,”http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/regions/brics/1465-how-the-chinese-are-helping-to-

transform-cuba-again)

China is Cuba’s second largest trading partner after Venezuela, and Cuba is China’s largest

trading partner in the Caribbean, with bilateral trade now standing at around $2 billion. Beijing

wants to help Cuba push through market-oriented economic reforms, knowing from its own

experience over the past three decades that private sector entrepreneurial activity can

stimulate foreign investment, build national capital and promote domestic consumption. To

this end, China has granted Cuba numerous long-term low or interest-free loans to support

development and maintain financial and social stability through the reform process. It has also

undertaken significant technology transfers and entered into joint ventures in farming, light

industry, and tourism. Cuba has started the reform process focussed on its biggest export

industries. It has, for example, begun restructuring its ailing sugar industry by abolishing the

sugar ministry and creating Azcuba, a state holding company consisting of 13 provincial sugar

companies that operate 56 sugar mills and 850 sugarcane farms. Azcuba signed foreign

investment agreements with companies from Brazil and Britain in 2012 to modernize harvesting

equipment and build biomass energy plants. Cuba exports about 400,000 tonnes of sugar

annually to China, more than half the amount it produces for domestic consumption.

China’s interest in Cuba is, of course, inseparable from the Caribbean’s natural resources and

those of Latin America more broadly. The Sino-Cuban economic fraternity, from Beijing’s

viewpoint, is largely pragmatic rather than idealistic. Beijing has demonstrated that it will

conduct business with left-leaning governments like Venezuela and Ecuador as readily as with

right-leaning governments like Chile and Colombia. The Sino-Cuban partnership may represent alost opportunity for the United States in promoting liberal democracy in the Western

Hemisphere. But it may also represent a path to normalized relations if China can help Cuba’s

economy reform such that it, like Vietnam’s, no longer justifies the continuation of a decades-

old U.S. trade embargo on the basis that Cuba’s economy is “dominated or controlled by

international communism.”

China is key in developing Cuban energy development

Davis ‘12 (Bob Davis and Wayne Ma, 5 July 2012, “Cuba Seeks Closer Ties With Beijing,”

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303684004577508432963724246.html)

Chinese technocrats and academics are working on a dozen projects to help remake the Cuban

economy, including infrastructure, transportation and energy, said Xu Shicheng, a Cuba expert

at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. While Cuba has made progress, "most importantly,

there is a need to update the people's mentality," he said. "Many people in Cuba think that

updating the private sector means adopting capitalism. It will take Cuba a long time to

accomplish what China did." Mr. Castro's visit comes as China tries to be a major player in Latin

American affairs. Already, China is a major destination for commodities from Brazil and

http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/regions/brics/1465-how-the-chinese-are-helping-to-transform-cuba-again


http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303684004577508432963724246.html

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303684004577508432963724246.html





Argentina, and is boosting investment in the region, especially in energy projects. Beijing also

has long been involved in a tug of war with Taiwan over diplomatic recognition by Central

American and Caribbean countries, which play off Taipei against Beijing. Cuba is a nation of just

11 million people but it has long been a foreign-affairs flash point because of the charismatic

leadership of former President Fidel Castro and its struggles against the U.S. There are about 1.5

million Cuban-Americans, many of whom live in Florida and other politically important states.

Havana has relied on exports of oil from its closest ally, Venezuela, headed by President Hugo

Chávez, who also had pledged in 2007 to help Cuba build or expand its refining capacity. But

Venezuela didn't follow through, and after the global financial crisis, China stepped in. State-

controlled China National Petroleum Corp. signed a $4.5 billion deal last year to upgrade

Cuba's Cienfuegos refinery.



Solvency – Cuba (Oil)

China is committed to developing Cuba’s oil industry Franks, ‘11 Jeff Franks, 8 June 2011, “China To Play Major Role in Cuban Oil Development,”

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/08/cuba-china-oil-idUSN0814065020110608

HAVANA, June 8 (Reuters) - China looks ready to play a major role in the development of

Cuban oil, including the island's soon-to-be explored fields in the Gulf of Mexico, after the

signing of energy-related accords during a visit this week by Vice President Xi Jinping.

The text of the agreements has not been disclosed, but they appear aimed at making China a

significant oil partner with its fellow communist-run country, which is likely to raise eyebrows in

the nearby United States. State-owned China National Petroleum Corp said on Wednesday the

accords committed the company to make "full use" of its oil expertise to help Cuba raise its oil

output and "to expand cooperation with (state-owned) Cubapetroleo in exploring and

developing new onshore and offshore oil blocks in Cuba." Whether the agreement means CNPC

has leased Gulf of Mexico blocks for exploration was not immediately clear. But Jorge Pinon, a

visiting fellow at Florida International University and expert on Cuban oil, said the Cubans have

previously said they were discussing the leasing of five of their 59 offshore blocks to the

Chinese. "All the pieces of the puzzle are finally falling into place," he told Reuters.

Those pieces include two other accords that commit the two countries to negotiate contracts

for a major expansion of a Cuban oil refinery in the city of Cienfuegos, and the construction of

a liquefied natural gas project, including a regasification plant, at the refinery. Sources have said

the projects would cost $6 billion, most of which would be provided by China and backed by oil

from Venezuela. Socialist ally Venezuela and China are, respectively, Cuba's number one and

two top trading partners.





Solvency – Venezuela Oil

China is key to Venezuela oil sales and development through loansKatakey and Guo, 13

Rakteem Katakey and Aibing Guo, 6 March 2013, “Chavez’s Death Could Dim China’s VenezuelanEnergy Prospects,” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-06/chavez-s-death-could-dim-

china-s-venezuelan-energy-prospects.html

State-run China Development Bank Corp. has agreed to lend Venezuela $46.5 billion since

2008, representing half of the loans the country received in the period, according to a Jan. 13

report from Massachusetts-based Tufts University. About 95 percent of the debt is backed by

sales contracts for crude, the report shows. Chavez, who transformed Venezuelan politics by

channeling record oil revenue to the poor, died at 58 after a struggle with cancer, raising the risk

of unrest and political infighting. Yao Zhongmin, head of China Development Bank’s supervisory

board, said in Beijing today the Venezuelan loans carried risks, for which the bank has a

contingency plan. He didn’t give any details. Shipments to China by Petroleos de Venezuela SA,

the state producer known as PDVSA, are up nearly tenfold since 2006 to an average 518,000

barrels a day and will surpass 1 million barrels a day before the end of 2015, Venezuela’s Oil

Minister Rafael Ramirez said Sept. 25. The country sells China about 19 percent of its output,

based on Ramirez’s statement.



Solvency – Mexico

China will not harm the Mexican market

Reuters ’12 (David Garcias, a journalist for Reuters news source “Mexico hails "new

relationship" with China over trade” Reutershttp://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/04/21/idUKL2E8FKGO120120421 April 21, 2012)-Karla

PUERTO VALLARTA, Mexico, April 20 (Reuters) - Mexico said on Friday it had reached an accord with China aimed at

promoting fairer bilateral commerce and announced joint business deals and investment worth

some $560 million. Mexico's Economy Ministry said the agreement with Beijing would stop "unfair

Chinese practices" in shoemaking, one of the main industries in Mexico to complain that China is flooding it with cheap

imports. The two signed business deals worth $300 million and agreed on new investments worth

$260 million, the ministry said. It did not provide further details. "This new relationship looks to answer the

imbalance that affects Mexico and establish a basis for more balanced and sustainable trade

in the long term," the ministry said. China is Mexico's third-biggest export market outside North America, and the two nations

compete to sell manufactured goods to U.S. consumers. Chinese investment has traditionally been very modest in Mexico but it has

picked up this year. The balance of trade between the two developing economies is heavily tilted in favor of the Asian giant, which

now provides Mexico with roughly 15 percent of its imports. Less than 2 percent of Mexico's exports go to China, with nearly 80percent of them heading to the United States. However, Mexico has been moving away from its dependence on

the United States in the last few years. "It's a fact that the most dynamic region on the planet is Asia. That's the

reality," said Francisco de Rosenzweig, Mexico's undersecretary for foreign trade. "Latin American and global

businesses with new investments are looking to make the most of the comparative advantages

in China." De Rosenzweig added that a planned Mexican trade mission to China was likely this summer. Mexico's announcement

coincided with the close of a trade meeting of the Group of 20 economic powers in the Mexican Pacific resort of Puerto Vallarta,

where ministers agreed to support open markets and oppose protectionist measures

Better Chinese-Mexican relations leads to enormous benefits

Kuribrena ’13 Jose Antonio Meade Kuribrena, Mexico’s secretary of foreign affairs “Mexico

and China: a Promising Future” http://english.caixin.com/2013-05-20/100530091.html 5/20/13)-Karla

Mexico respects and admires China's universal inputs. Since the establishment of diplomatic

relations in 1972, both nations have forged strong bonds of friendship, solidarity and

cooperation with enormous potential benefits for both countries. This was recognized by Pena

Nieto and President Xi Jinping during their meeting in April as part of the Boao Forum for Asia.

They agreed then to raise the relationship to new levels of dialogue and cooperation that

correspond to their enormous potential and the role Mexico and China play in the international

arena. We share hopes in the international realm and challenges that I am sure we can solve if

we bind our ties and exchange experiences. Progressively but surely, Mexico will have greater

presence in this area of rapid growth, global development and innovation that the Asia-Pacific

region has become. Mexico and China have the opportunity to consolidate their existing ties in

deepening exchanges, and making them more and more productive and mutually favorable.Political dialogue, trade, investment, education, science, technology, tourism and culture are

priorities in a broad and expanding bilateral agenda. The relationship between Mexico and

China has a promising future. We are countries in motion and in constant process of

transformation. With the relaunching of our ties, we will work to benefit from our coincidences

and our complementarities. I am convinced that in this new stage, the people of both Mexico

and China will benefit from a bilateral relationship sustained on a greater strategic and long-

term vision.

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/04/21/idUKL2E8FKGO120120421%20April%2021

http://english.caixin.com/2013-05-20/100530091.html




http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/04/21/idUKL2E8FKGO120120421%20April%2021



Increased Mexio-China relations has a potential to benefit both nations- Mutual

cooperation is keyMaurice and Xizhi 6/03 (Liang Xizhi and Peter Saldana Maurice, reporters for English news “

Interview: Mexican senator calls for stronger ties with China” English News,

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-06/03/c_132427267.htm , 6/03/13)-Karla

MEXICO CITY, June 3 (Xinhua) -- Mexico should strengthen cooperation with China, one of the world'smost dynamic economies, Senator Teofilo Torres Corzo said ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping's upcoming visit to the

country. Expecting China to have bigger role on the international stage and greater presence in international politics in the years to

come, Corzo said the country "should be an opportunity for Mexico, and Mexicans are beginning to understand that we can benefit

better from the second largest economy in the world." Also, China should be regarded as a factor for bolstering

Mexico's national competitiveness, as both countries have the potential and opportunity to develop greater economic

cooperation, he said. China and Mexico have maintained close dialogue at the highest level in recent years, and they need to expand

such cooperation to the fields of science, technology, culture and education, said the senator, who chairs the Mexican Senate's

foreign affairs committee for the Asia-Pacific. He called for the two sides to find new possibilities, improve mutual understanding,

and expand cooperation and mutual understanding. Mexico, Corzo said, should continue to work with China to promote

international ecological cooperation, the development of alternative energy sources, conservation and rational use of water, and the

construction of a new international financial system. With "very promising" prospects, the Mexico-China relationship

has the potential to benefit both nations as well as their respective regions, he added.@ The senator

also said Mexico and China should strengthen cooperation in infrastructure construction, aviation and maritime transport, tourism,

energy, mining and other fields. Corzo believed that Xi's upcoming visit will effectively promote the development of the bilateral

relations. "The mutually beneficial China-Mexico relationship will become closer with joint efforts

of the two governments," he said.

Mexico is starting to prefer China’s exports to those from the U.S.

Peters et. al 5/1 (Enrique Dessel Peters is the Full Professor and Head in the Division of Graduate Studies of the Faculty of

Economics of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, Adrian H. Hearn is an ARC Future Fellow, Chair of the Section for Asia

and the Americas; and Harley Shaiken is a professor of Latin American studies at UC Berkeley. “China and the New Triangular

Relationships in the Americas” May 1 2013)

Table 6 indicates, according to this methodology, the increasing level of competition with China between the

U.S. and Mexico in their respective markets during the period 2000-2011. In the case of the Mexico, over 95% of manufacturing

exports and 56% of total exports to the U.S. where under “threat” from China in 2011 – a trend that has increased since 2000. In fact, themajority of the competition between Mexico and China in the U.S. market falls under the category of “direct threat”, i.e. reg arding products

in which Mexico loses market share and China gains. In the case of the U.S., this dynamic has been even more profound: in the year

2000 only 36.82% of U.S. manufacturing exports to Mexico were under threat from China. By

2011, this coefficient increased to 74.45%. In contrast to Mexico, products under “partial threat”, i.e. those in which both

China and the U.S. are gaining market share but China is gaining faster than the U.S., are much more widespread (see Table 6).

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-06/03/c_132427267.htm





Solvency - $

China has the money to pay for the plan – they give billions.Gallagher ‘13 (Kevin Gallagher is an Associate Professor of International Relations. (BA,

Northeastern University; MA, PhD, Tufts University. ww.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-06/13/content_16613062.htm. US Blind to Latin America). – HyeongMoney

So what is the Chinese approach? During his visit to Latin America and the Caribbean, President Xi offered

more than $5.3 billion in financing, with few conditions attached, to its newfound Latin American friends. These offers will need to

be confirmed, but according to media reports, during Xi's trip the Chinese signed deals for $3 billion in commitments

to Caribbean countries for infrastructure and energy; $1.3 billion in loans and lines of credit to Costa R ica - a $900-

million loan from China Development Bank for upgrading a petroleum refinery and a $400-

million line of credit from Export-Import Bank of China for road infrastructure; and a $1-billion

line of credit from Export-Import Bank of China to Mexico for its state-owned oil company

PEMEX. Making available this financing comes on top of the already $86 billion in financing provided by China to Latin American gove rnments since

2003. Granted, that the amount - large as it sounds - seems just like another number in today's world. To put it into proper perspective, consider this:

Since 2003, China's policy banks have provided more finance to Latin American countries than

their counterparts at the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the US Export-Import Bank.



Solvency – Drugs

China influence key to counter-narcoticsShapiro, ‘5 Charles S., U.S. Department of State, “Chinese Engagement in Latin America Should

Enhance U.S.,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Western Hemisphere, September 21,2005, http://archives.uruguay.usembassy.gov/usaweb/paginas/527-00EN.shtml)

We expect that China's increasing engagement in the region will lead to increased cooperation

between China, the United States, and other Latin American and Caribbean governments on matters

affecting regional stability, especially terrorism, transnational crime, and counternarcotics. We view positively

China's participation in the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti in a way that contributes to the mission. China's Role in Narcotics

Control Given this subcommittee's interest in narcotics, let me elaborate on China's role in narcotics control in the

region. China has a large and developed chemical industry, and, like the U.S., it is one of the

world's largest producers of precursor chemicals, which have legitimate uses but are also used

in the production of cocaine and synthetic drugs. In particular, China is the world's leading exporter of bulk

ephedrine (used in cold medicines and weight-loss tablets) and a source country for much of the ephedrine and pseudoephedrine

imported into Mexico. China notifies the DEA of shipments of precursor chemicals to the U.S. and Mexico so that tracking may be

done to prevent diversion of these chemicals for illicit purposes. Nevertheless, some precursor chemicals are diverted from legal use

to manufacture methamphetamine destined for the United States. To regulate its chemical industry, China is a party to the 1988

U.N. Drug Convention and has regulations for record keeping and import/export controls on all chemicals included in the

Convention. Several provinces have more stringent controls than called for in the Convention. In the State Department's

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report we have noted, however, that China needs to improve its infrastructure to

adequately monitor its large chemical production capacity and international trade in chemicals. U.S. and Chinese

cooperation in chemical control and counternarcotics is good and has been steadily improving .

This was highlighted by a joint operation involving the DEA and several PRC law enforcement agencies in October 2004, leading to

the world's largest seizure of the synthetic drug Mandrax (18 metric tons), and the seizure of 10 tons of pseudoephedine tablets (a

key precursor for methamphetamine) in Los Angles in September 2004. While China is a transit country for heroin produced in

Southeast Asia to international markets, the DEA's Heroin Signature Program indicates less than one percent of heroin seized in the

U.S. comes from Southeast Asia.



Solvency – Renewables

China can successfully engage over Renewable EnergyBrandt ’12 Jon et. el. Masters in US Foreign Policy), “Chinese Engagement in Latin America and

the Caribbean: Implications for US Foreign Policy” December 2012 American University)One area of potential growth and trilateral cooperation is in renewable energy investment.

Historically speaking, the United States has led the way in renewable energy investment, but

over the past several years, China has made remarkable advances with a surge of new

investment in and emphasis on renewable energy technology. Investments in renewable

energy reached new heights in 2011, topping $257 billion, up from only $39.4 billion in 2004

(552 percent increase in eight years). 29 China has surpassed the US in the volume of

renewable energy investment, is second behind the EU, and is looking to expand its markets

for renewable energy. China and other Asian countries have set ambitious targets for

renewable energy as part of their primary energy portfolios. Government grants, subsidies and

other tax incentives have prompted a wave of Chinese manufacturing in wind turbines, solar

photovoltaic panels and other renewable products. For example, Chinese solar panel

production has actually outpaced demand globally and the Chinese are aggressively trying to

develop Latin America’s market for solar panels. Latin America provides an attractive market

for Asia in the renewable sector and there is great potential to foster increased cooperation in

the energy security of both regions as they strive to become less dependent on expensive and

dwindling hydrocarbons. Alternative energy provides a green platform to promote closer

economic ties, ultimately helping to mitigate the all - inclusive threat of climate change.



Solvency – Infrastructure

China successfully engages and invests in infrastructure – they solve the case.Brandt ’12 Jon et. el. Masters in US Foreign Policy), “Chinese Engagement in Latin America and

the Caribbean:Implications for US Foreign Policy” December 2012 American University (Page 11)

One of the major issues concerning Latin America and its US trade partners is the outdated

infrastructure and its effects on import and export activities throughout the region. In 2011,

Latin America had one of the lowest proportions of paved roads (as a percentage of total road

network) across all regions at 22.2 percent, second only to Sub - Saharan Africa at 18.8

percent. 30 Overall, there has been a very low rate of infrastructure investment by Latin

American governments with the average ranging between 1 percent and 2 percent of their GDP.

31 Other challenges include bureaucratic obstacles and flawed project implementation that

inhibits Latin America’s infrastructure competitiveness. 32 Latin America’s poor infrastructure

in regards to its roads, railways, and ports, hinders its export transfer and cost efficiency. In

fact, transport costs pose higher barriers to Latin America’s products entering US markets than

tariffs. 33 Thus, China has taken a more active role to finance infrastructure projects within theregion The Inter - American Development Bank (IDB) and the Export - Import Bank of China

(China Ex - I m B ank) have agreed to establish an infrastructure investment mechanism to

finance public and p rivate sector projects in the IDB borrowing member countries. 34 In

addition, China has proposed a $5 billion cooperation fund for infrastructure investment 11

and a $10 billion credit line to support the construction and infrastructure companies in the

region. 35 Such infrastructure investments present a beneficial outcome for Latin America,

China, and the United States. For Latin America, infrastructure investment will benefit other

aspects of their economies such as competitiveness, productivity, and trade. On China’s side,

this allows for a better export and import environment, but also opportunities to further expand

the use of the RMB currency in diverse markets. China’s infrastructure investment in Latin

America poses no current concern to the United States. Chinese infrastructure investmentinvariably benefits the United States as it creates a more modern export and import

environment for future trade.



Solvency – Agriculture

China can successfully engage over agriculture.

Arabia ’12 “China Urges Closer Ties with Latin America, Proposes $10 Billion Loan” Arabia 2000 June 27 2012)

Chinese financial institutions will allocate 5 billion dollars to initiate a China-Latin Americacooperation fund for joint investment in cooperation projects in manufacturing, high and new

technology and sustainable development, and the Chinese side will also initiate a 10-billion-

dollar special loan to support infrastructure cooperation between the two sides, he said.

Moreover, China is ready to discuss and sign currency swap agreements with more ECLAC countries, said the Chinese leader. China

proposes to launch a forum for Chinese and Latin American agriculture ministers, a China-

Latin America mechanism of emergency food reserves of half a million tons, and an

agricultural cooperation and development special fund, he said.

Meanwhile,China is willing to set up research and development centers for agriculture technology,

demonstration industrial parks for farm product processing and development zones for agriculture investment in Latin America, Wen added.

He also asked for the exchange of agricultural experts and technicians and urged people-to-people

and cultural exchanges to strengthen China-Latin American friendship. ECLAC, a regional economic

committee under the UN Economic and Social Council, was established in 1948. It is aimed at promoting regional economic and social

development and boosting economic cooperation between its 44 member countries. Wen arrived in Chile on Monday for an official visit.

Later on Tuesday, he left Santiago, concluding his South America tour, which had also taken him to Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina.

China agriculture engagement is a win-win.

Arabia, 6/9 “Chinese Vice Premier Calls for Agricultural Cooperation with Latin America” Arabia 2000 June 9 2013)

Vice Premier Wang Yang on Sunday called for closer agricultural cooperation between China and

Latin America and the Caribbean.

In a speech at the China-Latin America and the Caribbean Agricultural Ministers' Forum in Beijing Wang said, “We should boost

mutually beneficial cooperation in agriculture and other areas in pursuit of win-win

development.”, Xinhua reported

More than 300 representatives from both sides attended the forum. China and Latin America and the Caribbean are complementary to each

other in agriculture, and to tap the immense potential for cooperation serves the interests and welfare of the

people in all the countries concerned, Wang said. He proposed that governments involved

should work more actively as coordinators to establish stable, pragmatic and effective

mechanisms for agricultural cooperation. Also, enterprises should boost technological

exchanges and expand trade of produce, said the vice premier. China and Latin America and the

Caribbean can strengthen communication to safeguard their common interests on major agriculture-

related issues, and make joint efforts to push ahead with the formulation of an international produce trading system featuring fairness,

justness and stability, he added

china da and cp v2 - berkeley 2013

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