china disadvantage - gmu 2013

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2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – GMU Debate Institute

China Disadvantage – GMU Debate Institute ................................................................................................................................................*** China Disadvantage *** ...........................................................................................................................................................................

China Disadvantage – Shell – 1NC ...........................................................................................................................................................China Disadvantage – 2NC/1NR Overview ..............................................................................................................................................

China Disadvantage – Uniqueness – Relations High .................................................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Uniqueness – LA Uniqueness ................................................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Uniqueness – US Influence Declining ................................................................................................................... China Disadvantage – Uniqueness – A2: Alt Cause – Cybersecurity ........................................................................................................ China Disadvantage – Uniqueness – A2: Alt Cause – Asia .......................................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Uniqueness – A2: Uniqueness Overwhelms .......................................................................................................... China Disadvantage – Links – LA Engagement ........................................................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Links – Zero-Sum ..................................................................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Links – Mexico ......................................................................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Links – Venezuela .................................................................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Links – Cuba .........................................................................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Links – Perception Key .........................................................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – Turns Case – LA Economy ................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – Turns Case – LA Stability ..................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – Laundry List .......................................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – K-ish/Xenophobia .............................................................................................................. China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – Hegemony ..........................................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – Alliance ..............................................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – China Soft Power ...............................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – Asian Stability ....................................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – Proliferation .......................................................................................................................

*** Aff Answers *** ..................................................................................................................................................................................... China Disadvantage – Aff Answers – Relations Low ............................................................................................................................... China Disadvantage – Aff Answers – Alt Cause .......................................................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Aff Answers – Relations Fails ...............................................................................................................................China Disadvantage – Aff Answers – Not Zero-Sum ................................................................................................................................

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2013 China DA

*** China Disadvantage ***




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Shell – 1NCChina is carefully seeking cooperation with US on Latin American engagement---plan‘s unilateral approac

disrupts the process

BBC News 5-31 ―Chinese president's upcoming US visit may help dispel misunderstanding – Xinhua,‖ BBC Monitoring Asia Pacif – Political, L/N, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2k

Beijing, 31 May - Xi Jinping's just-started journey to the west hemisphere will be his first tour to Latin America as Chinese president.

Meanwhile, his June 7-8 talks with his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama at Sunnylands estate, California, will also be the first summit between the world's two largest economies after both countries

underwent leadership transition.

As many global observers have noticed, Xi's visit is unprecedented in its itinerary and other arrangements for a Chinese head of state, which evince a balanced approach toward b

developing and developed nations, as well as an innovative diplomacy style of the new Chinese leadership.

Instead of competing with other world powers for the so-called "spheres of influence," Beijing is seeking pragmatic cooperation for mutual benefit when building rapportwith Latin American countries, which is conducive to the region's social stability and economic growth.In the Caribbean and Latin America, Xi will show a world vision which prefers common prosperity instead of old-fashioned alliance.China's relations with Latin America have already entered a fast-growing track with a 100-fold increase in bilateral trade since 1990, as China has already become the region's second-largest trade partner.In China's global economic map, the region is gaining prominence as it emerged as a major destination for China's growing overseas investment.Scheduled next week in California, the Xi-Obama meeting will be innovative in several ways. It is rare in history that a Chinese president holds talks with his U.S. counterpart less than three months after assuming office.

The timing and the form of the summit will also be unprecedented throughout the records of China-U.S. ties.

Such special arrangements display the growing maturity of the ties between the world's largest developing nation and largest

developed nation.

Of course, the two leaders will discuss urgent issues such as recent challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, but they are also expected to take time to talk about laying the groundwork fo

forging a new type of inter-power relations.

From the Chinese perspective, a new type of relationship between the two nations calls for a new strategic concept for them to see each other as opportunitiesrather than threats, and materialize the opportunities via further cooperation.

As the world's top two economies, China and the United States are the two crucial variables in a fast-changing global landscape, both having huge

responsibilities to the peace and prosperity of the human race. The two sides need to take a long-term and full-range view of their

relationship and its possible impact.

It cannot be denied that the two countries have certain doubts over each other's strategic intentions, with Washington fearing its global status

overtaken while Beijing always wondering about the true purpose of Obama's so-called "Asia Pivot" and "rebalancing ."

To reduce suspicion and build trust, it is vital to keep the channels of communication always open , especially at the top level. The informal meeting between

and Obama will provide a golden chance for t hem to know each other better in person and help dispel misunderstanding between the two sides.

Cooperation is key---plan makes power competition in Latin America inevitable---collapses US-China

relations

Honbgo 13 Sun Hungbo is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Latin American Studies @ Chinese Academy of SocialSciences, ―Latin America arena for global powers,‖ 6-3-13, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/786399.shtml#.Ua6h6UCTiSo, AccessedDate: 6-4-13, y2k

New Chinese President Xi Jinping chose Latin America as part of the destinations for his second state visit, a sign that the new leadership will

concentrate more on Latin America 's role and influence in the transforming global pattern. There are likely to be more major steps forward to tune up Sino-

Latin American cooperation . China's investment in Latin America will be enlarged dramatically , along with a more specific and practical po licy aiming to

actively balance the different expectations of the interests of both sides. Obviously, China has become an important strategic partner with Latin America in terms

of economic exchanges and foreign affairs . Compared with other regions such as the Asia-Pacific a nd the Middle East, Latin America is not pivotal in the change of the international pattern.

Nevertheless, Latin America is becoming more fully engaged with international affairs. More importantly, Latin America is no longer constrainedto a US-dominated Western hemisphere, but is developing relationships with emerging economies from the rest of the world. However,

challenges still remain in those countries' China policies in terms of policy coordination and implementation. It requires bo th China and Latin America to make efforts to guide and design the d irection of the bilateral

relationship. It is also unavoidable that Latin America has become an arena for another round of power struggles . The US is trying to regain its influence in LatinAmerica, while Russia, India and Japan, no matter whether out of consideration of Latin America's resources and market or the need to readjust their foreign po licy, are also looking to t ake a share. Both traditional powers and

emerging economies are looking for leverage in the region. Every major power is speculating on the changes inside Latin America. The dominant US

position in this region has started to decline. Brazil is a rising power, but it is uncertain whether it can establish leadership in this region. Meanwhile, left-wing governments in Latin America are being

challenged over the sustainability of t heir policies. And most Latin American countries are readjusting their foreign policies for a diverse system of foreign relations. Major powers are reevaluating their

interests and readjusting their policies in this region to compete for influence. But whether they can live up to their own expectations depends on their national strength and future growth,

and more importantly, whether they can balance their interests with Latin America's. Both China and the US have denied any intention of rivalry in Latin America, but the thriving relationship

between China and Latin America has already impacted the traditional US influence over this region. Latin America has

become an unavoidable topic if China and the US want to establish a new pattern of relationship. Setting up mechanisms to

enhance communication, negotiation and mutual trust between both countries over this region should be a top priority . More challenges than opportunities will prevail

in the future relationship between the US and Latin America. The challenges are mostly left over by history, such as immigrat ion, drug dealing and US policies t oward Cuba and Venezuela. Besides, its domestic policy has blocked the development of its Latin America policy. There might be a strong resistance if the US wants to improve its relationship with Latin America. For China, it will embrace more opportunities than challenges in this

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/786399.shtml#.Ua6h6UCTiSo

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/786399.shtml#.Ua6h6UCTiSo




2013 China DA area. Although frictions have taken place in Sino -Latin American economic relationship, they are auspicious signals t hat the relationship between China and Lat in America is in a booming development. These problems, produced by prosperity, will also be addressed amid such development. Both China and the US are seeking ways to foster a constructive mechanism, so that trilateral cooperation among China, the US, and Latin America will

be achieved. Nonetheless, the trust deficit is the major obstruction that blocks both countries to deepen this cooperation. And China also needs to learn how to better respect Latin America's interests. More importantly, all

three parties, including China, the US and Latin America, have to find out feasible areas of cooperation.

US-China cooperation solves extinction

Garrett 10 Dr. Banning Garrett is the Director of the Asia Program at the Atlantic Council. This essay was previously published at Th

Globalist, ―U.S.-China Relations: Gone Fishin‘‖ December 02, 2010, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/us-china-relations-gone-fishin%E2%80%99, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2k

Voicing our concerns about our policy differences is essential as we continue to struggle with China on a wide range of bilateral and international issues. But we also must try to keep the larger strateg

picture in the forefront and try to land the elusive ―big one‖ — a more cooperative U.S.-China relationship to deal with the great strategic

challenges of the 21st century.

While China and the United States will always be reluctant partners at best, leaders of both countries have acknowledged that we are in the same boat when it comes to critica

21st century challenges.

We are compelled to pull together to maintain a growing and stable global economy , mitigate climate change and adapt to its effects, ensure energy

security and transition to a global, low-carbon economy, move to more sustainable economic models as resource scarcities loom as

billions of people seek to join the global middle class — and combat terrorism , proliferation , piracy , international crime , pandemics , failing states and a

host of other non-traditional threats.

This summer's unprecedented heat and forest fires in Russia and the massive , destructive floods in Pakistan may be the most recent warning signs that global warmin

is already altering our planet‘s climate, causing extreme weather and other first-order effects that will have cascading impacts on virtually all countries.

The implications for the global economy, societies and governments and the security of nations and peoples are potentially destabilizing and even catastrophic.The United States and China — the two largest economic powers — will not be immune from the impact of climat e change. Nor, as the biggest energy consumers and producers of greenhouse gases, will they escape blame from the rest of the world if they fail t o act and tocooperate.In the United States, there is growing anxiety about the pace of shifting power and a r ange of Chinese behaviors that are perceived as Beijing seeking to challenge a wide range of U.S. interests.The Chinese leadership, for its part, and especially elements of the People‘s Liberation Army, is flush with a sense of their country‘s rapidly rising power, which has been turbo-boosted in the last two years by its superior performance in the global financial crisis.Beijing seems to be emphasizing narrow national interests and making a new push to gain r ecognition for an expanding list of ―core interests‖ which now apparently includes China‘s territorial claims in the South China Sea. The Chinese seem reluctant to place a priority ontheir ―core interests‖ in ensuring their prosperity and security by cooperating with other nations, especially the United States, on long-term global challenges and threats.

We should ask what the prospects are for human civilization in this century as wel l as for American and Chinese interests if the United States and China do not

cooperate on global challenges — and even more ominously, if they have a highly competitive and antagonistic relationship, much less engage in

actual military conflict.

We may not have much time to fish in the depleting stream of potential cooperation. The United States and China need to change course

soon. The two giants now seem caught in an eddy of deepening suspicion of each other‘s intentions — despite the stated conviction of the leaders of both countries that they need to work

together .

http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/us-china-relations-gone-fishin%E2%80%99







2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – 2NC/1NR OverviewThe framework for US-China cooperation on Latin America is coming, but expanding unilateral US

economic engagement triggers great-power competition that destroys US-China strategic partnership.

DA outweighs the case:

A. Try-or-die---extinction is inevitable — economic downturn, climate change, resource conflicts, terrorism,proliferation, piracy, pandemics, and failed states will destroy civilization---ONLY sustained US-China

partnerships mitigates these existential challenges. That‘s Garrett.

AND- Declining relations triggers US-China war---that escalates to nuclear war

Kulacki 12 Gregory Kulacki is Senior Analyst & China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of ConcernedScientists, ―The Risk of Nuclear War with China,‖ 09/21/12, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gregory-kulacki/the-risk-of-nuclear-war-w_b_1903336.html, Accessed Date: 6-13-13 y2k

Although the United States is unwilling to make a similar commitment, U.S. superiority in conventional weapons and overall military capabilities makes it unlikely the

United States would consider using nuclear weapons for any purpose other t han preventing a Chinese nuclear attack on the United St ates. The most recent U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, in an effort to

deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy, declared that the "fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons...is to deter a nuclear attack on t he United States, our allies and partners."

The risk of a nuclear war

with China

lies in the potential for misunderstanding or miscommunication

during a conventional conflict.

China'scurrent strategy for employing its conventional and nuclear missile forces during a future conflict with the United States is self-consciously designed to create uncertainty,

with the expectation that uncertainty will restrain U.S. military action. Unfortunately, China's strategy could also precipitate a large-scale U.S. attack oChina's missile forces.

There are several Chinese military policies that might confuse U.S. decision-makers in a time of war. Some Chinese conventional missiles are located on the same missile bases asChinese nuclear missiles. Some Chinese missiles, particularly the DF-21, can be armed with either a conventional or a nuclear warhead. Chinese conventional war plans call for long -range "strategic" convention

missile strikes at key enemy targets, including U.S. military bases on allied soil and the continental United States.

If this were not confusing enough already, The Science of Second Artillery Operations contains a section on "lowering the nuclear

threshold" that details procedures for alerting China's nuclear forces in a crisis for the express purpose of forcing a halt to an enemy's

conventional attacks on a select group o f targets, such as Chinese nuclear power plants, large dams and civilian population centers. Although the Science of Second Artillery Operations unambiguously states that if

alerting China's nuclear missile forces fails to halt conventional enemy attacks China will ho ld firm to its "no first use" commitment, U.S. decision-makers might not believe it. Indeed, U.S. interlocutors have repeatedly to ld theiChinese counterparts that they do not find China's "no first use" pledge credible.

The combination of these factors makes a nuclear exchange between the United St ates and China not only plausible, but also probable if the two countries

were to become embroiled in a military conflict. As Lewis and Xue explain,

"If, in a time of high tension, the Chinese command authorized a conventional missile attack as an act of preemptive self-defense, t he enemy and its allies could not know if t

incoming missiles were conventional or nuclear. In a worst-case scenario, a Chinese first-strike conventional attack could spark retaliation that destroys Chinese nuclearassets , creating a situation in which escalation to full-scale nuclear war would not just be possible, but even likely."

AND-it outweighs on probability

Miller 11 Paul Miller is assistant professor of international security studies – National Defense University, 12-16-11,http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/16/how_dangerous_is_the_world_part_ii, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2k

China in 2011 is even more clearly a danger equal to or greater than the danger it posed during the Cold War. We went through two phases with China: from 1950 to 1972

United States and China were declared enemies and fought to a very bloody stalemate in the Sino -America battles of the Korean War, but the overt hostility was less dangerous because of China's crippling economic weakness.From 1972 to 1989, the U.S. and China lessened their hostility considerably, but China's power also began to grow quickly as it liberalized its economy and modernized its armed forces. In other words, in phase one, China was

hostile but weak; in phase two, more friendly but also more powerful. We have never faced a China that was both powerful and hostile.

That is exactly the scenario that may be shaping up. China's economic and military modernization has clearly made it one of the

great powers of the world today, including nuclear weapons , a ballistic-missile capability, and aspirations for a blue-water navy. At the same time, Chinese policymakers, l

their Russian counterparts, continue to talk openly about their intent to oppose American unipolarity, revise the global order, and command a greater shareof global prestige and influence. There are several flashpoints where their revisionist aims might lead to conflict: Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea, etc. And U.S.

relations with China are prone to regular downward spikes (as during the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, the 1996 cross-straits crisis, the accidental embassy bombing in 1999, t he EP3 incident in 2001, the ant i-satellite

missile test in 2007, and the current trade and currency dispute, to say nothing of our annual weapons sales to Taiwan). A militarized conflict with China is more likely today, with

greater consequences, than at almost any point since the Korean War.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gregory-kulacki/the-risk-of-nuclear-war-w_b_1903336.html



http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/16/how_dangerous_is_the_world_part_ii

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/16/how_dangerous_is_the_world_part_ii






2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Uniqueness – Relations High

Summit laid the foundation for future cooperation

Ng 6-7 Teddy Ng is South China Morning Post Staff, ―Low-key Xi-Obama meeting masks significance of talks,‖ L/N, Accessed Date:6-13-13 y2k

When President Xi Jinping lands in the United States today, there will be no 21-gun salute or White House welcoming ceremony waiting for him.Instead, he will spend two days in in formal gatherings with US counterpart Barack Obama at Sunnylands in Rancho Mirage, California, previously visited by past US presidents and other powerful figures.

Major outcomes, or concessions from either side, are not expected, but the trip is still significant because the two leaders will share close momen

together, setting the tone for the Sino-US relationship in the remaining decade of Xi's reign.In addition to serious talks on various issues, the two presidents will reportedly eat breakfast together and stroll around the retreat, taking in its sweeping mountain views and lush golf course. Xi's wife, Peng Liyuan , will accompany him, but her US counterpart, MichelleObama, will be absent.

Observers said the talks, after a tour by Xi t o "America's backyard" that included visits t o three Latin American and Caribbean nations, would be crucial for crisis management because o

rising frictions between the two great powers given America's declared "pivot to Asia".The first meeting between the two presidents since Xi succeeded Hu Jintao in March were originally scheduled for September, on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Russia, but both sides believed they should reach out to each other earlier.

"There is some sense of urgency to prevent any further deterioration in US-China relations," said Professor Susan Shirk , chairwoman of the 21st Century Chin

Programme at the University of California, San Diego. "The two leaders don't want another cold war."Professor Jia Qingguo , an international relations specialist at Peking University, said there was a consensus in both nations that a meeting in September would be "too l ate".

"This is the right time for the two nations to see how they should proceed for smooth relations," he said.The trip is also designed for both leaders to address their domestic audiences, showing they pay high regard t o bilateral ties but will not bow to pr essure from the other side.

"For Obama, this is to communicate to Americans that his administration is paying attention and takes the issues seriously and is takingthem to the highest level," said Clayton Dube, executive director of t he University of Southern California's US-China I nstitute.A series of thorny issues will be discussed by the two leaders, with any major agreements unlikely. For the US, the most pressing issue will be cybersecurity, following allegations that Chinese institutions have engaged in systematic hacking of the US.

Three US lawmakers plan to propose a new law that would freeze the US assets of foreign hackers and revoke their visas. Beijing has denied the allegations and Xi is expected to hit back.

"Getting China to recognise how serious the issue has become to the US will be a step forward," said Patrick Chovanec, a former political aide to senior

Republican Party leaders.For China, America's strengthening ties with countries in the Asia-Pacific region are a serious security concern, with Beijing believing the US is the only power capable of creating a negative external environment for China.Yue Gang , a retir ed colonel and military commentator, said Washington's rebalancing in Asia had had a retrograde effect on Sino-US ties that could not be compensated for by boosting their economic relationship."The two sides need to figure out h ow to prevent their ties from being affected by any other third country in the region," he said. "High-level talks can stop the deterioration in the relationship from worsening."Denny Roy, a senior fellow at the East-West Centre in Hawaii, said Beijing was on the alert as the US sought to gain the trust of its neighbours. "In this sense, China needs to improve the strategic atmosphere more urgently than the US does," he said.Other issues to be raised include North Korea's nuclear programme, which saw the two nations endorse a United Nations resolution against Pyongyang, and economic and trade frictions.In a sign that shows both nations are well aware that the talks will not lead to major achievements, the two leaders decided not to meet in Washington. "Neither leader wants the pressure of having to announce a breakthrough afterwards, which pressure would be greater if tmeeting was in Washington," Roy said.Dube said the talks at Sunnylands, where former US president Richard Nixon wrote his 1974 state-of-the-union speech, would be reminiscent of the way Chinese leaders came to important decisions by meeting at the Beidaihe r esort in Hebei. The talks would be unscriptedallowing Xi and Obama to "speak completely frankly and at length", he said.

"Through an extended meeting, you become more comfortable with each other, and you have the ability to actually interact in a way thatyields progress on an issue," Dube said.Jia Xiudong, a senior research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies, said informal talks showed the maturity of the bilateral relationship, and Xi's confidence.

"They can engage in long and serious talks without going through formalities, and they are more focused on pragmatic things

rather than protocol," he said.

Relations high---economic cooperation nowZhang & Shi 13 Yuhan Zhang is an energy professional in a multinational energy company based in the United States and a former

researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace — AND — Lin Shi is an energy professional in a multinational energycompany based in the United States and a former consultant at the World Bank. ―Conflict between China and the US is not inevitable,‖ April 13th, 2013, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/04/13/conflict-between-china-and-the-us-is-not-inevitable/, Accessed Date: 6-12-1y2k

President Xi Jinping‘s official visit to the United States in February 2012 — as China‘s then vice president — suggests that conflict between the two states is not inevitableThis goes against the ideas o f American offensive realists, who have publicly argued that conflict is an unavoidable conseque nce of the will to survive, which requires large states to maximise power and pu rsue hegemony in the

own regions. But Xi‘s visit saw China and the United States reach consensus on a number of important issues. They agreed to prioritiseshared interests and mutual respect as a means of ushering in an era of win – win cooperation between China and the United States.Xi‘s visit had three main goals: first, to strengthen trust between the two powers through an official visit; second, to familiarise American leaders with the basic political, economic, ideolog ical and

diplomatic style of China‘s next leader ; and, third, to consolidate Sino – US trade relations.The timing of Xi‘s visit coincided with the 40th anniversary of President Nixon‘s visit to China and the publication of the S ino – US joint communiqués, which played a critical ro le in normalising relations between the two states

Upon his arrival, Xi met with a number of former secretaries, including former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and Madeleine Albr ight and former secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson. X i also met with many policy makfrom the current administration, including President Barack Obama.

His visit laid a good foundation for the positive development of China-US political and economic relations for at least the next

decade. There are two key reasons for this. The first is that the visit successfully delivered the message that China is willing to engage in political communication

and economic cooperation with the United St ates. During meetings with current and former politicians, bus iness people and the media, Xi repeatedly st ressed the importance of cooperation and friendship

between China and the United States.

This message is necessary to reduce the possibility of future strategic misunderstandings , especially because the United States, as a representative Western capital

power, has been seen as ideologically prejudiced against China since the Cold War.

Recent Summit proves---it ensures long-term cooperation between US and China

Madhani 6-10 Aamer Madhani is USA Today Staff, ―What's next step in U.S.-China relations: Summit rosy, but issues remain,‖

June 10, 2013, L/N, Accessed Date: 6-13-13 y2k

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/04/13/conflict-between-china-and-the-us-is-not-inevitable/

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/04/13/conflict-between-china-and-the-us-is-not-inevitable/




2013 China DA

After President Obama's and Xi Jinping's weekend in t he California desert, senior aides to both leaders were quick to declare the shirt-sleeves summit a success that was marked

by the two leaders building rapport and speaking candidly on a series of sensitive issues.

Aides said the leaders agreed that North Korea must give up its nuclear weapons program, and announced a joint agreement on combating "supgreenhouse gases."

Obama made clear to the Chinese president that he was determined to establish a substantive relationship with him, while delivering a c lear warning that cyberattacks

emanating from China threaten to divide the nations. And Xi was able to show a Chinese audience that he was making progress in finding "a new path"

with their global rival. What remains to be seen is i f both leaders can make their lofty aspirations of reinvigorating U.S.-China relations a reality."This relationship is too complicated to come away with the feeling that all problems have been solved or on track t o be resolved," said Matthew Goodman, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former Asia adviser on th e National SecurityCouncil during Obama's first term.

For all the relationship building, in the end it's domestic pressures on Xi that could have the greatest impact on the Chinese taking action on the most maddening is

to the United States, from currency manipulation that led to a record $315 billion trade imbalance last year to insidious cybertheft and industrial espionage originating from China.

Xi faces falling GDP growth and a Chinese public that is impatient with stifling pollution in the cities, skyrocketing property prices anddiminishing job prospects for new college graduates of which an estimated 30% are unemployed."The leadership, as I understand it, looks now for a period of stability," former secretary of State Henry Kissinger told CNN on SundayThe two sides tightening on the North Korea issue has been a work in progress. In recent months, China has grown frustrated with North Korea's belligerent rhetoric over itsnuclear tests and missile launches.Officials from North Korea and South Korea sat down for the first intergovernmental talks in two years on Sunday ahead of higher-leveltalks later this week.

Consensus for cooperation nowXinhua News Agency 6-9 ―Chinese president optimistic for closer ties with US,‖ L/N, Accessed Date: 6-13-13 y2k

Palm Springs, United States, June 8 (Xinhua) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping said here Saturday [8 June] that he is fully confident that there is a broad prospect for cooperation between

China and the United States.

Xi made the remarks when meeting with Californian Governor Edmund Brown shortly before wrapping up a two-day meetings with his US counterpart Barack Obama.The two presidents met twice and took a walk together over the weekend at Sunnylands, a 200-acre picturesque estate in the Californian city of Rancho Mirage.Xi thanked Brown and other state officials for their hospitality and arrangements in hosting the face-to-face meeting between him and Obama, the first since the two countries completed their latest leadership transitions.

Xi told Brown that he and Obama had in-depth, sincere and candid discussions on bilateral relations as well as international and regional issues of

common concern, and reached important consensus.

Both sides agreed to build a new type of major country relationship based on mutual respect, mutual benefits with win-win results andlaid out a comprehensive blueprint for the future development of bilateral ties, Xi said.

Speaking positively of the achievements and efforts made by Californian state government in promoting coope ration and exchanges with China, Xi said local- level cooperation can consolidate

societal basis for China-US relations.

Both China and the United States have been making structural adjustments, maintaining economic growth and increasing employment, which provide numerous opportunities for cooperation, Xi said.

China is willing to expand economic cooperation and two-way investment with California and strengthen cooperation with the state in such fields as clean energy, information technologies,

infrastructure construction and culture industries.Brown said it is an honour of California to host the m eetings between the Chinese and US presidents.

He said the world needs China and the United States to build a new type of major country relationship, which is in the fundamentalinterests of the two countries and their people.California wants to strengthen cooperation and exchanges with China to make greater contribution to the development of US-China relations, the governor said.Xi arrived here Thursday after wrapping up a three-nation Latin American tour, which had taken him to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico.

Symbolic gestures are important---summit restored the framework for US-China relations

Rucker 6-9 Phillip Rucker is Washington Post Staff, ―Obama warns Xi on continued cybertheft,‖ L/N, Accessed Date: 6-13-13 y2k

The United States and China are economic competitors that face "a whole range of challenges on which we have to cooperate," President Oba

said late Friday as he welcomed his Chinese counterpart to a two-day summit in t his California desert town."The United States welcomes the continuing peaceful rise of China as a world power," Obama said in his opening statement, with President Xi Jinping sitting across the table from him. "We believe that a peaceful and stable and prosperous China is not only good for Chine

but also good for the world and for the United States."Obama also alluded to an issue aides said would be high on the agenda of his meetings with Xi: alleged cyber spying by China on U.S. companies and government entities.The United States seeks an international economy "where nations are playing by the same rules, where trade is free and fair, and where the United States and China work together to address issues like cyber security and the protection of intellectual property," he said.

Obama said he wanted to talk about all the hot-button issues between the two nations. Though he raised several explicitly in front of Xi,he framed them delicately as concerns the two countries could "work together to address." He said he wanted to talk about human rights with a nod toward Xi's

willingness to address the subject. He did not mention the territorial conflicts in the East China and South China seas between Beijing and Asian neighbors who are U.S. allies.Xi, who became president in March, noted that the two leaders "are meeting each other earlier than people might have expected" to chart the future of U.S.-Chinese relations."Our two countries have a vast convergence of shared interests, from promoting economic growth at home to ensuring the stability of the global economy, from addressing international and regional hot spot i ssues to dealing with all kinds of global challenges. On all theseissues our two countries need to increase exchanges and cooperation."Obama has decided that cyber security ranks along with economic and defense issues as a "constant focus" in relations with China, a White House official said recently, adding that a wave of digital break-ins "threatens to damage U.S.-China relations, as well as potentiallydamage the international economy and China's reputation."The U.S. and China agreed in April to hold high-level talks to tr y to set rules for cyber security.

U.S. officials have made no secret of their anger in the face of a barrage of hacking, including the efforts of a secretive military unit inShanghai that purportedly has stolen data from scores of U.S. companies.China has largely denied responsibility, countering that it is a victim of cyber attacks. No one has provided "hard evidence" of Chineseinvolvement in such intrusions, said Cui Tiankai, Beijing's new ambassador in Washington.




2013 China DA China experts said that Obama and Xi aren't aiming for particular agreements when they emerge from this weekend's meetings, but something less tangible.

"It's helpful if both teams can come away from the meeting saying, 'I can understand where this person is coming from,' " said Christopher Johnson, a former China specialist for t he CIA and now a senior advisor at the Center fo

Strategic and International Studies. " That's very important in an era and an environment of this increased mutual strategic distrust that has be

the theme for the last 18 months ."

The two leaders planned an evening and morning of cloistered meetings, to be interspersed with meals and maybe a short walk in the shaded gardens of the sprawling Sunnylands estate.

No one expects their long-term effort to work together will be an easy stroll. But after preliminary meetings involving top-level

emissaries, the Obama administration believes it may be able to pave the way for slightly more cooperative relations .

The White House was skipping some usual practices of high-level summits in an effort to keep this one more low-key and relaxed.

The two leaders each made statements to t he news media, but the broadcasts were delayed too late to get much of a viewership. Instead of big delegation filling a large room, only eight people came to the table for each side. The men wore jackets without ties.




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Uniqueness – LA Uniqueness

China‘s seeking cooperation in Latin America

Bridges 9 Tyler Bridges is McClatchy Newspaper Staff, ―China makes its move as U.S. falls back in Latin America,‖ 7-8-09http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/07/08/71510/china-makes-its-move-as-us-falls.html#storylink=cpy, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2k

RIO DE JANEIRO, Brazil — All but invisible in Latin America a decade ago, China now is building cars in Uruguay, donating a soccer stadium to Costa Rica and lending $10 billion to Brazil's biggest oil company.

It's supplanted the United States to become the biggest trading partner with Brazil, South America's biggest economy.

China has moved aggressively to fill a vacuum left by the United States in recent years, as the U.S. focused on wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and t he global economic crisis

sapped its economy.

"China is rising while the U.S. is declining in Latin America," Riordan Roett, a professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins

University, said by telephone while visiting Sao Paulo. " China is all over this region . They are following a state-driven policy to expand their peaceful

presence ."

China is beefing up its embassies throughout Latin America, opening Confucian centers to expand Chinese culture, sending high-level trade delegations throughout th

region and opening the door for ordinary Chinese to visit Machu Picchu, Rio and other tourism hot spots.Aiping Yuan came to Rio de Janeiro from Beijing in 1997 on a lark, fell in love with the city and decided to stay. She studied Portuguese, and when Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva made his first visit to China in 2004, she opened a small school in Rio to teachMandarin.She began with six students and today has 300, including senior executives at Petrobras, the country's biggest oil company, and Vale do Rio Doce, the biggest mineral producer. Both have growing business with China."Chinese is the language of the future for Brazil," Yuan said with a big smile.

China has forged a strategic alliance with Brazil that's allowed the two countries to partner with India and Russia in the so-called BRIC grouping,

which is demanding a greater voice in global political and economic affairs. Indeed, China is making inroads with developing countries worldwide.Beijing's main interest in Latin America has been guaranteeing access to the region's raw materials — principally oil, iron ore, soybeans and copper — to fuel its continued rapid growth. For many countries, there's a downside in the China tr ade, through which cheap impor

have displaced local textiles.

China's growing role has alarmed policymakers in Washington. However, China has been careful not to establish a military presence in the reg ion, since doing so would antagonize

Washington. The U.S. has considered Latin America to be in its sphere of influence since t he Monroe Doctrine of 1823.

China is willing to cooperate in Latin America

Ellis 12 Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric

Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America‘s relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. His worin this area includes the 2009 book, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores, and over 20 articles in English and Spanish published over the past 6 years in magazines and journals ranging from Joint Forces Quarterly to Air and Space Power Journal en Espanto the Revista de Dinámica de Sistemas. Dr. Ellis has presented his work in a broad range of business and government forums inArgentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Jamaica, Mexico, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. He is a frequent guest lecturer at thU.S. Air Force Special Operations School. Dr. Ellis holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics. ―The

United States, Latin America and China: A ―Triangular Relationship‖?‖ MAY 2012http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2k

Despite references to a China-US-Latin America triangle in press accounts and academic literature, the term is not a well analyzed academic construct, making it more of a label whose use is associat

with a certain level of ―intuitive validity.‖ At a superficial level, the logic of the term proceeds from the close historical linkage of the United States and Latin America, both

a positive and a negative sense. It is difficult to talk about the PRC‘s significant expansion in the region without reflexively thinking of the reaction of US

policymakers or the possible impacts on US corporations and interests. Ironically, China‘s own political traditions and strategic interests also lead it to pay particularattention to the United States as it engages with Latin America . Despite emphasis on a ―south-south‖ approach to its interaction with developing coun

such as those of Latin America,5 the PRC has proceeded very cautiously when forming relations. This can be seen, to some degree, as implicit recognition othe region as a US ―sphere of influence‖ and mirrors the PRC‘s likely desire to see the United States treat Asia as a ―Chinese sphere of

influence.‖ Although the PRC has publicly rejected the concept of ―G-2‖ diplomacy,6 coordinating with the United St ates to ―administer‖ the current global order, its strategic dialogue with the

United States over Latin America gave the appearance that it was willing to conduct precisely such ―coordination.‖7

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/07/08/71510/china-makes-its-move-as-us-falls.html#storylink=cpy

http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf

http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/07/08/71510/china-makes-its-move-as-us-falls.html#storylink=cpy




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Uniqueness – US Influence Declining

US influence is terminally declining in Latin America---only a risk that plan sparks regional power

competition

Ellis 11 Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric

Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America‘s relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. His wor

in this area includes the 2009 book, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores, and over 20 articles in English and Spanish published over the past 6 years in magazines and journals ranging from Joint Forces Quarterly to Air and Space Power Journal en Espanto the Revista de Dinámica de Sistemas. Dr. Ellis has presented his work in a broad range of business and government forums inArgentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Jamaica, Mexico, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. He is a frequent guest lecturer at thU.S. Air Force Special Operations School. Dr. Ellis holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics.―Emerging Multi-Power Competitions in Latin America,‖ 2011, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2011/2011-1/2011_1_03_ellis_eng_s.pdf, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2k

The competition between external actors in Latin America is a concept relatively removed from the traditional US way of looking at the region,and at geopolitics in general. While the primarily economic nature of that conflict may appear reassuring, the erosion of the US commercial presence in Latin America will also

undermine its ability to shape political and economic developments in the region. Although the US will remain equally tied to Latin Americ

in geographic and human terms, its ability to shape outcomes unilaterally continues to decline, implying that the US must increasingly learn to work with

partners, both within the region, and external to it. In this brave new world, Latin America will continue to develop a less US-centric image of the world , whilethe US will learn to develop new ways of being a partner, helping Latin America to make the most of what its other global relationshipshave to offer.

LA is now China‘s zone of influence

The Nation 9 ―The dragon and anaconda: China, Brazil and power balance in Americas,‖ September 16, 2009, L/N, Accessed Date: 12-13 y2k

The effects of the growing Sino-Brazilian partnership are being felt well beyond Latin America. For instance, in the o il-rich former Portuguese territory of Angola,

Brazilian and Chinese companies have been cooperating in oil and mining ventures . This year Angola became Africa's largest oil p roducer. Since 2007 Angolan oil accoun

for nearly 15 per cent of China's oil imports, making Angola China's number one oil supplier. China is already Angola's largest trading partner in the continent, with trade between the two nations reaching $49 billion in 2008.Brazil is Angola's fourth largest trading partner. Therefore the ever-growing partnership between the two giants can also have significant consequences for the balance of power in Africa.

China's presence in South America has been on a rapid rise since the beginning of the decade. China is now the second largest trading partner for

Cuba and Uruguay, and third for Costa Rica, just to mention a few countries. Overall China is now South America's second largest trading partner after the United St ates.In less than a decade of active Sino-Brazilian t ies, and after more than 80 years, Brazil's largest trading partner, the US, has seen its position being overtaken by China. A sign ofChina's growing influence in the region was the announcement early this year that the central banks of Brazil and Argentina - the two largest countries in the region - were negotiations with the Chinese government to replace the US dollar as the mode of transaction in their growing trade relations . They will instead

their respective currencies.

The expanding Sino-Brazilian strategic partnership reflects a clear change in the balance of power in the Americas. It demonstrates that

alliances between developing nations can now have a far greater impact on world affairs than t he Atlantic alliances of the past. While the US remains the dominant power in the Americas, the

continent is no longer its exclusive sphere of influence.

Their evidence is all rhetoric

Padgett 13 Tim Padgett is WLRN Staff, ―Why China Is Behind Fresh U.S. Moves In Latin America,‖ 5-27-13,

http://wlrn.org/post/why-china-behind-fresh-us-moves-latin-america, Accessed Date: 6-17-13 y2k

There are of course skeptics. I asked Robert Pastor , a former White House national security advisor for Latin America and now an international relations professor at

American University in Washington, D.C., if he thinks the U.S. is doing enough to keep itself relevant in the Americas.

―No it‘s not,‖ he says. ―President Obama‘s trip (to Mexico and Central America) is a good first step , but he needs to do a lot more to open up and show

America‘s interest in re-engaging with the rest of South America.‖

Pastor has a point: for decades, Latin America has heard a lot of rhetoric from the U.S. about engagement -- the kind Biden o ffered the Council of the Americas in Washington

recently, when he declared that the hemisphere ―matters more (to the U.S.) today because it has more potential than any t ime in American history.‖

http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2011/2011-1/2011_1_03_ellis_eng_s.pdf


http://wlrn.org/post/why-china-behind-fresh-us-moves-latin-america

http://wlrn.org/post/why-china-behind-fresh-us-moves-latin-america






2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Uniqueness – A2: Alt Cause – Asia

China changed its priorities---Latin America trumps Taiwan and SCS issues

Arnson & Davidow 11 Cynthia J. arnson is director of the Latin American Program at theWoodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars — AND — Jeffrey Davidow is the president of the Institute of the Americas, ―China,Latin America, and the United States: The New Triangle,‖ January, 2011,

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_120810_Triangle_rpt.pdf, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2k

The rise of China as a dominant economic power in the last decade represents one of the most significant changes in the international system sin

the end of the Cold War and one of the most rapid transformations the world has experienced� Changes in the Chinese economy, the growth of its manufacturing sector, and the

country‘s need for raw materials, energy, and food, have sparked an unprecedented expansion of China‘s commercial and political relations with

countries of the developing world, including but not limited to Latin America� While the political issue of Taiwan remains an important consideration for Chinese foreign

policy toward the region, politics no longer appear to be the dominant driver of the relationship with the Western hemisphere� Nor, despite

occasional sabre-rattling and appeals to China‘s historical territorial claims in Asia, China‘s global ambitions do not yet appear to be

principally influenced by traditional, nationalistic military intentions� Rather, the leading edge of China‘s interest in Latin Americ

and vice versa, is economic — and on a massive scale�

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_120810_Triangle_rpt.pdf

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_120810_Triangle_rpt.pdf




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Uniqueness – A2: Uniqueness Overwhelms

Cooperation isn‘t resilient---major misunderstanding is still possible

Mahbubani 13 Kishore Mahbubani is dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore anthe author most recently of The Great Convergence, from which this excerpt was adapted by Foreign Policy magazine. ―The TensionsBeneath,‖ June 10, 2013, L/N, Accessed Date: 6-13-13 y2k

Much depends on how the United States and China handle their superpower relationship.Since the dawn of geopolitics, there has always been tension between the world's greatest power and the world's greatest emerging power. No great power likes to cede its No. 1 spot. One of the few times the top power ceded its position to the No. 2 power peacefully was wGreat Britain allowed the United States to surge ahead in the late 19th century. Many books have been written on why this transition happened peacefully. But the basic reason seems cultural: one Anglo-Saxon power was giving way to another.

Today, the situation is different. The No. 1 power is the US, the standard-bearer of the West. The No. 2 power rapidly catching up is China, an Asian power. If China passes America in the next decade or two, it will be t he first time in two centuries t hat a non-Western power has emerged as No. 1. (According to economic historian Angus Maddison's calculations, China w

the world's No. 1 economy until 1890).

The logic of history tells us that such power transitions do not happen peacefully. Indeed, we should expect to see a rising level of tension as America worries more and mor

about losing its primacy. Yet it has done little to act on these fears thus far . It would have been quite natural for America to carry out

various moves to thwart China's rise.

That's what great powers have done throughout history . That's how America faced the Soviet Union. So why isn't this happening? Why are we seeing an

unnatural degree of geopolitical calm between the world's greatest power and the world's greatest emerging power?It would be virtually impossible to get Beijing and Washington to agree on the answers to these natural questions, as there ar e two distinct and sometimes competing narratives in the two capitals.

The view in Beijing is that the calm in Sino-American relations is a result of the extraordinary patience and forbearance shown by China. Chinese leaders

believe they have followed the wise advice of Deng Xiaoping, the late reformist leader, and decided not to challenge American leadership in any way or in any area. And when China has felt that it was directly provoked, it has afollowed Deng's advice and swallowed its humiliation. Few Americans remember any such instances of provocation. Chinese leaders remember many.In May 1999, during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, a US plane bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. America apologised, but n o Chinese leader believed it was a mistake. Similarly, a Chinese fighter jet was downed when it crashed into a US spy plane near HainIsland, China, in April 2001. Here, too, China felt humiliated. Few Americans will r ecall the humiliation Premier Zhu Rongji suffered in April 1999 when he went to Washington to negotiate China's entry into the World Trade Organisation; Chinese elites haven't forgottentheir minds, China has been responsible for the low levels of tension in US-China relations because China has swallowed such bitter pills time and again.

The view in Washington is almost exactly the opposite. Few Americans believe t hat China has been able to rise peacefully because of China's geopolitical acumen or America's geopolitical mistakes. Instead, the prevailing view

that America has been remarkably generous to China and allowed it to emerge peacefully because the US is inherently virtuous andgenerous.There can be no denying that the US has been generous to China in many ways: allowing China's accession to the WTO (under stiff conditions, it must be emphasised, but stiff conditions that ir onically benefited China); allowing China to enjoy massive trade surpluses;allowing China to join multilateral bodies such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum; and perhaps most importantly of all, allowing hundreds of thousands of Chinese students to study in American universities. These are generous acts.But it is also true that the US al lowed China to rise because it was so supremely self-confident that i t would always remain on top. China's benign rise was a result of American neglect, not a result of any long-term strategy. China acted strategically; America did not. After 9/11 attacks, for instance, the US focused on the Middle East instead of the rise of China, leading Hong Kong journalist Frank Ching to write, "The fact is, it's not going too far to say that China owes a huge debt of gratitude to Osama bin Laden."America has been sensitive to criticisms about its lack of a long-term strategy. I can speak about this from personal experience.In February 2009, Hillary Clinton visited China on her first overseas visit as US secretary of state. I wrote at the time: "There's little evidence Clinton has engaged in any serious strategic thinking about US-China r elations. If she had, she would have asked some big questioTraditionally, relations between dominant powers and emerging powers have been tense. This should have been the norm with China and the US. Yet China has emerged without alarming Americans. That's close to a geopolitical miracle. Who deserves credit for it? BeijingWashington? China seems to have a clear, comprehensive strategy. The US has none."Officials in Washington reacted angrily to this column. A senior official at the National Security Council called the Singaporean embassy in Washington to complain about a Singaporean criticising US foreign policy - even though, in theory, America welcomes debate andfree marketplace of ideas.

I also tell this story to illustrate how sensitive the establishment in Washington has become to any discussion on the nature of Sino-American relations. The truth about this relationship is that, while there is a lot ofcalm on the surface, tension is brewing below. I am convinced that there is great simmering anger in Beijing about being pushed aroundcallously by Washington. The Chinese resent, for instance, allegations o f Chinese cyberspying that make no mention o f America's own activities in th is area. The Chinese do not believe th

they are the only ones playing this game.

Given the many simmering tensions, it would be unwise to assume smooth sailing ahead for the US and China. The need to co-operate i

rising each day, as is the potential for a major US-China misunderstanding.




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Links – LA Engagement

US economic engagement causes competition with China---destroys relations

Regenstreif 13 Gary Regenstreig is Reuters Staff, ―The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin America,‖http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2i

Though the U.S. and Chinese presidents heralded a ―new model‖ of cooperation at their weekend summit , a growing competition looks morelikely . The whirlwind of activit y before President Barack Obama met with President Xi Jinping in the California desert revealed that Bei jing and Washington‘s sights are set on a similar

prize — and face differing challenges to attain it. Their focus is Latin America and the prize is increased trade and investment opportunities in a region where economic reforms have pulled millions ou

of poverty and into the middle class. Latin America is rich in the commodities and energy that both China and the United States need, largely stable

politically and eager to do deals. Meanwhile, just after Biden left Trinidad, Xi arrived, part of a tour that also took him to Costa Rica and Mexico to promote trade and cooperation. Both U.S. and Chines

officials, however, are finding a more self-confident Latin America, able to leverage its new strength to forge better agreements and find multiple trading partners. That will likely force Washington t o work harder to maintain itsleading trade position against China — which has money to burn in the region. ―There is a more energetic [U.S.] tone, a more optimistic mood about economic agenda in second term than [the] first time,‖ Michael Shifter, presidof the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington policy group, told me. ―There‘s something happening in the region and the U.S. wants to be pa rt of it. Whether there‘s a well-thought-out vision or policy remains a question. But this more of an affirmation of the region and a willingness to engage.‖ The United St ates, Latin America‘s largest trading partner throughout much of its history, still retains this position. Washington has now signed free trade

agreements with more than a third of t he hemisphere‘s nations and annually exchanges more than $800 billion in goods and services with La tin America — more than three times the region‘s commerce with China. InObama‘s first term, however, the administration was widely viewed as neglecting Latin America. And China has moved in fast. China built itannual trade with the region from virtually nothing in 2000 to about $260 billion in 2012. In 2009, it overtook the United States as thelargest trading partner of Brazil, the region‘s powerhouse — largely through massive purchases of iron ore and soy. Other data is telling: In 1995, for example, the United States accounted

37 percent of Brazil‘s foreign direct investment. That dropped to 10 percent in 2011, according to the Council of the Americas, which seeks to foster hemispheric ties. Washington‘s renewed ardor is at

least partly because of the fear that China will repeat in Latin America the economic success it has built in Africa.China has been able to present itself

a benevolent partner there, which has played well against the West‘s history of meddling in domestic affairs. ― It‘s about influence and leverage ,‖ said Eric Farnsworth, vice president of t he Council of th

Americas, ―…The region matured and expects to be treated in real partnership rather than [in the] patronizing way it happened in the past.‖

China‘s influence is growing in the Latin America---greater US engagement would risk great-power

competition

Ellis 13 Dr. Evan Ellis is a professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, D.C. He has published over 50works on Latin America and its relationship with China, and has presented his work in 24 countries. ―U.S.-China Competition Heats Upas Chinese President Xi Tours Latin America,‖ 6-7-13, http://www.manzellareport.com/index.php/world/687-u-s-china-competition-heats-up-as-chinese-president-xi-tours-latin-america, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2k

The coincidence between this week‘s Latin American trips by U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping highlight the undeclared

competition between the U.S. and China in Latin America , and across the globe. The new competition is a struggle over the economic, legal, an

political norms that will prevail as the global center of gravity shifts from the Atlantic to the Pacific in the course of the twenty-first century.

The U.S.-China competition is not a resurrection of the cold war, where the U.S. and Soviet Union actively promoted their respective concepts for a global order. Rather, it is an unintentional,

yet inevitable struggle.

Consistent with China‘s millennial history, the principal goal of PRC is to advance Chinese national power, wealth and security . Although the PRC does not seek

impose a new ideology on the world, the mercantilist way that it is promoting its economic development, combined with its lack o f commitment to international norms that it ―did not

create‖ means that ―China‘s rise‖ is wreaking havoc on the international system. ―China‘s rise‖ is wreaking havoc on the international system. In Latin America, while many governments and private i nterests have benefitted fromthe PRC‘s entry into the region, t hat same engagement has indirectly undermined a ra nge of U.S. policy objectives there, including the promotion of democracy, human rights, free trade, and the respect for contracts and rule of law.Although the PRC has been careful not to associate itself with the ―anti-imperialistic‖ rhetoric of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), efforts by China Development Bank and the International Commerce Bank of China to expand lending has been complimented by the inte rest within ALBA nations to free themselves from thconstraints of borrowing from Western financial institutions. The resulting $50 billion l oaned to Ecuador and Venezuela since 2007 has proved an important source of liquidity for those regimes, that have enabled them to sustain anti-Western policies and promote groups sympathetic to their cause throughout the region.

Similarly, the willingness of Chinese companies such as CNPC, Huawei, ZTE, and others to invest in Venezuela and Ecuador has made it easierfor those regimes to nationalize industries and otherwise displace undesired ―Western‖ corporations. Indeed, so long as ALBAgovernments have not taken action against Chinese business interesPRC‘s indifference to their political systems has cleared the way for their devolution to ever less democratic practices, inclu ding the suppression of press freedoms and the prosecution of dissidents.Chinese money and markets have undercut the U.S. policy agenda in financial accountability, human rights, and corruption.

Beyond ALBA, Chinese money and markets have undercut the U.S. policy agenda across the region in areas such as financial accountability, human rights, and corruption. Argentina was able to remain financiall y solvent in the years following its 200 1 debt default, in part, because of its massive export-oriented soy industry, which sel percent of its output to the PRC.In Suriname, when China Dailan modernized the nation‘s highway infrastructure, the human rights record of its President DesiBouterse was never an issue. In Guyana, the Chinese government did not appear to be concerned that a key telecommunication contract given to Huawei appeared to be a vehicle to give a national t elecommunicmonopoly to the son of a close politi cal ally ofthe country‘s president, Bharrat Jagdeo.

China‘s presence in the region also has a strategic significance beyond economics and policy objectives . The critical posture by the U.S. Department of

Defense regarding Chinese cyberattacks is a reminder that hostilities between the U.S. and China, while highly improbable and undesirable, are not unthinkable . In su

a conflict, PRC-operated ports, airports, telecommunications infrastructure, and other parts o f the Chinese commercial presence in Latin America represent potential assets in a global asymmetric warfare campaign against the

United States.The comparison between the current trip to Latin America by Chinese president Xi, and that of U.S. Vice-president Biden highlights how much has changed in the 8 years since the April 2004 U.S. Congressional hearings on China and Latin America, when U.S. administraofficials took comfort in the degree to which the U.S. dominated China in terms of influence in the region.In Rio de Janeiro, Biden talked about a U.S. ―strategic partnership‖ with a Brazil that had already had one with the PRC since 1993, with China-Brazil trade exceeding U.S.-Brazil trade by an expanding margin. Nor could it be overlooked that Brazilian President Rousseff htraveled to China before her first visit to the U.S.

The Latin America agenda of Chinese President Xi Jinping also illustrates the confidence of China‘s new ―5th‖ generation of leadership, with the choice of three

destinations in close proximity to the United States illustrating how quickly the PRC has moved beyond the discourse of the previous administration ―respec

for the U.S. backyard.‖ The trip to Trinidad and Tobago is the first visit by a Chinese President to the Caribbean, excepting his predecessor‘s Novem ber 2008 trip to Cuba. The soft power of China in the Caribbean also was on display, as seven full heads of state from across the region made the pilgrimage to Trinidad for an audience with President Xi, as he held court in the Marriott Hotel in Port of Spain.Of Xi‘s three destinations, Mexico highlights how the Chinese and U.S. positions in the region are interdependent. For Mexican President Peña Nieto, engagement with the PRC is a way to differentiate his regime fr om the policies of his predecessor Felipe Calderon, includnot only the war against criminal organizations, but also Calderon‘s closeness to the United States. Similarly, engagement with China through the ―Pacific alliance,‖ Latin America‘s hottest new sub-regional organization, shows Mexico progressively engaging with the ―new economy of the Pacific,‖ while r e-asserting a regional leadership role for Mexico, long a cornersof his Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).

President Xi in the United States' back yard is a message.Following his stops in Latin America, President Xi will meet with President Obama in California, where the two leaders are expected to talk about a r ange of global issues of mutual concern, from North Korea to the South China Sea, t o cybersecurity, to perhaps Syria and tMiddle East. As with previous great power summits, it is likely that Latin America will scarcely be mentioned. But nor will th e trip be ignored.

http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/

http://www.manzellareport.com/index.php/world/687-u-s-china-competition-heats-up-as-chinese-president-xi-tours-latin-america




http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/




2013 China DA

The very trajectory traversed by President Xi to arrive in California, across a region once called the ―U.S. Backyard‖ is , in itself, a message, that China has taken

its seat across the table in the forum of geopolitics, and expects from the U.S. a dialogue of equals.

Washington‘s strategy guarantees all-out competition

Clark 13 Lesley Clark is McClatchy Washington Bureau Staff, ―China‘s moves in Western Hemisphere have U.S. stepping up its gam

5-30-13, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/05/30/192624/chinas-moves-in-western-hemisphere.html#.UbjYnvmTiSo#storylink=cpy, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2k

China‘s courting of Latin America and the Caribbean – signaled anew this week by a visit by its president – is prodding the United States to step up its

outreach to the rapidly emerging economies, which are showing greater global clout.

President Xi Jinping‘s weeklong trip t o Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico starting Friday comes in the wake of President Barack Obama‘s recent trip to Mexico and Costa Rica, and follows by just a day Vice PresideJoe Biden‘s three-nation tour of the region. Xi will meet with Obama at the close of his trip, June 7-8 in California.

China has eclipsed the United States as Brazil and Chile‘s largest trading partner, purchasing soybeans, iron ore and oil to fuel its rapidly

expanding economy. Latin American exports to China accounted fo r just $5 billion in 2000; by 2012, they topped $104 billion.The global giant‘s rising influence in the hemisphere hasn‘t gone unnoticed in Washington, in part prompting what Biden dubbed the ―most active stretch of high-level engagement‖ in Latin America and the Caribbean in a ―lonlong time.‖ In addition to Obama‘s and Biden‘s trips, the White House will host Peru‘s President Ollanta Humala and Chile‘s President Sebastian Pinera next month. And in October, Obama will ho ld a rare state dinner for President DilmaRousseff of Brazil.

―Nothing motivates Washington faster than competition,‖ said Eric Farnsworth, the vice president of the Council of the Americas and the Americas Society, noting t hat trade deals with

Colombia and Chile were accelerated when it became apparent that Canada and China were moving in.

―There is recognition in Washington that we need to begin to contend more actively for the Americas , that Latin America is no t a region we can take for

granted anymore – if we ever did – because the region does have options,‖ Farnsworth said. ―We are still in many ways the preferred partner but we‘re not the guaranteed partn

and we‘ve got to fight for the region in a way that maybe we haven‘t had to traditionally.‖

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/05/30/192624/chinas-moves-in-western-hemisphere.html#.UbjYnvmTiSo

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/05/30/192624/chinas-moves-in-western-hemisphere.html#.UbjYnvmTiSo




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Links – Zero-Sum

China approaches relations in zero-sum relationship---insiders flip neg

Perlez 12 Jane Perlez is NYT Staff, ―Chinese Insider Offers Rare Glimpse of U.S.-China Frictions,‖ April 2, 2012,http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/world/asia/chinese-insider-offers-rare-glimpse-of-us-china-frictions.html?_r=0, Accessed Date: 6-13-13 y2k

China views the United Stat es as a declining power, but at the same time believes that Washington is trying to fight back to undermine, and even disrupt, the economic and

military growth that point to China‘s becoming the world‘s most powerful country, according to t he analyst, Wang Jisi, the co -author of ―Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,‖ a monograph published this week by th

Brookings Institution in Washington and the Institute for International and Strategic Studies at Peking University. Mr. Wang, who has an insider‘s view of Chinese foreign policy fr

his positions on advisor y boards of the Chinese Communist Party and t he Ministry of Foreign Affairs, contributed an assessment of Chinese policy toward the United St ates. Kenneth Liebertha

the director of the John L. Thornton Center for China Studies at Brookings, and a former member of the National Security Council under President Bill Clinton, wrote the appraisal o f Washington‘s attitude toward China. In a jo

conclusion, the authors say the level of strategic distrust between the two countries has become so corrosive that if not corrected the countries risk becoming

open antagonists. The United States is no longer seen as ―that awesome, nor is it trustworthy, and its example to the world and admonit ions to China should t herefore be much

discounted,‖ Mr. Wang writes of the general view of China‘s leadership. In contrast, China has mounting self-confidence in its own economic and military strides, particularly the closing power gap since the start of the Iraq war2003, he argues, America‘s gross domestic product was e ight times as large as China‘s, but t oday it is less than t hree times larger. The candid writing by Mr. Wang is striking because of his influence and access, in Washington awell as in Beijing. Mr. Wang, who is dean of Peking University‘s School o f International Studies and a guest professor at the National Defense University of the People‘s Liberation Army, has wide access to senior American policy makers, making him an unusual repository of information about the thinking in both countries. Mr. Wang said he did not seek approval from the Chinese government to write the study, nor did he consult the government

about it. It is fairly rare for a Chinese analyst who is not part of the strident nationalistic drumbeat to strip away the official talk by both the United States and China about mutual cooperation. Both Mr. Wang and Mr.

Lieberthal argue that beneath the surface, both countries see deep dangers and threatening motivations in the policies of the other. Mr.

Wang writes that the Chinese leadership, backed by the domestic news media and the education system, believes that China‘s tu rn in the world has arrived, and that it is the United States that is ―on the wrong side of history.‖ Th

period of ―keeping a low profile,‖ a dictum coined by the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in 1989, and continued until now by the departing president, Hu Jintao, is over, Mr. Wang warns. ―It is now a question of how many yearrather than how many decades, before China replaces the United States as the largest economy in the world,‖ he adds. China‘s financial successes, starting with weathering t he 1998 Asian financial crisis and t he 2008 globalfinancial crisis, the execution of events like the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai Expo in 2010, contrast with Amer ica‘s ―alarming‖ deficit, sluggish economic recovery and polarized domestic politics, Mr. Wang saysHe does not address head on t he far superior strength of the United States in military weaponry. But he notes t hat Beijing has developed advanced rocketry and space technology and sophisticated weapons syst ems without the―United States or the U.S.-led world order.‖ In the face of China‘s strengths, and worries that t he United States will be displaced from its premier position in the world, Washington is engaged in activities including stepped-upspying by American planes and ships a long China‘s borders that anger the Chinese, particularly its military, Mr. Wang wr ites. Promotion of human rights in China by American-supported nongovernmental organizations is view

as an effort to ―Westernize‖ the country and undermine the Communist Party, a stance the party will not stand f or, he says. That China is increasingly confident that it will prevail in thelong run against the United States is backed, in part, by Mr. Lieberthal‘s appraisal of American policy toward China. Mr. Lieberthal cites findings from American intelligence based on internal

discussions among crucial Chinese officials that these officials assume ―very much a zero-sum approach ‖ when discussing issues directly and indirectly related to

United States-China relations.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/world/asia/chinese-insider-offers-rare-glimpse-of-us-china-frictions.html?_r=0

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/world/asia/chinese-insider-offers-rare-glimpse-of-us-china-frictions.html?_r=0




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Links – Mexico

China‘s developing sphere of influence in Latin America through Mexico

The Economist 13 ―Why has China snubbed Cuba and Venezuela?‖ Jun 6th 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3, Accessed Date: 6-13-13 y2k

XI JINPING'S first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as China‘s president, from May 31st to June 6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijing‘s strongestideological allies in the region, Cuba and Venezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor Hu Jintao did on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi

stopped off in an English-speaking Caribbean nation, Trinidad and Tobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas. He then travelled to Costa Rica and Mexico (pictured) — two countries that are at least as mu part of America‘s orbit as Cuba and Venezuela are part of the ―Beijing Consensus‖. Why this snub to two friendly nations that have been lavished with Chinese largesse in recent years, especially at a time when both are strugglto come to terms with the death in March of Hugo Chávez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader?The short answer is: for simplicity‘s sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raised distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, and neither socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being off the itinerary. The beauty of having a chequebook as thick as China‘s is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, you can always mollify t hem with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuela‘s oil minister announced that he had secured an extra $4 billion fChina to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billi on already provided by Beijing. Not quite in the same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times reported this week that China was also plann ing to invest in Cuban golf courses, the i sland‘s latest fad.

However, as our story on Mr Xi‘s vis it to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for picking t he destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obama‘s

―pivot‖ to Asia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in America‘s backyard. China‘s business relationship with Latin America

less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexico‘s National Autonomous University, Latin America and theCaribbean were collectively the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding

Kevin Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Cost

Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America . Up until now, China has

hoovered up the region‘s commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexia rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it export s ten times as much to Mexico as it imports.

China is deepening relations with Mexico---views the region as its sphere of influence

Loudon 13 Trevor Loudon, ―The Encirclement Gathers Pace: China Enters Into ‗Strategic Partnership‘ with Mexico,‖ June 6, 2013,http://gulagbound.com/39221/the-encirclement-gathers-pace-china-enters-into-a-strategic-partnership-with-mexico/, Accessed Date: 6-13-13 y2k

As if Mexico didn‘t already have enough problems with gangsters. On his way to a San Francisco Summit with Barack Obama, new Chinese President Xi Jinping has visited Costa Rica and Marxist-led Cuba and Brazil to build up his Latin American support.

Most significant, however, was his meeting with Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto. This visit signals a new phase in Mexico/China relations. O

that will have a big impact on the United States.From the Communist Party of China website:

MEXICO CITY – Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Pena Nieto Tuesday announced to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a

comprehensive strategic partnership.The Chinese president arrived in Mexico City earlier in the day for a three-day state visit aimed at lifting the China-Mexico strategic partnership to a higher level, and held talks with Pena Nieto on bilateral cooperation.During the talks, the two presidents agreed that strengthening the China-Mexico long-term friendly cooperation serves the fundamental interests of the two countries and t wo peoples, and helps promote unity and cooperation among developing countries.Xi said the decision to upgrade the bilateral r elationship is a realistic requirement, and it also sets a clear target for the development of bilateral relations.Pena Nieto, for his part, said the upgrade of the Mexico-China ties indicates that bilateral cooperation has entered a new stage.The Mexican side is ready to work with China to constantly improve cooperation at higher levels and through more effective mechanisms so as to achieve common development, he said.

The two heads of state agreed to push forward the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership by working jointly in the followinfour aspects.Firstly, the two sides will view their relations from a strategic and long-term perspective and improve political mutual trust. The two countries will accommodate each other‘s concerns, and show mutual understanding and support on issues concerning eac h other‘s core inteChina and Mexico will maintain exchanges between high-level leaders, political parties and legislatures, give full play to the existing consultation and dialogue mechanisms, and improve coordination on each other‘s development str ategies.Secondly, the two sides will improve practical cooperation in accordance with their development strategies, and agree to increase mutual investment in key areas such as energy, mining, in frastructure and high technology.In order to promote trade balance, China supports the increase of imports from Mexico, while Mexico welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest here and promises to create favorable conditions for Chinese investors.Thirdly, as two major countries with r ich cultural traditions, China and Mexico will improve cultural exchanges. Both countries will encourage more exchanges between art troupes, promote tourism and strengthen communication among students, academics, journalists anathletes.China will build a Chinese cultural center in Mexico City, the first in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Mexico will establish a Mexican cultural center in Beijing as well.Fourthly, China and Mexico will improve multilateral coordination based on their common interests and responsibilities on major international issues.The two countries will maintain close communication and coordination on global economic governance, energy security, food safety and climate change.They will help developing countries gain a bigger voice in the int ernational community, and safeguard the common interests of the two countries and the developing nations.

China and Mexico support the establishment of the China-Latin America forum and promote the overall cooperation between

China and Latin America at a higher level.

After their talks, Xi and Pena Nieto signed a joint statement between the two countries, witnessed the signing of a host of agreements an jointly met the press.Pena Nieto said at the ceremony that China has become a major global economic engine and an important balancing power in international relations.

As two emerging powers, Mexico and China are each other‘s important strategic cooperative partners, and the Mexican side is r eady toforge closer ties with the Chinese side to achieve common development, the Mexican president said.China is ready to work with Mexico to constantly enrich the content of bilateral strategic partnership, promote mutually beneficial cooperation and contribute to world peace, stability and prosperity, he said.Xi said his visit to Mexico aims to deepen mutual trust, expand cooperation and enhance friendship. ―I believe with our joint efforts, China-Mexico relations will enter a new stage,‖ he said.

Latin America is rapidly becoming a Chinese sphere of influence . This latest development can only accelerate this unhealthy tre

China is deepening engagement with Mexico

Sarmiento-Saher 13 Sebastian Sarmiento-Saher is an editorial assistant at The Diplomat. ―Is Xi‘s Chinese Dream Compatible with

Latin America‘s?‖ June 7, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/is-xis-chinese-dream-compatible-with-latin-americas/, AccessedDate: 6-13-13 y2k

http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3


http://gulagbound.com/39221/the-encirclement-gathers-pace-china-enters-into-a-strategic-partnership-with-mexico/

http://thediplomat.com/china-power/is-xis-chinese-dream-compatible-with-latin-americas/

http://thediplomat.com/china-power/is-xis-chinese-dream-compatible-with-latin-americas/

http://gulagbound.com/39221/the-encirclement-gathers-pace-china-enters-into-a-strategic-partnership-with-mexico/






2013 China DA

Despite a chill in relations between China and Mexico in recent years, both countries have new leaders in Xi Jinping and Enrique Peña

Nieto who have signaled their intention to reset relations. With Mr. Peña Nieto‘s visit to China in April and Mr. Xi‘s trip to Mexico

about to end, both sides appear to be interested in finding areas where they can cooperate for both sides‘ benefits and downplayin

competition. For instance, if Mr. Peña Nieto is able to make needed reforms in Mexico‘s oil indust ry, China could become a big investor and consumer in that field. Additionally,

both leaders have signed agreements in mining and infrastructure, agreed to China purchasing US$1 billion worth of Mexican goods, anopened the Chinese market to Mexican pork and tequila.

Perception of encroachment to Chinese sphere of influence triggers backlash---spurs confrontation that

escalates

Benko 13 Ralph Benko is a former junior official in the Reagan Whitehouse, ―China‘s expanding sphere inevitable for waxing power ,2013-6-6, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/787350.shtml#.UbktcvmTiSo, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2k

Chinese President Xi Jinping's meeting with US President Barack Obama, in a low-key setting this week, is of potentially the greatest significance.

This meeting is being designed to foment a climate of "equality and mutual trust," as Xi has put it. These are themes that very likely resonate w ith Obama. But what

could possibly go wrong?

"What China expects from the US is a clear commitment that it will not do things to harm China's sovereignty ," Chen Mingming, a retired

Chinese diplomat, told media recently.

Respect for its sovereignty is a most legitimate expectation by China. But very few fully grasp the implications of the d ifference inherent in nonlinear Chinese and linear American

views of sovereignty.

For the linear-minded, West geographical boundaries are defined by lines on a map upon which all parties, with due ceremony, once upon a time agreed.This makes intuitive sense to Westerners. Yet it has l ed to strange outcomes. For example, departing European colonial powers often drew national borders arbitrarily. This set the stage for unrest, tragedy, and even genocide.In the classical Asian worldview, geographical boundaries are nonlinear. There are always grounds for claims, sometimes going back mill ennia, to different boundaries.

When a state grows strong, it will project a greater sphere of influence, extending its boundaries.In Asia, unlike in Europe and the Americas, organic spheres of influence, which wax and wane, determine boundaries.Some Asian countries have made sweeping claims on their former territories, which were ceded to m ajor powers based on the "unfairness" of previous treaties.To most linear-minded Westerners, relitigating the justice of an ancient treaty makes litt le sense. In contrast, to a nonlinear Asian mind, to whom this does not appear as ancient, it is a matter of simple justice. Neither view is wrong. But failure to grasp the distinction is potentially problematic. Instead, it would be better for our nations and our leaders to grasp this distinction in order to achieve great unity.

China's power is waxing. Its growing strength naturally increases its sphere of influence. This will inevitably push it to assert old

territorial claims dating to previous times. Some of those claims fall within the spheres of influence of some of US allies.

This can put the US in an awkward position. A harmonious relationship of equality and mutual trust is invaluable to all. China would greatly benefit by mindfulness of the important distinction between how each society thinks, would the US.Whatever other issues come up between the two presidents, and there are sure to be many, the pot ential for misunderstanding about sovereignty may be the most delicate.

China will defend its sovereignty above all. Yet the last thing China, or the world, needs is a Chinese confrontation with a belligerent

hyperpower.The US is a hyperpower. But Americans are not by nature belligerent. Neither are the Chinese.

If both leaders have been thoroughly briefed on the dist inctions that derive from their respective linear and nonlinear v iews of national boundaries, harmony between these two great nations

can be secured.China can afford to be patient so long as the legitimacy of its claims is not contradicted. In taking back full sovereignty over Hong Kong at the expiration of the UK's lease, China patiently, and prudently, issued a 50-year guaranof Hong Kong's political and economic system. Both dignity and harmony were served.The US need not be blinded by lines on a map to the concept that China's sense of its sovereign boundaries is dictated by the natural ebb and flow of the sphere of influence of a strong Beijing.And China would be most impressive if it takes a patient, benevolent, long-term view regarding the inevitable outcomes of its growing strength and dignity.

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/787350.shtml#.UbktcvmTiSo





2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Links – Venezuela

China‘s expanding in Venezuela---increasing ties now and reshaping trade patterns

Grudgings & Gardner 11 Stuart Grudgings and Simon Gardner are Reuters Staff, ―Analysis: Rising China threatens U.S. clout inLatin America,‖ 5-16-11, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/16/us-latinamerica-china-idUSTRE72F19C20110316, Accessed Date6-13-13 y2k

China's growing economic stake in the region may one day raise a threat to Washington's strategic dominance too as its deep pockets bring

new friends.U.S. ally Colombia recently announced it is in talks with China to build a railway linking its Atlantic and Pacific oceans, a possible alternative to the Panama Canal that would boost trade flows with Asia. A network of new

highways under construction are due to provide direct links to five po rts on Peru's Pacific coast in another sign of how Asian economic power is reshaping regional trade patterns.

While still largely focused on metals and agricultural goods, Chinese investments have begun to spread to the broader economy. China last year became the biggest direct investor in

Brazil, the region's largest economy, with about $15 billion worth of projects ranging from a $5 billion steel plant to the purchase of electricity networks for about $1 billion.

It has also built relations with U.S. nemesis Venezuela , whose firebrand President Hugo Chavez said during a 2004 visit to China he had been a

Maoist since childhood. China later launched a $400 million communications satellite for Venezuela, reducing its dependence on

U.S. and European satellites.

The United States remains the main trade and investment partner for Latin America, accounting for about 40 percent of the region'sexports in 2009 compared to China's 7 percent, according to the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America and theCaribbean.

China is rising fast, though -- from virtually nowhere a decade ago -- and is on cou rse to overtake the European Union as t he region's number-two trade partner by 2015.

That has also carried a cost for Latin America as cheap Chinese imports flood domestic markets, provoking a growing backlash from industries like manufacturing and textiles.

Growing Chinese sphere of influence in Venezuela now

The Sunday Telegraph 11 ―CHINA'S GLOBAL INTERESTS,‖ 6-26-11, Accessed Date: 6-13-13 y2k

SOUTH AMERICA

China has become Brazil's most-important trading partner , interrupting a special relationship between the US and Brazil that began in the 1930s. China

has also been steadily increasing its sphere of influence and has become particularly close to the four 'Red' South American countries

Venezuela , Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean says China will replace the EU as the largest global partner in the region by 2015.


escalates







Respect for its sovereignty is a most legitimate expectation by China. But very few fully grasp t he implications of the difference inherent in nonlinear Chinese and linear American

views of sovereignty.For the linear-minded, West geographical boundaries are defined by lines on a map upon which all parties, with due ceremony, once upon a time agreed.This makes intuitive sense to Westerners. Yet it has l ed to strange outcomes. For example, departing European colonial powers often drew national borders arbitrarily. This set the stage for unrest, tragedy, and even genocide.In the classical Asian worldview, geographical boundaries are nonlinear. There are always grounds for claims, sometimes going back mill ennia, to different boundaries.

When a state grows strong, it will project a greater sphere of influence, extending its boundaries.In Asia, unlike in Europe and the Americas, organic spheres of influence, which wax and wane, determine boundaries.Some Asian countries have made sweeping claims on their former territories, which were ceded to m ajor powers based on the "unfairness" of previous treaties.To most linear-minded Westerners, relitigating the justice of an ancient treaty makes litt le sense. In contrast, to a n onlinear Asian mind, to whom this does not appear as ancient, it is a matter of simple justice. Neither view is wrong. But failure to grasp the distinction is potentially problematic. Instead, it would be better for our nations and our leaders to grasp this distinction in order to achieve great unity.



This can put the US in an awkward position. A harmonious relationship of equality and mutual trust is invaluable to all. China would greatly benefit by mindfulness of the important distinction between how each society thinks, would the US.Whatever other issues come up between the two presidents, and there are sure to be many, the pot ential for misunderstanding about sovereignty may be the most delicate.



If both leaders have been thoroughly briefed on the distinctions that derive from their respective linear and nonlinear views of national boundaries, harmony between these two great nations

can be secured.China can afford to be patient so long as the legitimacy of its claims is not contradicted. In taking back full sovereignty over Hong Kong at the expiration of the UK's lease, China patiently, and prudently, issued a 50-year guaranof Hong Kong's political and economic system. Both dignity and harmony were served.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/16/us-latinamerica-china-idUSTRE72F19C20110316



http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/16/us-latinamerica-china-idUSTRE72F19C20110316




2013 China DA The US need not be blinded by lines on a map to the concept that China's sense of its sovereign boundaries is dictated by the natural ebb and flow of t he sphere of influence of a strong Beijing.And China would be most impressive if it takes a patient, benevolent, long-term view regarding the inevitable outcomes of its growing strength and dignity.




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Links – Cuba

China is expanding is Cuba through economic ties

Sainsbury 10 Michael Sainsbury is The Australian Staff, ―Beijing places Cuba higher on agenda,‖ August 3, 2010, L/N, AccessedDate: 6-13-13 y2k

IT has been a sometimes rocky friendship that has lasted 50 years. When Fidel Castro seized power in 1959, his communist comrades in the People's Republic of China were among the first in the world to recognise his governmthe following year. Now as the 50th anniversary of those ties approaches on September 28, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi has made his first trip to the island and visited the ailing former president, whose brother Raul runs the

country. For many years, the two nations were estranged as Cuba took sides with the Soviet Union during the Cold War and as China and thUSSR grew further apart. But since the fall of communism in eastern Europe in 1989, there has been rapid rapprochement between two of the remaining handful o f communist countries. In recent year

the two countries have gained momentum in the development of their relations and the two peoples show increasing readiness fo

more exchange and co-operation, Mr Yang told China's Xinhua news agency. Trade has boomed in recent years and China is now Cuba's second-largest

trading partner after Venezuela. Trade stood at $US1.5 billion last year, double the volume in 2007. Still, the number contracted by 31.5 per cent last year -- in line with an overall Cuban foreign trade

slump of 44 per cent -- as the country reeled from the economic crisis, devastating hurricanes and a sharp drop in its main commodity export, nickel. Fidel Cast ro has visited China three times and Raul Cast ro also visited before

being installed as Cuba's leader. China's President Hu Jintao has visited Cuba twice -- in 2004 and 2008 -- and there are ministerial-level visits, at least, almost every year. China has showered Cuba with

loans as part of its strategy to draw Latin America into its sphere of influence.


escalates









When a state grows strong, it will project a greater sphere of influence, extending its boundaries.In Asia, unlike in Europe and the Americas, organic spheres of influence, which wax and wane, determine boundaries.Some Asian countries have made sweeping claims on their former territories, which were ceded to m ajor powers based on the "unfairness" of previous treaties.To most linear-minded Westerners, relitigating the justice of an ancient treaty makes litt le sense. In contrast, to a n onlinear Asian mind, to whom this does not appear as ancient, it is a matter of simple justice.

Neither view is wrong. But failure to grasp the distinction is potentially problematic. Instead, it would be better for our nations and our leaders to grasp this distinction in order to achieve great unity.



This can put the US in an awkward position. A harmonious relationship of equality and mutual trust is invaluable to all. China would greatly benefit by mindfulness of the important distinction between how each society thinks, would the US.Whatever other issues come up between the two presidents, and there are sure to be many, the pot ential for misunderstanding about sovereignty may be t he most delicate.










2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Links – Perception Key


escalates

Benko 13 Ralph Benko is a former junior official in the Reagan Whitehouse, ―China‘s expanding sphere inevitable for waxing power,

2013-6-6, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/787350.shtml#.UbktcvmTiSo, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2k








When a state grows strong, it will project a greater sphere of influence, extending its boundaries.In Asia, unlike in Europe and the Americas, organic spheres of influence, which wax and wane, determine boundaries.Some Asian countries have made sweeping claims on their former territories, which were ceded to m ajor powers based on the "unfairness" of previous treaties.To most linear-minded Westerners, relitigating the justice of an ancient treaty makes litt le sense. In contrast, to a n onlinear Asian mind, to whom this does not appear as ancient, it is a matter of simple justice. Neither view is wrong. But failure to grasp the distinction is potentially problematic. Instead, it would be better for our nations and our leaders to grasp this distinction in order to achieve great unity.



This can put the US in an awkward position. A harmonious relationship of equality and mutual trust is invaluable to all. China would greatly benefit by mindfulness of the important distinction between how each society thinks, would the US.Whatever other issues come up between the two presidents, and there are sure to be many, the potential for misunderstanding about sovereignty may be the most delicate.





AND- PRC leadership perceives plan to be disadvantageous to China

Ellis 11 R. Evan Ellis is an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. ―Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study,‖ http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latinamerica.html, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2k

Blocking the Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions. The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and

information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country's sustained growth and

development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global

institutions from supporting Chinese interests.

In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being

used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral

free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the America

in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged .


http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html








2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – Turns Case – LA Economy

Cooperation solves Latin America economy and stability

Miller 9 Stephanie Miller is currently a consultant on U.S.-Latin America relations and was formerly the Research Associate for theAmericas Project at the Center. ―Cooperating with China in Latin America,‖ 6-3-9,http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2009/06/03/6209/cooperating-with-china-in-latin-america/, Accessed Date: 6-12

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Alicia Barcena, the U. N. Economic Commission for Latin America and t he Caribbean‘s executive secretary, made note of China‘s growing investments in Latin America and the Caribbean during a recent press conference in

Santiago, Chile, suggesting ―[t]here are promising hopes for Chinese investment in the near future.‖ Indeed, China increasingly looks to the region as a primary source for rawmaterials to match its blistering pace of development. These growing ties between China a nd Latin America and the Caribbean raise a question for U.S. policymakers: How should the United St

view China‘s emerging presence in a region that was once considered — under the Monroe Doctrine — the United States‘ sphere of influence? La

America and China continued to boost two-way investment, trade, and commercial ties even as the g lobal economic crisis froze international credit markets and reduced global trade between industrialized and developing regionalike last year. When Chinese President Hu J intao visited Latin America and the Caribbean in 2004, he announced that China was ready to increase a two-way trade to $100 billion U.S. dollars by 2010. By 2007 China and Lat inAmerica had already surpassed that, with two-way trade totaling $102.6 billion, 46.2 percent more than the previous year. And in 2008, two-way trade and investment reached $140 billion, with approximately $120 billion devotto bilateral trade. Increased Chinese investment in and commercial ties with Latin America and the Caribbean has also led to groundbreaking Chinese participation in the Inter-American system. In 2004, China became an observof the Organization of American States, or OAS, and sent riot police to help the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Hait i. Then, China joined the Inter -American Development Bank, or IDB, in January 2009 as a donor -

member with a $350 million-loan for various bank programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. Zhou Wenzhong, China‘s ambassador to the United States, says that China and Latin America findthemselves more connected by common interests and cooperation, with close ties manifested by frequent high-level contacts, visits, and

growing political trust on both sides. The Chinese government signaled how serious it takes its relationship with Latin American an

the Caribbean by publishing its first-ever policy paper on the region in November 2008. The report outlines China‘s priorit ies in Latin America and notes the ―move toward multi-polarity [globally]is irreversible and economic globalization is gaining momentum.‖ The Chinese government sees Latin America and the Caribbean at a similar stage of development and ―views its

relations with Latin America and the Caribbean from a strategic plane,‖ thereby seeking ―to build and develop a comprehensive and cooperative partnership featuring equal ity, mutual benefit, and common development with Lat

American and Caribbean countries.‖ The priorities in China‘s report on Latin America and the Caribbean lean heavily toward economics. Political ties are relegated mostly to exchanges,consultations, and a loosely articulated commitment to enhancing cooperation in international affairs. And it proclaims China ―stands ready to work with Latin

American and Caribbean countries to strengthen the role of t he United Nations, make the international po litical and economic order more fair and equ itable, promote democracy in international relations, and uphold the legitimatrights and interests of developing countries.‖ On the surface, China‘s interests in Latin America and the Caribbean seem similar to U. S. interests in the region. The Obama administration has said it wants to foster a foreign policapproach toward Latin America committed to a ―new era of partnership‖ working on ―shared challenges of economic growth and equa lity, our energy and climate futures, and regional and citizen security.‖ And it stat es it is―committed to shaping that future t hrough engagement that is strong, sust ained, meaningful, and based on mutual respect.‖ Concerns have also been voiced about China‘s unspoken motives for investing in Latin America and theCaribbean. Many U.S. commentators speculate that China‘s real interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are not indeed tied to the region‘s development, but instead are simply focused on unsustainably extracting the regionresources. Others suggest that China‘s activities are fueled by a secondary motivation to gain political favor in order to isolate Taiwan12 of the 23 countries that still maintain official diplomatic ties with Taiwan are in Latin

America and the Caribbean. It is clear that understanding China‘s spoken and unspoken motivations and priorities in Latin America and theCaribbean is a growing concern for the United States given that it, too, has policy goals for the region. But if the Obama administration active

pursues an agenda that is truly ―strong, sustained, meaningful, and based on mutual respect,‖ then it need not see China‘s

growing presence in Latin America as a threat. Instead, the United States may find China to be a willing partner to cooperate in areas of

mutual concern. One of these concerns is Latin America‘s economic development . More than 400 Chinese companies are registered in Lati

America and the Caribbean, operating in industries as varied as energy, agriculture, infrastructure, and telecommunicationsindustries in which U.S.

companies also do business. As such, the two countries benefit from an institutionally strong and transparent region where the rules ofengagement and competition are clear and democratic. The United States and China also benefit from a secure region in which to

operate. Problems of crime and public insecurity are pervasive throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. During t he last decade, approximately 1.2 million people have been ki

in Latin America and the Caribbean as a result of crime, and each year 200 million people —one third of the region‘s population —are victims of crime.[1] What‘s more, the Inter -American Development Bank estimates that the

region‘s gross domestic product would be 25 percent higher today if it had a crime rate similar to the rest o f the world. Thus, the United States and China, as important investors in the

region, could find ways to work together on helping Latin American and Caribbean governments tackle crime and insecurity. And theUnited States should seek China‘s cooperation in the various institutions that comprise the Inter-American system — a system that makesfundamental commitment to democracy and human rights. The United States could use these multilateral forums to ask China to upholdits policy paper commitments to promote a more equitable economic world order, as well as democracy in the international system. China‘

presence in Latin America and the Caribbean will continue to grow. So the sooner the Obama administration can find ways to cooperate with China in the

region the better . Doing so would strengthen the United States‘ standing in the region and would foster trust with one of its most

important global economic partnerswho happens to be evolving into a potential commercial rival to it south. In sum, focusing on anagenda that fosters mutual respect and engages Latin America and the Caribbean and its associates in finding solutions to regional and

global challenges will not only deliver on the United States‘ promise of seeking a ―new era of partnership,‖ but perhaps succeed in turnina rival into an ally.

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2009/06/03/6209/cooperating-with-china-in-latin-america/

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2009/06/03/6209/cooperating-with-china-in-latin-america/




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – Turns Case – LA Stability

Solves LA stability

Ellis 5 R. EVAN ELLIS is an associate with Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., who focuses on defense transformation and Latin Americansecurity issues. ―U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA,‖ June 2005http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub606.pdf, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2k

With the exception of pointedly a nti-U.S. regimes such as Venezuela and Cuba, Chinese interests in access to the region for trade may ironically compliment U.S.interests and create short-term opportunities for the United States and China to work together to strengthen government structures and promote regional stability and political institutionalization. This could, for example, include strengthening of government institutions in Peru and Ecuad

both of which possess oil resources and Pacific ports.130 In both countries, the political leadership is politically marginalized, including a strong challenge from a powerful indigenous faction in Ecuador.131 Similarly, Chinaarguably has a vested interest in the emergence of a stable and politically moderate Bolivia that could resolve its territorial disputes withChile and Peru, and increase exports of its natural gas resources through Pacific ports in one of those two countries.132

Chinese interest in promoting regional stability may ultimately extend to Colombia as well . Although Colombia is closely tied to the United States through the aid that

receives to fight insurgent and paramilitary groups and narcotics, it is willing to construct a pipeline and a refinery to facilitate the export of the region‘s oil to t he Pacific for potential sale to China. To the extent thatthe Guarija-Maracaibo and Maracaibo-Puerto de Tribugal pipelines become reality, for example, China could develop a vested interest iworking with the Colombians to prevent violence against themjust as the United States provided security assistance to help theColombians protect the Caño-Limon-Covenas pipeline in Arauca state.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub606.pdf

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub606.pdf




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – Laundry List

Relations solves everything

Zemin 2K Jiang Zemin is former president of PRC, ―Together to Build a China-U.S. Relationship: Oriented Towards the New Centurhttps://www.uschina.org/public/jiangzemin.html, 8 September 2000, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2k

Humankind is entering a new century and a new millennium. The world today is undergoing profound changes. The trend towards multi-polarization hascontinued to develop, though along a tortuous course. Economic globalization has brought about ever closer economic and trade ties between nations. Modern science and technology, the

information technology and the life science in part icular, have provided a new and powerful impetus to the development of the human society. Meanwhile, however, factors affecting regional and world

stability still exist. Regional conflicts have kept cropping up and the North-South gap has continued to widen. The call of the world's people for peace and developm

has become the main melody of our times. In the world fraught with both opportunities and challenges, the people and statesmen of our two countries are faced with the

pressing task of how to bring a healthy, stable and constantly developing China-U.S. relationship into the 21st century.

The Chinese and American people have a history of exchanges for more than 200 years. Our r elations have experienced twists and turns, but the strong desire of the two peoples for friendship has all along been pushing our relations forward.Since the 1970s, particularly in the 21 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations, China-U.S. relations have borne historical fruits of development, thanks to the joint efforts by l eaders and people of both countries. For instance, 21 years ago, th e bilateral trade vowas only US$2.4 billion, but in 1999 it reached US$61.4 billion, according to the statistics of China's customs. Today, our two sides have conducted exchanges and cooperation, unprecedented in scope, from Beijing and Shanghai to Washington and New York, as well as inUN.To facilitate the development of China-U.S. relations, we should both tr y to get a better understanding of each other, in terms of the country and the people. History and the realities show that prejudice is farther away from truth than ignorance and is a greater barrier t o theexchanges and contacts between nations than numerous mountains and oceans. China is making an effort to know the US better, and the United States should likewise make an effort to know China better.The Chinese nation created a splendid culture in the course of it s development over five thousand years and more and made tremendous contributions to human civilization and progress. For historical reasons, China lagged behind in modern times. However, the Chinese people have never stopped their pursuit for national rejuvenation, not even for a moment. In the past 20 years and more, the Chinese people have attained universally acknowledged achievements in building socialism with Chinese characteristics through reform and openinIn the future, we will continue to concentrate on economic development and to improve the living standards for the entire Chinese people. This is an objective that the Chinese Government has worked tirelessly to obtain.

The Chinese nation has a glorious t radition of loving peace. Since ancient t imes, the Chinese people have believed in the value o f peace. We Chinese people hope to see peace prevail in the world and to live in amity with the people of other countries. We are focusing on modernization and need a long-term peaceful and stable international environment. Therefore, to promote world peace and development is the fundamental objective of China's fore policy. We will continue to develop friendly relations and cooperation with all countries on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in eac

other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. A developed China will play a positive role in maintaining world peace and stabilityand will by no means constitute a threat to anybody.The Chinese people love democracy and freedom. In modern times, they waged an unyielding struggle for national independence and democratic rights. The founding of the People's Republic of China represents a great achievement of this struggle. The C hinese Government has made unremitting efforts to protect and promote the demrights of the Chinese people. Their civil and political rights as well a s their fundamental freedoms have been ensured and pr otected according to law. Their li ving standards have been improved to such an extent as has never been seen in hi story. The average life expectancy of the Chinese has increased from 35 years in 1949 to 70.8 yeathe past 20 years alone, China has l ifted out of poverty more than 200 million people, or roughly the population of the United States. Since 1988, hundreds of milli ons of rural folk have participated in direct elections at the grassroots levels. China has more than 2,000 radio a nd TV stations, over 2,000 newspapers and over 8,000 magaz

Every year, over 100,000 new books are published in the country. There are over 16 million netizens, more than 27,000 worldwide web sites, over 70,000 Chinese domain names and 61 million mobile phones in China. The Chinese people are enjoying extensive and full acc ess to information and many channels through which to expreviews.The Chinese nation is a big multi -ethnic family. The 56 ethnic groups have established among themselves a new-type relationship of equality, mutual help and unity. Areas inhabited by ethnic minorities have registered substantial progress in all undertakings and comprehensive social progress. Not long after the founding of the PeopleRepublic of China, the people in C hina's Tibet carried out democratic reforms. The serfdom under theocracy was done away with once and for all, and millions of serfs who had suffered tre mendously from oppression in the old days became masters of their own fate. The Chinese nati on features pluralism in unity. Because of t his featudiversified ethnic cultures in China are rich and colorful. The languages, religions and customs of ethnic minorities in China, includi ng the Tibetans, are protected and r espected and their cultural traditions have been carried forward and developed. In Tibet, many Tibetan children study every day in schools with the Tibetan language asof teaching. This is a fair conclusion that all those who respect facts would come to.As is clearly stipulated in the Constitution of China, Chinese citizens have freedom of religious belief. The Chinese Government protects its citi zens' freedom of religious belief and their normal religious activities. No state agencies, social groups or individuals shall force citi zens to believe in or not to believe in a r eligion. Nor should tdiscriminate against religious believers or non-believers. More than 100 million people believe in various religions in China. Religious figures are elected deputies to the people's congresses or members of the political consultative conferences in China. But Falungong that has been outlawed by the Chinese Government according t o lawthat has broken up, ruined and displaced many families. It is by no means a religion. All governments in the world would oppose cults like this and would bring to justice those who have done severe harm to the people.

Democracy, freedom and human rights are the common aspirations of mankind. However, because of differences in the history, cu lture, social system and the l evel of development, different countries would inevitably adopt different approaches to ensure these things to their people and would give them different content s and connotatiois quite normal. The differences among countries should not become an obstacle to the development of their relations. Ours is a diverse and colorful world. To ask all countries to institute the same political system and to judge the vari ous choices made by the people of various countries according to the values of one country are not deall. No country is perfect. China and the United States should strengthen their exchanges and dialogue on the basis of equality and mutual respect.An appropriate handling of the Taiwan question holds the key t o the establishment of a China -U.S. relationship oriented towards the new century. Taiwan has al ways been part of Chinese territory since ancient ti mes, and the Taiwan question has come about as a re sult of the civil war in C hina. An earlier settlement of this question andof the national reunification are the shared aspirations of each and every Chinese at home a nd abroad. The Chinese people love peace. The last thing they would like to see is fighting between fellow compatriots and brothers. "Peaceful reunification and one country, two systems" remain the basic principle of the Chinese Government inthe Taiwan question. We are most sincere in striving for a peaceful reunification a nd will do all we can to this end. The root cause of the tension across the Taiwan Straits i s that some people are at tempting to make Taiwan independent and separate Ta iwan from China. This is something we can never allow. I have said on many occasilong as the Taiwan authorities recognize the one China principle, we will sit down and hold talks with them, a nd anything can be discussed. I could go to Taiwan or leader from Tai wan could come to the mainland for such talks. In a word, a n earlier accomplishment of the peaceful reunification between the mainland and Taiwan will nthe interests of the people in Taiwan at all. On the contrary, this will enable the two sides to work together for better development, to the benefit of the entire Chinese people.As is known to all, the Taiwan question i s the most important and sensitive question in China-U.S. relations. Our relations have experienced ups and downs and twists and turns over the decades, most of which can be traced to t he Taiwan question. The U.S. governments, both Democratic a nd Republican, have all made clear -cut comm

this question. That is, the United States follows a one China policy and observes the t hree Sino-U.S. joint communiques. Furthermore, China and the US respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, a nd refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs. Once reunified with the mainland, Taiwan can still maintain its ecoand cultural ties with the US. An early solution to the Taiwan question will contribute not only to a normal development of China-US relations, but also peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific a nd the world at large.China's accession to the WTO is necessitated not only by its own economic development but also by t he development of the global economy. Last November, China and the United States signed a bilateral market access agreement pertinent to China's membership in the WTO. That was a win-win outcome. Once in the WTO, China wi

corresponding obligations. It will earnestly honor its commitments to further opening its domestic market, improving transparency of polic y and management, protecting the ri ghts and interests of foreign businesses according to law and improving its environment for investment and business activities. China should also enjoy its due rigmember of the WTO. Market opening should be a two-way street. The United States should create an environment of fair competition and el iminate all the unreasonable technical barriers for China's access to the U.S. market in accordance with WTO rules. Re solving the PNTR question is an obligation that the U.S. undertakes to fulfilaccordance with the WTO rules and is also the basis and prerequisite for the implementation of the China-U.S. agreement on China's a ccession to the WTO. An earlier resolution of this question will be conducive to the development of the economic cooperation and trade and of the overall relations between the two countries and serve interests of both countries.

Given the complementarity between our two economies, there is a vast potential for developing our economic cooperation and trade . W

are currently drafting the Tenth Five-Year Plan for the Economic and Social Development. In the coming five to t en years, China will continue to maintain a rap id economic growth. It will make vigorous effortfor a strategic restructuring of its economy, speed up the growth of the national economy and social progress on the basis of informationtechnology, facilitate the development of science, technology, education and cultural undertakings, accelerate the development of high-tech, such as the information technology, the bio-technology, the new materials technology and sophisticated manufacturing technologieand build up the infrastructure, such as water conservancy, transportation and energy. We will also intensify our efforts for environmental an

ecological protection. We are implementing the strategy to develop China's western regions in a planned and st ep-by-step manner, with a view to achieving a coordinated development of different regions. It is estimated

when the time comes, the import o f commodities and services alone will have reached US$ 3 trillion. China's development will provide other countries in the wo rld, including the United States, with an even broader market andtremendous opportunities for economic and technical cooperation a nd trade.

Both China and the United States are nuclear-weapon-states and permanent members of the UN Security Council . As such, we both shoulder

important responsibilities on a series of major issues that bear on world peace and security. We both hope to s ee our children live in a world o f security,

prosperity and happiness, free from hunger, disease and fear and under the skies that are blue and tranquil. To that end, we stand ready to increase consultations and cooperation with

United States in such areas as security, non-proliferation, environmental protection and fight against international crimes. China and the United States, along with other countries of the world, should wotowards the lofty goal of achieving common security for the whole world.

https://www.uschina.org/public/jiangzemin.html

https://www.uschina.org/public/jiangzemin.html




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – K-ish/Xenophobia

Deteriorating relations trigger protectionism and xenophobia

WEF 12 World Economic Forum, ―What If There Was a Cold War Between the U.S. and China?‖ Nov. 28, 2012,http://world.time.com/2012/11/28/what-if-there-was-a-cold-war-between-the-u-s-and-china/#ixzz2W7DHGihW, Accessed Date: 6-12-1y2k

If the relationship were to deteriorate further , how would this happen?It‘s already becoming a new kind of cold war. What this means is that the Americans and the Chinese will be frenemies. They‘re not going to become enemies, because that‘s not possible, but they‘re n ot friends any more, either. All of America‘s allies are very much afraidChina‘s rise, so they‘re begging the US to play a more significant role in Asia. You can see what the Americans are doing in response: in South Korea, they sign a new ballistic mi ssile deal, in Indonesia they send over fighter aircrafts, in Australia they send a whole bunch omarines to Darwin, and on and on. There have been l ots of joint military exercises in Vietnam and the Philippines. Then there‘s also the question of cyber attacks: China is America‘s principle enemy in this ar ea, and vice versa. The big question is to what extent all this is going to bleed over directly into the economic relationship. It‘s already star ting to, in that a lot of American firms are sa ying ―We don‘t have the access we used to into China, and furthermore the Chinese are stealing all our stuffAs the Chinese firms get larger, that will start t o have a greater impact on trade. The Doha round of international trade talks was meant to include China, but that‘s dead, and China isn‘t part of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement. On a big strategic level, alis increasingly looking like cold war, like containment.

What would be the next phase?

You‘d start to see more tit for tats on new trade tariffs, and new sanctions between the two countries. America would press its allies much

harder to align their investment policies with the US. You‘d start to see US corporate leaders publicly coming out and taking an anti-China

perspective, while the Chinese would be more aggressive about the need to work away from the dollar as the reserve currency.

On a cultural level, in America you would see fewer Chinese students, fewer Chinese people buying properties there. And Lord knows, there is alway

the potential for xenophobia : you only have to think back to the Japanese internment camps . Anti-Chinese sentiment would be a

dangerous and an ugly thing, especially if you continue to have this growing divide between the rich and poor. On the other side, it‘s not unthinkable that a Chinese

government under pressure domestically would push anti- American sentiment as a palliative.

http://world.time.com/2012/11/28/what-if-there-was-a-cold-war-between-the-u-s-and-china/#ixzz2W7DHGihW

http://world.time.com/2012/11/28/what-if-there-was-a-cold-war-between-the-u-s-and-china/#ixzz2W7DHGihW




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – Hegemony

Cooperation is key to managing China‘s rise---sustains hegemony

Layne 8 Christopher Layne is a professor at Texas A&M University‘s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service ―China‘s Challenge to US Hegemony,‖ January, 2008,http://acme.highpoint.edu/~msetzler/IR/IRreadingsbank/chinauscontain.ch08.6.pdf, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2k

Because of ideology, engagement has a role in us strategy , but it is engagement with (bared) teeth. The United States is willing to give China the opportunity to

integrate itself into the us-led international order —on Washington‘s terms. Thus, as a Pentagon document has put it, the United States wants China to become a ―responsibl

member of the international community.‖ Responsibility, however, is defined as Beijing‘s willingness to accept Washington‘s vision of a stable international order. As President Bush declared in a November 2005 speech in Ky

responsibility also requires China to achieve political liberalization and develop as a free market economy firmly anchored to the international economy. Indeed, us policy makers believe that, over the long term, peaceful relations are possible with Beijing only if Chinaundergoes domestic political and economic liberalization. As a result, the United States aims to promote China‘s internal transformation. As the Bush administration‘s National Security Strategy declares: ―America will encourage the advancement of democracy and economopenness‖ in China, ―because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and international order.‖ As then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick said in 2005, ―Closed politics cannot be a permanent feature of Chinese society.‖ us officials believe that nations as China that do not adopt American-style political and economic systems, and that do not play by the rules of the American-led international order, are ipso facto threats to us interests — threats to which America must be prepared to respond aggressively. Here is whereAmerica‘s willingness to employ the hard fist of military power against China comes into play. The Bush administration has said it ―welcomes a confident, peaceful, and prosperous China that appreciates that its growth and development depend on constructive connectionwith the rest of t he world.‖ At the same time, however, Washington has made crystal clear that it will n ot countenance a China that emerges as a great power ri val and challenges American primacy. The 2002 National Security Strategy enjoins Beijing from challenging theUnited States militarily and warns that, ―In pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness. In time, China will find thatsocial and political freedom is the only source of t hat greatness.‖ As Washington sees it, China has no justifiable grounds for regarding the us military presence in East Asia as threatening to its interests. Then – Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made this point in 2005 whe stated that any moves by China to enhance its military capabilities necessarily are signals of aggressive Chinese intent. According to Rumsfeld, China‘s military modernization cannot possibly be defensive because ―no nation threatens China.‖ Rumsfeld‘s view was echoin the administration‘s 2005 report on The Military Power of the People‘s Republic of China, which stated that ―China‘s milit ary modernization remains ambitious,‖ and warned that in coming years ―China‘s leaders may be tempted to resort t o force or coercion more quickto press diplomatic advantage, advance security interests, or resolve disputes.‖ Similarly, at an October 2007 conference on Sino-American relations Admiral Timothy Keating, the commander in chief of the us Pacific Command, made three points with respect to America‘China strategy. First, the United States will seek to maintain its present military dominance over China. Second, America will, through arms sales, ensure there is a cross-Strait military balance between Taiwan and China. Third, the United States will not allow China to cha

the status quo in Taiwan by force. In short, the United States is determined both to make sure that China does not emerge as a peer competitor and to impose itself as an obstacle to China‘s overriding national goal of reunification with Taiwan. China‘s rise

affects the United States because of what international relations scholars call the ― power transition ‖ effect: Throughout the history of t he modern international state system, ascending powers have always challenged the position o

the dominant (hegemonic) power in the international system —and these challenges have usually culminated in war. Notwithstanding Beijing‘s talk about a ―peaceful rise,‖ an ascending China inevitably will challenge the geopolitical equilibrium in East Asia. The doctrine peaceful rise thus is a reassurance strategy employed by Beijing in an attempt to allay others‘ fears of growing Chinese power and to forestall the United States from acting preventively during the dangerous transition period when China is catching up to t he United States.

Does this mean that the United States and China are on a collision course that will lead to a war in the next decade or two ? Not necessariWhat happens in Sino-American relations largely depends on what strategy Washington chooses to adopt toward China . If the United States tries to

maintain its current dominance in East Asia, Sino-American conflict is virtually certain , because us grand strategy has incorporated the logic of anticipatory violence as an instrument for

maintaining American primacy. For a declining hegemon, ―strangling the baby in the crib‖ by attacking a ri sing challenger preventively — that is, while the hegemon stil holds the upper hand militarily — has always been a tempting strategic option

http://acme.highpoint.edu/~msetzler/IR/IRreadingsbank/chinauscontain.ch08.6.pdf

http://acme.highpoint.edu/~msetzler/IR/IRreadingsbank/chinauscontain.ch08.6.pdf




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – Alliance

Lack of cooperation complicates global power balance---undermines Western alliances and global

integration

Zakaria 9 Fareed Zakaria, PhD Political Science Harvard and editor of Newsweek International, ―The Post-American World,‖Accessed Date: 8-7-10 JL

Beijing and Washington are wise to try to cooperate. Great-power conflict is something the world has not seen since the Cold War. If it were to return, all the troubles we worry

about now — terrorism, Iran, North Korea,--would pale in comparison . It would mean arms races, border troubles, rivalries among

alliances and client-states, local conflicts, and perhaps more. The onward movement of economic and political modernization worldwide would slow, if not cease. Even

without those dire scenarios, China will complicate existing power relations . Were the United States and the European Union to adopt

fundamentally differing attitudes toward the rise of China, for example, it would put permanent strains on the Western alliance that would

make the tensions over Iraq look like a minor spat. But a serious U.S.-Chinese rivalry would define the new age and turn it away

from integration, trade, and globalization.

Alliances prevent nuclear war

Ross 99 Douglas Ross – professor of political science at Simon Fraser University, Winter 1998/1999, Canada‘s functional isolationism

and the future of weapons of mass destruction, International Journal, p. lexis

Thus, an easily accessible tax base has long been available for spending much more on international security than recent governments have been willing to contemplate. Negotiating the landmines ban, discouraging trade in small arms, promoting the United Nations arms register are all worthwhile, popular activities that polish the national

self-image. But they should all be supplements to, not substitutes for, a proportionately equitable commitment of resources to the management and

prevention of international conflict – and thus the containment of the WMD threat . Future American governments will not ‗police the

world‘ alone . For almost fifty years the Soviet threat compelled disproportionate military expenditures and sacrifice by the United States. That world is gone. Only b

enmeshing the capabilities of the United States and other leading powers in a co-operative security management regime where the

burdens are widely shared does the world community have any plausible hope of avoiding warfare involving nuclear or other WMD.




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – China Soft Power

Successful cooperation bolsters Chinese soft-power

Hammond 13 Andrew Hammond is Reuters Staff, ―Addressing China‘s ‗soft power deficit‘‖ 6-7-13, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/07/addressing-chinas-soft-power-deficit/, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2k

As Chinese President Xi Jinping prepares for his landmark summit with President Barack Obama in California Friday and Saturday, the critical mission of improving China‘s image in the world could well be uppermost in his mind.

The central challenge that Xi faces here is t hat China‘s soft power – its ability to win the hearts and minds of other nations and influence their governments through attraction rather than coercion or payment – haslagged far behind its purposeful hard power built on its growing economic and military might.

This ―soft power deficit‖ could prove a real headache for the new Chinese president, for there is increasing international concern, suspicion and even

outright hostility as China‘s global role expands. In the United St ates, for example, public favorability toward China fell by over one-fifth in one year recently – from

percent in 2011 to 40 percent in 2012, according to Pew Research Global Attitudes Project.

At a time of continued economic uncertainty in t he United States, issues such as China‘s alleged currency mani pulation, the mammoth size of the U.S. trade deficitwith China and the large U.S. financial debt held by China, not to mention alleged Chinese cybersecurity attacks on American businesses and government offices,

has taken its toll on U.S. public opinion.

In Japan, meanwhile, public favorability toward China fell from 34 percent to 15 percent between 2012 and 2011, according to Pew. With Japanese distrust of China growing, Tokyo is actively

strengthening its diplomatic alliances, particularly with Washington, as it seeks to balance Beijing‘s growing economic and military strength.

In this context, Xi must rightly recognize the need for better diplomacy and strategic communications to enable stronger international

understanding and appreciation of the country . His summit with Obama represents an unprecedented opportunity to begin the journe

to repair China‘s global reputation.What must China do if it is to succeed in this journey during Xi‘s presidency? In the short term, the California meeting offers a first-class opportunity to restart a process of addressing growing foreign concerns about China‘s int entions as a nascent super power. Here, Xi will need to double down on long-standing Chinese pledges of securing aharmonious, peaceful transition as China rises, and being a responsible stakeholder in the international system.

This will not be enough, however, to reassure some audiences. To this end, Xi reportedly has a far more audacious goal t o fundamentally redevelop U.S.-China ties into a new type of cooperative –

rather than antagonistic – great power relationship.

While this agenda now lacks definition, it could prove symbolically powerful for China . So a good starting point at the summit would be clearer

commitments to develop stronger, joint U.S.-China positions on key issues, especially in Asia – particularly a peaceful resolution of t he North Korea nuclear standoff.

Beyond this summit, there is a huge forward agenda for China to tackle that will requ ire commitment to meaningful reform during Xi‘s pr esidency. If this happens, China will be able to potentially

secure significantly more dividends from the sizable sums of money it already spends on foreign charm offensives.Perhaps the most difficult issue to be addressed in the Rancho Mirage, California, meeting is the sometimes yawning gap between China‘s attractive culture and traditions and modern achievements such as its scientific progress (admired by many foreigners and a significansource of soft power), and the Communist regime‘s domestic actions. One case in point was the stunning staging of the Olympics in 2008. The elaborate opening ceremonies celebrated both traditional and modern Chinese culture and society, while underlining Beijing‘sclinical efficiency to stage m ajor events – though foreigners can sometimes interpret this ominously.Successful as those Olympics were, Beijing squandered much of the soft power dividends generated when it clamped down on the uprising and protests in Tibet and Xinjiang respectively. This counterproductive pattern of behaviour is by no means isolated. Beijing needs trecognize this to avoid what looks like a t endency to shoot itself in the foot going forward.This requires commitment to political change, transparency and concrete steps towards democratization – and matching these words to deeds. Much of th e international community is unlikely to welcome China as a peaceful, responsible world power if Beijing regularly cladown on Chinese citizens seeking domestic reform, including political dissidents, lawyers, human ri ghts activists and journalists.A second issue to address is that, traditionally, there has been too little emphasis from China on public diplomacy efforts t o reach out directly to foreign publics. Instead, Beijing has often placed emphasis, especially in Africa and the Middle East, on improving workingrelationships with strategically important governments through assistance programs that may not always serve the interest of local people.

This is now changing. China has rapidly developed public diplomacy skills and policies. But more change is urgently needed if hearts

and minds are to be won across the world.




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – Asian Stability

Cooperation solves Asian stability

Schiffer 11 Michael Deputy is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia. ―Building Cooperation in the US– China Military-to-Military Relationship‖ January 6th http://www.iiss.org/about-us/offices/washington/iiss-us-events/iiss-us-address-building-cooperation-in-the-us-china-military-to-military-relationship/

PresidentObama has expressed a desire to build a bilateral relationship that is positive in tone, cooperative in nature, and comprehensive in its scope. As President Obama has said, ―Our ability

partner is a pre-requisite for progress on many of the most pressing global challenges.‖ From climate change to non-proliferation, it is

easy to imagine the issues that a comprehensive US-China partnership can help to tackle -- and likewise the problems that threaten to festeif such a mutually beneficial relationship fails to take root. The Obama Administration‘s policy toward China rests on three pillars: First, a sustained effort to strengthen and expand bilateral cooperation between the United States and

China through such mechanisms as the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (the S&ED). We have been supportive of greater Chinese participation in multilateral institutions and have welcomed a greater Chinese role in the IMF and World Bank. We also have oft

worked well with China on the U.N. Security Council, and over the past couple of years on r eviving the global economy. Second, there a region-wide commitment to strengthen relations with our alliesand partners, particularly within a functional problem-solving regional architecture, and placing our China policy within our broader

Asia policy. Along with our allies and partners we see greater cooperation in the region – as it undergoes unprecedented change, and particularly as China emerges – as

critical for the stability of the region and indeed the globe. Third is a fir m insistence that a rising China abide by – and help to uphold – the global norms and international rules that h ave enabled its own rise

greater prosperity and increased national power. We believe that China has an interest in a stable and prosperous Asia-Pacific region, firmly rooted in theestablished norms and rules of the international system. And while of course only China can or will determine its own future, the

United States and others in the region must continue to work with China and encourage it to play a more constructive role withi

the region and globally. A strong U.S-China bilateral relationship, and a strong relationship between China and its neighbors, all workinin concert with a China that observes international norms, that plays by common rules of the road, and that exercises its new-foundnational power responsibly, can be a significant force in tackling shared challenges. So, while we may still have some distance to go before we achieve deep and genuine ―strategic

understanding‖ between our two nations, there are opportunities to build and improve on areas of bilateral cooperation. So, for examp le: China increasing its involvement in humanitarian and disaster relief efforts and deploying more peacekeepers to UN missions is a positindicator of the sort of China that we hope to see emerge in the years ahead; China has demonstrated its willingness to join and deploy naval vessels to the Gulf of Aden and to work in concert with the international community to combat piracy; Ch ina is an active participanthe emerging Asia-Pacific regional architecture; and China has shown its willingness to work through multilateral institutions and international organizations, such as the United Nations, to address the proliferation threats emanating from both Iran and North Korea.

Goes nuclear

Landay 2K Jonathan S. Landay (staff) March 10, 2000 ―Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts:

Knight Ridder Washington Bureau, l/n

WASHINGTON _ The 3,700-mile arc that begins at the heavily fortified border between North and South Korea and ends on the glacier where Indian and P akistani troops skirmish almost every day has earned the dubious tit le

most dangerous part of the world. Few if any experts think China and Ta iwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakist an are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of

them could destabilize Asia , jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war . India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear

weapons , and North Korea may have a few , too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that

helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships s

fragile ," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution , a Washington think tank . "We see the convergence

of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place . There are element

for potential disaster." In an effort to cool the region's tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Secur ity Adviser Samuel R. Berger all wil l hopscotch Asia's capitals this

month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved

against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the globa

taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime . In addition, globalization has made a stab

Asia _ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources _ indispensable t o the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, accordto the Commerce Department.

http://www.iiss.org/about-us/offices/washington/iiss-us-events/iiss-us-address-building-cooperation-in-the-us-china-military-to-military-relationship/








2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Impacts – Relations – Proliferation

China cooperation stops proliferation, especially in North Korea and Iran

Schiffer 11 Michael Deputy is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia. ―Building Cooperation in the US– China Military-to-Military Relationship‖ January 6th http://www.iiss.org/about-us/offices/washington/iiss-us-events/iiss-us-address-building-cooperation-in-the-us-china-military-to-military-relationship/

President Obama has expressed a desire to build a bilateral relationship that is positive in tone, cooperative in nature, and comprehensive in its scope. As President Obama has said,

―Our ability to partner is a pre-requisite for progress on many of the most pressing global challenges.‖ From climate change to non-

proliferation, it is easy to imagine the issues that a comprehensive US-China partnership can help to tackle -- and likewise the problemsthat threaten to fester if such a mutually beneficial relationship fails to take root. The Obama Administration‘s policy toward China rests on three pillars: First, a sustained effort to

strengthen and expand bilateral cooperation between the United States and China through such mechanisms as the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (the S&ED). We have been supportive of greater Chinese participation in multilateral institutions and have welcomed a greater Chinese role in the IMF and World Bank. We also have often worked well with China on the U.N. Security Council, and over the past couple of years onreviving the global economy. Second, there a region-wide commitment to strengthen relations with our allies and partners, particularly within a functional problem-solving regional architecture, and placing our China policy withour broader Asia policy. Along with our allies and partners we see greater cooperation in t he region – as it undergoes unprecedented change, and particularly as China emerges – as critical for the stability of the region and indeethe globe. Third is a firm ins istence that a rising China abide by – and help to uphold – the global norms and international rules that have enabled its own rise to greater prosperity and increased national power. We believe thatChina has an interest in a st able and prosperous Asia-Pacific region, firmly rooted in the established norms and rules of t he international system. And while of course only China can or will determine its own future, t he United

States and others in the region must continue to work with China and encourage it to play a more constructive role within the region and globally. A strong U.S-China bilateral relationship, and astrong relationship between China and its neighbors, all working in concert with a China that observes international norms, that plays bycommon rules of the road, and that exercises its new-found national power responsibly, can be a significant force in tackling sharedchallenges. So, while we may still have some distance to go before we achieve deep and genuine ―strategic understanding‖ between our two nations, there are o pportunities to build and improve on areas of bilateral

cooperation. So, for example: China increasing its involvement in humanitarian and disaster relief efforts and deploying more peacekeepers to UN missions is a positive indicator of t he sort of China that we hope to see emerge i

the years ahead; China has demonstrated its willingness to join and deploy naval vessels to the Gulf of Aden and to work in concert with the international community to combat piracy; China is an active participant in the emergiAsia-Pacific regional architecture; and China has shown its willingness to work through multilateral institutions and international organizations,

such as the United Nations, to address the proliferation threats emanating from both Iran and North Korea.

Proliferation guarantees massive nuclear escalation and war- deterrence fails

Utgoff 2002[Victor, Institute for Defense Analyses Deputy Director, ―Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions,‖ Survival, vol. 44, p85-102]jap

Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequenopportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is actually zero.

be sure, some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear to think that in any confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear capabilities, the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero.3 These theorists thinkthat such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear war that they would always avoid or t erminate confrontations between them, short of even convent ional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have differ

cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes instances in which states known to

possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles along their common border even af both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had

them. Again, history provides counter-examples. Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 even though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded tFalkland Islands and fought Britain‘s efforts to take them back, even though Britain had nuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nucl

capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose su icide for his nation. But history provides unhappyexamples of states whose leaders were ready to choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a ‗victory destruction‘ policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat .4 And Japan‘s war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing

suggested ‗Would it not be wondrous for the whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?‘5 If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear-armed nations, use onuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human na

suggests that the threat of retaliat ion with nuclear weapons is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use o f these weapons. While nat ional leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experienced peoeven their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points of view. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defyassessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in inte nse and fast-moving crises between nuclear-armed states.6 Inst ead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishfulthinking. They can misinterpret the words or actions of opposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that t hey think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is an inferior decision because the groupurgently needs the confidence or the sharing o f responsibility that results from settling on something. Moreover, leaders may not recognise clearly where their personal or party interests diverge from those of t heir citizens. Undegreat stress, human beings can lose t heir ability to think carefully. They can refuse to believe that the wors t could really happen, oversimplify the problem at hand, think in ter ms of simplistic analogies and play hunches. The

intuitive rules for how individuals should respond to insults or signs of weakness in an opponent may too readily suggest a rash course of action. Anger, fear, greed, ambition and pride can all lead to bad decisions.

Thedesire for a decisive solution to the problem at hand may lead to an unnecessarily extreme course of action. We can almost hear the kinds of words that cou

flow from discussions in nuclear crises or war. ‗These people are not willing to die for this interest‘. ‗No sane person would actually use such weapons‘. ‗Perhaps the opponent will back down if weshow him we mean business by demonstrating a willingness to use nuclear weapons‘. ‗If I don‘t hit t hem back really hard, I am going to be driven from office, if not killed

Whether right or wrong, in the st ressful atmosphere of a nuclear crisis or war, such words from others, or silently from with in, might resonate too readily with a harried leader. Thus, both history and humannature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But t he threat of nuclear war is not just a matter

few weapons being used. It could get much worse. Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclear weapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leadershipswould rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further degrade their decision-making. The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender couargue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in t he circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors o f the carnage already suffered may be seen a

justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.7 Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In the Second W

War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemicaweapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other‘s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in








2013 China DA

few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on theother. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants beforehand.8

Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread

proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial

probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror t he

American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nat ions wearing nuclear ‗six-shooters‘ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite p lace than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations

Nuclear Iran causes an arms race that goes nuclearKroenig 12 Matthew Kroenig, Jan/Feb 2012, Kroenig is an assistant professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanto Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, From July 2010 to July 2011, he was a Special Adviser in the Office of theU.S. Secretary of Defense, responsible for defense strategy and policy on Iran, ―Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike Is the Least BadOption,‖ Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/13405

Some states in the region are doubting U.S. resolve to stop the program and are shifting their allegiances to Tehran. Others have begu

to discuss launching their own nuclear initiatives to counter a possible Iranian bomb. For those nations and the United States itself, the threat will only

continue to grow as Tehran moves closer to its goal. A nuclear-armed Iran would immediately limit U.S. freedom of action in the

Middle East. With atomic power behind it, Iran could threaten any U.S. political or military initiative in the Middle East with nuclear war , forcing

Washington to think twice before acting in the region. Iran‘s regional rivals, such as Saudi Arabia, would likely decide to acquire their own nuclear arsenals, sparking

an arms race . To constrain its geopolitical rivals, Iran could choose to spur proliferation by transferring nuclear technology to its allies -- other

countries and terrorist groups alike. Having the bomb would give Iran greater cover for conventional aggression and coercive

diplomacy , and the battles between its terrorist proxies and Israel, for example, could escalate. And Iran and Israel lack nearly all the

safeguards that helped the United States and the Soviet Union avoid a nuclear exchange during the Cold War -- secure second-strike capabilities, clea

lines of communication, long flight t imes for ballistic missiles from one country t o the other, and experience managing nuclear arsenals. To be sure, a nuclear-armed Iran would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. Bu

the volatile nuclear balance between Iran and Israel could easily spiral out of control as a crisis unfolds, resulting in a nuclear

exchange between the two countries that could draw the United States in, as well.

North Korean nuclearization triggers multiple scenarios for nuclear war – first strikes, proliferation, and

loose nukes.

Baltutis 9 Aaryn, writer for the San Antonio Examiner, ―North Korea's Infinitesimal Threat‖ 7-22-09, http://www.examiner.com/x-

16803-San-Antonio-Political-Buzz-Examiner~y2009m7d22-North-Koreas-Infinitesimal-Threat]

Despite U.S. State Department claims to the contrary, there is no bigger threat to the security of the United States in this day and age than North Korea. Compared to the "grave and imminent"threat that was sold to us in 2003 to justify the invasion of Iraq, I would put North Korea as a 10 out of 10 in terms of clear and present danger to America. In 2003, Saddam Hussein's Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, no ties to terrorism and a joke of a military. T

only justifiable reason that has survived Bush-era war propaganda is Iraq's U.N. mandate violations. Despite that reality, not only does North Korea continue to spit in the face of the same U.N. resolutions, there is absolutely no doubt thatthey have manufactured WMD's and are actively trying to weaponize these systems and even proliferate them to countries like Myanmar on a daily basis. Missiletest after missile test meant for deliberate antagonizing, including some that have flown over Japanese airspace and possibly have the range to reach Hawaii, have demonstrated real-lifedata of the threat, and not questionable "slam dunk" intelligence assumptions. Not that a missile would have to go as far as Hawaii to affect American lives. There are tens of thousands of American troops still stationed in Korea, Japan and Southeast Asia

well as the millions innocent civilians of t hose nations. Kim Jong Il's health is failing , his people are starving, and there is no clear route of succession. He may feel he hasnothing to lose in one all-out glorious attack on American interests before he passes away. China, North Korea's steadily cold an distant ally, might support the United States after a N

Korean attack, but conversely they would also resist direct intervention north of the DMZ. A violent struggle might ensure if Kim Jong Il passes away suddenly or a coup removes him first. All kinds o

variables and uncertainties make this one of the most volatile regions in the world. I can't think of a single other situation anywhere in the world right now more precarious.




2013 China DA

*** Aff Answers ***




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Aff Answers – Relations Low

Recent summit was meaningless---relations is still low

White 6-11 Hugh White is professor of strategic studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU. ―Road to good relations along and hard one,‖ June 11, 2013, L/N, Accessed Date: 6-13-13 y2k

That Xi and Obama are talking is a good start. Whether they can agree is another question. An important opportunity was lost at last weekend's Sunnylands Summit to build a durable, peaceful relationship between America and China. Presidents Obama

and Xi agreed on the urgent need to avoid rivalry and discord, but revealed diametrically opposed ideas of how that can be done, and hours of

talk did nothing to bring them closer.

This was the first time leaders of America and China have had such long and informal conversations, and the fact they have do ne so - and plan to do it again - is welcome. But meetings alone achieve nothingand the differences of approach between Obama and Xi were starkly clear over the weekend.

While both spoke of their hopes for good relations, Barack Obama focused on specific concerns on which America wants China to act - human rights, North Korea, cyber securityand trade. He thinks better US-China relations are best built one matter at a t ime, essentially by China doing what America wants.

Xi Jinping took exactly the opposite approach. Rather than focus on specific questions, he spoke of the US-China relationship as a whole. He repeatedly spoke of his hopes

build "a new model" of power relations between the two countries."China and the United States must find a new path", he said. "One that is different from the in evitable confrontation and conflict between the major countries of the past. And that is to say the two sides must work together to build a new model of major country relationship

For Xi, then, tensions between Washington and Beijing will not be fixed simply by addressing specific topics one by one.

It requires a fundamental change in the underlying structure of the relationship. It was t herefore Xi rather than Obama who drew the obvious but ambitious parallel between their meeting and Nixon's

historic journey to Beijing to meet Mao in 1972, which really did create a new model of US-China relations.Xi drew the parallel because he hopes he and Obama can redefine the foundations of the US-China relationship as radically as did Nixon and Mao 40 years ago. He wants to replace the Nixon-Mao model because it requires China to accept American strategic primacy in A

That does not fit what Xi calls the "Chinese Dream" of regaining its traditional position of leadership in the region.

Unfortunately, Xi has not explained what he'd like to replace the old Nixon-Mao model with. He wants America to concede much more power and influence to China, but it inot clear how much, or on what terms. Xi said during the weekend that the Pacific was big enough for both of them, but this tells us little about how much influence he is willing for America to mainta

on China's side of that wide ocean.Obama didn't mention Nixon and Mao precisely because he does not want to emulate their achievement by fundamentally changing the basis of the US-China relationship. He wants things t o stay as they are, with America in charge.

What's worrying is that this difference in approach reflects the fundamental incompatibility of their underlying objectives towards one

another and their roles in Asia. America wants to retain strategic leadership in Asia, and China wants to displace it.

Both are sincere about wanting peace and stability but have radically different views of what that will look like and how to get there.Meanwhile, new barriers to co-operation keep appearing. The latest is America's preoccupation with what US national security adviser Tom Donilon called "cyber-enabled economic theft - theft of intellectual property and other kinds of property in the public and private rein the United States by entities based in China."He told reporters after the summit that this was now such an important topic to the US that it threatened the entire relationship. It was, he said, "now really at the centre of the relationship", and "inconsistent with the kind of relationship that we want to build with China"."If it's not addressed, if it continues to be this direct theft of United States property, this was going to be a very difficult problem in the economic relationship and was going to be an inhibitor to the relationship really reaching its full potential."These strong words suggest the US has adopted a rather remarkable policy. It is willing to threaten the whole future US-China relationship over concerns about this category of cyber crime of which Donilon was not willing to provide concrete examples. No doubt such crimes are real, and genuinely significant, but are they more important to America than a good long-term relationship with China? Hardly. And it seems Xi did nothing more than note Obama's concerns. So if, as seems likely, Beijing does nothing to stop thecyber crimes, what exactly will Obama do? My bet i s nothing. He has set yet another r ed line he cannot enforce, and looked shrill and weak t o the Chinese as a result.

So there is not much good news out of Sunnylands. A bold and confident new Chinese leader and his charming and intelligent

counterpart can meet and talk for many hours in a relaxed and beautiful setting and still find new things to disagree about, and reach noconsensus about how to keep the world's most important relationship off the rocks.

Symbolic gestures are irrelevant---resolving substantive disagreements are key — relations low

LaFranchi 6-7 Howard LaFranchi is CSM Staff, ―US-China summit gamble: Can relaxed format boost rapport over rivalry?; L/N,Accessed Date: 6-13-13 y2k

Skeptics of the importance of personal rapport between world leaders are dubious that the southern California summit this weekend between President Obama and

China's new president, Xi Jinping, will amount to much.

Even though the two leaders are expected to discuss everything from military and corporate cybersecurity to North Korea, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and US-China trad

the summit's emphasis on building their personal relationship leaves doubters unimpressed.

"If we actually saw a substantial agreement on countering cyberthreats ... or saw the Chinese throttle back on territorial claims, that wou be significant," says Dean Cheng, a research fellow in Chinese political and security affairs at t he Heritage Foundation in Washington.

But Mr. Cheng, who insists that " tone" and whether or not two leaders get along matter little in defending national interests , says he anticipates little of

substance from the summit at the Sunnylands estate in Rancho Mirage, Calif.

"If, as we expect, it's a photo opportunity, and an opportunity to share salsa and chips, it [will have been] an opportunity to

exchange pleasantries, and that's about it," he says.But the Friday and Saturday summit, which is set to include at least six hours of conversation between Mr. Obama and Mr. Xi, is built on the premise that the dynamics between leaders do matter - especially in such a critical and rapidly evolving relationship as that betweethe United States and a rising China.




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Aff Answers – Alt Cause

Alt causes to relations---cyber-security

Walker 6-10 Tim Walker is staff reporter @ the Independent, ―US: China talks were good - but stop hacking our computers,‖ 6-10-1L/N, Accessed Date: 6-13-13 y2k

A weekend summit between the US President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping has concluded in California, with one US official describing the talks as "unique, positive andconstructive".

Tom Donilon, the US National Security Adviser, said the leaders had broadly agreed on topics including the denuclearisation o f North Korea, and tackling climate change. The matter of cyber security,

however, remained a stumbling block for US-China relations.

The two-day "shirtsleeves" summit at the Sunnylands private estate in Rancho Mirage near Palm Springs was billed as an opportunity for the leaders of the world's two largest economies to build a personal rapport. It is the first time the men have met since Mr Xi took officMarch.As they strolled together in the 200-acre grounds in sweltering heat on Saturday, Mr Obama told reporters they had made "terrific" progress in their talks.Observers noted that, unlike his reserved predecessor Hu Jintao, Mr Xi seemed at ease with the enforced informality of the event, at which neither leader nor their staff wore ties.The Chinese were keen to portray the summit as a meeting of equals. For both sides, it was an opportunity to ease tensions as each expands its military and economic engagement in the Pacific.At a press conference following the talks, Mr Donilon said the thorniest issue at hand was cyber security. In r ecent months China has been accused of digital thefts from a series of US businesses and government agencies.

In one instance Chinese hackers are thought to have accessed the confidential designs for more than two dozen US weapons systems.

On Saturday morning Mr Obama reportedly pressed his guest to rein in his country's cyber espionage activities. According to Mr Donilon, the US President told Mr Xi

that the alleged hacking was "inconsistent with the kind of relationship we want to have with China ". If it continued, he said, it would be "a ver

difficult problem in the economic relationship".

The Chinese, however, said they too were victims of hacking. Last week The Guardian published det ails of a presidential directive in which Mr Obama allegedly ordered US intelligence offici

to make a list of pot ential foreign targets for US cyber attacks.




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Aff Answers – Relations Fails

Relations fail---ideological differences trump cooperation

Roy 13 Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu. His book Return of the Dragon: Rising China and RegionSecurity was published this month by Columbia University Press. ―U.S.-China Relations: Stop Striving For ―Trust‖ June 07, 2013,https://thediplomat.com/2013/06/07/u-s-china-relations-stop-striving-for-trust/2/, Accessed Date: 6-12-13 y2k

Great-power rivalry is still with us , now in the form of a confident, assertive China rising in a region long dominated by a United States that some observers believe is declining. Although China is

different from the Soviet Union in important ways, the issue of peace versus conflict between the two big powers is again the central strategic concern of our t ime. And again, both governments speak of afundamental need for ―strategic trust‖ in U.S.-China relations.For about a decade, top U.S. officials and military leaders have repeated an argument that can be summarized this way: China‘s rapid milit ary modernization and buildup cause Americans and others in the Asia -Pacific region to have suspicions about China‘s intentions.Outsiders see no need for China to bulk up so heavily to protect itself, so they wonder if the Chinese are planning wars of aggression or other challenges to the status quo. Consequently, more tr ansparency in U.S.-China relations is needed to allay these suspicions. Increasecommunication and getting to know each other better will create ―trust,‖ and trust will lead to peace. In a 2011 rendition of this argument in the New York Times, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen used the phrase ―blind suspicions‖ to describe the bilateral relationship, succinctly making the point that familiarity and suspicion are inverselyrelated. ―Bluntness and honesty are exactly what‘s needed to create strategic trust,‖ he added. Hence the emphasis on China clarifying its intentions, asking the Chinese to reveal more in their defense White Papers, deepening U.S.-China military-to-military contact, and so

The argument that trust leads to peace is built on the premise that the suspicions between China and the U.S. are unfounded and would

evaporate with more and deeper dialogue. Unfortunately , however, at least some of these suspicions are all too warranted . China and the U.S.

have irreconcilable differences over several fundamental strategic questions. One is whether modern international law should govern regional affairs, as opposed to a return to

―historical‖ arrangement of a Chinese sphere of influence.Another is whether China can legitimately make expansive sovereignty claims (the South China Sea, Taiwan, the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea, Arunachal Pradesh, etc.) that impinge on the vital interests of neighboring peoples. Another is the future strategic roles of Japand South Korea. Diplomatic niceties aside, most serious observers can see that as each other‘s two most dangerous potential adversaries, the U.S. and the PRC are preparing to go to war with each other if necessary. These are not misunderstandings that would be cleared uthe right group of Chinese and Americans had drinks together.

The problem is not that each country erroneously perceives the other as warlike. Both want peace, but on their own terms. Some of what China calls ―defensive‖ looks t

others like aggression. What America terms ―stability‖ is ―containment‖ to China. Indeed, more ―bluntness and honesty‖ might bring out additional attitudes that are not often discussed publicly and that would driveAmericans and Chinese further apart, such as the Americans hoping for t he demise of the Chinese Communist Party or the Chinese suggest ing that all U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific should reloc

to areas no further west than the Hawaiian Islands. More transparency would not dispel mutual suspicions, it would confirm them.

Relations is still unstable---major roadblocks remain

Gill 13 Professor Bates Gill is chief executive of the US Studies Centre at The University of Sydney, ―Obama, Xi unplugged,‖ June 8,2013, L/N, Accessed Date: 6-13-13 y2k

Obama, Xi unplugged Any promise in these impromptu sessions will depend on the personal chemistry, writes BATES GILL T he meeting this weekend in California between US President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, marks many ‗‗first s‘‘ andholds much promise.It will be the first time the two have met as presidents. (They met last year in Washington when Xi was China‘s vice-president and it was widely assumed he would soon take the mantle of power.)

It is also rare for a Chinese president to make a trip to the United States this early in his term – less than three months since he was installed as the country‘s head of st a

And one would need to go back to the Nixon-Mao meetings of the early 1970s to recall a time that the leaders of the two countries met in relatively unscripted sessions

discuss the US-China strategic relationship and its future. No doubt these are positives. It is essential that these two leaders hold open-ended and wide- ranging discussions. It is also critical that they do so this early in Xi‘s tenure, in a ‗‗no neck -tie‘‘ format and without th e many constraints an official state visit would impose.

But at the same time, the unusual and promising nature of the talks in no way lessens the challenges the two men face to put the US-Chinarelationship on a sturdier footing for the future.

Indeed, given the hype and expectation this meeting has generated in the US, in China and e lsewhere, the pressures are even greater to show that some significant outcomes or‗‗deliverables‘‘ emerge from this important meeting. But for several reasons, we should temper our expectations.

To begin, the most important items for discussion simply do not lend themselves to basic policy adjustments and deliverables. The biggest question to discuss will be how to improve

strategic trust between the two countries.

Put more simply, the two presidents will need to convey credible and reassuring messages to one another – both in tone and substance – o

how the two countries can co-exist and mutually benefit, especially as their interests increasingly intersect in the Asia-Pacific region.

If that were not difficult enough, the two men have a lengthy catalogue of specific concerns to discuss, conversations which may – or manot – contribute to building strategic trust.Finding common ground on such issues as improving economic growth both at home and abroad, mitigating climate change, and combating piracy may be the easy part.

More difficult will be joint solutions emerging from whatdiplomats call ‗‗frank conversations‘‘. President Xi will raise tough questions onAmerican military activities and long-term intentions around China‘s periphery and whether the US can agree to ‗‗a new model of great

power relations‘‘ (read: treat China as an equal).Conversely, President Obama will want to hear his counterpart explain what China will do with its growing power.

Will China resolve its territorial disputes peacefully? Can it abide a continuing strong American role in the region? When will China reinin its cyberhackers? Other tough talk on both sides will have to resolve differences over North Korea, Syria, Iran, and much more.But even if the two leaders genuinely seek and unexpectedly find common ground on some of these issues, challenges of a differe

sort still lie ahead for both of them: translating goodwill to action in the face of significant domestic antagonism. While it seems

that Xi has consolidated his power comparatively quickly, he is still new to the job.Conservative and nationalist elements in the Chinese body politic in particular will be watching to see if their leader stands up to the American President. Xi wil l need to strike a delicate balance: asserting Chinese interests and concerns and not seeming to be tooaccommodating, while at the same time not alienating his counterpart with a lack of compromise.President Obama‘s task is no easier, but for different reasons.

Given his domestic situation – serious economic and fiscal challenges and a well-entrenched opposition – he will be hard- pressed toconvince Americans of the need to become a closer partner with the Chinese for long- term gain.While the ‗‗moderate middle‘‘ of the foreign policy elite would agree with this approach, look instead for critics on the lef t and right to strongly question the value of the meeting, particularly as there is unlikely to be any immediate and tangible ‗‗win‘‘ coming out of thesediscussions.

https://thediplomat.com/2013/06/07/u-s-china-relations-stop-striving-for-trust/2/

https://thediplomat.com/2013/06/07/u-s-china-relations-stop-striving-for-trust/2/




2013 China DA

China Disadvantage – Aff Answers – Not Zero-Sum

Competition for influence in Latin America is not zero-sum---means no collapse of relations

Cerna 11 Michael Cerna is a graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State University, ―China's GrowingPresence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region,‖ April 15, 2011, China Research Center, Vol. 10,http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/, Access

Date: 6-12-13 y2k

With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different sectors, there is seemingly room for each side to grow ; which implies that, in fa

trade with Latin America is not a zero-sum game . China presents an alternative to the United States, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. Th

U.S. is much more diversified than China at the moment and therefore does not need to enter into direct competition . However, as China responds to calls from Brazil and

diversifies its investments, there is increasing worry that China is going t o outmatch U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful political consequences – primarily, providinLatin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democraticalternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem.The third BRICS summit in April provided more insight into the potential consequences of China‘s growing place in Latin America via its relations with Brazil. One proposal to emerge from the summit of the five nations (Brazil, India, China, Russia and South Africa) wa broad-based international reserve currency system providing stability and certainty. The idea was to set up a new exchange rate mechanism that would bypass the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency of the world. In addition, banks of the five BRICS nations agreed to establmutual credit lines in their local currencies, not in U.S. currency. While the chances of such a proposal gaining support are debatable, it sets a clear example of a possible shift in power away from the U.S. and toward a more global organization, one that is arguably anchoreChina. If China becomes a preferred partner in Latin America, it will show that U.S. dominance around the globe also is at risk.

So what does China‘s growing place in the region mean for the future? Depending on whom this question is posed to, there are two probabanswers. The first is that China‘s intensifying relations with Latin America offer a clear sign of the end of U.S. dominance in the region, and in a greater sense, the

entire world. There is enough evidence to show that the tides have changed in favor of China. The other answer is that it means nothing. The U.S. is obviously still the more

dominant power in the region, and Chinese presence will eventually subside, again leaving the United States as the region‘s premier partner. The real answer probably falls somewhere

in the middle .

Is China the preferred partner for Latin America? At this point, the definitive answer is no. However, the United States should not take its place in the r egion for granted. There is clear evidence of an increasingly symbiotic relationship with China throughout Latin AmericaWhile the U.S. is the most dominant trade partner to the region as a whole, it is losing ground in key countries, namely Brazil, which is blossoming on the world stage and is emerging as the clear leader in the region. Increasing trade and investment can be beneficial for all,the power that China can derive from its growing economic influence could bring increased political and ideological influence that the U.S. might find unnerving. China already has replaced the U.S. as the largest trading partner for Brazil and Chile, and is on pace to do thesame in Peru and Venezuela. At the very least, this should cause the U.S. to pay more attention t o its southern neighbors and take steps to make sure that China only benefits economically and not politically at the expense of the U.S. The world will be watching.

As it stands, the Chinese are not broadening their relations with the region in a way that directly competes with the United States. China is strictly

concerned with commodities, including oil. U.S. President Barack Obama recently signed an agreement with Brazil‘s Petrobras that will allow the oil company to drill in the Gulf of Mexico. This

symbolic move could cause tensions to increase as the world‘s two largest oil consumers battle over rights to Brazilian oil. In that regard, the competition may go beyond a race to Latin commodities and move into the realm offighting for political influence. It is odd to think that the United States would need to compete for hemispheric dominance with a country on the other side of the globe, but China‘s actions and increasing integration into the regiotell us that such a scenario may one day arise. Given the proximity and importance of Latin America to the United States, t his region could be the symbolic battle that best measures the continued hegemony of the U.S. versusChina.

China is seeking peaceful influence---zero-sum relationship is false

GT 13 Global Times, ―China, US not competing over Latin America: expert,‖ 2013-5-31,http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.UboPxfmTiSo, Accessed Date: 6-13-13 y2k

Chinese President Xi Jinping heads to Latin America and the Caribbean on Friday, in a state visit aiming at promoting China's cooperation with the region.Xi's visit to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico follows his first foreign trip to Russia and three countries in Africa, Tanzania, South Africa and Republic of Congo, shortly after t aki

office in March.

While Xi kicks off his v isit, US Vice President Joe Biden is concluding his Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some media reports described "dueling visits" by Chinese and U

leaders, and said that the "competition between the world's two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display."

Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other . Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in La

America by giving play to the ir respective advantages."

Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is acoincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US

influence in the area.

"It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of influence in a certain area. China and the US'

involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game," Tao said, explaining that it is a good thing for Latin America.

Chinese and US leaders visit Latin America out of th eir respective strategic needs, Tao said. All countries need to interact and cooperate with other countries, and visits of such high-level are usually arranged long time before they start s, Tao said.China has embarked on a diplomatic drive since completing its once-in-a-decade leadership transition with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang also visiting India, Pakistan, Switzerland and Germany, and several high-level visitors to Beijing. After visiting Mexico, Xi travels to thUS for his first summit with President Barack Obama on June 7 to 8 in California.

http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.UboPxfmTiSo

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.UboPxfmTiSo

http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/




2013 China DA

*** China Co-op Counterplan ***




2013 China DA

Solvency Advocate/TextTEXT: The United States Federal Government should propose a strategic forum for cooperation on

______________ [plan mandate] to the Republic of China under the Joint Commission on Commerce and

Trade and implement the result of the commission.

CP is key to joint US-Chinese ventures---housing discussions under JCCT improves US-Chinese dialogue in

the context of economic engagement.

Scissors 11 Derek Scissors, Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Asia Economic Policy in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundatio

―Tools to Build the U.S.– China Economic Relationship,‖ August 8, 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/tools-to- build-the-us-china-economic-relationship, Accessed Date: 6-5-13 y2k

Institutional economic arrangements can be loosely described as multilateral, bi lateral, and ―unilateral.‖ The last refers to actions that pertain to the relationship but are taken solely by the U.S., such as the publishing ofcongressionally mandated reports by cabinet departments. There are annual and special repo rts from congressionally established commissions th at exclusively consider China. There is also serial reporting from theexecutive branch. Prominent here are the Department of the Treasury‘s biannual assessments of currency policy and the United States Trade Representative‘s annual trade estimates and intellectual property reports.[4]

Bilateral arrangements include both regular dialogues and scheduled meetings between principals. Almost t he entire set might be labeled as under t he umbrella of the Strategic and

Economic Dialogue (S&ED). Indeed, this was part of t he original justification for the then-St rategic Economic Dialogue (SED): to improve economic diplomacy between America and China by unifying increasingly far-

flung components in a strategic conversation. At the creation of the SED, President George W. Bush indicated the ―need to est ablish an overarching bilateral economic framework.‖[5] This goal has not come

anywhere close to being met . The initial announcement of the SED tasked it with examining long-term strategic issues ―rather than

seeking immediate solutions to the issues of t he day.‖[6] Judging by the SED‘s and S&ED‘s development since, there appears to be a very large number of long-term strategic issues. There have been

many communiqués. There has not been progress to justify the value of the overarching framework as initially envisioned. The result, whenthe Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) and other arrangements are included , is an incoherent proliferation of

groups and discussions. These appear to have no logical relationship whatsoever — some topics can easily fit in three or more forums, and there is no functional relationship between any of t he dialogues

and working groups. Economic Relationship Rests on Two Very Different Pillars[8] Established in 1983, the JCCT has since expanded in response to the developing

bilateral relationship. The JCCT meets annually to discuss trade and investment, business development, industrial cooperation,commercial law, and export controls . The American side is now represented by t he Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative; the Chinese side, by a vice premier. The SED was

established in 2006 and became the S&ED in 2009. The economic track addresses broader issues than t ypically discussed in the JCCT, with emphasis on finance and energy. The U. S. Treasury Secretary leads theAmerican side and a vice premier leads the Chinese side. The now-constant trips by cabinet officials from both sides often overlap with the formal dialogues but also may include discussion of still more issues. The visits by chiefs of state, typically every 12 to 15 months, have the unique potential to depart from and alter the existing structure — helpfully or harmfully — though they have not done either recently.[9] Finally, multilateralinstitutions, such as the Asia – Pacific Economic Community, offer two means by which the U. S. can engage the PRC. The first is t he potential effects of multilateral agreements, such as the Doha round of WTOnegotiations, a potential free trade agreement for the Asia Pacific, o r from the presidential and ministerial G-20 conclaves. In principle, such agreements cou ld powerfully shape bilateral economic relations. The second isside meetings between the U.S. and China at multilateral events.[10] These are plainly informal but are a repeated and expected occurrence, offering the opportunity t o coordinate on multilateral matters at hand and address

any acute bilateral problems. The Value of Just Talking When Sino – American economic discussions are disappointing, as they usually are, the standard defense ofthe status quo is the value in ―just continuing to talk.‖[11] While unsatisfying, t here is some merit here. There is value to decision makers at all levels, in what

are now the two largest economies, consulting on a regular and publicly disclosed basis. This is especially the case with economies and

policymaking processes as profoundly different as those of America and China — where chances are high for a simple but dangerous

misunderstanding. Better understanding each other‘s broad concerns, constraints, and priorities is good use of time bu t, if this is the goal,

the enormous U.S. economic diplomatic commitment to the PRC is wasteful. Government reports, such as on currency policy, wh ich feign as if the U.S. is trying to

accomplish meaningful things, are pointless on t his score. So is the complex framework the S&ED has become. Simple discussion at the cabinet level is all that is necessary for better understanding. The profound bilateraldifferences, however, indicate the need for progress well beyond continued t alk. If the two largest economies cannot harmonize to some extent on investment and saving, for example, the imbalances that contributed to thefinancial crisis will worsen.[12] China‘s growing g lobal share in GDP and other measures makes subst antial progress more necessary as time goes on. When dealing with the PRC, national-government-to-national-government approaches are unavoidable and may in fact be the only way to force difficult change. Among the core issues listed, t he WTO settlement process itself is hardly ideal but is not driving U. S. – China disputes.Similarly, China's holding truly massive quantities of American debt is unhealthy but has not caused the problems routinely ascribed to it.[13] The remaining issues show poor results. Protection of intellectual propertydoes not appear to have improved despite years of American efforts. Market access to the PRC can arguably be said to be deteriorating, and market access to the U.S., though extensive, remains under constant politicalthreat.[14] While energy and the environment are thought to be areas of notable bilateral cooperation, Chinese coal use and carbon emissions are now by far the world‘s largest and the rate of climb does not appear to be

slowing.[15] Economic imbalances have clearly worsened, driven to a considerable extent by worsening Chinese overinvestment.[16] Comparing the Institutions Some ways in which Americaengages the PRC have proved more effective than others. The United States Trade Representative‘s annual report on intellectual property may have proved helpful elsewhere in t he

world, but not in China. The biannual currency report is close to a farce — its content never varies in meaningful fashion and it is now published on a political schedule.[17] If a U.S. Administration does not have acoherent view of the PRC that permeates the bureaucracy, scattered reports from various agencies merely waste t ime and resources. They cannot build toward any achievemen t. The U.S. government‘s public reporting on

Sino – American economic relations is purely for domestic political purposes; it has shown no value in advancing American goals and shou ld be sharply reduced. Bilateral tools are more numerous and more

diverse in performance. On its own terms, the JCCT has been successful . It was established at a time when China was a newly reforming

economy with a small global presence, and bilateral economic problems were technical rather than strategic . The JCCT has

maintained this focus, and progress has continually been made at the level of policy implementation. It was not des igned to, and has barelyattempted to, address matters of structural adjustment, leaving these unaddressed until the SED was created. Beyond talk, the SED, and then S&ED, as a whole have failed. On st rategic issues, such as market access, therehas been negligible progress attributable t o the S&ED or even deterioration. Worse, there does not appear to be a strategy — in the form of long-term priorities and preferred means to attain objectives — for either the Bushor Obama Administrations individually, much less a consistent approach across Administrat ions. To illustrate, energy and the environment are typically presented as areas of cooperation, with multiple agreements inked atevery major meeting. These agreements, however, did nothing to mitigate profound differences between the U.S. and China seen at the Copenhagen summit, for instance.[18] Further, China has not budged from its energyuse path. A coal exporter when the SED was established, it became the world‘s second-largest coal importer just a few years later, as well as the second- largest oil importer, even while restricting some energy-relatedexports.[19] In another area of emphasis, intellectual property rights, the U.S. and China have spent a great deal of time and e ffort with very few results. Simply because the relat ionship is important does not mean that

every issue must be discussed, especially when t his universalist approach has fared so poorly. Many of the components of the S&ED should just be disbanded. At this point in the Sino – American

economic relationship, meetings between heads of governments are necessary. There is considerable value in the principals

having contact prior to a crisis such as seen in autumn 2008. Beyond that, some political theater is unavoidable. However, the high-level visits now often simply repeat the

substance of scheduled bilateral dialogues with no discernable movement toward strategic objectives. The U.S. seems to t ake twice as long to accomplish the same things, which are fairly minor to start. As with thedialogues, there is obviously no t a set of true economic prior ities for the presidential summits. Individual cabinet -level meetings may have particular goals, but also lack any strategic direction.[20] In multilateral arenas,the communication associated with the G-20 meetings immediately after the collapse of Lehman Brothers shows the value o f Sino – American economic coordination. The appearance of conflict or misunderstanding between Beijing and Washington in autumn 2008 might have triggered global panic.[21] Since then, though, the G-20 has accomplished little, even while the utter lack of progress in rebalancing threatens another crisis. Atthe International Monetary Fund, modest Sino – American cooperation has helped shift voting weights in a sensible direction, but has done little in the far more important matter of China‘s balance of payments liberalization.The WTO is perhaps the most obvious forum to make progress. WTO adjudication certainly seemed like an obvious solution t o bilateral disputes at the time of t he PRC‘s accession a decade ago. The WTO has since beenrevealed to be ponderous in dispute resolution, effectively permitting years of ―illegal‖ behavior before penalties can be im posed.[22] Sino – American communication at the WTO rounds has not only failed to speed

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/tools-to-build-the-us-china-economic-relationship







2013 China DA bilateral talks, it has failed to assist in the long-delayed and perhaps greatly diminished Doha round.[23] The WTO inhibits protectionism — a worthy feat — but, as China has risen, it now does little more. A free tradeagreement of the Asia Pacific is a superb vision but even its first step on this path, the Trans – Pacific Partnership (TPP), is years away from completion. The Way Forward The current, U.S.-driven institutional structurelooks like nothing so much as a way to portray the U.S. – China economic relationship as vital, while accomplishing little. At present, the balance of evidence suggests the PRC is not exceptionally important to the

American economy. Right now, China is one major American partner , among Canada, Japan, Britain, and Germany. There is no particular need for regional

or most sector discussions, such as for transportation, and for a strategic economic dialogue solely with the PRC. The next few presidential summits can

focus largely on security issues. Among uni lateral actions the U.S. can take, China should be de-emphasized in American government economic reports (with t he welcome effect of de-emphasizing the reports themselves).In multilateral forums, the U.S. can alleviate unwarranted fears of U.S. – China condominium by elevating discussions with other partners and de-emphasizing discussions with China. China certainly has the potential to become qualitatively different than other important American partners. Not only is it bigger in GDP, it is now global in trade on a scope second only to the U.S. Present institutions are extensive but utterly unsuitable tocreate the best conditions for progress. Superficial engagement in t he form of an explosion in bureaucracy is a very poor substitut e for identifying difficult but necessary tradeoffs. The various China reports issued by theU.S. government accomplish nothing in terms of changing Chinese behavior. Despite the encouraging name, bilateral discussions under the umbrella of the Strategic (and) Economic Dialogue never seem to have astrategic focus and, as they cont inue to proliferate, risk losing any coherence whatsoever. They have become the cover story for the failure to act on fundamental matters, that is, nothing was accomplished but the two sides

agreed to create several more working groups. In contrast, mult ilateral forums are underused. Forming coalitions to confront China in existing forums faces well-known obstacles.[24] But another tactic is available: use orcreate multilateral institutions where China cannot participate until it meets certain conditions. The obvious example at present is the TPP — a trade group that might be able t o achieve liberalization well beyond the stalledWTO process. In addition, a Western Hemisphere free trade area would indirectly force Chinese trade practices to improve, at the risk of losing market share. Such efforts have great value in themselves but, to assistAmerican economic diplomacy with respect to the PRC, they must a lso contain a China strategy. If multilateral diplomat ic work is consciously a nd persistently coordinated, t he terms, the participants, and the timing and

sequence of new initiatives will create incent ives for China to change its behavior. The U.S. therefore should: Match American objectives in economic diplomacy with the PRC with the institutional

structure created. If objectives are limited, the now-elaborate structure should be sharply curbed. Curb unilateral reporting on China, as it is e ntirely unhelpful. Treasury‘s cur rency report, for example, has degenerated into

a government relations exercise. Eliminate many bilateral dialogues, such as the S&ED‘s Anti-Corruption Working Group. Consolidate others, such as the

JCCT ‘s Business Development and Industrial Cooperation Working Group, Industries and Competitiveness Dialogue, and Industrial and Innovation Policies Dialogue. House the few discussions

most needed to manage the economic relationship , such as on intellectual property rights and investment, under the JCCT. House only dialogues that pertain

to a clear strategic goal ; for example, liberalization of the PRC‘s balance of payments, under the S&ED. When appropriate, greater priority can be attached to this goal by the Vice President leading the

American delegation and proposing that China be represented by t he Premier (typically the third-ranking Party o fficial). Coordinate with — not duplicate — the S&ED at presidential meetings, focusing t he economiccomponent tightly on a single st rategic objective. Cabinet-level meetings should be coordinated with the JCCT and feature management of the economic relat ionship. Stress relationship management when engaging China

at existing multilateral institutions (given the demonstrably limited capacities of organizations like the WTO to achieve strategic goals). Incorporate a China strategic component in

new multilateral endeavors whenever possible. For example, the TPP should emphasize curbing subs idies for state-owned enterprises. Unclutter a Vital Economic Relationship For years, senior

American officials and political representatives have talked as if t he economic relationship with China is critical, while the U.S. has had no substantive strategy. U.S. interests have been poorly served by the ever-

expanding pile of reports, dialogues, and s ide meetings. The institutional structure of Sino – American economic relations must be considerably trimmedand reshaped. The new structure will include some of the bilateral management tools which presently exist but narrowly focus

other bilateral arrangements on a few strategic objectives. Multilateral efforts can also play an important role, by indirectly pushing the PRC to change in ways the U. S. has

been directly, but unsuccessfully, advocating.

china disadvantage - gmu 2013

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